Talk:Phenomenology (philosophy)/Archive 1

Kant
Kant should be mentioned in the first paragaph, as either an early practitioner of phenomenology (his constructivist epistomology) or as Husserl's inspiration.
 * Yes, although Husserl also disagreed with Kant on certain points. He was also influenced by Brentano and Frege. Now, there's criticism below stating that people do not understand what phenomenology is based on this article. There are two basic contrasts missing. In philosophy, phenomenology is contrasted with the classical disciplines of ontology and epistemology, and this, for one, makes it notable. In cognitive science, phenomenology is contrasted with psychology and neuropsychology. It studies the structuration of consciousness and lived experience via bracketing biological concerns away and thus focuses on consciousness/experience itself drawing its methodology and terminology from there. As one example, phenomenology studies emotions such as hate, but with disregard to the chemistry or the evolutionary function of hate. Thus, it studies hate as it appears. This makes sufficient sense and obviously has many applications. However, phenomenology is not claimed to be something fancy and abstract but something simple and concrete-- some basic notions that had been ignored. I could try to improve the introduction. Femke 01 (talk) 07:16, 15 January 2023 (UTC)

This article needs major clearing up
Even after reading this article I am still not sure what the hell Phenomenology IS. I gently suggest that those who are working on this article should make it clearer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Foamhead (talk • contribs) 11:11, 19 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Unfortunately the subject may bear a good deal of the responsibility for this obscurantism. Jaydubya93 (talk) 13:13, 16 January 2014 (UTC)
 * I agree the subject matter makes it hard to describe and grasp. I think some organization may be helpful such as adding a "history" section describing the history of the subject itself and its adherents. With all the already intense subject matter and many contributors to the ideas of phenomenology, it was easy to get lost in various parts of the article. Halio45 (talk) 05:55, 21 January 2021 (UTC)

I'd say a good way of clearing this entire article up would be to put all the different uses of the term, historical uses, etc, in a separate heading towards the bottom. The introduction should, basically, be about Husserl's phenomenology, with the beginning mentioning that "Although the term phenomenology may indicate different things depending on context, today it usually refers to Edmund Husserls philosophical system." The way it is now, when you enter the page, all you get is confusing historical information. It's also a bit silly to first say it has three main uses, and then list several other uses before making a slightly more detailed description of Husserl's philosophy, including the most direct influences, and then adding yet another list of influences after that. Then, it all continues detailing the development of Husserl's phenomenology in his books. It would be better to treat it less as Husserl's "property," and focus more on just detailing what phenomenology is, noting important philosophers, and then a short list of major concepts. Because there are way way too many concepts that are specific to phenomenology if all types of phenomenology is included, it would be better to keep this list to the basic ones (lifeworld, intentionality, lived body, noema and noesis, the specific definition of phenomenon (how phenomenology it avoids becoming rationalism or empiricism or any other reductionist philosophy), and some others).Der Zeitgeist (talk) 10:44, 1 July 2008 (UTC)


 * 'This Article Needs Major Clearing Up'~Response: I added right away some description of the dichotomy between Cartesian Analysis and Phenomenological Reflection--I even found the word analysis right off the bat: Phenomenologists explicitly reject that word--and an example of the way in which Phenomenology better resembles non-theistic mysticism. I sighted my specific example for "nature as miracle" but not for the bigger part that I edited; still, it made no sense before and contradicted the definition of Phenomenology--not to mention, I found ZERO words in the introduction about the distinction between a world of objects and actions as the two elements of a largely deterministic universal dynamic that can be fully understood through empiricism alone and an understanding that looks to consciousness or "phenomena": no one explained, clearly, this important difference, and thusly, it made no sense and just sounded like vague rambling about extremely general terms that effectively meant nothing with out their context, which the past author obviously did not understand, in that said author defined phenomenology with a "[primary interest in]...analysis"=wrong, very wrong — Preceding unsigned comment added by 166.70.26.190 (talk) 04:25, 8 November 2011 (UTC)

I feel, reading this, that it is already too much about Edmund Husserl, whereas the transition from Husserlian to Heideggerian phenomenology was deep and profound. Heidegger rejected basing phenomenology on the study of conscious experience in order to avoid the problem of the Cartesian cogito and possible solipsism that entails. For Heidegger, being-in-the-world is prior to the intentional acts of "consciousness," and unlike Husserl, he rejects any metaphysical separation of subject and object. I think we have to make more room for post-Heideggerian phenomenology. undergroundman 17:53, 11 February 2012 (UTC)

By assuming that Husserl is the founder of phenomenology it ignores the Hegelian and Kantian contributions except as afterthoughts. Why begin with Husserl instead of Hegel, who first uses the term in a major work that deals largely with the structure of experience? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.21.104.252 (talk) 15:49, 14 February 2012 (UTC)
 * While I agree about Hegel, Kant might best be understood as a citation rather than a "contributor". I have a hard time conceiving of Kant considering himself a "phenomenologist". Jaydubya93 (talk) 13:16, 16 January 2014 (UTC)


 * Phenomenology characterises itself by the study of phenomena, which literally means appearances, opposed to reality. This train of though come directly from Plato’s cavern, so by your interpretation we could start the phenomenological investigation with Plato who tried to talk about phenomena. Like Plato, Hegel and Kant are not phenomenologist who follow the methodology created by Husserl. What Hegel and Kant mainly meant by phenomenology was the study of appearances fundamental to empirical knowledge by sensory certainty. Husserl, greatly inspired by Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), developed a clear conception of phenomenology, tightly allied with the conception of intentionality.  So with Husserl, phenomena must be reconceived as objective intentional contents (sometimes called intentional objects) of subjective acts of consciousness. Even if people like Hegel and Kant where talking about perception and thoughts, which meant that they where indeed applying phenomenology, the where not phenomenologist in the proper sense that we use in a contemporary context. We could say that epistemology came into its proper being with Descartes, metaphysics with Aristotle who followed Plato, and phenomenology came into its own with Husserl. --JLRoy (talk) 16:43, 21 October 2019 (UTC)

Possible Disambiguation Topic
''Phenomenology is:

A) an administrative way of getting alternative views; B) a behavioural response to personal stimuli; C) a computable way of formating or viewing things from an individual's perspective; E) an empiricist way of validating one's thoughts; I) an ideal way of formating personal attributes; P) a phenomenologist way of viewing things from a mental view; S) a solipsist way of viewing how one's view of one's world affects one;''

This is a strange sort of article. Is is possible to have a more conventional sort of write-up, too?


 * I'm not really sure who would really be looking for any of these lettered topics. I would imagine people  coming to this page would be looking for either (1) what is the meaning of the term "phenomenology", or (2) information about the philosophical school of phenomenology.   But I was philosophy student, so I might not be the best judge.  AdamDiCarlo 15:49, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

Variants and Schools within Phenomenology
The article reads a little like a quick biography of Husserl. As well as Brian Shapiros point that Hegel was an important influence there is little on Heidegger's role and nothing whatsoever on Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I'd like to see a broadening of the article to cover more of the variation within phenomenology. This might also better elucidate the common unifying themes that help define the school. Dr Headgear April 1 2004


 * [Regarding schools or strands of Phenomenology,] I dont think these should necessarily have seperate pages, rather a few paragraphs on each. --Dr Headgear 15:01, 2 Apr 2004 (UTC)
 * Well, Munich phenomenology rejected Husserl's later transcendental turn, so they are fundamentally different. However, we do not need to decide this now. We should rather start working on them as sections within the phenomenology article and see later on whether they need an article of their own. Cat 15:49, 2 Apr 2004 (UTC)
 * OK, agreed, lets write and see what comes out. --Dr Headgear 16:53, 2 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I think sections 3 and 4 should be removed and placed under a new section "Transcendental Phenomenology". Husserl can be included here as a transcendental phenomenologist. Section 5 should include that Husserl began as a phenomenological realist. Cpointon (talk)

Realist Phenomenology
A small subsection, outlining phenomenology as espoused in the _Logical Investigations_. Link to it from Munich phenomenology. AdamDiCarlo 15:58, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

Phenomenology largely began as realist phenomenology, being a descriptive science of the world and "its manifestations in art, culture and science, in an attempt to unveil the essential features of the world as experienced by ordinary human beings"

Transcendental Phenomenology
Phenomenology as espoused in the _Ideen_. Probably what people generally mean when the say phenomenology. Another topic referred to by the Munich phenomenology page. AdamDiCarlo 15:58, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

For the majority of his career Husserl practiced Transcendental Phenomenology

Munich phenomenology

 * There's already a separate article on this, I guess we need to link to it. AdamDiCarlo 15:49, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

Existential phenomenology
Existential phenomenology differs from transcendental phenomenology by it's rejection of the transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego's transcendence of the world, which for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transperent before the concious. Heidegger thinks of conscious being as always and already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a presuppositionless starting point - transcending claims about the world arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories of the ontological nature of the world.

Impact of Phenomenology
I'd suggest adding to all of this, something about the general influence of phenomenology and its relationship to other streams of thought, e.g. structuralism, poststructuralism, analytic philosophy, consciousness studies. Mporter 01:56, 9 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Rejection of Cartesian Dualism and Realism

 * Does this fit well enough for both trans. and ext. Ph. ? Dr Headgear


 * Phenomenology arises from the failure of naturalism. Naturalist disciplines, like obviously the natural sciences, need a firm foundation to account for their status. However, you cannot employ a naturalist epistemology to found the validity of naturalist disciplines, because this leads to a vicious circle of a method "proving" its own validity. Phenomenology observes that not all knowledge is empirical and hence not all science needs to be naturalist. We do experience ourselves (or "our selves") in a completely different way as we experience external objects. Moreover, when we employ methodological scepticism, we see that we could be misled about everything appearing in our senses except our own consciousness about it. This would lead to solipsism, except that while we live in this limbo of suspending our judgements over the existence of external objects, we are in a privileged position to investigate their essence. We can use all logical possibilities, and not mere empirical generalisation, to categorise and analyse the objects that we experience with our senses by uncovering their essence, i.e. what makes them objects of one kind instead of another. Doing this without having to refer to really existing things "out there", produces invaluable results because, by suspending the naturalist prejudice, we can produce a non-empirical and hence non-circular foundation for the natural sciences. There are various concrete analyses given in the works of phenomenologists like Pfänder, Daubert, Scheler etc. concerning values, ethics, art, law, right, etc. but one of the most impressive examples is that of Adolf Reinach who gave an analysis of legal language that led him to the discovery of speech acts, 50 years before John Austin, who eventually also spoke of linguistic phenomenology in reference to his own work. Does this answer your request at least partially? I have tried to avoid most typical phenomenological terminology, but if you want me to, I'll use "transcendental" in the next one ... . Cat 13:19, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

Precursors of Phenomenology (Berkeley)
I'm surprised that there isn't more mention of Berkeley's idealism in relation to phenomenology. Berkeley's idealism asserted that our only direct, immediate knowledge is of the ideas, representations, and perceptual pictures in our mind. We don't directly know what is external to our mind, that is, what is considered to be "real." Husserl's bracketing of reality and focus on mental phenomena seem to follow Berkeley's thinking. 152.163.100.11 16:44, 18 September 2005 (UTC)James Moriarty, Professor of Mathematics


 * I would agree, this is clearly a precursor of phenomenology, as is skepticism, both from the ancients and from Hume. It would be worthwhile to add a section indicating precursors of phenomenology. AdamDiCarlo 15:49, 13 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Also it isn't entirely clear that Husserl escaped a form of idealism himself. Johnor 10:11, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Lifeworld
The lifeworld ("Lebenswalt" if I remember correctly) was a key element of later phenomenological writings of Husserl, and probably deserves at least a quick mention and definition. AdamDiCarlo 15:49, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

Critique of Phenomenology
A survey of some of the most salient critiques of phenomenology.

Bracketing brackets too much
Phenomenology assumes that mental activities are completely transparent. No account is taken of the influence of, say, native language on thought processes themselves. The theory of object constitution, a large topic of the _Ideen_, takes no account of the impact of linguistic terms as "pre-given" as it were to the perceiving subject. It is difficult if not impossible to modify the phenomenological study of mental apperception to account for linguistic or historical factors. AdamDiCarlo 15:49, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

See the work of Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, where he talks about the impossibility of a complete transcendental reduction. 16:39 09 May 2006


 * Are there not philosophical critiques? Should they not be described? Pelarmian (talk) 14:34, 17 November 2019 (UTC)

Fall of Phenomenology
It might be worthwhile to look at what happened to the influence of phenomenology, specifically, its dwindling influence. The phenomenological school does have an arc, where it grew and then shrank. By the 60s it was almost completely gone.

I would suggest that phenomenology represented one of the last great "aufklarung" projects of total knowledge. That is, it assumes a complete knowability of the mind. It also envisioned philosophy being crowned again as the apex of the sciences. More "partial" philosophies such as post-structuralism, deconstructionism, situationalism reflected a more limited role that philosophy was to limit itself. Basically, the enlightenment becoming the post-enlightenment. This is probably too broad and editorial however. AdamDiCarlo 15:49, 13 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Actually, phenomenology is experiencing somewhat of a resurge right now. People such as Alva Noë, Shuan Gallagher, Pierre Bourdieu, Hubert Dreyfus, Albert Borgmann, and many others have contributed a great amount to a contemporary phenomenology movement. In fact these phenomenologists (Bourdieu is not really a phenomenologist, but the influence that phenomenology, especially Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, has had on his work is undeniable) have largely reconciled their theories with scientific studies. I am mainly talking here about those in the tradition of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who speak of embodiment and such, but I think it is too soon to say that phenomenology has totally dwindled. Many people, in all different disciplines (philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology) are subscribing to more or less phenomenological positions these days. What really needed to be done was to look to science, especially psychology and the neurosciences etc., and to situate the subjectivity of phenomenology within an overall structural, or objective, framework (as Bourdieu endeavored to accomplish). This may be coming from my biased selection in readings, but I think that most contemporary phenomenology is more in the Heideggerian/Merleau-Pontian vein. That is to say, they deal more with analyzing the body and being-in-the-world and practices. I am not sure if there is much transcendental phenomenology these days. It seems that many people are still taking from Husserl, but not to the extend that they are commiting themselves to an acknowledgement of the superiority of cognition, or to intellectualism, or to recognizing some sort of transcendental ego. Of course, I could be wrong about this. The main point is that phenomenology is still alive, though it may be weaker (it does not seem to have had any major theorists like Husserl or Heidegger lately). Drifter 05:34, 10 August 2006 (UTC)


 * I think it is not meaningful to declare philosophies dead based on trends. They must be debunked if to be declared dead, truly. Otherwise they're just out of fashion. Rursus dixit. ( m bork3 !) 21:07, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

Surely somebody must have debunked it completely at some time? Seadowns (talk) 17:04, 14 August 2019 (UTC)

Article structure
I made some changes based on Adam's suggestions and on the Italian article. I hope the "stubby" sections and the lists can be expanded to something better. Just two more points to make here: 1) Husserl's realist phenomenology of the first edition of the LI is not the same as later realist phenomenology by the Munich group and others. Also the Munich current is not coincidental with all of realist phenomenology, i.e. not all realists are Munich realists. AS reported on the CARP page, recent realists include Barry Smith and Karl Schuhmann. So I'd keep two separate sections on Husserl's early stuff and later realism. 2) The one big glaring omission is that of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Perhaps we should do something about that before worrying about precursors and decline and such. :) Cat 10:58, 14 October 2005 (UTC)

Is there something left out in the first words?
Shouldn't
 * Phenomenology is a current philosophy

be
 * Phenomenology is a current in philosophy

?--Imz 03:53, 29 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Corrected. Cat 16:31, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Existential Phenomenology
Is it right to call Heidegger an Existential Phenomenologist? As far as my limited knowledge of the subject goes, this term - not widely in use, in my experience - connotes the Existentialism of Sartre with whom Heidegger has been lumped, and also with Levinas, who was certainly greatly influenced by Heidegger's thought but had little to do with Sartre's interpretations, again. Heidegger does repeatedly make use of the terms existentiality, existence, etc but they mean different things and Heidegger himself objected to Sartre's use of the words. Sartre popularised the term Existentialism to refer to the rather different ideas expressed in Being and Nothingness - any comments/ revision suggestions? -- Simonides 06:18, 5 February 2006 (UTC)
 * Though Heidegger repudiated the term, he is considered nevertheless an existentialist. Furthermore, though he distanced himself critically from Husserl's phenomenology, he is considered a phenomenologist. Therefore the most suitable label, even if it's use is not widespread, is to call him an "existential phenomenologist". This term is used with explicit reference to Heidegger, for instance here (tendencies and stages-existential phenomenology) For Heidegger as an existentialist see here. Hope this helps. Cat 09:54, 5 February 2006 (UTC)
 * He is of course a phenomenologist, my quibble is with the preface "existential" which is not used by any philosophers of note. Historians of philosophy tend to come up with phrases that oversimplify philosophical terms and have little philosophical content, for instance by calling Kierkegaard, Kafka, et al "Existentialist" - I don't think we should adopt the dilution of the terms. -- Simonides 23:40, 5 February 2006 (UTC)
 * "not used by any philosophers of note" is a vague criterium: do you consider of note those who I consider of note? The authors of the two webpages I linked above are two established scholars, tenured professors in their field and they use the label "existential phenomenology" for Heidegger's philosophy. They do not call him existentialist, but existential phenomenologist, which clearly distinguishes him from Sartre (whom few would call "phenomenologist"). If you are really offended by the epiteton "existentialist" you could call him an "ontological phenomenologist", however, considering the research area of organisations such as SPEP I don't think anyone in the field actually has many qualms about associating Heidegger with existential philosophy / phenomenology. Cat 09:47, 6 February 2006 (UTC)


 * A phenomenological existentialist...Platypusjones 18:37, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

Shall we clarify the definition?
The very beginning of the definition goes:

Phenomenology is an approach to philosophy that takes the intuitive experience of phenomena (what presents itself to us in conscious experience) as its starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of experiences and the essence of what we experience.

Now, let's clarify here what is that "it" in the sentence referring to. It's not clear. In short, let's look at the structure of the sentence: Phenomenology is an approach that takes something as its starting point and tries to extract something from it. It what?

If would be nice to clarify that part.

For more detailed information on Phenomenology go to http://www.ihoratio.com

The "it" from that definition seems to refer, fairly unproblematically, to refer to whatever the initial occurrence of "Phenomenology" refers to. 67.171.140.29 (talk) 06:15, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

Part on Husserl and Heidegger
I temporarily removed the following piece from the article to put it up for discussion. I think it is a bit too POV in its present form. Cat 19:41, 28 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Although perhaps most Encyclopedias will maintain otherwise, the view expressed by Edmund Husserl himself is that Martin Heidegger did not develop the philosophy of phenomenology. Rather, Edmund Husserl, a Jew by race, was retired by the Nazi Party and Martin Heidegger, a member of the Nazi Party, was installed in his place.  The ideology developed by Heidegger was original to him, using Heidegger's original terminology.  Thus the new science of phenomenology as defined by Husserl was halted with the advent of Heidegger, and was revived only after the fall of the Nazi government by scholars who recognized Husserl's unique value.


 * Very well, then let's discuss it, Cat. Perhaps it's too pointed as written, yet the facts of the matter are on its side.  Most Encyclopedias don't have the courage to discuss the obvious facts -- but rather than overbalance obsequious Encyclopedias, I'm willing to maintain the NPOV that the facts offer -- provided that we reveal the relevant facts as they are.  The discussion should at minimum indicate: (a) Heidegger was indeed a Nazi; (b) Husserl was indeed a Jew; and (c) Husserl disapproved of Heidegger's technical treatment of phenomenology.  The rest of it, that: (d) a Nazi would naturally displace a Jew at the University, in a most hostile way if necessary; and (e) Heidegger's hasty and non-phenomenological composition of BEING AND TIME was intended to satisfy minimal requirements for Husserl's post, may be set aside for a later entry. Petrejo 01:56, 31 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Heidegger was not a Nazi when he "displaced a Jew" at Freiburg. This was 1927, not 1933 when the party assumed power. Are his rectorship and his assumption of Husserl's chair being conflated here? There was certainly no hostility in this assumption, as Husserl assisted him in it. 129.21.104.252 (talk) 16:26, 14 February 2012 (UTC)


 * It seems a little dubious to call Heidegger's B&T non-phenomenological. It all depends on the definition. If phenomenology is simply a method of describing phenomena as they appear, or, as Merleau-Ponty says it, a return to the phenomena, then I think Heidegger's exposition certainly was phenomenological, for it attempted to describe the experience of Da-sein in a primordial fashion. If phenomenology is a method, not a position, then I think it could be said that Husserl and Heidegger differ largely in content, not in form. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty made the apt observation that Heidegger's philosophy flows straight from Husserl (or something to that extent). By this he might have meant that Husserls method, carried to its limits, will result in something like Heidegger's B&T (at least with respect to, for example, being-in-the-world), or otherwise that Husserl in his later life came to many of the same conclusions that Heidegger did (especially with respect to lebenswelt, etc.). While the political differences did indeed serve as an indubitible background for each's philosophy, we should recognize that the philosophies are neither mutually exclusive (as can be seen in the way in which they are often combined by philosophers) nor completely discontinuous and opposed to each other.

a) Heidegger was a Nazi: OK, but this is the article about phenomenology, not about Heidegger or the Nazi party. b) Husserl was an ethnic Jew, and hence victim of racial laws passed by the Nazis: OK, but this is an article about phenomenology, not about Husserl's biography or about Lehrstuhlpolitik in Germany in the '20 & '30 c) Husserl not only disapproved of Heideggger, he explicitly stated that what Heidegegr was doing was not phenomenology at all (at least not Husselrian phenomenology) and called his work "Geniale Unwissenschaftlichkeit": OK this is indeed relevant for the article. d) Heidegger replaced Husserl, but I do not know in how far that went paired with personal hostilities. Heidegger as a Professor had to be a party member (AFAIK) and obey the rul, even though he might disagree with them, or be fired. Not sure, but I don't think it is very relevant here. e) This hastyness is new to me, I have to check it, I'll get back to you tomorrow about this. That it is unphenomenological needs to be amended: it is not Husserlian phenomenology.

My main beef is that many of the statements, while true or arguably true, are not very relevant in the current context. The article is about Phenomenology as a current in philosophy. Perhaps we could also write another article about the history of the phenomenological movement, taking into account who was professor where and when or why he was promoted and who he knew and liked or disliked. I hope though that we can keep this article here more focused on the philosophical content. However, I think some of your points can be easily integrated in the articles and biographies of Husserl and Heidegger. Cat 12:13, 31 May 2006 (UTC)


 * If you want to talk about Phenomenology, Cat, specifically Husserl's Phenomenology, then it makes good sense to be accurate. It is *relevant* that Heidegger was *not* a follower of Husserl -- because most Encyclopedias say that he *was*.  See how important that is?  The truth matters.  We can try to show the reader that Heidegger was *not* a follower of Husserl by using advanced philosophical language -- but that is for experts and professionals.  We can *also* show that Heidegger wasn't a follower of Husserl by showing the *external* facts of their relationship.


 * Since Heidegger was an alleged student of Husserl, that leads the uninformed to conclude that Heidegger was paying attention to Husserl. But Husserl says he wasn't.  What was Heidegger doing then?  The facts suggest a reasonable reply -- Heidegger was planning to kick Husserl out in any way he could.  You say that's not proven, Cat, but actually you haven't read all the facts, have you?  There are several books on this topic -- a good starting author is Tom Rockmore.


 * Heidegger was *not* a follower of Husserl, as Husserl says. That's the key.  To know more about Heidegger's involvement with Nazism is critical.  It *does* influence his writing.  (If Heidegger were a composer or architect, you could argue that his politics wouldn't necessarily influence his work.  But writing and philosophy are special cases.  They *are* influenced by personal politics.)


 * Advocates of Heidegger try to argue that he joined the Nazi Party at such-and-such a date, and so he had no interest in the Nazi Party before that. The facts speak otherwise.  Heidegger made many speeches in favor of Hitler and the Nazi Party -- including all the Heil Hitlers -- and it shows in his writings, when, for example, he writes of the lack of scientific spirit in philosophy.  Also, his advocacy of Nietzsche is directly related to Hitler's enthusiastic advocacy of Nietzsche.  These are not isolated cases.  (Naturally that's an emotional topic.)


 * We're speaking of Phenomenology -- specifically that of Husserl, so please get the facts correct, Cat. Speak of Husserl, but DON'T speak of Heidegger in that way, even though most other Encyclopedias do.  They don't know or don't care.  The facts declare that Heidegger made zero contribution to the advancement of phenomenology -- whether Hegel's or Husserl's.


 * If you wish to be accurate, Cat, then don't follow the crowd. Leave Heidegger out of it -- unless you feel competent to make the case before Professors.  Speak more of Husserl, and more of Hegel, and you'll have the right approach. Petrejo 00:10, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Indeed, I agree, let's get the facts correct. Husserl intended Heidegger to be his successor and carry on with phenomenology, several letters report his glowing opinion of Heidegger. Then between 1927 and 1931 he begins to get severe doubts about Heidegger's approach, for instance he writes to Roman Ingarden that "Heidegger diesen Gang und somit den ganzen Sinn der Methode der phänomenologischen Reduktion nicht erfaßt " (Brief an Ingarden, 1927, BW III, S. 236)." Notwithstanding Husserl himself proposed Heidegger to be his successor at Freiburg. However, after reading Sein und Zeit" Husserl kame to the conclusion that "ich das Werk nicht im Rahmen meiner Phänomenologie einordnen kann..." (Brief an Ingarden, 1929, BW III, S. 254)." As we both agree, what Heidegger is doing is not Husserlian phenomenology. Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink tried to carry on Husserl's work, but I do think we should acknowledge that Heidegger's own brand of philosophy should still be called phenomenology and should be distinguished very clearly from Husserl's. Hence the approach in the article to individuate different phases and stages of the phenomenological movement and my proposal to split them out into realist phenomenology (the Münich group, and more recently Spiegelberg, Schuhmann, Smith), transcendental phenomenology, or constitutive phenomenology, developed after the transcendental or idealist turn (Husserl's mature position, most known and studied), and finally existential phenomenology, which would be Heidegger's approach in SuZ. I still think that Heidegger's relation to Nazism and the possible influecens of Nazi ideology on his work are best left for a separate article and should not enter into this one. The personal realtionship of Husserl and Heidegger can best be treated in their respective biographies, not here. In the content of your observations I might even agree to a great extent, but I just don't think this is the right place. If you want to address Heidegger's (very personal) interpretaions of Nazism, feel free to start a new article. This one here is about phenomenology in general and its development. Heidegger is considered to be part of that and it is correct to report it here, making it clear that it is very different from Husserl's, but then also Husserl's mature thought is very different from his early work. Nevertheless the article should succintly treat all forms of phenomenology and serve as a portal to more specific articles, one of which might be about Heidegger and Nazism. Cat 08:10, 2 June 2006 (UTC)


 * I'll agree with you on condition that an objective article about Heidegger and Husserl and their relationship to the Nazi period must be *referenced* within the article about Phenomenology, and even highlighted. The article as it now stands is still tame -- since these two are the two main writers discussed, and their relationship with each other isn't irrelevant.  Indeed -- it impacts the history and development of phenomenology as a possible science.  A third name should be inserted here -- G.W.F. Hegel -- who was arguably the first German to write a full-length book on phenomenology (i.e. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1807).  Granted, Hegel's phenomenology isn't transcendental or existential, it's dialectical.  But it's still oft-cited and is more than a little relevant because Heidegger wrote specifically about Hegel in at least three different publications.  (I should add that Hegelians tend to agree that Heidegger's treatment of Hegel was superficial in the extreme, and led to the postmodern habit of dealing with Hegel in a superficial manner.)  Husserl may have enjoyed seeing Heidegger bungle his work on Hegel.

I did some fact-checking on the issue. Husserl retired (Emeritat) voluntarily as was normal for a Prof. Ord. of a certain age in 1928. He was "sent into a permanent vacation" on 6 April 1933, but this was a general racial law not something targeted at Husserl personally. In fact it was reversed for him personally on 20 July 1933. References to official documents to this effect can be found in Husserliana Dokumente I "Husserl Chronik", p. 428-429 and 433. In both cases, Heidegger had nothing to do with it. To the contrary, Husserl proposed Heidegger as his successor and Heidegger was chosen unanimously by the faculty. Moreover, Heidegger at that point already was an ordinarius at Marburg, so didn't need to fulfill any extraordinary requirements to become prof. at Freiburg (see Hua Dok. III Briefwechsel vol. VIII p. 194.f). Also, I nowhere found any documents supporting the claim that Heidegger barred Husserl from the library. That too probably was a general racial law and not a personal act of hostility of Heidegger towards Husserl. Cat 09:16, 20 June 2006 (UTC)


 * The June 20 summary is largely correct, although it is true that Heidegger, as rector, enforced certain general laws which did indeed have the effect, for example, of barring Husserl from the philosophy seminar library. However, it is absurd to suggest that he was anything other than a follower of Husserl.  He acknowledges Husserl in Sein und Zeit, and repeatedly and explicitly throughout the lectures on phenomenology which he gave in the late 1920s and early '30s.  His philosophy would have diverged significantly from the work of his mentor, regardless of national politics.  He began as a follower of Husserl, and later deviated from Husserl's thought.  Nothing strange in that.  Incidentally, it is important to be careful with supposed facts.  "Husserl was indeed a Jew".  Well, the Nazis certainly designated him as Jewish, and his family had indeed been Jewish.  But Husserl was a Protestant - an assimilated German protestant, whose sons had fought with distinction in the 14/18 war.  KD  November 2006

Phenomenology forums
Hello everyone. This is not quite on the topic of the article and for that I apologize. I have set up some freely-hosted forums for the purpose of discussing all aspects of phenomenology. I am not sure if it will at all be successful (especially because it does not have its own domain and all that fancy stuff), but I got lots of time before the semester and nothing to do, so I might as well try and garner a phenomenological forum. If you are at all interested, go ahead and visit phpbber.com/phpbb/phenomenologyso.html Drifter 21:28, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Phenomenology in (the philosophy of?) science
There's a short article titled Phenomenology (science) in need of improvement/rewriting. Its content seems to fall more under philosophy of science than under science itself. It has been proposed for a merger into Particle physics phenomenology, although the latter has nothing to do with philosophy (and uses the term phenomenology in a very different way). I don't know anything about philosophy of science and hoped to find some experts here to contribute to the discussion. Thanks! HEL 13:02, 1 February 2007 (UTC)

Clarified introduction
Former version implied that Heidegger was as different from Husserl as Husserl was from Hegel. No: Hegelian phenomenology is one thing; Heideggerean phenomenology derives directly from Husserl's in the 1920s lectures before and after the publication of Being and Time. His dispute with Husserl is quite specific, and I've given a short-hand version of it. Other changes: "transcendental" phenomenology isn't the direct intuition of experience, but its examination at the level of the transcendental ego - I've tried to encapsulate that in a couple of words; the description of Heidegger's work was esoteric unless you're a Heideggerian, and didn't relate to existential phenomenology directly anyway - I simplified, although it's not perfect. Will try to look at other parts of the article later.KD Tries Again 18:05, 12 April 2007 (UTC)KD


 * Can one at least try to separate the particular philosophies from the meaning or definition of the term(there is none on his page)? What about buddhist phenomenology? Does english have an equivalent to the word phenomenon, and what would it be? The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article about phenomenological reduction which isn't very helpful, can anyone name or find a better source? Wouldn't it be nice to better define the word phenomenon? - since it's like, a realy realy important part of the word "phenomenology"? : )

just throwing it out there, for consideration 89.172.50.205 14:30, 20 April 2007 (UTC)


 * I don't think that's possible, as the terms mean something different for each of the philosophies mentioned. I agree the rest of the article does need work.  "Phenomenon" for these purposes just is an English word.KD Tries Again 19:26, 11 May 2007 (UTC)KD

Derrida
How do people feel about including Derrididean phenomenology as another "main meaning" of phenomenology in the history of philosophy? I was present at a talk he gave in which he stated that his thought was phenomenological. Hay4 18:32, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
 * I would be disinclined. He wrote about Husserlian phenomenology extensively, but most sources categorize him, of course, as a post-structuralist or deconstructionist.  I don't know the context of the remark he made in the talk, but in any case I don't think that would be a decisive cite for Wikipedia as it's a primary source (however absurd that might be).KD Tries Again 18:50, 30 April 2007 (UTC)KD
 * The context of Derrida's remark? He was making it clear that he understood himself to be a phenomenologist. But I agree that in the US Derrida is commonly labeled a "post-structuralist." I personally think the label is misleading. Hay4 05:36, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
 * The difficulty I have is that I know Derrida is not a Husserlian phenomenologist; he discusses it very critically. Nor is he a Heideggerian.  From a second-hand report of a remark at a meeting, without context, I have no idea what he might have meant.  I think both for that reason, and also to be consistent with Wiki policy, it would be good to have a written reference which everyone can see.KD Tries Again 19:24, 11 May 2007 (UTC)KD
 * To digress a little; Wow you guys are really smart. Seriously, no kidding. Amit 17:44, 1 August 2007 (UTC)

The use of tobacco in phemon estate agent in Kilburn.
Weak Weak explain the various management of different senses in housing population gated communities. Your love, Stephen Gate. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.45.244.142 (talk) 07:51, 5 May 2008 (UTC)

As Hegel wrote: "Spirit is this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into this substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content." Your love, Lestrade.Lestrade (talk) 14:54, 5 May 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

What phenomenology is for
A lot of people reading this are probably thinking "OK, so phenomenology studies the structures of consciousness and the way things appear to consciousness, but why?" This isn't made particularly clear in the article, yet describing some of the many purposes for which phenomenology is used may make it easier for readers to comprehend what phenomenology is and why it is considered a fruitful practice. --Le vin blanc (talk) 23:16, 8 September 2008 (UTC)


 * See | the current version. 71.247.12.83 (talk) 16:18, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

"Prereflexive"
The section "What Is Phenomenology?" says "It is the attempt to reflect on pre-reflexive experience . . ." Should the word be "prereflective"? Cognita (talk) 05:37, 15 September 2008 (UTC)


 * No. A surface is reflective - it reflects what is looking at it back. A person is reflexive - he is directed towards himself.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 14:32, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

The introduction
As with the other article, the short comment field doesn't allow for proper argumentation. First of all, consciousnessly isn't a word. Not even in "simple language." Secondly, phenomenology doesn't "refer" to varying philosophies. If it did, we would have to have a multiplicity of phenomenologies; one phenomenology would have to "belong" to Husserl, and another would "belong" to Heidegger while a third would "belong" to Sartre and yet another to Merleau-Ponty. However, even though Husserl "created" phenomenology as we know it today, and while these philosophers all criticised each other and differed in "results," they were all phenomenologists. In other words, phenomenology itself, as a philosophy, contains within it both Husserl and Heidegger as well as all the other phenomenologists. This is also why phenomenology isn't "synonymous with Edmund Husserl's philosophy." Third, phenomenology doesn't restrict itself to "pure subjectivity," nor is pure subjectivity characterised by the absence of "ad hoc theories of origin or assumptions." When it comes to the how vs the what... How has two uses: One is in connection with "procedures" ("How do you make a stew?") and the other is in relation to experience ("How does the stew taste?" -- that "What does the stew taste like?" is sometimes used here needn't come into consideration here, but it could be said that the proper answer to the first question would be to describe one's experience of it while the proper answer to the second question would be to describe the taste of something else that tastes like what one is tasting now (an external relation)). In the context of phenomenology, the first question would correspond to the noesis while the second would correspond to the noema (without these concepts needing to be mentioned in the introduction). If that was unclear, suggestions or edits are welcome, as long as they do not misrepresent the subject at hand. I will try adding noema and noesis to the article if I can come up with some sort of concise definition.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 20:08, 14 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks, I am correcting. 71.247.12.83 (talk) 03:45, 17 October 2008 (UTC)


 * With your entry, it was not a matter of correcting -- it was a matter of it all being all wrong; if you were to "correct" it, you would have to write everything all over so that it actually became an accurate and correct description of phenomenology. I do not know what competence you claim to hold in this field, but you are certainly not capable of showing you have any.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 09:30, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

experienced in their subjectivity: Just to underline Der Zeigeist's point - it is fundamental to Husserl's position that each intentional act has both subjective (noetic) and objective (noematic) content; if it is a perceptual act it may also have an objective correlate in the real world. Husserl further distinguished the real content of an individual psychic event from its noetic content, thus opening up a further distinction within the subjective content of the act (distinguishing what happens in "my mind" when I, for example, wish something from the noesis of wishing in general). It is only because intentional acts have an objective content that Husserl thought they could be studied systematically. This is how and why he distinguishes his position from psychologism in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchugen.

The edit by 71.247.12.83 is, therefore, inaccurate in content as well as being inaptly worded. The previous version suffers similar problems, but it needs to be improved rather than just changed.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:59, 17 October 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

"Through the years, Husserl's original account of phenomenology has been criticised and developed not only by himself, but also by his student and assistant Martin Heidegger and many other existentialists, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir." - I have removed the word "other" from the introduction, since it implies that Heidegger is an existentialist, which is a matter of great contention, with Heidegger himself and many other philosophers (Derrida, for example) arguing that he is not. --Le vin blanc (talk) 16:09, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The unfortunate phrase 'phenomena "as experienced in their subjectivity" ' was intended to substitute the phrase "experience in its purely subjective aspect" (not clear enough), but my English failed to include the word "subjective" properly in a simple construction, and contrasted with "objective" intuitively recognizable, and, so, helpful in a simple definition. Please, do not even try to mention noetic and noematic content, because they do not belong there. Regardless that both belong to the subject, only one can be mentioned for convenience. 1st sentences are not subject to arithmetic or proportionality. Simplicity and clarity are the objective, and not proportionality.  There was a famous request posted to Hillel to teach Torah, while the men is standing on one foot.  Hillel replied: "'That, which is hateful to you do not do to others' ... the rest is commentary." You do not find in the Bible that phrase or anything similar, so technically it is not accurate, but summarizes everything. A summary can be creative, and yours is not, but let it be. 141.155.135.66 (talk) 23:04, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

For continuation see User talk:71.247.12.83. 141.155.135.66 (talk) 19:27, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

The following sentence in the introduction doesn't make any sense, and should be deleted: "This phenomenological ontology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another." Cpointon (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 15:30, 19 June 2012 (UTC)

The Philosophical Movement
It's vital to note that this article is intended to deal with a specific philosophical movement, rather than the term "phenomenology" in its various usages. If any wants to change that, there needs to be a proposal relating to the disambiguation page and we need to change the heading of this article. That's the starting point for considering the content of the article, including the introduction. The introduction, therefore, needs to be a concise statement of what phenomenology meant to Husserl - the stuff about it "usually refers to" Husserl needs to go. The place to find that will be in a reliable secondary source on Husserl's phenomenology. I do have some, and will try to come up with something. I'd urge dealing with noema and noesis in the main article rather than in the introduction, as there is a major academic dispute as to what even Husserl meant by the terms.

I'd say the introductory sentences need to mention Husserl in a historical context as founder of the movement, the reason for studying the structures of consciousness, and arguably intentionality - and that's about it.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:37, 17 October 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * I agree: Moving the part about it often referring to the philosophy first developed by Husserl to the disambiguation page would be a good idea. One could probably also mention the way in which many analytic philosophers use it there.
 * When you say that you believe the article needs a concise statement of what phenomenology meant to Husserl, however, I am not sure that I agree. At least not in any sense that it would be presented as all "belonging to" him. This does not mean that one could not mention that it was meant to be a truly descriptive psychology, and an attempt to put man back in the world instead of isolating him in his own psychology. However, mentioning explicitly that that was what Husserl intended when developing phenomenology would seem out of place to me. Such things can be dealt with in the article, or in the article on Husserl.
 * I could have another read-through of Merleau-Ponty's "What is phenomenology?" thing and see if there are some proper definitions there.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 09:44, 18 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I would just like to specify that the point about Husserl above doesn't exclude the possibility of mentioning him as the historical "first" of phenomenologists, and phenomenology's father, but rather that the aspect of him being "only" the father, the origin, but not the continued development, should be kept intact; phenomenology doesn't belong to him.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 11:11, 18 October 2008 (UTC)

Here's our current starting point, according to the page readers see when they search for Phenomenology on Wikipedia:

Phenomenology (philosophy) which focusses on the work and followers of Edmund Husserl (April 8, 1859 – April 26, 1938).
 * Existential phenomenology which focusses on the work and followers of Martin Heidegger (September 26, 1889 – May 26, 1976), himself a follower of Husserl.
 * Dialectical phenomenology which focusses on the earlier work of Georg Hegel (August 27, 1770 – November 14, 1831).

This article is supposed to be about the first of those three topics. I do have some suggested language which clarifies the subjective/objective point and which I think would form the basis for the consensus, but I am assuming this is an article about Husserl and his school. On the other hand, the article on Existential Phenomenology is a joke. We could nominate that for deletion, deal (briefly) with the phenomenological aspects of Heidegger and Sartre here, and have a link here to the Hegel article.KD Tries Again (talk) 15:17, 20 October 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * As long as the interpretation of "Husserl and his followers" or "Husserl and his school" doesn't "forget" "his followers" and "his school," I agree. When it comes to Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, for instance, I'd say it should be possible to include their observations in so far as they relate to what could be called phenomenology without a further qualification (as in "Husserl's phenomenology," "Sartre's phenomenology" or "Existential phenomenology"); if Merleau-Ponty developed the most extensive phenomenological account of the body, his account, not Husserl's, could be included, etc.
 * Expanding on existential phenomenology could be possible, but I know I wouldn't know where to draw the line; I treat it all as phenomenology anyway.
 * The first sentences in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception could be helpful in formulating the first sentences. You can probably find the whole thing if you have the book, but I'll just quote what I find relevant to an introduction...
 * "What is phenomenology? [...] Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence of perception, or the essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point other than their 'facticity'. [...] all its efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status. It is the search for a philosophy which shall be a 'rigorous science', but it also offers an account of space, time and the world as we 'live' them. It tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is, without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the scientist, the historian or the sociologist may be able to provide."
 * Actually, now that I think about it, summing phenomenology up as "endowing lived life with a philosophical status" isn't a bad way of describing it. Of course, it wouldn't necessarily make sense unless you know the specifics, so it would probably not be able to stand on its own, at least not as an introduction, but keeping that perspective in mind while writing the introduction could be helpful.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 19:45, 20 October 2008 (UTC)

Fair enough. I guess we should improve this article, then see if there's anything left over which makes an article on Existential Phenomenology worthwhile, or whether that should re-direct here. I have a great summary of Husserl's phenomenological method from the Woodruff Smith book published by Routledge, as well as a good description from the first chapter of The New Husserl edited by Donn Welton. Spiegelberg's history of the phenomenological movement is available online, in part at least. I am trying to find time to develop some language from these sources and a few others, which should fit well into the shell of what currently have. I can use these sources to get away from the over-emphasis on subjectivity, as the whole point of the movement (rightly or not) was to develop phenomenology as a rigorous, objective science.KD Tries Again (talk) 21:27, 20 October 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

By the way: Would it be a good idea to include short descriptions of each intentionality under the heading of Intentionality? Perhaps a list with links to articles on the particular intentionality and then including the description of the phenomenological concept of that intentionality in that article?Der Zeitgeist (talk) 11:39, 22 October 2008 (UTC)

Inaccurate first sentence
The first sentence is bugging me, as it is precisely the opposite of what Husserl believed. Phenomenological analysis suspends both the natural attitude and the first person perspective. Since the article is explicitly about the "philosophical movement" founded by Husserl, that's what needs to be defined first, followed by a basic definition of what Husserl took phenomenology to be. KD Tries Again (talk) 17:41, 6 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * I edited the lead. The historical parts are based on Spiegelberg's history of the movement, the description of Husserl's approach on introductions by Woodruff Smith, Welton and Pivcevic.  I can insert precise page citations in the lead if wished.  (I also revised the first sentences under "What is phenomenology?" which repeated the error.) KD Tries Again (talk) 17:57, 6 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Can you clarify how you are using the terms "subjective" and "objective" in the statement that "phenomenology attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective"? Many people think different things when they think about the dichotomy, and it has had conflicting definitions in the history of western philosophy, so the statement could be rather confusing for readers. --Le vin blanc (talk) 00:08, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

I mainly agree with your edits, but I'm having a bit of trouble with the "phenomenology attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective" sentence as well. I kind of get what you mean, but at the same time, I'm not sure that the sentence says what it should say. I'm still leaning towards Merleau-Ponty's description, according to which phenomenology wouldn't be trying to create conditions as much as it would bestow (or better: restore) objectivity on (to) that which is normally considered subjective. A good example is Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry," in which it is clear that "habitual" or, rather, passively accepted knowledge shouldn't be considered knowledge proper: You have to bring it up in original evidence to know it. I'm also afraid that the "putting consciousness back in the world" has somehow been lost, although I do not believe it was ever in the article before. The ideal would be if one could incorporate both the fact that consciousness is put back in the world as well as the restoration of lived life as objective into one sentence. If I were to put it into words, my way of putting it would of course create slightly Kafkaesque sentences in English, so I'll leave the specifics up to someone else, but I'll propose something: "In its most basic form, phenomenology attempts to restore consciousness [from its modern conception as something subjective] to the status of something that could be objectively studied: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgments, perceptions and emotions are made available to the phenomenologist as being in the world." After that, the clarification that neither natural science nor analytical philosophy (although by implication) has the tools to handle consciousness properly is quite sufficient, I believe.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 00:46, 7 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Der Z.; yes, we're in agreement - Husserl's project is to make consciousness an object of rigorous analysis. I'll see if I can improve to take account of that.


 * Le v.b.; objective/subjective - right, really difficult terms to handle. Husserl uses them all the time, of course. The sentence does go on to identify two simple examples of what's subjective.  I'm not going to present any original research on the meaning of the terms.  I'll just introduce here - when I have time, tomorrow or the weekend - some citations for the way they're being used.KD Tries Again (talk) 02:44, 7 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * Idea: Would it help with both your points if, instead of "primarily concerned with the the analysis of the objective structures of consciousness..." we said something like "primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of (systematic/rigorous?) analysis (study?). Gets rid of "objective" and gets at the notion of consciousness being studied like something "in the world".  Any better?KD Tries Again (talk) 14:48, 7 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * That could work, yes. Perhaps you could also mention, when you say that it isn't neurology, etc., that it is in a first person perspective. Of course, the first person perspective is kind of implied in the notion of reflection, so it could work any way, but if there was some way making it clearer?Der Zeitgeist (talk) 15:34, 7 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Let's think about that a bit more. As you know, the perspective Husserl intends to achieve through the epoche is precisely not first person - ultimately its the experience of the transcendental ego.  He wants to bracket the "real" conscious experience of the guy called Edmund Husserl.  Maybe this is best explained in the main part of the article.  (Maybe we can do something like "Although conscious experiences can only be studied from a first person perspective, Husserl's aim was...etc, etc.)KD Tries Again (talk) 16:01, 7 November 2008 (UTC) KD Tries Again

Subjective = having to do with: inside of the observing subject's head; inner; interior; psychological; ideal (ideational); mental phenomena; mental images; introspection.

Objective = having to do with: outside of the observing subject's head; outer; exterior; ontological; real; material objects; physical bodies; perception.

Lestrade (talk) 17:40, 7 November 2008 (UTC)Lestrade


 * Hello Lestrade. The difficulty here is that Husserl's method claims to make objective study of mental phenomena possible.  (He might well be wasting his time, but that's what he's up to.)  We just need to state that with reasonable clarity, I think, and if it helps to find an alternative to "objective" I don't mind.KD Tries Again (talk) 21:45, 7 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again
 * The articles on Husserl and on Phenomenology won't be complete until they tell the story of Frege and psychologism. Husserl completely capitulated to Frege. Maybe it was because of Frege's authority as a mathematician. Frege criticized all studies of non–evident, non–objective, unobservable, interior, subjective mental phenomena. No discussions of representations, ideas, notions, or mental images were allowed in Frege's world. Husserl may have had some important ideas regarding mathematics when he wrote his book Philosophy of Arithmetic. After Frege disparaged him, however, Husserl abandoned his overtly psychologistic researches and tried to disguise his efforts under the alternate name of phenomenology. By saying that Husserl tried to "create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective," we are referring to Husserl's struggle to satisfy Frege's criteria. Husserl's favorite topics were "usually regarded as subjective." Husserl wanted to talk about subjective, inner, mental processes but, because of Frege's criticism, didn't want to appear to be a mere psychologist. As a result, he tried to convince everyone that he was really objectively talking about logic and phenomenology. In actuality, he was talking about interior, subjective, mental phenomena: that is, psychology. Husserl's phenomenology is crypto–psychology. At the end of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl asks the reader to practice introspection, because truth dwells in the inner man. He quoted Augustine's On true religion, 39, n. 72. (Do not wish to go out. Go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man.)  As Schopenhauer noted, the objective can only be apprehended after it comes to us through the subjective. The objective cannot merely migrate into our brains without filtering through the subjective forms.Lestrade (talk) 00:48, 8 November 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

Personal view. And, I might add, plainly wrong.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 14:31, 8 November 2008 (UTC)


 * User:Der Zeitgeist, If possible, please explain why any of the following ten assertions are not correct facts:


 * (1) The articles on Husserl and on Phenomenology won't be complete until they tell the story of Frege and psychologism.


 * (2) Husserl completely capitulated to Frege.


 * (3) Frege criticized all studies of non–evident, non–objective, unobservable, interior, subjective mental phenomena.


 * (4) No discussions of representations, ideas, notions, or mental images were allowed in Frege's world.


 * (5) After Frege disparaged him, however, Husserl abandoned his overtly psychologistic researches and tried to disguise his efforts under the alternate name of phenomenology.


 * (6) By saying that Husserl tried to "create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective," we are referring to Husserl's struggle to satisfy Frege's criteria.


 * (7) Husserl tried to convince everyone that he was really objectively talking about logic and phenomenology. In actuality, he was talking about interior, subjective, mental phenomena: that is, psychology.


 * (8) Husserl's phenomenology is crypto–psychology.


 * (9) At the end of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl asks the reader to practice introspection, because truth dwells in the inner man. He quoted Augustine's On true religion, 39, n. 72. (Do not wish to go out. Go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man.)


 * (10) The objective can only be apprehended after it comes to us through the subjective. The objective cannot merely migrate into our brains without filtering through the subjective forms.


 * Lestrade (talk) 15:22, 8 November 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

Thank God Arthur Schopenhauer died before Husserl and Heidegger were born, otherwise we would see him being unduly quoted throughout the article on phenomenology. Lestrade is a well-known "POV pusher". --Le vin blanc (talk) 23:14, 8 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Le vin blanc, why don't you confine yourself to discussing Husserl, Frege, and psychologism, instead of calling me a name? Your joke about undue quotations isn't funny and may be a mere evasion because you are not able to comment on these important topics.Lestrade (talk) 15:32, 9 November 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

Splitting a paragraph into points like that is the same as making it a new collection of statements. This doesn't change the fact that what you're saying is both unrelated to phenomenology as well as a point of view. If you want to discuss your views of phenomenology, fine, but do it somewhere else. I'm getting fed up with users bogging up articles in the discussion page; this is exactly the reason why I was apprehensive about editing wikipedia. It was fine for a little while but then... next thing we know, the IP user will leave comments on your talk page, asking you to "intervene with my behalf, please?"Der Zeitgeist (talk) 15:50, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Getting back to the matter at hand, the way I understand it, and what I meant, was that the epoche doesn't remove the first-person perspective; description of the noema or the noesis is still description of these as they appear, and they can only appear to a consciousness, in its essential first-person perspective.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 16:07, 9 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Many people ask "What is phenomenology?", "What good is it?", "What are some examples of phenomenology?". The Wikipedia article should help answer these questions. Making ad hominem remarks and jokes is of no value here. My list regarding Frege and psychologism is an attempt to get to the very heart of phenomenology. Your comment on first–person perspectives is also at the heart of phenomenology because it is an admission that the objective cannot be apprehended unless it is filtered through the subjective forms of an observer's nervous system.Lestrade (talk) 16:56, 9 November 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

The phenomenological concept of objectivity relies heavily upon intersubjectivity, but even here the notion of subjectivity is different from the normal use of the word: The subjective isn't exclusive of objectivity (then where would we be?). This point is most easily illustrated by the example of two persons standing at two different places, watching the same clock. For both these people, the clock will be the same, show the same time, etc. However, these two people see two different sets of aspects of the (same) clock while at the same time having the whole clock given in experience, including its "hidden" sides and the fact that the Other is also looking at this clock. According to phenomenology, this is descriptive of the pre-reflexive experience of the clock. If you ask the other what time it is, he will most likely reply that it is 19:56 (which is indeed what the clock they're watching is showing) unless he is joking or trying to fool you, in which case you normally apprehend this fact, that he is joking, etc., or, if you are fooled, this still doesn't really have much of a bearing on how you apprehend the clock: That people are sometimes mistaken doesn't necessarily entail solipsism. The situation may be modified by the belief that either you or he is misreading the clock or something along those lines, but the clock still remains there experienced as available to both you and the Other, as intersubjective. In short: All experienced things are experienced in a first-person perspective, even those things that modern people normally call "objective," but just because they exist to us in the first-person perspective, this doesn't mean they can't be intersubjective, i.e. objective. That's a rough overview. If you had even tried reading phenomenology, you would have known this (it doesn't take more than "Cartesian Meditations"), and I wouldn't have had to spend my time explaining it to you. This still amounts to nothing more than two people quarrelling over some aspect of something that is supposed to be represented the way it was intended to be. If you have any substantial critique (with sources) you are free to put it in the Criticism section.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 19:19, 9 November 2008 (UTC)


 * The article on Edmund Husserl does include a section on Frege and psychologism (I havedn't looked carefully to see if it's any good). I agree it needs to be mentioned here, but I don't think an extended discussion is warranted.  I assume there's a psychologism article and we should be linking to Frege and psychologism (and, obviously, Husserl) here, while devoting the meat of the article to the phenomenological 'movement'.


 * As for the subjectivity issue, we won't resolve it on the talk page. It's immensely complex and controversial, and I suggest we just go to the sources and see what they say.  I can tell you that the secondary literature on Husserl and phenomenology is in utter disagreement about key issues, such as the nature of the noema, and all we can do here is report the various viewpoints.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:56, 9 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Subjectivity and the Reduction
I looked at some sources at the weekend, confirming my sense that we must be cautious in referring to first-person subjectivity here. Husserl himself protested that it was a fundamental misunderstanding of his philosophy to interpret reflection at the level of "mundane subjectivity" rather than "transcendental subjectivity". There seems to be a firm consensus that the epoche, introduced in Ideen, suspends not only the "natural attitude" and existential commitments, but also the "empirical ego", "concerete ego" or "psychological subject" (see Pivcevic, Husserl and Phenomenology p72; Lyotard, Phenomenology p45; Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (Vol 1), p141. In phenomenology, the everyday ego or self is supplanted by the pure or transcendental ego; in other words, phenomenological reflection considers not what is presented to my consciousness (my "first person"), but to consciousness as such.  Of course, access to the field of transcendental consciousness must traverse everyday, empirical consciousness - but only in order to suspend or bracket the latter.

So any reference to a first person, subjective quality in phenomenological reflection must be very highly qualified. I've amended the second paragraph to take account of points above, and my comments here. I have left the term "objective" where it appears further down the article - I'd defend its use simply because Husserl and his commentators use it all the time; but I've cleansed it from the lead.KD Tries Again (talk) 15:07, 10 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * Ah, I see now -- we were talking past each other. Your point is valid, and I agree on the point about it being to consciousness as such. My point was simply that even at this level, consciousness is a first-person kind of thing; consciousness can only present itself to consciousness.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 18:17, 10 November 2008 (UTC)


 * And frankly I think that's a fatal problem for Husserl. We can cite Adorno's Against Epistemology in the criticism section for the point that the transcendental ego is either just a regular ego with a fancy label or an empty term.KD Tries Again (talk) 20:38, 10 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

"Empty term" = a word designating a concept that is not ultimately based on a &hellip; &hellip; "first person kind of thing."Lestrade (talk) 20:49, 10 November 2008 (UTC)Lestrade


 * I don't know.. to me it seems he took it into consideration somehow, but I do not have any secondary sources for this; it's only what I get from reading his books. Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego could also be a criticism, by the way. I'll see if I can find some good quotes or something.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 23:53, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

Deleted inaccurate first sentence
The following sentence appeared at the head of the article: "Phenomenology is a philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness." This view was held neither by Husserl and his school, nor by Heidegger, Sartre or any other leading phenomenologist I can think of. It would be better as a description of "subjective idealism". I removed it and re-added other useful information which had disappeared for some reason. If an editor wants to defend it, I'd would welcome a citation attributing such a view to Husserl. Throughout his work, he makes meticulously distinctions between the object as it appears to individual consciousness, the intentional or phenomenological object and the really existing object: he explicitly states that bracketing the so-called "natural standpoint" is not a denial of the real existence of the world/objects. See Ideen 32.KD Tries Again (talk) 15:32, 25 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Onto-phenomenology
Isn't there a sub-field of phenomenology which blends in some elements of ontology ? It would be called phenomenology of Being. ADM (talk) 07:43, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

That depends on what you're referring to. Sartre subtitled Being and Nothingness "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology," but a phenomenological ontology is not necessarily the same as an ontology. I'd say the epoché points to this fact. Also: Read this. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 18:47, 28 March 2009 (UTC)
 * You can tell that Sartre read his Hegel. Phenomenology is the polar antithesis (opposite) of ontology. Phenomenology is the study of that which appears. Ontology is the study of that which exists, apart from the way that it appears. To the normal mind "phenomenological ontology" would be a contradiction between the adjective and the noun. Hegelian logic, however, accepts such contradictions and tries to blend them together in some overall synthesis. Another example: Sartre's "being" and "nothingness" are blended and synthesized into "becoming," in accordance with Hegel's idiosyncratic logic.Lestrade (talk) 22:10, 16 September 2009 (UTC)Lestrade

Consciousness is consciousness of
I changed it back. The sense of the phrase is lost if it's rendered "consciousness is conscious of," as the point is to describe it all on a transcendental level: I may be conscious of something, but consciousness is always consciousness of something. The "of" is also sometimes omitted, as in Being and Nothingness where Sartre puts it in parenthesis: Consciousness (of) something. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 19:04, 15 April 2009 (UTC)

Noesis and Noema
Hard to improve the existing text just by tinkering, because it was basically wrong. Noesis and Noema are certainly not the intentional act and its object; they are parts of the structure of the act. I've amended it so that it is, at least, accurate - but it's impossible to explain these concepts clearly to a general reader in one paragraph. I think it's important to have links to more detailed articles. Unfortunately, last time I looked, the Noesis article was no help, and in large part not about Husserl. The Noema article is scrappy, but I think I brought it up to a reasonable level of accuracy. The bottom line is that there is an absence of agreement on what Husserl actually meant by noema, and the dispute isn't ever going to be settled. I took out the part about why Husserl "arguably" used the terms; I think it was wrong, and I think he says flat out somewhere why he uses them. I haven't been able to turn up the passage, but we really need that (or a third party source) rather than an informed guess.KD Tries Again (talk) 23:56, 24 August 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again.


 * I agree with the edit, but I wonder: Would it not be beneficial if one introduced the epoché towards the end (in discussing the controversy surrounding Husserl's concept of noema), and then actually incorporating the epoché into the article in its own section after that? Der Zeitgeist (talk) 21:32, 28 August 2009 (UTC)


 * That's a good idea. As it stands, the article mentions the epoché several times, and in my opinion misrepresents what was a methodological device as a sceptical epistemological strategy (something Husserl inadvertently encouraged, and then regretted, by honoring Descartes in the title Cartesian Meditations).  These mentions would need to be cleaned up; of course, what the article really needs is a thorough re-write, but I am not sure I have the time.  I tidied the Noema section because I had already rewritten the Noema article.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:50, 5 September 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again


 * Yeah, although I would say that it's fair to *mention* the sceptical roots of the epoche, it certainly is a misrepresentation to say that Husserl's epoche is the same. I haven't got a lot of time myself either, but I'll see if there are any good, pithy formulations in any of my books when I get back to them.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 21:00, 6 September 2009 (UTC)


 * It should be possible for us to get the epoche right, at least. It's very hard to explain Husserl without going through every one of the main concepts in proper order.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:57, 7 September 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Special language
According to an "undo" by Der Zeitgeist on September 16, 2009 at 7:31 AM, there is a special philosophical language of cipher code that is used by philosophers to communicate with each other. "It's terminology, and not supposed to conform to everyday language." Words that have been used for centuries with a conventional meaning have been appropriated by professional academics and given a different, secret meaning. A good example is Hegel's use of the word "positive" to mean "authoriarian."


 * wtf is "authoriarian". This ugly word makes no appearance in on-line dictionaries. Myles325a (talk) 06:46, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

A perfect example in this article is the word "intentionality." According to the article, "The word itself should not be confused with the 'ordinary' use of the word intentional." In order to justify this practice, these code words are euphemistically called "technical terms."


 * What, and the non-"euphemistical" proper definition is "secret code words"?Myles325a (talk) 06:46, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

Readers should be warned that the words in this article designate idiosyncratic concepts. Unless the reader has broken the code, there can be no understanding.Lestrade (talk) 11:50, 16 September 2009 (UTC)Lestrade


 * Why don't the wankers who write such gibberish then add a glossary, and if they are too shy about being seen as poseurs, why don't the critics and those commentating on the text do so? Myles325a (talk) 06:46, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

Yeah, there's special terminology. In philosophy as elsewhere. "World" and "Earth" means different things when discussing Heidegger than when discussing geology. None of the uses conform to the "everyday" use of the terms. Furthermore, etymologically, the use of "intentional" is closer to the original than the everday use of it ]. When it comes to consciousness, the point is that the sentence "consciousness is always conscious of something" implies that there is something called consciousness, the property of which is to be conscious of something. The point, however, is that consciousness itself never is anything but consciousness _of_ something; there is no consciousness which is not consciousness of something. Phrased positively, this means that "consciousness is always consciousness of something." There just wasn't enough room to expand on the "undo" in the comment for it, so I shortened what I had to say, and expected people to be able to read (see two headings up from here). Der Zeitgeist (talk) 13:50, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Changes insisted upon by User:71.247.231.74
I will expand a little more on my objections to the changes by User:71.247.231.74:


 * the etymology is incorrect: "Menon" is a proper name in Greek, not "thing"; phenomenon comes from "phainomenos" which is the present participle of "phainesthai" "to appear" (thus, "appearing"). So the ending "-omenos" (or "-omenon") is a verb ending, not a noun.


 * the article doesn't need to spell out in detail the origin of the word "phenomenon": this is a case of undue emphasis, gilding the lily


 * the change to the sentence in the lead obfuscates the meaning of the key sentence describing Husserl:
 * "In Husserl's conception, phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis."
 * was changed to:
 * "Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness and the phenomena, which appear in acts of consciousness, as objects of systematic reflection and analysis."
 * The former sentence makes sense: Phenomenology concerns making A and B objects of analysis. The latter makes no sense: Phenomenology concerns making A and B, which appear in acts of consciousness, as objects of analysis. The subordinate clause implicitly modifies both A and B which is incorrect (the structures of consciousness don't appear in the acts of consciousness). And one does not make something as an object of analysis.

--EPadmirateur (talk) 20:14, 18 November 2009 (UTC)


 * Thanks for moving this discussion to the Talk page, despite the anonymous user's insistence on continuing to revert (I've already left a WP:3RR warning for them). I agree with everything you've written here (though I suspect the mispunctuations in the anonymous user's version of that sentence are just a result of non-native English).  About the etymology: let's also remember that Wikipedia is not a dictionary -- even if it is correct, there is not really any reason to provide the etymology of the word "phenomenology" here, since the word is not the subject of the article.  The current consensus version's discussion already has more Greek in it than is necessary (or perhaps desirable); since "phenomenon" is a common English word, it might be better simply to discuss the particular philosophical sense in which it's used here.  -- Rbellin|Talk 21:19, 18 November 2009 (UTC)


 * The etymology in the 2nd par. is disruptive, so I suggest to place it typically just after the term in parethesis, as: (from Greek: phainómenon "that which appears"; and -logia "study of") or to drop it off entirely (b.t.w., Gr menos mind, intention, intention, force, hence phainó shine forth -> menos mind = to appear... I hope?).
 * The "Husserl" sentence is murky, because the subordinate clause disrupts it, and Wikipedia is not only for experts; I suggest: "Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the structures of consciousness and the phenomena appearing in acts of consciousness, as objects of systematic reflection and analysis."
 * --71.247.231.74 (talk) 03:07, 19 November 2009 (UTC)


 * This is all about a Cratylus-reminiscing word game (not to be confused with language game or language-game), which is commonly played by philosophers (epecially by those adhering to Neoplatonism or Hermeneutics). One reinterprets a word's morphology by naming which other (ad hoc selected) words sound like it, in order to impose a new meaning on it. This is of course non-notable pseudoscience and has no place in Wikipedia (unless perhaps a really notable philosopher incorporated this method in his/her theories, in which case a properly referenced statement about it could be placed in the articles concerning that philosopher's theories). Even if we were to include this game somewhere in the article, the thing here is that the references provided by the anonymous contributor were used in an adulterated way since they did not back up his/her claims. The book "Hermeneutics" by Richard E. Palmer first cites the morphologically correct etymology (not the bogus one inserted by anon.) and then tries to play with retroactive etymological semantics, while the the entry on strongsnumbers.com merely proves that the word φαίνω existed in Anc. Greek. The fact that φαίνω exists does not prove by itself that it is semantically connected with the word φαίνομαι (in this context) or with the contemporary term phenomenology. To sum it up, 71.247.231.74's proposed edit is pseudoscientific original synthesis of nonnotable material (thusly violating WP:FRINGE, WP:OR, and WP:UNDUE). --Omnipaedista (talk) 07:12, 19 November 2009 (UTC)


 * That "issue" has already been droppped off also for the Rbellin's argument. Why do you want to sink the discussion on moving up the etymology and correcting the "Husserl" sentence by dwelling on the dropped off "issue"? Do you do it in good faith? Do you want to improve the article? Please, stick to the subject:
 * The etymology in the 2nd par. is disruptive, so I suggest to place it typically just after the term in parethesis, as: (from Greek: phainómenon "that which appears"; and -logia "study of") or to drop it off entirely.
 * The "Husserl" sentence is murky, because the subordinate clause disrupts it, and Wikipedia is not only for experts; instead, I suggest:
 * 1. "Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection about and analysis of the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness."; or
 * 2. "The objects of systematic reflection and analysis of phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, are primarily the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness."; or
 * 3. "Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the structures of consciousness and the phenomena appearing in acts of consciousness, as objects of systematic reflection and analysis.".
 * What about that? --71.247.231.74 (talk) 20:06, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

Since the "Husserl" sentence is done, let's fix the lead's 1st par. The idea is not to change the content, but to simplify the form by using simpler sentences to make it more accessible (for laymen), while moving the etymology up as an option. Also, phenomenology is not a philosophical method, but a philosophical movement. I suggest: What about that? --71.247.231.74 (talk) 01:34, 21 November 2009 (UTC)
 * Phenomenology (from Greek: phainómenon "that which appears"; and lógos, meaning "study") is a philosophical movement. It was founded in the early years of the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl, expanded together with a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany, and spread across to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's work.


 * Looks fine to me. --EPadmirateur (talk) 21:46, 21 November 2009 (UTC)


 * Great, now we have a much better lead for it is simple and inviting without losing any content. The shortest etymology up front is next to invisible there and easy to skip over. Maybe you could help with Existentialism, which lead is so convoluted and inaccessible. WP:Lead is not to tell as much as possible, but the opposite using the simplest and inviting language. Somehow, it does not reach some. --71.247.231.74 (talk) 21:32, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

One more thing to replace "...often in contexts far removed from Husserl's work" with "...often in contexts far removed from Husserl's early works" to justify the "movement" label, to avoid suggesting that Husserl's works were homogenious and not muliti-directional, as were works by almost everybody else. --71.247.231.74 (talk) 00:32, 26 November 2009 (UTC)

Merge Comparative phenomenology into this article
Does Comparative phenomenology warrant its own article or should it be merged into this one? PDCook (talk) 17:27, 7 December 2009 (UTC)


 * Am I right in suspecting that that is a paper someone submitted for some class or other? Der Zeitgeist (talk) 10:35, 8 December 2009 (UTC)
 * It's from a master's thesis and the article is in desperate need of someone else who knows something about the topic. The article is bloated and possibly contains original research. I know nothing of philosophy and the user is a newbie who isn't really following my advice on article writing. PDCook (talk) 17:59, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

For now, I moved the article to the Incubator: Article Incubator/Comparative phenomenology. Please edit it.PDCook (talk) 15:04, 9 December 2009 (UTC)

Lowering the grading
This is not a B article. Just compare it with Analytic Philosophy, which is unreasonably rated as a C article, and it should be clear. It meets every point of the criteria that a C article is "substantial, but is still missing important content or contains a lot of irrelevant material. The article should have references to reliable sources, but may still have significant issues or require substantial cleanup."


 * You know, something like the above really needs a date, don't you think? Come on, genius, tell me why someone might think such a thing? Myles325a (talk) 06:50, 4 April 2012 (UTC)

Stephen Hicks Opening
Stephen Hicks is a rather minor pop youtube philosopher, defending rather esoteric Ayn Randist views that are rejected by the academic philosophic community. Opening an important topic like Phenomenology with a lengthy block quote from Hick's attempt to link Kant with totalitarianism, seems totally inappropriate for such a major article. I recommend that Hicks be entirely removed from the article, but at the very least something has to be done about the opening. --Gary123 (talk) 02:28, 24 June 2011 (UTC)


 * I agree. In addition, I removed the indefensible passage below from the beginning of the overview section. At best, this needs a serious rewrite, and really, I just don't see now it belongs in an encyclopedia article on phenomenology. Kant's use the the term 'phenomena' in the First Critique doesn't automatically make him the father of phenomenology. Maybe it gets a mention later on. But is it really any more relevant than the greek origin of the world 'phainomenon' derived from 'phainein', meaning "to show"? ...It's worth noting that Kant DOES use the term 'phenomenology' in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, but its far from clear that the way in which he uses it has anything to do with phenomenology, as the term gets used in the 20th century. ...Also, the passage I removed refers to structural linguistics and phenomenology as two camps of "19th Century Kantianism." As the terms are ordinarily understood, 'structural linguistics' and 'phenomenology' are both primarily 20th Century movements, and it's far from clear that either one is a form of 'Kantianism.' There have been a number of neo-Kantian movements since Kant's time and many more movements influenced by Kant -- see Neo-Kantianism for a pretty standard list. But it would be controversial to add the phenomenologists and structural linguists to this list in an encyclopedia article on phenomenology:

Stephen Hicks writes that to understand phenomenology, one must identify its roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguished between "phenomena" (objects as interpreted by human sensibility and understanding), and "noumena" (objects as things-in-themselves, which humans cannot directly experience). According to Hicks, 19th-century Kantianism operated in two broad camps: Hicks writes, "In effect, the Structuralists were seeking subjective noumenal categories, and the Phenomenologists were content with describing the phenomena without asking what connection to an external reality those experiences might have." — Preceding unsigned comment added by Brijohn6882 (talk • contribs) 00:15, 13 September 2014 (UTC)
 * structural linguistics and
 * phenomenology.

Hume and common sense
I don't think anyone thinks that Hume attempts to defend common sense with his metaphysics and epistemology. He actually says something pretty clear at the end of his first book on the Treatise, the one devoted to metaphysical speculation, that he realizes his skepticism isn't something he can maintain for very long, because it contradicts his daily experience, and that it doesn't have that much to do (beyond the skeptical method) with the other two books. In fact, the earliest non-ad hominem attacks on Hume were by the self-proclaimed "Common Sense Philosopher" Thomas Reid. Otherwise, I endorse the context in which Hume is included in this article: a certain Kantian reading of Hume's metaphysics seems defensible that places him in the phenomenological camp. We can add Protagoras to the mix, as well.24.98.253.143 (talk) 02:42, 21 September 2011 (UTC)

Neil Evernden
I've moved the following from the second paragraph as its position was incommensurate with its significance.


 * The antithetical nature of Phenomenology to the Cartesian World-view makes Phenomenology an analog to mystical non-theistic religion, such as Buddhism. The explicit embrace of mysticism in Phenomenology, especially within the subclass Ecological Phenomenology, rests in large part upon the work of Neil Evernden, who coined the notion of "Nature as miracle" (Evernden, Nature in Industrial Society, 159), a corner stone in the Phenomenological rejection of empiricism.

--Quadalpha (talk) 07:48, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

Journals

 * Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique
 * Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts
 * Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
 * Research in Phenomenology
 * Newsletter of Phenomenology (online-newsletter)
 * Studia Phaenomenologica
 * Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology
 * The Roman Ingarden Philosophical Research Centre
 * Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
 * Continental Philosophy Review
 * Human Studies
 * Husserl Studies
 * Phenomenology & Practice
 * Journal Phaenomenologie

Book series

 * Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke
 * Edmund Husserl: Collected Works
 * Edmund Husserl: Dokumente
 * Edmund Husserl: Materialien
 * Analecta Husserliana
 * Phaenomenologica
 * Contributions to Phenomenology
 * Studies in German Idealism

'introduction' should = 'etymology'
Potamites (talk) 13:57, 5 November 2014 (UTC)i logged on just to make a point that many others have of course already made: it is bizarre to read

"Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany."

when another wikipedia page reads

"Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's most important and widely discussed philosophical work. Hegel's first book, it describes the three-stage dialectical life of Spirit. The title can be translated as either The Phenomenology of Spirit or The Phenomenology of Mind, because the German word Geist has both meanings."

now i simply wish somewhere could tell me about the earliest appearances of "phänomenologie". did hegel create the word himself? i'd usually expect wikipedia to fill me in on this.

(though as a linguist familiar with synchrony and diachrony, i actually do accept that not all introductions should focus on etymology. it just seems like it might sort this page out a little)

oh this is a pretty good quote from "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Phenomenology_of_Spirit" while again seeming to seriously falsify the second sentence of this page as shown in the first quote above.

" This is why Hegel uses the term "phenomenology". "Phenomenology" comes from the Greek word for "to appear", and the phenomenology of mind is thus the study of how consciousness or mind appears to itself. In Hegel's dynamic system, it is the study of the successive appearances of the mind to itself, because on examination each one dissolves into a later, more comprehensive and integrated form or structure of mind." — Preceding unsigned comment added by Potamites (talk • contribs) 14:14, 5 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Would it be possible to have one example of consciousness or mind successively appearing to itself, being examined, and then dissolving into a later, more comprehensive and integrated form or structure of mind? I know that this is a bold and naïve request, but it should be very easily fulfilled or carried out by anyone who knows Hegel's writings.72.82.129.209 (talk) 02:43, 22 June 2016 (UTC)Hans Wurst

Person vs. Individual: Completely obscure distinction
I know next-to-nothing about the topic of phenomenology. When I got to this passage I had to pause:

"The third assumption is that persons, not individuals, should be explored. This is because persons can be understood through the unique ways they reflect the society they live in."

I can find nothing to explain to me what difference could exist between a "person" and an "individual." Thus this passage communicates nothing to me. The elaboration that "This is because persons..." does not clarify at all.

One should definitely be careful with this image
The following sounds like creative writing to me: "[Intentionality] itself should not be confused with the 'ordinary' use of the word intentional, but should rather be taken as playing on the etymological roots of the word. Originally, intention referred to a 'stretching out' ('in tension,' from Latin intendere), and in this context it refers to consciousness 'stretching out' towards its object. However, one should be careful with this image: there is not some consciousness first that, subsequently, stretches out to its object; rather, consciousness occurs as the simultaneity of a conscious act and its object.' Especially poetic and metaphorical are the words, "...it refers to consciousness 'stretching out' towards its object." Some citations would be welcome.72.82.129.209 (talk) 00:10, 21 June 2016 (UTC)Hans Wurst

Main lead unclear... Why, and how to improve it
According to https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ : "Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view."

This is the lead, that Stanford has on its entry on phenomenology.

I strongly suggest to follow that lead, exactly as written, and quote Stanford. It can the be disputed afterwords, if anyone wants to do so.

I gives absolutely no meaning to have a lead here at Wikipedia, which explains phenomenology

as

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness.

There is probably NO philosophical investigation, where this is NOT true. So Stanfords point by adding

"as experienced from the first-person point of view" is exactly to DISTINGUISH what is essential to phenomenology from other philosophical takes.

phenomenology is already a very complex subject. Not have a clear lead does not improve common human understanding! :-)

Sincerly CT

/*Change first sentence, sources-links*/
- Change: Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness.

-Change to: Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of observation as the presence of human being existence. .


 * Semantically more comprehensive sentence, go for the consensus, thanks...Arnlodg (talk) 17:54, 2 February 2019 (UTC)


 * Sorry that doesn't make sense -Snowded TALK 23:33, 23 March 2019 (UTC)

Uncited addition
Ald81, please do not make uncited additions of text, as you did here. Per WP:VERIFY, any addition you wish to make requires a supporting citation. The text you added ("The Logical Investigations are the epistemological foundations of modern Artificial Intelligence providing a compelling mathematical framework going beyond Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian logical thought structuring axioms. They offer instead a new scientific method that can be applied to fields from the latest theological advancements in Christology to solving medical research questions as well as support the coding architectures suited for Quantum Computing") is quite unnecessary. It is only vaguely relevant to the topic of the article, and per WP:LEAD has no place in the lead. It is also worded in a promotional rather than a neutral way and as such is not appropriate to Wikipedia. FreeKnowledgeCreator (talk) 03:03, 30 March 2019 (UTC)

Citations awry in 10.1 Heidegger's
It seems like most or all of the citations with footnote 48 should be 49, but I can't confirm their accuracy. 48 Introna (2005) seems odd here in general, as the text doesn't even mention Heidegger (and Feenberg just once as a reference) and I don't see how it relates to his phenomenology or criticisms of it at all.

[48] - Introna, L. (2005) Disclosing the Digital Face: The ethics of facial recognition systems, Ethics and Information Technology, 7(2) & [49] - Feenberg, A. (1999) 'Technology and Meaning', in Questioning Technology, London and New York: Routledge. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dom Sjuk (talk • contribs) 23:26, 26 October 2020 (UTC)

Gabriella Farina quote in the lead
It doesn’t give any insight or meaningful information about phenomenology besides Farina’s opinion of it. I think it might only trip up people’s understanding of phenomenology when they come to this article. Bagabondo (talk) 19:22, 28 October 2021 (UTC)

Language,Phenomenology and wikipedia entries
1/ It seems the word 'phenomenology' has many diverse usages; even the definitions of which are not agreed. -is it the function of a wikipedia entry (or any encyclopedia entry) to arbitrate in it's coverage: --the relative importance of those usages ? -- the best definition of any of those usages ? 2/ The word 'science' also has several diverse usages; the definition of one such might be: -"Falsifiable theories about the shared, objective phenomena of time and space." - with such a definition; the definition of [phenomenology] as : "science of subjective experience"; might be seen as a contradiction in terms. - this would seem to point to yet another problem for encyclopedic entries, this time linguistic; ie how to deal with linguistic conflicts involving the definitions of the constituent words in an entry ? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Rhnmcl (talk • contribs) 01:37, 11 April 2022 (UTC)

“Brentano” should be a link
The article’s single reference (by last name only) to “Brentano” should be a link to Franz Brentano [Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1917)]. This would help disambiguate Franz Brentano from, inter alia, Bernard von Brentano, novelist; Christian Brentano, German writer; Clemens Brentano, poet and novelist. Jaredkieling (talk) 15:52, 7 April 2023 (UTC)

Selectively archiving Talk page
This article needs a lot of work, and this page is unmanageably cluttered. I am archiving everything more than a few years old that no longer seems relevant. Others are, of course, invited to review the contents of the archive and restore anything they see fit. Link: Talk:Phenomenology_(philosophy)/Archive_1

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 16:08, 25 July 2023 (UTC)