Talk:Problem of induction/Archive 1

Popper
Karl Popper did in fact claim to have resolved the problem of induction through his deductive approach to science, but I think that as the paragraph appears in the article at the current moment, it is biased toward proponents of Popper's insistence on his having done away with induction. The debate as it actually stands is not so definitively in favor of Popper. Many of his critics have pointed out that induction is implicit in his method of deduction as the falsification of a theory is itself a scientific claim, and as such, for a falsification to be so incontrovertibly accepted as Popper believed it should, it would have to rely on induction since induction would necessarily be the manner of logical inference used to demonstrate the universality of a theory about another theory having been falsified. Batman Jr. 03:52, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

I need some help here. Has Salmon's criticism of Popper been addressed? I need more info so I can make up my mind as to where my own world view lies. If someone has any comments that go beyond something fitting to this article, contact me directly at EimacDude_at_aol_dot_com

ThVa 11:26, 18 Dec 2007 (UTC)

Inductive Reasoning v Problem of Induction
From the discussion above, and from the reverts that have been occurring, I think we need to be clear on the distinction between Induction and "the problem of induction". So: the "problem" is determining whether or not inductive reasoning can be logically justified.

A good introduction can be found here.

If you think this is inaccurate Nox (bot?), please use the discussion page before editing so boldly.

--Gdickeson 14:52, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Stove
I'm thinking David Stove should be mentioned here, because he marshals arguments against Hume, Popper, and Goodman, all of whom are mentioned in this article. I wish I were able to present his views myself, but his technical writing is beyond me. Two complete topical works of his are available online: [Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists http://www.geocities.com/ResearchTriangle/Facility/4118/dcs/popper/popper.html], and [Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism http://www.geocities.com/ResearchTriangle/Facility/4118/dcs/hume/hume.html].


 * I think that this should be included in the main article as a critique of Popper. Wesley Salmon argues this point very well.  The problem with Hempel is that he agrees that falsification says nothing about what is true, just what is not.  Corroboration is not confirmation.  But what grounds do we have then to trust a corroborated theory over a none corroborated theory?  If one uses a corroborated theory to act on he/she is still guilty of induction.  Reesebw (talk) 05:27, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Goodman
Seems very complex- a triffle clearer please? Larklight (talk) 21:47, 13 February 2008 (UTC)

Added Ancient Origins section
I added the section on Sextus and Weintraub. ImperfectlyInformed (talk) 07:34, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

different from/different than
'Different than' is Standard in English. Admittedly, maybe it's not quite as accepted among grammarians as 'different from' -- however, it sounds better. ImperfectlyInformed | {talk - contribs} 17:15, 6 May 2008 (UTC)


 * That link observes, "Different than has been much criticized by commentators" and concludes, "best advice for Formal and Oratorical levels: stick with different from." "Different than" is rarely used in writing.  The List of English words with disputed usage says "different from" is undisputed while "different than" is disputed.  Why switch from an undisputed usage to a disputed one?  More to the point, "different to" 'sounds better' to some of us -- that doesn't seem like a good basis for deciding. ThisIsMyWikipediaName (talk) 18:17, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

Mathematical induction section
The mathematical induction segment is simply incorrect, and doesn't have anything to do with scientific induction. Mathematical induction is a theorem which holds over natural numbers, and is equivalent to the fact that natural numbers are well ordered (every nonempty subset of natural numbers has a least member) This is a deductive procedure and has the flavor of induction, but it isn't induction.


 * I didn't write that section, but it says that mathematical induction does not have the same issue that scientific induction does because it is based on deductive reasoning. So I'm not sure what your problem is. II  | (t - c) 22:27, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

It's out of place, if mathematical induction is on here then why not epsilon-induction and transfinite induction too? My first impression was that someone was trying to equate the process to scientific reasoning, but even if that were not the case (as you pointed out) it's out of place on this article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.111.56.192 (talk) 06:13, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

I just checked some of the sources, and they even have mathematical induction on the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. I think it's out of place, but if it's on the major sources then I guess it's okay, my initial thought was that it was just misleading to have something from the realm of mathematics on an article about induction (unless perhaps to speak of the status of axioms). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.111.56.192 (talk) 06:20, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

I disagree that it's out of place to mention mathematical induction in an article on (the problem of) induction. Read Polya. Of course there is no "problem" of mathematical induction, but the thought processes are similar. 142.151.170.136 (talk) 15:11, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

Mathematical induction is certainly based on statistical recurrence, just as scientific induction is, so there was no reason to remove that section.


 * "To over-simplify the issue, it could be said that mathematics replaces the question "Why should we use inductive arguments at all?" with "What conclusions do we reach if we allow certain kinds of inductive arguments?"
 * No inductive arguments are allowed; as said above, math induction is deductive. –Pomte 08:35, 14 December 2008 (UTC)

Old Stuff
This statement seems out of left field. I find it kinda crazy and even offensive to respectable scientists and maybe even philosophers.:
 * "The problem calls into question all empirical claims made in everyday life or through the scientific method."


 * It most certainly does NOT apply to modern science. In fact, the modern scientific method only uses induction purely to reinforce and balance the resulting outcome.  I think it could be debated that the scientific method as it's used today does not include inductive reasoning at all and in fact exists partly to prevent it from influencing the results (see falsifiability and other comments below).  And what the heck are "Empirical claims made in everyday life?"  Not scientific, I'm sure.  This sentence sounds like "Scientific Method Denial" if such a thing exists.  I'm posting this in the discussion page instead of taking a hatchet to the text because I'm just a humble research scientist and I don't "have a background in philosophy" and I'm still new at this.  If I've miss something big here, lemme know.  Otherwise, I'm going to axe this whole statement.Swiftek (talk) 09:26, 23 December 2008 (UTC)

This sort of nonsense is not helpful in this article:


 * "Induction regarding the laws of nature is justified in practice by the fact that we would cease to exist if they change significantly. In addition, to a great extent they are based on a few symmetries, each of which can be broken only once."

If you don't have a background in philosophy, particularly epistemology or the philosophy of science, please do not waste other wikipedians time by posting sophmoric crap like the material above in a technical article like this one. It is hard enough for a well-versed philosopher to write a good article on this topic. B 02:37, 22 Oct 2003 (UTC)

Do we need this page? I suggest it be re-directed to inductive reasoning. It adds no content that is not better explained in the longer article. The stuff on Nelson Goodman is useless until someone writes an article on him worth linking to. Banno 08:35, 24 Oct 2003 (UTC)


 * Banno, there is much more to be written on this article as well as on the related inductive reasoning article. The article on inductive reasoning should briefly refer to the problem of induction, but the problem of induction should not be confused with inductive reasoning itself. Both terms, "problem of induction" and "inductive reasoning", are also fixed phrases for their distinct issues, and folks who are looking for info on one would be surprised to find it tucked in under the heading of another and have to wade thru the article to get info on the subject matter they are looking for. We don't merge articles on wikipedia just because they are stubs... —B 13:56, Oct 24, 2003 (UTC)

Thanks, B. I see your point. But you will have to help me here. What content will be included in this article that would not be appropriate in the other? A quick look will show that the inductive reasoning article is, as it should be, a discussion of the problem of induction. In what way do you see the problem of induction as being a "distinct issue" apart from the justification of inductive reasoning?Banno 19:11, 24 Oct 2003 (UTC)


 * Hey, Banno. Inductive reasoning isn't a discusion of the problem of induction. Otherwise it would need to be retitled from "inductive reasoning" to the "problem of inductive reasoning". It is or should be an article on: what inductive reasoning is (or as some call it, "inductive logic"). Along with its encyclopediac definition, it would include examples of it (written in formal logic, not just plain english); how it is or isn't used in science or philosophy; who recognized it; how it differs from deductive logic and whatever else I cant think of at the moment. It should make a brief reference to the justification of inductive reasoning with a link to the article that discusses the "problem of [justifying] induct[ive reasoning]" usually referred to as the problem of induction. —B 20:10, Oct 24, 2003 (UTC)

I still can't see a clear difference; Unless there is a loud protest, I'll move the stuff from inductive reasoning to here in a few days. Banno 10:36, 7 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * I'm sorry if you can't distinguish Inductive reasoning and the problem of induction: one obviously is an article on what induction is and the other is an article on the philosophical  problem of induction. Don't merge them or I will revert. What is inane, however, is your recent creation of the hypothetico-deductive method article as if that material is supposed to differ somehow from what should be in the article on deductive reasoning. What you need to do is move the material from the hypothetico-deductive method with a redirect and merge it into the article on deductive reasoning. B 16:59, Dec 7, 2003 (UTC)

All of what you describe would be equally at home in problem of induction. But I have no intention of getting into an rv. war with someone who thinks hypothetico-deductive method is the same as deductive reasoning. Thanks for demonstrating such an open and cooperative attitude.Banno 19:58, 7 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * I erred regarding my comment on hypothetico-deductive method. It does deserve its own article separate from deduction. My apologies. B 05:33, Dec 8, 2003 (UTC)

No problem. Thanks. Banno 10:43, 8 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * Look at me change my mind and compromise some more: go ahead and merge problem of induction into induction if you please. I think it is possible that the material under the problem of induction may eventually become too large and unwieldy in the induction article and will need to be spun off into an article of its own again. However, after some more thought and given the practices on other wikipedia articles, I no longer object at this point. B 21:51, Dec 8, 2003 (UTC)

Note that I have moved Inductive reasoning to Induction where it should be. B 21:51, Dec 8, 2003 (UTC)

I think the rock-toe example recently added (by BoNoMoJo I believe) should be deleted. It really adds nothing and just clutters the definition. If the example is worth including, it should be placed after the definition. Fairandbalanced 00:15, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)


 * Pay attention Fairandbalanced or figure out how to use wikipedia better...then you don't have to speculate who made the changes. Ww made the changes, not me. B 03:56, Dec 7, 2003 (UTC)

The material on falsificationism is not particularly relevant here, namely:


 * Sir Karl Popper bypassed the 'problem' by noting that science actually does not rely on induction, but developed the notion of falsification as a way around the problem of induction, actually testing possible hypotheseses by experiment. Popper replaced induction with deduction, making modus tollens the centrepiece of his theory. On this account, when assessing a theory one should pay greater heed to data which is in disagreement with the theory than to data which is in agreement with it. Popper went further and stated that an hypothesis which does not allow of such experimental text is outside the bounds of science. This was his doctrine of falsificationism.

Popper's work on falsificationism was not directed at the problem of induction; falsificationism was more of response to the logical positivists' verificationism or confirmationism. B 02:12, Dec 8, 2003 (UTC)


 * See my comments in talk:falsifiability on this issue. Popper clearly intended his theory to be a solution to the problem of induction, and says so. Nevertheless, I will re-work the paragraph. Banno 09:07, 8 Dec 2003 (UTC)

Can anyone adjust the Problem of Induction Page? I accidently lost a line at the bottom of the summary while attempting to edit. Any help?

Lewis
Does anyone remember Descartes making that argument somewhere in the meditations sometime after the cogito? I seem to remember him proving god's existence in order to justify the consistency of the world (thus we can rely on our empirical senses w/ god's existence validated). Asking this because maybe he should be included even if he didn't use the precise terminology? --Mr Bucket (talk) 07:56, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

Ordinary Language Solution
Why is there no reference to a Wittgensteinian-type solution to the problem? OLP solutions seem to be by far the superior ones in this case, and I think should be mentioned in the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.65.124.182 (talk) 12:00, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Bayesian inference
The following submission was recently placed by ananymous IP user at the head end of page, and I have moved it into normal positioning on the page...Kenosis 03:02, 23 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Hi all, where's Bayesian inference? It was my (limited) understanding that many philosophers appeal to Bayes to explain why they hold belief that the sun will rise tomorrow.  No matter what the initial a priori probability is that the sun will rise, the a posteriori probability eventually converges to 1 after many many dawns.  Bayes is referenced and discussed in inductive reasoning.  Is there an expert that can help, or tell me that I'm all wet?  Thanks.--63.138.93.195 02:25, 23 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Good point. Shall we copy some of the content from the Sunrise Problem to here? --winterstein (talk) 14:29, 7 April 2011 (UTC)

Removed original research (Kevin Kirchman notable?)
I removed some material posted by User:Kalexander which seems to be based on his own original research (see the link that had been inserted at the end of the removed section). From what I can tell, this doesn't seem to be an established approach to the problem of induction. flowersofnight (talk) 15:36, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

It has been re-insertered with a link to "Kevin Kirchman", who is not particularly notable. Not in the company of Popper and Goodman, anyway.1Z 15:09, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

Time will tell. 1Z 11:55, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * It doesn't even appear to deal with the problem of induction at all (as stated by Hume, et al. -- viz., whether inductive inference is a doxastically and propositionally justifiable form of discursion); it rather seems to address, very basically, the possibility of induction and the mechanism by which the mind makes inductive inferences. I'm not aware of any philosophers doubting the possibility or logistics of induction (Hume said on the contrary that he is certain we do make inductive inferences). So I don't see how this section is relevant to the article at all, notability notwithstanding. » MonkeeSage « 17:47, 28 April 2007 (UTC)


 * No one "notable" among the notable may doubt the existence of inductive process. But the justification of a concept doxastically and propositionally (and now, presumably, notably) was not Hume's issue. His issue was simply how can we justify an idea rationally from its formation as a generalization. All the new terminology tacked on to his original inquiry does not necessarily belong, nor are the newer views a reasonable standard from which to evaluate discussions of his original problem. 1Z 12:14, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * It seems to be int he Randian tradition, and Randians do tend to assume that you can solve problems by giving an account of psychological mechanisms. 1Z 21:20, 28 April 2007 (UTC)


 * This is an argument method to categorize one persons new idea as another's, in order to discredit the new idea. As the comment below shows, this attempt is unfair and not reasonable.

1Z 12:18, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * Hmmm, I'm not sure about that...as I read Rand, her Objectivism is a form of Realism, which bases justification (at least propositional justification) on reasons, not causes. For example, we may be able to fully describe the psychology, process and context of belief that hens lay eggs because they are possessed by evil spirits, and this can perhaps supply doxastic/personal justification for the belief, but I don't think Randians would argue that it can supply propositional justification for the content of the belief. And as I read Hume and Russell on the problem of induction, that is the crux of the matter: whether our personal beliefs about induction can be propositionally justified -- whether our beliefs can be objectively proven to match the way things really are. So even if we can prove the possibility of induction and describe its logistics, or even provide doxastic justification, this doesn't do anything to solve the main problem of induction as described by Hume and Russell. » MonkeeSage « 10:02, 30 April 2007 (UTC)


 * So, is it the case that, on the basis of notability guidelines and standards of relevance, this section should go? » MonkeeSage « 04:26, 4 May 2007 (UTC)

Kevin Kirchman
To induce facts from the past is part of what we mean when we talk about "reason" (we also are refering to deduction, a distinct mental process). It's meaningless to discuss whether we should "reasonably" trust induction: induction is part of what reason is all about.

The Problem of Induction is fundamentally about 'ideas', and whether or not they are rational. Aristotle established the concept of inductive reasoning, which is really a misnomer, and is one cause for the misunderstanding of the nature of inductive processes.

Concepts are formed by particular mental methods of behaviour. Concept formation is the basic process of forming all ideas, or identifying symbolic representations that have universal applicability.

The discovery of concepts that have universal applicability is not, therefore, a rational process per se. Validating that the concepts are universals, however, is rational, as deduction from concepts is used in the process of scientific validation. One can assert a universal (an inductive concept) by simply asserting a broad spatial or temporal scope of a simple descriptive concept, such as 'this dog has four legs'. By modifying the statement, it is possible to create an inductive concept, which may or may not be valid universally.

If we say 'all dogs have four legs', we have asserted an inductive concept. It remains to be seen whether this concept is valid or not--whether any particular referents of the concept contradict the assertion, for instance, a dog born with three legs. When Karl Popper discussed falsification of theory, he was referring to the identification of evidence which contradicted inductive abstractions.

Returning to the Problem of Induction, asking whether or not it is rational to assert inductive concepts is really too broad a question. The real issue is can we identify some concepts which have been asserted that do have universal validity. If we can, then we should ask more specifically is there a class of concepts which can have universal validity, and what is the nature of that class of concepts.


 * Aristotle established the concept of inductive reasoning, which is really a misnomer

Because? You previously said induction was part of reason.
 * Induction is _generally_ considered as part of reasoning behaviour, largely because of Aristotle's confusion. 1Z 13:00, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * The Problem of Induction is fundamentally about 'ideas', and whether or not they are rational.

You previously said reasoning was a process.
 * No, I said deduction was a process. 1Z 13:00, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * Concept formation is the basic process of forming all ideas, or identifying symbolic representations that have universal applicability.

Why universal? Why not just more general than particular?
 * Because as human beings we have sought knowledge, which is universal concepts. And your comment presumes the lack of this explanation to be a failing in the rest of the discussion. It wasn't a mind dump. 1Z 13:00, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * The discovery of concepts that have universal applicability is not, therefore, a rational process per se.

You previously said induction was part of "reason".
 * No, I said Aristotle confused the issue by including induction as reasoning. The philosophic community, of supposed notable persons, still considers that induction is reasoning. For Aristotle, induction and deduction were reasoning.
 * But induction is a distinct mental process from deduction, therefore it is not intelligent to call it inductive reasoning, when a deductive syllogism is a mental behaviour, while inductive concept formation is a distinct mental behaviour.

My point is that Hume, using Aristotle as a starting point under the presumption that deduction and induction were types of reasoning, attempted to justify inductive concept formation from a deductive standpoint.
 * His argument, as Bertrand Russel puts it, "Just because the sun rises today, how can we say it will rise tomorrow?"
 * Well, from the Kirchman perspective (obviously presently failing the epistemological standard of notability), we can assert the inductive concept "the sun always rises" (limited in its temporal scope intelligently given our current knowledge of the Sun's lifespan), validating it by methods of science. Then we can use this concept in a chain of reasoning:
 * If the sun always rises (with temporal scope limitations).
 * Tomorrow is a new day.
 * => Therefore the sun will rise (with temporal scope limitations).
 * Because the philosophical 'alchemists' do not want to acknowledge my historically distinct epistemological theory, which includes new theories of validation, induction, deduction, ethics and concepts, that was itself validated in use with commercial applications by many of Global 500 companies, the epistemological standard of "notability" is questionable, if those making the "note" have biases against the advance of human understanding. Mendel was not notable, nor were many other innovators in the history of science.1Z 13:20, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * When Karl Popper discussed falsification of theory, he was referring to the identification of evidence which contradicted inductive abstractions.

In a context where there is a differece between propositions and concepts.


 * If we say 'all dogs have four legs', we have asserted an inductive concept.

Inductive proposition.
 * No. Inductive concept, as redefined by my theoretical model. Propositions are only symbolic representations of concepts. And a concept does not have to be subjectively "believed" to be a concept. It can be held mentally without commitment. 1Z 13:24, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * Returning to the Problem of Induction, asking whether or not it is rational to assert inductive concepts is really too broad a question. The real issue is can we identify some concepts which have been asserted that do have universal validity.

That's easy We just have to examine the entire universe...
 * Not true. Do you know how else we might test the validity of a concept of knowledge? 1Z 13:31, 22 September 2012 (UTC)


 * If we can, then we should ask more specifically is there a class of concepts which can have universal validity, and what is the nature of that class of concepts.

Ask? Do you have the answer or not? 1Z 22:13, 19 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Of course. Why else would I ask the question. But then, if I am not noteworthy, then how could my knowledge be accepted by those whose standard of knowledge is that which is approved by some group of others, who may indeed be threatened by a chemistry that challenges their alchemy.1Z 13:31, 22 September 2012 (UTC)

Statements of the problem

 * Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and numerous others up until at least the late 19th century have considered inductive reasoning the basis of scientific method&mdash;indeed inductive reasoning is used today, though in a more balanced interaction with deductive reasoning and abductive reasoning.

Of course inductive reasoning is still used today. Even if this gets phrased better, it is unsourced and would belong in inductive reasoning, not here. –Pomte 12:44, 27 December 2007 (UTC)

Relation to "Problem of evil"?
, you added a link to Problem of evil in the "See also" section, but I don't understand the connection to the induction problem. Maybe you could explain your reasons? Thanks in advance. - Jochen Burghardt (talk) 18:33, 3 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Thanks for addressing the matter . Although the article isn't part of the religion portal, the ongoing Atheism-theism debate includes the problem of evil and the problem of induction as arguments for and against religion. I came across the Problem of Induction article while surfing the religion and atheism portals. The reason I surfed the portals was to find valid arguments for the debate. I just felt adding the internal link would make it less of a burden for the Wikireaders sharing the same interests as me. Although Probability theory and the Problem of evil both have nothing to do with the article, the problem of evil differs in that it would actually be useful for readers. I agree; many of the internal links in the "See Also" section should go. However, Apophasis and The Problem of Evil should be kept. They can actually be useful to some Wikipedians; no less so than the Law of large numbers, which was also kept. With a small degree of usefulness, the link is worthy of taking up some space. After all, WP is not paper so 22 extra bytes is no biggie. If the community doesn't mind would it be possible for the two internal links specified be re-added? Thanks. GuyHimGuy (talk) 02:01, 8 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Thank you for explaining. If you want to, add a link to this article (and the Problem of Evil page) to a page on the Atheism-theism debate. But this article has nothing to do with the problem of evil (or Apophasis, unless you care to explain), so a See Also link is not appropriate. In contrast, all of the current See also links (including Probability theory and Law of large numbers) are actually related to Induction. By your logic, every Wikipedia article would have hundreds of See also links, which would make it impossible for anyone to find the relevant ones. Please see the guideline at WP:SEEALSO. -hugeTim (talk) 02:13, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Hi. I agree with : in order to help Wikireaders who share your interest in atheism/theism to find arguments for that debate, a link from there to here (i.e. from some atheism/theism article to problem of induction) would be appropriate, not vice versa. I (still) can't imagine what readers interested in philosophical induction could benefit from being referred to the problem of evil, or to apophasis. - As a side remark: contrary to, I think that the notion, although not the article, probability theory has a strong connection to induction; see e.g. the introduction of the publication [] However, the wikipedia article is currently only about the "frequency concept of probability", while induction relates to the "logical concept of probability or degree of confirmation" (quotes from p.133). - Jochen Burghardt (talk) 11:26, 8 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Resolved. Thanks for the responses guys. I'll just leave the article as is for now. I now agree that the problem of evil has little to do with scientific philosophy. I guess readers can simply find this page the same why I did; a Google search concerning the reliability of science. GuyHimGuy (talk) 15:59, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Induction Solves Demarcation Problem
Consider this example of the way induction must work in a particular science, specifically chemistry.

Mendeleev's periodic table was produced by noting the periodicity inherent in the physical and chemical properties of elements. For a long time, the table had weak acceptance, akin to the former pseudoscience of alchemy. Then along comes the particle physicists and Wolfgang Pauli's exclusion principle, which finally allowed a scientific explanation of both the electron configuration of atomic elements, and also the reason for the various groupings into periods, groups, etc.

This is already an example of how induction works in an actual science (where it had previously failed in alchemy). Isaac Newton himself was something of an alchemist. Where he succeeded brilliantly in physics, he failed miserably as a chemist.

The process of scientific iinduction continued with discovery of new chemical and later transuranium elements, always with the solid understanding of the periodic table serving as the foundation.

To throw induction completely out of the scientific method as Hume and Popper proposed is sheer folly. Moreover, a pseudoscience cannot possibly build on itself the way that science does. Induction applied to extending pseudoscience by even a tiny amount results in collapse of the premise(s) on which the pseudoscience is based. So, if Hume and Popper were so interested in the demarcation problem, why would they begin the process by throwing out the best working principle of the scientific method? It's bad enough that so much of science needs to rely on trial and error without throwing out all of the instrumentation that had previously been successful in revealing how the universe works. I suggest that we throw out the ideas of philosophers like Hume and Popper instead. Danshawen (talk) 23:54, 4 June 2014 (UTC)danshawen

Roy Bhaskar and Critical Realism
Y'all need to get Bhaskar and Critical Realism on this page!

Bhaskar says of Hume "[o]ne finds in the Treatise an eminently sensible realist methodology’, but that this description of scientific work is ‘in almost total dislocation from, and certainly lacking any foundation in, his radical epistemology’. (p. 41)

Bhaskar describes the scientific approach to establishing a law of nature:

"In the process of the establishment of a law of nature three questions may be asked:

(i) is there an empirical regularity which constitutes a prima facie candidate for a law?

(ii) is there some reason, other than the regularity, why the predicates instantiated in the law-like statement should be conjoined?

(iii) is this reason located in the enduring powers of things and the transfactually active mechanisms of nature?"

- Bhaskar p154

He then goes on to note that, "At the Humean level laws just are empirical regularities." (p. 155)

In comparison, science as practiced works on i, ii, and iii:

"Most science proceeds by way of a two-tiered method designed to identify invariances in nature, normally under conditions which are experimentally produced and controlled, and to explain them by reference to enduring mechanisms. It is in the movement from the identification of an invariance to the mechanisms and structures that account for it that the logic of scientific discovery must be found."

- Bhaskar p159

In other words, Hume was just saying, you see a bunch of cases X and they have trait Y. Induction would say that the next case of X will also have trait Y, but this is illogical. You could see something else. But Bhaskar is saying that we know more about the world, on a number of different levels, and we're being more exacting about mechanisms.

Hume would say, Just because of all of your experience with ice cubes melting in the heat, you can't logically say that an ice cube in the sahara desert on a hot day will melt because, well, you know, maybe it won't! Nyah Nyah Nyah!

Bhaskar would say, well, we know rather a lot about ice cubes on hot days, not just from repeated experience (although that is pretty strong) but from our knowledge of different mechanisms. And so (to simplify, Bhaskar does tend to rather go on and on) the ice cube will melt -- or if it doesn't, there will be a good reason (it's in a freezer!).

All references are to Bhaskar, Roy. "A Realist Theory of Science." (2008). Pigkeeper (talk) 22:54, 31 October 2015 (UTC)

Kant
Shouldn't he get a mention? Straw Cat (talk) 03:48, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

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Induction & deduction
WP DEPENDS ON INDUCTION & DEDUCTION. THEIR MEANING SHOULD BE FIRM. This encyclopedia accepts the premise of enumerative induction that the more editors who agree on the content of an article, the more accurate and useful that content. Induction is practiced on every TALK page. Editors generalize from a few observations, and deduce concrete conclusions from their generalizations.

WP contains 4 repetitive and fragmentary articles on induction: Inductive reasoning, The problem of induction; New riddle of induction, Inductivism. I would like to rectify this chaotic situation by rewriting and merging these 4 articles, retaining only the reasoning title. I ask you—a participant in relevant TALK pages—to judge my rewrite/merge project: SHOULD I PROCEED? Below is the current proposed outline:

Definitions. Induction generalizes conceptually; deduction concludes empirically.

David Hume, philosopher condemner.

Pierre Duhem, physicist user.

John Dewey, philosopher explainer.

Bertrand Russell, philosopher condemner.

Karl Popper, philosopher condemner.

Steven Sloman, psychologist explainer.

Lyle E. Bourne, Jr., psychologist user.

Daniel Kahneman, psychologist user.

Richard H. Thaler economist user.

Please respond at Talk:Inductive reasoning. TBR-qed (talk) 15:58, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

The lead could be simplified
I propose to replace

by

I would also propose to remove the following sentence:

This sentence presents a false controversy. It does it, because it conflates two different things: the requirement for a rational justification of observed processes and these processes per se. The correct sentence (not that I propose that we use it) would be: "Induction processes are seen in everyday life and through the scientific method and, for that reason, C. D. Broad famously said that induction is the glory of science, but, if that is the case, Popper who found the way to rationally explain these processes must be the glorious hero of the philosophy of science."

- Dominic Mayers Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:12, 7 May 2020 (UTC)

The new section on David Harriman's book
First of all, it's clear that the content is not verified. It's a favorable evaluation of the book and an interpretation of its scope made in the voice of Wikipedia, which breaks WP:NPV. Even if it was sourced in and attributed to some secondary source, a review of a book, even a brief one, is not in the scope of the current article.

That does not mean the content of the book is not acceptable in Wikipedia. I don't want to enter into the question whether the content is acceptable, because this would require a search for secondary sources that verify the same content (in respect of WP:NOR) and I am not going to do that now. However, I could not stop myself from looking at the main thesis of the book, which has 30 citations in Google scholar and thus is a good candidate. The book starts by doing a good job at describing the distinction between deduction and observed induction in science. It brings out a key point: deduction requires that there has been some previous induction, which, of course, is well known and understood. The main thesis of the book starts with this excerpt: "The problem is to identify the method of induction, not to seek its “justification.” One cannot ask for a justification of induction, any more than for a justification of deduction. Inducing and deducing are man’s means of justifying anything. Their validity as cognitive processes, therefore, is an unchallengeable given. Aristotle did not ask: Is deduction legitimate? but rather: How should it be performed so as to reach valid conclusions? Similarly, our question regarding induction is not: Is it legitimate? but rather: Given the validity of induction, how should one perform it so as to reach a knowledge of facts?"

- Harriman, David

This is not the problem of induction that most people try to address. Harriman argues that people try to address the wrong question, but his argument can be criticized. It is based on a similarity between deduction and induction: they are both a way to do inference. He says "One cannot ask for a justification of induction, any more than for a justification of deduction." But induction and deduction are more different than they are alike, so one cannot conclude that we can proceed with induction as we do with deduction. An important distinction is that induction is ampliative, i.e., it generates information that is not implied in the premises. So, as Carl Sagan said, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" and thus induction requires extraordinary evidence. The most important distinction, though, is that deduction has almost never been put in question, whereas induction has always been put in question. So, the natural question is given that we accept deduction as a valid mean of inference, because it is very ordinary, how can we justify induction, which appears extraordinary.

In contradistinction, the book denies from the start any form of justification for induction. I have not read the book, but it's possible that it provides a valuable description of recent induction processes in science and try to extract from this an observed scientific methodology. If it is that, it can hardly claim any novelty. It is exactly what Lakatos argued that should be done. Yes, Lakatos rejected, as did Popper, inductivism but only as a rational justification, not as an observed phenomena that follows rules. Only a small glance at Lakatos work shows that he wanted to find the inductive rules that are followed in the history science. He was explicit about that in his book "The methodology of scientific research programmes" (pp. 162-165). Most of this book concerns the history of science and the observation of these inductive phenomena. The only difference is that Harriman denies any chance of justification, whereas Lakatos did not. Popper, we can say, also denied a rational justification for these observed rules, that is, he never tried to turn them into rules that can justify steps of inference or to find such rules that would justify them.

In this manner, Popper might seem close to Harriman, but there is a big difference. Popper did not deny a rational explanation for these observed induction processes and, in fact, he offered a very natural explanation. Zahar presents this as the fundamental difference between Popper and Lakatos. This rational explanation makes a big difference, because otherwise one is tempted to interpret these observed rules as if they were some kind of ampliative rules of valid reasoning, which we should follow. Why not? If they are observed and they are successful, why not use them as rules of inference? Popper's explanation explicitly rejects this interpretation. Popper offered methodological rules, which were prescriptive, but they were not inductive. By the way, Lakatos proposed descriptive inductive rules, but these rules were either deprived of any form of inductivity or rewritten so that they could not be prescriptive before they found their way in his proposed methodology. Here is an excerpt that illustrates the first case (emphasis mine) : "Musgrave in a letter containing some major constructive criticisms of an earlier draft, in which he demanded that I specify, for instance, at what point dogmatic adherence to a programme ought to be explained 'externally' rather than 'internally'. Let me try to explain why such objections are beside the point. One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. What one must not do is to deny its poor public record. Both Feyerabend and Kuhn conflate methodological appraisal of a programme with firm heuristic advice about what to do. It is perfectly rational to play a risky game: what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk."

- Lakatos

Here is an excerpt that illustrates the second case: ""It is very difficult to decide, especially since one must not demand progress at each single step, when a research programme has degenerated hopelessly or when one of two rival programmes has achieved a decisive advantage over the other. In this methodology, as in Duhem's conventionalism, there can be no instant − let alone mechanical − rationality. Neither the logician's proof of inconsistency nor the experimental scientist's verdict of anomaly can defeat a research programme in one blow. One can be 'wise' only after the event.""

- Lakatos

So, at the end, Popper's and Lakatos' methodology were both non inductive and consistent one with the other.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:32, 8 May 2020 (UTC)

Implicit assumption that no background knowledge is involved
The following sentence suggests that no background knowledge is involved in observed induction processes: Some thinking is needed to find a better way to describe the problem, but the description must clearly distinguish between a rule to describe observed processes, which usually involve some hidden background knowledge, and an ampliative rule to infer new knowledge. By definition, the ampliative rule does not use any background knowledge that, if made explicit, would allow to deductively infer the "new knowledge".

Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:37, 8 May 2020 (UTC)
 * I think my proposed revision addresses this issue. Please see below.TBR-qed (talk) 20:57, 8 May 2020 (UTC)

Limited description of Popper's position on induction
This excerpt does not present all aspects of Popper's position on induction:

It does not incorporate Popper's organic view of science. To appreciate the importance of this organic view of science, another question must be considered, which is also a wrong question in Popper's view: how do we explain the inductive success of science, if induction is not valid logically? Popper argued that we do not have to explain this, because it's not happening that way. It's not only that justification is not needed, because this is compatible with the belief that there is an inductive process in science to be justified or not. Popper says that there is actually no inductive process in science, which is a much stronger statement. If there is no inductive process at all, of the Hume's kind or of any other kind, how can we explain that we have laws to put to the test? This is where Popper's organic view of science is important. A key point here is that an organic process does not have to be inductive at all, it does not even have to be a mental process. Yet such organic process is responsible for how amoebas evolved, etc. For Popper, scientific conjectures are the result of an organic process. Does it follow laws? Of course it does, but trying to understand this is beyond the scope of epistemology in Popper's view. It involves too many irrational aspects of the mind, etc. Therefore, one cannot even argue about the role of observations in that process and an induction process assumes that we start from observations. A very strong argument proposed by Popper against the idea that we start from observations is that observations are theory-ladenned and therefore there is no such a thing as an observation without first a theory. Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:29, 23 April 2020 (UTC)

Related bias in the article
In my view, the entire article is biased and makes Wikipedia affirms that there is an inductive process in science and in common reasoning. This bias shows up right at the start in the following excerpt (though it attributes it to Broad, putting this view at the start is a bias) : "The problem calls into question all empirical claims made in everyday life or through the scientific method, and, for that reason, the philosopher C. D. Broad said that "induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy.""

It also shows up in the picture of the raising sun and its caption (in this case, it is not attributed): "Usually inferred from repeated observations: "The sun always rises in the east."" I suspect that it shows up at other places in the article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:04, 23 April 2020 (UTC)


 * You could just go ahead and delete the sentence with the C. D. Broad quotation. Anyone who objects can raise their objections here. According to wikiquote:C. D. Broad, the quotation is a paraphrase anyway.
 * As for the picture caption that you mentioned, I could be wrong but both picture captions in the article strike me as a little tongue-in-cheek. I don't think you're supposed to draw any conclusions from the rising sun picture caption by itself; you're first supposed to read the caption of the rising sun picture, and then read the caption of the funeral picture, and then realize what the problem is with the reasoning in the first caption. It's illustrating the problem of induction through a visual joke. Biogeographist (talk) 19:07, 23 April 2020 (UTC)
 * We don't want to take joke too seriously. So, I can only answer by, in my opinion, an even funnier joke (see pictures on the left). Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:27, 23 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I approve! Biogeographist (talk) 23:46, 23 April 2020 (UTC)
 * I address this issue in my suggested revision. See below.TBR-qed (talk) 21:03, 8 May 2020 (UTC)

Is this article obsolete?
In the near future, I intend to revise the article Problem of induction. I am motivated by the 2005 article with that name by Sloman and Lagnado in the Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, edited by Holyoak and Morrison. That article, it seems to me, makes this article obsolete in 3 ways. It eliminates detailed history of induction, easily available in descriptions of philosophical schools. It distinguishes kinds of inductive methodologies that are rarely noted. And it provides examples of current work on the topic, which is not elsewhere available. I ask editors interested in this topic to read Sloman and Lagnado and respond on this talk page whether they share my judgment of obsolescence or not.TBR-qed (talk) 15:02, 3 May 2020 (UTC)


 * This proposed revision may be related to what proposed at  Editors should read that discussion, where there was some opposition to 's ideas.
 * Regarding the article by Sloman and Lagnado, note that the authors are psychologists, and most of their chapter is focused "exclusively on the psychology of categorical induction" (p. 101) as part of a "descriptive account of inductive reasoning" (p. 99) as opposed to the "justificatory" concerns of many philosophers (p. 96). It seems to me at first glance that some material from Sloman and Lagnado's chapter would be appropriate both in Problem of induction and in Inductive reasoning, but to limit the scope of this article to the scope of Sloman and Lagnado's article would likely be controversial since the "justificatory" concerns that Sloman and Lagnado consider less interesting or even obsolete were nevertheless important to many philosophers' understanding of the problem of induction. That's my first impression. Biogeographist (talk) 00:52, 4 May 2020 (UTC)


 * I have just discovered your extended discussion, which I shall carefully study. Below is my response to your earlier comments.  Thank you both for your acute observations.  S&L are indeed psychologists who focus on the “psychology of categorical induction.”  But their first 2 sentences—framing of the problem with Hume and the “fact” of sunrise— connects them directly to the WP article example of sunrise & its broader concern for justification.  That is why I suggest relating 4 more scholars to S&L’s sample to show how modern scholars superficially adopt Goodman’s formalized knowledge while ignoring philosophical concerns—with negative results.   I add Duhem & Dewey to show long-standing rejection of enumerative induction.  I add Popper (who accepted the validity of sunrise) to support Hume & to critique S&L “induction as scientific methodology,” that conflates method of Duhem & Dewey with modern social science methods, including economist Thaler.  I would leave [Inductive reasoning] & [Inductivism] unchanged to report more traditional treatments of induction.  I have posted 2 sections of my draft revision in my sandbox, which I hope you can access and tell me your thoughts.TBR-qed (talk) 21:26, 8 May 2020 (UTC)

Using the chapter (subsection added for easy editing)
After having read the chapter and related sources, I agree with that the distinction between "descriptive account of inductive reasoning"  and the "justificatory concerns of many philosophers" is important. My understanding, and perhaps also the understanding of Biogeographist, is that, if this distinction is understood and taken into account in the way the chapter of Sloman and Lagnado is used, this chapter, especially the part after the history, can be used as a main source for the article as suggested by. Yes, in this perspective, the current article is obsolete, because it is too much about history.

But, if we don't see this basic distinction, the content of this chapter (and perhaps of many other sources that adopt the same descriptive approach) can become the source of a false controversy. Clearly, when Popper wrote that induction is a myth, he did not mean to say that the processes studied by Sloman and Lagnado are a myth. He only meant that, though these processes can be described as inductive rules, which relate premises to conclusion, what truly is going on is different and involves other "knowledge" perhaps not yet formalized.

We can schematize the situation as follows. Let B denotes the non formalized knowledge, P denotes the premises and C the conclusion. Because, B is in the background, what is observed is that P is used to infer C. So, we say that we have observed the inductive rule P |= C, but what truly happened is B Λ P |= C. This is an important distinction, because the inductive rules P |= C  are well known in logic to be fallacies, but the hidden processes  B Λ P |= C are most likely not fallacies.

It's very obvious that the chapter of Sloman and Lagnado refers to the way people normally think using their background knowledge. There is an implicit assumption that there is some uniformity among people in the way they think, i.e, some uniformity in this background knowledge. This is not at all opposed to Popper's view. On the contrary, it is a support for Popper's view. I agree with Biogeographist that we need to make a link with the philosophical perspective and that some other sources will be needed to make the link. However, I might be wrong, but I feel that not much needs to be added to the chapter to accomplish that. There is a terminological issue here, because we refer to these processes as "inductive reasoning" and yet there is, hopefully, no claim that they are inductive fallacies. This can be taken care easily by making a little bit clearer that "inductive reasoning" refers to the description of observed processes, not to rules to rationally justify these processes. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:58, 7 May 2020 (UTC)
 * I have just discovered your lengthened comments, which I will carefully study.  Below is my response to the earlier comments:

Thank you for your acute observations. S&L are indeed psychologists who focus on the “psychology of categorical induction.” But their first 2 sentences—framing of the problem with Hume and the “fact” of sunrise— connects them directly to the WP article example of sunrise & its broader concern for justification. That is why I suggest relating 4 more scholars to S&L’s sample to show how modern scholars superficially adopt Goodman’s formalized knowledge while ignoring philosophical concerns—with negative results. I add Duhem & Dewey to show long-standing rejection of enumerative induction. I add Popper (who accepted the validity of sunrise) to support Hume & to critique S&L “induction as scientific methodology,” that conflates method of Duhem & Dewey with modern social science methods, including economist Thaler. I would leave [Inductive reasoning] & [Inductivism] unchanged to report more traditional treatments of induction.