Talk:Pragmatic maxim

Yoneda Lemma
The pragmatic maxim seems strikingly like the Yoneda lemma from category theory. Namely, to understand a conceptual object, it suffices to understand how the object transforms under all structure-preserving maps. I do not know if this idea has been developed in the philosophical literature yet. If not, then this represents original research and should not be added. If it has been developed, then a reference should be provided, and the content added to this page. --74.66.20.170 (talk) 05:29, 18 June 2013 (UTC)

Disambiguation Page?
How does one set up a disambiguation page? For instance, the Paul Weiss that I get by default is a different one than the philosopher who edited Peirce's Collected Papers. Thanks, Jon Awbrey 23:30, 4 January 2006 (UTC)

Normative / Positive
The claim that the pragmatic maxim is normative is highly suspect, and I think it stems from Peirce's way of expressing the idea. He says that it should be used to clear up metaphysics, which sounds normative, but it could be argued that Peirce merely encased his idea in intellectually belligerent language: he thought he was right and he wanted to prove the metaphysics was "wrong" and his (weak) argument was roughly, "if you adopt my perspective, everything will become much clearer." This does not mean that the content of the maxim is normative. Mistercupcake 01:36, 9 October 2007 (UTC)

Actually, it's cogent for the claim that the pragmatic maxim is normative, that "it stems from Peirce's way of expressing the idea." Most of Peirce's formulations of the maxim are normative, and he himself said that it was originally enounced in the form of a maxim. That's why he takes the trouble at one point to reformulate it as a "philosophical theorem." So it can be expressed normatively or non-normatively, but Peirce usually treated and expressed it normatively, and he did not do this by saying, "use it to fight metaphysics!" He does it by stating it in the imperative mood, addressed to "you." The article in which he introduces the idea is a "How to" article -- "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." That's an inclusive "Our" -- "yours, mine, all of ours."

To establish that Peirce's pragmatic maxim is a normative or regulative principle, it's enough to show that Peirce formulates it that way and treats it that way.

Moreover, Peirce did not use the pragmatic maxim only in the fight against metaphysics. He used it in many ways; he uses it in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in order to define truth and reality. And he was not against metaphysics per se, but instead wrote extensively on it, and included it as the third division of cenoscopic philosophy. General metaphysics: Peirce argued for scholastic realism about generals, and eventually embraced modal realism as well. Religious metaphysics: Peirce believed in and argued for the reality of God. See "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908). Physical metaphysics: Peirce held the view, which he called objective idealism, that "that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." See Peirce, "The Architecture of Theories", The Monist 1 (1891), pp. 161–176, see p. 170 via Google Books, reprinted (CP 6.7–34) and (EP 1, 285-297, see p. 293). There's a lot of metaphysics in Peirce! And he didn't deny it, he affirmed it. The main thing to understand is that Peirce regarded logic (philosophical and mathematical alike) as preceding metaphysics. He disliked a lot of the works and ideas of metaphysicians. But it is only in his early writing that he writes of clearing up metaphysics almost as if to abolish it.

Moreover it really helps in understanding Peirce's view if one knows his classifications. For Peirce, the theoretical locus of the pragmatic maxim is in philosophical logic. Peirce regards (philosophical) logic as normative. He classes philosophy itself as cenoscopy, which his second division of the "Sciences of Discovery" (except for that which he calls "Synthetic Philosophy" or "Science of Review").

Sciences of Discovery -- heuristic, as opposed to review-oriented and to practical. 1. Mathematics -- draws necessary conclusions about hypothetical objects 2. Philosophy / Cenoscopy -- about positive phenomena in general, and does not resort to special experiences or experiments in order to settle its questions 2a. Phenemonology/Phaneroscopy/Categorics 2b. The Normative Sciences 2bi. Esthetics 2bii. Ethics 2biii. Logic (or formal semiotic) 2biiia. Speculative Grammar (or Philosophical or Universal Grammar) (or Stechiology) Includes the classification of signs. 2biiib. Critic (or Logical Critic, Critical Logic, or Logic Proper). (Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction, and deduction). 2biiic. Methodeutic (or Speculative Rhetoric, or Universal or Philosophical Rhetoric). Is the locus of Peirce's Pragmatism, and includes study of scientific method. 2c. Metaphysics 2ci. General Metaphysics, or Ontology 2cii. Psychical or Religious Metaphysics, 2ciii. Physical Metaphysics 3. The Special Sciences / Idioscopy (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.) (corrected The Tetrast (talk) 17:46, 23 January 2008 (UTC) and again The Tetrast (talk) 17:47, 23 January 2008 (UTC) and again! The Tetrast (talk) 17:48, 23 January 2008 (UTC))

So pragmatism, and the pragmatic maxim, are an aspect of methodeutic, which is a heuristically oriented (as a part of the Sciences of Discovery), philosophical, normative study of methods of inquiry, in inquiry's aspect as a positive phenomenon in general. (paragraph augmented The Tetrast (talk) 17:32, 23 January 2008 (UTC))

On the theoretical locus of pragmatism and the pragmatic maxim as being in methodeutic, see the tabular list of titles of Peirce's proposed list of memoirs in 1902 for his Carnegie application, Eprint On Peirce's classifications more generally see the list which I compiled for the Classification of the sciences (Peirce) wiki:

The Tetrast (talk) 17:22, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Peirce, C.S., 1902, "An Outline Classification of the Sciences", The Collected Papers, vol. 1, pp. 203-283 (1902) Eprint, from projected book Minute Logic.
 * Peirce, C.S., 1902, "On the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of Research", Manuscript L75.350-357, Arisbe Eprint, from "Logic, Considered As Semeiotic", Manuscript L75, with draft sections labeled and interpolated into the final (submitted July 1902) version of the 1902 Carnegie Institute application, Joseph Ransdell, ed., Arisbe Eprint.
 * Peirce, C.S., 1903, "A Detailed Classification of the Sciences", The Collected Papers, vol. 1, pp. 180-202 (1903) Eprint and Eprint, from "A Syllabus Of Certain Topics In Logic", the Essential Peirce, vol. 2, pp. 258-330.
 * Vehkavaara, Tommi, 2001, "The outline of Peirce's classification of sciences (1902-1911)", (11.4 KiB).
 * Vehkavaara, Tommi, 2003, "Development of Peirce's classification of sciences - three stages: 1889, 1898, 1903", (19.4 KiB).

Confusion
As noted in the AFD discussion (q.v.) this article is highly confused. It is conflating the First Rule of Reason and the Pragmatic Maxim. The first quotation in the article is the Rule. The third is the Maxim. For sources that can be used to fix this article, see the AFD discussion Uncle G (talk) 02:30, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

I don't see a second quotation which isn't the Pragmatic Maxim, but the currently first quotation is F.R.L., not the Pragmatic Maxim. Of course it's relevant, lots of things are relevant, but I agree that it doesn't belong there in this article. Also, the stuff about the Pragmatic Maxim not being normative or regulative does not seem based on anything in Peirce. Generally, I'm inclined to revert the article to my last edit. The Tetrast (talk) 17:27, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

I should have added this article to my watchlist a while ago. The Tetrast (talk) 17:33, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

Source Literature
Uncle G asked me to see whether the citations in Articles for deletion/Pragmatic maxim might be worth including for this article. Good work has appeared since the original AFD discussion for this article closed, so I would recommend including the following which were not cited as sources in that discussion. This is a brief paper by one of the foremost Peirce scholars with considerable research behind it but written for a more general audience. This essay collection by another foremost Peirce scholar usefully approaches the pragmatic maxim from different angles. Of the earlier work suggested as sources for the original AFD discussion, I would recommend including I would not recommend including the following, because they are not aimed at giving a scholarly understanding of the maxim and are better described as possible applications of (certain interpretations of) the maxim I would also recommend not citing the article by Sami Pihlström ('Peirce's Place in the Pragmatist Tradition') specifically - since it is not fully focused on the pragmatic maxim itself. However, it would be sensible to in an article of this sort to cite the whole collection from which this particular paper comes: the interested and primed reader will glean much useful information about the pragmatic maxim from this whole collection Phenomenologuy (talk) 08:10, 29 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Cheryl J. Misak 'The pragmatic maxim: how to get leverage on a concept' Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol 17, 1, 2010, pp. 76-87.
 * Christopher Hookway The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and Pragmatism (Oxford University Press, 2013)
 * Olshewsky, T.M. (1983). "Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 19: 199–210
 * Cheryl J. Misak 'Peirce and the Pragmatic Maxim' in Verificationism: Its History and Prospects (Routledge, 1995).
 * Juan Fontrodona (2002). Pragmatism and Management Inquiry: Insights from the Thought of Charles S Peirce Quorum/Greenwood
 * Peter Ochs (1998). Peirce, Pragmatism, and the Logic of Scripture. Cambridge University Press.
 * Donald L. Gelpi (2000). From Transcendentalism to Pragmatism". Varieties of Transcendental Experience: A Study in Constructive Postmodernism. Liturgical Press.
 * The Cambridge Companion to Peirce Cheryl J. Misak (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Shall I revert?
I've commented on the placement of the F.R.L. at the top of the article and on the question of whether the Pragmatic Maxim is normative. I said that I'm inclined to revert the article to my most recent edit. Nobody has responded, so if another day or two goes by without response, I'll carry out the reversion. The Tetrast (talk) 04:27, 30 January 2008 (UTC)

Well, I kind of disappeared there for a while, but I'm back for the moment. I see that nobody has commented on my proposed reversion. Last call! I really will revert as I've proposed if nobody says anything. The Tetrast (talk) 02:52, 28 February 2008 (UTC)

Okay, I'm going to go ahead with the reversion as soon as I re-familiarize myself with things at this page. The Tetrast (talk) 02:15, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

Well, I tried, but I can't do it because of "conflicting or intermediate edits." I'll figure it out. The Tetrast (talk) 02:20, 23 March 2008 (UTC)