Talk:Particular

philosophy —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.225.17.82 (talk) 05:06, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

A particular thing is a unique thing, so for every property it participates or not. Now, for example consider "the property of being in present moment", and "yourself" as a particular thing, are you participate a.m. property now and 200 years ago? How we can solve this paradox? — Preceding unsigned comment added by The philosopher no. 2 (talk • contribs) 15:33, 19 April 2020 (UTC)

Redness as not Particular
Isn't it correct to say that Redness is often particular between different kinds of objects? I understand that 10 apples of the same seed (or however you'd say it) would have the same hue of redness, but wouldn't a woman's hair and a bicycle likely or near-certainly have different hues? Calling all different hues of red red might be a generalization (I'm not sure). --Mr Bucket (talk) 17:46, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

An answer to "redness" is redness as a word is particular in the mind of its user and instances of this word for the group of users are particular as its meaning in any particular time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by The philosopher no. 2 (talk • contribs) 15:33, 19 April 2020 (UTC)