Talk:Person/Archive 1

Peter Kreeft
I have been attempting to link to Peter Kreeft's argument that all humans are necessarily persons. But UninvitedCo.,Inc. keeps reverting my changes.


 * It's because describing Peter Kreeft as a "philospher" and linking to his website that is clearly bias'd towards a religious view is not deemed impartial. I'd recommend bringing the subject up here for people to discuss, and then perhaps you can work it in logically. Adding the links to things like additional views and other places would be more appropriate than the body of the articles.  Wikibofh 23:58, 14 Apr 2005 (UTC)


 * The Peter Kreeft "argument" uses a straw man, a slippery slope argument and numerous other rhetorical tricks that oughtn't to be needed if he was making a serious philosophical point, and I note that although Peter describes ethics as one of his academic "interests" his background is essentially that of a Christian Apologist and therefore if his essays deserve a place in Wikipedia it's surely over there somewhere. Surely someone, even a graduate student must have published a survey (ie describing schools of thought and papers published) of current ethical thinking on personhood? Otherwise if Peter's essentially "pro-life" essay has to stay we probably need an equivalent fiercely "pro-choice" philosophy essay to balance it. That's not really the Wikipedia way though.


 * Yes, I think we could get something better than this. Whether the fetus is a person from conception, from some point after conception but before birth, or not until birth, has been written on by a lot of people.  Baruch Brody is one well-known "pro-life" philosopher who carries more weight in the philosophical community than Peter Kreeft, who I think it would not be unfair to say is essentially unknown. --Delirium 01:37, July 31, 2005 (UTC)

Peter Kreefts argument seems fallacious because if God exist he is a person, but certainly not a human being. --RickardV 14:01, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

Yes, non-human personhood is encyclopedia stuff
I'm new here, but I was surprised by the big notice questioning whether the sections on non-human persons belonged in an encyclopedia. The idea of a personal God is a major element in much Christian theology and pastoral discourse. That alone should qualify the topic for inclusion, I think. There would need to be a neutral, encyclopedia-appropriate discussion, which doesn't seem to be here yet, and I don't think I'm the one to write. But include the topic? Yes. Greener72 03:36, 5 March 2007 (UTC)

Capacity to be loved?
The capacity to be loved is what makes a true person
 * If your girlfriend died 30 seconds ago and you're not yet aware of that, you still love her, but she's no longer a person. Furthermore, pets can be loved too, but few people would argue they are people. --Army1987 11:19, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Troublesome beliefs...
Certainly the impression I got when I was studying this stuff as part of my Philosophy course was that a lot of trouble comes because people want these 4 things to be true:


 * A baby is a person.
 * A fetus is not a person.
 * A non-human animal is not a person.
 * A baby is no smarter than many non-human animals.

It's really quite hard to say how all these things can be true. In particular, saying that a baby is a person because of what it will become means you can no longer say a fetus isn't a person. Evercat 00:20, 9 August 2005 (UTC)


 * I would debate that a person has to be concious and self aware. From personal experience of my own memories, I can conclude that I have no proof that I existed before 5 years of age. I would also say if I were brain dead then I no longer exist unless somehow I can be revieved to a concious state. The scary thing is that with this thinking, I could say that children before a certain age are not concious or self aware and may not be a person as what we think as sentient. I'm not advocating Pro-Choice or Pro-Life in either direction, but we must look at sentient life as something more than just being alive. Then again I wouldn't want a higher life form passing judment on my thought patterns as not being aware. --68.80.190.94 03:39, 11 August 2005 (UTC) james


 * what is all this philosphical and controversial discussion about? a person is a distinct living entity - period. (a corpse is not a person, an embryo can not survive on its own - a fetus might survive but is not detached from the mother - if it is (born), it is a baby and thus a person.) Iancarter 23:06, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
 * Why even bother posting? You're a complete fucking moron - period. (this was satire, helping to illustrate the falaciousness of your argument from personal credulity.) Quantum Burrito 02:51, 29 December 2006 (UTC)

I must be doing something right in considering the opposing side's arguments when my writing is accused of being right wing. Anyway, I would like to know why LucaviX keeps removing:


 * The issue that babies seem no more mentally adept than some animals.
 * A brief discussion of why the degrees-of-personhood idea is considered "dangerous" by some.

Evercat 01:18, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

I'll give 2 articles that discuss the problem of babies:


 * Robert Larmer; Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 12, No 3, 1995.
 * Don Marquis; Why Abortion is Immoral, Journal of Philosophy, 1989.

e.g. Larmer writes (as a reductio ad absurdum) that:


 * If we have no qualms about aborting a zygote or fetus ... we should have no qualms about killing an infant ... since in none of these cases is the zygote, fetus, or newborn infant, conscious in the sense in which we normally use the term.

My point is that this is a real argument used by real philosophers, so I will thank you to kindly stop removing it. Evercat 01:37, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

Evercat 01:29, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

Moved comments from main by 65.240.161.47:

Firstly, it has already been noted that the criteria listed above are are subject to debate. Secondly, no one is advocating the inhumane treatment of babies and they meet most of the commonly held criteria of personhood, they are typically held to be "Developing persons". Third, incomplete personhood is indeed recognized by all first world legal systems, as proven by voting rights and otherwise. Lastly the objection to the concept of incomplete personhood are listed in the below paragraph and that is the entire point of bringing "babies" into it which will only act to scare right leaning individuals who do not have an indepth understanding of personhood theory.


 * Certainly nobody is advocating inhumane treatment of babies, but Peter Singer amongst others seems to take the view that babies are not really people. Certainly, if a baby is a developing person then why isn't a fetus? As for voting rights etc, this doesn't mean that minors aren't considered full persons, just inexperienced persons. Whether all this scares right leaning individuals is irrelevant... Evercat 12:16, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

One last note, not everything in personhood theory is just a "view" there is a science behind it that shouldn't be overlooked. That there are degrees of personhood would be more accurately defined as a common consensus, not just a view, as there is a very wide consensus regarding varying degrees of incomplete personhood


 * This isn't really a scientific question, it's a philosophical question. I don't understand this constant criticism of non-scientific views in this debate, as the whole thing is unscientific. What makes a person is not the sort of question that science answers. Evercat 01:51, 10 August 2005 (UTC)


 * Some in personhood theory argue that some non-human animals, particularly great apes, can develop personhood. Perhaps the most famous non-human considered by many academics as a person is Coco. However many great apes in captivity, specifically subjects of neurological study, personhood study, and sentient animal studies have been taught sign-language and have developed all or most of the commonly held criteria for personhood. user:lucavix

Personhood Theory
Personhood Theory isn't entirely new. Personhood theory looks at personhood as an objective science for the most part. It's mostly of interest to transhumanist and Psychiatrist like myself. I think a quick msn search for "personhood theory" may bring a lot up on it. I deal mostly with the Psychiatric aspects while some deal more with the hypothetical aspects. The criteria for personhood in personhood theory do not involve dreams and goals, but focus more on the capacity for self determination, self awareness, a Biographical self, and so forth. The reason I included what you so promptly moved is because it fits perfectly with the larger discussions in personhood theory, mainly the concept of an incomplete or developing person. I would like to have that paragraph that you moved, or something very similar, listed under personhood theory. user:lucavix


 * I just wonder whether "personhood theory" is sufficiently mainstream for special mention? I mean, it's not that far removed from the criteria set out in the section above... Evercat 23:40, 10 August 2005 (UTC)

Personhood Theory is a science, sciences do not need to be mainstream to have merit. Like I said, this isn't a world in which all we have are different viewpoints, we also have actual sciences and fields of study. Personhood theory is however fairly mainstream in academic circles, Particularly among Psychiatrist like myself, but I can't speak for lay circles. user:lucavix

Personhood Theory

 * This is a quick note regarding the statement: Another problematic example is the status of a person in deep sleep, with no consciousness at the moment, but who upon waking would return to being an entity with full subjective awareness in the future. This statement needs to be rewitten and factually checked. What is deep sleep? If you mean REM sleep or stage four sleep then the brain is very active, and not considered to be "with no consciousness at the moment". Furthermore, what does "full subjective awareness mean?" Does this mean second order reflection of consciousness, also called introspection? Its very vague and needs to be worked on.

Removed paragraph
I removed:


 * Furthermore, this concept of person lead to a paradox regarding "person" in the objective sense. If an individual is not a person but is not not a person, ie. is a partial person, then if we are to use the word person in the objective sense the individual will be both a person and not a person at the same time. This has sometimes been countered by the argument that "person" is a subjective designation thus avoiding the paradox based in the objective sense. Although this can be further countered by the fact that if this is the case then persons are the ones defining what "person" means, which is circular reasoning meaning that "person" would be a meaningless concept which negates the meaningful nature that is needed for it in the field of ethics.

This is terrible. The whole point about having "degrees of X" is that you get away from the need to treat X as a binary "yes or no" concept. A different example would be intelligence. If someone said Bob was somewhat intelligent, and I said "What, you mean Bob both is and isn't intelligent? That's impossible!" I would just be making a mistake. Evercat 12:47, 13 August 2005 (UTC)

Minor Transhumanist Slant
Don't get me wrong, though a bit on the Bioconservative side I do see many merits to transhumanism (especially in regards to radical life extension and self improvement) but there seems to now be a minor transhumanist slant that may be worth looking at. I'm not saying that Transhumanism is in any way a bad thing, even though I might not always favor some transhumanist arguments. I have realized in my past experiences here that I am extremely uncomfortable with withdrawing the categorization of person from a late term fetus or young infant, due to my own biases on the issue, so I'm not going to edit anything from fear of going overboard (my POV on this is reason enough to stay pretty much uninvolved). Anyway, I like most of what has been added to the Personhood Theory section, though I was slightly troubled with the suggestion that a sleeping human might be arguably not a person (Most secular humanist interested in personhood theory consider Periodic consciousness a first and primary criteria for personhood, but not continual uninterrupted consciousness). I would like to see some of Personhood Theory (not to suggest that all of it is represented with a slant, but some of it seems to be) represented from a more neutral and less transhumanistic slant. My main concern is that it may be percieved as too far from center if you will, and that some of the merits will be lost on some of the more conservative readers. --Lucavix 05:31, 27 August 2005 (UTC)


 * Uploading proposals tend to assume that the mind does not persist through time in a substantial way (usually theoretically grounded on "eliminative reductivist" arguments that claim there is no soul or "self," but of more central importance, that conscious awareness itself is - somehow - an "illusion"), so making a "copy" of brain structures is - in terms of survival - just as good as preserving the original structure. Advocates also tend to believe that such a copy would have conscious experience rather than merely acting as a convincing automaton (though consistent eliminative reductivist advocates argue that *we already are* automaton-like entities).

When I think of this sort of reductivism I think of Parfit. Perhaps you're thinking of Dennett (who I've really not read at all) but I don't think this sort of view must see consciousness as an "illusion". Also, I don't see why this sort of view is any more open to this "automaton" charge than any other view. Even mind-body dualists can't say how the mere addition of something non-physical gets you out of Hume's dilemma that every thought was either determined or random... Evercat 11:12, 27 August 2005 (UTC)

I hope such additions are not being mistakenly associated with myself. I neither see consciousness as an illusion nor subscribe to the idea that we are somehow entirely automated (I believe in self determination and believe that individual consciousness is not only very real, but a necessity for personhood). --Lucavix 05:31, 28 August 2005 (UTC)

No, my comment wasn't addressed at you. :-) Evercat 20:55, 28 August 2005 (UTC)

I do wonder if we need such a detailed discussion of the various physicalisms, etc, in the section "Are all persons human?" The article is already pretty baffling for a casual reader, I would imagine. We should try to keep things fairly simple... Evercat 12:57, 30 August 2005 (UTC)

I've removed all of the following, since it's so incredibly baffling, and probably more relevant to pages about mind rather than personhood. Really, if you can't explain something in simple language it's not worth the effort... try to remember that most of your readers will not be specialists in this field. There's an excellent piece on Wikiwatch here that rather explains the problem I'm getting at. Evercat 19:56, 30 August 2005 (UTC)

Excised text follows:

People commonly underestimate of the complexity of philosophy of mind when appealing to positions with implications they may not believe to be justified. However, appealing to partial remedies in an attempt to salvage these positions may ultimately prove incoherent as well. For example, within the class of positions identifiable as "physicalist" (that the mind consists of nothing additional to a physical organization that permits conscious perception and abstract thought), positions include [1] "reductive eliminativism," [2] merely "reductive physicalism" and [3] "non-reductive physicalism." Both [1] and [2] ("deep reductivist" views) hold that in understanding the mind, we are forbidden from appealing to anything "over and above" basic elements (e.g. atoms or quanta), including larger-scale organizational structures that these elements cycle through (such as whole nerve cells) as autonomous entities in their own right. However [1] holds that given a deeply reductive premise, all one "is" consists of distinct basic entities, and since such entities constantly enter and exit a larger system like a neuron, it is incoherent not only to claim that a self-same subject persists over time, but (if one follows the reductive claim consistently) even a fleeting "moment" of basic perceptual awareness that occurs over approximately 100 milliseconds cannot be attributed to the same subject of experience. (Note that the issue of immediate perceptual access in consciousness is distinguishable from a capacity for memory.) On this position, there is no "self" as a momentary subject of experience. But more fundamentally, even as part of a system, basic elements as such could not be "subject to" anything other than an extremely particular condition that oftentimes is analogous to conditions outside the system. Therefore, the eliminativist holds that we should not speak of a self and even avoid the term "mind" to help people avoid the temptation to reify the purely abstract term; consequently, the term "person" also becomes suspect as technically incoherent. Instead, eliminativists have argued we should restrict our description to observable entities and convenient descriptions of larger systems of such entities which perform observable functions (e.g. neurons, brains).

Attempting to reconcile deep reductivism with claims that minds, persons, and a "self" or (on Daniel Dennett's account) a series of "selves" do exist, [2] attempts to reinterpret these terms in a purely "functional" manner. The term "information" is appealed to not just as an aspect of things or a perspective on them, but as an ostensibly neutral basis of all ontological analysis, since it can be employed to account for functional relations amongst all observable features of reality, regardless of scale, and can therefore be employed to refer to abstract relations that must occur in a physical system like a brain for it to be capable of the intelligent functions it performs (e.g. problem solving, creative association), as well as such things as abstract social relations (e.g. language, class status) which can indirectly affect an intelligent physical systems, and abstract conditions that can provide such systems with an ever-changing elemental substrate with an abstract form of continuity in terms of the dispositions of a system with a given physical organization (e.g. "beliefs," personality traits). The investigation of mental phenomena using information theory in the field of cognitive science has been highly productive, however, when applied in a deep reductivist manner as [2] does, it proves inadequate for the task of accounting for an immediate subjective experience as [1] due to the same conceptual barriers of reductivism. Essentially, a reductive physicalist can talk about the diachronic "selfhood" of an intelligent system based on a system's behavioral dispositions, but lacks the ability to effectively account for immediate synchronic subjective experience, which in turn would be necessary for any "self" across time that had subjective awareness (as opposed to, say, a non-conscious robot with characteristic behavioral patterns). One strategy to which advocates of [2] will sometimes (tacitly or explicitly) retreat is to claim that because the direct experience of immediate subjectivity is not open to empirical observation, we may be deeply mistaken about the nature of our own immediate interpretive awareness, and "consciousness" may not really be experiential at all, but rather a non-existent kind of "illusion" that mental systems are dispositionally prone to "believe." It is all very Humian.

However, this line of argument takes the perceptive access of minds to reality for granted, and in doing so ignores deeper problems in accounting for any sort of qualitative experience - a universally recognized feature of awareness, even when considered fundamentally illusory - or ability to make judgments for ourselves about the world that permit judgments to occur in a social context, such as a scientific assessment of evidence concerning the nature of basic entities. In order to act in the world as we do, we require experiential access entailing (1) capacities for sensorial report of bodily encounters which are only recognized as representative of any given thing via (2) capacities for judgment of sensory appearances. A human lacking either of these elements would lack any experience. Kant described the hypothetical condition negatively, where a lack of (1) would result in "emptiness" and a lack of (2) would result in "blindness." So, considering the conceptual problems listed above for explaining how the synchronic experience of consciousness is possible, it would seem that the challenge for physicalism to account for reductivist remains to be effectively overcome.

Perhaps a non-reductivist physicalism [3] could eventually meet this challenge while also supporting more robust versions of subjectivity and persistence through time in a naturalistic way. One useful line of thought has come from the great philosopher of biology, Ernst Mayr. He argued against deep reductivism for understanding biological systems in a way that was not "vitalistic," the definitive phrase being "emergent autonomy with compositional reducibility." Using such an account, whole neuronal cells could be considered as persisting physical objects with compositional cycling, and the sensory and intellectual acts necessary for cognition could be recognized as distributed in neural networks for particular functions and across the whole brain for "gestalt" forms of immediate awareness. Such a depiction also suggests that a subject of experience could persist in a substantial way through the persistence of compositional objects (neurons) in the central nervous system, which could also be "cycled" by the loss or gain of neurons or artificial devices operating on computational connectionist principles without dramatically altering the "emergent" subject distributed throughout the system. A forthcoming paper by transhumanist Ben Hyink promises to make just such a case. If the arguments in this emergent autonomy thesis prove sound and its premises do not prove contradictory to new evidence, it would have important implications for uploading proposals, especially in precautionary safety measures necessary to sustain continuous facilitation of a physically persisting subject of experience or a robust form of subjective "self" which can change features (e.g. psychological dispositions) and endure through periods of unconsciousness (e.g. deep sleep) without undermining its own embodied continuity.

By no means does this succinct analysis completely solve the problem, of course. There remain other issues, especially the nature of quantum mechanics, which shape the outcome. Some theorists like Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff even advocate a "quantum consciousness" proposal in which large-scale quantum coherence is held to be the source of conscious subjectivity. Hyink's approach argues that the major interpretations of quantum mechanics all permit his perspective of emergent autonomy, though some allow it in a less "intuitive" or "naïvely realist" way than others, such as the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Also, this needs to be explained:


 * 1) Self awareness, self bonded to objectivities.
 * 2) Self as longitudinal thematic identity, one's biographic identity.

What does "self bonded to objectivities" mean? And "longitudinal thematic identity"? Good grief. In English, please. Evercat 20:16, 30 August 2005 (UTC)

- The justifications for carefully-reached conclusions in philosophy of mind are complex. Why should we expect the language used to be universal (it takes a lot more space to explain ideas contained in words that one can "goggle")?


 * I just came across this several-month-old comment. For anyone who cares, please know that I have recanted my position based on new arguments and more reflection. I hope to publish a paper on the transience of material facilitation of the mind soon. - Ben Hyink

Cleaned up
The article has been cleaned up as per your request - contact me if you have any inquiries. Izehar 18:53, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

Merge People to Person
Either People should be merged to Person or Person should be moved to Personhood. Currently there are two different articles with the same name, barring an accident of the language, and it's confusing. Melchoir 05:11, 11 March 2006 (UTC)
 * People should not be merged to person. I'll check out personhood. Zanaq 11:00, 11 March 2006 (UTC)
 * And no, person should also not be moved to personhood, there is a nice #redirect in place. I will remove the {merge}tags. Please explain what you find confusing, I may try to clear those elements up in the articles. Zanaq 11:03, 11 March 2006 (UTC)
 * The redirect is helpful, yes, but it doesn't really make the point strongly enough. Currently, as far as I can tell, the article Person is about personhood, the concept of being a person, but not about persons. The article People is about persons. What I find confusing is that these articles have the same name, modulo a plural, yet they cover different topics. I wouldn't expect to find such a content split on any other topic; to pick a random example, Fruit discusses both fruithood and actual fruits. Fruits is, as it should be, a redirect to Fruit. Melchoir 19:25, 11 March 2006 (UTC)
 * The article "Person" is about the philosophical topic. Personhood is a far more controversial and widely discussed matter than "fruithood", and it shouldn't be merged with people. I would support a move to Personhood, however. That title more strongly suggests the nature of the article. --The Famous Movie Director 02:36, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
 * I agree with Movie Director's comments exactly. Bhuston 17:48, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
 * no merge! "people" = "group of persons" or "the people" of a nation while "person" is an entity - if a merge should occur it should be with Natural_person Iancarter 22:57, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

Name dispute
I suggest moving this page to Personhood, then making Person redirect to Person (disambiguation), with the disambig page improved to include links to all the relevant concepts: People, People (disambiguation), Human, Natural person for the legal term, and Personhood for the philosophical debate about who is a person (this page). This talk page doesn't have a lot of activity, so I'll give it a week or two to see if there are any objections. I haven't done a move that significant before, so someone needs to tell me if there would be dire consequences. --Grace 10:29, 18 June 2006 (UTC)
 * I second your suggestion. It's helpful to recall that for Locke, person is entirely a forensic term, and human is a biological one. By the way, for Locke, children are selves, but they are not persons. As selves, they have certain rights (to life, among others), but as not-yet-persons, they are not yet accountable for their actions. Fascinating reading, Locke's Essay. (I'm writing about it now.) Cheers, Anthony Krupp 04:40, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Rewording
In the first sub paragraph somebody werote: " that elevates it above mere objects". In my oppinion this should be rewarded. Animanls are often not considered to be "mere objects". I think a better statement would be: "above nonsentient beings". Your thoughts? --BorisFromStockdale 02:56, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
 * I disagree about the need for rewording. If you read the paragraph, the point being made is about non-human persons and specieism, as well as a direct link to the animal rights debate. --Bhuston 09:08, 18 June 2006 (UTC)

"Human being" = Homo sapiens or all genus Homo?
"A human being is a member of the genetic species Homo sapiens" -- Two different senses of "is" are possible here: (1) "Is" of time (what situation currently exists) ("My dog is eating") or (2) "Logical is", independent of time ("A dog is a mammal."). In sense (1), a human being is [currently] a member of the genetic species Homo sapiens; however in sense (2), should all members of genus Homo be included as human beings or not? "Neanderthals were human beings", "Homo erectus were human beings." -- 201.50.123.251 13:58, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
 * I have no answer, but find this to be an interesting question!--Anthony Krupp 19:54, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

people or persons
Moved to Talk:Person/RfC archive. Parties agree that the discussion has become inflammatory. &mdash; Arthur Rubin | (talk) 18:21, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

Request for Comment: persons v. people
Previous discussion at Talk:Person/RfC archive. Parties agree that the discussion has become inflammatory. &mdash; Arthur Rubin | (talk) 18:23, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

No objection to that, but I'm not sure that I agreed the discussion has become inflammatory. I just said it wasn't getting anywhere. Emeraude 21:26, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

I never used to word Inflamatory either and sorry if Emeraude you took unkindly to me correcting your mistake on my reply. I think the new rfc should be created and leave the pair of us well away from it so we do not but heads as before. can we ettle on that please and walk away from this page.--Lucy-marie 22:20, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

The RfC in question should cover two issues:
 * 1) "Persons" vs. "People"
 * 2) "Personhood" vs. whatever phrase it got turned into.


 * I'm in favor of the first option in each; the current version seems to have the second option in each. &mdash; Arthur Rubin |  (talk) 22:45, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

When person (pl) is persons and when is it people
Well, this is one of the more ridiculous things I've ever seen. I can't believe the enormous content dispute over something purely factual that has got to be one of the easiest things to look up.

However, I'll settle this right now with the OED. There are many definitions for a person, but I only found one notation in terms of which plural made the difference. And yes, both "persons" and "people" are plurals of "person".

II. A human being, and related senses.

2. a. An individual human being; a man, woman, or child. In ordinary usage, the unmarked plural is expressed by the word people; persons emphasizes the plurality and individuality of the referent (see PEOPLE n. 2a). In earliest use: the individual acting in a particular capacity or concerned in some respect (cf. sense 1).

I'm going to repeat that. "In ordinary usage, the unmarked plural is expressed by the word people;"

"persons empahsizes the plurality and individuality of the referent"

What does that mean? That means that you're all wrong! Persons and people are both used at specific times. Persons can be wrong. So can people. So, here is the entire OED definition of people. Where is says sing., that means that for that usage of the word, you would use "persons". Where is says pl. you use "people". This definition is entirely based on plurality, so the sing. and pl. refers to the plurality or individuality of the referent. I will provide a link to the definition, but I don't think you can get the OED online without paying, so that's why I'm showing the definition as well.

From the OED online, the defintion for people/persons:

I. In general, indefinite use. 
 * 1. In sing. Used unemphatically, as a general or indefinite designation: persons unspecified as regards number, class, or identity.
 * In this use the word is almost equivalent to a pronoun (cf. a man s.v. MAN n. 17a), comparable in subjective use to French on (see ONE pron.), German man (see MAN pron.), but having a corresponding objective and possessive; e.g. ‘people say that he is extravagant’, ‘drivers waiting to bring people back’, ‘to give people what they want’, ‘one who can read people's thoughts’. 


 * a. With the. Obs.


 * b. Without the. With pl. concord.
 * In this sense people has in colloquial use taken the place of men in ‘men say’, etc. (see MAN n.1 1b).


 * 2. In sing. With pl. concord.   a. Men or women; men, women, and children; folk.
 * Freq. with singular modifiers in Middle English.
 * In ordinary usage, this is treated as the unmarked plural of person, whereas persons emphasizes the plurality and individuality of the referent (see PERSON n. 2a).
 * good people: see GOOD a. 2c.


 * b. In emphatic use: human beings, as opposed to animals, spirits, etc.


 * c. In extended use: animals, living creatures (applied (chiefly poet. or humorous) to animals personified).


 * d. U.S. colloq. In predicative use. An individual, somebody; a person of standing. Usu. without article.

 II. Specific uses. 
 * 3. In sing. Chiefly with the.   a. Those without special rank or position in society; the mass of the community as distinguished from the nobility or the ruling classes; the populace. With pl. concord.
 * See also man of the people s.v. MAN n.1 31; the common people s.v. COMMON a. 12a.


 * b. Christian Church. The lay people, as distinguished from the clergy; the laity as a class or group.
 * In many cases the sense could be interpreted as ‘the congregation’, i.e. those making the responses in a church service (cf. sense 5), or as ‘the parishioners’, i.e. viewed in relation to a priest, clergyman, etc. (cf. sense 4b).


 * c. Pol. The whole body of citizens of a country, regarded as the source of political power or as the basis of society; esp. those qualified to vote in a democratic state, the electorate.
 * Freq. in the terminology of Communism and Socialism, often in the possessive: see sense 12.
 * Not always clearly distinguishable from sense 3a.


 * d. Law. Usu. in form the People. In certain parts of the United States, and in the Republic of Ireland: the prosecution as designated in a criminal case.
 * The equivalent of the Crown in a British law case. 


 * 4. In sing. Persons in relation to an individual, or individuals, to whom or with whom they belong. (Chiefly with possessive.) In modern English with pl. concord.   a. A body of people attending, employed by, or working for a person in a position of power or authority; esp.    (a) the retinue or household of a master or mistress;    (b) troops, military forces, an army, a ship's crew, etc., considered in relation to their commanding officer (cf. MAN n.1 6);    (c) the team of employees of a manager or other leader.
 * In early use freq. with possessive implied rather than stated.


 * b. The subjects of a king or any other ruler, temporal or spiritual, spec. God, Christ, or (quot. ?c1450) a saint regarded as a sovereign power. Also: the parishioners of a priest or parson, the congregation of a pastor, etc. Also in extended use.


 * c. Those with whom a person belongs; the members of one's family, tribe, community, etc., collectively; one's kin. Also: (orig. and chiefly Public School and University slang) one's parents, siblings, or other relatives at home. Occas. (U.S. regional (south.)) in pl.
 * people-in-law now rare, the relatives of one's wife or husband.


 * 5. a. In sing. With pl. concord. The individuals belonging to or living in a particular place, or constituting a particular assembly, class, or category; the inhabitants of a city, region, country, etc.


 * b. As count noun: a body of persons; a multitude, a crowd (of persons). Also: a class, a group. Obs.


 * 6. The body of men, women, and children comprising a particular nation, community, ethnic group, etc. Cf. FOLK n. 1.
 * Sometimes viewed as a single unit, sometimes simply as a collective of individuals.


 * a. In sing.   (a) A nation, regarded as a unit.
 * In Biblical quots. (see quot. a1382) applied to ants considered as a ‘race’ or ‘nation’ (after the Vulgate and Hebrew; cf. FOLK n. 1b).


 * (b) With pl. concord. A nation, regarded as a collection of individuals.


 * (c) With pl. concord. Nations. Obs.
 * In the plural sense ‘nations’ the singular form was freq. used from the 15th to the 18th centuries: constantly so for the Greek and Hebrew plural in Tyndale and Coverdale and other 16th-cent. Bible versions founded on them (but not in the Rhemish version); nearly always so in Geneva, and in 1611 (where the Revisers of 1881-5 uniformly substituted peoples). Also in many 18th-cent. writers. Cf. sense 7b 


 * b. In pl. Nations, races.
 * This plural use was avoided in 16th cent. Bible versions, and by many 17th and 18th cent. writers (see sense 7a(c)). It was thought to require defence or explanation even in the 19th cent. (cf. quots. 1842 and 1845). 

III. With defining word.
 * 7. With qualifying word prefixed (often as a plural form applicable to both genders, where the singular has the distinctive man or woman), as country-people, lay people, townspeople, tradespeople, etc. (See also the qualifying element.) Cf. PERSON n. 2e, FOLK n. 3a.
 * Since the late 20th cent. people has often been preferred to men or women as being less gender-specific.

<Br> IV. Phrases. <Br>
 * 8. With complementary of-phrase.   a. Used in phrases denoting a group or community of people identified as belonging together by reason of certain shared origins, attributes, attitudes, or beliefs, as people of condition, of colour, of fashion, of quality, of rank, etc.


 * b. People of the Book, a body or community whose religion entails adherence to a book of divine revelation; spec. [after Arabic Ahl al-Kit{amac}b < ahl people + al- the + kit{amac}b book (see KITAB n.)] (mainly) Jews and Christians as regarded in Muslim thought.
 * Quot. 1697 is app. based on a misunderstanding of the phrase. <Br>


 * c. Peoples of the Sea, any of various sea-borne migrant peoples described in Egyptian records of the 19th and 20th Dynasties, who invaded and settled parts of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine. Cf. Sea Peoples s.v. SEA n. 23.


 * 9. of all people: expressing disbelieving or indignant surprise that a particular person should be involved. Cf. OF prep. 30e.

V. Compounds.
 * 10. General attrib., as people-pleaser, worship; people-blinding, -born, -centred, -devouring, -friendly, -oriented adjs. people business orig. U.S., (a) a business in which contact with customers, or customer satisfaction, is (portrayed as) the most important element; a business in a service industry; (b) a business whose most important asset or element is the (skill or talent of) the people it employs. people carrier, a vehicle or system designed to transport a relatively large number of passengers; spec. a large family car, similar in shape to a minibus, capable of seating six or more people, usually in three rows. people-king now rare [after classical Latin populus r{emac}x, French peuple-roi (1735 in Voltaire)], a sovereign people. people mover, any of various (esp. automated) systems or vehicles for transporting large numbers of people, usually over short distances. people-organ Obs. rare, a body of people seen figuratively as constituting a church organ. people person, a person who enjoys or is particularly good at interacting with others. people-pestered a. Obs. rare, crowded with people. people power, (a) power of or belonging to the populace; esp. political or other pressure exercised through the public demonstration of popular opinion; (b) physical effort exerted by people, as opposed to machines (rare). people skills, the ability to interact with or relate well to others, esp. in a work environment. people smuggler, a person who organizes or is involved in the illegal transportation of immigrants from one country to another. people smuggling, the transportation of illegal immigrants from one country to another; cf. people smuggler. people sniffer, a device that chemically analyses the air around the human body, or one for detecting the presence of hidden persons by chemical (or physical) means. people-state, a democracy.


 * 11. Compounds with people's (freq. with capital initial). Of, belonging to, or for the people; spec. (in the terminology of Communism and Socialism) designating institutions, concepts, etc., regarded as belonging to and controlled by the people, rather than a select ruling group.   a. people's artist, bureau, college, government, party, police, state, etc.


 * b. people's army, (a) an army organized on egalitarian or communist principles; (b) an army composed of the common people; a territorial army or Home Guard. people's car [after German Volkswagen (1937 in the company name, perhaps earlier)], an inexpensive car designed for mass sale. people's choice, a person or thing chosen by the majority of people, a popular favourite. people's court [in sense b after German Volksgericht], (a) (with capital initial) a court of the former Soviet Union or of other countries having a similar legal system; (b) (with capital initial) a court set up by the Nazi regime in Germany to deal with political offences (now hist.); (c) an unofficial court set up by a vigilante group, or to dispense mob justice. people's democracy, a political system in which power is regarded as being invested in the people, spec. a communist state, esp. in eastern Europe (now hist.). people's friend, (chiefly with the) a person, organization, etc., (esp. a politician or ruler) considered as having the interests of the public at heart (in earlier use, not always a fixed compound). People's front (now hist.) = POPULAR FRONT n. people's palace, (a) the chief government building, esp. of a democratic country; (b) a centre equipped with a wide range of recreational and educational facilities; spec. a former institution comprising a library, theatre, educational classes, etc., which opened in the East End of London in 1887 (now part of Queen Mary College, University of London); also fig. people's park, a park intended for the use of all members of a community. People's Power = people power (b), sense 10; spec. any of several political parties of various countries, claiming to represent the interests of the people. people's republic, any of various left-wing or Communist states (as People's Republic of China); also in extended use. people's theatre, a theatre for community use, esp. one run on socialist principles. people's war, (a) a war in which the common people are regarded as fighting against the ruling classes or foreign aggressors; (b) a war in which all members of the community are involved, a total war.

This can be used when editing this article so that users know when "persons" is correct and when "people" is correct. This can also be used to settle any disputes over which term is correct in a particular instance. This isn't and never should have been an opinion debate, the different plural forms are used in different instances, so it's just a matter of helping people understand when one form is correct and when another is correct and editing the article and being a grammar stickler.

There really is no need for additional comments. As I've said before, this isn't an opinion, really it's just something that needs to be properly looked up, which I've done, so I hope that we can move onto the bigger issues. TStein 09:31, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Thanks for posting that. You are right, the OED is only available on very expensive subscription, which is why I posted the Chambers extract.  But you are incorrect to say that "That means that you're all wrong!"  Most of the comments have been from people, myself included, who have said along that the plural of 'person' can be 'persons' or 'people' depending on the context (and in the context of this article, 'persons' is required).  Two users have denied that 'persons' is even a word. Seeing as you think it's now settled, why don't you make the alterations back to the original?  Emeraude 11:21, 8 January 2007 (UTC)
 * What I meant by saying that everyone was wrong, was that the people on the "persons" side kept saying on the Rfc that persons was correct in all plural instances and people was only correct in some. Which is incorrect.  I'm fixing the article now and every plural instance may in fact be "persons", but there may be some "people" in there as well.  I do think that people promoting "persons" (like that?) understood the difference, as the pointed out the differences in overall definitions, but making blanket statements like that leads to people fixing articles by just blindly switching all instances of "people" to "persons" which can be just as bad as having all pl. instances use the word "people" instead.  And if you followed that, you're a fine example of a person indeed.  TStein 01:30, 9 January 2007 (UTC)

major edit
As you can see, I tagged almost every section and did some deleting too.

This article is a mess. The article is on, or supposed to be on, or trying to be on what makes someone a person. It's a philiophical article, and there's a reason that people have suggested moving this to personhood. There's a reason personhood redirects here.

But the article is a mess and only a fraction of it is on topic. There's was a section on Corporations as people which was silly. It was not on topic--it's another definition or person, and can be found at the disambiguation page for person. Whoever wrote the section even recognized that it was a separate topic. The paragraph began:"Largely separate from the discussion of 'real' people are considerations. . .."

There are also sections on the non-person debate, fetal rights, non-person humans, non-human people, and a section titled, "Possible criteria for Being a person". This article manages to get in aliens, embryos, comatose patients, chatboxes, the Guinness book of world records and Gorilla sign language.

Either this article discusses the legality of what a person is, or this article discusses the philosophy of what a person is. We can split this article and have articles on both, but most of the sections I tagged were not only off-topic and unencyclopedic (for this article), but they needed serious overhaul anyway.

I'd like to hear what people think. Do we want to change what this article discusses and make it focus on legal stuff, in which case it needs a TON of work because it needs sources and rewriting and is biased and has aliens and has practicaly zero global perspective? Do we want to keep the original focus, in which case we delete the extra stuff? Do we want to keep the original focus and does someone want to take a crack and writing "person (legal)" possibly using some of what we already have? TStein 10:59, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * The article should concentrate on the philosophical aspects, rather than the legal which, although it is related and needs mentioning, can be adequately covered in a elsewhere. Incidentally, be aware that the phrase 'being a person' has been altered from 'personhood' throughout the article and this is the subject of a separate debate which will hopefully result in 'personhood' being restored.  This will make the article more understandable.  Emeraude 11:13, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Ahhh. That makes sense.  I'm hoping that this article can be cleaned up (at least to the affect of what does and doesn't belong) and then I can bring up where this article belongs in relation to everything else.  Maybe we can also add the most important definition for person to the disambig page: confused. :)


 * I think my biggest beef with the whole legal aspect is that I really think there's a whole wiki section for that. I'm not sure that "person" can cover it, even if there is a seperate article.  First there are "rights people have", and that can be answered both philosophically and with a law book, but it's very difficult to answer with a global perspective.  Who has what rights where?  And there are other articles that cover that.  The second part is "all other things that are not considered human but people argue that they should be/given some sort of human rights/recognized as or similar to humans (legally) in some way"  And that includes everything, and again it's very hard to do from the global perspective, and there are already individual articles on all of these issues.  There are articles on fetus rights and animal rights and the rights of comatose patients and these articles can really do the job necessary because they can spend to time covering the issue globally and then dicuss all of the issues including the one of humanity and legality.  These various rights issues touch on and deal with a ton of things, only one of which deals with the topic we're dicussing.  Any article we try and write would be repetitive and not do nearly as good a job as the individual articles do.


 * I do think that it might be possible to write an article on person from a legal standpoint, but only if we looked at the big, big, big picture and didn't go into specifics but wikilinked like crazy.  We'd most likely need an expert of some kind to help out, because getting that kind of grasp on the big picture is hard, and we'd need to really make sure that the article had a good global focus.  Unfortunately, I don't think that the segments we have written now fit either of those criteria.  We don't have an expert who could do this lying around do we?  TStein 12:30, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Now that you mention it, the "rights" issue is a whole separate ball game! Human rights - OK, not much scope for dispute about what would be included there. But when we get into animal rights, or the rights of animals to be regarded as persons, foetus rights, etc rights, as if all these were persons, we are dealing with separate subjects and it may well be that lawyers are better qualified to write these than philosophers.  This article is useful, I think, in helping to define who/what may and may not be regarded as a person - personhood if you like - and if it could be edited to concentrate on that it would even be a useful source of reference for any of the 'rights' articles.  Emeraude 19:37, 8 January 2007 (UTC)

Major Cleanup Edit/ What Did you People Do?
I just completed a major cleanup. Many instances of people have been changed to persons, some have stayed and some have been made singular because the plural was incorrect. I'm not sure I got all of the instances down perfectly, so if you see an instance you think is incorrect, fix it and say why you think it's the other one (citing the Oxford). It would be helpful if you also dropped a quick line on the talk page to explain it. Besides the fact that for some reason "persons" v "people" proper usage is a contentious topic, some of the cases are difficult to figure out.

"Being a person"???

Are you kidding me? I don't care what kind of argument y'all are having or how important it is, you don't change the NAMES OF REFERENCES or QUOTES!!! So and so may have said this, but we aren't using the phrase "personhood" in the article so let's just say that he said this.

I don't know what the "being a person" arguement is about and frankly, I don't care. First off, it's ridiculously silly because the article sounds like crap because of it. The sentences make no sense half the time and aren't grammatically correct because whoever did these edits literally replaced "personhood" with "being a person" which doesn't work lots of places. Second, most of these article sections that are litered with "being a person" are referring to sources which use the term "personhood" and are talking about other peoples' work, their work on "personhood", a term that these people are using, not the term "being a person". Person is litered with instances similar to this: "____ argues that being a person ______", only no one the article cites uses this phrase.

Please, fill me in on this dispute and give me a solid reason for not changing all of these instances back so that the article properly refers to the people and theories that it discusses.

Haste makes waste

I get that this is a hotbed of more arguments than I can count, but editing this article was just sad. "comatosed" was not the only mistake that was a recent change, coming out of one of the many edit wars where Wikipedians rushed to change phrases and words and tenses without reading what they were writing.

"comatosed" people and persons aside, I think this article can really be good, and I'd like to see it happen. TStein 02:59, 9 January 2007 (UTC)

People v. persons, being a person v. personhood and reverting.
This article does not use the term "persons" or "people". Do NOT edit the article and change "persons" to "people" or "people" to "persons".

The debate HAS been settled. This article will use the proper pluralization of the word "person". Which means that the article currently uses both pluralizations. The ENTIRE pluralization of "person" definition (from the OED) has been copied onto the talk page. If you are not sure what to use where (and it gets complicated, for example, "persons" for biblical nations, "people" for nations in general), look at the OED definition or ask someone.

If someone changes everything to "persons" or to "people" revert back to the most recent edition that uses both terms properly. If other edits have been made since, add them in.

"Being a person" v. "personhood"

The articles that this article refers to use the term "personhood". The theories that this article refers to use the term "personhood." This article quotes these theories and refers to these theories and discusses them. We cannot use the term "being a person" when the context is "so-and-so also discusses this context of being a person". THEY don't. They discuss personhood. It's the term they use and therefore the term they must.

If someone really is against this term, they can go through the article and can substitute the term "being a person" for "personhood" at any point where the article isn't refering to someone else's theories or work and where it makes sense in the context of the sentence and works grammatically. I don't see the point, but you're welcome to do that. In the meantime, anyone who edits the article and changes it back to "being a person" is misrepresenting someone's work and theories.

The reverts done today reverted the article to where it misquoted work and where article's were misreferenced. That's not ok. TStein 09:13, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

last para???
Um, I'm not so sure about that edit Arthur Rubin.

In re the first one:

"'While historically most humans did not enjoy full legal protection as 'persons' (women, children, non-landowners, minorities, slaves, etc.), from the late 18th through the late 20th century being born as a member of the human species gradually became secular grounds for an appeal for basic rights of liberty, freedom from persecution, and humanitarian care.'"

I think you may be right although it's hard to tell whether or not the article is refering to the collective human race or the individuals within the human race.

But for the last section, "Individual rights and responsibility", I'm a little confused. The whole paragraph is refering to the human race. Humans are the only race expected to be ethically responsible etc. But in that first line is it refering to the individual rights of members of the human race or individual rights of persons who are not in any sort of collective? I think it has to be the former. The rights belong to the individuals, and we are speaking about individuals plural here, but we are speaking about a group of individuals who belong to a group (in this case the human race)...I think we could also just refer to definition 2b for this.

I've been round and round and back again though, so I'd like someone to double check the last para and make sure that it in fact referring to the human race when using the plural form of the word person. TStein 15:18, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

Just reviewing
This article seems to be very editorial in style. There may be a good case for a substantial rewrite to fix that, somewhere along the line, it seems. Theres a lot to say on "personhood", but I'm somewhat concerned that (as several tags suggest) this article is not doing the best of jobs of being encyclopedic about it at present. FT2 (Talk 17:20, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

Update: I've done the following edits to address this so far: FT2 (Talk 18:06, 15 January 2007 (UTC)
 * 1) Written a new intro, this one focusses on three areas: 1/ an overview of what personhood is (as opposed to discussion which belongs in the main article), 2/ why personhood matters and how it's applied, and 3/ what beings are (or are argued to be) persons and are hence affected by this question.
 * 2) Pulled the rest of the detail of "which philosophers say what" from the old intro to a starter sectin "definitions of personhood" where they can be stated and explored/contrasted more fully.
 * 3) Created a new section summarizing who personhood has been argued to apply to, and what if any controversies arise in this debate.
 * 4) Grouped several existing sections, without textual change, into an overview section, "Classification debates", to give the article some structure.


 * This is a great job of starting to work on the content. I think it appropriately handles what falls under the scope of an article on "persons" fairly well.


 * There are some things which still need to be done, either by myself or someone else. So here is a todo list for the article.


 * general article clean-up for the newly written sections and the sections that are definately being kepy. General editing, mostly small things but a few sentences need to be rewritten.  If someone (including me) doesn't get around to this soon, I'll add a tag for reminder.
 * Fetuses are not an exception to human beings after birth. They are one of the hotly debated exceptions, but I think all parties agree that they are not after birth.  Those few sentences need to be cleaned up in general.
 * standard formatting needs to be applied. There are lines in some places not others.  There are sources thrown in that are completely un-wikified.  I know this is hard to do while this is tagged beyond belief, but it's on the todo list now.
 * final decision made on the removal of the tagged sections. Could we get some votes?  I don't want to wait much longer before making edits on those sections--it's already been a week and no one seems against deleting those sections.  Could we get some more votes and then go ahead and finish cleaning?  08:21, 16 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Looking over the article, it seems to me that those sections proposed for deletion belong somewhere in Wikipedia, although possibly not in this article. The "Personhood in fetal development" section probably is hopeless, but the other sections would seem valuable if adequately sourced.  &mdash; Arthur Rubin |  (talk) 15:08, 16 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Support for major clean-up: This in addition to the points made by user:FT2 and User:Arthur Rubin, this article could also benefit from restructuring. For example, the lead section focuses on philosophical viewpoints, but the scope of this subject clearly calls for a broader introductory summary. Legal, literary, moral (deontological), phenomenological, mythical, sociological, historic, economic and religious definitions of 'person' are all detailed enough to justify stand-alone article for each. The lead section should either indicate something to that effect, or the article should be retitled to reflect a more narrow scope. The non-philosophical sections currently seem "tacked on" and disjointed. dr.ef.tymac 06:54, 18 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Dreftymac - Very very nice edits to the structure, and especially to clarifying then setting out the various uses and contexts of the term. Much impressed at the gradual change you have made in the last 24 hours to the article. FT2 (Talk 15:18, 18 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Hi FT2, thanks for the feedback and also for initiating the discussion on major issues with the article. I think a lot of your points were spot-on, and it's just a matter of making the incremental improvements to the work already done, and eventually addressing the tagged content, as well as the other "todo" items. Good job to all who have worked on this article so far, hoping we can keep it steadily moving forward. dr.ef.tymac 20:20, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

Title
I think this article might be better titled "Personhood" rather than "Person". Thoughts? FT2 (Talk 15:25, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
 * Benefits=(consistent with associated article (e.g., 'corporate personhood'); consistent with the usage in the article) Problems=(not so sure "personhood" will help people find this article via search; it may over-emphasize the 'analytic' and 'conceptual' "tests" at the expense of the "literary" or "religious" meanings of 'person'). Questions=(would that then justify the creation of another article "person"? If so, how would that other article differ? Would person just be a redirect to "personhood"?). My vote would be to hold off on such a renaming for now at least, until the structure of this article stabilizes a bit more, and until more citations are added. The text of the citations can help establish common usage and terms. dr.ef.tymac 20:32, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
 * Sensible approach - no rush. FT2 (Talk 01:49, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

Is there a name for this?
We seem to have two main ways person/hood is defined:
 * One use of the term is on the basis of identity, self awareness, etc - ie something about inherent inner qualities and capabilities an entity has regardless of others.
 * The other use of the term is centred round agency and recognition - ie something about rights and responsibilities in their relationships with others.

Is this an acknowledged split in philosophy or dictionaries or somewhere? Does these "whatever they are" (meanings? viewpoints? definitional approachs?) have a formal name or title or class or something? Can we characterize the distinction better than just noting it is used in either sense? FT2 (Talk 01:49, 20 January 2007 (UTC)
 * 1) phenomenological, epistemic, ontological, existential, (etc. etc.) loosely categorized under the header "conceptual definitions of self or personhood"; 2) deontological, ethical, moral, relitavistic, utilitarian (etc. etc.) loosely categorized under the header "normative definitions of personal and inter-personal responsibility"? Very deep stuff, hard to think of a single definitive basis that everyone could agree with. dr.ef.tymac 03:32, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

Do not rename this page
I've requested an uncontroversial move to undo Rebroad's rogue editing. IF someone liked this name change, as soon as the name is changed back, they can go to Wikiepedia:Requested moves and properly request it as a controversial move and go through the steps. Miss Mondegreen | Talk  11:33, 17 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Miss Mondegreen. The move I did was uncontroversial as it was to bring the article in line with the description already given on the disambiguation page. However, now that you have raised an issue with it, it can no longer be deemed uncontroversial, and therefore it seems a bit cheeky that you have submitted it to be moved back as a not controversial move!! --Rebroad 18:45, 20 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I have no idea how I missed this comment before and I've replied to you elsewhere but for the record I'll reply here as well. The disambiguation page doesn't define this article--this article defines this article.  If the description there was off, then the description needed to be changed, not the article name.  The article name would only need to be changed if it didn't fit the article, and as you can see, you changed the article name to something that fit the article less.  Everything else I've covered elsewhere, and in case anyone here doesn't know, I requested it as an uncontroversial move because changing back to the last version with consensus is uncontroversial.  Anyone who wants to propose any name change they want is free to do so at WP:RM.  But propose first.  Miss Mondegreen | Talk   08:00, 22 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Article needs a different name: Person (philosphical) is misleading. Even a casual reading shows it's not strictly philosophical (at least not in its current state). In fact, it's all over the map. Even ignoring the heavily-tagged and dubious content, this article is in need of serious review, starting with the title (someone earlier proposed personhood). I think a strong case can be made for trimming it down drastically, and making it little more than a disambiguation page to more specific articles in the variously described subcategories briefly enumerated in the article. dr.ef.tymac 13:29, 17 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Dreftymac--I'm working on undoing what Rebroad did, but it hasn't been easy, because the edits boarded on really smart vandalism. This user edited the name of the article at the disambig page first, and then used that as the reason for moving the Person article, "as per distinction on disambiguation page" a distinction of course, that he created.
 * He then edited the Person page redirecting it to Person (disambiguation) which went against long standing consensus and kept non-admins from being able to undo his move.
 * I agree with you, I think this is an awful name for the article because the article covers both the philosophical state of being a person and the legal state of being a person, but either way, this name changed should have been proposed. Several name changes have been proposed in the past because people do want to clean the article up and rename it and possibly split it up and possibly move the disambig page to Person, but all of that requires consensus.
 * I listed moving the page back to person as an uncontroversial move at Wiki:Reqested moves, but it was moved to incomplete because it said I didn't provide rationale, which I had. I've replied, and I'm waiting on it, but I can't fix this myself--we need an admin, either from Requested moves or just a general one.  It shouldn't be a big deal to get it fixed because even if some people like this idea, no proposed move has gone through before because this is a controversial article and we're just trying to revert this wild editing.
 * I've undone what I can do (the redirects that were changed), but other than that we're waiting on an admin to undo this, and then yes, I think we should plow ahead with the clean-up and everything else. Anyone got an admin on IM? Miss Mondegreen | Talk   07:12, 18 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Moved back. I can't figure out why Person still has a "reference" to Talk:Person (philosphical), as seen in Special:Whatlinkshere/Talk:Person (philosphical).  Any ideas?  &mdash; Arthur Rubin |  (talk) 13:32, 18 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I don't know. It's a bug I'm guessing, and probably has something to do with all of the redirects and moves that it went through.  Miss Mondegreen | Talk   07:09, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

Getting back to business
Now that the vandalism has all been taken care of, we stuck back with what to do with this page. Here are the issues I remember:
 * cleanup
 * what belongs on this page, philosophical personhood? legal personhood?
 * split the article?
 * naming the article, naming split articles

I don't really think I can do much work work until March Madness is over. Not because I'm losing that much productivity :), but because I lost so much before March began, that March would be mad even without bracket busters. But before I do anything, and before anyone does anything, it would be nice if we knew what we were aiming for.  This article only covers philosophical personhood and legal personhood, and the way it is now, even if it were cleaned and everything both things don't seem to belong in the same article.  The article could be written in a different voice, talking about the different types of personhood, philosophical, legal, (whatever else), or it could be split into two articles and cover each one better.

But before we start chopping and writing and stuff, it would be nice to have an idea of what we're getting at. Miss Mondegreen | Talk  07:09, 19 March 2007 (UTC)


 * I think you touched on the main problem here. I seem to recall the last major "cleanup" effort on this article consisting of patching up deficiencies and a start at a semi-coherent structure. Some contributors attempted to reform the pre-existing hodge-podge but so far, no one has undertaken direct editorial responsibility for this article. Both user:FT2 and User:Arthur Rubin mentioned key issues, and I attempted a skeletal 'structure' with the Person section, but so far, this article really has no outline to speak of. Is there enough momentum to start one here in discussion or in the User space?


 * I think the second primary problem stems from the subject matter itself. I think there are citable and legitimate candidate topics for inclusion that are nonetheless going to be magnets for trolls, cranks and soapbox-jockeys: 1) religious doctrines; 2) non-human and artificial 'persons'; 3) political and sociological definitions and implications; and 4) recurring debates (such as with fetal development). (I don't know how many of those already exist somewhere in other articles.)


 * These are some reasons for the earlier thought about just making this a disambiguation article. If this article is going to be comprehensive, and yet stay NPOV, then it's going to take coordination, and some astute anti-vandalism work, on the level of Miss Mondegreen's recent efforts, on a regular basis. Who has the energy for that? Perhaps another option is just tag it for attention by an expert and see if that increases momentum. dr.ef.tymac 15:43, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

People persons!
Can someone brifely summarise the difference between "people" and "persons" and include this within the article please? --Rebroad 11:36, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
 * This is the difference. But this is Wikipedia not Wiktionary, so I fail to see why we'd write an article on it.  At any rate, it wouldn't fit in here, it would be a separate article altogether.  Miss Mondegreen | Talk   12:27, 28 March 2007 (UTC)


 * People, persons and other impertinent pipsqueaks will inevitably continue to wonder the same thing. An explanation or usage note of some kind could very usefully be included, in entirely appropriate Wikipedia fashion. Obey 12:48, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Dig back in the archive of this discussion. You will see a long tedious debate where an editor globally altered every occurence of persons to people on the spurious grounds that there was no such word as 'persons', the plural of 'person' being 'people'. You will find masses of dictionary defintions in that part of the archive explaining the varied uses of 'persons' and 'people'. Emeraude 12:54, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
 * No archive digging necessary Emeraude--the full OED definition is on this talk page and I linked to it. The problem with including a notation Obey is twofold.  First, it's not really appropriate.  If people aren't educated, that's their problem.  We can provide a link to the word at wiktionary and make sure the entry there is top-notch.  The second problem is look the definition.  Look at it--that's a really long definition, and there's no way that could go anywhere except in an article of it's own.  We could try and make a as general as possible ignoring specificities, vague but not too vague definition/explanation, but I'm not sure we could, or that it would really belong.  Miss Mondegreen | Talk   13:09, 28 March 2007 (UTC)