Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory/Archive 2

SRH-149
For those who are a bit curious and clearly at the will of the moderators, they might wish review the document found at "www.fas.org/irp/nsa/safford.pdf" (approx. 635 kb).

This is a document widely known in the Pearl Harbor lore as SRH-149 (SRH - Special Research History), and is of interest to many for several reasons, for example, the manpower levels applied to IJN codes in 1941, ..., etc.

It is titled A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States, the author being Laurance F(rye). Safford, Captain, US Navy (Retired). This document's sub-title is Captain Safford's version of the pre-Pearl Harbor History, prepared 21-27 March 1952, (with special reference to coordination and cooperation).

Some items to note about this version of SRH-149:

(A) Title page for this document has "Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-27-2005 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended." (E.O. 12958 - Executive Order No. 12958), and

(B) Within this "Declassified and approved for release by NSA ..." document, pages 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20 remain today heavily redacted.

(C) At the bottom of page 15 is a redacted message. It is an example to note - the Japanese send the same message twice, first "en clair" and then enciphered; clearly poor procedure on the Japanese part.

So, for a document written in March 1952 (nearly 56 years ago) and partially declassified and released in October 2005 - just over two years ago - those who say ALL of the Pearl Harbor documents have long been - even decades ago - declassified and released into the public domain are incorrect. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.44 (talk) 15:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

SMS
Question about "Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of the Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers" by Philip H. Jacobsen, Crytpologia Volume 31, Number 3, July 2007, pages 223-232.

What does SMS mean? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.166.7.92 (talk) 11:10, 11 December 2007 (UTC) In the 1930s each command or ship in the Japanese Navy used a "one-up" reference system. A "one up" gave a consecutive number, 000 through 999 (and then repeated) for each successive administrative message. This reference number was called a Secret Message Serial number (SMS)ScottS (talk) 23:25, 11 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of the Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers, by Philip H. Jacobsen, Crytpologia Volume 31, Number 3, July 2007, pages 223-232.

"Abstract:

By analyzing all the available Secret Message Serial (SMS) numbers originated by the Japanese CinC 1st Air Fleet, it is clear that no messages were sent by radio during the formation of the Strike Force during its transit to Hawaii. It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began. The Strike Force maintained strict radio silence and thus there was no Allied foreknowledge of the attack through radio communications - despite revisionist claims to the contrary."

A. Jacobsen's use of SMS is incorrect - twice. In the abstract and title (i.e., Secret Message Serial, an error which ScottS repeats) above as well as his review of Stinnett's Day of Deceit at www.amazon.com.(i.e., Station Message Serial), Jacobsen is wrong there also.

SMS stands for Secret Message Series. For an explanation of SMS's see Stinnett (paperback edition, Notes section, page 333, note 16). Note who Stinnett used to vouch for the meaning of SMS.

B. Further, "... By analyzing all the available ..." begs the question of those known but not available SMSs. These identified SMSs, even today are under FOIA requests as yet to be released to the public. Stinnett's note from above addresses this by commenting on a gap of thirteen messages in the SMS series, these being sequential messages. Such a gap gives pause to Jacobsen's claim of "confirmed" on its surface and his expertise suffers. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 (talk) 12:28, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

Not that it matters, but I see nothing refuting Jacobsen's terminology. Stinnett's claims are between 606 and 620. Those dates are between Nov. 1 and Nov. 3. By looking at various other Secret Message Serial numbers in the article you can see the list of dates and numbers. ScottS (talk) 16:34, 12 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Would Homer "Charlie" Kisner, Chief Radioman of Station H at the time, brook such a variety of SMS useage? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.135.107.202 (talk) 17:51, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

Nothing from Kisner's quotes on page 333 note 16 claims otherwise. Do you have another source to site? ScottS (talk) 18:07, 12 December 2007 (UTC)


 * That Kisner actively collaborated with Stinnett in the writing of Day of Deceit as well as his US Navy experience, notably being at Station H at the time, are well known. Kisner, upon seeing the now three meanings for SMS says what?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.176.50 (talk) 12:52, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

Again can you quote a source please from page 333 or other? ScottS (talk) 16:23, 13 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Kisner, deus ex machina is prima facie and requires nothing more - as some might know. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.167.190.98 (talk) 17:54, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

No quote I see. In short yet another incorrect/unsupported claim from Jamaskin. ScottS (talk) 18:11, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

Japanese on Radio Silence
From Jacobsen's abstract above is: "It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began."

Or beginning with the sortie from Hitokappu Wan until "bombs away" and the "Thunder Fish" launch - not a peep - all frequencies at all times. So says Jacobsen. [For a narrative of this attack, see "Torpedoing Pearl Harbor" by David Aiken, Military History December 2001 issue, pages 46-53, continued on 82.]

However, Jacobsen neglects some details. Some of these are from The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans which provides another perspective - from the Japanese viewpoint.

"From skipper of I-72 on 1255 7 Dec., to Advance Force and Task Force, received on 1433 7 Dec. (Telegram) The enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage. 1255 "

N.B., Dates and times were kept by the IJN relative to Toyko local time. Also, recall the placement of the International Date Line. And, within the book cited the usage of "signal" and "wireless" and "telegram" are not consistent. The two messages above use telegram as a radio transmission. [Aiken also uses telegram.]

So, on the facts, provided from the Japanese "eyes" - Jacobsen is incorrect.

[Extant is a FOIA-released Station H Intercept Log is a 6Dec41 intercepted transmission from call sign WA HI 8 - a Kido Butai submarine.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 (talk) 13:19, 12 December 2007 (UTC) Commander Genda who helped plan the attack stated "We kept absolute Radio Silence" I'm not interested in your poor speculation. Former Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshoka who was communications officer on the flagship Akagi, said he did not recall any ship dispatching a radio message before the attack. I see nothing in the Goldstein and Dillon "Pearl Harbor Papers" that refutes Radio Silence. Furthermore The Japanese after battle report clearly states "The success of the surprise operation was attributed to the following factors: ... 4. Concealment of the plan. ... STRICT RADIO SILENCE. In order to keep strict radio silence thorough steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strictest radio silence was perfectly carried out."

ScottS (talk) 16:50, 12 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Forgetting that Station H Movement Report of 28Nov41 are you - the FOIA-released version? Or the FOIA-released Intercept Log for 6Dec41 already noted for call sign WA HI 8?  As inconvenient for some as these might be - they are facts.

WAHI8 was not a Kido Butai submarine as Wilford claimed. Most likely, it was a submarine in the southern or Philippine action or was connected with the Sixth Fleet. There were only three Kido Butai submarines, and there is no evidence that they sent any radio messages. Furthermore, Captain Kijiro in charge of the three Kido Butai submarines stated that nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters. See Jacobsen text note 8 ScottS (talk) 18:13, 12 December 2007 (UTC)


 * "WAHI8 was not a Kido Butai submarine as Wilford claimed." Makes no difference, tho the conspiracy nuts won't notice. Subs were expected to transmit, & perhaps be detected; Kido Butai didn't transmit, & these subs weren't attached. (Or is that what you meant...?) Cf the rpt protestations about scouting subs in the archive... Trekphiler (talk) 21:52, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
 * Re Japansese statements Kido Butai kept comsec, must conclude all IJN officers of the KB were in on the conspiracy. Trekphiler (talk) 07:20, 13 December 2007 (UTC)


 * From " ... Most likely, it was a submarine in the southern or Philippine action or was connected with the Sixth Fleet." -were the IJN navigators so ill-trained as to miss where they were? Did you miss Lahaina anchorage?  And did the O-type seaplanes report?


 * And, yes, all FOIA requests for the details regarding the message on the Station H Intercept Log for 6Dec41 - denied so far.

Let's consult Jacobsen for clarity:

From: Philip H. Jacobsen List Editor: "H-DIPLO [Laderman]" Editor's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Author's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Date Written: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 05:30:16 GMT Date Posted: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 12:16:25 –0500 The last paragraph of this document is: “Let me assure everyone concerned that the people that worked both on JN-25B and the traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications in late 1941 were dedicated, competent and and experienced professionals. With a much larger staff, up to date equipment and dedicated communications circuits perhaps the outcome might have been different. Any blame should be placed on those who didn't provide the resources to do so. A few dedicated men with relatively little to work with did an excellent job of sifting through two complete call sign changes within a month as well as many other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese including almost complete radio silence and still came up with the a lot of information on the massive Japanese fleet intentions and movements of November/December 1941. And they were and are not now engaged in any conspiracy or coverup.” [N.B., the “and and” appears in the original text] In particular, from the above is seen, “ ... other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese included almost complete radio silence ...”

The operative words here are “almost complete” ... Jacobsen, in his own words. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.176.50 (talk • contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007

Jacobsen clearly does not subscribe to the view that the Kido Butai (Akagi) broke radio silence, I would suggest reading more current works to clarify. Further support comes from my own conversations with him. I would also suggest that you talk to, or read Wilford and Villa. ScottS (talk) 16:28, 13 December 2007 (UTC) You'll need to clarify your other gibberish.ScottS (talk) 17:06, 13 December 2007 (UTC)


 * So were Jacobsen's words then revised? Does make him a revisionist?


 * On Wilford - got page 154 of Dr. Wilford's MA thesis yet? Recall that handwritten remark "FAF using AKAGI xmtr" - to use your phrase "reading more current works to clarify." Your comments here are ... seem ... dated and limited in scope.
 * —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.167.190.98 (talk • contribs) 10:22, 13 December 2007

Nope I haven't got it yet. I however was under the impression that you had read more current published material from Jacobsen/Villa/Wilford ScottS (talk) 17:57, 13 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Pity you have not arranged for a copy; either of the single page or the entire document. Following are others, with comments, which you may wish to acquire.

"Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and his Misidentified Signals," Philip H. Jacobsen, Cryptologia, Volume 29, Number 2, April 2005, pages 97-120.

From page 115:

"... Besides, 375 kHz was an air and sea navigational frequency and regular naval communications was not permitted on sea navigational frequencies. ..."

Well, Jacobsen is wrong. Why?

Letter from Lt. John Lietwiler, Fort Mills, P.I. to Lt. Robert Densford, U.S. Navy Department, Washington, D.C., dated 6Oct41 [FOIA-released - Declassified 3/3/200]

Last paragraph of letter has:

" ... In project Baker, it has been decided to supply a generator instead of running a power line. The said generator has arrived, and I am now angling for a suitable site and house. It will aid us no end when installed as we now have to make a daily battery trip from here.  What is the last word on the Collins Baker sent in some bearings on 375 KC, and Geiken says they couldn't get that low with the equipment he knew about. .."

Or, the US Navy documented as using 375 KC to sent "bearings."

From pages 115-116:

" ...In order to overcome this unreliability, the U.S. Navy limited its experiments with automatic re-broadcasting of Morse signals mainly to situations where the original signal was from a steady source like a land-line such as between San Francisco and San Diego. Even for single point-to-point circuits using high frequencies, they employed widely spaced, large directional antennas like rhombics as well as huge banks of diversity receivers.  This kept the incoming signal at a more or less constant amplitude with the narrow 'dynamic range' of their keying devices and greatly reduced the 'dropouts' on the receiver's high speed inked tape recorders.  Ships at sea in those days generally didn't have the space needed for large directional antennas for the huge banks of early diversity receivers required to provide a reliable automatic re-broadcasting effort with long-distance sky wave signals."

Seems Jacobsen is wrong - again. As the following demonstrates:

Mailgram No. 080037, RESTRICTED, from 10Jul41, FM: COM 11, TO: COM 12, INFO: OPNAV, BUSHIPS, CINCPAC, COMS 13, 14 [RG 181, A6-1/A1-1, Declassified 8/7/00]

"PARAGRAPH THREE URLTR JULY SECOND TRAFFIC ROUTING ALTERNATE PROVISIONS AUTOMATIC REBROADCAST IS PRACTICABLE AT SANDIEGO X POINT LOMA REBROADCAST INSTALLATION IS COMPLETE AND OPERATION IS SATISFACTORY X DESIREABLE THAT YOU UTILIZE THESE FACILITIES AS MUCH AS PRACTICABLE IN ORDER THAT MORE PERSONNEL AT POINT LOMA WAY RECEIVE EXPERIENCE IN OPERATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT X NO REASON EXISTS FOR ANY DIFFICULTY IN REBROADCASTING ON ANY FREQUENCY FROM SANFRANSCISO WASHINGTON PEARL HARBOR OR VESSELS OF THE FLEET X ONLY LIMITATIONS POWER OF TRANSMITTERS AT PRESENT AVAILABLE X SUGGEST DAILY ONE HOUR USE IN HIGH SPEED HANDLING."

So says the US Navy in July 1941 - "No reason exists for any difficulty ... " from shore stations or vessels of the fleet.

Page 117, footnote 63:

" ... RUSI8 was unidentified for November and the Akagi would not have send a movement report two days after leaving port. ..."

Again, Jacobsen is wrong, again.

Jacobsen, who ScottS has parroted above, are relying on a very old copy of the Station H Movement Reports. This has been explained in some detail, e.g., use of "white out" tape and liquid, ..., etc.

With patience and persistence, the FOIA procedure does work - perhaps not Mercury-like - but it does work. The FOIA-released document showing the Jacobsen/ScottS regarding CV AKAGI error is available in the public domain, multitple sources are given above.


 * Not wishing to be remiss in Pearl Harbor reading materials:

The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable, by George Victor, Ph.D., Potomac Books, Inc., 2007, [ISBN-10 159 797 0525].

From page 302:

"Whether intentionally or not, Roosevelt exposed the fleet to a Japanese attack by stationing it in Hawaii. Then he intentionally used naval units as lures by ordering them on various expeditions in the Pacific. Withholding key information from Kimmel and Short increased the fleet's exposure greatly and it was most glaringly increased by not sending a warning on December 6, 1941.

Despite the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States openly into a European war is still unthinkable to many people, but to fewer and fewer as the years past. As has happened over time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance aroused by the idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will probably continue to fade."  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.165.172 (talk) 14:22, 14 December 2007 (UTC)


 * "Did you miss Lahaina anchorage? And did the O-type seaplanes report?" Are you blind? Or do you just ignore anything that doesn't conform to your biases? Sixth Fleet subs were not attached to Kido Butai, so (as I've repeatedly said above), their signals did not expose the location of the task force. Pay attention. And by the time "the O-type seaplanes report", the strike had already been launched, so their detection was irrelevant. (Not to mention it was too late for PacFlt to do anything about it.) I'm guessing you don't know that.  Trekphiler (talk) 14:04, 15 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Did you miss " ... until "bombs away" and the "Thunder Fish" launch - not a peep - all frequencies at all times." Bounded again, but to simplify it - Not the time the aircraft cleared the carrier decks, but the time the attack began - the point of the quote.  And, does the the skipper of the I-72 know he is supposed to be with the Sixth Fleet supporting the "Southern" operation, and not scouting the Lahaina anchorage?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.162.149.68 (talk) 15:35, 15 December 2007 (UTC)


 * "does the the skipper of the I-72 know he is supposed to be with the Sixth Fleet"? Since he's a sub skipper, when all IJN subs belonged to Sixth Fleet, I'm guessing he knows. And I notice you ignore that, as K.B. has already lauched by the time that VS is overhead, it makes no damn difference if he's detected, because the blow is going to fall regardless. Just as at Midway, unless Kimmel hits Nagumo before the birds are aloft, the game is over. Also (& I notice you don't distinguish, yet again), that VS is not overhead the Kido Butai when he signals, so the task force was silent until after the attack began. (I'm guessing that's too inconveniently true for you to notice.) Trekphiler (talk) 07:08 & 07:35, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

Pearl Harbor Materials Which Remain Classified
What Pearl Harbor Materials would the readership, if they could, like to see declassified immediately? And, why those?

For example, from the www.amazon.com book reviews for Stinnett's Day of Deceit is:

Some Documents Still Not Declassified, December 9, 2000, by Dave Mann (Brentwood, TN USA)

"I served with the US Army Special Security Group (USASSG) during the period 1984 to 1987 and worked on a 'declassification review' of pre-World War Two and World War Two 'Special Intelligence' documents. We safeguarded several thousand linear feet of files inside a vault at Arlington Hall Station, VA. There were hundreds of linear feet of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) documents pertaining to Pearl Harbor. I admit that I was so dulled by the continuous adrenal rush of reading yet another document revealing some 50-year old historical snippet that I really did not attempt to think about the importance of what I read. After reading this book and comparing it to my memory I sat shocked at the accuracy of the author's research. It is no longer hard to believe in the perfidy of America's politicians after 8 years of The Arkansas Mafia and the Clintons; this book will make it very clear that the politicians of the 1930's and 1940's were every bit as bad as we can imagine. Buy this book and read it now." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.176.50 (talk • contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007

Given his review I suspect he is the perfect gullible reader for Stinnett. This reminds me,...Stinnett, Wilford and Wiley often make claims of classified or missing documents. However, a little research often proves their claims to be incorrect. Like the Wilford "missing" Record of prosperity page 3 or when Stinnett claims "That there are 300 pages of RDF fixes [sic] that were originated by VICTOR [Samoa] between July and December 1941 locked in Archives II vaults at College Park, Maryland" page 212. Often the claims are outdated or were the result of poor research. I'm of cource not saying there aren't any classified documents, however I am saying that you can't trust what Stinnett/Wilford/Villa often claim. ScottS (talk) 16:51, 13 December 2007 (UTC)


 * ScottS has neglected some salient details on Wilford and Stinnett, and provides no details for either Wiley or Villa.


 * From Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941 footnote 153 on page 76 is: " ... Quotations from Infamy are necessary because page 3 of Grogan's 10-page account, a copy of which Toland deposited in the Roosevelt Library, is now missing. Moreover, the Matson Navigation Company was unable to provide a copy of Grogan's account."


 * What Wilford "claims" is in fact correct, "page 3" from the Roosevelt Library is gone.  Wilford's "page 3" is not ScottS's "page 3" - as should have been clear from Wilford's footnote. [Further, also removed from the Toland Papers at the Roosevelt Library is page 385 from Farago's paperback edition of The Broken Seal.]


 * As to Stinnett, on page 212 (hardcover edition), he wrote: "There are 300 pages of RDF fixes that were originated by VICTOR between July and December 1941 in Archives II vaults at College Park, Maryland. Another set of documents at San Bruno traces them to Rochefort's office in Hawaii.  But neither set of VICTOR documents has been released as of the writing of this book."


 * What Stinnett "claims" is true. ScottS neglects the last sentence, which qualified the timing of Stinnett's statement.  Stinnett's book (hardcover) was published in 2000.  [To note, Rochefort before the APHP (Part 28, page 868) says "... never received RDF from Samoa."]  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 18:53, 26 December 2007 (UTC)

You're the one with the implied sinister nature of classfied PH docs. Does this pertain to all documents or just the ones you want/ or just can't find? Did this apply to the Crane files pre 1999 before those were brought to the public?ScottS (talk) 18:08, 13 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Phrasing of "sinister" started where? Is Sheet Number 94644 sinister?
 * — Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.165.172 (talk) 06:56, 14 December 2007

Technical Assistance
I deleted this:
 * "Page 81, left-column has the text " ... Nevertheless some wireless communication had to take place, for it would be folly to expect the voyage for this armada of ships to co-ordinate without it. Short wave signals from Japan could be picked up by the larger ships but not the small craft - more especially the low-lying submarines - this was impossible, because of their aerials and the curvature of the earth.  To solve this problem Nagumo's radio technicians had to resort to a subterfuge. High frequency (short wave) signals, picked up by one of the carriers, were re-transmitted simultaneously on a low frequency [sic longwave].  These short range signals the smaller ships could intercept, and the hoax worked almost perfectly because none of the US monitoring stations was looking for a Japanese signal in the low frequency band.  However, ..."  [Release of the classified CV AKAGI source materials would be very helpful here.]"

This is as mistaken as the belief of Lurline's radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. Under radio silence, navies resort to older techniques, developed & used for decades before radio, blinker light & morse; when these are inappropriate, flag & semaphore, in use for over 200yr, are available. Trekphiler 12:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Odd. A verified and sourced quote from a known text [A. J. Barker's Pearl Harbor - Battle Book 10] - deleted. The "radioman" in question here (Grogan) held a US Navy reserve commission and had decades of military and maritime experience beginning with the US Navy in WWI; signal flags and narrow-beam blinkers of necessity mean "line of sight" and are useless in heavy weather (e.g., From Layton's And I Was There page 249 " ... Naguno's striking force had run into the first really big storm ...") and/or when vessels are scattered beyond the horizon.


 * Regardless of how necessary it was to use the radio, the source says that Nagumo used it. Generally it is assumed that a source has documents or interviews with survivors to back up such statements.  Therefore, whether it was necessary or not, Nagumo used the radio (assuming the source is valid), and it should be noted.  Whether said action was logical or not, Nagumo did it and the text should remain in the article if it is true.  Fanra 13:17, 17 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Sorry but what source are we again discussing? There are also sources (Japanese survivors of the Kido Butai) claiming that radio silence was observed IIRC. What source is now claiming that the Japanese task force DID in fact break radio silence? thestor 07:44, 6 July 2007 (UTC)

Besides Farago's The Broken Seal (Bantam paperback edition - POSTSCRIPT), also see Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined for one; of, course, Stinnett's Day of Deceit is another; and, Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth is another. And, as Prange flags SHIRIYA as part of the Kido Butai, also Prados' Combined Fleet Decoded. There are also several recent journal articles.

To fact-check the above, see Farago's The Broken Seal (paperback edition), on lower page 381, regarding Grogan, is " ... whose own credentials included a reserve commission in the U. S. Navy with years of service in Naval Communications."


 * We are talking about the radiomen of the Lurline, right? So he may have had experience with radio communications. But did he actually claim to have intercepted transmissions from a Japanese task force NEARBY? Couldn't he have gathered Japanese communication from another source then the Kido Butai? Radio signals can go a heck long way, and a single radioman on a lone civilian freighter probably could not do a triangulation. Again, we have the testimony of Japanese survivors claiming that radio silence was observed during the travel to Pearl. thestor 07:39, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

On Grogan ... "So he may have had experience ..." No, he definitively did have a US naval communications background - decades worth; no "may have..." about it.

Mention of "triangulation" - agreed. However, common practice then as now ... "relative bearings." These are used to determine the general direction of a signal source, and if multiple relative bearings are taken over time of the signal, movement in the source can be established.

All of the Japanese merchant fleet had returned to Home Waters; Grogan did not say Russian vessels - very easy for him to determine. He did use the call sign for Japanese shore stations. No doubt, his now "missing" radio log would be helpful.

Perhaps ... but we now have at least six (6) "broken radio silence" instances in the public domain (viz., Ranneft, Ogg, Grogan, 30Nov41 COMSUM14 AKAGI "tactical circuit" message, and "code movement" annotated report from STATION H on 28Nov41, and also from STATION H, submarine call sign WA HI 8 on 6Dec41) all occuring at approximately the same time. All are independent of each other. There are other examples. None, however, generated an action such as, e.g., CINCPAC: FLASH IMMEDIATE: UNKNOWN SIGNAL SOURCE APPROX N-NW PEARL ADVANCING WESTERLY X INVESTIGATE X REPORT X

On Japanese survivors ... Yes, yes, ... as Prange says. But we also have contradictory claims, some even from the Japanese. What we DO NOT have are the official records ... say, the US Navy Mid-Pacific RDF records for all monitoring stations (i.e., Hawaii, Samoa, Dutch Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, ...), nor various "Y" services such as - from Canadian records (Gordon Head, Esquimalt, ...), nor Dutch files (Batavia), nor British files (Singapore, Hong Kong), nor Australian/New Zealand RDF stations during this period. So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 even after numerous and quite specific FOIA requests? Any surmise?

[Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), on pages 266-67 shows an August 1941 disposition/RDF bearing chart for Call Sign "8E YU" - CV AKAGI, and on page 315 shows a handwritten STATION CAST RDF report (viz., TESTM dispatch) from 5 December 1941. Wilford's MA Thesis, on page 167, shows TESTM messages numbers 051515, 051525, and 051535 as sent to STATION HYPO, in their encoded and decoded form. To note, from TESTM 051535, "VICTOR" is the US Navy RDF monitoring station in America Samoa. Mr. Stinnett and now Dr. Wilford are to be highly commended for their superlative efforts as these are the first public displays of this RDF data, which clearly demonstrate the US Navy's excellent RDF skills and in situ capabilites.]

Unless you've got a source that isn't a conspiracy nut, I'm more inclined to believe the Japanese on this one. Their records, reproduced in Prange, Goldstein, & Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, indicate the radio keys were removed. Moreover, "narrow beam blinker"? I'm thinking of 24" searchlights (if needed). And do you really believe professional navy navigators can't keep station in heavy weather? Or that they'd be beyond "line of sight"? Just how much separation do you think they were keeping from Akagi, anyhow? Over the horizon? "So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 "? BTHOOM. Considering the number of people in USG with the ability, & inclination, to classify things secret even as we speak, & a general tendency by bureaucrats & politicians not to want to release any information, I'm not too surprised by this; I can just hear the CIA & NSA wanks saying it'll compromise sources & methods. (Yeah, al Q still uses radios, that's the method... Or is it NSA/CIA persuading the carriers to give up your phone/email records, just like they did the cable coys, when that was against the law...?) Trekphiler 02:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

"Over the horizon?" ...

Beyond the Horizon ... a few seeds along the way for those Baker Street irregulars;

A. Hawaii Operation, VADM Shigeru Fukudome, "US Naval Institute Proceedings", December 1955, pp. 1315-1331. Something about a Patrol Mission for three submarines (I-19, I-21, and I-23).

B. "Formation for Alert Steaming" from The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, on page 187.

Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi. Comment is due to fog, positioned some 8 miles away.

From The American Practical Navigator (aka Bowditch), Appendix, simplified formula to calculate the distance to the horizon from varying "lookout" heights. Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats, even with the I-boat being 8 miles "nearer" the horizon?

The answer begets a question: What good are these "patrol" I-boats on my flank? Sanity check?

C. From Layton's And I Was There, page 213, "Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...

So, let's see, curvature of the earth, following seas, ... Yup, beyond the horizon. Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless.

D. Also edited by Goldstein and Dillon, The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, from "Japanese Monograph No. 102: Submarine Operations December 1941-April 1942", on page 235:

"Besides the above forces, attached to the Carrier Striking Force from the 6th Fleet to perform patrol duties, were the submarines I-19, I-21 and I-23. In addition to acting as the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, this unit was to rescue the crews of downed aircraft and be prepared to resist counterattack.

"... the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, ..." Goldstein and Dillon contradict themselves.

Any surmise as to why? [Hint: Need to rationalize/cloud "radio silence" ...]

As another "sanity check" of Prange and associates, another question. Prange's At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, on page x of the Introduction, second to last paragraph has: "The Japanese put very little about the Pearl Harbor plan on paper, and what was available aboard four of the carriers of Nagumo's force (including his flagship, Akagi) went down at Midway in June 1942.''

If this statement is so, where did the "papers" in the references used above (items B and D) come from? In Prange, there are many, many other errors.


 * Ahh, the vicissitude of ignorance...
 * " However, common practice then as now ... 'relative bearings.'" I recall seeing a source placing all of Grogan's bearings in the area of the Kuriles, hence a product of IJN's deception op...
 * "Patrol Mission for three submarines", "Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi", "Layton's And I Was There, page 213, 'Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...'". Key word: "submarine". Able to submerge, hence gain invisibility. Didn't apply to carriers (or cruiser, or destroyers). Also, IJN submarines not notorious for comm silence. Not to mention, detecting sub message traffic wasn't indicative of anything, considering 1-6/12/41 was still peacetime...
 * "Patrol Mission for three submarines", "Layton's And I Was There, page 213, 'Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...'". Keyword(s): patrol & scouting. They were expected to signal to Kido Butai; their detection did not give away the position of the task force.
 * "Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats". This is a misunderstanding of the nature of blinker signalling, I'm guessing. Akagi would see blinker from an I-boat at considerable distance, & a TF ship with their big-ass blinkers would be able to signal to an I-boat a fair distance off, but this misses the point. The question is, "Was radio necessary between members of the Kido Butai?" Answer, no, because DDs & CCs in company with Akagi would never be over the horizon. I-boats not an issue; for comm with them in company, they aren't over the horizon, either. Which is, more or less, what I said; your acceptance of the need for radio reflects the same ignorance Stinnett shows.
 * "Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless." Well, no, as noted. Ships in company, such as a task force escort group, have comm by flag or blinker for two centuries. Just because it's convenient for the conspiracy doesn't mean these methods cease to function. You need to explain why Akagi signalmen wouldn't use them, at all, which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; "fog" or "weather" doesn't get it, because a 24" searchlight is pretty d*mn effective in weather, & standing orders would serve for periods of fog (& it's not like the TF didn't know where they were bound, or what stations the other ships in the TF were keeping...). I frankly don't give a d*mn how experienced a radio operator Grogan was; his supposed evidence implies IJN signalmen were all incompetent, to a man, which I flat don't believe. Any questions?  Trekphiler 00:18 & 00:22, 28 July 2007 (UTC)



A. Re: Kuriles - may want to check your comment - a citation would also help; "hence" as an implied QED is unsupportable here, got any cross bearings? Familiar with Rochefort's impressions of IJN radio deception efforts (See Layton, pages 228-229)? Of course, recall mention of those still classified RDF and "code movement" reports from the period - that curious pattern of FOIA denials.

[Another odd thing about the Kuriles, before 1941 the US Navy had a very detailed and complete set of charts for "Hitokappau Wan" (now O. Iturup), and yet in the APHB is the comment about an unknown port. But that is another thread ...]

B. Re: Patrol Unit of three I-boats. Patrol Mission SOP - surface cruising ahead of main force was then the norm; submerge to avoid detection. Why?

Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan. Who "sees" farther? (Recall Bowditch).

The tasking of a Patrol Mission is what? Does that change for "peace time" - a non sequitur.

From Japanese sources of the planning and operational aspects of the three I-boats (See "Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II for I-boat specificatons), their patrol line advanced in front of the Striking Force main body, and well beyond visual range. It is hundreds of miles ahead in fact as the Japanese and Layton tell us.

So, how again does the main body of the Striking Force communicate with these I-boats? Or, what would cause such a need to contact these I-boats, established as "being over the horizon" ...?

C. Causes such as: (a) the known and several changes in course of the Striking Force,  (b) the December 5th alert (See: The Pearl Harbor Papers, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, pages 38-39) which caused a immediate zig-zagging and wide dispersal of the main body, (c) weather (See: Morison's Two Ocean War, page 46), ..., etc.

[An aside here, when vessels within a convoy were alerted to the danger of attack (e.g., surface raider, submarines), what was their reaction, e.g., do they scatter? Or, if the convoy experienced heavy seas and poor visibility? And, did these "events" place any vessels beyond the horizon? What was done to re-group the convoy?]

And, lest we forget, Nagumo was sensitive to a timeline, as other Japanese operations were in process.

D. Re: those flags and blinkers. It is your statement " .. wouldn't use them, at all, ..." Where did this "..., at all" come from? Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that? The initial statement regarding flags and blinkers ... "line-of-sight".

Now - just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats - as they are far beyond "sight" ... patrolling hundreds of miles ahead of the Striking Force?

And, " ... which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; ..." Citation? Context?


 * "Re: Kuriles". I'd cite if I could; I don't have it handy & can't recall it.
 * "Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan." That was American practise; I'm unconvinced IJN submariners did it. "just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats"? How does this necessitate Kido Butai radiating? Nagumo received reports, he didn't issue them. I notice you prefer to ignore that.
 * "C. Causes such as:" planned course changes? Are IJN navigators stupid? Incompetent? Weather: the same. The Kido Butai would not have been scattered beyond the horizon by a typhoon, much less a bit of heavy weather. And DDs would routinely "shepherd" (as they did for Atlantic convoys...), using flag & blinker to communicate as needed (& even merchantmen were capable of coping with that; for damn sure IJN signalmen could). Reaction to attack? This isn't PQ-17, it's a fleet task force, with six aircraft carriers and about a dozen destroyers; Pearl Harbor Papers records numerous "attacks" (always claimed successful, BTW) on phantom submarines, which was SOP throughout the war. So much for "time pressure". (BTW, what was the contingency plan for Nagumo being delayed?)
 * "Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that?" Stinnett (& you) claim Kido Butai was radiating. I say (& demonstrate why) there was no need for it. "which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply"? This is Stinnett (& you) claiming Kido Butai was radiating. Demonstrate a need for it. "at all"? Any use of radio implies Nagumo's signalmen were too stupid to use flag or blinker; repeated use implies little or no use of flag or blinker, & demands IJN signalmen be incompetent, to a man. You offer no persuasive reason to use radio, & your excuses reflect an ignorance of TF operations. Take a look at Midway. Yamamoto continually recieved reports; he radiated none, to preserve radio silence (& thereby conceal his location...). Was Nagumo so stupid he didn't know this? (Stinnett, & you, imply as much.) Trekphiler 15:50, 12 August 2007 (UTC)


 * How, again, does Akagi communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats which are far beyond the horizon - for example, to notify them of a main body course change?


 * Where does Stinnett say that flags, blinkers WERE NEVER USED? (edition, page)


 * Also, where is the specific citation for "... which the continuous (repeated) DF fixes ..." Or, if that is a surmise, indicate as such.  Here, it should be noted that the RDF logs remain classified.


 * Just a fact - naval communications RECEIVERS of this era did, as you say - "radiate" - whenever they had power applied. In fact, those frequencies were monitored.


 * "How, again, does Akagi communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats which are far beyond the horizon - for example, to notify them of a main body course change?" And, again, there is no need. It's not like the I-boats don't know what the objective is, or where Hawaii is. Or do you think their skippers aren't told in advance? Or that they aren't told what the TF's planned course is, including scheduled course changes? How stupid do you think the Japanese were, anyhow?
 * "Just a fact - naval communications RECEIVERS of this era did, as you say - "radiate" - whenever they had power applied. In fact, those frequencies were monitored." Yeah, trials have determined they could be detected at up to 70mi. I'm unaware of Kimmel or Short mounting sigint patrols to detect them. So? Oh, as I recall, Stinnett also claims tranmissions from Home Islands to Kido Butai. You presume they're being recieved, I take it, & somebody was picking them up. How close was Lurline? 1000mi? Quite a bit more than 70, no?
 * DF fixes? Stinnett (which I don't have handy...) goes on at length about it, which implies to me a fairly extensive comm traffic, which implies little/no use of flag/blinker. Which is what I've been saying all along. I don't recall ever saying (tho you're trying to make out I have) Stinnett expressly says it. "the RDF logs remain classified." So what are the claims by Grogan? Or are they classified, too? Its them that I question.
 * BTW, I see you have no answer for the rest, just the same old nonsense. And your interpretation of "radiate" is pretty thin. I'm using it in a way common now, i.e "transmit". Evidently you aren't aware of it. Trekphiler 01:58 & 02:02, 23 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Did the Striking Force experience any "un"-scheduled course changes? Anything odd occur the evening of 5 Dec 1941, for instance, that caused unease?  [See The Pearl Harbor Papers (Goldstein and Dillon, editors), pps. 38-39, note 12 - as this is from Prange and associates, it must be so.]


 * How, again, does the main force communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats, which are far beyond the horizon? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Special:Contributions/ (talk)


 * "How, again, does the main force communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats, which are far beyond the horizon? " Have you not read a single word I've written? Read my lips: Kido Butai had no need to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats. It was the task of the Patrol Unit I-boats to communicate with (i.e., signal to) Kido Butai'. Kido Butai'' had no need to radiate. Which I've said at least three times, now. What part of that isn't clear to you yet?
 * "'un'-scheduled course changes" of 5 Dec 41? I repeat, do you think Japanese navigators are incompetent? That the task force is incapable of maintaining station? That DDs are incapable of finding & herding back "lost sheep", all crewed by professional sailors? I despair of finding reason. Trekphiler 13:09, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
 * "Captain Kijiro in charge of the three Kido Butai submarines stated that nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters." So what would they be "communicating" about? (Oh, wait, I forgot, the Scouting Force was lost & had to signal to Nagumo for directions, because their navigators had forgotten how to take a sun sighting...) Trekphiler 11:53, 1 December 2007 (UTC)

As you seem to have missed it, or are perhaps ignoring it:

"Since skippers and crews of oilers were veterans who had grown up at sea for many years, they were able to master refueling works and others in a comparatively short period of training, but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ..."

To repeat ''... but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ...''

Or lost to sight ...

Rengo Kantai Extracts by Ryunouke Kusaka, Chapter 12, The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans, editors Goldstein and Dillon, page 152. (Oh, yes, a Japanese source.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 (talk) 13:00, 12 December 2007 (UTC)


 * I've been ignoring it? Read what I actually said, for a change, rather than spouting your predigested garbage. The problem of night stationkeeping has nothing to do with use of radio. Convoy escorts (of civilian convoys, let alone task forces) rounded up strays & didn't need to use radio. "lost to sight"? Or just off proper station? And I thought you distrusted the accuracy of Prange. (Or did you not notice it was his research?) Neither does the ability to keep station at night have a single thing to do with the ability to follow a course, which is what navigation means (or do you not know the difference between navigator & helmsman?). And I notice, now you're criticising the tanker crews, while just a moment ago, it was the Scouting Force that was lost & incapable of knowing where they are. Good to know you're not worried about actually answering the claims. Trekphiler (talk) 07:54, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

From Farago's The Broken Seal Bantam Press Edition

Footnote, page 47

"The United States Navy had a generally low opinion of the seamanship of the Combined Fleet, and the exercises off Mihonoseki did little to change it. Designed to train crews for action at night, they ended in disaster when two cruisers and two destroyers collided in the dark.  The vessels were seriously damaged and some two hundred sailors lost their lives in the embarrassing accident.  The commanding officer of one of the cruisers 'atoned' for the mishap by committing suicide." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 12:15, 2 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Oh, good, another comment that has nothing to do with the issue. A collision at night is rather different than not being able to read a chart, which is the claim you were making, for both the Kido Butai and the tanker train. Which of them didn't know what part of the ocean they collided in? (The wet part? Or did they not know that, either?) Also, note, it was a training cruise, where mistakes tend to happen, where they are expected to happen, so they can be identified & corrected. Also note it was at night, when mistakes tend to happen more frequently. And the Japanese tolerated a higher degree of hazard in their exercises than the USN, which explains why they were much better night fighters than the USN for the first, oh, 2yr of war. Or does "USN opinion" override the facts, with you? Trekphiler (talk) 09:36, 5 January 2008 (UTC) (BTW, I'm not looking this shit up. 09:36, 5 January 2008 (UTC))

Advanced Knowledge
I (re)did an insert in the page about US knowledge of Japanese war plans. I think it is important and very relevant to this debate that the US Navy did in fact have advance knowledge of the war plans of the Imperial Japanese Navy -- it's traditional war plans, that is! These had been inspired by the defeat of the Russian Baltic fleet in 1905 and they were maintained throughout the 1930s and well into the 1940s for the eventuality of a conflict with the USA.

The common theme of Japanese war plans from the 1920s until well into the 1940s, was a defensive strategic posture of the IJN. The initiative to advance across the Pacific was to be left to the US Navy. The Japanese would use their superiority in night operations and torpedo attack (including the use of the famed Type 93 or Long Lance torpedo) to wage an attrition campaign against the numerical superior US battle fleet. The battle fleet would then fight a Decisive Battle against this weakened US fleet under favourable conditions, near its home ground. In the 1920s that was still expected to happen very close to Japan, in the 1930s and 1940s the expected location gradually shifted to the central Pacific.

This is what the US Navy knew about Japanese war plans, and what it expected to happen; its own war plans were based on the same set of assumptions. The IJN's staff adhered to this concept right until and even after Pearl Harbour. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a strategic surprise because it was a fairly radical diversion from the traditional plan, although it could also be interpreted as taking the strategy of attrition of the US fleet by light forces to a logical extreme.

There is a parallel with the other great strategic surprise of the first war years, the German attack on France in May 1940. In that case, too, the Germans achieved surprise in part because the French actually knew the traditional war plans of their opponent. (Literally, as a copy had fallen into the hands of the Belgians.)

81.164.88.220 (talk) 13:08, 26 January 2008 (UTC) Mutatis Mutandis, 26 January 2008
 * We know this; I'm less convinced USN knew it about Japan, even when both navies based their doctrine on Mahan. (If you can source it, that's another matter.) To suggest it affected surprise I find very dubious. It's far easier explained (& sourced) to say USN underestimated IJN capabilities to mount such an operation (as in fact) than to allege blindness due to doctrine.


 * Comparison to May '40 is invalid; the Germans changed the plan from the "traditional" (Schlieffen) concept in the captured doc, & the French Army's own plans (without ref the the captured doc or the actual actions of the Germans) played right into German hands in the event. Trekphiler (talk) 21:32, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Through a glass, darkly
I deleted:
 * "Of note, for added clarity here, the perspective of U.S. naval intelligence at the time as taken from the Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry shows, " ... The significance of the term, 'tactical circuit' is that the vessel itself, that is AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a maru.""

because, frankly, I'm not sure what it was trying to do; the point was already made in the 'graph above it clearly enough. I also deleted this:
 * "To also note, for the 30 Nov41 COMSUM14's statement about Akagi hear on tactical circuits (i.e., radio transmissions) calling marus, that all requests for the source materials used to develop this summary have been denied for many years; with many of these requests even pre-dating the FOIA process. Which maru(s) did Akagi "work" - call signs? How was Akagi identified?  Time of the intercept(s)?  Signal characterisitcs (quantity and strength) of the intercept(s)?  Frequency (or frequencies) used by Akagi?  Any acknowledgements intercept(s)?  RDF bearings taken? ... ? All of these questions remain open. "

as unencyclopedic. They may be valid points for more research; try answering some of them. I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked {& answered!) these questions; try citing it. Or sources that do answer them. Trekphiler (talk) 03:08, 4 January 2008 (UTC)


 * "I'm guessing ..." - a clear winner, prima facia, as being "encyclopedic" Oh, in case you missed/ignored it - the source material remains classified.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:11, 4 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Why don't you try contributing something besides insulting remarks & unanswered questions? I guess being an anonymous jerk is more your style. Trekphiler (talk) 05:33, 5 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Would that include your, after 25+ years "analysis", and which could not fill a thimble ... I got that wrong! comments? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 21:55, 11 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Obviously you haven't got anything useful, once you get past being insulting. Trekphiler (talk) 21:24, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Vacuous prattle from I got that wrong! and I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked (& answered!) ... - another of the stellar contributions from the untutored? Track down that Hewitt Report guess yet? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.164.2.123 (talk) 13:34, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
 * "Vacuous prattle" Yes, you'd know. I have better things to do than argue with a closed mind. Or an empty one. Trekphiler (talk) 18:19, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Would those "better things" include your reading, however so brief, of the Hewitt Report? Can we expect you to illuminate/contribute items from the 30Nov41 COMSUM14 report?  Or would that be more of your guessing?  Do tell.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.56 (talk) 20:26, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

<--Y'know, rather than complaining, why don't you source it, for those of us who don't live next door to the Library of Congress? No, wait, you'd rather attack people who disagree with your purblind ignorant views. My mistake. Trekphiler (talk) 13:16, 9 March 2008 (UTC)


 * You may want to "Google" it for yourself - there are several "sources." But as you seem to avoid "looking stuff up" - enjoy your solo journey.


 * Regards the Library of Congress - a wonderful resource, but you might want to start elsewhere. The National Archives in College Park, MD is suggested.  See John Taylor - very helpful to many.


 * While there, rub the "terp" and go to the student operated "Creamery" on Route 1, try the vanilla ice cream with maple syrup; and within walking distance is the first military air field in the US - the Wright brothers flew from there. Watching "short field" practice is always fun.


 * Your mistake? Well, "Y'know" far beyond my ken.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 17:36, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

Trigger maru
I deleted
 * "As given by IJN Admiral Toimioka, the oilers supporting the Kido Butai were Kyokuto Maru, Kenyo Maru, Kokuyo Maru, Shinkoku Maru, Toho Maru, Nihon Maru, Toei Maru, and Shiriya; Shiriya is described as a "... naval unit designed as an auxiliary to the Pearl Harbor task force ... The skipper of Shiriya was Captain Minour Togo, son of the great Admiral Heihachiro Togo. ..." And, also Parker's "The Unsolved Messages of Pearl Harbor", Cryptologia, 1991, Volume 15, Number 4, pgs. 295-313 has, " ... One of the most significant of the intercepted messages was sent 1 December 1941. It offered a tantalizing clue as to the whereabouts of the objectives. One of the tankers assigned to the Strike Force was Shiriya ...""

and
 * "However, Shiriya Maru, an IJN tanker and not a member of Japan's merchant fleet, appears in Parts XIII, pages 407, 420, 462-464, and Part XXX, page 2743, 2787, and 2792 in the Hearing before the Joint Committee. As well, message SRN-116476 refers to two "marus". "

I can already hear the complaints about deleting sourced material, so for the zealots, let me make it crystal clear: if you can demonstrate the significance of this material, rather than just use it to hint special knowledge (which is all it's doing now; calling Shiriya a "naval unit", but conveniently ignoring "an auxiliary", i.e., not a fleet unit {I won't even ask about the relevance of the relationship to "the great Admiral"}), put it back in. That is, show how these lists put the Kido Butai en route to Pearl. As I read it, the "calling marus" is routine housekeeping, carried on by the radiomen left behind, as part of the deception program; unless you can show different, leave it out. Trekphiler (talk) 13:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Just some research ...


 * Starting with SRN-115398 - a frequently pointed out singularly in the tale of the SHIRIYA. This message, of 1 Dec 1941, from SHIRIYA to ComDesDiv7, is given as “This ship is processing direct to position 30.00N, 154.20E.  Expect to arrive that point at 1800 on 3 Dec.  Thereafter will proceed eastward alone 30 degrees North latitude at speed 7 of knots.”

Psst, ... Thimble, her ain't a'headin' south.


 * And, further ...

Some other SHIRIYA messages (by date and not SRNs) in addition to SRN-115398 above add more detail and include:

18 Nov

From: Sec1stAirFlt To: CdrDesDiv7 Info: CO SHIRIYA

STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 was not sent to the SHIRIYA. Please arrange to supply her with a copy of same.


 * Thimble ... "STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order ..."

20 Nov

From: SHIRIYA Action: COS CarDiv1, Combined Fleet

1.	I will complete loading aviation gasoline and other miscellaneous equipment 21 Nov. 2.	The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 Nov. 3.	Expect to get underway on 24 Nov and join up during morning of 27 Nov. 4.	STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 has not been received.


 * Thimble ... COS CarDiv1 ... Chief of Staff, Carrier Division 1 ...

21 Nov

From: CO SHIRIYA To: CrdDesDiv7

We are undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart 24 Nov and arrive at Sea on 27 Nov. Advise rendezvous point your unit. Regarding refueling at Sea …


 * Thimble ... DesDiv 7 (Destroyer Division 7) was the escort assigned to CarDiv1 (Carrier Division 1) – namely CVs AKAGI and KAGA]

Finally, it is HIJMS SHIRIYA ... and, yes, her is a "fully-fledged" member of the IJN.

So, on absolutely no standing, Thimble deletes sourced material again ... becoming forever known as half-Thimble for making a mess and not cleaning it up - again!
 * Are you always such a halfwit? Or is it just with me? Where did I say Shiriya wasn't IJN? Or a fleet tanker? You've offered no evidence putting Akagi, Kaga, or DesDiv 7 en route. "30.00N, 154.20E", without looking at a chart of the Pacific, is about where I'd expect an exercise rdv. And if she was assigned DesDiv 7, I'd expect just this sort of routine housekeeping traffic. Or is that actually being faked by conspirators? Or can't the Japanese read charts? (Oh, wait, you think they can't. I forgot.) Show me something that puts her en route to Pearl. (Hmm, Lurline was reading her deactivated radio transmitter from 1000nm away. Is that right?) Show me something that proves she was en route. (Sorry, Grogan's unsub word doesn't get it. Neither does yours.) Show me something that proves one of her "consorts" was en route. (Ditto.) Show me anything except evidence Shiriya was a fleet tanker, which is all you've proven so far, & which I knew already. (You have a real talent for proving the known. How about some of the unknown, for a change?)


 * Your argument "it's secret, therefore it's a conspiracy" is unpersuasive. (I think that's an "appeal to silence", or something; somebody doesn't deny your ridiculous charges, they must be true.) There are any number of reasons to keep things secret; conspiracy does not always pertain, contrary to your paranoid fantasies. Or, explain how what FDR was doing in the Atlantic encouraged Japan to attack. (That I gotta read.) Maybe you forgot (I'm being charitable, my guess is you have no clue), the world is round, & the USN has only so many ships to cover it all, so what happens in the Atlantic has a direct, material bearing on what happens in the Pacific; if FDR is sending ships to aid Britain in the Atlantic (he was, y'know), where were they coming from? The Bolivian Navy?


 * And finally, since somebody put it up on the page, at long last (if unsourced, AFAIK), what kind of moron would FDR have to be to sacrifice his main fleet assets just to bring the U.S. into war? Even to risk them, with no chance to inflict harm on the enemy? Where is it carved in stone there had to be a massacre at Pearl to get Congress off the dime? It's carved in the paranoid fantasies of the conspiracy loons; that's hardly persuasive (or any) evidence. Answer those.


 * BTW, when you're finished your ad hominem rant, recall, I'm not the sole arbiter of what stays off the page or goes in; if anybody but you thought I was really wrong, it'd be back in long before now. Captain Dunsel 01:30, 11 March 2008 (UTC)


 * And, from the Knox Report we have, and no "guessing" ...


 * "Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians."


 * So, along with Kimmel losing about one-third of his fleet to King operating in the pond, lest we forget ... all that other "giving" ... from the "Bolivaian Navy" no less.


 * {You do know who authored Lend-Lease?]


 * Congress ... um, Stark says to Congress US was agressor in the pond. Does Congress or President ask for declaration of war?  And, gee, an election is coming ...


 * Desire for "first overt act of war" from Japanese ... or, sorry gobs, but do take the first punch; it will not that bad, these "Japs" cannot be that strong.


 * Oh, the details from that COMSUM14 from 30Nov41 ... "you guessed" it ... still classified, ... really, they are - fair dinkum fact.


 * And, as you said earlier, to paraphrase ... Rochefort lost friends.


 * Rochefort stated that there was no dummy message traffic during all of 1941 - none.


 * "The main effect (if not the intended purpose) of this particular story (US Navy document CSP 1494A, April 14, 1942, pages 14-15, Did the Japanese Paint Us a 'Picture.') was to make the service believe that the old lie was actually true - that Rochefort, Huckins and Williams had been sucked in by the Japanese radio deception. ...


 * "Rochefort and the other officers at Pearl Harbor took offense at the contemptible way in which their reputations had been smeared. ... There were no dummy messages on Japanese naval circuits at any time during 1941. ... No responsible person in the C. I. Organization ever believed that the messages in this system were 'dummies.' ... "


 * Oh, the source ... Layton, you can find the page. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 09:51, 11 March 2008 (UTC)


 * "Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British," Wasn't that the idea? Aid the British? So your own argument falters on little things like facts.
 * "Kimmel losing about one-third of his fleet to King operating in the pond," Again, wasn't that the idea? And, look at the reverse. After Japan attacked, these ships would be sent back, which did nothing to aid the British. (Ooops, I forgot, FDR is an evil genius, he engineered a conspiracy to help Britain. My bad.)


 * Um, and yet via the Robert Commission, Hawaii Departments are deemed "unprepared"? In 1941 how many PBY-5s went across the pond; how many to Hawaii?  Were those "sent" back?  Did CV RANGER come back? Did USS Texas come back?


 * "Does Congress or President ask for declaration of war?" Ditto. After Rueben James & Greer, there was reason enough, & that would have helped Britain. Pay attention. War with Japan assuredly would not, per above (which you yourself pointed out, I see).
 * "'first overt act of war'" You forget, Japan was fighting the Chinese, & FDR wanted to impose a blockade without the League of Nations branding the U.S. an aggressor. ...


 * But it was not called a war in the US was it? The "China Incident" as called was needed to side-step the US Neutrality laws - arms to belligerents a non-no.  So why does US provide arms and financial aid to China?  Regards League of Nations, Haile Salassie showed the US (the US having Observer Status only - recall FDR's commitment to Hearst) its choice not to join cost them nothing, i.e., "branding" was not an issue.


 * ...An overt act by Japan would allow it. Like the man said, you've got to "see the whole board". (In your case, see part of the board. See a square on the board. See part of a square on the board.)


 * So, take the punch. "Accidents" in the Atlantic did not cause a declaration or war, the cockleshell fleet of three did not, the Dutch rang the ABD agreement (of which Congress knew nothing in 1941) bell 4Dec41, ... time is running out.


 * "Rochefort stated that there was no dummy message traffic during all of 1941 - none." In JN-25, no; the only reason the Japanese would send dummy traffic in JN-25 is if they thought it was compromised. Ask if there was any maskirovka for the traffic analysts.


 * Glory - No dummy traffic in JN-25. But, to ask, just how does a traffic analyst assigned to RDF work determine if the message is a dummy?


 * "still classified" And still no evidence of sinister intent. Your paranoid certainty, & repeating the claim, does not make it so.
 * And finally, I see, as usual, you make no effort to actually answer, just introduce more garbage. I guess dialog isn't in your lexicon. (Reasoned dialog is beyond you.) Andy Travis, Captain, RCN (rtd) 11:28, 11 March 2008 (UTC)


 * As an exercise, try using the ATIA procedure to gain the release of "The Examination Unit" files for Gordon Head RDF for the period 26Nov41-7Dec41. And do let the readers know of your success or failure in the exercise.


 * Cap'n Travis, you're debating a guy who blanked the Regis Philbin page. I'm attributing nothing of value to his edits here. Binksternet (talk) 15:15, 11 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Noted, but there are still people around who think this crap is credible. Let some of them, even one, see the flaws, I'm satisfied.
 * "'Accidents' in the Atlantic"? Fat chance. FDR was hoping Hitler or Congress would get so het up, there'd be a declaration; bet on it.
 * "how does a traffic analyst assigned to RDF work determine if the message is a dummy?" Not the issue. The originator is in the callsign; true or fake, for DF, the originator & location are what's important, not the content. And it's masking the location of the Kido Butai that's the issue; if the originator says Akagi & the location is Hittokapu Wan, the job's done.
 * "not called a war", "arms to belligerents a non-no." Exactly. If Japan made an overt act, the U.S. could apply a blockade, rather than just try & sneak weaps through. (Don't think the League didn't suspect aid to China. It was coming from Germany & Russia in a rush, more than the U.S. ever supplied before the war.)
 * "So, take the punch." Which benefits Britain how, again? Escorts, ships, aircraft, VLR Liberators [!] all going to SWPA, rather than RN & RAFCC... Boy, that conspiracy is right up there with...hmmm...defeating al Qaida by invading Iraq.
 * "how many PBY-5s went across the pond; how many to Hawaii? Were those "sent" back?  Did CV RANGER come back? Did USS Texas come back?" Not the issue. How many went to Hawaii instead of Britain? Whole squadrons of B-24s, which CC was desperate for, went to SWPA for LR recon & bombing; just one in Gander could have cut losses to U-boats dramatically in 1941, which would have had very beneficial effects on  BOLERO  & might have meant  NEPTUNE  goes off, oh, a year sooner, with substantially fewer casualties & much faster inland & frontier-bound movement, whence no Sov occupation of Poland & EGer, for starters. Ranger wasn't capable of fleet operations (she was too small), so no loss; she'd have served as a training ship or an AVG anyhow (which should have spared Wasp from ferrying Spits to Malta, BTW).  Trekphiler (talk) 03:25 & 03:44, 12 March 2008 (UTC)


 * What - nothing on Gordon Head? The Marconi gear there was impressive for its day.  Recall the difference in the "Y" procedures and the "W" procedures - and then how to marry them?  Got caught missing your intent about dummy messages did you - loose reasoning, again.  Did you miss school the day the League of Nations was covered?  Remember why Japan withdrew from the League of Nations?  Another of those "I got that wrong" instances?  Oh, you were guessing - again ... that explains a great deal.


 * "Which benefits Britain how?" ... missed another memo have you? As a hint: conduct a detailed review the Magic summaries for Nov41 - just a suggested starting pointer for you. You might, just might, track a path to answer how and why FDR - the night before his 8Dec41 speech - tells some Congressional leaders that Germany will declare war on the US in days. Warning as this will require focus and energy and certainly tools of discovery your "twenty-fives" does not evidence.  Enjoy a few "Blues" along the way.


 * Oh, and prior to getting that Gordon Head material released, and please do report progress, suggest you brush on the BRUSA and UKUSA Agreements. The CANUSA and CAZAB Agreement might also apply.  Remember SRH-149 remains redaced, obviously using your rationale.


 * But as half-thimble is now but a dram (or a sou), a real page-turner for you. It is clear your "solid" claims need some ... dare I say ... revision.  So, do scan Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding was in East Asia, 1936-41 by Antony Best (N.B., no "h" in Antony), LSE/Routledge, London and New York, 1995. [ISBN 0-415-11171-4].  For example, Chapter Six ... Burma Road something or other. ... a give'me for you.


 * Have at it dram. Enjoy the "happenings" in the pond - you might even discover the history of the British FH3/FH4/FH5 sets and those "birdcage" antennae.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.18.1 (talk) 11:10, 12 March 2008 (UTC)

<-- Good to see you actually answered all that.... (Ooops, my bad.) Caught you with Cpn Travis, did I? Trekphiler (talk) 13:02, 12 March 2008 (UTC)

American Carriers
This section is smudging the facts a bit. Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships and from what I've read in some books, he planned the attack for when it happened based on the hope that the Aircraft carriers would be in dock, he missed them by 2-3 days. Also note that the IJN strike force consisted of large amounts of carriers. This section leads people to believe that all members of both Navies considered carriers inferior, infact there was a divide in the navies, older Admirals who had been with battleships most of their lives and younger officers who trained with carriers. Similar to how some of my older relatives refuse to learn metric and continue to use it, and complain when something is not in Imperial (we're Canadian, not a shot at Americans). Commissioned officers works on a merit system, but also a seniority and political system, quite a few leading IJN officers for instance would have been in the Battle of Tsushima (Yamamoto Isoroku included), and would of considered ships like the Yamato new and top of the line. Younger officers who may of had their first commands or first served on carriers would hold very different opinions. Who knows what opinion Roosevelt had. Also, saying that "aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable" doesn't make sense, thats 2+2=4. Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships, no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 05:55, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

Also, the Kido Butai came in from the north, closer to the Aleutians than Wake or Midway. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:05, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

If the battleships were so universally considered superior, why the Kido Butai? 6 aircraft carriers and escorts. 6 scouts and escorts hardly sound like "the single most powerful naval fleet", not my words, by the words of Wikipedia on the Kido Butai. In addition, while trying to say how unsafe they were out in the ocean surrounded by the IJN, Midway was shelled at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the next day Malaya was invaded by the 25th Army under Yamashita and the Americans were kicked out of Shanghai. Then on the 9th goes Bangkok. Peking is overrun on the 11th. On the 13th the Philippines are invaded by the 14th. On the 16th Borneo is invaded. And on the 23rd, Wake Island is captured. Seems like the safest place during all of this was 200 miles west of Hawai. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:28, 2 April 2008 (UTC)


 * Some IJN perspective:


 * "In the last analysis, the success or failure of our entire strategy in the Pacific will be determined by whether of not we succeed in destroying the U.S. Fleet, more particularly, its carrier task forces." [ADM Yamamoto, IJN, 1942], and


 * "I think our principal teacher in respect to the necessity of emphasizing aircraft carriers was the American Navy. We had no teachers to speak of besides the United States in respect to the aircraft themselves and to the method of their employment. ... We were doing our utmost all the time to catch up with the United States." [FADM Nagano, IJN, 1945].


 * From "Evolution of Aircraft Carriers: The Japanese Developments" by Scot MacDonald, Naval Aviation News October 1962, pages 39-43. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.131.242.94 (talk) 12:11, 2 April 2008 (UTC)


 * "Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships". So the legend goes. That's not what happened at Pearl, nor Midway, where he held his heavies back, well beyond the range of carrier air, per doctrine.
 * "Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships". True. Doctrine didn't see it that way. Carriers would scout in the van; cf Midway.
 * "no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement." Irrelevant. Battleships were expected to engage battleships in a heads up gunfight, after scouts (CVs, SSs) attrited the enemy; losses were expected, & accepted.
 * Unless you've got a source that says otherwise, I'm putting it back in. Trekphiler (talk) 03:12, 5 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Do you have a source that says Aircraft Carriers, not just ships serving as scouts, were expendable, or that the Kido Butai was west instead of north of them? Wikipedian rules, the burden of proof lies in the hands of whoever wants to add, I don't need proof to delete. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 03:35, 6 April 2008 (UTC)


 * I agree with Trek here. Hindsight is enticing, and if oftne responsible for distorting perceptions. It is certainly true that some forward thinking folks were aware of the potential of aircraft carriers (in all large navies), just as it's true that some still held with battleships as the main threat and most effective offense. And it may be that the split was largely along age lines (though Yamamoto's views would be an obvious exception. But it is nevertheless true that most (in all navies) did not see carriers as the major threat they would become (though mostly in the Pacific) until the Taranto raid (and even then it was mostly thought to be some sort of special case) and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales off SE Asia. Even so, IJN failure to adequately train and replace pilots (in comparison to US effort) made their carriers less effective after Midway and Coral Sea.
 * By and large then, mental ossification was a significant factor in the panning of all Navies, and even to some extent after Taranto, Pearl, and the SE Asia sinkings. It changed, certainly in the US Navy, after the loss of all those ships at Pearl. The carriers, and the subs, were really all that was left for quite a while. The IJN had the luxury of thinking otherwise for some time. ww (talk) 03:48, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Even if you do get the sources, don't just revert, actually try to improve the article, just because its a "page for conspiracy loons" doesn't mean you can't try to make it better. The Kido Butai was to the north, not the west, if you look at [[Image:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg|300px|thumb|the map]] you can clearly see the Enterprise was no where near either attack force, so don't add back comments that suggest it was.
 * Agreement is not as important as sources that state an aircraft carrier was expendable to either military force at the time. Sorry if the image above is annoying, I don't use them much.
 * "doesn't mean you can't try to make it better." True, which is why the perspective is important. Saying CVs were more important doesn't do that. At the time, they weren't recognized as such. Yamamoto's oft-touted as the IJN icon of CV air, yet his screwed up dispositions at Midway were textbook Mahan. If you can explain that contradiction, I would love to hear it. (Don't even mention Nagumo; he was a]a BB sailor & b]not the sharpest knife in the drawer.) I notice also no BBs went with Nagumo to Pearl, in keeping with CF doctrine which was, had been, & would be, expecting a "decisive battle" (with BBs, by definition) near Japan as late as June 1944, despite (by then) extensive experience to the contrary. (I'll leave aside the influence of submarines, which was greater than most historiographers acknowledge or recognize; it's an old, old tune for me...)


 * From Trek (aka half-thimble) we have " ... I notice also no BBs went with Nagumo to Pearl, ..."
 * When can we expect another of those famous "I was wrong about that - again." comments, as there were two BBs in the Striking Force - (BB Hiei and BB Kirishima). [Poor chap, seems he does not know what he does not know; but, regardless, we can expect this fact not to deter him from his deletions of properly cited materials] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:36, 6 April 2008 (UTC)


 * As for where Enterprise & Lexington were, we can argue how close to the K.B. either was, but surely nearer Japan than Pearl, which was the point; if the objective was to sacrifice fleet units, why weren't they held? Trekphiler (talk) 04:47, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Sun Tzu said something about the basis of war is deception. I didn't think the goal was to sacrifice fleet resources but to sacrifice resources in a way to not destroy your strategic ability to win and to appear as if you were an underdog or some such. I can't explain the behavior of Yamamoto. I haven't added into the article anything about carriers being better, I don't even think I added anything, what I did do was delete information that was incorrect (sending Big E and Lex away was dangerous for them, Pearl Harbor was no safe port, and there were few safe ports to be in after Pearl Harbor) and that would lead people to believe that a ship with 2000 people on it and a cost very comparable to a battleship would be sacrificed as readily as a destroyer or other small normal scout element. If they did do that, I want to see sources to that effect for it to remain in the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:00, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Don't you revert that again, you have no sources aside from your own opinion to add that stuff in. That would be the third time and I'm a little rusty on the rules but I recall something about doing something 3 times is bad when you have nothing but your opinion backing you up. If your right get sources, if you can't find any, right it on your own website, it doesn't belong in wiki. And you can see on the map the Big E and Lex, which are at the bottom stay well away from the KB which come from the north, the closest they got was on the 6th, afterwards the KB moves far north again, west. According to a map in a book next to me they might of been close to the 3rd Submarine Squad. Probably not a threat there though, submarines rarely attacked large ships with any success and they already had a mission which they weren't going to jeopardize for a small group. And they went towards Japan in the same way that LA is towards Japan while NY isn't, the carriers always had other American properties, namely Wake and Midway, between them and Japanese properties.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:18, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Actually at the time of the attack it looks like Big E was pretty close to Niihau (I think, thats kinda hard to read), only a couple of islands west of Pearl Harbor. Lex is over at Midway, it then moves south on the 8th while the Kido moves north. Thats still very misleading though, most people know more about minimaps in Strategy games than Radar or whatever. I doubt single ships or small groups of ships would really be in much danger unless they were specifically being hunted by a large group with plenty of surveillance equipment (namely airfields and sea planes and submarines placed in the right spots on the sea lanes), such actions would not be feasible when trying to attack enemy possessions. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:48, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

<--
 * "you have no sources aside from your own opinion to add that stuff in." Oh, really? Let me see... Wilmott, Empires in the Balance & Barrier & the Javelin (USNIPress, 1982 & 1983); Peattie & Evans, Kaigun (USNIPress, 1997); Holmes, Undersea Victory (1966); Miller, War Plan Orange (USNIPress, 1991)(see the page, which agrees (& which I didn't write, BTW); Humble, Japanese High Seas Fleet (Ballantine, 1973) (not the strongest source, I admit, but it's handy...); Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History (Little Brown, n.d.); Blair, Silent Victory (Lipincott, 1975) (I think); Morison's 14 volume history of USN ops in WW2; & doubtless others I haven't bothered to make a note of.
 * "I didn't think the goal was to sacrifice fleet resources but to sacrifice resources in a way to not destroy your strategic ability to win and to appear as if you were an underdog or some such." If that were so, the carriers would have been in harbor & the heavies at sea; risking, let alone sacrificing, BBs was totally contrary to doctrine of all major navies dating to the 1900s. It would have been stupid in '40s thinking, which is exactly why IJN refused to risk their own heavies well into 1944, expecting, anticipating "decisive battle" between BBs, contrary to the evidence. And IJN was (or so the myth goes) more progressive in use of carriers than anybody prewar.
 * As to "nearness", I'm happy to concede that one. It's a trivial point. In any case, if the idea is to sacrifice without excessive cost to future combat, it's the CVs, not the BBs, that would have been in harbor. They weren't. QED. Trekphiler (talk) 07:18, 6 April 2008 (UTC) (post scriptum: had the BBs been at sea, the losses would have been an order of magnitude worse... Is that evidence of conspiracy, too?)


 * "From Trek (aka half-thimble) we have " another insult from the peanut gallery with nothing constructive to offer. Do you spend your days looking for ways to catch me in mistakes? Or do you genuinely believe I spend hours researching every reply I make here just to avoid petty insults from the likes of you? (I'd say what I really think, but that'd be even less civil than you, & arguing with a halfwit accomplishes nothing.) You hide behind an anon account & haven't even the common manners not to break up other people's posts... Isn't that trolling? Trekphiler (talk) 14:56, 6 April 2008 (UTC) (Be glad I'm not an admin, boyo.)


 * " ... believe I spend hours researching every reply I make here ..." Prima facia from your many erroneous postings, even what is considered fundamental and common knowledge about Pearl Harbour (viz., the two BBs in Kido Butai), escapes you - that is, not knowing what you do not know. [Does the adage Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. - False in one thing, false in all things - apply here?]  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 15:16, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Actually I am asshole, I'm not satisfied with your comments above, but I am satisfied with what you did to the article, instead of reverting everything you got rid of the garbage and you actually got sources (which I'll have to trust state somewhere that especially large and costly ships serving in the scout role are expendable). As being uncivil, up to this point I have not had a bad thought in my head while writing this, your the one with words like "conspiracy loons" in your mouth, why right on a page you think to be for the insane? And I'm not hiding, I used to have an account a long time ago and then everything in my real life fell apart and I abandoned the account and for the past little while I've been going on here and fixing little things wrong that I see, people saying things without sources backing them up, people using sources that don't make sense (for instance someone on the Order of the Dragon was using a Zulu shaman as a source for the use of the dragon in their symbols). And thats got to be the stupidest fucking quote I've ever read, nothing is so black and white that a person who is full of the wrong information can't occasionally have the right information. Theres a guy who got banned not so long ago and every edit he had done in the last while got reverted, perfectly harmless CORRECT information, references to a Chinese wiki, and then someone got banned for adding that back in, on the grounds of the idea of your quote, I weep for the world when idiots who read something cool sounding think they've become wise. What so contructive have you done, even after looking at a map (and since you seem knowledgable I'd assume you've looked at many more involving this, just as I have) you repeatdly refused to delete the Kido Butai. I see you've had some arguements about grammar, thats useful, of course it would be somewhat hypocritical of me to see a little of your work and assume it represents all of it. I got someone with more understanding of the subject to follow the fucking rules and use sources, like pulling teeth that was. I added my 2 cents here far away from the eyes of the normal reader. If you were an admin this whole project would be on its way to hell. As proof, its on its way to hell and there are plenty of admins just like you, ready to break every rule when they want and to ban people over following them, citing imagined lack of civility. (By the way, nice Schofield).


 * Take it offline or hang it up, guys. This particular article is what we're discussing; fragging each other isn't helping Our Gentle Reader. Binksternet (talk) 05:12, 7 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Y'know, instead of busting my balls over whether the carriers were expendable, why don't you look at Yamamoto's own orders. He told Nagumo losing half the task force's carriers was an acceptable loss rate. Also notice, IJN to the end of the war tried to conserve BBs for the "decisive battle" of Mahanian doctrine. CVs did not play a role there, & never had. Fleet doctrine was for CVs to act as scouts. That's how they were designed & operated. As scouts, they were expected to be expendable. Navies expect to lose ships in wars. That's what construction & training programs are for: to replace losses, expected losses. Callous? It's a fact. And if you think that attitude is callous, take a look at how Ralph Christie treated his subs out of Oz during the war: "playing checkers with submarines" (quoted in Blair's Silent Victory, feel free to look it up). And if I were an admin, this page would have been deleted long ago.
 * As for your problems elsewhere, I sympathize. I've been sniped at by anon nitwits here enough, it's hard to tell who's who, & I begin to class all the same. If that doesn't apply, my apologies. Honestly. Trekphiler (talk) 17:07, 12 April 2008 (UTC)