Talk:Property dualism

Horrific article
I can't understand anything on this page. The 'reducible' doesnt link to a definition of reducible, and the analogy to water and light makes no sense. The writing is also painfully difficult to parse.24.61.92.71 (talk) 03:04, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

"Non-reductive physicalism is the predominant contemporary form of property dualism according to which mental properties are in some sense identical with neurobiological properties, but are not reducible to them."

This is wrong. Physical properties are not identical with mental properties, according to this or any other view, in ANY sense of the word "identical". They are no more identical than the height and volume of a thing, or the color and flavor of it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.77.142.91 (talk) 17:44, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * You're quite wrong; Identity theory holds that mental properties are physical properties. But the article is even more wrong, horribly so; non-reductive physicalism is most certainly not dualism; as the Physicalism article says, "physicalism is generally a form of monism", Physicalism is essentially monist". -- 71.102.200.232 (talk) 08:18, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

Thank you. I stand corrected. I wasn't aware of this [absurd] doctrine. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.77.142.91 (talk) 17:56, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

(To the comment two up from this one)Non-reductive physicalism is a form of dualism... specifically property dualism. (Though it is true that physicalism is monism, so there is general some overlap in the theories- a good example of this is the diagram on p939 of The Oxford Companion to Philosophy). It sees qualia as having a seperate quality that the brain state from which the originate lacks... thus pain is somehow mysterious (the hard problem of consciousness)and not explained fully by the physical state of the brain. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Heligan (talk • contribs) 10:44, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

Bad Sentence in Biological Naturalism?
His view is that although mental states are not ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are causally reducible (see causality).

Am I missing something or should it read "although mental states are not ontologically reducible to physical states, they are causally reducible... --Golden Eternity (talk) 03:35, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

Is Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive physicalism?
Note according to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism, Epiphenomenalism is defined as Non-reductive physicalism.

If Epiphenomenalism is Non-reductive physicalism, then both of these statements cannot be correct;

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism; "Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical..."

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism; "In philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism ... is a view according to which some or all mental states are mere epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of physical states of the world... while mental states are caused by physical states, mental states do not have any influence on physical states."

Is Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive physicalism?

(Note I have already updated http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism with a new definition of Non-reductive physicalism which includes Epiphenomenalism [non physical mental states]. However, in light of the definition provided at Physicalism, either a) on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism the new definition will have to be reverted and Epiphenomenalism will have to be dissociated from Non-reductive physicalism, or b) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism will have to be updated with the new definition which includes Epiphenomenalism [non physical mental states]).

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:12, 24 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I have now assumed that there was originally a mistake in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Property_dualism and that Epiphenomenalism is not Non-reductive physicalism (based upon the definitions given of non-reductive physicalism in both http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism, and the definition given of Epiphenomenalism in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism). I have updated http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism to reflect this (including separating Epiphenomenalism from the Non-Reductive Physicalism heading). If this change is wrong, and Epiphenomenalism is in fact Non-reductive physicalism, then this latest change can be undone. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 02:32, 26 April 2009 (UTC)

Epiphemomenalism is property dualism (and hence non-reductive physicalism) though it is also compatible with substance dualism. Its essence is the fact that there is no two way interaction between sensations/thoughts, and the brain states that cause the sensations/thoughts, is the key to understanding this (its essentially a way out of 'double effect' issue raised by the 'mind-body problem').

The trouble is it is often misrepresented as much more materialistic than it infact is, it is not reductive, if it was it wouldnt need to have the one-way interaction specification. Its the essence of the hard problem of consciousness, it sees pain as an unexplainable in materialistic terms(qualia), but as having no effects on brain states itself (cause not effect). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Heligan (talk • contribs) 09:07, 22 December 2009 (UTC) 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism; "Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical...they are not reducible to physical properties" Its probably this bit thats slightly confusing (although accurate)...its trying to explain the concept of distingish qualia from the brain state... so qualia becomes 'the hard problem' of consciousness'. This doesnt contradict epiphenomenalism, as that also sees the two as connected but as having different properties. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Heligan (talk • contribs) 10:06, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for your feedback - I will restore the page layout, and divide it into 'Causally irreducible mental states' (one or more mental states are irreducible to physical states) and 'Causally reducible mental states' Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 08:51, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

I have had to change 1. "Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical..." to "Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are caused by physical states..." such that epiphenomenalism can be described as non-reductive physicalism (although it would be much simpler if it did not claim this status at all). Although some versions of epiphenomenalism might claim mental states are physical - these cannot then go on to state 2. one or more "mental states have no influence on physical states". 2. implies mental states are not physical states, and 1. implies mental states are physical states (see philosophy of mind page definition of non reductive physicalism for direct statement). It seems like the definition of 'physical' is either extended (1.) or contracted (2.) depending upon which sentence it appears in to avoid implying substance dualism. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 14:25, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

Heligan, based upon recent reading, I no longer think the stance you proposed on epiphenomenalism is correct (epiphenomenalism is not non-reductive physicalism, but it is property dualism) - do you have a reference for this? For now I am reverting the changes regarding this. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 19:00, 5 June 2010 (UTC)

Hi Richardbrucebaxter

Im not sure why you think it cannot be both compatible with non-reductive physicalism and propert dualism; Epiphenomenalism is about causality....

You maybe right that classifying it as anything else blurs the vital point, that it is only about cauusality. It is compatible with many other ideas, that arent necessarily compatible with each other.

It fits with non-reductive physicalism because, while it sees mental as caused by physical states, and as reducible to those causes (not beyond those causes in some way physically) the effects of the physical(ie the mental) are of a different ontological class (which brings us to a compatibility with non-reductive physicalism and propert dualism). Just because it sees mental states as impotent effects, does not have a bearing on its being non-reductive. It may help to think of it in terms of determinism, with mental states as impotent qualia... (Casual Reducibility versus Ontological Reducibility is mentioned in the discussion page for Philosophy of mind as a significant distinction) Even in the Property Dualism section on wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism quote "Recently, epiphenomenalism has gained popularity with those struggling to reconcile non-reductive physicalism and mental causation." this sentence implies it is not actually only relevant to property dualism.

When it is simply classified as property dualism, it blurs the issue that, it is compatible with non-reductive physicalism as well as other theories. It can also be compatible with substance dualism as well http://www.enotes.com/topic/Type-E_Dualism

I think it would be better to say it is a compatible with various theories rather than classifying it as anything.

I'm not ging to re-edit as I dont want to get into an editing war about this...Heligan (talk) 13:16, 30 October 2010 (UTC)


 * Thanks Heligan for your response, and I am sorry for the delayed reply. One of the main problems is that this method of definition is incompatible with the Philosophy of Mind page (and relevant children) in its original and current forms, in which non-reductive physicalism and epiphenomenalism are described as being incompatible; "non-reductive physicalism ... this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism". I understand the problem from a technical point of view (ontological verses causal reducibility), and it would make perfect sense to classify it this way also. However, although I conducted a search myself, I could not find clear references that talk about them in this way, and no one has appeared so far particularly apt to change it (or accept its being changed). The references I found where these concepts were brought together (made compatible) involved the equation of these concepts rather than epiphenomanilism being talked about as a subset of non-reductive physicalism. I could imagine that there might be other reasons for this (for example, context - for the purposes of making an argument). Please let me know how you would like to proceed. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 15:17, 13 February 2011 (UTC)

https://sites.google.com/site/minddict/physicalism-non-reductive this article would seem to support the idea that non=reductive physicalism is epiphenomenalism.146.200.31.201 (talk) 22:33, 5 February 2019 (UTC)

However I then found a pdf called philosophy of mind by hse jan-march 2011.... that seems to clear up the distinction (https://slideplayer.com/slide/5382776/) on page 26 there is a diagram of different types of causation which shows that epiphenomenalism differs from non-reductive physicalism because of of mental states leading to other mental states in non-reductive physicalism, but not in epiphenomenalism.146.200.31.201 (talk) 23:09, 5 February 2019 (UTC)

Extant Property Dualists?
Does anyone know if anyone actually calls him or herself a "property dualist?" It seems like a position invented in the secondary literature. Though supervenience tends to involve two sets of properties, and hence a kind of property dualism, advocates of supervenience in phil-mind are typically physicalists. In regards to this article, if there are self-proclaimed property dualists they should be cited; if not then that somewhat remarkable fact should be noted, I think. Jyoshimi (talk) 17:28, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

I suppose Davidson(anomalous monism)would be one, he certainly sees qualia as significantly different in properties from brain states. And that is what property dualism is generally about, but Im not sure whether he calls himself a dualist. http://www.iep.utm.edu/anom-mon/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/#ProIProDua Here is a quote from the last link... "Is Davidson, then, a property dualist of the sort discussed in §4? The question is a tricky one, for two reasons. First, Davidson is at the very least agnostic about properties. Whatever his considered view, he does not invoke properties in the way that property dualists typically do. Second, property dualism as described earlier is incompatible with physicalism, yet Davidson himself appears to be a physicalist. (Here we must add “in a sense”, for there is no one kind of physicalism. But we are confident that Davidson is a physicalist in a sense that the property dualists of §4 would reject."

—Preceding unsigned comment added by Heligan (talk • contribs) 11:11, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

Im pretty sure Chalmers is a self proclaimed dualist, heres a link http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers —Preceding unsigned comment added by Heligan (talk • contribs) 12:18, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

Searle is another one who seems to be wanting to say he is not a property dualist, despite wanting to claim an ontological distinction beween brain and mind. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism —Preceding unsigned comment added by Heligan (talk • contribs) 12:34, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

pan-psychism
pan-psychism is clearly the non-emergent form of property dualism. Pan-psychism is dualistic, it's not substance dualism since it claims that mind and matter are codependent and necessarily involve one another but the logical inconceivability of mind emerging from mindless matter because they are qualitatively different 'things' is the justification for pan-psychism to begin with. (Unsigned edit by IP 174.89.56.237 posted here at 21:01 23 May 2013. For the sake of tidyness, I have taken the liberty of this mark-up and attribution Chjoaygame (talk) 23:53, 30 March 2019 (UTC))

Assessment comment
Substituted at 20:12, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

This article
This article has a lead statement about property dualism, but it is not evident to me that there is in the body of the article a section about property dualism as such; absent citations of reliable sources in the lead, I would expect to find them in such a section. The lead statement assumes that the dual properties belong to a physical substance, an assumption that seems to me to rule out pan-psychism; perhaps the meaning of the word 'physical' may be questioned. I am not familiar enough with the literature to know whether the assumption is well enough supported there to pass without a reliable source citation.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:09, 31 March 2019 (UTC)

No response to the foregoing post. I therefore intend as follows.

The term 'property dualism' on its face does not assume a particular kind of ontic substance, physical, psychical, or monic. It therefore seems overkill for the lead to specifically write "—the physical kind—". So I intend to remove that, unless there is objection.Chjoaygame (talk) 05:14, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: Mind-Body, section 16
— Assignment last updated by Jovanna.lanbaxter (talk) 17:34, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: Mind-Body, section 18
— Assignment last updated by Willraschkowan (talk) 18:51, 19 October 2022 (UTC)