Talk:Sa'ar 5-class corvette

Combat History
Is it really going to Ashdod for repairs? Ha'aretz is still (7/15/06, 16:10 EST) reporting it's under towage to Haifa.

Sa'ar 5 classification
The Sa'ar 5 are certainly not missile boats but corvettes as they have armaments typical for corvette and displacement of 1227 ton which is well inside corvette range of between 540 and 2,750 tons Arusinov 10:49, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Armament
It seems that this class of ship can either be equipped (at the bow) with a Phalanx CIWS or a 76 mm gun, but not both. The sources I have seen indicate that all examples were built with the Phalanx. Riddley 18:03, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
 * As a consequence of not carrying the 76mm Oto Melara gun, this ship would be unable to shell inshore targets, however I have seen some refs to the systems being interchangeable. At this point I think the term "shelling" is non-NPOV so I'm going to remove it. Riddley 18:40, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Added some detail about armament, as it was lacking Taiko123 (talk) 10:44, 15 October 2021 (UTC)

Weapon(s)? used in the Hezbollah attack
The reference to "C-102" in the Fox report is clearly a typo for C-802. There is no C-102 missile produced by China or indigenously in Iran, so I'm removing the reference. Riddley 17:20, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Wikipedia currently has an entry for Kosar which describes an Iranian theater ballistic missile, obviously not a weapon used in the strike on the INS Hanit - for the sake of internal consistency the reference to Kosar in this article or the Kosar article should be amended. Riddley 23:57, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

The weapon being referred to is actually the Kowsar (note slightly differently spelling), which is an Iranian version of the Chinese C-701 missile anti-ship missile... essentially a smaller version of the C-802 missile which is often referenced in this context. It's still unclear which type of missile struck the INS Hanit, and will likely remain so -- in fact the source cited in this article at the time I write this (as of early September 2009) actually uses the C-802 designation but then goes on to describe characteristics consistent with the C-701/Kowsar, e.g. 20kg warhead (C-802 has a much larger warhead over 120kg). Personally I don't think there will ever be definitive clarity over this issue, as the official Israeli line is that the missile was a C-802 or derivative, and the Chinese line is that it must have been a C-701 or derivative (e.g. Kowsar). A third possibility is that the missile was a C-802 but the warhead failed to explode (a quite common occurrence with semi-armor-piercing warheads on anti-ship missiles -- see USS Stark and HMS_Sheffield_(D80). However all these theories, which are plausible to varying degrees, are speculative.  It therefore seems reasonable to modify the article to reflect this reasonable degree of uncertainty

Latest article on July 17, 2006
http://www.defense-update.com/2006/07/ins-hanit-suffers-iranian-missile.html

Sunday, July 16, 2006 INS Hanit Suffers Iranian Missile Attack

Updated: July 17, 2006:

According to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources, the attack was conducted by Chinese C-802. Apparently, two missiles were launched toward the Israel Navy Ship (INS) Hanit (Spear), SAAR V class corvette patrolling the Lebanese coast 16 kilometers from the shore. The attack was a coordinated, simultaneous “high/low” attack - the first “high” missile passed over the Israeli ship. Missing the target, it continued flying, hitting and sinking a civilian Egyptian ship cruising 60 kilometers from the shore. The second missile followed a sea-skimming flight profile hitting the Israeli vessel at the stern, killing four sailors and setting the flight deck on fire and crippling the propulsion systems inside the hull. Surviving the potentially devastating attack INS Hanit returned to Ashdod naval base for repairs.

The simultaneous attack was probably using two techniques as well, ensuring maximum chances of success. The Israeli Navy believes the missiles used targeing data from Lebanese coastal radars, therefore maintaining low electro-magnetic signature throughout the attack prparation phase. The first missiles was apparently used as a radar-guided “bait”. seducing the ship to deploy its defensive systems against it, focusing all the attention on the “obvious” threat while the second sea-skimming missile closing below. A supporting fact for this assumption is the fact that the first missile locked on the unfortunate Egyptian ship 44 kilometers away, as it was the next visible target in its flightpath. The second, missile could have been guided by radar or, more probably, Electro-optically. This method would require the launch of two types of missiles, a C-801/802 for the “high” profile and a C-701 TV guided missile for the “low” profile.

According to an Associated Press report, based on an interview with an unnamed IDF official, the Israeli vessel didn’t use its electronic countermeasures systems as they did not anticipate such a threat in the area. Yet, this comment is questionable, as there were repeated intelligence reports about Iranian supplies of sophisticated equipment, missiles and drones to the Hizbollah. However, the naval or coastal defense missiles were not mentioned specifically, leading the Israelis to remain unaware of the imminent threat.

C-801 radar guided anti-ship missile weighs about 750 kg, it is powered by a rocket motor and has a range of 40 km and is equipped with 100 kg warhead. The upgraded C-802 uses a rocket booster for launch, and a turbojet cruise motor, giving it a range of up to 140. The warhead uses about 180 kg of shaped charge explosives, which makes it a most capable threat to major warships including U.S. aircraft carriers. The C-701, (also known as Iranian Kosar) is deployed with Iranian forces as a truck mounted coastal defense missile, it is much smaller than the C-801/802, weighing about 100 kg, its range is about 18-20 km and the warhead has 29 kg of explosives, set with a delayed activation fuze to maximize internal damage after hull penetration. It uses an Infrared/TV seeker or active millimeter terminal guidance.

Adeptitus 22:42, 17 July 2006 (UTC)

Be advised, the weapon used was not a c-801(solid rocket) or a c-802(parafin turbojet). Either weapon contains a significant warhead that would have been sufficient to sink a warship of 10kilotons; the saar-5 masses only ~1.3kilotons and was not not sunk but only disabled. The c-701, with it's smaller warhead, seems to be a much better match for the observed damage effects upon the saar-5 vessel. The iranian version of the c-701, the kosar, has a millimeter radar tracker. I also find the claims by the idf that the ships countermeasures were turned off to be very specious at best. Chances are very good that the idf has no effective counter to the kosar anti-patrol boat missile and that they will do their best not to broadcast this information to the world, thus we are treated first to the cover story that the ship only sustained light damage, then we get to hear the even more questionable yarn that an idf vessel would go into a warzone with it's ecm turned off.( the stated israeli rationale for having the flagship of it's naval forces being naked in lebanese waters was that they were attempting to prevent an act of fratricide with idf air assets, but this clearly doesn't hold water as all idf aircraft have iff squeakers that would prevent a friendly sam lock-on, this is attested to by the fact that other idf vessels had their full ecm/sam packages blaring as well as their sam/amm batteries in northern israel were fully active.) cheers.--24.165.28.52 23:20, 20 July 2006 (UTC)


 * I have seen a report that the IDF are now saying that the Barak missile system was actually operational at the time, but operating in "a particular mode" which did not allow it to engage the incoming missile (sorry didn't make a note of the URL). The lack of protection from the Phalanx could simply be due to it being a stern hit (the Phalanx being in the bow).  I agree that there seems to be no obvious reason why the passive defence systems such as ECM and chaff launchers would not be operational - these could pose no threat to friendly aircraft, IFF installed or not. However, such things have reportedly happened, in the Falklands HMS Sheffield apparently had some ECM systems disabled at the time of the Exocet strike because of frequency clashes with the satellite phone system. Riddley 22:47, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

Minor reformat
I moved the specs chart up and photo down, should look better now. -- Adeptitus

Consolidating combat history
There are too many places where the Sa'ar 5 combat history info is being presented: the C-802 page, the Sa'ar V page, the INS Hanit page, miltiary operations of 2006 israel-lebanon conflict page, and heaven knows what else. Since the hit on the ship is specific to the INS Hanit, I suggest we move all relevant info on the missile strike to the INS Hanit page, and just have the other articles refer to it by link. As of now there's too many articles describing the same incident with conflicting info. -- Adeptitus 17:50, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

The combat history of the Hanit is neccesary context on any article regarding the saar 5 class corvette. A detailed list of specs on a military vessel without reference to how it actually performed under combat seems, what is the appropriate term? ,trivial. Combat history of members of the saar 5 class are a needed and illuminating aspect of any encyclopeadia entry for the saar 5. The events surrounding the hanit's fate are still evoloving, therefore there are some inconsistencies in the various articles that touch upon the topic; these will ,with time, reach a level of consistency that accurately reflects reality a la the spirit of Wiki, unless of course this article gets hijacked by the pro-israel/pro-arab wiki factions that love to distort reality to reflect personnel ethno-centric prejudices. cheers --24.165.28.52 22:45, 25 July 2006 (UTC)


 * I think the issue is whether to have the full details of the incident on this page which is for the class of ships or on the individual page for the INS Hanit. I would tend towards the latter, as I feel this combat action means the INS Hanit deserves its own article. Riddley 22:47, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

Blacklisted Links Found on the Main Page
Cyberbot II has detected that page contains external links that have either been globally or locally blacklisted. Links tend to be blacklisted because they have a history of being spammed, or are highly innappropriate for Wikipedia. This, however, doesn't necessarily mean it's spam, or not a good link. If the link is a good link, you may wish to request whitelisting by going to the request page for whitelisting. If you feel the link being caught by the blacklist is a false positive, or no longer needed on the blacklist, you may request the regex be removed or altered at the blacklist request page. If the link is blacklisted globally and you feel the above applies you may request to whitelist it using the before mentioned request page, or request its removal, or alteration, at the request page on meta. When requesting whitelisting, be sure to supply the link to be whitelisted and wrap the link in nowiki tags. The whitelisting process can take its time so once a request has been filled out, you may set the invisible parameter on the tag to true. Please be aware that the bot will replace removed tags, and will remove misplaced tags regularly.

Below is a list of links that were found on the main page:


 * http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/saar5/
 * Triggered by  on the local blacklist

If you would like me to provide more information on the talk page, contact User:Cyberpower678 and ask him to program me with more info.

From your friendly hard working bot.— cyberbot II NotifyOnline 09:22, 3 April 2014 (UTC)

✅ This issue has been resolved, and I have therefore removed the tag, if not already done. No further action is necessary.— cyberbot II NotifyOnline 20:10, 9 April 2014 (UTC)