Talk:Philosophy of science/Archive 1

Moved from talk:philosophy of science

There are serious problems with the wiki dictionary entries for both the 'philosophy of science' and 'scientific method'. First and most importantly they are dated! Not only can science progress but sometimes even philosophy can. The consensus among philosophers of science today is that we are in a 'post-positivist' era. This means that there are no longer any (or very few indeed) professional philosophers supporting any of the various versions of empiricism that have been put forward as theories of knowledge or modified to directly address the issues of scientific method, criteria of judgement and so on. This is true to the point where the terms empiricist and positivist are often used pejoratively. Now many non-philosophically inclined scientists are perhaps unaware of this. Some of them cling to the simple beliefs about science taught to them when they were college freshman in spite of the fact that these old fashioned beliefs bear little relation to their actual practice. Many scientists, a little more self reflective, and a little more aware of the philosophical and sociological discussions of science, vainly attempted to hold onto some sort of Karl Popper falsification notion. Many of them have been rightly annoyed by the various postmodernist critiques of science but Popper does not give them adequate philosophicval ground to deal with the critiques of Kuhn and Feyerabend let alone the more extreme social constructionist issues put forward by poststructuralist and postmodernist critics. There is a new philosophy of science - Critical Realism - which both scientists and lay persons, as well as professional philosophers, find quite compelling. It projects a deeper critique of empiricism on the one hand, while refuting postmodernist versions of relativism on the other. It does so in a way which most people also find in accord with commonsense.

The second problem with both entries is that while Wiki in general is very concerned with social issues, these entries do not consider either the social sciences or the philosophy of social science. The scientificity (or not) of social science is a raging contemporary debate that infects (or enriches, depending upon your point of view) most substantive sociological debate. Critical Realism has a unifying position with respect to the natural and social sciences; that is the latter can and should be scientific. This point of view has a bearing upon the question of the scientific method as well. It is only in the most vague and general sense that one can speak of a scientific method at all. It is something like an injunction to be be logical,systematic and observant. In any other important methodological respects sciences are disciplinary and sub-specialism disciplinary specific with respect to methods. The methods, to put it crudely, must be appropriate to their objects of knowledge.

There exists today a rich and varied literature about critical realism and also applying it to a plethora of questions. A starting point to investigate this perhaps would be my book 'The Philosophy of Social Science: New Perspectives' (available at Amazon and elsewhere: ISBN 0582369746). Garry Potter

An interesting assertion that philosophy of science can progress... after all, some would argue that the 'progression' away from positivism was actually more like a regression back to Kant. Still, I have a question, or at least food for thought: even if philosophy can progress, what is its role in science and in the community at large? I think it's a great subject to study, and more people should do so, but the majority of the population and indeed the majority of scientists seem to manage quite well without it - or even really being aware of it! --

Philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular progress when they better succeed at explaining the subject areas they set out to explain. Proving such progression is in one sense simply the argumentive proof for whatever it is one is attempting to prove. Hence, proof of our progress since Kant is dependent upon some of the myriad books, articles, arguments etc. that have been authored subsequently actually advancing our understanding of topic areas he engaged with. If one can not improve upon what has been written before why bother to write? Hence, contemporary philosophical work depends upon an implicit faith in both the possibility and actuality of progress.

It is very true as you say that both the public at large and scientists seem to get along just fine with littlle or no knowledge of philosophy. Historically there are broadly speaking two extremes in perspective with respect to philosophy's (potentially helpful) relation to science: the 'master scientist' and the 'under-labourer'. I tend towards the latter. Philosophy can improve scientific work through the clarification of concepts,logic and issues concerning criteria of judgement. It can also aid in properly situating scientific practice and results in terms of historical socio-economic context. . . and accordingly perhaps humbly teach science some humility. Science as Whitehead asserted continued blithely on indifferent to its 'refutation' by Hume (the problem of induction). This unfortunately is simultaneously weakness as well as strength.

One last point: I think perhaps that philosophy's greatest value with respect to science could be its (future) contribution to the public's greater understanding (and correction of misunderstandings!) of science. Garry Potter

Like Garry, I'm also concerned with the wikipedia articles for philosophy of science, scientific method and related articles. The subheadings for the current philosophy of science article are relevant but poorly represent the great host of issues with which the philosophy of science deals. It is, as Garry says, outdated. I also agree with what Garry implies that wikipedia currently has a strong non-philosophically-trained-scientist bent (to its detriment). (Most scientists do not have training in the philosophical foundations of science (which tends to make scientists dogmatic in regards to science, like RK) let alone formal LOGIC!...scientists think they know what logic is, but most don't know jack about it...which should be suprising/alarming since these folks are developing theories that should rely on sound logical formulation....Any ways....) And it is true that "there are...few...professional philosophers supporting any of the various versions of empiricism". A number of philosophy of science theories with different flavors had been developed over time from instrumentalism, prescriptivism to realism (realism is a sort of strict development of empiricism)...instrumentalist theories seem to have won the day with most philosophers of science. Philosophy of social science is currently completely neglected in wiki, and while I attempted to make a brief reference to the difference in scientific methods between so called hard and soft sciences in the science article, some dummy (scientist) deleted it.


 * I sympathize with your concerns about scientists not trained in philosophy trampling philosophy articles in their muddy boots, but you're not going to bring the two cultures any closer by calling people names like "dummy." Also, there's no need to encourage a view of this problem as cutting neatly between sciencey and philosophical Wikipedians. I trained as a scientist, and yet I've been over at scientific method often arguing single-handedly for weeks to keep the article agnostic about method and to make sure that the broad-based dissent among philosphers and social scientists gets mentioned.168... 02:11, 24 Nov 2003 (UTC)


 * The above comments (not from 168, the notes above him) strike me as an attack towards RK, and to scientists as a group. All I can say is that this person needs to go to Barnes and Noble, and read a few dozen books by scientists. Many certainly are well versed in logic and philosophy, and arguably more so than most philosophers are versed about science. We should not engage in unfounded condemnations of entire professions based on a philosophical disagreement. JeMa 20:15, Nov 24, 2003 (UTC)

Perhaps what you say is true, but the fact still remains that philosophy of science and scientific method are both at best meagre reviews of their subjects, and attempts at improvement are stubbornly resisted. Methinks you protest too much. Banno 03:45, 25 Nov 2003 (UTC)


 * I just noticed that my comments aren't very timely, this being a discussion that seems to have left off four months ago. Oh well.168... 02:42, 24 Nov 2003 (UTC)


 * The censorship by those fanatics of scientism is truly tiresome. It is tme to fight back in earnest, and modernize the view of various subjects here.  EofT

My primary counterpoint to Garry is concerning "Critical Realism". It seems to borrow from Instrumentalism. If merely another version of instrumentalism, I'm doubtful it is widely accepted version among professional philosophers of science, as it is only one of many instrumentalist theories (or philosphies of science in general). Garry seems to come from the philosophy of social science school which has developed somewhat independently from the philosophy of science tradition which started out focusing on physics, ignoring social science for some time. B 18:02 15 Jul 2003 (UTC)


 * Yes, it does seem instrumentalist. And there are deeper issues here too, like economics and whether it is religion or not.  Read this on the Physiocrats, surely that is at least one origin for "philosophy of social science".  Also review Sociology of knowledge, Islamic science and quasi-empiricism in mathematics.  These should be better integrated into philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science.  But, also, we should be cognizant that many reject the idea of philosophy as such, and reject the idea that the process of philosophy actually reveals anything.  This view too should be represented, especially as more people hold it than hold the opposite view. EofT


 * Surely there should be discussions of various types of bias here too, those relevant to science? For a current messy debate on this see Talk:Gaia theory.  And there are big questions on ghost-writing of medical research and limits of inquiry and ethics of experiment and all that.  A total rewrite of the existing article is in order. EofT Also General Semantics, Theory of Everything, cognitive science of mathematics, other cognition and observation questions in philosophy of physics and the many issues around time and its measurement.  EofT


 * User:EntmootsOfTrolls/WikiProject Body, Cognition and Senses will deal with some of those issues in a fundamental way, starting from the right place. You are all encouraged to join it and help. - 142.

---

A suggestion: philosophy is usually defined as metaphysics (or ontology), ethics and epistemology. Good articles on the philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics and for that matter philosophy of social science (including economics) should deal with all three issues, rather than let scientism, mathematical fetishism, and economism pick and choose which issues to deal with. There is work on all nine (three by three) issues, and a good research effort will cover it all. EofT

I am surprised --and suspicious-- about the "usuality" of your definition. It is interesting, unless precisely "useless, not even false" (Dirac?). I have an other problem with the distinction between "philosophy of science" and "epistemology". Is there any? To whom? On what grounds? Please note that there are no links to pages for a distinct philosophy of science in other languages, and I feel uneasy to add one in French. Marc Girod 10:44, 23 Nov 2003 (UTC)

The following Moved by Banno 20:46, 19 Dec 2003 (UTC)
Does anyone else find it bizarre that the article doesn&#8217;t even mention induction? Banno 10:50, 25 Nov 2003 (UTC) - Banno -- Either this or the Scientific Method article used to mention induction. It's been removed by someone. There are so many different agendas from so many editors on these articles (and those related) that I've found it impossible as a matter of practice to keep up.

Regrettably, many of their viewpoints are logically mutually exclusive, or at least in my view, violate the fundamental difference between science and other activities looked at by the philosphically inclined. That difference is that whatever science is at any particular time (the 'vector sum' of what all those scientists do -- not the crooks and charlatans and I'll finesse that one here) is entirely dependent on touching base with what the world tells us (as nearly as we can make it out) in experiments. Whether those experiments are deliberately and consciously designed to fit some philospohical scheme or another, all science (practicioners, observers, and culture) dumps any account that is clearly contradicted by experimental result. That there is much human bias, cultural attitude, pack behavior, fraud, confusion, friction (in the Clausewitzian sense), and tradition involved in actual practice down among the practicioners, their funders, spouses, kids, commentators, philosophers, etc changes nothing essential about that difference between science and other stuff. It is, in my view, the job of the philosophically inclined to accoutn for this difference, should they choose to accept. This comment will self-destruct in 10 seconds, Jim.

Many of the article editors, and commentors here, seem to have a different view.

Smoke, hissing, ...


 * Jim, the existence of a range of viewpoints should not be a problem for the Wikipedia community (yes, that is pretty idealistic, but hey, the whole project is pretty idealistic&#8230;). But Alternat views must at least be acknowledged.


 * Your statement, &#8216;all science dumps any account that is clearly contradicted by experimental result&#8217; is a neat expression of the orthodoxy presently in place in the Wikipedia. Thank you for summing this position up so neatly. However this orthodoxy is at odds with the accounts given by Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend, and is not supported by much of the history of science. Yet any mention of this within the main science-related articles is almost instantly removed. Take a look at the history of the scientific method page for a range of examples.


 * Banno, you are wrong. That page gives zero examples of ideas permanently held on to by scientists, once data becomes well known which disproves the previous theory. This page merely notes that out of tens of thousands of scientific discoveries, a handful have taken a bit longer to be accepted. Well, so what? Feyerabend and his friends are just having a fit, because the entire scientific community doesn't instantly make such changes. And its a damm good thing that they don't, or we would have to rewrite all of our science textbooks every year to include "proven new ideas" that really are flawed, due to experimental era, bias, or some other problem.  In the real world, a large community of scientists have the responsibility, and the time, to look at many experiments over a period of many years, to insure accuracy. Any policy to the contrary would be rash and damagin.  As for Kuhn and Lakatos, they also are not considered authorities by all scientists and philosophers.  They have an agenda to push that blinds them to what goes on. RK 15:03, Nov 28, 2003 (UTC)

Hi, RK. Pleased to meet you. I must admit that I&#8217;m not sure to which page you are referring. Do you agree that central to the thesis of Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend is the idea that scientists defend falsified theories? If not, what is it you think Lakatos meant by a negative heuristic? What do Kuhn and Feyerabend mean by Incommensurability?

If you agree that they present a divergent view of science, what are your grounds for not having them represented in the article? Does this encyclopaedia lay down some sort of ruling as to who is to be considered an authority, and who not? I suggest that you would have a hard time finding another discussion on the philosophy of science that does not mention them. Banno 20:52, 28 Nov 2003 (UTC)


 * It seems these supposed defenders of science are so frightened that they will not permit even a hint of criticism. The result is a stultified and dishonest appraisal of the field. Such an environment is more likely to disenfranchise rather than encourage support for science, and so is essentially counterproductive.Banno 10:53, 28 Nov 2003 (UTC)


 * This is an ad homeninm attack and slander of all scientists, and of most contributors who work on Wikipedia science articles. If you truly believe that we are all this "dishonest", then your only choice is to engage us in edit wars with personal attacks, or to go away until you change your mind, and can work with us productively and in good faith. I hope you choose the latter. RK 15:03, Nov 28, 2003 (UTC)

Yes, it is an ad hominem attack, but not against &#8220;all scientists&#8221;, as you suggest, but against those who continually and persistently remove reference to criticism of the perceived orthodoxy. I suggest that the general scientific community has a much better understanding of methodology than is presented here &#8211; and would steer well clear of the mediocrity of these articles. Your reply is more offensive, given that it is a personal attack. Banno 20:52, 28 Nov 2003 (UTC)

Moti Nissani's article on The Plight of the Obscure Innovator in Science recounts nearly four dozen examples of scientific discoveries which:
 * are universally accepted nowadays, but
 * which were ignored, ridiculed or otherwise marginalized when first mentioned by their discoverers

It's a pretty impressive list. The impression it makes on me is, don't rock the boat unless you're prepared for a long chilly swim. Seems to me that no matter people aren't as eager to find and welcome new ideas as some rosy-colored views of "the march of scientific progress" would lead us to think. --Uncle Ed 19:17, 4 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * True, yet I believe that this supports my point. Even though some scientific theories are at first ignored or ridiculed, if they are demonstratably correct, then they are eventually accepted. It just doesn't always happen quickly. People are not always willing to accept new ideas, especially in religion and in politics. But in science, people eventually will have to accept these new ideas when enough evidence accumulates. RK 14:19, Dec 5, 2003 (UTC)

I think we agree: demonstrably correct ideas, even if dismissed at first, have always been able to enter the mainstream after the passage of sufficient time.

If we disagree at all, it might be over:
 * how long it takes (several months to a few years vs. DECADES)
 * how easy the process is (enlightened, objective, curious scientists avidly seeking new insights vs. prejudice, outright hostility, funding battles, vicious character assassination campaigns) --Uncle Ed 16:57, 5 Dec 2003 (UTC)

Nothing would make me happier than to be able to agree with you both. Certainly, the theories we have now are better than those of even twenty years ago. But tell me what the statement &#8220;if (theories) are demonstratably correct, then they are eventually accepted&#8221; might mean. What is it for a statement to be &#8220;demonstrably correct&#8221;? Do you know of a way of knowing which theories that are now held to be &#8216;demonstrably correct&#8217; will in future be found to be false? Or do you know that all our present theories will never be replaced by better ones? Banno 03:50, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)
 * I think you are disagreeing with a position that we do not have. I agree with you that we certainly hold some beliefs now that in the future can be proven incomplete, or even incorrect. One well-known example are the theories of quantum mechanics and special relativity. Both of these theories have been tested to a degree further than any other theories in the history of science, and both have passed every test with flying colors. Yet physicists are well aware that these theories paint incompatible pictures of the ultimate nature of the universe, and that in their present form, these theories cannot be made to work with each other. This is a very clear sign that both of these theories, however true, are incomplete; both are aspects of a greater whole, and we do not yet see the entire picture. RK 04:19, Dec 6, 2003 (UTC)


 * So of course we now cannot tell what the future will hold. But that was never my point. Rather, my point was that the arguments against science in this and related articles were very flawed. They list theories which people took a long time to accept, and concluded "Hah! Scientists sometimes refuse to accept new ideas"  Yet in every case stated (by definition!) these theories were accepted. It just took some time. As time goes by there is no reason to assume that this process of acceptance will someday stop - unless people abandon science for political dogma or fundamentalist religion. When something is proven true by experiment, by enough people in enough ways, eventually the scientific community comes around to recognizing that it is true. That is all that I am saying. RK 04:19, Dec 6, 2003 (UTC)


 * I suspect you meant to say quantum mechanics and general relativity. Dirac incorporated SR into QM while it was still fresh off the griddle. 168... 05:41, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * Whoops! Yes, that is precisely what I meant to write. Thanks. RK

This re-phrasing might be something with which I could agree. But I want to be very clear, so I will ask for further clarification. There appear to be two different views expressed here. What will you choose as the arbiter of which theory is correct &#8211; that it be &#8220;demonstrably correct&#8221;, as in the first post, or that it be accepted by the scientific community, as in the second? Or do you think these two are the very same thing? Banno 06:09, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * I think they are usually the same thing. When are new theories accepted by the majority of the scientific community without proof? Scientists are skeptical about claims, and will not accept claims as provem until not only is demonstratable evidence produced, but they wait until many such people, in different labs, can reproduce such evidence on their own. (Of course sometimes they wait too long, other times not long enough.) The results of science, of course, are only as relibale as the particular humans involved in the field. RK 14:26, Dec 6, 2003 (UTC)

So a theory&#8217;s being demonstrably correct is the same as it being accepted by the scientific community? We have agreed that at different times, theories cease to be accepted - I&#8217;m thinking of the Tower Argument, or Newton&#8217;s laws. But if being demonstrably correct is the same as being accepted by the scientific community, doesn&#8217;t this imply that it is possible for a theory that was once &#8220;demonstrably correct&#8221; to, as some other time, become &#8220;demonstrably incorrect&#8221;?

And if that is the case, then doesn&#8217;t it appears that when a scientist says of a certain theory that it is demonstrably correct, he or she means precisely that, at the present time, it is accepted by the scientific community? Isn't this substantially the point made by Kuhn? Banno 22:51, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)

Banno -- No. Kuhn was making points about the sociology of science, how people (ie, scientists) cope with change in the intellectual content of their field (ie, theories). He was correct, in my view, in noting the pattern(s) of change which occurs in many cases amongst scientists, and so in science. But scientists are hardly immune to human behavior patterns and this should not have been a surpise to anyone -- though perhaps less than clearly noticed, of course. Blunder, persistent blunder, misunderstanding, foolishness, mendacity, rivalry, fraud, misjudgement, mistake, and other human stuff should be expected to be inevitable. None, not one -- however regrettable, changes the underlying nature of science nor its philosophy. With respect to the philosophical underpinings of science (ie, what it is that science fundamentally *is*), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is largely, in my view, irrelevant. Interesting and useful, perhaps, but irrelevant. Whatever science is, and whatever it's fundamentally about, is not affected by boneheaded scientists (or others), nor by the stodginess or lack thereof of scientific groups or schools or whatever, nor by mistake, fraud, rivalry, or other goofiness, nor even by the incredible brilliance of this or that scientist here or there.

'Science' will surely be done differently in detail (organizationally, cooperatively, prestigiously, ...) by little green men from Arcturus, women, Asians, intelligent ants, and Eskimos than it is by its practicioners heretofore here on Earth. But, Newton's laws of motion will be the same (at low velocities and outside of sufficiently intense gravitational fields) regardless of the ethnic, racial, specieal nature of the scientists involved. And General Relativistic corrections to those Laws will still describe behavior better, however they may have been arrived at locally. They will still be needed for any designing a cyclotron, attempting to make sense of some astronomical observations, trying to generate energy from atomic phenomena, or to explain certain isotopic residues equivalent to those found in equatorial W African sediments, ... Kuhn's observations (about how theories/paradigms/... change) will not be accurate for many of these groups, but any who thought gravitational attraction was an inverse fourth power law will have much trouble. And it is that universal trouble when getting *it* (ie, science) wrong that is key, in my view, to the nature of science. In its limited baliwick (experimentally testable theories only), it works; Hume's critique of induction as a method of reaching truth does not apply, for science (ie which theory to take seriously) is governed by past observation, not future anticipation/application. This is unlike just about everything else in theology or religion or history or ... In those cases, disagreement cannot be referred to experiment for resolution with the result taken as unavoidable for all (including the intelligent ants and the little green men from Arcturus). If no such resolution is possible, no theory need be abandoned by those committed to it which is very much unlike science.

Since this approach only provides a way to throw out inadequate theories (eg, experiment B has torpedoed theory A, so it's no longer worth bothering with about, but the experimental result does not preclude some further experiment C from showing that theory A is untenable in some other respect: examples include pholgiston, spontaneous generation (at least of ordinary Earth life), Aristotlian/Ptolmaic cosmology, Lysenkoism, Aryan superiority, ...), it is an inherently asymptotic approach to *anything* that might be claimed to be truth. ALL SCIENCE is composed of temporarily *best available* theories; there is no truth here and no mechanism for finding it. Another reason Hume's critique is irrelevant. A better theory (by the sole test of better accounting for observed phenomena) is to be preferred by all who practice science -- modulo their psychological/sociological situation which may permit only a limited reorientation as to the currently best theory. Said phychological/sociological reality may be interesting (eg, to Kuhn and others, and even to me), but has nothing to do with the underlying science.

Now, there are people who believe they have found *truth* in some scientific theory (practicioners of one type of scientism) and there are folks whose need for certainty compels them somewhere (perhaps even to science), and there are folks whose need to resist the 'pressure of orthodoxy' is such that they oppose anything with considerable prestige and widely accepted, and there are folks who cannot abide anything which contradicts (or seems to do) some aspect of their religious committments. All of these save the first may account for the vehemence of some committments to this or that economic theory, and those who misunderstand the nature of science may even be motivated by the first. Such committments are common in today's world. But not one of these modifying factors has *anything* to do with the underlying science, for each is different for different people, broadly for different groups, and most likely for different species as well. But each of these people, groups, and species confront the same universe and so must reach the same understanding(s) of it or their buildings will fall down, their ships will sink (assuming oceans and ships of course), their airplanes will crash, their medical engineering will kill unecessarily, and so endlessly on.

Nothing Kuhn, or any other, says changes this underlying relation with reality with which it is the business of the philosophy of science to cope. Noting that there is disagreement amongst published academics -- even famous ones or recent ones or less recent ones for that matter -- is neither sufficient to change fundamentals of science and so of its philosophy, nor even in many cases relevant. It is scholasticism revived, though under a new name, to think otherwise. This is not a majority voting issue at this level -- there are real constraints which apply and which cannot be ignored lest your philosophy no longer be of science, but about something else. That some philosophical position may become so popular that 'most' scholars adopt it will mean exactly nothing (in re science anyway) if that philosophical account does not recognize and deal with the testable nature of science, and its tentative contingent quality as well. In my view, "this way to the Lysenkoism", or some intellectually equivalent nonsense.

Humans have not characteristically coped well with contingent things, especially contingency which cannot be foreseeable. Kahneman and Tversky (and others) have turned up characteristic ways in which human thought is universally defective, and there is likely a connection with scientism and such, but that's for another time I think. A new experiment may cause such problems with existing theory(s) as to cause abandonment, but what that experiment is is only dimly (very dimly indeed in most cases) foreseeable. Until then, there is a hard and non-contingent quality of every existing theory -- it's the best we've managed to dream up, given our knowledge and it works (so far). And that's a hard thing to get around for those who are disinclined to accept it. Most folks aren't comfortable nagivating intellectually in such tricky waters. Those who are are, by comparison, rather unusual and more than a little odd. This reaction (and limitation) may account for some of the vehemence about the philosophy of science that we can observe with regard to the relevant Wiki articles and discussion pages, and of course in much else.

ww
 * Ww, I am very, very pleased that my questions have elicited such a extensive and passionate reply.


 * I quite agree that Kuhn is mostly irrelevant to the way science is actually done. But, as 168 has been at pains to point out, so are all statements in the philosophy of science. Science works, and is astonishingly effective. All philosophers and philosophies of science, not just Kuhn, are pretty well irrelevant to the scientific process. But isn&#8217;t this true as much of Wiki&#8217;s hypothetico-deductive orthodoxy as it is of Kuhn?


 * As for alien science, I think the language you use needs to be a bit more precises. It&#8217;s not true that Newton&#8217;s laws of motion will be the same for aliens as for us, since Newton&#8217;s laws are expressed in English, and aliens certainly will not express themselves in English. Isn&#8217;t it rather motion itself that will be the same for aliens as for us, regardless of how it is expressed?


 * I have entirely failed to follow much of the remainder of your post. Sorry. Banno 08:33, 9 Dec 2003 (UTC)

---
 * Banno,


 * I'm sorry that you have failed to follow most of my post. If you will note the obscure bits, I'll try to assist.


 * On the question of whether phrasing an inverse square law in English versus Intelligent Ant or indeed versus 'human female language' (if such there be aside from grammar differences in some languages), we have a very severe disconnect. It is my view that any theory in science (and make sure that it is understood that I am using science carefully to reflect only experimentally testable theories) is invariant across any restatement. If nothing else, a mathematical statement (of which there are many -- all equivalent) should make that clear. If you are serious in endorsing 168's claim then you (and 168) and I have perhaps an unbridgeable gulf.


 * As for the point that discussions of the philosophy of science are not themselves science, well I'd regard that as tautologically true. No such philosophical statement is experimentally testable (or in Popperian terms falsifiable) and thus not science. None the less science is (or its practiciioners are) doing something and that something is susceptible to philosophically oriented discussion. And I think that discussion can be illuminating, if not scientific. It is certainly interesting to this discussant.


 * I will note that, on review of your posts, I have detected a repeated concern for 'demonstrable correctness'. I think this is wrong headed. No experiment may demonstrate that some theory is demonstrably correct. The sum of past observation (including experimental observation) can at most merely decide that this or that theory is the best currently available. And often not even that much. Science does not produce 'correct' demonstable or not. It produces theories which are best at the moment, subject to correction/improvement/modification in future. Since the correction (etc) is generally in accounting for some new phenomena (in the case of Newton's gravitation this would be such things as the motion of Mercury), current theories will remain the best available within their scope. Thus, artillery designers don't bother with General Relativity, but stick with Newton, and none of our spacecraft have moved sufficiently quickly to require General Relativity correction either. Newton's account is, for certain purposes (pretty wide ones for the moment) a perfectly sensible approximation to an account we know is 'better'. Which is to say that it (General Relativity in one guise or another) accounts for observed phenomena better.


 * ww

I&#8217;m not speaking for 168. If what you mean is that the alien&#8217;s science could be translated into English, doubtless you are correct. But that was not what I took you to be saying in the other post. In the absence of any identifiable aliens we can chat to, let&#8217;s leave the point moot.

If you read the discussion closely you will see that the phrase 'demonstrably correct' was agreed to by RK and Uncle Ed. All I wanted to do was to find out what it was they meant by it.

This isn&#8217;t really the place for a general discussion of science. My purpose in the discussion with RK was to draw attention to the social aspects of science, which are poorly dealt with in the article. But I&#8217;m not sure of the relevance of the present discussion to the article itself. Banno 06:59, 10 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * Banno,


 * It seems that you wish no further clarification of my earlier posting which you failed to follow. Do I understand correctly?


 * In re 'demonstrably correct' -- I would think that RK and Uncle Ed are victims of some linguistic confusion. I suspect, having reread their posts, that what they meant is 'not demonstrably incorrect' or 'best available' or some such. Both appear to share what you have objected to in posts here as a view of the philosophy of science which insufficiently recognizes its social constructionness and is therefore naive and incorrect. Too conventional and orthodox if I undersnad correctly. Garry Potter and others have also made postings here and in Scientifc Method with a similar orientation. I suspect that RK and Uncle Ed are more in agreement with my view on this than with yours or Potter's. But perhaps they will notice this post and speak for themselves.


 * In re: no aliens to chat with -- That we haven't yet made contact with aliens (Ants or otherwise) has not stopped many from claiming that science is socially constructed / has no claim to objectivity / is not universal in some sense / deserves no (and has earned no) special place among the intellectual disciplines we have developed / etc. Indeed, in a recent post here, you noted that "science is by definition socially constructed". Since it, and everything else humans do, is done by humans I suppose there is a certain inevitability in such a claim. However, it is also intellectually nihilisticly tautological as such claims are too often used to block (preclude, trump, vitiate, ) any other account of the nature of science. In short, polemically.


 * That such claims have become fashionable among some observers (academics (and publishers)) in the era of Lacan and deconstruction and post modernism is of no particular significance. The only question about them I see as relevant is, "Are such claims helpful in understanding science or how it works or why it has a special intellectual place amongst our activities?". I think the only answer is not particularly, for they leave the field in a state of 'no agreement on anything is possible, save discussion of bias and distortion (socially constructed, psychologically constructed, or otherwise constructed)'. This is, in my view, not only a position of intellectual despair ('it is possible to understand nothing beyond bias analysis'), but is plainly wrong. Science, and only science, uses appeal to the observation -- typically and best, experimental observation -- to govern whether one should take theory A for the moment as 'the way things are'. That being so, and modulo the inevitable sloppy connections in individuals regarding an understanding of the consequences of any particular experiment for theory A and pending additional news from the other experiments, anyone (Intelligent Ants included) should have the same willingness to go with theory A as the best available assuming they have no access to additional information.


 * Since women (or (other than educated white male) ethnicities, or economic statuses, or educational attainments, or ...) fill the place of the Intelligent Ants in many (especially the post modern / deconstructionist sort) analyses of science, it's probably not necessary to even include  in our thinking. The same considerations are said to apply to many other, not so alien groups.


 * Science (by which I mean our techniques of theory construction in re the natural world) has earned a prestige that no other intellectual discipline can match and that prestige crosses ethnic, religous, gender, economic, ... boundaries. Thus, no one would be happy flying in an airplane (or riding an elevator, or in an automobile, ...) designed by an engineer who regarded the content of science as essentially dependent on local social / psychological / political / etc conditions. Basing your stress or lift calculations on Roman theories, or Cambodian theories, or ancient Greek theories, or female theories, or feline theories, or , theories about material strength or airfoil behavior would make me distrust every such engineer, and so probably anyone else who became aware of said engineer's unusual convictions about the theoretical basis of his practical craft. As well, an analysis of my (and my wife's) genetic situation by a Lysenkoist would not fill me with confidence. Yet, for some decades in the USSR, genetics and biology was socially / politically constructed in just that way. IT WAS ALSO WRONG.
 * And so also for spontaneous generation theories for such things as maggots and bacteria (after bacteria were noticed, of course) in spite of strong social (philosophic and religious mostly) support for them. They were, it turns out, WRONG all along, and the experiments which falsified those theories (by Spallanzi in the one case, and Pasteur in the other) demolished them entirely.
 * That those theories continued to be strongly believed by many even is something that is probably due to social construction and may be in need of some explanation. Here, questions of social construction may be quite relevant. Such books as Hoffer's True Believer or some of those attempting to understand the rise and acceptance of Nazi dogma might help. But none of that has anything to do with science -- unless some experimentally testable theory of how it happens could be developed. Tough to do, I suspect.


 * Social / political / psychological / ... support/construction for theories in science is a poor reed indeed on which to rely if one's goal is find better theories (by the criterion of better accounting for the phenomena, including experimental testing). Since that's the goal (however poorly followed in particular cases) of science, it follows that social constructionism arguments are less useful than one would hope an explanatory approach would be.


 * Hope some of this clarifies the previously unclear.


 * ww

I agree with most of what you say, ww. It appears that you are arguing ardently against a position that I do not hold. Let me ask, though, since I agree with you, how is it that we both know that Lysenkoist genetics is wrong? I certainly have not done the experiments to check, have you? Or, if you prefer, what does it mean for a theory to be &#8220;taken for the moment as the way things are&#8221;? How do we justify our acceptance of Quantum or relativistic physics?Banno 21:32, 13 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * Banno,
 * If indeed I have argued, as you say, against a position you don't hold, I have stepped on a non-existent step. Sorry about that.


 * As for the question you raise about Lysenkoism, I agree that it is interesting. Perhaps, we may be able to agree that political pressure (up to and including imprisonment and death) is/was an inadequate way to support any theory on a scientific subject -- however much support that political position commands/commanded?


 * I regard quite a number of theories about the world as false enough not to rely on even if I have not personally repeated the experiences which allegedly demonstrated that falsity. For instance, I take some care to act as though I believe that ammonia leaks are dangerous (likely fatally dangerous) though I have not myself tested the claim that sufficient ammonia does not support life; every time I've encountered one, I've been unable to remain in the vicinity. And so also with hydrogen sulfide (aka, 'rotten egg smell'). Perhaps I would be bolder in the case of cyanide which is said to have an 'almondy' smell. As I type this, I would hope not. And so on with grenades and such. In these cases, as in almost all education, it is the reported experience of the species which is determinative. Not necessarily correct by some philosophic criterion of truth, but asymptotically approaching socially approved reliability if neither truth nor workability. This is not scientific, but merely practical; I don't have the time, nor do you or anyone else, to repeat tests beyond some certain minimum (which is actually rather small). However, this approach is eminently capable of internal contradiction; and has repeatedly encompassed such. For example, I am told in this instance that members of some group of people are not trustable (indeed are quite dangerous), but in another instance that members of that group (perhaps even some of the same people) are trustable to the extent of correctly and reliably performing low status work (cooking, sewer repair and installation, water supply repair and installation, unpleasant diamond mining, etc).


 * In contrast, the subject matters treated by science have mostly heretofore shown a considerable internal consistency in many respects, so there has been (and perhaps will continue to be) a check against inconsistency of the example type. If so, the experiments I personally perform to test theories will also be tests of some larger part of the existing theory collection. If so, well and good. If not, the experiments I perform to test a theory still serve, in that limited case, to identify theories which fail to account for observation -- in these cases, the experiments I have performed. Thus, I perform science in a small (and not very generalizable) way every time I am building something if I suppose something might work (this stud placed here to take that load), and conduct a test to determine whether it will or not. (Oops, wrong again. It fell down. But, even if it hasn't yet fallen down, this establishs only that the alternative theory (that it would) was wrong for loads and conditions encountered to date. Perhaps an additional straw added tomorrow would be too much, in which case my theory that the stud would be sufficient will have been shown to be inadequate).


 * Of course, if I misunderstand the significance of an experimental observation, some further experiment or another's correction of my misunderstanding will be required to lift the scales from my eyes. But if I never 'get it', I will remain, and so will any who agree with me in re that significance, on the side of what may be eventually shown to be in error. My status as a 'certified scientist' whatever that is, will change nothing. Consider the many 'certified scientists' with professorships and even Nobel Prizes who participated -- several with considerable venom and apparent sincerity howver odious -- in the banishment of 'Jewish science' from Nazi Germany. Their opinions changed absolutely nothing about whether Einstien's account of special or general relativity, or even of Brownonian motion or the photoelectric effect withstood experimental testing or failed to withstand it. And similarly for those who denied that theories of spontaneous generation (for 'religious' reasons or any other) could withstand (or had withstood) Spallanzani's and Pasteur's experimental tests.


 * Whether I (or you or they) ever 'get it' or not isn't of much consequence to "science", except to me and perhaps mine who are squashed by a falling wall, for it is not a voting process, even nominally. It is a reasoning process (determining whether some observation demonstrates that some theory is no longer tenable), which I may manage to fail repeatedly. Not many of Newton's contemporaries even understood his accounts of motion, probably largely because he wasn't very interested (for psychological reasons we can only guess at, I presume) in explaining himself intelligibly to his fellows. From a meta-science viewpoint, that didn't change invulnerability of his account to experimental falsification (or the lack thereof). At that time and place (and for some time thereafter), his account was the best available, whether understood or personally tested by his contemporaries or not.


 * Does that help?


 * ww