Talk:Retirement of General Shinseki

Here's a snippet from Google:


 * Bush, Kerry asserted, "even fired the army chief of staff" because "he didn't like what he was hearing." General Eric Shinseki faced heavy criticism from within the administration after suggesting that an invasion force needed to be several hundred thousand strong to properly pacify Iraq. Shinseki in fact retired, though it is unclear whether he did so under pressure.

Is it generally the practice of Wikipedia to create separate articles for each individual point raised during a Presidential debate? I didn't even know it was the practice to create separate articles for each Presidential debate, let alone for each point raised during such debates. -- Antaeus Feldspar 19:03, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * LOL. This is the first time the United States has chosen to hold a presidential debate since Wikipedia came into existence. Remember, the World Wide Web is only 10 years old...


 * It is Wikipedian practice to create several short articles on a topic, when it's likely that there will be partisanship and bias amoung contributors. Evercat and I both know that I am a biased writer. But after the dust settles, the small articles can be consolidated into one main article.


 * If I tried to create an article on Candidates' positions on major issues in the 2004 US Presidential Election, the edit war would make Palestine look like a picnic. --Uncle Ed 19:21, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * If that's true, if this is the accepted Wikipedian practice, then it seems a good associated practice to follow might be to create a category for these short articles -- Category:Debate Points In The 2004 Presidential Campaign, or something of that nature? It would help make sure none of these smaller articles get left out when the time for consolidation arises.  -- Antaeus Feldspar 19:32, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Quick repair section
I deleted this sentence:


 * This had been reported by the New York Times and the Washington Post when it occurred.

The phrase this had been reported apparently refers to the FACT that Shinseki had been forced into retirement for making critical remarks. If that is what the sentence is intended to convey, then let's rephrase it like this:


 * The New York Times and the Washington Post both said that Bush's reason for retiring Shinseki was to shut him up.

But I think the sentence was really meant to convey the idea that the 2 papers ran article which were about the retirement.

What I'm getting at, is whether the papers are backing up the "forced retirement" claim, or not. --Uncle Ed 20:09, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * Well, if the NYT and the Washington Post did support the retired-to-silence-him thesis, then yes, it should go back in, although for clarity I'd favor a phrasing more like:


 * ... an interpretation that had also been taken by the New York Times and Washington Post when the retirement was announced.


 * The Rumsfeld thing might also need to go in; if it's unprecedented for a general's retirement to be announced so very far in advance of it actually happening, then it supports the perception that the retirement in fact happened under pressure. That perception is not proof, but it does mean that Kerry stating it as so was not entirely unreasonable.  -- Antaeus Feldspar 00:15, 2 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * You've given me food for thought: what if (1) Rummy announces the retirement, because he thinks Shinseki isn't a team player; and then (2) Shinseki starts making increasingly critical or "disloyal" statements in public? Rather than being "retired for mouthing off", wouldn't this mean "mouthing off in response to being retired"? --Uncle Ed 14:10, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * That is possible. You bring up a good point, one where I'm not aware of the factual basis:  I had assumed, that like most people in the private sector and most people in civilian civil service, the General chose his time of retirement, and interpreted Rumsfeld's announcement of it as merely a move to undermine his authority, turning him from "the guy in charge" into "the guy who's in charge temporarily but whose days are numbered."  But do Army generals in fact get their retirement dates chosen for them?  That's something I don't know, and it would very much need to go in if "announcing the retirement" really meant "making a unilateral decision on retirement, with the consent of consultation of the principal."


 * As for whether the General's views on Iraq changed because of Rumsfeld's move -- it's possible. What in fact I think is very likely is that the situation was "chicken and egg" to some extent -- he was critical of the White House's plan for the war; his criticism got him either early retirement or early announcement of retirement; that show of non-support prompted him or freed him to be even more critical, et cetera...  But unfortunately, it's all speculation on our parts.  Unless his recorded views on the war changed really markedly with his retirement/announcement-of-same, then all we really have to go on is "the Bush campaign said this", "the Kerry campaign said this", "General Shinseki said this."  -- Antaeus Feldspar 16:29, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * My understanding of military politics is that there's a time for debate, and then after the commander makes his decision you "close ranks": i.e., shut up, salute, and do your best to make the plan succeed. I recall Shineki as a Clinton-era holdover who never supported the Bush administration. IMHO Bush put up with it as long as he could, then eased him out.


 * As for what we should put in the article, I would say that my speculations and yours (while providing food for thought), probably ought not be in the article. Let's focus on public statements by Shinseki and Rumsfeld, et al. Or if some columnist or politician says it was a policy dispute, then quote that POV. I'll do a little googling... --Uncle Ed 16:46, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Washington Times quote
June 11, 2004:
 * "Gen. Shinseki ran afoul of Mr. Rumsfeld last year after he publicly opposed the secretary's decision to cancel the Army's $11 billion Crusader artillery program. The general also challenged civilian Pentagon officials on the issue of Iraq, saying in congressional testimony that the United States would need several hundred thousand troops to stabilize and occupy Iraq after a war."

Robert Novak column

 * Rumsfeld had defied precedent by announcing 14 months in advance Shinseki's retirement as chief of staff in June 2003, making him a lame duck.

Jed Babbin
Columnist Jed Babbin says Shinseki was "the protégé of Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye, and as political as his mentor" and should have been fired as soon as Rumsfeld took office. 


 * I'm sorry, but that's a really horrible quote to put in there. "Horrible" as in "it would make Wikipedia look bad to have that in there, making us look like we're just a forum on partisan gossip."  I'll take a look at that article to see if it contains anything more than his opinion and speculation on the subject, but as it is it's not more worthy to go in the article just because it's a columnist's POV assertions, rather than our own.  -- Antaeus Feldspar 17:19, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * If that's a cut, I won't revert it. "When in doubt, leave it out" is my motto. And here are some more comments. --Uncle Ed


 * Top army officers have also made little secret of their resentment of the way Rumsfeld and Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz -- who, like other top Pentagon civilians in the Bush administration, have never served in combat -- dismissed the former Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki. Shinseki presciently warned before the war that at least 200,000 troops would be needed to occupy Iraq after an invasion. Wolfowitz denounced that estimate as wildly off the mark, while, in a major break with tradition, neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz attended Shinseki's farewell ceremony where he cautioned against a 12-division strategy for a 10-division army.


 * Many officers still are rankled by the treatment of former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, who last spring was sharply criticized in public by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz for suggesting the occupation would require significantly more troops than the initial war. At Rumsfeld's direction, the number was whittled back, with Rumsfeld and other senior officials arguing that "shock and awe" would collapse any opposition and the Iraqi people, as Vice President Dick Cheney said in a March 16, 2003 interview on NBC's "Meet the Press," would greet U.S. troops "as liberators."

Lots of partisan politics being discussed here. A number of interesting questions are raised by the Shinseki retirement:


 * Was Wolfwitz right about shock and awe?
 * Yes: the war ended so fast that historians simply call it an "invasion".
 * No: the war's still going on: insurgency, rebellion, terrorism, etc.


 * Was Shinseki right about troop requirements for the occupation?
 * Yes: The occupation failed (or is failing), and Rumsfeld finally had to increase troop strength to the level Shinseki recommended
 * No: The occupation has not failed (or is not likely to fail), and Rumsfeld has NOT had to increase troop strength to the level Shinseki recommended --Uncle Ed 17:32, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * March 13, 2003: Breaking all precedent, Rumsfeld had announced 14 months in advance that Shinseki would be stepping down as chief of staff. Thus, the general was a longtime lame duck February 25 when Sen. Carl Levin, senior Democrat on Armed Services, asked him how many troops would be needed to occupy Iraq. His "several hundred thousand" answer was so far from the official line that it confirmed Rumsfeld's view of Clintonite generals out of control. While Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz declared Shinseki "wildly off the mark" and Rumsfeld also disagreed, the general stuck to his estimate. That left it to the secretary of the Army in testimony before Senate Armed Services last Thursday.

Check me on the timing, but the passage above suggests the following order of events:

1. Rumsfeld announces Shinseki's retirement.

2. Shinseki contradicts Wolfowitz & Rumsfeld on "occupation" troop strength.

Kerry camp says that 1 was a punishment for 2. Interesting, if Shinseki got slapped for doing something he hadn't even done yet! --Uncle Ed 18:29, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Kerry debate quote

 * The president ... went to Cincinnati, and he gave a speech in which he said, "We will plan carefully. We will proceed cautiously. We will not make war inevitable. We will go with our allies." He didn't do any of those things. They didn't do the planning. They left the planning of the State Department in the State Department desks. They avoided even the advice of their own general, General Shinseki. The Army chief of staff, said. "You're going to need several hundred thousand troops." Instead of listening to him, they retired him. (emphasis added for Wikipedia talk page)

Is this equivalent to saying Bush "retired him for saying we needed more troops"? I don't think so, not after studying this matter so intently. Okay, maybe he insinuated that idea...

But the context was a bit larger. Kerry was saying that Bush didn't listen to him (Kerry) or to Shinseki, and that Bush broke his promises:


 * to plan carefully
 * to proceed cautiously
 * not to make war inevitable
 * to go with our allies

I was in the army 5 years. From what I have been able to see of the war-planning process, it definitely was careful. They even brought MOPP gear -- masks and charcoal-laden suits to protect against chemical and biological weapons. (It turned out they didn't need them, but if (a) they hadn't brought them and (b) Saddam had used chem or bio, everyone including me would have said Bush didn't plan carefully.

The invasion plan was done so well that American and British casualties were very low. I'd call that proceeding cautiously. In fact, the shock and awe worked so well that (as Bush said later in the debate) they enemy just folded up and went home.

Bus did NOT make the war inevitable. Saddam could have avoided it, if he had simply begun cooperating with the arms inspectors. Ironically, if the Democrats are right about Saddam never having had and WMD, Saddam could have proven this easily via such cooperation. Instead, he chose not to cooperate. The war wasn't inevitable: letting the UN and all see that he had no WMD (if that was really true then) would have prevented it.

So, either:
 * He had WMD, but needed more time to hide them; or,
 * He had no WMD, but didn't want to admit he had been bluffing.

Either way, he was playing tricks that precipitated a war.

I'm not sure how mush allied troop strength Bush promised to send to Iraq, but the number of countries exceeded those who fought alongside us in the Korean War (15 then). I don't think Bush promised to bring France and Germany; Spain came, but left after a terrorist attack during their elections; Russia never was an ally.

Hmm. A friend tells me I'm making too much of this. --Uncle Ed 17:58, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)


 * Honestly? I'd agree.  It's getting into whether Shinseki was right in his assessment of troop demands.  For purposes of this article, it doesn't really matter -- especially if the Bush admistration's assertion that his assessment of troop demands had nothing to do with his retirement is true.  I think the salient points are these:


 * Shinseki's interpretation is that he was forced into retirement;
 * Kerry's interpretation is that he was forced into retirement specifically for his assessment of troop requirements;
 * Bush's interpretation is that he wasn't forced into retirement at all;
 * The facts so far do not make any of these interpretations so compelling that the others are thereby falsified.

Even if we had the word of an oracle that Shinseki's projections were completely wrong and incompetently so, all that would do is substantiate an interpretation not on the table: that Shinseki was forced into retirement over his troop projections and that forced retirement was justified. That, however, would be a hard bar to meet the standards of proof for; it wouldn't be enough just to say "in retrospect, Shinseki was wrong because he said we'd need this many troops and we succeeded with this lesser amount" (and even that is presuming that everyone could agree that we've "succeeded"). You'd have to prove that the projections could be seen by any reasonable observer to be inaccurate beforehand -- and you couldn't even get a consensus from all reasonable observers now that those projections were inaccurate. -- Antaeus Feldspar 18:19, 8 Oct 2004 (UTC)