Talk:Quantum mysticism/Archive 3

Metaphysics, not Science
Hi, I'm new to Wikipedia. There are already existing science articles (e.g. quantum mechanics. Is this not a metaphysical article? Shouldn't it be written with a lighter touch? Please discuss. Trelawnie (talk) 04:53, 7 June 2009 (UTC)

Interpretation vs. Theory
There is no sharp demarcation between "fact" and "interpretation" in quantum mechanics. The only facts are that quantum mechanics gives you the probabilities of certain experimental outcomes, when the interaction of the experimental devices and the quantum system is particularly simple. When talking about how the perception of observers emerges in quantum theory, it's all philosophy. The rewrite made things less clear.

For example: the many worlds interpretation is not the most preferred by mystics, it is the least preferred. Mystics prefer Copenhagen interpretation, because it explicitly rejects describing observers with quantum mechanics. No source is needed for the obvious statement "the atoms of the brain do not stay the same", since all atoms enter and leave the body. The discussion of subtle points of consciousness is not improved by introducing the sentence "mystics believe" every once in a while, because non-mystics also need to answer the question of what consciousness is just as well, or leave it alone.

That means that the discussion is going to be completely philosophical, it can't be helped, hinging on the most annoying points of "what is my experience made of" and "how is this consciousness-stuff represented in quantum mechanics". —Preceding unsigned comment added by Likebox (talk • contribs) 05:53, 13 August 2009 (UTC)


 * There are some very clear facts associated with quantum mechanics: Double-slit experiment, Hydrogen spectral series, and the time evolution of Bose–Einstein condensate are all facts and the Bohr model of the atom could be considered a stipulation. Its important to remember that all applications of modeling reality off a wave functions are extrapolated from hydrogen like atoms.  Its not a fact that "wave functions spread into the world" its an interpretation of a sparse number of facts, readers should be reminded that there are many interpretation of quantum mechanics.  Its very important to distinguish between "fact" and "interpretation" especially when describing QM's relationship to "mysticism".


 * The problem with the atoms and brain statement is not the idea that the atoms of the brain change.


 * "It has been suggested that the brain can't be explained though atoms since the atoms which constitute the brain do not stay the same."


 * The problem is that by changing a classical explanation based around atoms is in sufficient since they change location. This is similar to saying that classical mechanics is insufficient to explain the solar system because the planets move.  Classical methods fail it both situation but not for the implied reasons.  The sentence contains wp:synthesis I was giving the author an opportunity to attribute the sentence before I or another editor deletes the text.


 * As for the "mystic believe" qualifiers not everyone believes in philosophical zombie. But the bigger problem is whole premising of the hypothetical question in "Mind/body problem in Newtonian mechanics" includes a host of assumptions and is contextualized in a mystic belief system.  For example the idea that consciousness is a "stream" is inane from my perspective I think of it as a temporal physical pattern, given the right tools and resources a pattern could be replicated an infinite number of times.  But I would never add that to the text because that would be wp:synthesis so I qualified, through attribution, the verifiable text. Thats what I can say for now.--OMCV (talk) 02:11, 14 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Don't be ridiculous--- that whole history section is the toughest thing to source, as is anything else on this subject. The issue is this--- quantum mechanics is not classical mechanics. It does not describe the positions of atoms. It describes wavefunctions. So even if you take the perspective the consciousness is the clockwork in the brain, that doesn't tell you what consciousness is in quantum mechanics because quantum mechanics does not describe clockwork. It describes wavefunctions.Likebox (talk) 05:58, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * A Newtonian clockwork consciousness model does not need to meet the standards of QM, it only needs to meet its own standards which still allows atoms to exchange. If the classical model of mind and brain is failing by QM's standards the sentence needs to be rewritten and no matter what the sentence still needs citation. Furthermore if something is difficult to cite wp:verify odds are that it doesn't belong in an encyclopedia.--OMCV (talk) 12:50, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * It's not impossible, just difficult to cite.Likebox (talk) 18:02, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Like I said rewrite it so it makes sense and then cite it.--OMCV (talk) 04:03, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Consciousness Causes Collapse
This needs to be separated out from this article. This article should focus on mysticism and relations between mysticism and QM. CCC is just a straighforward add-on to Copenhagen, a half-way house between Copenhagen and full blown many-worlds. Many worlds can best be described as : consciousness seems to cause collapse from its own point of view.Likebox (talk) 05:53, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
 * If the main CCC article is going to be Wigner's interpretation of quantum mechanics then Consciousness causes collapse should presumably redirect there, not here. 1Z (talk) 06:38, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Removed Paragraph
The laws of quantum physics allow by calculation the prediction of observables, which can be tested in repeated experiments to a very high precision. This is a property shared with all other physical theories, but not with mystical beliefs. However, Ken Wilber asserts that meditation with the aim of experiencing higher consciousness may be regarded an experimental science (as it was and is regarded by some Buddhist sect.


 * This paragraph has no purpose except to misrepresent quantum mechanics as a mundane kind of physical theory, sort of like Newton's theory, except more precise and probalistic. That's not quantum mechanics. Nobody who knows quantum mechanics ever thinks of it that way.


 * Quantum mechanics does allow prediction of experimental outcomes after interpretation. The theory distinguishes between "measurements" and "physical processes", and this distinction is essential. A person is always performing measurements, and there is no obvious way of making sense out of the quantum state of a person. More generally, the entire classical world can only be extracted out of the theory itself by taking a many-worlds type interpretation. Otherwise, the theory is dualistic, just the same as mysticism.


 * Mysticism is not science, but the type of mysticism supported by quantum mechanics is of a very limited sort: it is just the statement that the consciousness-stuff is not reducible in an obvious way to material-stuff. The reason is that no classical-stuff is reducible in an obvious way to wavefunction-stuff. That separation is the entire content of quantum mysticism.Likebox (talk) 19:01, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
 * A deterministic perspective is a very common interpretation of quantum mechanics. More importantly most researchers (regardless of their religious or mystical beliefs) treat quantum mechanics as a mathematical formalism when they work; which means they are agnostic to determinism or more likely assume some form of determinism as is the norm in all physical sciences.  With that said I see know reason to keep the paragraph other than it being a well cited opinion of a quantum mystics, even if a lesser quantum mystics. Did you know that the double-slit experiment has been conducted with bucky balls (Arndt, M. et al. Nature 401, 680–682 (1999)).  I don't think the double-slit experiment has been conducted with humans yet but it would be a reason experiment to conducted if we wanted to quantitatively measure how much our wave component contributed to our physical behavior.--OMCV (talk) 02:44, 14 August 2009 (UTC)


 * What is a "deterministic perspective" in quantum mechanics? Do you mean many worlds? That's still subjectively probablistic.Likebox (talk) 05:56, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Scientists before they conduct experiments make the assumption that cause and event are linked through the material world, that some aspect of the world they are trying to understand is going to have intelligible deterministic behavior. Likebox you appear to be very hung up on theoretical perspectives and seem to have trouble distinguishing between QM models of reality and known experimental facts.  Most of these perspectives over step their data otherwise their wouldn't be so many perspectives.  As stated before we are going to have to do better to distinguish between "facts" and "interpretations".--OMCV (talk) 13:01, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * What do you mean "cause and effect are linked through the material world?" Do you mean that if you do something twice you get the same results? That's certainly wrong. Do you mean that if you do something twice you get the same probabilities? That's also incorrect, if you do certain experiments. Please don't impose your own pet philosophy on this article--- it is discussing subtle issues which are difficult to explain.Likebox (talk) 18:00, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I'm hardly describing a pet philosophy, its the operational philosophy of the vast majority of people working in scientific research stated in plain language. Its also off topic.--OMCV (talk) 04:08, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree that it's a little off topic, but I want to know where you are coming from. If our discussion here is free enough, we might come to agree on a text by mutual understanding. So be patient, I am just core-dumping my POV, so that you can do the same, and we can compare our POV and see if it is possible to make the article pleasing to both of us.


 * The "science is about measurements" philosophy is so minimalistic, it suggests that science has absolutely nothing to say about consciousness or mysticism in any way. While this is a self-consistent point of view, and was held by Bohr, it is no secret that many people believe that a theory is about reality. So if you say that "electrons are fully described by wavefunctions", some will go further and say "electrons can be identified with wavefunctions". This was explicitly the point of view of Everett. It rejects the Bohr notion that science is just about explicitly described feasable measurements, and it incorporates the Wigner point of view that the rules of conscious perception is why we percieve collapse.


 * This point of view is not very sensible sounding to Bohr people, because they think of the wavefunction as somehow representing "information about the system", but the Bohr perspective is not self-evident. One reason is that the wavefunction is not a probability, so an "ignorance" interpretation makes it natural to ask "ignorance of what exactly?" a Bohrist would say it is ignorance of incompatible classical position and momentum, but a modern person would say "but position and momentum are fully quantum concepts, not classical ones. The classical ones are just approximations. And there are probably no hidden variables underneath to be ignorant of." Bohr would say "that's complementarity!" and so on.


 * Some people view the idea that the quantum description does not describe systems that include observers as mystical all by itself--- since it separates out the world of physics and the world of experience. Some people view the role of consciousness in CCC as mystical, because it separates out "experience" from "physical description". But it's always the same thing that people are pointing out as "mystical", and I wanted to explain what it is as clearly as possible.Likebox (talk) 04:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

What's wrong with the rewrite
Within Newtonian mechanics, the question of consciousness is not directly addressed since consciousness can not be directly measured and or quantified.


 * Yes, yes, we know, and everyone who reads this knows this. It is not useful to state the obvious.

Adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective to explain the nature of consciousness suggests the content and function of a mind might be identified with the position and velocity of the atoms of the brain. Knowing the state of the atoms determines the future, so in a verificationalist sense it determines all measurable aspects of conscious behavior.


 * This is exactly what was said more pithily before. It is not useful to say "adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective" instead of "In Newtonian mechanics", because that obfuscates the issue

Proponents of Quantum mysticism claim that even in a Newtonian universe, there are philosophical doubts about explain consciousness through the position and velocity of atoms.


 * Proponents of quantum mysticism do not specifically claim this. This is stuff that nobody disputes (as far as I know). This is an expository paragraph, designed to get the reader to the point where the explanations of mysticism in a physical theory can make sense. So it explains why you can't obviously point to a certain collection of atoms and say "that's my consciousness", because 1. what if the pattern moves into different atoms, like when atoms get replaced in the brain? And what if you copy the pattern into a duplicate, but keep the original, which way does the consciousness go subjectively? These two questions need to be asked to get the reader to understand the perspective of Everett. These questions are only raised by not answered, because if you haven't thought about these before, you aren't going to understand anything.

It has been suggested that the brain can't be explained though atoms since the atoms which constitute the brain do not stay the same. Individuals have put forward certain contrived thought experiments in which they claim the identity of mind and brain can become confused. For example, when a conscious Newtonian observer is duplicated, by copying all the relative positions and velocities of the observer's atoms. It is is argued that it is not obvious which way the stream of conscious experience for the observer will go but it assumed to go one way or both (but not duplicated). If the consciousness only goes one way, the duplicate will be left a philosophical zombie, without a consciousness of its own. But if the consciousness goes both ways, both observers start off with the same internal state, so that the subjective experience of the consciousness after the split requires extra information to describe. This information is what determines which path the consciousness will take. It has been argued that the value of this information is subjectively very important for the duplicated- since the information predicts the relative futures' of the duplicated pair - but this information is not contained in the relative positions and velocities of the observer's internal atoms.


 * This is OK, but overqualified. The Dennett stuff is classical, no QM, it just talks about copying consciousnesses. This is implicit in Everett too. It is not particularly mystical, and the "suggestion" is overly strong: the suggestion is not that the brain cannot be explained through atoms, the suggestion is that there is more information in the pattern of consciousness than what you can see in the position of the atoms. For example, which way a duplicated observer's consciousness "goes" is a bit of information like that.


 * The source for moving the brain pattern into a different system (a remote electronic machine in this case) was discussed by Dennett in "Where am I". This is the source for the statement "The atoms don't stay the same", but it is a loose paraphrase of ideas, as is the whole thing, frankly.Likebox (talk) 06:20, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The first section states how Newtonian Mechanics sees the world and I'm glad we agree its accurate but I disagree that it will be obvious to anyone who comes to this page. There is a great deal of misunderstandings of scientific philosophy that revolves around quantum mysticism and its best to be clear, especially when it takes a single sentence.  In the next section "Adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective to explain the nature of consciousness..." is stated the way it is because there has never been an experiment based in Newtonian physics conducted on the "nature of consciousness" this line of thought is extrapolation.  If there was such research it would be worth citing here.

Proponents of Quantum mysticism claim that even in a Newtonian universe, there are philosophical doubts about explain(ing) consciousness through the position and velocity of atoms.


 * This sentence has been attributed to "Proponents of Quantum mysticism" because it is a disputable statement. Seriously the "Newtonian model" of the universe lacks a proper description of atoms, the whole idea pitting the two models against each other in this way is contrived and thus needs attribution.  It seems the following hypothetical statements are primers for Everett's theories, or perhaps from Everett's works, and as such be attributed to Everett or purged as wp:synth.  I've already stated that the hypothetical question is bad.  The idea that our "stream of consciousness" is hiding in the subatomic activities of ground state atoms/molecules flies in the face of modern neuroscience which at no point invokes subatomic activity.  Consider they whole hypothetical question in need of citation or deletion.  Paraphrasing even if its loose should be attributed and if its too loose its wp:synth.--OMCV (talk) 13:42, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * It's only SYNTH if people who aren't familiar with the ideas think it is. Everyone knows that there is nothing original about these ideas--- they have been kicking around for 60 years. The statement that there are "philsoophical doubts about explaining all the contents of consciousness through positions of atoms" is not debatable--- the doubts exist. Whether they are justified or not is another story.


 * To explain these doubts--- if someone makes a copy of you, and puts the copy in Antarctica--- do you feel that you are still where you are, or that you are teleported to Antarctica? What if it is the original that is moved very very quickly to Antarctica, while the copy is left here? What if the atoms are split between you and copy half/half.


 * The question of consciousness is where you feel yourself to be. This is a different question than where the atoms actually are.Likebox (talk) 18:06, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * If its been around for 60 years it should be very easy to cite as it is I've deleted it as OR. Someone who understands QM would realize that two observers whose atoms relative positions and relative velocities are identical would be identical.  They would also realize that the situation of identical observers could theoretically never be achieved because of the uncertainty principle even if all the practical difficulties are ignored.


 * The vast majority of biochemical activity contributing to all of life can be explained without QM. There are two exception that I know of, quantum tunneling must be invoked to explain the reaction rates of H+ and e-.  All heavier atoms are well explained through classical chemical kinetics.  Subatomic states play no known role in consciousness for example the magnetic alignment of nuclei that occurs in an MRI machine has not been demonstrated to the biological activity of anything.  It seems the contrived hypothetical question concerning the twin observers, the stream of consciousness, and their "feelings" is Likebox's OR as such its been deleted.--OMCV (talk) 04:26, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * It is well cited--- it is in Dennett and Hofstadter. The sentence you give "Someone who understands QM would realize that two observers whose atoms relative positions and relative velocities are identical would be identical" shows that you do not understand QM at all, and should not edit this article.Likebox (talk) 04:49, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * What I meant by that cryptic statement above is that it is impossible to even imagine that two observers' atoms have a definite position and definite momentum. It is not allowed in QM, even hypothetically. You can't view the uncertainty principle as a limitation to measuring the position and momentum (but they exist anyway secretly inside). That's a completely wrong point of view.


 * Your hypothetical unknown simultaneous position and momentum would be local hidden variables, and would violate Bell's inequality. They would not obey Newton's laws, and they would have to be in constant communication faster than the speed of light. This type of misunderstanding is not shared by ANY quantum mechanics practitioner, and it is serious enough error for me to ask you to please get a better understanding for quantum mechanics before mucking around with this article.Likebox (talk) 05:02, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * If "it is impossible to even imagine that two observers' atoms have a definite position and definite momentum" than the hypothetical needs to be restated. I was thinking well within the ridiculous hypothetical to say that two observers with identical atoms and velocities are identical, I never said that they would stay identical, its best not to make to many interpretations your bound to get something wrong.--OMCV (talk) 05:27, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The hypothetical is a pure hypothetical, in Newtonian mechanics. It imagines that you make a clone of a classical observer, and the clone then goes off and does other things. But at the instant that the clone is made, it has the same relative (classical) positions and velocities. This thought experiment assumes the world is classical, and that a classical world could include conscious beings just like ourselves. This might not be clear enough in the article.


 * In quantum mechanics, there is no analogous copying, because you can't precisely duplicate a quantum state. But the analogous thing in QM is just a macroscopic superposition itself. In Everett's view, an observer in a superposition "feels" unsuperposed. This is the main point, echoed in Wigner's consciousness causes collapse article.Likebox (talk) 21:58, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Its a hypothetical! You say it not possible to "precisely duplicate a quantum state" well in classical mechanics its not possible precisely position a collection of atoms and the classical mechanics doesn't even have the Bohr model.  What I think you real mean is that quantum states spread infinitely so internal states can't be distinguished from external states thus the idea of duplicating internally relative state is a fallacy.  I'm fine with that.  Then again that assumes a quantum state at infinity is relevant. In the practical application of quantum mechanics, "Matter" has a very localized wave function and the influence of more distant aspects of these wave functions are considered inconsequential for everyone but mystics.  That's why delocalizing matter in a Bose–Einstein condensate was such a big deal.--OMCV (talk) 14:18, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) I think you are confusing "quantum mysticism" with the unrelated idea that Quantum Mechanics has something to do with the functioning of the brain and consciousness itelf. Those two ideas have nothing to do with one another.

"Quantum mysticism" is an interpretation of the fact that the laws of quantum mechanics make reference to an observer, and that these references are unavoidable, unlike in classical mechanics.

The idea that quantum effects or tunneling have to do with the functioning of the brain is a completely separate idea with very little support. This is called "quantum consciounsness" or something.

Quantum mechanics is still mystical even if you view the mind as clockwork. The reason is that quantum mechanics does not describe clockwork, it describes clockwork in superposition.Likebox (talk) 17:42, 18 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Also from reading your comment again, you seem to suggest that objects in the classical limit have "tight" compressed wavefunctions which lump around the classical position and momentum. This is incorrect. It is correct for the part of the wavefunction which describes the relative state, meaning the relative positions and momentum of the different interacting particles, but the overall state of a system will always end up in a gross superposition of macroscopically different possibilities. This doesn't require a sophisticated Bose-Einstein condensate, it's just Schrodinger's cat.Likebox (talk) 17:46, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * First, Schrodinger's cat is intended to illustrate difference in interpretations. The thought experiment would have very little meaning without actual experimental evidence of quantum mechanic phenomenon like the double-slit experiments.  Its backwards to say that Schrodinger's cat is evidence of phenomenon.  Second this line of exchange is hopelessly off topic and I won't respond here again.--OMCV (talk) 02:05, 21 August 2009 (UTC)


 * It is not off topic. This article is on quantum mysticism. You must understand quantum mechanics to understand what it is all about. I think you don't have a very good grasp of quantum mechanics, so you don't understand why some people think it is mystical. If you learn the quantum mechanics, you will have a better perspective on the text you wish to delete.


 * The "double slit experiment" or "stern Gerlach experiment" are preliminaries. They are designed to get a person used to thinking in terms of probability amplitudes. Once you understand that a particle's position and spin is described by a wavefunction, you next have to understand that two particles position is described by a single wavefunction in six dimensional space. That three particles are described in nine dimensions, and that 20 particles live in 60 dimensions.


 * These enormous spaces are required in QM, and they are not illustrated in regular explanations. The point of "Schrodinger's cat" is to explain what kinds of things happen in this enormous space. The cat becomes a superposition of dead and alive. But does a wavefunction in 10^25 dimensions really describe cats? If it does, and the cat is superposed, does the cat "feel" simultaneously dead and alive?


 * These questions are the central ones in the philosophy of science and philsoophy of mind. That's where quantum mysticism comes from.Likebox (talk) 20:54, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Why the edits in the next section are no good
Unlike classical mechanics, in quantum mechanics, there is no naive way of identifying the true state of the world or its components such as observers. The state of all parts of reality is believed to be measurably indefinite as described by the uncertainty principle.


 * This is not just about the uncertainty principle. It is about the wavefunction. Using the uncertainty principle in this context can make it sound like there is a secret hidden variable underneath.

The implications of this finding on the nature of reality is unclear since there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) the wavefunction, that describes matter and energy, spreads out describing an ever larger superposition of different worlds. In this interpretation an observer observing a superposition can be described by a superposition of different observers seeing different things, but in actual experience, an observer never feels a superposition, but always feels that one of the outcomes has occurred with certainty. This apparent conflict between a wavefunction description and classical experience is called the problem of observation. The founders of quantum mechanics each interpreted the theory and associated assumptions different, each interpretation has different implications on an observer and their relationship to the world.


 * This is pretty much OK, but it is equivalent to what was there before. I don't understand these nitpicking rewrites. If you aren't going to change the content at all, why make it sound worse?Likebox (talk) 06:17, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
 * There is a need to distinguish between undisputed "facts" and "interpretations" or "models". I don't dispute the statements listed above have been made, they just need to be attributed and cited.  Thats what all my edits have been about.--OMCV (talk) 13:46, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Have you read the sources already there? If you do, then I think you will be satisfied that there is no original thought in the whole section.Likebox (talk) 18:08, 16 August 2009 (UTC)


 * To quote Wigners conclusions on his own paper:

"The present writer is well aware of the fact that he is not the first one to discuss the questions which form the subject of this article and that the surmises of his predecessors were either found to be wrong or unprovable, hence, in the long run, uninteresting. He would not be greatly surprised if the present article share the fate of those of his predecessors."


 * I'm not overly worried that these ideas are OR, I'm worried that ideas are being stated as undisputed facts when they are interpretations that need to be attributed to an individual or a school of thought.--OMCV (talk) 04:42, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Considering that nothing here is stated as fact, that is a surprising assertion. To say "there are philosophical doubts" is not the same as saying "this is true", or "this is false". It just says people have raised doubts (they have).Likebox (talk) 05:06, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Lets say you heard someone say that they thought my sister could be a slut. I still want this non-fact cited and attributed.  But thats not what the problem is the version I edited stated to the effect that "quantum mechanics states this", I changed it to "an interpretation of quantum mechanics states this".  There is a big difference in one quantum mechanics is treated as a single entity, I would be fine with that if you where dealing with things a mathematical formalism.  Instead you are invoking ideas almost whole derived from an interpretation of quantum mechanics completely unrelated to the mathematical formalism and its supporting experimental evidence.--OMCV (talk) 14:27, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) I agree that there is some justification necessary for the emphasis on many-worlds in this section. I believe this is justified, because the many-worlds article came somewhat before Wigner's article on consciousness, and some have suggested that it inspired Wigner's article. Wigner's point of view directly inspired some of the quantum mysticism, but Schrodinger's point of view also was somewhat similar, and everyone was aware of the pitfalls of describing an observer using quantum theory.

The many-worlds literature is the historical source for nearly all modern interpretations of QM. The interesting part is that Everett's point of view has also been influential in the philosophy of mind, through the work of Dennett and Hofstadter. That's because the mind-subtleties that arise in many-worlds can be made to arise in any mechanistic theory of consciousness. So I think the emphasis is appropriate.

But the main issue of what quantum mechanics says and so on is pretty much without dispute, and independent of intepretational details, so I didn't bother to qualify it. Maybe you could be more specific about what statements are underqualified. Likebox (talk) 17:25, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Cites for Mind/Body Problem in Classical Mechanics
All the philosophy there is contained in great detail in the articles by Dennett from the late 70's early 80's, and reprinted and expanded upon in the Hofstadter/Dennett book cited. To be clear: there is no quantum mechanics in what Dennett and Hofstadter discuss, it's all about representing consciousness as a pattern in atoms, but the ideas are certainly inspired by Many Worlds interpretation.

Please do not make this section less clear: the statement that is made is that which way you "feel" yourself to go when your atoms are duplicated is an extra bit of information which is not present before the split, but is present after. This bit is apparent to you, as a subjective observer, but it has no objective meaning inside the atoms, because your consciousness goes both ways. This point is a little subtle, and I ask you to understand it before editing the section. The wording needs to be clear that it is exactly one bit that is not present in the atoms. Not "extra information" or "some claim that there is extra information". It is exactly one bit, and no more.

This extra bits is the "world selection" in many worlds, or equivalently the "results of past measurements" in some variants of Copenhagen, or with the "outcome of the consciousness collapse" in CCC, or with the "actually realized histories" in decoherent histories, or any other of the equivalent up-to-philosophy intepretations. The role of consciousness here in making the world appear as it is is similar to the role of consciousness in making time "go forward" subjectively. The feeling of time "going forward" is not obviously derivable from physical law, because it is a perceptual property, not a physical property. It is obviously related to entropy production, but exactly how is hard to say. Similarly, the feeling of "probabilistic measurements" is a subjective feeling in many-worlds, and an additional axiom associated with observers in standard Copenhagen style interpretations.Likebox (talk) 01:07, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * For the hypothetical question its not good enough to say the philosophy is out there in papers for the 70's and 80's. Please cite and attribute the hypothetical question plainly so that I and other editors can verify that it isn't a hypothetical of your own creation.  Its troubling that "The wording needs to be clear that it is exactly one bit that is not present in the atoms."  Does it need to be so exact because its quoted or does it need to be so exact because its your personal idea that needs to be protected.  The idea that there is one bit connected to: "world selection", "results of past measurements", "outcome of the consciousness collapse", and "actually realized histories" needs to attributed and cited as well as the idea that those are equivalent concepts .  This is not a forum for individuals to present their own thoughts stick to what can be cited. For now the offending section has been deleted.--OMCV (talk) 05:05, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * This hypothetical question is the SUBJECT of the book, "The Minds' I". It is also the subject of the articles I quoted here, and Hofstadter, who is an author on The Mind's I, makes no bones about the link to many-worlds.Likebox (talk) 05:13, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * (moved from OMCV's talk page)::: About "Citing a whole book" please look at it: the book contains a lot of articles that discuss thought experiments like the copying of an observer. The articles are very long-winded, because they are written to convince a skeptic, but you can just skim them (although they are pleasant to read). The original article is (I think--- I haven't read this in years) "where am I" by Dennett, and "Who am I?" (a sequel). I think they are both reprinted there, with extra commentary. The many-worlds article by Hofstadter is reprinted in "Metamagical Themas" (I am pretty sure). I didn't cite a particular page, because the thought experiment I wrote about is a very condensed summary of "Where am I". That is written as a fable about someone whose consciousness is copied into circuits (if my memory serves me right). I really don't mind if you change stuff here, but please read this literature first. Dennett is a very non-mystical philosopher of consciousness.Likebox (talk) 22:07, 17 August 2009 (UTC)


 * First this talk page is the place to respond to my specific concerns about the article. Second this clearly demonstrates that  the "hypothetical question" is of Likeboxes' own invention.  If it was adapted from a "fable about someone whose consciousness is copied into circuit" than there has been significant WP:Synth since at no point does it mention circuitry.  His ownership issues over the language are also disconcerting.  If the "hypothetical question" needs to be deleted until it can be specifically cited and attributed and Likebox's personal thoughts don't qualify as "WP:RS".--OMCV (talk) 12:59, 18 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I just looked at where am i very briefly and you might as well be citing the gholas of the Dune series or something by Williams Gibson. I understand that Dennett is a prominent philosopher and I'll look at the piece and see if it can be paraphrased and attributed.  This is generous of me since the burden of citation is not on the editor you challenges the material but the editor that adds it.  I expect the hypothetical question to remain deleted until it is correctly cited.--OMCV (talk) 14:39, 18 August 2009 (UTC)


 * You are supposed to use your common sense. There is an entire book devoted to copying consciousness, an article about copying consciousness, a decade of philosophical discourse about the copying of consciousness, and I paraphrase this old 80s discussion here. I do NOT say that Dennett is the only source, there are others, the particular example might not occur in the exact same words, but that's not the point. Anyone can see that its the exact same idea, perhaps illustrated differently (although I think the duplication example is given too in "Where am I" or one of the later articles in the book).Likebox (talk) 17:09, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) About "ownership": the reason I object to the rewrite is because the rewrite suggested in the subtext that there is a deterministic point of view, where quantum mechanics is just an uncertainty, or ignorance, on top of what is basically classical mechanics. This makes quantum mysticism into gibberish, because the mysticism comes out of realizing that the quantum uncertainty is not like a classical probability. If it's not a probability, how come if "FEELS" like one? There's the mysticism.

This type of mistake made me queasy about the rest of the rewrite. It wasn't terrible, though.Likebox (talk) 17:13, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Picking apart this rewrite
What's wrong with this rewrite (in addition to the obvious fact that it deleted Dennett/Hofstadter, which was the only point of the section)

Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics
Newtonian mechanics has historically been associated with the assumption that the world could be observed consistently from any vantage point, a strong concept of determinism, reductionism, and positivism. These philosophies, in their most extreme form, lead to the belief that given the positions and velocities of all atoms at one instant of time, we could compute the fate of the universe for all future times. When various forms of these beliefs are applied to consciousness and the mind-body problem the result is physicalistic monisms such as eliminative materialism.

The development of quantum mechanics and relativistic physics both elevated and limited the role of the "observer" in philosophically significant ways. The uncertainty principle relationship to the observer also placed theoretical limits on what could potentially be "known" about physical matter. The development of these theories lead to a critical reevaluation of the beliefs through which physics is contextualized and experimental results are interpreted. This reevaluation ultimately lead to the destabilization and speciation of physic's dominant philosophical context. The role and importance of determinism differed greatly between the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. This diverse environment provided fertile ground for the development of mystical interpretations and mystical extensions to the material interpretation of quantum mechanics both by professional scientists and mystics.

What's wrong with this paragraph: a bunch of things.


 * 1) Logical positivism is NOT associated with Newtonian mechanics, and never was. It is associated with relativity and quantum mechanics. It was developed partly as a challenge to the metaphysical concept of absolute space and time which underly Newton's mechanics.
 * 2) "These philosophies, in their most extreme form... (lead to determinism)" That's absolutely false. Newton's mechanics in its most obvious form leads to the theorem that if you know the present position and momentum (and if the force law is sufficiently regular) then you know the future. This was said explicitly in a famous quote by Laplace, and was echoed for 300 years. It is also mathematically true. The previous text just takes it for granted (and assumes you understand it).
 * 3) "Relativity and quantum mechanics ... elevated the observer..." this is bullshit. Relativity did not elevate the observer much more than Newtonian mechanics. In the final reckoning, the theory of relativity describes a reality which is independent of the observer just like any other classical theory, but whose most natural description in terms of time-slices depends on the observer's state of motion. Quantum mechanics was always completely different. It requires the act of observation even to define the primitive concepts in the theory, like the wavefunction. This distinction is absolutely essential. Nobody would ever talk about "Relativistic mysticism", and relativity is not a particularly positivist theory.
 * 4) "The uncertainty principle placed a limit on what could be known..." This statement shows profound ignorance of quantum mechanics. The uncertainty principle is not a limit on what "can be known", it is a limit on simultaneous measurement of position and momentum, for the simple reason that a quantum description does not have a simultaneous position and momentum. It is misleading to state it as a limitation on our knowledge, because it is not clear "knowledge of what, exactly?"
 * 5) This sentence "The development of these theories lead to a critical reevaluation of the beliefs through which physics is contextualized and experimental results are interpreted.  This reevaluation ultimately lead to the destabilization and speciation of physic's dominant philosophical context." sounds like it was written by an illiterate. Do not use big words for no reason: you could say the exact same thing like this "When these theories came along, they turned physical philosophy upside down", which is much more readable. Big words == Dumb people.

I restored the previous text. If you are going to change the text, at least make a minor effort to write readably, without pompous big words.Likebox (talk) 18:24, 19 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Ok, aside from the relatively trivial style issues (that's a pet peeve, sorry), the rest of the points I made above are not very convincing:


 * I understand why you said positivism now--- you mean predicting the behavior of a mind is the same as understanding consciousness. This also takes care of point 2. I put that back in the merge.
 * I fixed the Dennett stuff to be clearer.
 * The relativity business, while not mystical, did involve one point which was positivist. Time seems to "go forward" in Newtonian mechanics, but not in relativity. This point was lost on me when I wrote the above comment. Go figure. I still think it's a little out of the way to mention it.
 * The uncertainty principle is certainly not the right way to say it--- I stand by this one.
 * I also stand by the style issue, but it's not very important.

Hopefully the merge made it clearer. Perhaps it is also possible to ease your doubts about the Dennett stuff (he really does discuss copying consciousness in the Mind's I--- it's in there. Two minds (one a backup copy) diverge after a glitch, and then the backup copy becomes hopelessly unhappy).Likebox (talk) 07:10, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

Sticking to the subject
This is getting ridiculous. Please read WP:synth. The section on Dennett/Hofstadter contains substantial synth and there has been no compelling argument to the contrary. Of these concerns I'm most worried about (3) and (1) their relationship to WP:synth and the possibility that these are not unique edits but indicative of a more pervasive misrepresentation of material. I've attempted to offer reasonable arguments and they seem to have failed. As I see it the next step is some form of arbitration. I've never initiated arbitration and have no desire to do so but it seems this situation may demand a third party, I hope you see share my views on this Likebox.--OMCV (talk) 03:23, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
 * 1) The section on Dennett/Hofstadter is connected to Dennett/Hofstadter perspective on the Mind/Body problem but nothing directly connects it to the "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics".
 * 2) There is a huge amount of work associated with the Mind/Body that could be connected to "Newtonian mechanics". Focusing on the work of Dennett/Hofstadter in detail is disproportionate.
 * 3) As it stand this Dennett/Hofstadter section does not fairly represent what could be described as the "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics" but rather provides a venue to for an editor to imply that aspects of Newtonian mechanics foreshadowed quantum mysticism.
 * 4) This is not the section to discuss the many-worlds interpretation or Copenhagen interpretation as it doesn't relate to "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics".
 * 5) "The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms." This statement is just poorly thought out.  Its meaning is entirely unclear as is its connection to Newtonian mechanics.  I expect that this is inspired form the transcript of Feynman's speech the "Value of Science".  This idea was presented well after well after the introduction of quantum mechanics and Feynman clearly explains how he relates consciousness to the fact that "The radioactive phosphorus content of the cerebrum of a the rate decreases to one-half in a period of two weeks." . (Still Feynman was some what misrepresenting the study since it was probably concerned with the uses and exchanges ATP, the brains fuel and not its structure.  Its akin to saying the fuel I have in my car today is not the same as the fuel I had in my car yesterday yet it is still my car.)


 * I don't think I read that Feynman thing, but I may have. It certainly isn't the inspiration for the changing atoms. That's just to make sure that people understand that copying the information in the brain to new atoms is a normal thing, because that's the only process that Dennett uses to make the intuitive paradoxes in his fables.


 * While I agree that there is a huge literature on consciousness in philosophy, all of it is useless for this article, because it is not informed by the quantum thinking. Dennett's paradoxes are essentially the same type of effects which are naturally suggested by the many-worlds interpretation, and so they help explain the relationship of consciousness and intepretation of QM. It is possible that Dennett was directly inspired by many-worlds (although there is no source for this assertion).


 * There is no synth. The ideas stated in this article are those of Dennett and Hofstadter, with next to no alteration. I used my own language, but the ideas are not original. These ideas are not quantum mechanical, they are classical by default (the machines which Dennett refers to never involve any quantum mechanics). In this article, that fact needs to be emphasized. That's why I wrote in "Newtonian" mechanics. It really doesn't have to be newtonian, you could retitle the section "Mind/Body problem with a deterministic brain".


 * The classical problem (informed by Dennett) makes the quantum paradoxes clearer. There is no other work in philosophy of mind that I know of which is at all related to quantum mechanical perspectives. While I agree that some editorial judgement has been used to select which philosophy and physics articles are relevant, that is not SYNTH, that's writing an article. If you have other sources you think should be added, there's plenty of room.Likebox (talk) 04:26, 21 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The section titled "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics" should not be informed by quantum thinking.


 * Dennett's story deals with the speed of light, electronics, radio waves, and many other things which are not described by any "Newtonian" model. Newtonian physics (classical physics) is a model of reality whose relevance is limited to the translational motion of large objects (generally atoms or bigger) moving slowly (well below the speed of light) in the observers frame of reference.  There is the cultural concept of "Newtonian Physics" which is tied to the philosophical idea of a clock-work universe, the idea of a perfectly accessible determinism.  This idea should be described in its own terms and not through a quantum thinking informed filter.


 * The ideas of Dennett are distinctly different from the thought experiment in the article. The concept of "consciousness stream" and a "single bit of information" is not contained in DENNETT's Where Am I?, these two ideas need to be cited and attributed if they are going to be included without dispute.


 * "The classical problem (informed by Dennett) makes the quantum paradoxes clearer." The classical system presented authentically had no use or knowledge of quantum paradoxes.  Researchers ignored any philosophical concern that could resemble a quantum paradox until the discovery of specific phenomenon such as spectral lines.  As it stands now the section should be titled "Mind/Body problem as perceived by physicalist in the opinion of Dennet".  But then again, Dennet's work came well after the development of quantum mechanics and as its written now the article doesn't represent Dennet's ideas.--OMCV (talk) 05:17, 21 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Thank you for the link to the Mind's I website. The original "Where Am I" contains the copying procedure, "Hubert" is the computational copy. The idea that there is a way for a consciousness to go when it is duplicated is contained in this work. The stuff you are complaining about, the "bit of information", etc, is so trivial and obvious, I think it is silly to argue about.Likebox (talk) 04:34, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) To respond to your comment: by the phrase "Newtonian mechanics" I did not mean just Newtonian mechanics, I meant Maxwell's equations too and even special relativity, since they are all pretty much identical as far as mind issues are concerned.Likebox (talk) 21:48, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Accusations of SYNTH
I think all of these accusations are caused by not reading "The Mind's I". The relevant article is a sequel to "Where Am I?" where there is a copy of the consciousness, and the copy diverges from the original because of a computer glitch. From this point on, the copy and the original are two separate consciousnesses, but there was only one before. This leads to trouble, because only one of them can control Dennett's body, and neither consciousness want its body to be passively controlled by the other.Likebox (talk) 04:33, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I just read Where was I? and it doesn't help your case. The "diverging copy" is actually from the end of "The Mind's I" by Dennett, I recommend you reread the article.  As I stated above the thought experiment now in the article is SYNTH.--OMCV (talk) 05:41, 21 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I quickly skimmed it--- you are right. The diverging copy has a "switch" (one bit of information) which is useless at first, but then diverges. This is the mysterious "bit" that you complain about. Dennett says explicitly "I don't know which one I am, Yorick or Hubert", which is paraphrased into "this bit is blah blah blah" in the article. Really, there is no new idea here. Honest.Likebox (talk) 04:46, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The differences between Yorick and Hubert is far more than a "bit". Dennett never offers a theory as to why they diverge only that they do.  The switch is used to move between two different systems that started indistinguishable from each other but have many unobserved differences and thus diverge to observably different states.  This is very much synth.--OMCV (talk) 13:43, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Its akin to saying that I have two painted balls of the exact same size, elasticity, and density, they behave the same in almost every situation except a when placed in magnetic fields. The difference is because one ball is a metal and the other is wood.  This isn't one "bit" of information from a physics point of view even if it is from a linguistic point of view.  Every atom in the two balls is different.  The same is true for "Yorick" and "Hubert" and concluding the switch to be one "bit" of different between the two systems is just absurd.--OMCV (talk) 14:18, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * You are right after they diverge, but before they diverge the difference is exactly one bit: which way the switch is set. This is the single bit I was talking about. I agree it can be confusing, and probably can be reworded better.Likebox (talk) 20:13, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Summary of Complaints about Mind/Body Section
Perhaps the title of the section should be "Mind body problem disregarding quantum mechanics" instead of "Mind body problem in Newtonian mechanics. But since "Newtonian mechanics" is just a stand-in for "what people normally think of as physical law", the change would only be slight.

The point of the Dennett experiments is to show how different the mind can be from the material property of the brain. This discussion came after the analogous discussion in quantum mechanics, so you can't say it's not derived from this.Likebox (talk) 04:11, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The section is now titled Classical Mind/Body problem. Hopefully that will get rid of the specious arguments about classical theories other than Newtonian mechanics.Likebox (talk) 21:49, 22 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Form a "proper" classical perspective there is only measurable "body" and unmeasurable "mind" is not addressed, thus the mind/body problem does not exist in a classical framework that deals only with body. The invented content must go no matter what title it is given.--OMCV (talk) 02:32, 24 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The title is not invented. It just means "what people called the mind/body problem for 300 years before QM". If you don't like it, please suggest an alternative. Do you like "Non quantum Mind/Body problem?".Likebox (talk) 07:16, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

In re third opinion
For whoever provides a third opinion here, the current dispute seems to be about the inclusion or removal of the following two paragraphs: "'But even for these hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, this type of copying leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and duplicate all the information in the brain, by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains. The two brains start out exactly the same, but diverge afterwards, since they will have different experiences from this point on. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience for the observer will go. If the copy is not a philosophical zombie, the consciousness had better go both ways. But each copy feels to have gone only one way." "'So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way thier consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms. These types of thought experiments were widely discussed in philosophy in the 1980s [1], but similar ideas appeared earlier as part of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.'"
 * ^ [Dennett, Daniel C. (2001-01). The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul. Basic Books. ISBN 0465030912.]

(Diffs of removal and re-addition from article history.) — Athaenara ✉  18:40, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * That's is correct from my perspective, I deleted the text on the grounds that it is synth. Less importantly this text does not address the issue of "Mind/body problem in Newtonian mechanics" for which the section is titled. A more detailed presentation of both sides of the argument are located in the preceding text of this talk page.--OMCV (talk) 19:35, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Yes, that's correct from my perspective too. This type of discussion, outside of quantum mechanics, is useful for a person who is unfamiliar with philosophy of mind. It explains why the question of consciousness has been considered somewhat slippery, and it is the same sort of slipperiness that is involved in the stranger case of quantum mechanics. It might be badly titled: "Classical Mind/Body problem" might be better.


 * The reason I think this belongs in an article on quantum mysticism is because the discussion of observer splitting/copying as far as I know first appeared in the quantum literature. These questions about consciousness were then reexamined in the non-quantum context in the 1980s by Dennett and Hofstadter. So I think that the link to the Dennett things is informative and relevant.Likebox (talk) 20:20, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Third Opinion So the main reason being given for the deletion of this material is that it is SYNTH? If so, it should be possible to point to specific parts that appear in none of the sources quoted. Perhaps then, we can find a form of words that avoids those specific claims. I'll note, as an aside, that "some philosophers have raised doubts" should be accompanied by a citation stating who at least some of those philosophers are, and where they published their doubts.

As to the lesser problem (if I'm reading you both correctly) of the section not belonging here, perhaps the section could be re-titled, and re-phrased to say something like "in his book [X] on quantum mysticism [Y] argues that...", thus clearly indicating that somebody, at least, thinks the subjects are relevant to each other? Anaxial (talk) 12:54, 24 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The following is adapted from my talk page: You can't paraphrase something as original as Dennett's work to the point that you can't attribute it to Dennett or some one else.
 * Dennett never supposed that consciousness would "stream" to only one of the copies he describes in his scenario, he never even suggested it. The concept consciousness "stream" and the two split alternatives are currently full inventions.
 * In fact Dennett points out that each copy is fully conscious and indistinguishable untill they split for undisclosed reasons.
 * In the current form Dennett's scenario is contradicted by saying the experiment is "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains". What Dennett actually described was two copies of physical minds tied to the same body through some form of radio transmission.
 * Furthermore its a major omission to ignore that the minds presented by Dennett are made up of vastly different material one an uploaded mind and the other a Brain in a vat far more than one "bit" of difference by any reasonable interpretation an diffidently not "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains".
 * Dennett never said the two copies differed by only one bit, that claim is based on an unusual interpretation of the "switch".
 * The part on "atoms which make up the brain get replaced" is not sourced (nor explained/described in a reasonable way).
 * At no point does Dennett claim to be addressing the mind/body problem from the perspective of Newtonian or classical mechanics nor does he claim to exclude quantum mechanics. Rather he addressing classic philosophical questions like demonic deceiver and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde scenarios in a modern yet still unrealistic context.
 * Philosophical zombies are not discussed in any cited source.
 * Basically the entire section and hypothetical as presented right now is a very original piece of work. I could come up with more details but that's the bulk of it.--OMCV (talk) 16:27, 24 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Dennett did too talk about "streams", except perhaps not in that language. You can substitute "train of thought" or "sequence of memories" or diverging experience.
 * YES, that's the whole point--- they are indistinguishable, except for hardware, until they split. So which way do you go? He adresses this too--- he says "I don't know which one I am, Yorick or Hubert".
 * NO NO NO. The case is YORICK/HUBERT, as I explained before. TWO BRAINS, SAME MIND, and they diverge. The radio stuff is just a red herring. Stop bringing it up.
 * That's a part of the essay I wished to ignore, because it is irrelevant for the present discussion.
 * It's obvious. Don't force people to source the obvious.
 * Ditto. It would be better if you only bring up stuff you are sincere about.
 * "Newtonian/Classical" just means "Not quantum", or if you like "Capable of being simulated on a deterministic computer", which is true of Yorick.
 * Philosophical Zombie is a link to an introductory article here on philosophy of mind.


 * It's a hypothetical, but it's not my hypothetical, it's Dennetts. You are annoying. You ask for a source, you get a perfect source, and you are still not satisfied.Likebox (talk) 14:22, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Let me be more explicit with points 3 and 4. The statement "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is not related to the idea producing two copies of a consciousness in two different forms, one a brain in a vat and the other an uploaded mind.  This idea of "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is central to the entire hypothetical and is not supported by any reference.--OMCV (talk) 17:04, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Please, less of the accusations of bad faith; they are unlikely to help resolve the issue. With regard to points 5 and 6, I would suggest that in this case, we should, indeed, cite the obvious, since it's clear that at least one party doesn't find it "obvious" - and, if its obvious to you, a cite won't be hard to find. It also seems clear to me that, if you're copying a brain in a vat into an uploaded mind then, no matter what else you may be doing, you're "copying all the relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" (arguably you might be if you were copying one uploaded mind into another, but I gather that's not the case here). So I would suggest altering that phrasing, and perhaps some explanation as to why this would be relevant, since, if you're not copying the particles, it's not obvious to me what it has to do with quantum physics. Perhaps you can clarify for me? Anaxial (talk) 17:16, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Copying positions and relative velocities, as far as I see it, is exactly the same as two copies in two different forms. I didn't remember the precise details of Dennett's example when I wrote it, and I wrote something which seemed equivalent to me. What's the difference exactly? If you don't like it, I can replace it with copying into a computer. You still can't tell which copy you "are" until the glitch. The glitch still reveals an extra bit of information to you, an extra bit which wasn't there before the split.Likebox (talk) 17:14, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Hmm... it seems to me that it's actually very different. If all the positions and velocities were the same, what you would have would look the same to an outside observer as well as being the same from an internal perspective; a brain in the vat does not look the same as an uploaded mind, and the "mind" itself is running on completely different hardware, so the positions and velocities would, ipso facto have to be different, wouldn't they?. Anaxial (talk) 17:19, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * All of this discussion is predicated on Dennett's philosophy of mind, where the mind can be identified with the information content in the brain. The information content in the vat-brain and the computer-program brain is identical--- they will answer the same to any question. So it is effectively the same as any other copy. I melded the two examples in my mind (uploading and copying atoms), because I agree with Dennett. But I don't know. Why is this difference essential? Also, I replaced the one I wrote with Dennett's below.Likebox (talk) 17:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Now that we have established the brain in a vat and the uploaded mind are different I think we can also conclude that there is more than one "bit" of difference between the two (point 5). Since there are substantial differences, as usually assumed with uploaded minds, I don't think anyone would debate there are potentially strange outcomes when people theorize about uploaded minds, be it within the framework of classical mechanics or informed by quantum mechanics.


 * Points 6 and 7 still stand. There is no citation or explanation of 6.  For point 7 there is no reason to assume that Dennett isn't considering quantum mechanics, after all to create his story he also had to abandon aspects of known technology and classical mechanics.  All we know is the first person account of the story not the theoretical frame work.--OMCV (talk) 17:41, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

The statement in the article is "by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This is, it seems, not part of the argument made in Dennett's book, since clearly the atoms in a brain and in an uploaded system are not going to be the same. Therefore, this does, in my view, constitute synthesis, and does not belong on WP - unless, of course, there is some other book that does make this exact argument, in which case we need to cite that. Anaxial (talk) 20:13, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * We are most definitely NOT in agreement. There just is no substantive difference between copying consciousness into AI and copying consciousness by duplicating atoms for the purpose of this discussion. The notion is identical in this case. The only reason I am giving an alternative is to make the issue go away, not because I agree with OMCV's interpretation of OR.


 * OR is here to keep the encyclopedia free from people's editorializing, and from misinformation. It is NOT to prevent examples which illustrate the idea in a slightly different language than the source. For the purpose of this particular discussion (which is about duplicating minds--- what does it feel like from the inside), there is not a shred of difference between copying to AI and copying to a set of atoms.Likebox (talk) 21:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Except that copying to AI leads to a slightly clunkier discussion (it makes it seem that copying to AI is essential here, but only the duplication is used). Still, it's not a huge difference.Likebox (talk) 21:34, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Regarding Dennett and Classical mechanics: It is impossible for Dennett to have been considering quantum mechanics, because it is well known that a computer cannot simulate a quantum mechanical system and stay parallel for any length of time. He was considering the traditional mind/body problem within the good old classical/deterministic computational model of the physical world. There's nothing wrong with that, just his thought experiment doesn't work at all in quantum mechanics. In quantum mechanics the computer, even with perfect information, would have no idea what the brain in the vat is going to do after about a fraction of a second, because different paths diverge quickly. That's the whole point. Quantum mechanics is probabalistic and diverging. In the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, the diverging paths of observers in quantum mechanics are thought of as exactly analogous to Yorick/Hubert.Likebox (talk) 21:34, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Would this be better?
But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, one could imagine moving all the information into a computer. This leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and simulate all the information in the brain, by simuating all the atoms relative positions and velocities in a computer program. If the two brains get identical experiences, they stay exactly the same. But if there is a different experience for one of the two copies, the copies diverge afterwards. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience inside the system will go. Both you and the program should have a consciousness in this scenario, to avoid making one of you a philosophical zombie. But it is impossible for each copy to be aware of the other.

So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms.Likebox (talk) 17:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I think this is slightly muddier, since the type of duplication in Dennett's article is irrelevant, but it is equivalent as far as the content is concerned.Likebox (talk) 21:36, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Explaining this one-bit business
The point of the part of Dennett's article dealing with Yorick/Hubert is that you can't tell which one you are Yorick or Hubert, until the divergence occurs. If someone told you that they were going to simulate the painful experience of smashing a hammer into Hubert's skull, and they asked the shared body "are you going to feel pain", there would be no way for either Yorick or Hubert to answer. The answer to the question: "who am I? Yorick or Hubert?" is not answerable by either. Even if you gave both Hubert and Yorick full knowledge of the position and momentum of all the atoms in all the world, neither one would be able to tell which one they are. The quantum mechanical analog of this bit is what has been called the mystical observer-dependent part of quantum mechanics, at least this is what it is called in the many worlds interpretation. In other interpretations, the same bits are called other things.Likebox (talk) 22:05, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Policy Interpretation
The goal of policies like OR or SYNTH is to keep the encyclopedia accurate, and free from people's personal crackpot theories. They are not designed to make Wikipedia writing enslaved to the particular illustrations or phrases used in the sources. To decide when two ideas are "basically the same", a lot of common sense judgement needs to be employed. You should always be asking yourself--- is this basically the same idea?

In this case, the thought experiment in question is duplicating a brain. The type of duplication is irrelevant, but in order to illustrate this concept, I said "copy all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This was then attacked as OR. GIVE ME A BREAK. This is so obviously the same as any other form of copying, that to challenge it as OR shows a myopic and dangerously lawyerly approach to content on the encyclopedia. This type of editing can easily delete valuable information, which is well sourced, but not plagiarized from the source. I have removed the phrase for now, but I still believe that this is a dangerous interpretation of policy.Likebox (talk) 20:29, 26 August 2009 (UTC)
 * The "copy all the atoms relative positions and velocities" was central to the OR text but it is not the entirety of the OR text. The text still needs to go.  I've explained the reasoning as plainly as I can and in multiple ways; this isn't a matter to debate this is a matter of policy.  If you can attribute the hypothetical and surrounding statements to an WP:RS they can stay if you can't they must go.  This has been the case since the beginning of the discussion.  Once this section is cleaned up we will move on to the rest of the article.


 * What has slowed things down is the arguments you have provided thus far have been exceedingly specious. Likebox, it seems the things you choose to understand and remember is extremely selective and convenient.  This makes discussions and ultimately researching a consensus extremely difficult.  In addition to all this you are still displaying ownership of the text reverting content of User:Michael C Price, who was willing to defend you at Wikiquette alerts.  Your brash language and needling may have been tolerated in the past but this sort of approach to discussions is not whats best for Wikipedia.--OMCV (talk) 00:36, 27 August 2009 (UTC)


 * There is no OR, and if you think the arguments I gave are specious, I beg you to read them again and reconsider. I give them sincerely. I do not agree with you, and I think your approach is destructive to all good encyclopedic content.


 * In compliance with the third opinion suggestion, I removed "copy all the atoms relative positions and velocities" and replaced it with the more neutral "copy the information in the brain", which is equivalent, and is what Dennett uses. If you want this gone, please wait to see what consensus is around the new phrase. I didn't like being forced to do this, because the examples are effectively identical, but since the third opinion suggested this compromise, I complied.


 * You are wrong about "matter of debate/matter of policy". All policy implementation is subject to debate, and this debate is useful for defining what policy means. Any literature has a certain scope of ideas which all people who are familiar with the literature know about. When you write sometimes you use one or another of these ideas to illustrate the whole circle of ideas, and that should be OK so long as each idea can be sourced. If a person who is unfamiliar with the ideas involved reads about a subject they don't know about (like quantum mysticism), they might think "Oh, this is all OR" because the ideas are unfamiliar. If you read the sources, and internalize the arguments, and you still think the ideas are OR, then maybe you are right. But I see no evidence that you have done so.


 * You have read the Dennett part, on the classical mind body problem, but that's the preamble. The main part of the article is about the analogous thing in quantum mechanics, which starts with Wigner's paper and Everett's. These are essential for the quantum part. You also have to be familiar with observation in the Copenhagen interpretation, and the nature of wavefunctions. Please read these sources, because they are what the article is based on.Likebox (talk) 12:05, 27 August 2009 (UTC)
 * The third opinion also suggested that you cite "But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts." to the specific philosophers. It appears you either failed to read this or willfully ignored it.  There is nothing that says Dennett is discussion a Newtonian observer.  Likebox, You say its impossible that its a quantum mechanics informed observer so it must be a Newtonian observer but its also impossible for it to be a Newtonian observer thanks to problems like the "three body problem" among others.  Dennett is never explicit with his philosophical of scientific frame work in this piece which is written as fiction.  Dennett's piece is a hypothetical dealing with different philosophical content than what you are attributing to the piece.  Its clear and disturbing that you are using this content as a preamble for the rest of the quantum mysticism page.  You want to be able to say that a classical approach had "doubts" which foretold the coming of quantum mechanics and quantum mysticism.  Neither Wigner or Everett bothered to make this claim in the papers you cite and to my knowledge there is no WP:RS that makes this claim.--OMCV (talk) 21:44, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

I suggest we use these guidlines to settle disputes here. So, assuming that everyone here is familiar with QM, we can forget sources for the moment and discuss any issues from first principles. Count Iblis (talk) 01:16, 28 August 2009 (UTC)


 * To OMCV, I see the problem you are raising--- thank you for stating it clearly. That section most definitely should not imply that the classical doubts "foretold" the coming of quantum mechanics, because that would be a bald-faced lie. The reason I wrote it this way is just because I really think it makes it pedagogically easier to understand the quantum part (especially many-worlds, which has a notoriously history of being philosophically confusing), after you think about the easier non-quantum stuff a little bit first. It's not historical, history was actually the reverse, the copying of observers in classical context was an issue that was only raised well after the many-worlds interpretation raised the same issue in the quantum context.


 * For the "philosophers raised doubts" part, I agree that it should be sourced to individuals. I just didn't notice that part of the third opinion (my reading and paying-attention skills are deteriorating, sorry). But do we really need to have a discussion of the substance dualists? They wouldn't care if it was quantum or classical mechanics anyway (I think, I don't know their position very well). People like Dennett pretty much identify mind with "software" and brain with "hardware", which is a very mild sort of dualism. But it's still a little dualistic because of Hubert/Yorick, and that's what that Dennett story is about.


 * Four Count Iblis, I agree that those guidelines should be adhered to. It seems that part of the issue that OMCV is raising here is that there is unintended subtext in the structure of the current text which is implying all sorts of things that should not be implied.Likebox (talk) 02:03, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Pedagogy and Clarity
Articles absolutely need to be comprehensible to the non-specialist. The discussion of the classical mind body problem is designed to by a warm-up for the nonspecialist reader to understand the quantum case. It is especially important for understanding many-worlds/decoherence interpretations. This is very important for clarity, and clarity should not be sacrificed. But it is not intended to imply that this is the historical order in which the ideas developed. In fact, at the end of the section, the article says "Similar ideas were developed earlier in the context of the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics".Likebox (talk) 02:57, 28 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I can't budge on it, that hypothetical is un-sourced OR and must go. By my count three editors have identified it as OR.  As you have discussed on my talk page regarding what you call class 3 QM "Class 3 is not mystical, but is also not-not mystical."  The same applies to everything in classical mechanics.  I oppose the hypothetical on content terms since its an overly contextualized leading question tied to assumption limited outcomes.  The part concerning one bit is tied to some seriously unsourced assumptions.  Hypotheticals always have more than two potential out comes.  Here is how this hypothetical would read form a proper classical perspective: "An observers who consist of matter (body and mind are not distinguished) is copied resulting in two observers with identical internally states.  The internal states of these observers subsequently diverge because of their different relative relationship to the external environment."  The reason I didn't challenge the content based on what I just wrote, claiming my idea as correct is that that content is my own OR.  As OR that content can never be added to the article just as the current OR must now be removed.  I think Wigner treatment of classical mechanics is far better. --OMCV (talk) 03:37, 28 August 2009 (UTC)


 * You persist in maintaining that a perfectly well sourced thought experiment is OR. Please give it a rest. Classical mechanics is not the focus--- the focus is on a materialist model of the mind, like Dennett, with a computater-program dualism. It is not my fault if an editor or two (only two by my count) have considered it dubious--- it looks dubious until you read the soure. Me and Michael Price think it is well sourced. The reason for the disagreement is because the other editors are not familiar with the ideas. If they spent some time reading the literature, they would also agree its not OR.Likebox (talk) 04:05, 28 August 2009 (UTC)
 * You have already waved your hands in this way before. If you want to describe Dennett's work your welcome to. As it stands now the text does not describe Dennett's work.  Furthermore I appear to be more familiar with Dennett's text than you  at the moment.  In your future edits please respond to the discussion at hand.--OMCV (talk) 04:44, 28 August 2009 (UTC)


 * You have read the Dennett essay more recently than the last time I reread it, I admit, but I have long-term familiarity with the ideas, and that makes it easier to paraphrase as opposed to copy. I also read other Dennett works (he has a short new book which is illuminating), and I basically have a little "Dennett module" that lets me know when I am faithful to Dennett and when I am doing OR. Since the ideas are new to you: let it sit in your mind for a few weeks and see if you still think it's OR.Likebox (talk) 19:54, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

CCC comment
Someone added this to CCC:


 *  Quantum decoherence does not apply to systems governed by a quantum control such as the Schrödinger's cat experiment, or as proponents of CCC postulate, the human brain.

That's completely not true, because it misunderstands decoherence. Decoherence applies to the cat, because there will be no interference effects between the live cat and the dead cat. Interference only happens when a quantum system evolves to the exact same state by two different paths. The probability amplitude that a dead cat will spontaneously evolve to the exact same state as an alive cat is for all intents and purposes equal to the probability amplitude that either of them turning into a frog. Since the two options never interfere, the relative phase of the wavefunction is not effectively measurable, so the two options are "decohered". Does that mean that they are "collapsed"? Absolutely not. It just means that they can be treated as if they are collapsed for all intents and purposes. But mysticism and philosophy are not about all intents and purposes, even the smallest chance of an alive and dead cat interfering needs to be taken into account.

The second misinterpretation in this sentence is that CCC has something to say about the operation of the brain. That is completely false. The consciousness is tied up with the brain in CCC in the same way as in classical mechanics. It's just that whenever the brain is in a superposition, consciousness does not superpose, but forces a choice between the options. This is pretty much the same idea as in many-worlds, except without the realism, so Wigner might be engaged in "rip off the academic corpse" here.Likebox (talk) 03:21, 28 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Sorry, but I think you're wrong. The classic demonstration of interference is the two-slit experiment.  Interference doesn't require that the two paths lead to the same quantum state, only to the same position.  In the two-slit experiment, the two paths lead to the same position, but different momentum, hence different quantum states.  In other words, interference applies to the measurement of a specified variable, not to the entire quantum state. Looie496 (talk) 17:21, 28 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Two states with the same position are the exact same state in qantum mechanics. Interference only happens when two paths lead to the same position for a particle (and also for all the other particles in the universe). This is a well known fact.Likebox (talk) 19:56, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Metaphysics and Science
Another new writer with suggested references, content to follow. Physicist Fred Alan Wolf was referenced but I suggest his book "The Spiritual Universe" (Moment Point Press: 1999); "Matrix Energetics" by Richard Bartlett, D.C., N.D.(Atria Books: 2007): "The Biology of Belief: Unleashing the Power of Consciousness, Matter, and Miracles" by Bruce Lipton, PhD. (cell biology) (Hay House: 2008). The latter two books are non-serious material appealing to the general public. The science vs. metaphysics conflict is that quantum mechanics describes mathematically what can't be visualized, or the implications of various interpretations appear implausible, so where do you go with the information represented by the math? You look at various models, any of which appear irrational but likely approach "truth" to some extent, the degree of which is unknown. I welcome the serious extemporization, and appreciate the difficulties involved. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Chempst (talk • contribs) 17:08, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Step Outside the Box
Grant a newbie a bit of leeway here for a moment...sometimes stepping out of the off-topic limitation might lighten the conflict... how I picked this site as my intro I don't know but I found you first. I'm a former chemist not as versed in QM or philosophy as others, but finding myself with numerous years of "mystical" explorations with holistic practitioners -- I'm a scientist-observer to experiential events beyond my comprehension but observed with a critical eye. I'm going to quote from Dr. William Tiller's foreword to Matrix Energetics by Richard Bartlett, D.C., N.D. and expect to be ignored or used as food for thought by those more QM math-inclined:
 * "[Dr. Bartlett] adopts the quantum mechanics metaphor that there is a virtual sea of possible solutions; there, you are free to use your imagination and pick one that you like. He recognizes that even when a metaphor is not factually correct as stated, the concept you visualize can have significant power to drive an action from an entirely different level of reality than you anticipate....The term "Matrix Energetics" comes from books on energy medicine by James Oschman, who in turn was inspired by the work of Alfred Pischinger, author of Matrix and Matrix Regulation: Basis for a Holistic Theory in Medicine. In both Pischinger and Oschman's work, the term deals only with our normal, electric atom/molecule level of physical reality. Dr. Bartlett, on the other hand, thinks that we are basically constructed from light and information and are thus malleable to focused intent. Under this rubric, Matrix Energetics is an archetype; practitioners maintain a state of awareness and enter into a kind of energetic rapport with clients... so that they can have the freedom to express a different outcome for their physical states....[There is] a second, unique level of physical reality that may or may not be strongly coupled with our normal particulate electric atom/molecule level of physical reality, that which we are all cognitively aware of at the conscious level. At present, only our unconscious is aware of this new magnetic information wave level of physical reality that functions at superluminal velocities in the physical vacuum-level space between the fundamental electric particles that comprise our atoms and molecules..."


 * I'm out of practice with editing equations so I will describe the sole equation Tiller uses here: a sum of the electric atom/molecule level contribution and the magnetic information wave level contribution with coupling coefficient, the coefficient disappearing when conventional Maxwellian equations apply. When the coupling is significant the electromagnetic gauge symmetry state of the space is raised, with higher thermodynamic free energy per unit volume state, enabling useful work to be done on a system of lower-EM gauge symmetry state. Tiller claims human intention can strongly influence the physics of this duplex space.

So perhaps thought experiments are metaphorical as well as undemonstrable, and metaphor is appropriate even in QM, and also there potentially are factors beyond physical reality impacting this discussion -- our understanding of QM is limited to our current understanding of it -- we have further to go to have the tools and language to describe what we don't yet know. So allow that possibility into your disagreement.Chempst (talk) 04:08, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Hubert/Yorick is NOT OR
It is in the Dennett article. Please stop saying that it is OR. I can see that you get the main points about the measurement problem. But if you leave out the question of copying consciousness, which is explicitly adressed by Dennett, also explicitly adressed by Everett, and less explicitly adressed by Wigner, then you leave out the way in which a good part of physicists reconcile themselves to the difference between the way the world is described and the way the world is experienced.Likebox (talk) 05:04, 29 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Hubbert/Yorick are not represented by the text you have provided. Dennett is not addressing classical or quantum mechanics he's addressing philosophical problems with an undisclosed physics model.  Three editors including myself have identified this as OR.--OMCV (talk) 15:10, 29 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I ask to get those mystry editors to identify themselves. Stop making things up. The text has changed to remove the "by duplicating the atoms positions and velocities", which was the only thing ONE person tentatively agreed with you was OR. Even then, that person is probably ignorant of the literature, because that opinion is dead wrong.Likebox (talk) 16:36, 29 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I realize that you have missed opinions before so here's &  for one editor and  for a second editor and I summed it all up here  a while ago .  I wish the other editors were stubborn enough to argue with you Likebox, but like you said sometimes brashness and needling does work.  As it stand sooner or latter another editor will join the conversation and either you or I will be taken to WP:RFC and this situation will be resolved.--OMCV (talk) 03:08, 31 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Or perhaps the reason that they aren't arguing is because they were satisfied with the minor cosmetic change, or perhaps they realized that they were wrong and changed their mind. How should I know? The stopped talking. That's why we have talk pages with long-ranging conversations, as opposed to one-time voting.Likebox (talk) 18:44, 31 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I think is bad form to assume your fellow editor wouldn't be a big enough person to admit when they are wrong. Their was never even a slight suggestion that they considered the Synth a cosmetic issue.  This is an exceedingly long conversation for such small bit of text.  But as you say the conversation goes on.--OMCV (talk) 12:16, 1 September 2009 (UTC)


 * That's normal--- you need this long conversation, because, in some sense, it's also part of the article. This type of thing allows readers to figure out exactly how reliable the information in the article is.Likebox (talk) 13:50, 1 September 2009 (UTC)
 * The statement "This type of thing allows readers to figure out exactly how reliable the information in the article is." is especially troubling.--OMCV (talk) 01:40, 9 September 2009 (UTC)


 * You have a too-limited view of Wikipedia! It is 'not'' a summary of sources. It is written by people with strong POVs and special knowledge, battling it out with some political rules. The rule is that anyone is allowed to say "oh yeah? Prove it!" for any statement. Then the sources have to come out, and the information checked for accuracy. The sources + the debate + common sense lets people see what the neutral version should be.


 * These rules are not how content is originally written. Not a single decent article on Wikipedia (with the exception of first-edition Brittanica copying) was written by taking a source and summarizing the information. It was written after a long political debate, by big POV pushers, until consensus on a neutral version


 * The nature and quality of the debate, along with the cited sources, allows readers to appreciate exactly how accurate the information is. This is especially true of science articles. I was involved in a year long debate with another user on radiation hormesis regarding undue-weight issues. The debate clarified the literature, and allowed an informative balanced article to get written.Likebox (talk) 18:33, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

...but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms...
Why not? Are we talking about the entire system comprising of the two brains here? Count Iblis (talk) 13:33, 29 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Its questionable what Likebox is talking about here. The biggest problem is that it appears to be OR.  Your opinion would be most welcome.  I think the best way to get caught up with the debate is to look over Talk:Quantum mysticism.  Regardless I'm willing to start the debate from your fresh perspective.--OMCV (talk) 15:06, 29 August 2009 (UTC)


 * If it's confusing, I can explain, but please understand it before accusing OR. I assume you already know that Yorick is Dennett's brain-in-a-vat, while Hubert is a computer simulating the brain. Either one can control the body. There is a switch that says which is controlling the body. This is all classical physics (despite what OMCV says).


 * If you are Yorick/Hubert, before the divergence, and somebody asks you "which one are you, Hubert or Yorick" that's a bit of information. It will be revealed to you after the divergence, but you can't know it in advance. There is nothing in the position of any of the atoms of Hubert or Yorick that will help to answer that question for you.Likebox (talk) 16:40, 29 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I see. But then that's also true if you had only one brain, because the information about how that would evolve will then also depend on the information present in the outside world. Replacing your sentence: "nothing in the position of any of the atoms of Hubert or Yorick" by "nothing in the position of any of the atoms in the universe" would make sense to me. Because if I'm Yorick or Hubert, whatever I'm aware of is encoded by the velocities and the relative positions of the atoms w.r.t. each other in my brain. If I had access to the data about all the atoms in the universe, I could still not decide which of the two copies I am. Count Iblis (talk) 18:00, 29 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Right, that's what I meant. Some people would interpret that bit of information as "mystical" knowledge associated with the observer's experience, not with the atoms from which the observer is built. The point is that this idea, which only shows up in really contrived circumstances (Hubert/Yorick) in classical systems, is very natural in quantum mechanics.Likebox (talk) 03:42, 30 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Is this a problem of a classical system or a problem of Dennett's contrived system that not related to classical or quantum mechanics in any clear way. Furthermore Dennett never explains why the divergence occurs in his hurried conclusion to his story.  The switch represents a bit of information but nothing that indicates the switch is the cause of the divergence.--OMCV (talk) 11:36, 30 August 2009 (UTC)


 * It has nothing to do with "classical" or "quantum" mechanics per se, this is just a philosophical issue with consciousness that people in philosophy brought up (after people in QM brought it up) and people should know about so that they understand what Everett is talking about. Dennett's story is classical by default, it just doesn't deal with quantum mechanics. It talks about computers and brains without dealing with quantum superpositions of computers and brains. That makes it a good warm-up for the analogous issues in quantum mechanics, so that people understand what kind of strangeness you can have with conscious experience before they deal with quantum strangeness.


 * It doesn't matter why the divergence occurs, and of course it's not the switch. Why would you say that?


 * Within many-worlds, Dennett's divergence is why observers see a probablistic world, when the wavefunction evolves linearly and deterministically. The idea is that wavefunctions with weight on different histories are splitting observers. This idea can be done forward in time, in which case the consciousness splits, or it can be done backwards in time, in which case an observer has a "consistent history" which is reconstructed from future observations. Modulo philosophy, these are the same. If you pick one particular observer, then the collapse occurs relative to their "consciousness basis", so that consciousness causes collapse, a-la Wigner. If you don't, then it's standard many worlds (also known as many-minds, where the emphasis is on what Everett brought up: the minds keep splitting into seperate futures).Likebox (talk) 15:31, 30 August 2009 (UTC)


 * What do you mean by one bit? Dennett's story never discusses one bit, I guess you're insisting its that mystical something, but I just can't believe that you would be so blatant about pushing OR.  In the above comment I reverted to the assumption that the bit must be discussed in Dennett's text and the only thing in Dennett's text that represents a single bit is the switch.  Dennett's story is not classical by default, its a philosophical independent of a distinct physical model.  To quote WP:Synth "that precise analysis must have been published by a reliable source in relation to the topic before it can be published in Wikipedia by a contributor."--OMCV (talk) 02:30, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

(to count Iblis) I wasn't sure what you are talking about when you said something like "That would be true if there was only one brain". The whole point is that when there is a duplication of a mind, and if you are this mind, then you don't know which duplicate you "are" really. This information is not available to either Hubert or Yorick.

This type of information is exactly analogous to the random results of observations in some interpretations of quantum mechanics, and in all interpretions, the information about observations is what is considered "mystical".Likebox (talk) 19:26, 30 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I agree, but I think one has to consider also the information outside of the brains and then argue that even that is not enough for either brain to make a prediction of its future. Otherwise there is no difference with the more trivial case of a single brain. Because a single brain interacting with the environment will have different possible futures depending on the information that resides outside the brain that has yet to influence the brain.


 * You could also say that whatever information is stored in the brain is present in the velocities and relative positions of the atoms. If you are inside a closed spaceship in deep space, you cannot experience your absolute position. You can then identify the center of mass position with the extra bit you wrote about. Suppose that there is only one brain and the future of that brain depends on the value of that bit, revealing that bit would allow it to know its future.


 * If we have two identical brains in two closed spaceships, you could make available to both brains all the information present in the universe, and they still won't be able to tell in which spaceship they are located. Both the brains would know that one brain will evolve one way and another will evolve another way, but they don't know which one they are, because they can't know their absolute position.


 * So, I think this missing bit is connected to translational invariance, or more generally, a symmetry which you can exploit to create two identical brains which are in different physical states (e.g. one is obtained from the other by applying a symmetry operation like translating the whole brain which doesn't affect the internal state). Count Iblis (talk) 20:50, 30 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Wouldn't a center of mass be at least 3 bits of information in three dimensional space? I think you are demonstrating a very good point this thought experiments can be interpreted many different ways.  The text contains two possibilities, I've presented a third in my original edit of the section, and here Count Iblis is presenting yet another (unless Iblis is shoe-horning theirs into one of Likebox's two possibilities).  Lastly Count Iblis, I was also wondering if you had a chance to read Where was I? where am i putting aside all musings the contended text is OR, at least from my superposition.--OMCV (talk) 02:46, 31 August 2009 (UTC)


 * What Count Iblis is doing, OMCV, is trying to understand all the issues first, with honest conversation about different situations, before taking a firm stand on the nature of material. Sources don't discuss all hypotheticals, and sometimes, when you go far enough away from the ideas, it does become OR. But you need to explore the territory first before making that decision.


 * That's a point I didn't think about. If you have unknown information of another sort, like where you are in a translationally invariant system, and then you "find out", you have reduced your unknown bits. This is though obviously not mystical information, because you are learning something about data that was "already there". The thing that made copying different, as I saw it, is that you can create new data for the observer which was not already there. Before copying, you can have full information, know everything. The copying machine could be fully determinstic, so you would think you would have full information at all times. But then, once the copy is made, you have one new uncertain bit, which popped out of nowhere.


 * This new uncertain bit is only present after the split. You could have full information about everything before the split. So the new bit can be generated within experience without any uncertainty generated in the physical world.


 * I suppose you could say that's analogous to putting me in a spaceship and let random effects make the spaceship have a random center of mass. That's true, but then you could attribute the randoness to external variables. With the duplicating brain, all the atoms are deterministic, and the probability comes "out of nowhere", in a sort of mystical way.Likebox (talk) 18:54, 31 August 2009 (UTC)


 * After thinking a bit, I remembered why this is different. The information about where I am in the translationally invariant case most certainly is in the position and velocities of the atoms--- it's in the position information of my atoms. But the information about where I "go" when I get duplicated is not in the position and velocities of the atoms before, during, or after the duplication. It just "emerges" out of nowhere.Likebox (talk) 19:20, 31 August 2009 (UTC)
 * You have supposed that the the copying was flawless while I would contend that the story was presented in just such a way to encourage the reader to doubt the expectations of the "scientists". For example the contrived radiation wasn't supposed to damage the first body but none the less it did.  The scientists are very self congratulatory and secretive.  If they got the radiation wrong and display other personality flaws why are we to suppose Hubert/Yorick are a perfect pair that ultimately deviated.  In addition they deviated with only a three paragraphs of first person account before the story closes that amounts to " Oh my, something went wrong".  We as readers don't know why Hubert/Yorick deviated, it could be a quantum difference(s) between the copies, an aspect of their physical minds position in reality that was super-sensory, or the possibility that the copy process wasn't perfect, or perhaps the computer couldn't perfectly model a brain indefinitely.  These all staying within the bounds of the text that doesn't limit itself to a specific "hypothetical" physics system.  Impressing limits on the story is invention that is usually called Synth on Wikipedia.--OMCV (talk) 12:11, 1 September 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree that it depends on what Dennett meant exactly. The essential point is that there is a period of identity after the copying, and then a divergence during which neither copy knows which way it will go. This introduces exactly one "mystical bit" for either copy, while Quantum mechanics introduces lots and lots of mystical bits for any one observer.Likebox (talk) 13:48, 1 September 2009 (UTC)