Talk:Rolf Witting

Paternalism
I find the notion of paternalism problematic. This paternalism, for lack of a better term, is unquestionable. The question is however, if Witting really was the only one who saw this, and if this really was his most dominating view of the Swedes. The impression one gets from the autobiography of the German ambassador to Helsinki (who was not much of a convinced Nazi) is that Witting's distaste for Scandinavians was more of the political and maybe racist kind, and probably deeply rooted in Witting's personality, but also that his liking for Germany had very little to do with the progress of Nazism.

--Ruhrjung 15:26, 2005 Jan 2 (UTC)


 * That is hard to answer. As Witting was himself belonged to the Swedish speaking minority and was mamber of Swedish People's Party, I'd say that it was more political kind. It was then -and even today- quite common in Finland to consider Swedes "besserwissers" in foreign policy questions. (Well, do you really think that Sweden with more than 800 years of foreign policy experience could have more knowledge on issue than Finland with it's 20 years.:-P).
 * Also I find it interesting that Witting's liking was more towards Germany than Nazism, as it has been used very often against him. Finland had had strong scientific relations with Germany over 600 years. Especially Reformation opened many connections between Finland and German universities. (As it closed others to France and Italy.) So I don't find it so peculiar that Finnish scientists had close connections -and even liking- to their German counterparts.--Whiskey 23:30, 8 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * Distaste for Swedes were surely not only a question of different views on foreign policy, although that's an important point. Swedes (in general) identifie with Sweden as an actor on her own merits, and dissaprove of actions on behalf of someone else, as of France in the 18th century or of USA in the 20th. Finns (in general) identifies with a Finland that is a (minor) team player, although the teams have been different from time to time. Until 1809, it was the team of the Swedes, then that of the Russians, than that of the Germans (1918-1944), ...then we had the sad era on the bench, and now we are in the game again, this time in the European team. :-))
 * But &mdash; there is a strong current of distrust for the Swedes, which has several roots and expressions; and Witting was only one of many who disapproved of Swedes. The issue of his mother tongue has little relevance, although it's true that if we are going searching for Finns who understand and approve of the Swedes, then we surely will have best chances to find some if we look among the Finland-Swedes. Fagerholm was one, but he was a Social Democrat.
 * The paternalism wording is not false, per se, and now when you have given it a less prominent position in the article, I think it's fairly motivated.
 * /Tuomas 05:03, 14 Jan 2005 (UTC)

As a Foreign Minister
The first option for Ryti and Mannerheim for new Foreign minister was G.A. Gripenberg, who unfortunately was then ambassador in London. He himself declined as his selection would have undermined any effort with Soviet Union and Germany and endangered his work in Britain.

After that it was the eliminating game for politicians, as one by one suitable politicians were declared unsuitable to job: Hackzell (domestic support insufficient), Ramsay (too bustling), Procopé (untrustworthy, although long time friend of Ryti), Berlin ambassador Wuorimaa (too passive), Moscow ambassador Yrjö-Koskinen (burned out), Enckell (too old (didn't prevent his selection four years later)) and Paasikivi (too soft for Soviets). Only then Ryti proposed Witting, who has served deputy Foreign Minister in Kivimäki cabinet at 30s, but even then only part time as he became to cabinet at mid term.

The selection of Witting was a surprise, as he hasn't been diplomat, his only contact with Foreign ministry was his part time deputiness.
 * Two years as deputy FM was much more than many other Foreign Minister's Finland has had. The predecessor Tanner comes to mind, but he was absolutely no exception. An alternative view could be that Ryti listened to, and agreed with, every reservation against proposed candidates until Witting, who was his own proposal. The reservations against other candidates were not particularly strong. "Untrustworthy" could be said about Witting too, "insufficient domestic support" also. The real reason not to chose Ramsay, Procopé, Wuorimaa, or Voionmaa, is easier to see in their association with the pro-democratic foreign policies of the 1930s. Paasikivi would have been out of question, unless there had been a serious attempt to adopt to the Moscow Peace - but the psycological preconditions were not there yet.
 * (But please don't read this as if I believe in Heikki Ylikangas' reasoning that the Finnish government made the decision to side with the Third Reich as early as in March '40.)
 * /Tuomas 06:16, 14 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Linkomies described him stubborn negotiator and he thought that he was the right man to handle negotiations with Soviets, but that he couldn't hold his calm and he wasn't agile and resilient which would had been needed when negotiating with Germany. President Kallio described his as "He has an especially important feature, which is very important right now: He can't talk. Now it is not time for foreign minister to talk, but can old diplomats be quiet?" Also Paasikivi and Voionmaa considered Witting suitable for the job. Practically with selecting Witting Ryti kept the control of Finnish foreign policy with himself,
 * Hmmm... I don't have the memoires at hand, but my recollection from Paasikivi's and Linkomies' is the opposite. Linkomies wrote something along the line of "wasn't fit" and "ought never to have come in question". But yes, one of Ryti's obvious intents was to retain the control for himself. /Tuomas 06:16, 14 Jan 2005 (UTC)

[...] as all practical reasons it was the permanent undersecretary of foreign ministry, Aaro Pakaslahti, who ran the ministry. If one checks who was consulted or who was present when important decisions were made, Pakaslahti was almost always there. Ryti didn't have time, Witting didn't have experience and Pakaslahti didn't have authorisation to deliver enough timely information to Finnish embassies in London, Moscow and Stockholm making their work much harder. --Whiskey 23:30, 8 Jan 2005 (UTC)
 * Are you maybe referring to memoires by Pakaslahti? :-))
 * But yes, I agree with you here too. Witting was more of a figure-head than a policy-maker. Pakaslahti belonged to AKS and had been secretary general of Suomalaisuuden Liitto, if my memory serves me correctly. The essence of putting a weak pro-German man in the position as foreign minister was of course a considerable strengthening of the AKS-influence compared to the predecessors and the alternatives.
 * /Tuomas 06:16, 14 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Was Witting held to be a good choise as FM?
It seems as if the article on this point, where Tuomas and Whiskey seem to have rather different understandings, could be well served by precise attributions to written sources. I've removed the following sentence from the text. "All agree" seems not quite correct:
 * All agree that the decision was premier Ryti's, and that others among the top tiers were, or must have been, less than enthusiastic but without much of a say on the actual choice. Mannerheim was negative, the Agrarian President Kallio didn't consider himself competent in matters of foreign affairs, although formally it was the president's prime responsibility, the other large party, the Social Democrats, had every reason to be highly suspicious against Witting's fringe right-wing ideology, which also is clearly reflected in memoirs by leading Social Democrats, and the Conservative party's heaviest names Paasikivi and Linkomies were outright negative.

There is maybe a difference between what people said and/or wrote in their diaries when he was appointed compared to what they wrote after the Paris Peace Treaty? --Ruhrjung 14:57, Jan 14, 2005 (UTC)

Linkomies wrote in his memoirs (he wrote those in prison when serving his sentence as "Guilty for War" 1947-8)(translation mine): "At early times, when we had to resist Soviet pressure after the Moscow Peace, he as a hard-skinned man was in a correct place, but later when things has changed, he couldn't anymore fill his place to the benefit of the country. Then it would have been needed resilience and flexibility which he lacked. He tied our country too closely to Germany, to which direction our policy at those conditions naturally had to be steered, but although so, that our freedom of action had been maintained." Linkomies also blames his increasing use of alcohol (which was the downfall of also another prominent Finnish minister, Ahti Karjalainen) and writes also: "Negative side of him was, that he walked his own roads and couldn't negotiate calmly and impassionate way with others." and writes few sentences about Witting's antipathy toward Swedes and how it affected his judgement: "Witting was unwilling to consider Swedish opinion when there was a reason to consider it. It wasn't clear to Witting, that Finland shall never arrange her foreign policy to opposite direction of Sweden." -Whiskey 23:35, 31 Jan 2005 (UTC)