Talk:Responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War

the beginning of the article is very far from NPOV
So, after a 1-sentence introduction saying that both sides blamed each other, there is an essay-style paragraph, without any references, which (a) is extremely biased and (b) contains information which is only semi-relevant and shouldn't belong to the first paragraph of this article:

"A number of reports and researchers (among them independent Russian experts) concluded that the conflict started much earlier than the Georgian military operation began on 7 August at 23:35 and Russia was responsible for the war. Some have argued that shelling carried out by South Ossetian separatists in early August was done so to trigger a Georgian military response and therefore Russian military intervention. Some researchers paid attention to the military exercise "Kavkaz 2008", which concluded in early August. During this exercise a written notice entitled "Soldier, know your probable enemy" (the enemy was clarified as Georgia) was circulated among the Russian participants."

Only then it proceeds to mention the results of the European investigations, conveniently putting it in the "while" clause: "While an independent report commissioned by the European Union blamed Georgia for starting the war, concluding that "open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military operation against Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas" on 7 August, ..."

This should be edited. This is so ridiculously blatant. --2601:644:500:B620:291F:4128:5241:B632 (talk) 20:36, 17 December 2019 (UTC)


 * More than half a year later, the problem still exists. I would add the tags according to WP:AWW to the sections marked in bold, however, since the article is protected, someone else has to do that.

'A number of reports and researchers (among them independent Russian experts) concluded that the conflict started much earlier than the Georgian military operation began on 7 August at 23:35 and Russia was responsible for the war. Some have argued that shelling carried out by South Ossetian separatists in early August was done so to trigger a Georgian military response and therefore Russian military intervention. Some researchers paid attention to the military exercise "Kavkaz 2008", which concluded in early August. During this exercise a written notice entitled "Soldier, know your probable enemy" (the enemy was clarified as Georgia) was circulated among the Russian participants.'
 * Not a single citation is given for this paragraph. --2003:F6:273A:9700:C851:4EC0:22A3:710F (talk) 15:41, 1 August 2020 (UTC)
 * This has still not been corrected properly. The first sentence in bold mentioned in previous post does not have the requested “who” note.
 * this is the kind of paragraph that gives Wikipedia a bad name. Zero sourcing for the only section/paragraph many people, if not most, will read. This article is already heavily biased beyond wiki standards by leaning heavily on unconfirmed/anonymous sources. The first section is blatantly biased and It needs sourced or corrected. Tucke012 (talk) 15:50, 9 March 2023 (UTC)

Orphaned references in Responsibility for the 2008 South Ossetia war
I check pages listed in Category:Pages with incorrect ref formatting to try to fix reference errors. One of the things I do is look for content for orphaned references in wikilinked articles. I have found content for some of Responsibility for the 2008 South Ossetia war's orphans, the problem is that I found more than one version. I can't determine which (if any) is correct for this article, so I am asking for a sentient editor to look it over and copy the correct ref content into this article.

Reference named "nytimes.com": From CNN:  From 2008 South Ossetia war: Georgia Offers Fresh Evidence on War’s Start 

I apologize if any of the above are effectively identical; I am just a simple computer program, so I can't determine whether minor differences are significant or not. AnomieBOT ⚡ 05:30, 7 April 2009 (UTC)

Not NPOV
This article clearly pushes Russian POV on the conflict, cherry picking what to cite and what not from Tagliavini's report, siting "infamous" Uwe Klussman with his "unnamed sources" as facts.

The very name of the article tries to hide facts, that this war was fought on two fronts, between Georgia and Russia, and that Tagliavini's commission found no justification for russo-"abkhazian" actions on the western front. Which led to yet another case of ethnic cleansing of Georgians by Russia + separatists. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 136.2.1.101 (talk) 10:35, 3 December 2010 (UTC)

Readability
The article is not readable.

Plus, every section of the initial version starts with pro-georgian claims. It obviously leads to certain pro-georgian POV, especially when considering low readability.

To solve this problem I split the periods of text into two parts: pro-georgian and pro-russian. The criteria to split different statements are author's answer to the main question: "Who started the war"? That corresponds to the name of the article.

As an example of such an approach you can see International recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or International recognition of Kosovo. FeelSunny (talk) 08:37, 10 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I don't think the classification of the statements to "Pro-Russia" and "Pro-Georgia" ones it's a good idea. It's too simplifying, and it polarizes the issue. I think it does improve the readability somewhat, but I don't think the previous version was that unreadable that we'd have to take this measure. I know that "which side comes first" in text is a problem, but there doesn't seem to be a good solution for this. Maybe we should try to integrate the two types of comments in prose somehow? Offliner (talk) 08:45, 10 April 2009 (UTC)

Offliner, what we had initially was just 200 lines of text, poorly split into some very vague parts. Plus, pro-Georgia quotes were first in most of the parts. The reason why I inserted tags was the user now can at a glance find quotes that support any of the sides, and estimate without reading each quote who tells each side is guilty. This definitely makes the text more readable. If we need another solution, we may probably try to split the text into two columns.

What we have right now is much easier for perception than before. Readability of this article is what really disturbs me. Another possible solution is to make two different parts: one for quotes with discussion on nature of events, and another with clear statements of who prepared and started the war. That would also be a readable text.

PS. Though I agree that it may polarize the opinions, the matter of the article implies polarisation. It's about who is responsible, and for most sources there are only two possible answers. Russia or Georgia. FeelSunny (talk) 12:48, 10 April 2009 (UTC)


 * When the version was still in the main article it was ordered by a completely unbiased criterion: The date of the comments. Putting arbitrary headlines in is a very bad idea because the issue is not black and white and not all comments can be clearly classified as pro-russian or pro-georgian. Many are middle of the road (like Wikipedia articles should be!). All your headlines will do is start a "lets make the pro-X side stronger by including more comments there" race that will lead to a horrible article. --Xeeron (talk) 15:33, 10 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Dear Xeeron, I inserted two examples of exactly the same approach. The approach itself does not make any of them horrible. Rather better readable, I'd say. Th criteria of time means nothing - the quotes are still very voluntarili selected, and they reflect only the editors opinion. But now the reader also can understand what anyone says at a glance. Just like in International recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or International recognition of Kosovo. FeelSunny (talk) 13:28, 11 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Those are different articles and imho quite bad ones. They are mere lists. Your ordering does not help the article, since the comments can not all be classified (as I pointed out above). E.g., what made you put this part
 * On November 17, Moscow Times reported that on August 7, state-owned Russia television showed Sergei Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, speaking at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council. He is reported to have said: "I have spoken to the president of South Ossetia. It has more or less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus District has entered the area." The newspaper does not specify if Bagapsh was talking of a paramilitary battalion or a unit of the Russian army.
 * under pro-russian? My suspicion is that your main reason for reordering is to "show" that the russian point is "stronger" by amassing more comments under that heading. --Xeeron (talk) 18:03, 11 April 2009 (UTC)

No, the example you provided is completely wrong. The statement itself (if it's that short as you cite it) was definitely inserted into the article by mistake - it has nothing to do with the topic of the article. Please give another example, and then we can definitely work out a better way to systemize the article. Until then, please, do not revert anymore. FeelSunny (talk) 23:36, 11 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I guess I'll have to agree with Xeeron about the classification of statements. We should probably use chronological order in the last section, and remove the inserted subheadings from others. If we have to use the classification system, then it should be "Statements supporting Russian point of view" and "Statements supporting Georgian point of view" instead of "Pro-Russian" and "Pro-Georgian." But probably the best solution would to find some other way of improving readability. Offliner (talk) 06:01, 12 April 2009 (UTC)


 * About the example (that you now deleted): Depending on how you read it, I'd say it is pro-Georgian, since it talks about a battalion entering on August 7 (like the Georgians claimed). You classified it first as pro-Russian, now as irrelevant. That shows how inappropriate the classification really is.
 * About reverting: The onus to defend the edits is always on the person who inserts new material, in this case you. So "please do not revert until the issue is resolved" applies more to you than to me. --Xeeron (talk) 08:49, 12 April 2009 (UTC)


 * So what alternatives do we have considering the readability? Again, 200 lines of plain text, quotes etc are hardly readable. Making this article un-readable is also a POV, as (I think all would agree) majority of the sources claim the Georgian side should have more responsibility for the 2008 SO war. FeelSunny (talk) 12:10, 12 April 2009 (UTC)


 * My solution is to competely rewrite the part, shorten it by about 70% and place it where it belong: In the 2008 South Ossetia war article. If there is a chronological list of quotes for people with further interest here, that is fine for me, but that is about it. All this page ever will be is a like a prolonged endnote to the main article. --Xeeron (talk) 21:18, 12 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Let's wait for Offliner's opinion.FeelSunny (talk) 17:42, 13 April 2009 (UTC)


 * The whole "responsibility" material should be rewritten to nice, summary-style prose. But this should be done in the main article, not here. The reason for this is that the rewrite will probably end up removing material, and we should try to avoid removing too much well-sourced content from Wikipedia. I have modified the classification system in this article to something that is acceptable to me for now. The next step would be to start the rewrite. If Xeeron does this and it works out well, he will get a barnstar from me for his many constructive edits during a long period of time. Offliner (talk) 17:57, 13 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I have been trying to do that for several days now, but I always get diverted by other matters on my watchlist (e.g. this article). --Xeeron (talk) 21:38, 13 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I may start this work on this Friday's evening. Hope it will be done by Monday, then. FeelSunny (talk) 05:13, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

The combatants' positions
Georgia first claimed that its attack was a response to Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages, and that the aim of the attack was to "restore constitutional order" in South Ossetia. Later, Saakashvili said the aim of the Georgian attack was to counter a Russian invasion. During a United Nations Security Council meeting on 8 August Georgia said that the first Russian troops entered South Ossetia at 05:30 am on 8 August. In a decree ordering the general mobilisation, which was published on 9 August, Saakashvili noted that the Russian troops had advanced through the Roki tunnel on 8 August, which was after the Georgian attack. The Georgian government later changed its position, saying that around 11:30 p.m. on 7 August intelligence information was received that 150 Russian army vehicles had entered Georgian territory through the Roki Tunnel. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Mikheil Saakashvili said "we wanted to stop the Russian troops before they could reach Georgian villages. When our tanks moved toward Tskhinvali, the Russians bombed the city. They were the ones -- not us -- who reduced Tskhinvali to rubble."

Russia says it acted to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia, and its own peacekeepers stationed there. The Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia suffered casualties during the initial Georgian artillery barrage on Tskhinvali and were besieged by Georgian troops for two days until a Russian unit broke through to their camp and started evacuating the wounded at 5 a.m. on 9 August. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit was ordered to move through the Roki Tunnel at around dawn of 8 August well after the Georgian attack had begun. Defending Russia's decision to launch attacks on uncontested Georgia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said that Russia had no choice but to target the military infrastructure being used to sustain the Georgian offensive. Initially, Russia went as far as accusing Georgia of committing genocide against Ossetians, noting that Georgia codenamed their attack "Operation Clear Field" Russia codenamed their operation as "Operation Forcing Georgia to peace".

South Ossetia said that it called for Russian help once the Georgian bombardment of their capital city, Tskhinvali, started, in order to prevent genocide and was relieved when the 58th Army intervened to assist against, what Ossetians called "the most frightful fire". South Ossetia further called into question Georgia's assertion that Russian Forces were bombing Tskhinvali, because the South Ossetian Minister of Defence, Vasiliy Lunev, was also in command of the Russian Army after the wounding of Russian General Anatoliy Khrulyov. South Ossetia stated that Saakashvili's brutal attack on their country is simply a continuation of Georgia's aggressive behavior, demonstrated in the 1920s, the early 1990s and Saakashvili's feeble attempt in 2004.

Georgian intelligence and journalistic evaluation
Georgia has released intercepted telephone calls purporting to show that part of a Russian armoured regiment crossed into the separatist enclave of South Ossetia nearly a full day before Georgia’s attack on the capital, Tskhinvali, late on Aug. 7; Russian military played down the significance of the intercepted conversations, saying the troop movements to the enclave before the war erupted were part of the normal rotation and replenishment of longstanding peacekeeping forces there. In a 16 September article, The New York Times described the intercepted calls as "credible if not conclusive."

In a later article published on 6 November The New York Times said that "neither Georgia nor its Western allies have as yet provided conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary" and that the phone intercepts published by Georgia did not show the Russian column’s size, composition or mission, and that "there has not been evidence that it was engaged with Georgian forces until many hours after the Georgian bombardment."

OSCE monitors
A former senior OSCE official, Ryan Grist, who was in charge of unarmed monitors in South Ossetia at war's start and in mid of August 2008 forced to resign by OSCE, told the BBC in November 2008 that he had been warning of Georgia's military activity before its move into the South Ossetia region, saying there was a "severe escalation" and that this "would give the Russian Federation any excuse it needed in terms of trying to support its own troops."

According to Grist, it was Georgia that launched the first military strikes against Tskhinvali. "It was clear to me that the [Georgian] attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” he said. “The attack was clearly, in my mind, an indiscriminate attack on the town, as a town.” Grist's views were echoed and confirmed by Stephen Young, who was another senior OSCE official in Georgia at the time. According to him, there had been little or no shelling of Georgian villages on the night Saakashvili’s troops began their onslaught on Tskhinvali. Young added, that if there had been shelling of Georgian villages that evening as Georgia has claimed, the OSCE monitors at the scene would have heard it. According to him, the monitors only heard occasional small arms fire.

NATO states military experts
NATO officials interviewed by Der Spiegel believed that the Georgians had started the conflict. The officials treated the exchanges of fire in the preceding days as minor events and did not see them as a justification for Georgian war preparations. The NATO experts however did not question the Georgian claim that the Russians had provoked them by sending their troops through the Roki Tunnel. But their evaluation of the facts was dominated by skepticism that these were the true reasons for Saakashvili's actions.

Western intelligence agencies, quoted by Der Spiegel, believed that Russian troops from North Ossetia did not begin marching through the Roki Tunnel until roughly 11 am on 8 August. The Russian army also did not begin firing until 7:30 am on 8 August. Wolfgang Richer, a military expert to the German OSCE mission, said that he could find no evidence to support Saakashvili's claim that the Russians had sent troops through the Roki Tunnel before the Georgian attack, but he could not rule it out either.

Politicians
🇺🇸 On 8 September Dana Rohrabacher (a senior Republican member of the United States House of Representatives) Foreign Affairs Committee, argued at a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, according to The Daily Telegraph, that "the Georgians had initiated the recent military confrontation in the on-going Russian-South Ossetian conflict", citing unidentified U.S. intelligence sources. Further, Telegraph reported that "Mr. Rohrabacher insisted that Georgia was to blame", citing him: "The Georgians broke the truce, not the Russians, and no amount of talk of provocation and all this other stuff can alter that fact." Telegraph stated: ""His comments got little attention in the United States but have been played prominently on state-run Russian television bulletins and other media."

On 25 November Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Georgia's former ambassador to Russia, has given a testimony to a parliamentary commission in which he said that Georgian authorities were responsible for starting the conflict. According to Kitsmarishvili, Georgian officials told him in April 2008 that they planned to start a war in Abkhazia and that they had received a green light from the United States government to do so. He said that the Georgian government later decided to start the war in South Ossetia and continue into Abkhazia. According to him, "Russia was ready for the war, but the Georgian leadership started the military action first."

🇬🇧 A report prepared for the British House of Lords comes to the conclusion that "The precise circumstances surrounding the August 2008 outbreak of the conflict are not yet clear but responsibility for the conflict was shared, in differing measures, by all the parties. There is evidence of a Russian military build-up prior to the August war. In addition, Russia’s use of force was disproportionate in response to provocative statements and military action by President Saakashvili. President Saakashvili seems to have drawn unfounded confidence in confronting Russia as a result of mixed signals from the US Administration. The origins of the conflict lie in both distant and more recent history in the region, involving population transfers, national grievances, commercial, political and military interests."

Independent fact-finding mission sponsored by the EU
🇪🇺An independent international fact-finding mission headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini was established by the EU to determine the causes of the war. The commission was given a budget of €1.6 million. Its final report was supposed to be released on 31 July, 2009, but this was pushed back to 30 September.

The final report, published on 30 September 2009, concluded that Georgia started the war, but both sides bore responsibility for escalating the conflict. The commission could find no evidence to support the Georgian claim of a prior Russian invasion. In addition, there was conclusive evidence that the Georgian offensive was not meant only as a defensive action. According to the commission's legal experts, the Georgian attack was in violation of international law. The initial Russian response was justified, but its later stage was disproportionate and in violation of international law. According to the report, "several elements suggest the conclusion that ethnic cleansing was carried out against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia both during and after the August 2008 conflict". The Report further points out that these attacks were committed by unorganised bands, not by Russian forces, and it is unclear if Russia should be held responsible for the actions of the various militia units.

Statements by analysts
🇸🇪 In August 2008, Svante Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski and Niklas Nilsson from the Institute for Security and Development Policy, primarily sponsored by the Government of Sweden, commented that preceding the war, "Moscow’s increasingly blatant provocations against Georgia led to a growing fear in the analytic community that it was seeking a military confrontation," adding "Russia had been meticulously preparing an invasion of Georgia through the substantial massing and preparation of forces in the country’s immediate vicinity." The paper pointed out that its assertions were "initial conclusions," and because of the recent nature of the event, the information might possibly need correction as more solid evidence arrives.

🇬🇧 On 5 October, 2008, Senior Fellow of the British International Institute for Strategic Studies Oksana Antonenko wrote, that regardless of Russia's prior military buildup or the low-level clashes between South Ossetian militia and Georgian forces, it was Georgia's decision to deploy its military to take control of South Ossetia that started the war. She noted that in July, 2008, expectations of an imminent war were already widespread among Georgians and international observers. Georgian forces had been preparing for a war 4 weeks before the fighting started on 7 August, by taking control of strategic positions around Tskhinvali, relocating peacekeeping units operating within the conflict zone and bringing troops and weaponry into the region. She added that it is difficult to understand what prompted Georgian president Saakashvili to launch the attack, but suggested that Saakashvili's decision may have been a calculated gamble; because of growing scepticism in the West towards his rule, Saakashvili wanted to "position Georgia in the international spotlight as the key test of whether the West would acquiesce to Russian hegemony in its near abroad. For months, Saakashvili's government sought to discredit Russia as a mediator and a peacekeeper in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to internationalise negotiating formats, replace Russians with Western peacekeepers and weaken Russia's control over the separatist regions. Dragging Russia into a war would have done just that, particularly if Tbilisi expected any response from Moscow to remain limited to South Ossetia."

🇬🇧 In 2008, Roy Allison, of the UK-based Chatham House, co wrote in International Affairs that there is strong evidence that the Russian invasion of South Ossetia and then deeper into Georgia was indeed planned and even expected rather than spontaneous and improvised. However, the exact timing of the intervention during August–September may not have been of Moscow’s choosing, if for example South Ossetian forces were impatient to instigate a conflict in July–August to give Russia a pretext for intervention and could not be effectively controlled. Regarding the events of August 7/8, Allison states that "Moscow’s insistence that its forces did not cross the Georgian border until Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali were in severe jeopardy has gained quite wide acceptance internationally. The Georgian claim has, however, been strengthened by the release of telephone intercepts (lost for a month in the chaos of combat) indicating that at least part of a Russian armoured regiment had crossed into South Ossetia by late on 7 August." In the light of the Russian occupation of uncontested Georgian territory, its claim to realise the peacekeeping function assumed in the Sochi agreements is described as "increasingly surreal". Russia's goals in the war are described as manyfold: Restoring the security of its peacekeepers and 'citizens' in South Ossetia, the establishment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as military protectorates, a weakening of Georgia's strategic position (as a means to dissuade NATO from offering a MAP to Georgia and to diminish the attractiveness of the energy transit corridor from the Caspian) and bringing down the government of President Saakashvili.

🇲🇽 After visiting South Ossetia in September 2008, a Mexican TV Journalist, Raul Fajardo stated: "I am confident that if it had not been for Russia and the courage of the Ossetian soldiers who defended their homeland, mankind would have regretted today the genocide of the Ossetian people, the irretrievable loss of the people with a unique history, traditions and culture".

🇺🇸 On 11 November an editorial in the International Herald Tribune stated: "There is no reason to doubt the OSCE monitors. The inescapable conclusion is that Saakashvili started the war and lied about it.

🇷🇺 On 16 November, 2008, Ivan Kotlyarov, economist by training, wrote, that Saakashvili launched the war to bring South Ossetia back to Georgian control, but also to boost his falling popularity by creating a small war which he could win. However, Kotlyarov points out that a thorough analysis of the causes of the war "It is impossible at this point".

🇺🇸 In December 2008, Professor Charles King described the Georgian attack on South Ossetia as "an ill-planned reconquista" in his article published in the Foreign Affairs journal.

🇷🇺 In July 2009, the Moscow Defence Brief, a magazine published by CAST, an independent Russian think-tank, pointed out that: External observers frequently miss the point that Russia’s stake in the conflict over the unrecognised republics is much higher that that of Georgia’s entry into NATO or the destabilisation of energy transit routes that bypass Russia. Russia simply could not afford to lose: in view of the harsh nature of the conflict in Abkhazia and Georgia in the early 1990s, Georgia’s seizure of these territories would mean ethnic cleansing, and the flight to Russian territory of many tens of thousands of embittered and armed refugees. The loyalty of the North Caucasus republics of North Ossetia and Adygeya, tied by blood relation to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, would be undermined. North Ossetia, moreover, is the largest and most loyal autonomous republic in the region. Russia would have been shown to be weak before the entire North Caucasus, and this would have marked a return to the situation of the 1990s. The reaction of the international community to Russia’s war with Georgia, no matter how harsh, could not compare in significance to the implications of a new war in the North Caucasus. Georgia’s attempt to export the ethnic conflict that it created in the early 1990s to Russian territory had to be intercepted at any cost.

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Please make sure that all grammar is correct, I've already spotted one in the second paragraph, it should be "... its conclusions", not "it's". — Preceding unsigned comment added by Nonsenseop (talk • contribs) 22:25, 20 November 2016 (UTC)

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Undue weight
POV pushing in certain parts of the article, for example, having only analysts supporting a particular view even though there are a number of analysts with other views (even if there are fewer of them). As a result, I've tagged the article. This can be improved through, for example, including more analysts that aren't repeating the same views as all the existing others. Mellk (talk) 22:14, 8 May 2019 (UTC)
 * Then provide reliable sources and/or clear examples of “POV pushing”. This “request” is so incredibly vague that the tag isn’t technically tenable by our standards. Thus, I’ll be removing the tag until you do so. As far as I can tell, the information presented represents mainstream analysis and scholarship. Not every view needs to be represented, per WP:FALSEBALANCE and WP:FRINGE. Fringe views, and ideas not generally accepted in a preponderance of reliable sources, are generally undue, with certain exceptions. Symmachus Auxiliarus (talk) 18:52, 17 December 2019 (UTC)

EU report
, how does the Telegraph article support the changes you have made? This is what is written in the article

Open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military operation against the town of Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas, launched in the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, the report concluded.

There is the question of whether the use of force by Georgia in South Ossetia was justifiable under international law. It was not.

Alaexis¿question? 17:32, 11 May 2021 (UTC)


 * The IIFFM Volume II unequivocally states that Georgia's on-the-spot response to ongoing separatist attacks that lasted until August 7 was justifiable and in accordance to international law. It only conlcludes that the consequent military offensive launched by Georgia on 8 August was not justifiable anymore as an act of self-defence. The events all took place within the conflict region. The way Telegraph article puts it, leaves the impression that none of the Georgian actions were justifiable, when that is not at all what the report concluded. TheMightyGeneral (talk) 11:02, 12 May 2021 (UTC)


 * On what page do they say so? Alaexis¿question? 11:32, 12 May 2021 (UTC)


 * Hey, didn't expect the quick response so sorry for editing away. I added the relevant pages of Volume II for the parties involved since it's very extensive and detailed. The report concludes for Georgia's on-the-spot reaction on pages 250-251 (Volume II pages) following:

"Therefore the alleged attacks on Georgian villages, peacekeepers and police in July/August 2008 could no longer be countered by the JPKF. Because the peacekeeping mechanism had broken down, reactivating the peacekeeping mechanism was not an alternative means of redress available for Georgia. So Georgian on-the-spot self-defence was necessary, even under a narrow conception of necessity, but this does not suffice to justify the Georgian reaction."

"The on-the-spot reaction must additionally have been proportionate. According to the findings of the Mission, the reactions were proportionate under both concepts of proportionality: scale and effects of force and counter-force were similar, and the Georgian on-the-spot reaction was reasonable in relation to the permissible object of the Georgian reaction, namely to halt the South Ossetian attack on the Georgian villages."

"To conclude, the condition of proportionality was met with regard to the on-the spot reaction of Georgia in the phase of hostilities before the full armed conflict began."

It further reads on page 251:

"Taking into account all these factors, it can be said that the air and ground offensive against Tskhinvali on the basis of the order given by President Saakashvili was not proportionate and therefore the use of force by Georgia could not be justified as self-defence."

"IV. Conclusions: no self-defence by Georgia beyond on-the-spot reactions"

"To the extent that the attacks on Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers were conducted by South Ossetian militia, self-defence in the form of on-the-spot reactions by Georgian troops was necessary and proportionate and thus justified under international law."

"On the other hand, the offensive that started on 7 August, even if it were deemed necessary, was not proportionate to the only permissible aim, the defence against the on-going attacks from South Ossetia." ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

In regards to legality of Russia's intervention in the conflict, it the states the following on pages 274-275:

"d) Conclusions: Lack of necessity and proportionality"

"As an act of self-defence against the attack on the Russian military bases, the only admissible objective of the Russian reaction was to eliminate the Georgian threat for its own peacekeepers. The expulsion of the Georgian forces from South Ossetia, and the defence of South Ossetia as a whole was not a legitimate objective for Russia, because Russia could not rely on collective self-defence in favour of South Ossetia, as will be shown below. The admissible Russian objective was therefore limited."

"The military reaction of Russia went beyond the repulsion of the Georgian armed attack on the Russian bases and was thus not necessary. Russia mainly targeted military objectives, and at least some of the targeted military objectives were related to the Georgian attack in South Ossetia. Nevertheless, Russian military support for the use of force by Abkhazia against Georgia cannot be justified in this context. The bombing of large parts of the upper Kodori Valley was in no relation to any potential threat for the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia (see below)."

"The same applies to the posting of the ships in the Black Sea. An impartial observer, putting himself in the place of Russia, would not have qualified the Russian reaction as reasonably related to the objective of halting the Georgian attack on the Russian peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia. The means employed by Russia were not in a reasonable relationship to the only permissible objective, which was to eliminate the threat for Russian peacekeepers. In any case, much of the destruction (see Chapter 5 “Military Events in 2008”) after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement is not justifiable by any means. According to international law, the Russian military action taken as a whole was therefore neither necessary nor proportionate to protect Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia."

Further conclusions on that topic:

On page 276 under '''IV. No justification of Russian use of force as fulfilment of the peacekeeping mission'''

"Conclusion: Russia could not justify its use of force as a mere reinforcement and fulfilment of its peacekeeping mission."

On page 283 under '''2. No collective self-defence through intervention of a third state'''

"4. Conclusions Russian military activities against the Georgian military forces were not justified as collective self-defence under international law."

On page 284 under '''VII. No justification of the use of force as “humanitarian intervention”'''

"To conclude, the Russian use of force cannot be justified as a humanitarian intervention"

On page 289 under '''4. Rescuing Russians as a case of self-defence?''' and 5. Application to this specific case

"In conclusion, the Russian intervention in Georgia cannot be justified as a rescue operation for Russian nationals in Georgia."

On page 294 under '''II. Legal qualification of the Abkhaz and Russian offensive: violation of the prohibition of the use of force and armed attack on Georgia'''

"4. Conclusion The use of force by Abkhazia was not justified under international law and was thus illegal. The same applies to the Russian support for Abkhaz use of force."

TheMightyGeneral (talk) 12:17, 12 May 2021 (UTC)
 * I've just added the characterisation of the Georgian response to Ossetian attacks before August 7 as necessary and proportionate to the article. Alaexis¿question? 08:00, 13 May 2021 (UTC)
 * Regarding the "while initially legal" words, I think it's a fair summary of what is written in the report (Volume I 2009, p. 23):

When considering the  legality  of  Russian  military  force  against  Georgia,  the    answer  needs  to  be  differentiated. The Russian  reaction  to  the  Georgian  attack  can  be    divided  into  two  phases:  first,  the  immediate  reaction  in  order  to  defend  Russian    peacekeepers,  and  second,  the  invasion  of  Georgia  by  Russian  armed  forces  reaching  far  beyond the administrative boundary of South Ossetia. In the first instance, there seems to be little  doubt  that  if  the  Russian  peacekeepers  were  attacked,  Russia  had  the  right  to    defend  them  using  military  means  proportionate  to  the  attack. Hence the  Russian  use  of  force  for  defensive  purposes  during  the  first  phase  of  the  conflict  would  be  legal.
 * Note that this is the interpretation of the Telegraph and not my own. Alaexis¿question? 08:06, 13 May 2021 (UTC)


 * Agreed. The defence of the peacekeepers taken as seperate phase, is treated similar to Georgia's response to separatist attacks prior to the escalation. I was more focused on the report's conclusion, that Russia's response as a whole was disproportionate and not justifiable besides that. You are absolutely right. I edited that part accordingly, adding the "while initially legal".

TheMightyGeneral (talk) 10:23, 13 May 2021 (UTC)

Golovanov's story
How is the story of Oleg Golovanov related to the responsibility for the war? Do we really need a long paragraph about him in the section on the Russian peacekeepers? Alaexis¿question? 18:49, 13 May 2021 (UTC)

Flags in the analysts section
I think they are completely unnecessary as analysts have no political affiliation. Alaexis¿question? 19:00, 13 May 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 28 September 2022
Grammar! Please remove extra words! "The report stated that stated that" 2601:19B:4500:5EA:85FC:593E:7E68:DD0A (talk) 23:09, 28 September 2022 (UTC)
 * ✅ ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 23:14, 28 September 2022 (UTC)

Merge with Russo-Georgian war?
This article should be either merged with en:Russo-Georgian war or the lead should include more information and sources about events between August the 1st and the 7th (artillery shelling, violation of ceasefire agreement, etc.). 185.115.5.28 (talk) 04:13, 13 March 2023 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 27 May 2024
returnd = returned 2603:8000:D300:3650:AD45:E6EE:7A8:8B7C (talk) 20:14, 27 May 2024 (UTC)
 * ✅ M.Bitton (talk) 23:57, 27 May 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 8 July 2024
confict =conflict 2603:8000:D300:3650:E1D2:5AC3:C25B:7842 (talk) 14:55, 8 July 2024 (UTC)
 * ✅ Ligaturama (talk) 15:05, 8 July 2024 (UTC)