Talk:Russian invasion of Ukraine

Belarus as belligerent
The infobox lists Belarus as belligerent on the Russian side. This is sourced to a piece of information on the BBC which itself is sourced to a Facebook post by a Ukrainian adviser to the defence minister. I hope editors here agree that this is an extremely poor sourcing for Wikipedia to formally implicate a country in an international war.

To-date, the role of Belarus for Russia has been nearly identical to the role played by Poland, Romania or Germany for Ukraine: as a training and resupply ground, arms supplier, and political backer. There's no good evidence that Belarusian troops are or have been taking active part in hostilities. While bilateral relations are in a rather poor state, neither country is openly engaged in hostilities against the other.

In this view, I propose removing Belarus as belligerent. — kashmīrī  TALK  18:38, 27 June 2024 (UTC)
 * The role of Belarus has not been at all similar - nevermind “identical” - to that of Poland, Romania or Germany. Ukraine is not attacking Russia from the territory of Poland, Romania or Germany. Russia did attack Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. This is pretty straight forward.  Volunteer Marek   05:29, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The main reason we list Belarus as a belligerent is that Russian troops were allowed to invade from Belarus. Ukrainian troops may train in foreign countries but always return to Ukraine before entering combat. Russian air attacks were also staged from Belarus. No country has permitted Ukraine to stage air attacks from their territory. GordonGlottal (talk) 19:51, 27 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Please see the very complete discussion here. GordonGlottal (talk) 19:53, 27 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Under this reasoning it could be argued that Belarus ceased its "belligerency" sometime around 2022, as Russian troops have not moved between Belarus and Ukraine since April of that year, and it is not apparent that Russian artillery and air strikes have since taken place from Belarusian territory or airspace.
 * A compromise might include a qualifier something along these lines:
 * 🇷🇺 Russia
 * Donetsk Republic
 * Luhansk Republic
 * Supported by:
 * 🇧🇾 Belarus (2022)
 * SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 20:22, 27 June 2024 (UTC)
 * if there is a source which makes such an argument, let’s see it.  Volunteer Marek   05:31, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Which argument, specifically? SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 06:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Is it true that nothing has been staged from Belarus since 2022? The Ukrainian army reported a launch from Belarus on 5 August 2023 (Source). GordonGlottal (talk) 00:07, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Claim not verified independently - the source (CNN) only mentions is in passing, attributing it to an unreliable source (a different belligerent). Insufficient for an encyclopaedia IMO. Anyway, a missile launch by Russian troops stationed in Belarus does NOT make that country a belligerent. In other articles, we don't consider single instances of territory use as sufficient to consider the entire country a belligerent in a war. — kashmīrī  TALK  01:41, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * If I remember correctly, the infobox used to say that. Benpiano800 (talk) 02:20, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * @GordonGlottal The close of that discussion highlighted that there was no consensus to list Belarus as belligerent. That was more than 6 months ago, and a new discussion is warranted. — kashmīrī  TALK  01:43, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I guess it's been long enough for another RFC. But only if you think there's a real likelihood of changed consensus—be respectful of everyone's time. Note that another RFC is unlikely to be permitted for quite a while if two fail 7 months apart. GordonGlottal (talk) 02:20, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Belarus is not listed as a belligerent. It is listed as a supporter and there was clear consensus to keep [Belarus] there. This is affirmed twice in the RfC close. This is the single most discussed element of the article and has hosted near a dozen RfCs and innumerable edit-requests and proposals across the two main articles. All bar one RfC has closed with no consensus. The Belarus RfC is the exception. 'A new discussion' without clear preliminary endorsement is doomed to status quo. Mr rnddude (talk) 04:35, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * I support @Kashmiri's proposal for removal. The United States has provided far more lethal military support to Ukraine than Belarus has provided to Russia. Ukraine Armed Forces would not be able to make biweekly payroll without economic support from NATO. Russia can continue to prosecute this war even if Belarus removes itself completely from the situation. The same cannot be said for Ukraine if the United States steps away completely. Where is the neutral balance here? This particular aspect of the info box betrays a systematically biased point of view. Alternatively, simply have the info box express the fact that Ukraine is supported by the United States. Chino-Catane (talk) 18:50, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks. It's not only that. Ukraine is being actively armed by Europe and the US, it keeps receiving incredible amounts of military hardware, equipment, munitions, training, military intelligence, etc. The collective West has embarked on an economic war against Russia, seizing its assets and blocking its trade. Belarus has not done anything resembling that – generally, the West is much more engaged in the Ukrainian war than Belarus has ever been. If Belarus, by simply allowing Russian troops on its territory in line with its international obligations (CSTO), is called a "belligerent" by Wikipedia, what will be the right term for the Western countries so active in Ukraine? — kashmīrī  TALK  20:37, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Russia invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. The US (or EU or NATO or whatever) did not invade Russia from Ukrainian territory. Or at all. Simple as that.  Volunteer Marek   05:27, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Nothing in the CSTO treaty required Belarus to do any of this, not that it matters. I want to modify what I said earlier slightly in response to this exchange: Your proposed understanding of the conflict is fundamentally rejected by the vast majority of English Wikipedia editors and by the sources English Wikipedia has chosen to elevate as reliable. An RFC from this perspective is guaranteed to fail. It will be an enormous waste of editors' time and effort. Wikipedia is not a place to right great wrongs. Please find a more productive use of your editorial energy. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:24, 28 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Why do you keep insisting that Belarus is listed as a "belligerent" when you have already been corrected above? Belarus is not listed as a belligerent, so your whole suggestion here is built on either you misreading or a misrepresentation of what the article actually says. TylerBurden (talk) 17:37, 30 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks to Manyareasexpert for publishing an explanation offering reasons why this article labels Belarus a "co-belligerent supporter" and not the United States. Belarus permitted Russia to stage its pre-invasion force and launch missiles from its territory. Similarly, we in the United States staged our forces for the 2003 invasion of Iraq from somewhere. We also launched air support for that invasion from somewhere. Were those pre-invasion staging territories and air support launch pads labeled as "co-belligerent supporters" in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq? Chino-Catane (talk) 16:18, 30 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Answer to this question seems to be that we list Turkey and Kuwait as belligerents proper (under "coalition of the willing"). The US didn't distinguish between different types of military support for the invasion and included hosts as full members of the coalition. See 2003 invasion of Iraq. GordonGlottal (talk) 04:31, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

Mentioning NATO in lead
Continuing from the discussion above: (1) Should we mention NATO in the lead section? (2) If so, how should this be done (should it be presented in the context of the security guarantees demanded by Russia in December 2021, or in some other way)?

My favored wording is In late 2021, Russia massed troops along Ukraine's borders and issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially to Ukraine. The demands were broader, including the withdrawal of NATO troops and weapons from all of Eastern Europe (presumably in an attempt to extract maximum concessions), but the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation, given the circumstances of the crisis. I don't think that a clause like denied any plan to attack or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would do this deny this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17, as massing troops around a country and then issuing a list of demands of that country clearly constitutes a tacit threat of invasion. To be clear, simply mentioning Russia's demands does not present them to readers as legitimate, though I will note that if Russia didn't intend to negotiate at all, it wouldn't have issued any ultimatum. Indeed, documents recently published by the New York Times have revealed that in the spring 2022 talks, shortly after the invasion started, Ukraine agreed to Russia's demand that it become a permanently neutral state and never join NATO. The situation has now changed, but this demonstrates that this particular point of negotiation was and continues to be real, and should thus be presented to our readers. — Goszei (talk) 07:15, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Pinging all those who have participated in this discussion so far. — Goszei (talk) 07:18, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation Again those are personal opinions. Another question is why should the lead provide Russian demands but not their assessment by RSs, which assessments are already in the article.I don't think that a clause like denied any plan to attack or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would do this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17 Again those are personal opinions. And no, it wasn't obvious, and as far as on February 23 everybody in Russia were laughing and making fun of Ukrainians for them to get concerned with possible invasion rumors. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Agree. In the run up to the invasion the question of “will they invade or won’t they?” was a huge deal and many commentators were assuring us that Russia wouldn’t invade based on Russian denials. It is also not obvious. Ultimatum in such situations aren’t necessarily rare. In 1991 US pretty much said “leave Kuwait or we’ll invade” - there were no denials. In this case the denials themselves were a propaganda campaign and Kremlin disinformation so yes, they’re important.  Volunteer Marek   16:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Here's how the Council on Foreign Relations summarized Russia's demands:
 * What Does Putin Really Want in Ukraine? Chino-Catane (talk) 10:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I support your NATO background addition but please don't base it on outdated sources, as, after the start of the invasion, every pre-2022 source is outdated, and will be deleted. Use, for example, Putin's Wars and NATO's Flaws - Google Books and Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books . ManyAreasExpert (talk) 11:15, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Putin's Wars and NATO's Flaws isn't scholarly, it's a book by a journalist without significant academic credentials or significant background in Russia/Ukraine. It's a low quality source. JDiala (talk) 00:06, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * This is better then pre-2022 sources and existing NATO-related text could be enhanced. There are more in-depth assessments however. For example, There is no question that Russia—its leaders, expert analysts, and public— reacted negatively to NATO enlargement right from the start. Despite some contrary statements, Russia’s opposition was fairly consistent over time. But there is little evidence that NATO’s enlargement per se was the primary cause of Russia’s concerns or fears about the West. There is little evidence of any direct Russian military reaction to enlargement, and Russian experts knew that enlargement actually made NATO harder to defend. Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I can only reiterate what I said above: editor discretion is strictly limited by policy, which requires us to follow reliable secondary sources. Valid wiki arguments take the form "RS1, RS2, and RS3 all say X" never "X must be true according to the following evidence and logic". Please state your argument exclusively in terms of secondary sources if you're here to build an encyclopedia. Then others can reply with alternate sources, critiques of your sources, critiques of your summary, etc. This is the only way it can work. GordonGlottal (talk) 20:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

What's the policy justification for this pre-2022 source ban? Only 2 / 9 citations in the International treaties subsection were published after January 1, 2022. How can this ban be justified for a Background section where history must be discussed? For example, the WP:GA assessed article Russo-Georgian War does not adhere to this condition. Chino-Catane (talk) 17:51, 9 July 2024 (UTC)


 * No ban but the source should be related to article topic and those pre-event are just don't. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:38, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The cited sources generate information describing "Russian threat perceptions". Which particular sentence(s) and source(s) do you believe are unrelated to the background of the historic episode we are labeling "Russian invasion of Ukraine"? Chino-Catane (talk) 21:19, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened. Why should we use pre-invasion sources to describe the invasion, given there are plenty post-invasion assessments. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 21:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * It's not at all unusual to use sources about the background context of an event published prior to that event. If you're claiming that there was a "serious reassessment" sufficiently serious to deprecate older sources, you need a source for that. JDiala (talk) 23:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The source should be on topic. You seem to question the validity of the sentence There was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened. I think we should stop here. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 23:42, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * All of the sources in question are on topic. You are also misquoting your own sentence. You originally said "there was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened" and now you are saying "there was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened". It's hard to glean the point you're trying to make. As you've been told, you need an evidence-based, WP:RS backed reason to discard pre-2022 sources. This is not normally done. JDiala (talk) 23:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * All of the sources in question are on topic. Let's have a look at the first source CIAO: Strategic Analysis: NATO Eastward Expansion and Russian Security (archive.org) of contested edit . Nowhere it mentions the Russian invasion of 2022. No surprise here, since the source dated November 1998. So no, your statement is wrong.You are also misquoting your own sentence. You originally said "there was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened" and now you are saying "there was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened" So do you agree that There was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened is valid? ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:17, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Sources from prior to the invasion by definition do not take into account the invasion in their assessment. That does not mean that they are irrelevant for discussion on the background context of the invasion. JDiala (talk) 09:16, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * discussion on the background context of the invasion That should be source's conclusion, not yours. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:27, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * This isn't the standard used for sourcing. Editors are allowed to adjudicate whether a given source is relevant to a given article. As you've been told, it's routine practice for older sources to be used for for the background sections of a given article. JDiala (talk) 09:33, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Since you did not respond to the question, "Which particular sentence(s) and source(s) do you believe are unrelated...", I take this to mean that every sentence in my reverted edit is related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
 * "Why should we use pre-invasion sources..."
 * Every sentence in my reverted edit was factually correct, generated from sources that no one has flagged as poor work or discredited. I have no issues with using newer sources to improve the entry, but this is no reason for my entry to not appear in the article as it was presented.


 * "...describe the invasion..."
 * My Background subsection titled "Russian threat perceptions" does not describe the invasion itself. As Russia built up its invasion forces, it publicly stated demands concerning NATO 1 2 3. My entry presented historical facts concerning Russia's perceptions of NATO. Those facts have not changed, nor have they been disputed. Chino-Catane (talk) 03:48, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * No point arguing for the usage of pre-2022 sources, given there are plenty of sources which actually mention the article subject. You can even use the one given above. I even quoted some of its conclusions above. Here's more:Some Western observers, even after February 2022, recognise the role of agency and contingency in a backhanded way, when they wonder why Russia’s vast bureaucracies, and the majority of people did not recoil in horror when their leader launched his war. Unfortunately, historic inves tigations into the impact of NATO enlargement on the Russian elites have become side-lined by current security and geopolitical concerns in the West. Still, as this essay suggests, it would have been much better for Western leaders to acknowledge what happened in 1991–1999 and in Ukraine between 2004 and 2008 without prevarications. A candid effort to get the story of NATO expansion straight and why Ukraine was left exposed to Putin’s fury would not affect any policies and attitudes that Putin’s brutal attack generated. Nor it would lessen the support for Ukraine’s cause. But it would have settled the issue once and for all, and thus denied Putin’s machine of propaganda lies, as well as his sympathisers in the West, any real grounds for credibility. (the chapter end paragraph) ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:51, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "No point arguing for the usage of pre-2022 sources": The use of pre-event sources in a background section does not require defense. There exists no policy nor general practice of excluding them, as the three aforementioned WP:GA articles demonstrate. I'm not seeing how your block quote relates to Russian threat perceptions with respect to NATO. Chino-Catane (talk) 19:28, 10 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Here are two WP:GA-assessed articles about armed conflicts that cite sources in their background sections published before the episode itself: Battle of Kilinochchi (2008–2009) and 2008 Mumbai attacks. Chino-Catane (talk) 03:59, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * another up-to-date source: NATO and the Russian War in Ukraine - Google Books A third option was put forward by Russia in December 2021 as an alternative to a full-scale invasion and was then ignored by the West that remained and remains wedded to the principle of self- determination: to force Ukraine to abjure any application to join the EU or NATO and to guarantee its neutrality by a great-power congress, involving Russia itself and America, of course, and NATO collectively (Bismarck must be laughing and weeping in his grave). Such a proposal not only flies in the face of the principle of self-determination but has also been deprived of any credibility by the behaviour of Russia itself as it had entered into just such a great-power agreement with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In this, the US and Britain stepped in as guarantors of an agreement between Russia on the one hand and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on the other that if the latter surrendered to Russia the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory at the time the USSR was dissolved, Russia in turn would promise not to touch their frontiers. Which Russia, in the case of Ukraine, has blatantly ignored since 2014. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:55, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * You really do need to engage with the arguments others are making to defend your position. Chino-Catane's point is that non-up-to-date sources are routinely used for the background sections of major events (including wars). You should address this. JDiala (talk) 09:19, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * That could not be used as a justification to violate the argument that sources should be on topic of article subject. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:24, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Please engage with the argument. We've cited numerous examples of GA-tier articles which source in a given way. Clearly, your views are not congruent with what the WP community considers correct sourcing. JDiala (talk) 09:33, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Wrong. See WP:OR : To demonstrate that you are not adding original research, you must be able to cite reliable, published sources that are directly related to the topic of the article. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:43, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Yes, and you are misinterpreting what “directly related” means in this context. I will reiterate what I said earlier. “We’ve cited numerous examples of GA-tier articles which source in a given way. Clearly, your views are not congruent with what the WP community considers correct sourcing.” If you are incorrect and someone corrects you, it is generally wiser to be humble and accept the feedback rather than digging your heels in. JDiala (talk) 17:28, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * You can't override WP:OR with some local consensus. No more false theses please. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 18:00, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * It's not a violation of OR. You just don't understand what OR is. JDiala (talk) 18:12, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * No false theses please. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 18:25, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Manyareasexpert's citations of WP:OR on this point is accurate. The way to write a background for this article is to cite present, up-to-date sources that provide the background information and analyses themselves. You do not need, nor should you be referring to, outdated sources to achieve this. You will be hard pressed to present a convincing argument for how a source that cannot so much as discuss the article's subject is directly related to it. The argument from GA rests solely on other content and is an invalid justification there-in. Any editor can review and promote a GA, even whilst it contains violations of any policy. A major recent incident resulted in one of the most prolific GA authors having nearly all (5 of the original 233 retained GA status) of their GAs delisted and being site-banned because of the innumerable problems that those articles had and the intractability of their own problems. Even aside that, both GAs being cited here were listed over 15 years ago. They don't represent current practices at GAN. But lest anyone be led astray, even if they were FA articles listed yesterday, that does not mean they are devoid of any problems, only that all identified problems were resolved.  If you are incorrect and someone corrects you, it is generally wiser to be humble and accept the feedback rather than digging your heels in shows a complete lack of self-awareness. Mr rnddude (talk) 19:29, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I think it's important for you to understand that the position and interpretation you are defending is something absolutely in the fringes. This isn't a case of one or two GA articles which may or may not be good; this is basically everything. Nearly all reasonably large articles on a major recent geopolitical event have at least some sources published prior to the event's occurrence particularly in the "background" (or similar) sections of the respective articles. If you hold your interpretation, fine, but it's probably best to get a strong consensus for it because you have a fringe view on policy. There's a preference for recent sources but this is not an absolute ban on older sources. Furthermore, even if we are to accept your interpretation, then that implies many of the sources in the current version of this article (published pre- February 2022) also ought to be removed. JDiala (talk) 19:55, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There are indeed sources and statements within the present version of the background section that should be removed. The position that Manyareasexpert espoused, is one I have re-iterated repeatedly, even on this very talk page. It is not one I am defending, it is one I am upholding: see 00:58, 11 December 2023. Mr rnddude (talk) 20:11, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Fine, have it your way. I am actually seriously considering just systematically removing all pre-February-2022 sourced stuff in the background section. Do we have local consensus for this? We can't have one standard for material endorsing the pro-Ukrainian POV and another standard for the opposite perspective. JDiala (talk) 00:57, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

This would be fair. Chino-Catane (talk) 05:32, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * - I take it by your manual reversion, that you do not in fact endorse systematically removing all pre-February-2022 sourced material from the background section? Please clarify your actual stance and edit according to it. Rather than claiming one thing, than acting upon another. Mr rnddude (talk) 09:06, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * After discussion, of course. My main concern is you're being selective. It did seem interesting that the first target was something about NATO, rather than other things. JDiala (talk) 09:54, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * It is unnecessary to assign motives to my editing. I initially selected the paragraph with a citation needed tag and only one other dated source. The first thing I removed whilst editing, was not NATO, but the Russian invasion of Georgia. The relevance of which isn't well established within that paragraph. If your concern was that the removal of material about NATO above it shifted the article further away from NPOV, you should have stated that in your edit summary. It'd be a concern I could give due consideration for. Mr rnddude (talk) 10:18, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There are a large number of claims based on pre-2022 sources. Removing them all in a haphazard fashion could negatively impact the quality of the article in the short-term. I think, if you want to do this, it is worth being circumspect in the process. I'd recommend attempting to find alternative sources based on post-2022 work before removing a given claim, or (if you yourself do not have time to source-hunt) consider temporarily putting a CN tag. JDiala (talk) 11:52, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks for your effort providing such a comprehensive explanation. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 20:28, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "sources should be on topic": It is not controversial to state that Russian threat perceptions of NATO relate to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [1 [2] [3] Every source I cited directly discusses Russian threat perceptions with respect to NATO. Chino-Catane (talk) 20:06, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "another up-to-date source": I'm not seeing how this block quote relates to Russian threat perceptions with respect to NATO. Chino-Catane (talk) 19:32, 10 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Responding to the question on the top, no, we should not, at least in such context. One needs to propose a specific phrasing to approve or disapprove. My very best wishes (talk) 01:19, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * As about using pre-2022 sources, I think they can be used, but only if relevance of the content to the subject of the page is immediately obvious. If not, such content should be removed per WP:NOR. My very best wishes (talk) 16:04, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

Russian threat perceptions
With regards to your reversion, which sentence(s) and source(s) in particular are you accusing of being instances of Russian propaganda? Chino-Catane (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)


 * The lengthy section you added was one-sided and gave undue weight to the Kremlin's claims of the "threat from NATO expansion". This is one of the excuses Putin gave for invading. The only sources used were those that support the Kremlin's narrative. It gave no opposing views or counter-arguments, and it took the Kremlin's claims at face value - even tho' most Western analysts believe they're only a pretext.
 * We could write an equally-lengthy section about the Kremlin's other claims: its denial of Ukrainian nationhood and statehood, "Ukrainian Nazis", "genocide in Donbas", etc. But, like the "NATO expansion" claim, they're already mentioned in the article, and writing a whole section for any of them would likewise be giving them undue weight.
 * As I said in my edit summary, if your content belongs anywhere, it would be Russia–NATO relations. But it would need to be re-written to include opposing views. – Asarlaí  (talk) 10:34, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I agree that an entire section on "Russian threat perception" is probably undue. However, I don't agree with removing properly sourced content altogether by dismissing it as propaganda. You can have it underneath "background" but without its own section. The size of the added material should be somewhat reduced. JDiala (talk) 19:36, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The "Background" section and the "Prelude" section already mention the Kremlin claims about NATO several times. – Asarlaí  (talk) 19:45, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Right, only to dismiss them as meritless or a pretext. There is another perspective that Russian fears were to some extent merited. JDiala (talk) 20:16, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "one-sided": The entry takes no sides. The notion that Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as a threat is a matter of fact. Russia's perception of a NATO threat, which is not exclusive to a military threat as summarized in my entry, directly relates to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This is not controversial.
 * "support the Kremlin's narrative": You are projecting a pre-conceived notion of some narrative onto a set of facts that are not disputed.
 * "undue weight to the Kremlin's claims": My entry made no reference to any claims whatsoever, nor does it assign moral justification to any claim made by any belligerent.
 * "one of the excuses Putin gave": A neutral observer would not use the word "excuses". A neutral observer would say, "...one of the reasons Putin gave..."
 * "opposing views or counter-arguments": There are no views opposing the notion that Russia's perceptions of a NATO threat relate to its invasion of Ukraine. Chino-Catane (talk) 21:07, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "The notion that Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as a threat is a matter of fact" - Whether the Kremlin really believed NATO enlargement to be a threat, or was merely using it as a pretext for invasion, is a matter of debate. It is most definitely controversial and disputed. What isn't disputed is that Putin claimed the invasion was provoked by NATO.
 * This article already says that Russia allegedly felt threatened by NATO enlargement. It already says that Putin related this alleged threat to the invasion. Here are some quotes from the article:
 * "when Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO in 2008, Putin warned that their membership would be a threat to Russia. Some NATO members worried about antagonising Russia".
 * "Russia demanded that NATO end all activity in its Eastern European member states and ban Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining NATO. Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO followed an 'aggressive line' ".
 * "Putin said that Russia was being threatened ... that a hostile NATO was building up its forces and military infrastructure in Ukraine".
 * We also link to other Wiki articles discussing this NATO aspect in more detail.
 * So, why do we need to go further and include a lengthy section about this one particular aspect? This article is already very long, and it's not the place for lengthy discussion of Russia's perceptions of NATO. – Asarlaí  (talk) 22:20, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

"Whether the Kremlin really believed...": My entry doesn't mention the Kremlin or its beliefs. What the Kremlin believes is not a suitable topic of investigation because it cannot be investigated. Is it a matter of controversy that, "a majority of surveyed Russians believed Russia had reason to be afraid of NATO countries"? Think about the answer to that question along with my assertion "the notion that Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as a threat is a matter of fact". Now let's address the three quotes you mention, in sequence. There exist three instances in this article of Russian threat perceptions being presented, juxtaposed with sentences that dismiss them. "why do we need to go further and include a lengthy section": 334 words is not lengthy. This article does not need to go further in presenting Russian threat perceptions, it just needs to start. "This article is already very long": This article is very long because it includes a detailed timeline of events. Chino-Catane (talk) 10:09, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "In 2002, Putin said that Ukraine's relations with NATO were 'a matter for those two partners'. However, when Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO in 2008, Putin warned that their membership would be a threat to Russia." The second statement presents a Russian threat perception, preceded immediately by a statement made 6 years prior that invalidates it. The first sentence is pulled from an article that begins, "Russian president Vladimir Putin wants you to believe that NATO is responsible..."
 * "Russia demanded that NATO end all activity in Eastern Europe and ban Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining NATO. Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO followed an 'aggressive line.' These demands were widely seen as non-viable..." This presents a Russian action against a perceived threat, which is immediately dismissed.
 * "Putin said that Russia was being threatened: he falsely claimed that Ukrainian government officials were neo-Nazis under Western control, that Ukraine was developing nuclear weapons, and that a hostile NATO was building up its forces and military infrastructure in Ukraine.": This presents a Russian threat perception labeled as false.


 * "There exist three instances in this article of Russian threat perceptions being presented, juxtaposed with sentences that dismiss them." - I wouldn't say that they're dismissed; rather that they're juxtaposed with the facts. Do you suggest that we add evidence that might support them?
 * "334 words is not lengthy. This article does not need to go further in presenting Russian threat perceptions, it just needs to start." - I'm not against presenting Russia's perception of a "NATO threat". The article already does. Nor am I against adding a wee bit more about it. But I'm against devoting 300+ words to it, on top of what's already there; and I'm not the only one. For balance, we'd have to write more about Russia's/the Kremlin's other perceptions, like how it sees Ukrainian sovereignty and nationhood. We'd probably also have to write more about Ukraine's perceptions. But as I said, the article is already very long, and is not the best place to discuss these things in great detail. There are other articles for that. – Asarlaí  (talk) 11:44, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "juxtaposed with the facts"
 * The two instances of Russian threat perceptions are positioned very far apart, sequenced with facts deliberately positioned so that readers immediately dismiss them. This is not a useful presentation of the Russian view, which is critically important information in an article describing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The single instance presenting Russian action on its threat perceptions was also similarly sequenced with, "...widely seen as non-viable", with no cited WP:RS. Russian threat perceptions do not need to be "supported". They need to be presented in such a way so readers understand that Russian threat perceptions are mortally serious.
 * "we'd have to write more about Russia's/the Kremlin's other perceptions"
 * This can be handled concisely.
 * "Ukraine's perceptions"
 * Ukraine's perceptions played no part in Russia's decision to invade it. Ukraine's self-defense requires no explanation. Chino-Catane (talk) 05:57, 12 July 2024 (UTC)


 * We mention it, it deserves no more coverage. Slatersteven (talk) 13:17, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * You mention it in passing only to dismiss it entirely. There's no consideration given to the opposing view that the threat perception had a legitimate basis. JDiala (talk) 18:44, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Russian threat perceptions require at least 300 words of uninterrupted prose. An uninterrupted exposition of the Russian view is critically important in an article titled Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:06, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Why? Slatersteven (talk) 09:54, 12 July 2024 (UTC)


 * - Yes, that was very good reversion. This is all hypothetical at best or a propaganda at worst. "Russia considered NATO expansion a threat to its national security"? Yes, but only if Russia would attack first. "Ukrainian entry into NATO ... represented a direct challenge to Russian interests"? Yes, but only if Russia would attack Ukraine. "Russia's world view as being rooted in pragmatic geopolitics aimed at enhancing its power and security."? This is a provable nonsense. Did Russia achieve such goals by attacking Ukraine and forcing the further enlargement and militarization of NATO and Ukraine? By losing a half million of its own people as dead and wounded? If anything, Russia has lost its power, security, reputation and even people. My very best wishes (talk) 01:01, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There is some truth here. Putin did plan to attack Ukraine and potentially other countries, and therefore, NATO was a threat. And of course all Baltic republics would be occupied by Russia already if they were not members of NATO. And right now Putin has created a choice: he will either subjugate Ukraine or NATO will have to intervene more directly. Hence a threat. But none of these perceptions by Putin justified the invasion, as the included text implied. Rather, the perceptions came true because of the invasion. My very best wishes (talk) 02:19, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

Mearsheimer critique
Mearsheimer views on Russian war are widely criticized - you could read it in John Mearsheimer if it would not be removed. Thus Mearsheimer assessments here should be followed with assessments of his assessments. Which would make all of it too much for this article. Better to not to have Mearsheimer at all.

This is regarding latest edits. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:28, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I'm perfectly happy with including criticisms of Mearsheimer. That would be balanced. What I don't want is the total exclusion of Mearsheimer altogether, which was the previous consensus position for the article. The man is one of the most well-known, oft-discussed political scientists in the modern era. To dismiss him altogether simply because he doesn't tout the "Russia-bad" narrative editors here seem to endorse is a blatant violation of neutrality.


 * "Which would make all of it too much for this article" let's be honest, this is just a rationalization to avoid including anything which could give the appearance of criticism of Ukraine/NATO. It wouldn't be "too much" for the article, you could fit in his position and counters to it within one or two sentences. The POV pushing in this topic area is remarkable. JDiala (talk) 18:41, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The sentence referencing Mearsheimer doesn't even require criticism. It's non-controversial. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:22, 12 July 2024 (UTC)


 * It is simultaneously the case that Mearsheimer is a significantly notable enough commentator that his analysis should be included; and that Mearsheimer's analysis on Ukraine has been widely criticized as being absolutely bunk. So no, it would not be better to not have him at all, unless we cannot do so without giving him undue weight or shielding from criticism; in which case it would actually be better. It's much the same as we should be doing for every other formerly respected academic who subsequently dived face-first into the "crank" pool (e.g. Theodore Postol on Syria) ⇒   SWAT Jester   Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat! 19:28, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Either way fits the rules. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:40, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Several of your sources are incredibly low-quality. One is some random from the Ayn Rand Institute (lol). One is a journalist without professional scholarly background (Katie Stallard). One is Carl Liles, some random unknown master's student from the University of Tartu (also lol). The others are more respected --- but of course scholarly disagreements between respected scholars are not unusual. While Mearsheimer does have provocative views on many topics, there is no evidence indicating he's regarded as a "crank." JDiala (talk) 20:59, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I disagree with your assessment, but if what you're pushing for is for Mearsheimer's views to be included, then they have to come with appropriately sufficient context for how widely criticized he's been in the context of Ukraine, which may be more than just fitting in his position and counters to it within one or two sentences. To not do so would be giving his position undue weight and be just as blatant of a violation of neutrality as the one you were complaining about above. If we can't do that, then they shouldn't be there at all. ⇒   SWAT Jester   Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat! 23:08, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * If you think it's a due weight issue, a full survey of the field might be in order. I personally don't have the time to carry it out, but there are others active on this TP who have the wherewithal. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 00:04, 12 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Better sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Irrespective of controversies over his larger framework, Mearsheimer's specific thesis on the Ukraine invasion (that it was the West's fault because Putin was trying to negotiate in good faith, and it could have been avoided with a pledge to keep Ukraine out of NATO) is shared by very few other scholars.
 * Actually, I think the page currently leans too far in the Realist direction by exclusively discussing military and diplomatic history in the "background" and "prelude" sections. Liberal researchers like Timothy Snyder argue that the invasion resulted from ideological and political evolutions within Russia itself, not just relations between Russia and other powers. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:55, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * So why not mention this in 1-2 sentences? Chino-Catane (talk) 06:36, 12 July 2024 (UTC)


 * I think small section "Motives for invasion" is out of place and undue on this page. This is not a part of "Background". These are questionable speculations by a couple of cherry-picked authors on why exactly Putin decided to attack Ukraine. This is an interesting question, but it is already covered at length in several sections of another page, Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. There were several justifications by Putin and others: Denying Ukrainian statehood, an emergence of "right forces", genocide by Ukrainians accusations and of course the expansion of NATO. One of the cherry-picked authors (Mearsheimer) focuses on the last reason, "the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO", which is basically a well known motif of Putinist propaganda. Yes, it needs to be described somewhere, but it was described already on another page. My very best wishes (talk) 19:57, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * In other words, this author is telling that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia was fully justified, and that the justification was one provided by Putin. Author does not hide that his view is contrary to the mainstream views on this subject. Moreover, he is saying obvious nonsense, such as Putin was not bent on the occupation of Ukraine. How come when Russia has officially annexed all these territories (and Crimea) and included them to Russian Federation? This is such an obvious WP:FRINGE or propaganda. So, I am saying this page is not a proper place for including WP:FRINGE and debunking it. Only page  Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine is. My very best wishes (talk) 20:39, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * It's not WP:FRINGE. The viewpoint that NATO expansion bears some degree of responsibility for the war is a minority view, but not totally outside the mainstream discourse. JDiala (talk) 21:22, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Speaking on the essence of this (and as described in many sources), Ukraine had absolutely zero chance to be accepted to NATO before the invasion, and Putin knew it. And even now, it has very low chance to be accepted to NATO. My very best wishes (talk) 21:31, 11 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "Putin knew it": A living political figure's private thoughts and what they "knew" are generally not regarded as productive avenues of academic research. Chino-Catane (talk) 07:22, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Russo-Ukrainian War started in 2014. A new state during a war and with an unresolved territorial dispute could not be accepted to NATO. Everyone knew it, not just Putin. In fact, by starting the low-intensity conflict in 2014, Putin effectively prevented Ukraine from accession to NATO. Putin is also well aware that NATO will not attack Russia. That's why he withdraw nearly all Russian forces from the border with Finland and sent them to Ukraine. My very best wishes (talk) 15:12, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "out of place and undue on this page": I don't see how it is "out of place and undue" to include a short section presenting motives for invasion in an article titled "Russian invasion of Ukraine". It seems that you have a problem with a particular individual. What is your qualm with the sentence, "Neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer assigned the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO."? Chino-Catane (talk) 07:12, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I am not opposed to including some content on the subject of "Why Putin invaded Ukraine", but it should be focused on mainstream views, for example as summarized by the Institute for the Study of War, i.e. . If this will be just a brief summary, then Mearsheimer simply does not belong there per WP:FRINGE.
 * According to ISW:
 * This is mainstream view on this subject.My very best wishes (talk) 16:04, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I tried to include it (and was reverted), but it is indeed a question how exactly this should be framed on the page. My very best wishes (talk) 18:17, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * How is the sentence, "Neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer assigned the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO.", even remotely controversial, especially when it is immediately followed by the presentation of a perspective that is probably praised by most of the editors of this article? There does not need to be any critical assessment whatsoever of that first sentence. Your suggestion that the presentation of a single individual's very reasonable view requires an "assessment of the assessment" is utterly ridiculous. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:20, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * If nothing else, even using the label “realist” or “neorealist” without proper context and explanation is kind of POV, since it implies those that disagree with him are “unrealistic” (in practice of course the exactly the opposite turned out to be true)  Volunteer Marek   07:32, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I'm sorry, this is ridiculous. These are schools of thought in international relations. A link to the page on realism or neorealism is adequate context for the correct meaning of these words. JDiala (talk) 19:54, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I don't think it's ridiculous. It's not clear to me whether he's a "realist" or "neorealist", or what he's more often referred to in sources as an "offensive realist"; so just applying the label without context, even with a wikilink, doesn't really tell me anything about *why* Mearsheimer is associated with those schools of thought, or why the label is relevant to this article (which is not actually about Mearsheimer anyway). ⇒   SWAT Jester   Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat! 21:35, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Agree with providing more descriptive description or omitting those narrow academic terms. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 22:11, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I will remove this and we can discuss the wording here. Slatersteven (talk) 09:55, 12 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I will remove this and we can discuss the wording here. Slatersteven (talk) 09:55, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm looking at the structure and wording of the edit. I think if we want a section about the motivation behind the invasion, we can't start by immediately mentioning Mearsheimer's view, as he is a controversial figure. This would be WP:UNDUE and WP:FRINGE. We would need at least some sort of introduction describing the landscape of such discussions. As mentioned by other editors, a lot of this is discussed in the article Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which talks about all of the justifications used (often contradictory) by Russia. BeŻet (talk) 09:28, 15 July 2024 (UTC)

Spelling mistake in image description
Could someone please fix the spelling mistake in the caption for the image of the Normandy format meeting, only is misspelt as "onyl". The caption is as follows:

"Negotiations for conflict resolution started in 2014, with the Normandy Format facilitating meetings until just before the fullscale invasion, facilitating in 9, December 2019 a meeting between President Zelensky and President Putin for the first and 'onyl' time"

Thank you :) 1mikeymouse1 (talk) 13:11, 16 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Fixed. Slatersteven (talk) 13:15, 16 July 2024 (UTC)

Misrepresentation of WP:ONUS
Your recent revert is in fact having nothing to do with WP:ONUS. It is true that that the onus is on those wanting inclusion to gain consensus for inclusion. This does not mean that the intermediate, temporary version as there is an ongoing discussion must be your version. For that, the norm is to maintain the status quo, see WP:STATUSQUO.

It is important for you to understand that the point of this is to discuss. This is how consensus is built on this encyclopedia. This is how editing disputes are resolved. You are not actually participating in any discussion, and haven't been involved in any discussion here since June 30th. This is not really in the spirit of the collaboration.

In addition, per administrator ScottishFinnishRadish you do in fact need consensus to remove established long-standing material, notwithstanding some contradictory-seeming policies. JDiala (talk) 23:44, 16 July 2024 (UTC)
 * This paragraph should go (agree with TylerBurden) because it is not about relations between former Soviet republics (the subject of the section), but about their relations with NATO. Hence this should be removed or made a different (sub)section. My very best wishes (talk) 02:00, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There are two separate issues being raised here: STATUSQUO and NOCON. One of these is a policy, the other an essay. The opening sentence of NOCON is [w]hat happens when a good faith discussion concludes with no agreement to take or not take an action? I can stop here as we have a significant problem. We're dealing with Schrodinger's discussion. That is that the discussion has simultaneously concluded and is on-going depending on which state suits someone's purposes. NOCON only applies to the former state. If the discussion has concluded:   STATUSQUO is an essay. It does not represent a widely accepting community norm, per WP:GUIDES. There isn't an issue with citing it, but policy has priority. The policy being sought here is WP:PRESERVE which instructs that editors retain material that has flaws that would otherwise be included anyway without them. However, that policy applies to material that is neutral, verifiable, and free of original research. Given the preceding, the material is not subject to preservation. It can be removed. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:16, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Now what? Compile a selection of sources on the Russian invasion of Ukraine that provide background coverage on NATO-Russia / NATO-Ukraine relations and an analysis on their impact leading up to the invasion. Write a paragraph or dedicated section about it from those sources. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:16, 17 July 2024 (UTC)


 * It is true that STATUSQUO is an essay, but it is also not the main argument I'm using. The main argument is NOCON. Supplementary to that main argument were two auxiliary arguments, namely (1) STATUSQUO, and (2) a discussion with an administrator, SFR, who appeared to take my side which you can see in the link provided. It is misleading to suggest that STATUSQUO "does not represent a widely accepting community norm." If you read WP:GUIDES carefully, it only indicates that essays may not be supported by widespread consensus. Your assertion may or may not be true. Your discussion on WP:PRESERVE may be an argument for removing the material (which you could utilize in a discussion) but it doesn't justify reverting during an ongoing discussion. Anyways, as I've already told you, your views on OR are quite fringe. We don't really agree that using pre-2022 sources is OR; that is a point of contention, although again I have been cooperative with respect to trying to find compromises.


 * The prior discussion did not conclude, and a vote count does not imply consensus has been established. There was a legitimate concern I respectfully brought up in the end of the discussion that you did not respond to or engage with. This isn't a "Schrodinger's discussion"; this is a simple case of you not responding, and thus me concluding that a discussion has not concluded. I want to be clear that I do intend to be cooperative and fair, keeping in mind that my position is currently the minority position. I have no doubt that we can have a positive and constructive conclusion to this discussion. If you read my objections carefully, I am not even objecting entirely to the edit, rather merely suggesting a compromise.


 * We should also be careful to bifurcate the issues at hand here. The first is the actual content dispute. The second is the specific issue of whether TylerBurden's revert was justifiable. On the second point, I do not think TylerBurden's conduct is remotely defensible. In general, if there is an ongoing discussion going on about disputed content, it is not considered appropriate for an uninvolved editor to revert to his or her preferred version without participating at all in the discussion. TylerBurden has not even wrote anything on this talk page in all of July. His revert does not seem to me in the spirit of collaboration, which is what the policies we are debating are anyways intended to facilitate. JDiala (talk) 10:14, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * My views on OR are mainstream, that you are ignorant of it does not change that. You may not use sources that do not discuss an article subject to make claims about the article subject. Present that statement to any admin you like, they will tell you some variant of: no shit. I've been ignoring your casting of the term fringe because they are frankly so off-base that they are not remotely worth debating. Since you are absolutely insistent upon it, fringe has a specific meaning on Wikipedia that relates to the presentation of views in Wikipedia articles that depart significantly from the mainstream. It is inapplicable to editor interpretation of policies and guidelines. If you haven't noticed, you are consistently finding yourself in disputes with other editors because of problems like this. I have no issue discussing any material within the article with you, but you need to stop lecturing highly experienced editors. Your approach does not appear collaborative to most editors, but combative.  I ignore some of what you write because any uninvolved, experienced editor would realise that it is wrong. For example, I would ignore your 'not a democracy' point as my assessment was more than a vote count as any editor can identify. I presented specifically used arguments and afforded them due weight. I treated the arguments with equal weight – I doubt most editors would – and only then did I assess that there is a clear majority position. You've misrepresented that as a straight vote count. This doesn't appear to me to be a good faith approach. I have skipped over other such errors because if I dissect every line this will be a wall of information. If desired, I can do that and post it to your talk page to read.  Lastly, the reason I haven't responded to your concern is that I am not available every day to edit. The last thing I wrote was: if you have an NPOV concern, I can give it consideration. I have not edited the material further. Recognising the present situation, I have proposed the least conflict ridden path forward. If you want to fight other editors over that paragraph, be my guest. If you want to move the article forward, re-read my 'now what?' comment. Figure out what hills are worth fighting for, and which should just be retreated from. Mr rnddude (talk) 12:09, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I do not think your OR views are mainstream. As brought up previously by Chino and I, virtually all other articles, including GA articles and homepage-linked articles, on current events allow for sources published pre-event in the background section. You can insist they're all wrong and GA articles are actually all bad (which is the argument you employed previously). Maybe you can make your case, but you cannot pretend it's mainstream. Definitionally, it's not mainstream if other articles (often edited by folks even more experienced than you) do not do this.


 * "Fringe" is an adjective in the English language, roughly translating to anything not clearly in the mainstream. I'm using the word in a generic English language sense, not in reference to the Wikipedia policy WP:FRINGE. This should be evident from me not capitalizing the word or appending the prefix "WP:" to the word. In general, whenever there is a law or a policy, there could be a range of interpretations to that policy. Some are mainstream interpretations. Others are less mainstream interpretations. I am using the adjective "fringe" in reference to what I consider your less mainstream interpretation.


 * Bringing up "combative" is funny. Let's compare our comments. You use profanity like "no shit". I use collaborative words like "compromise" and "respectfully." Who's really the combative one? The suggestion I had was simple and reasonable. If you are removing material based on it supposedly being based on an outdated source, it is probably a good idea to check if material you are removing can be substantiated by newer sources first.


 * Before we discuss moving forward, I will actually take up your offer on discussing the OR interpretation with an administrator. I was evidently too generous conceding compromises before actually even being confident that your position is a legitimate one. I will make a post on SFR's talk page. JDiala (talk) 23:55, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Update on the last point: I was told by SFR to move the discussion to WP:NORN, which I have done. This question of OR really ought to get resolved before we move forward. JDiala (talk) 00:42, 18 July 2024 (UTC)
 * You can insist they're all wrong and GA articles are actually all bad (which is the argument you employed previously) - This is false. I have never said that all GA articles are wrong or that they are bad. This doesn't qualify even as a strawman as that would require the presence of straw. I said – repeating for the benefit of passers-by – that just because a GA does something that does not mean that it is endorsed by policy. The argument should not rest on other content (essay) alone. The GAs that Chino-Catane cited passed the process fifteen (15) years ago. They are not representative of the process in 2024. I have contributed to both the GAN and the FAC process both as a writer and a reviewer. I used to be actively involved in both, but have turned my attention elsewhere with my limited editing time. I am averse to having that time wasted by – in the politest terms I can muster – such poor quality engagement. This spat will not lead to the article improving. I am aware of the NORN discussion, and have posted there as well. That matter is now in the hands of other editors. Mr rnddude (talk) 06:06, 18 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Absolutely. To replace the first sentence, for example, one can use Putin's War on Ukraine - Google Books Russia subsequently prosecuted a military intervention in Crimea and Donbas in order to create a Georgia-style frozen conflict that would preclude NATO membership. This limited military intervention did not change the course of Ukrainian foreign policy, as Ukraine repealed its neutral non-bloc status in December 2014 and constitutionally enshrined EU and NATO membership as a strategic goal in February 2019. The collapse of Russian soft power in Ukraine, which was illustrated by opinion surveys showing less than 20% of Ukrainians with positive views of Russia31 and the inability of the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc—Party for Peace and Development to challenge for power, restricted Moscow’s non-military options. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:25, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * ... or Ukraine and Russia - Google Books The year 2008 saw two pivotal events: the Bucharest NATO sum mit and Russia’s invasion of Georgia. At the Bucharest summit, NATO declined to offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans but said that they could eventually join. Depending on one’s view, this com promise was either a concession to Russia’s concerns or an aggressive move to which it felt compelled to respond. Similarly, whether Georgia’s actions justified it being invaded by Russia was highly debatable. While both the United States and European Union were appalled by Russia’s actions, both made concrete efforts to put the episode behind them. In pursuing a “reset,” the new Obama administration was accused of appeasement and naivete, and the strategy brought few results.The themes highlighted in Chapter 1 were all dramatically on view between 2005 and 2010. The security dilemma in central Europe was exemplified by the Bucharest summit: Ukraine and Georgia, fearing Russia, sought a formal alliance with NATO; NATO, worried about both those states but also about Russia’s reaction, tried to have it both ways – acceding to Russia’s opposition while reassuring Ukraine and Georgia – but even this was insufficient to assuage Russia’s fears of an intolerable loss. Mutually incompatible notions of the status quo exacerbated the security dilemma. For Russia, the perception after 2004 that Ukraine had been lost stoked resentment and determination to redress the problem. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:39, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Welcome to include any of this or some parts of the removed text. This content is relevant because not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia (unlike Baltic Republics). This only needs to be well sourced, and the relevance to the subject of the page should be clear, e.g. as appears in this diff . My very best wishes (talk) 15:12, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia. Hell no. Russia would likely attack Ukraine even sooner should it see an increased risk of NATO infrastructure getting closer to its borders. Besides, in 2008, much of the Ukrainian military command was on Russian payroll, and Russia had a 100% visibility into, and much influence over, the flow of security information there. To include these UA structures in NATO information sharing mechanisms would be a suicide, nobody at NATO was ready for such a risk. Add to that the fact that Georgia attacked Russian troops first in Tskhinvali against NATO principles and explicit US advice (that's why nobody at NATO offered support beyond lip service) – and you start seeing that the outcomes of the Bucharest summit were only reasonable. Let's just follow the books and focus on facts and not OR-type what-ifs. — kashmīrī  TALK  18:51, 17 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia". Well, this is actually a well known claim by many, including Zelensky : Zelenskyy didn't just single out the Russians – the murderers who hunted down pedestrians and cyclists. He also mentioned former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. "I invite Ms. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy to visit Bucha to see what the policy of 14 years of concessions to Russia has led to." Zelenskyy was referring to the NATO summit that took place in Bucharest in April 2008. So, why did not Merkel and others accept Ukraine to NATO? There were reasons as outlined in the linked investigation by Spiegel, but summarizing them is not easy. This can be used on the page of course. My very best wishes (talk) 01:20, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

If you have an issue with user conduct, do not discuss it here. Slatersteven (talk) 10:18, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

Subarticle on Ukrainian civilians arbitrarily detained in occupied UA + RU?
Do we have a sub-article on the issue of Ukrainian civilians arbitrarily detained by Russian authorities in the occupied Ukrainian territories and in Russian territory? Please respond at Template talk:Russian invasion of Ukraine or here. As stated over there, we have an 86-page Moscow Mechanism report but the topic doesn't seem to quite fit into any existing article. Boud (talk) 18:32, 18 July 2024 (UTC)