Talk:RTI International/RFC

(a) More critical
RTI has worked with the US Agency for International Development since 1983. In 2003, RTI was the sole bidder on a $168 million contract with USAID to "create and train local governing councils across post-Saddam Iraq", the organization's biggest contract to date. Both RTI and USAID have drawn criticism over the nature and execution of the contract from critics of the Iraq Reconstruction project such as Naomi Klein, and corporate watchdog groups. RTI lacked any previous experience in Iraq, and the project was criticized by RTI employees and observers as unrealistic and undemocratic in nature , ,. In 2004 RTI employees "physically lost" $185,481 and then billed USAID to replace the lost cash. Between 2003 and 2012, USAID awarded RTI over $1.8 billion in development contracts, which contracts accounted for over 75% of the organization's revenue from 2009-2012. Since 2003 RTI has hired at least five former USAID employees to executive positions. In December of 2014 RTI announced that it had been awarded a 5-year USAID contract worth up to $650 million to "improve urban and local governance in 112 countries in key functional areas including public service delivery, accountability, climate change management, and urban finance." "

(b) Long
In April 2003 USAID contracted with RTI to support the Local Governance Program in Iraq, which attempted to develop local governance and administration. RTI's efforts led to the Purple Revolution in 2005 that developed a national assembly, eighteen provinces and the Kurdistan regional assembly. After the assemblies were established, RTI held workshops and trainings to teach newly elected Iraqis budgeting and administrative skills.

A security contractor with Unity Resources Group, which was hired to protect RTI staff, shot and killed two Iraqi women in 2007. A 2008 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted the government paid $185,481 for physical cash abandoned in office safes as RTI staff evacuated areas where fighting had broken out. It also said it was unclear whether the program was a success or not, because it had no process for evaluating results. The following year it conducted an audit and found that RTI's local governance and administration training was benefiting the development of local Iraqi governments. Work in Iraq became 35 percent of RTI's revenue by 2010. According to academic James D. Savage, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) struggled with meeting with Iraqis under civilian security standards for a war zone, which were lifted in 2007 and most staff did not know arabic or have an expertise in Iraqi culture.

(c) Short
In April 2003 USAID contracted with RTI to support the Local Governance Program in Iraq, which led to the Purple Revolution in 2005, as well as the development of a national assembly, eighteen provinces and the Kurdistan regional assembly. After local governments were established, RTI held workshops and trainings for newly elected Iraqis to develop budgeting and administrative skills through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). According to academic James D. Savage, RTI struggled to meet with Iraqi political leaders while complying with civilian security requirements, had little training in Iraqi culture and had to work with a severely under-developed political and financial system. Work in Iraq became 35 percent of RTI's revenue by 2010. Or (c2) for even shorter