Talk:Philosophy of logic

organisation
Sections re-arranged--Philogo (talk) 13:13, 15 February 2009 (UTC)

This article completely ignores the discussion on logic that happened in continental philosophy! It's heavily biased towards analytic philosophy! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.175.48.129 (talk) 14:38, 27 September 2022 (UTC)

For the record the originally suggested section headings were:
 * Truth, Propositions and Meaning
 * Truth
 * Logical Truth
 * The analytic-synthetic distinction
 * Tarski's definition of Truth
 * Leibniz's Law
 * Rationality and Logic
 * Are Logical Truths a priori or a posteriori knowledge? Synthetic or Analytic?
 * The problem of non-being
 * Vacuous names
 * Do unicorns have horns and did Hamlet see a real ghost?
 * Does the square root of minus one have the same ontological status at the sqaure root of two===
 * Do predicates have properties?
 * Sense,Reference,Connotation,Denotation,Extension,Intension
 * The status of the Laws of Logic
 * Classical Logic

Philosophy of Logic redirects to this article--Philogo (talk) 13:16, 15 February 2009 (UTC)

truthbearers
Material moved to main article Truthbearer together with sections terminology used and example sentences --Philogo (talk) 13:13, 15 February 2009 (UTC)


 * @ 149.255.239.6 (talk) 00:38, 8 November 2023 (UTC)

Ps and Qs
I am just wondering whether the Ps and Qs of the section Philosophy_of_logic need to be explained. I would think that p is used for proposition and wondered whether q, in the current sense, might also relate to qualia.

Gregkaye (talk) 11:32, 21 November 2009 (UTC)
 * p and q with or without subscript are being used as propositional variables&mdash; Philogos (talk) 01:44, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

Normativity of logic
There is not much here on the normativity of logic, I'm not massively knowledgeable on the philosophy of logic but this does seem like a gap. A broad overview of the topic can be seen here from the SEP: The Normative Status of Logic. I remember reading an interesting paper on this about Frege's arguments for the normativity of logic but cannot remember the exact paper, although the SEP article cites this one (among others) Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic. There is also this Philosophy Compass article which tend to be quite good Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought. On the arguments against normativity of logic side, I'm most aware of the argument that logic sometimes implies we should infer to a belief even though arguably we shouldn't - example given in the SEP page is if we believe p and p->q, but have evidence against q. Logic holds that we should infer to q, but arguably the most rational thing to do is discard belief in either p or p->q. Apparently this is due to Harman and a number of papers of his are given in the SEP bibliography. Just wondered what regular editors here think on this. Shapeyness (talk) 14:04, 7 August 2023 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the the sources. I added a short paragraph on this point to the subsection "General characteristics". Phlsph7 (talk) 16:25, 7 August 2023 (UTC)