Talk:Second Balkan War/Archive 1

First Death Camp in Europe
Bulgarian soldiers, as well as Bulgarian civilian population from Solun/Tessaloniki was sent to a small island called Paleo Trikeri. The prisoners were not provided with housing, they slept under sky. No water. Bread soaked with sea water. The cruelty of ordinary Greek people exceeds the cruelty of the well known Nazi war crimes. No surprise that Bulgaria joined Germany in WW1 and WW2. See publications by the Czech journalist Vladimir Sis. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:343:8001:503E:11DB:33A7:B2A4:572A (talk) 03:11, 25 October 2019 (UTC)

Untitled
Please Wikipedia can you get an impartial researcher/historian to write/edit this page. It is of very high importance to a number of wikipedia projects but at the moment is written in an amature way and in very bad English. Please please!!! 217.113.81.153 (talk) 13:16, 22 June 2010 (UTC) Sierra Leonean

Where are the casulty figures from? They seem to be covering the First, not the Second Balkan war. I have figures that Bulgarian KIA, WIA, POW and MIA in the Second war were around 96.000. Serbian losses in both wars were around 67.000 (books by serbian historian Savo Skoko - ok I`m open for comparison, but state your sources). Bulgarian deaths seem to be grossly underestimated as it waged this war against Serbia + Greece + Montenegro (one division participated) + Ottoman Empire (later surprise entry) + Romania (later surprise entry with hardly any fighting - their deaths seem to be overestimated). Additionally, how could have the Ottomans sustained such heavy casaulties? Main Bulgarian forces were positioned towards Serbia and Greece and even the hard-won fortified Adrianopole fell quickly. Where are the Montenegrian casaulties? Are they included in the Serbian list? Montenegro was an independent kingdom back then.

Veljko Stevanovich 12. 11. 2005. 21:35 UTC+1

quite a few basic factual timeline and geographic geographic errors hereDaveHM 11:58, 18 December 2005 (UTC) see very good synopsis here: http://countrystudies.us/bulgaria/12.htm DaveHM 12:25, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

Listed Bulgarian armies (1. 3. 4. 5.) faced the Serbs, but the initial attack was carried out only by the 4th army (which was, however, by far the strongest boasting over 100 infantry batallions) commanded by Gen. Kovachev. Others were initially kept in reserve, probably as not to escalate the war further than just taking the disputed areas in Macedonia (but also as a consequance of underestimating Serbian war potential). When the 4 th. army was defeated at Bregalnica (which resulted in dismissal of Bulg. de-facto CINC Gen. Savov following a quarrel with the nominal CINC King Ferdinand), idle armies were thrown into battle with Serbs (conducting the offensive towards Pirot).

Veljko Stevanovich 15. 02. 2006. 13:35 UTC+1

I'm not seeing much here about something crucial: why Serbia & Greece sought territory in Macedonia. Austrian intervention to demand the creation of an independent Albania meant that projected Serbian and Greek territorial gains there were lost. So Serbia sought recompense in Macedonia; the Greeks, meanwhile, had never signed an agreement with Bulgaria about territorial division in the first place.


 * True
 * On a separate issue, why is Bregalnica listed AFTER Kalimantsi, when it took place before (as can be seen) I`ve tried to correct that, but it appears I`ve done It wrong.


 * Veljko Stevanovich 22. 02. 2006. 16:45 UTC+1


 * I noticed that one too. Corrected. Valentinian (talk) 21:01, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

The Bulgarian soldiers was around 500 000 men not 300 000!!!

End of the War
I've given up on fixing up the writing, but surely the war was ended by the Treaty of Bucharest on August 10, 1913?

Start of the War not stated clearly
Article does not say anything about the Greek attack against Bulgarian unit on June 17. This is much earlier than the official beginning of the war on June 30.

http://macedonia-history.blogspot.com/2008/12/blog-post.html — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:343:8001:503E:11DB:33A7:B2A4:572A (talk) 03:04, 25 October 2019 (UTC)

The Second Balkan War was started by a Bulgarian commander. On July 29, a Bulgarian Commander (unspecified) ordered an attack without recieving Government authorisation. Serbia and Greece declared war despite a disclaimer from the Bulgarian Government. Was the general Mikhail Savov, as another comment seems to suggest?

Wolfson/Laver: Years of Change: European History 1890-1990 Hodder Murray Page 115 (ALCUS36 14:17, 4 April 2007 (UTC))


 * My source (Savo Skoko & Petar Opačić: Vojvoda Stepa Stepanović, Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, Beograd, 1985) states that the order was issued by him. I checked it again and I noticed that I made a mistake in the previous post - Gen Savov actually held the position of aide of the Comander in Chief of the Bulgarian army - the BG 4th army was commanded by gen. Kovachev (first name not given). Position of CINC was officially held by the Bulgarian king Ferdinand Koburg - though the actual battle command is normally conducted by the aide - so Savov was de facto Bulgarian CINC. I'm not entirely sure about the spelling of his name since my source is Serbian. In Serbian it is spelled Mihail Savov (Михаил Савов in Cyrillic - I assume that would also be the correct spelling in Bulgarian) In English it could be spelled that way or Mikhail Savov, Mihail Savoff, Mikhail Savoff etc. The Bulgarian king certainlly approved the order, but not the ministers who still waited for the Russian arbitering of the dispute.


 * Veljko Stevanovich 13. 08. 18:58 UTC+1


 * The theory the war started due to an individual act of an officer, unauthorized by his governement seems unlikely.
 * Follows the citation of a speeach by the Leader of Bulgarian Agrarian Party, M. Stambulivski directed to the Tsar Ferdinand, trying to convince him not to join central powers in WW I. Stambulivski, as well as several other parliamentars present at the event hold Tsar personally responisible for entering the "disastrous adventure of 1913":


 * "In the name of every farmer in Bulgaria I add to what M. Malinoff has just said, that the Bulgarian people hold you personally responsible more than your Government, for the disastrous adventure of 1913. If a similar adventure were to be repeated now its gravity this time would be irreparable. The responsibility would once more fall on your policy, which is contrary to the welfare of our country, and the nation would not hesitate to call you personally to account. That there may be no mistake as to the real wishes of the country I present to your Majesty my country's demand in writing."


 * French Prime minisiter Viviani, addressing to the Parliament, on Bulgarian situation after the war: "Neither King nor people were resigned to the loss of the fruits of their efforts and sacrifices, and to the consequences of the unjustifiable war they had waged upon their former allies."


 * Source: History of the World War, by Francis A. March and Richard J. Beamish  M.Campos (talk) 14:12, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

Could someone provide the source for the assertion that Bulgarian High Command ordered the atack on Grece and Serbia "without notifying the government". In view of the reaction of the Bulgarian opposition that does not seems very likely. Nor it is common for military to break the command cahain, execpt in case of "coupe d'etat". Unless appropriately sourced I think that statement shoul be removed.M.Campos (talk) 17:44, 31 October 2008 (UTC)


 * http://books.google.com/books?id=jIS0djhGv9cC&pg=PA1&dq=second+balkan+war&lr=&hl=bg. Look at the page 7 what the Russian government thought. According to Bulgarian historians the government was not consulted for the attack and that is why two days after the start of the war it ordered the army to hold its offensive in a vain attempt to negotiate a ceasefire. Avidius (talk) 21:09, 31 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The Russian position should be seen from the perspective of their own interests. The best solution from them would be the Bulgaria to renounce to Austro-Hungarian influence, cease the war opperations, put the blame on a allegedly insubordinate general and return to Russian sphere of interest, along with Serbia. Maybe the most likely is the Bulgarian attack was a preventive coup against the threat from Greek-Serbian alliance. It is very difficult to believe that a military commander that started the war on his own, without the support of the government, would remain in his position instead of being court-martialed. And the omission of the Bulgarian tsar in that respect configures by itself at least a tacit approval to his attitude.


 * That is of course my personal interpretation, and you have right to disagree. But I still perceive the theory that the attack was unauthorized as unsupported by evidences, except by a declaration from a part highly interested in presenting a specific version for the facts. By the other hand, Bulgarian sources I stated impute the "blame" for war directly to the Tsar. Maybe we could mention within the text about Russian diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict the fact they attributed the attack to an unauthorized military action. Do you think that is a "workable" solution?M.Campos (talk) 14:56, 6 November 2008 (UTC)


 * The events previous the war are very complicated but it is clear that the IV and II army advanced after they were ordered to do so by the de facto CINC general Savov. Savov claims he talked with Tsar Ferdinand (the de jure CINC) who gave authorisation for an advance in response to serb and greek provocations prior June 16. Whether the government knew about the attack is a debatable question however it is clear that it didn't formally aprove it.Avidius (talk) 17:55, 6 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Although I am not a regular contributor to Wikipedia, I shall note that R. J. Crampton's book "Bulgaria" does state that Savov ordered the Bulgarian army to advance "without the knowledge of the cabinet". He does not, however, refer to any sources. Owen Jennings (talk) 10:54, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Russia
The day after Romania declared war, Russia also declared war but played no major part in the war. Therefore I have added Russia to the infobox.

Louis Do Nothing

Kresna Gorge
According to Richard Hall in his well known book The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War the Battle of Kresna Gorge was an important tactical victory for the Bulgarians. In the words of the author himself "The Kresna Gorge counterattack had succeded brilliantly for the Bulgarians". Hall also speaks of "imminent annihilation of the Greeks" which very vividly describes the defeat of the invading forces.

Part of his book can be found here 

This is at least one fact in favour of my claim! Now the next time User:SotosfromGreece decides to remove proven facts at least he should give a proper explanation.--Avidius (talk) 21:19, 23 December 2008 (UTC)


 * I've read the book, and despite his best efforts Hall is prone to some bias, simply because of his sources, which rely more on Bulgarian and Turkish bibliography. The Battle of Kresna Gorge has been puzzling me for some time. In Greek historiography it is clearly described as Greek victory, while the exact opposite seems to happen with Bulgarian sources.
 * My personal suspection is this: Hall (which is my basic "independent" source) says exactly (page 122):
 * "Even before the imminent annihilation of the Greeks, the Bulgarian government had demanded that its army cease military activity.[...]A last-minute victory over the Greeks, however emotionally satisfying, could only exacerbate Bulgaria’s predicament." Is he implying that the Bulgarians stopped their attacks because they were ordered and not because they were not able to continue due to heavy losses (as is the Greek oppinion)?


 * What Hall doesn't mention at all, is that while the Bulgarian attacks forced both Greek flanks back, they failed to break them. In fact at the time of the armistice the Greek army was counterattacking on the entire Bulgarian front recapturing the lost ground, with the weight on the center in an effort to break the Bulgarian line. That's why it's seen as a Greek victory in Greece.


 * What I can guess is that facing the Romanian invasion the Bulgarian high command decided to stop attacking the Greeks as the armistice had already been agreed, allowing the Greeks to counterattack in the last day(s). So both armies felt victorious: the Bulgarians because they believe they would destroy the Greek army if they continued, and the Greeks because they feel they repelled and defeated the Bulgarian attacks and were in position to attack and break the -weak- Bulgarian center advancing further into Bulgaria.
 * My guess. Unfortunately I don't have my sources, so I write by memory.--Xristar (talk) 14:22, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * A very nice summation Xristar. From what I've read, that's also my view about what happened. The Greek army was certainly not in an enviable position from a tactical point of view, but at the moment of armistice, it still held its ground. Speculation as to what might have happened may go both ways, and is not very encyclopedic (for what it's worth, personally I think a Bulgarian victory more likely, but it would have been pyrrhic at best). De facto, the fight was a draw. Interestingly enough the topic became a matter of polemics in Greece after the National Schism, with Venizelists accusing Constantine of endangering the army by his initial refusal to accept the armistice. BTW, on Hall, he is a good source, but inevitably biased, as his field of expertise is Bulgaria. I have read an encyclopedia written by a number of scholars on WW1, and he has written the entries on both Greece and Bulgaria: Bulgaria gets a thorough and quite sympathetic treatment, where, among other things, it is stated that the Serbs and Greeks attacked Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War (!), while Greece is limited to a bland couple of paragraphs. Constantine  ✍  15:47, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

Well according to the Bulgarian sources I have the operation placed the greek army in a very critical position with both its flanks under severe pressure by the advancing units. They say that the Greek attack in the centre forced the Bulgarians to retreat to new positions north of what is now Blagoevgrad on 14th of July where fresh reinforcments of the First army were begining to arrive. Nn the next day the greek army tried to advance in the direction of Blagoevgrad but was pinned down by superior artillery fire, the same thing happened on the 16th and the Greeks were never able to get closer more than 3-4 kilometres to the main Bulgarian positions. On that day general Ivanov was replaced with general Kutinchev who ordered the attacks on the flanks to begin. Bulgarians on the right flank and on the 16th of june were continuing the advance while the Greek army was forced to sent its 7th division and parts of ts 6th division to halt the Bulgarian advance on the other flank. On the 17th of June those forces managed to hald the Bulgarian Rodopski detachment and drive it back some 2 kilometres however when they did that their flank was exposed to the other Bulgarian unit which was advancing in this sector the Samokov detachment and as a result the greeks were forced to stop. On the 18th the Bulgarian units were preparing to continue the offensive when the news about the armistice arrived and the army was ordered to cease hostilities. By the way my source list some casualty figures for the war, if you also have such figures we may compare them.--Avidius (talk) 15:51, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

I have the same opinion about the Kresna battle with Xristar. But I would like to inform you that I ordered Hall's book some weeks before just because I noticed that everything that our bulgarian contributors were footnoted where exclusively from him. I just ended the reading (since has only 142 text pages) and I find the book a strange Bulgarian-apologizing text, full of historical errors and collectively chosen facts. In its way, a narrow and truth-manipulating book almost a nationalist leaflet for a lost war. Having read just before a very detailed, real neutral historical study (Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 by E.J. Erickson / 400pages), I was able to see how purposely Hall manipulated and twisted both the military and diplomatic facts, to the bulgarian favor. His numbers tend to go up or down depended to the outcome of the battles and wars (600.000 men in the 1st war -the victorious one- 350.000 in 2nd -the lost- just some months later) He is systematically blaming everybody else for the sad end of the Bulgaria's aspirations except the admitted Bulgarian maximalism. He is failing to follow the diplomacy in such an extend that when russian foreign minister (Sazonov) turned his back to the bulgarian prime minister (Danev) in 25 June 1913 every reader becomes socked from the Russian betrayal since previously the author had said nothing about Bulgaria's attitude against Russia outside Constantinople (when Russia threatened to attack them), its attitude against Romania, its attitude against Serbia and finally against Greece. In Kresna battle he see an "imminent annihilation of their opponents unless the bulgarian government had demanded that its army cease activity" (just hours before Bulgaria's collapse, something like: if Hitler lived a day more, he would destroyed the russians), which is just totally untrue. To me it is also the first time to see an history author to try to blame the victim for the attack of his aggressor (although they were still allies at the time of the attack). And many many other. Also the map's quality is really a shame, since all of them are hand-written. In sort to say the less the book is more of a lesson to anyone on how not to write an historical book than an objective historical study of what happened a whole century before.

I don't know if Avidius has really the book or he is reading some pages from the internet but I do believe that anyone who has read it can see clearly that it is an open pro-Bulgarian interpretation of the wars which in some of its details is closing the area of fabrication through manipulation of facts and numbers. --Factuarius (talk) 01:24, 1 May 2009 (UTC)

My reply is intended for Factuarius as I wish to explain why Hall wrote some stuff in his book. The First thing - he excused Bulgaria for starting the SBW. What is supposed is that the Bulgarian elite had information about a secret agreement between Serbia and Greece to work together against Bulgaria if there are complications after the war. So Ferdinand's version was that the questions is not IF there is going to be a war, but WHEN and WHO will start it as it's inevitable. Second question - the Bulgarian superiority in the Kresna Gorge - I think the reason Bulgaria's position was considered superior can also be explained by the fact that Greece accepted the armistice which was ignored before. BraikoT 19:43, 12 July 2011 (CET)

Opposing forces
The Bulgarian part of this section is a total mess full of exaggerations and misleading information it needs to be rewritten.--Avidius (talk) 12:04, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

What is the misleading in the informations? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Factuarius (talk • contribs) 21:32, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

Because Avidius, I really believe that misleading is to have in your hands an official figure of the Bulgarian Army giving a total stregth of 7,693 officers & 492,528 soldiers = 500,221 men (your posting) and to prefer to mention Hall's 350,000.

Or to have an official figure of the Bulgarian Army for Ivanov's units -not Army- for 74.972 men (your posting) and to write that Hall says that Ivanov claimed that he had 36,000 without mention his very next words that Ivanov "probably underestimated the number of his soldier'' (p112).

I don't believe that you are really interested in writing history. I believe you are interested in making just propaganda. But maybe I am wrong.--Factuarius (talk) 23:01, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Factuarius I can see you haven't got the needed knowledge on the structure of the Bulgarian Amry and think that a bulgarian division had 60 000 men which is a complite nonsense but don't worry soon i will give you detailed explanations. By the way i don't take your comments about Hall twisting the facts seriously at all and if you think that because his view is different then yours he is twisting the facts that is your problem.--Avidius (talk) 20:05, 1 May 2009 (UTC)

Yes i have Hall's book and here are a few quotes from it: " the Bulgarians had a peacetime army of under than 60,000 men, which during the war expanded to 350,000... the total number of men mobilized durong the war was 599,878" however only the first number represents the Field or Active Army and if you had read the last pages of his book you would have reat that "the total number includes men serving in such capacities as railroad works for instance". So what hall has written is 100% accurate and i will give you more details latter.

On your second point I find it amusing that when i wrote 80 000 for the Second army you affcourse preffered to undo that and put in the total strenght of 108 000 men, and now you are critisizing me about it.Not to mention the ridiculous notion that this completely made up number implies, that the Second Army was perhaps bigger then the Greek Army. So please be a little bit more careful when you accuse people of twisting the truth.--Avidius (talk) 20:50, 1 May 2009 (UTC)

About numbers
Dear Avidius

The logic of an army that has 600,000 men but the half of them are “in such capacities as railroad works” only in Hall's quality books can be true, and only Hall can believe it.

The figure of 108,000 is not from a greek source, is from the official study of the greek “Ministry of Army” title “The Greek Army during the balkan wars of 1912-1913” edition 1932 ACCORDING THE OFFICIAL BULGARIAN STUDY not specified date but surely before 1932. You footnoted a bulgarian study of 1932 but you sent me a 1941 edition. So the problem is yours. Your Army was caught in cooking the numbers not the greek.

And of course you are lying when you say that I EVER wrote “that the Second Army was perhaps bigger than the Greek Army” I never did that and everyone can trace my editings back three months now.

Also you lied when you said that you wrote before for 80,000 men. You firstly wrote Ivanov's figure of 36,000 men and after my 108,000, you input a number of 60,000 coming from nowhere (possibly by multiplying the total number of the companies (246) by 250, the men per company mentioning in the txt) after my insistence you took from your sleeve an official number of 74.972 and when I again dismissed it you are insisted in a 80.000 figure. So until now you tried to put four different numbers. This is also not serious attitude.

About my knowledge of the Armies structure I have to tell you that is enough to know that the sum of the men of the companies of an army is less than the actual number of the army. And that even the number of the men in the divisions are a fraction of the actual number of the men in an army. You are the guy who didn't knew it when you had to count Ivanov's army but you remember it when you tried to convinced us that half of the bulgarian army were working tourists. And about the strength of the bulgarian divisions you will surprised to find that f.i. the 7th division was running to capture Salonika in 50,000 couples of legs.

About Hall's book: I never had the illusion that you could disagree with him. The point is that even if his problem is that "he is rely much on bulgarian sources" (as his apologizers say), as an historian writing a book he could be able to find an "official bulgarian study" like yours to give some more reliable figures than those of Ivanov's f.i. Unless he had, but preferred to give Ivanov's ridiculous figure and just to say that probably were "more". Who could thought that it will be three times more. But he is clearly lying in the next paragraph where says that "the greek Gen. Staff considerably overestimated the numbers of Bulgarians...between 80.000 and 105.000". Amazingly the first greek figure is the official calculations of the 1941(yours) Bulgarian HQ edition end the second figure is just 3.000 men less of the official calculation of the pre-1932 (main) edition. But strangely enough I don't see him to make such colosal errors for the Greeks or Serbs (p.108) where he is extremely accurate. But, no need "to take my comments about Hall twisting the facts seriously at all"

With lies and cookings nobody writes history except Hall. And still you are not answering my previous posting about your attitude, if it's not misleading

to have in your hands an official figure of the Bulgarian Army giving a total strength of 7,693 officers & 492,528 soldiers = 500,221 men (your posting) and to prefer to mention Hall's 350,000.

Or to have an official figure of the Bulgarian Army for Ivanov's units -not Army- for 74.972 men (your posting) and to write that Hall says that Ivanov claimed that he had 36,000 without mention his very next words that Ivanov "probably underestimated the number of his soldier (p112).

Maybe I am a bad guy but after your last posting I still don't believe that you are really interested in writing history. And I still believe you are interested in making just propaganda. But still maybe I am wrong. --Factuarius (talk) 01:29, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * I repeat that when I wrote the 74,972 than you changed it with that made up number and when Hall writes railroad workers he clearly gives an example of the non combatant duties in the army. The number 492,528 includes the people serving in the fleet,as border guards,the  Ponton Battalion, telegraph park and some 34,000 first call opultscentsi battalions(опълченски дружини) and 34,900 men secand call of the opaltscentsi battalions(mostly older people), all of these were not part of the Active Army which consisted of the divisions and seperate brigades.Also the second call was by law never to leave the borders of the country.So affcourse you don't know enough about the structure of the Bulgarian Army and it looks like your Greek source is unreliable in that matter. By the way do not make up facts like pre-1932 "main" edition because for what I know the main edition is from 1941 unless you can show me that their is an earlier one. And we all know that when we add the reserves and non combatants to the Greek army it will make up a number well over 200,000 but it seems most Greek users here want to make the greek Army as small as possible and fighting an enemy many times its size. If a Bulgarian Division had 60,000 men like you claim the result of the war would have been different.--Avidius (talk) 11:32, 2 May 2009 (UTC)

Ericson
I wonder what number does he give for the Bulgarian Army and since you have the entire book you should be able to answer.

Here is an analysis of his book []. After I read it I can see why you preffer it to Hall after all as this analysis tell us it has a "generally pro-Turkish bias" and " harmonizes quite well with official histories produced by the Greeks ".So you want us to disregard Hall in favour of Ericson but the result won't be different.--Avidius (talk) 11:53, 2 May 2009 (UTC)

Numbers, Hall, Erickson & we
Avidius

Twisting again & again my words goes to nothing. That you wrote 74,972 is also in my post. But before that, you insisted in 36,000 then 60,000 then 74,972 and then 80,000. This is what I am telling you. And this I think is illuminating for your attitude.

I suspect that the Bulgarian's navy had...1,511men, the pontoon troops...641men, the telegraph park ...511. And because I am afraid that in your next posting you will mention also the air arm, you can add another 13men. The opultscentsi & opaltscentsi battalions and the second call I thing YOU KNOW that they did took part in the war. So I will repeat again that “The logic of an army that has 600,000 men but the half of them are “in such capacities as railroad works” only in Hall's quality books can be true, and only Hall can believe it”.

I cannot imagine how you are hoping to go on with lies, everybody can go to my posting just some lines before yours and to see that I never spoke for "main" or not main editions, this word simply is not anywhere in my text, I don't “make up facts” you are “making up facts”. You know that I don't have the older Bulgarian edition (who could have it in Greece?) But I do know that THERE WAS a Bulgarian edition before 1941 BECAUSE MY BOOK IS OF 1932 AND IS MENTIONED IT.

I couldn't find the number 200.000 for the Greek army anywhere (...even in Hall). Unlike the Bulgarian army which goes up and down in a matter of hundreds of thousands depended to the outcome of the battles and the wars, everybody agreed about the strength of the Greek army.

Stop say things about Erickson and READ THE BOOK. I did the same with Hall's. I read it before saying anything about it. What I also had read in the review you footnoted is “author’s exhaustive treatment of a little-known yet vital part of modern European history, as well as to a more technical military definition.” Amazingly what you and maybe the author of your review forget, is the actual title of the book which is “Defeat in Detail: The OTTOMAN Army in the Balkans” He is honest enough in not christened his book “The Balkan wars 1912-1913” (as Hall). Gives no Bulgarian figure for the 2nd B.W. (p.321-22). And main edition has 415 pages 70 more than that of the review.

I will post again what I fill that took no answers from my previous post:

When I wrote “that the Second Army was perhaps bigger than the Greek Army”

About the strength of the Bulgarian divisions. If you will surprised in finding that f.i. the 7th division was running to capture Salonika in 50,000 couples of legs (I said 50,000 not 60,000 that you continuously said).

And if it's not misleading:

to have in your hands an official figure of the Bulgarian Army giving a total strength of 7,693 officers & 492,528 soldiers = 500,221 men (your posting) and to prefer to mention Hall's 350,000.

Or to have an official figure of the Bulgarian Army for Ivanov's units -not Army- for 74.972 men (your posting) and to write that Hall says that Ivanov claimed that he had 36,000 without mention his very next words that Ivanov "probably underestimated the number of his soldier (p112).--Factuarius (talk) 16:57, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * I am affraid you are missing the point again!Hall writes 370,000 because that is the number of the Active Army(army in the Field) the rest is in the units you mentioned and the 84,000 + opaltchenie and border guards. While the greek numbers here list only the infantry and cavalry divisions but not the non combatants and reserves. As for the Rila division the official book for the balkan War says it had 37,000 which was by far the biggest Bulgarian division in the first war so I suspect tha Hall either has made a mistake or has counted something in adition to that division. However now that you have the real Bulgarian book you can see the numbers of the divisions. I am sure you will find out that the biggest was the 4th which had about 33,000 men(including non-combatants like medical staff,logistics personel etc.)
 * And you still haven't given me the Erickson number about the Bulgarian Army.--Avidius (talk) 16:32, 2 May 2009 (UTC)

If there was something published before 1932 and was mentioned in your source then you should be able to tell me the exact year it was publishet,its title and publisher otherwise your source is unreliable.My book certainly has a bibliography in the end and I can see it uses sources that go back to 1913.--Avidius (talk) 16:37, 2 May 2009 (UTC)

Furthermore Hall has named his book well after all he is not only focused on the Bulgarian Army and the First Balkan War but also talks a lot about the Macedonian theatre and the Second War, so i am wondering why are you critisizing the man. If you are trying to prove that Erickson is less biased then Hall you are certainly failing.--Avidius (talk) 16:46, 2 May 2009 (UTC)

Answers & "answers"
Lies upon the lies. Hall says “...a peacetime army of under 60,000 which during the war expanded to over 350,000” (where is the 370,000figure?) I say again that the opaltchenie and border guards also did took part in the war. The 5th border battalion f.i. was among the units that took part in the battles against Greeks under Ivanov.

You also lied when you say that “the Greek numbers here list only the infantry and cavalry divisions but not the non combatants and reserves” in my comment in 16:57, 25 April 2009 & 16:32, 25 April 2009 I gave a full detailed picture of the non combatants and why what is in the article is reliable and sound. See by yourself. (117.861 in Macedonia 24,416 in Epirus total 142,277, 5700 in the old Greece and in Aegean islands) & (from 148,000 there were only 104.000 in the divisions) with nearly two of them in Epirus, so the 118.000 of Macedonia 8 divisions were not combatants but total men.

I am happy in finding a point of disagreement between you and Hall but the 7th Rila had more than 48,000 whatever you say.

There is a very detailed explanation on why I am criticizing Hall in my two previous posting in which you answer in fact nothing. See them again and answer me. Especially for what we are discussing (the Greco-Bulgarian forces) I say again

“even if his problem is that "he is rely much on Bulgarian sources" (as his apologizers say), as an historian writing a book he could be able to find an "official Bulgarian study" like yours to give some more reliable figures than those of Ivanov's f.i. Unless he had, but preferred to give Ivanov's ridiculous figure and just to say that probably were "more". Who could thought that it will be three times more. But he is clearly lying in the next paragraph where says that "the Greek Gen. Staff considerably overestimated the numbers of Bulgarians...between 80.000 and 105.000". Amazingly the first Greek figure is the official calculations of the 1941(yours) Bulgarian HQ edition end the second figure is just 3.000 men less of the official calculation of the pre-1932 (my) edition. But strangely enough I don't see him to make such colossal errors for the Greeks or Serbs (p.108) where he is extremely accurate.”

That's why I am “criticizing the man”

The book I have has 2,121 Annexations. I have the 1st (with the maps) and the 2nd volume, the later is ending on the 512 page without giving any annexations. In the main text says “according the official Bulgarian figures” and this is how the Greek study could have so detailed picture for Ivanov's army down to the last (border) battalion, as you can see in the article.

I always I answering every last questions, I said you that Erickson “Gives no Bulgarian figure for the 2nd B.W. And I gave you the pages in case you are not believing me so to try to locate them (p.321-22). But you still don't answer in:

When I wrote “that the Second Army was perhaps bigger than the Greek Army”

Where I spoke for "main" or not main editions

And why when you put in the article that Hall writes that Ivanov claimed that he had 36,000 men, you were not mention his very next words that Ivanov "probably underestimated the number of his soldier” (p112)--Factuarius (talk) 18:10, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * Have you really read Hall's book? I don't think so because if you had you'd have seen page 108 wew he uses the number 360,000 which is a rounded number because he adds that the total number is not clear. I really don't know what is your problem with Ivanov and why you blame Hall that he behaved like a real historian and wrote both points of view in his work - mentioning how the comander of the Second Army explained it and then explicitly saying that Ivanov underestimated his troops. Is this the Bulgarian bias Hall has? So what really bothers you is the fact, shared by everyone except obviously the Greek command, that the Greek Army had a substantial numerical superiority. Does Erickson say something about that? I doubt it,after all he talks mostly about the ottoman army?--Avidius (talk) 18:40, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * Second if your greek source doesn't have the exact name and year of publishing of the alleged :"bulgarian source" it uses than we must assume it is nonexistant.--Avidius (talk) 18:40, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * By the way i asked if he gave any figures at all including figures for the FGirst Balkan War.--Avidius (talk) 18:42, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * Hall says what I told you in 16page and what you now say in 108p (not 370,000 you said) I told you what is my problem with Hall in my prev. post for second time read it again. My problem with Ivanov is that he is a coldblooded lier. My problem with you is that you hadn't mention that "Ivanov underestmated his number of troops" when you footnoted Hall's/Ivanov's 36.000. I am tired to say you that four times. The problem with Greek's numerical superiority is the deference between the 82,000 (or so) more Ivanov/Hall said and the actual 10.000 more which is the truth. I am not ready to throw in the garbage my book because you don't like it.--Factuarius (talk) 18:57, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * In the first paragraph of the 68p. Erickson said "the Bulgarians could field 459,810 men in their army". In the next paragraph says “Full mobilization of all reservists added two additional infantry divisions to the peacetime nine...” without giving new figure. He also don't mention the four new independent brigades (Serres, Drama, Odrin of 25.000men in your book). To my calculations these new units must count more than 100.000 men. --Factuarius (talk) 19:32, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * So Erickson gives us a completely new number for the start of the First Balkan War and this is not the number I see in most Bulgarian sources, not to mention that he uses "could" which means he is not aware of the real number. By the way the three brigades actually had 21,000 new recruits because as my book says 3,000 soldiers were from the old divisions.I also have general Ivanov's book about the Second Army in the Second Balkan War so i will read it again to see what new thing I can find.--Avidius (talk) 19:59, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * So Erickson gives 460.000 in the start of the war and at list 560.000 during the 1st war. Your book gives 500.000 with or without the 3.000. Hall gives 600.000 and every last of them took part in the war. Either you are idiot or you are playing the idiot. Am out of this Kafkasian dialog.


 * Ivanov was an incompetent lier playing that he didn't know his own army's strength.--Factuarius (talk) 08:14, 3 May 2009 (UTC)


 * Now,now what is this 560,000 ? Perhaps a product of your imagination or clumsy calculations each time a new number. It is clear that he was far more competent then you are and though he might have underestimated his army the opposite is true about the greek generals who were trying to explain their loses which were several times those of the First Balkan War.You are also incompetent to tell who took part and who didn't though I know that you want to make it look like all the male Bulgarian population was fighting the Greek Army, which if we want to be frank was more then the 140,000 we see here since you have conviniently omitted for instance some 85 companies not part of the divisions on occupation duties, each of them in full strength. Not to mention that you still can't find the name and year of publishing of what you have selfproclaimed "official bulgarian source pre 1932" which only shows how trustworthy your source is.--Avidius (talk) 12:45, 3 May 2009 (UTC)

Since you are so smart to use Greek sources on the Bulgarian Army and to deny the Bulgarian users the right to use their own official sources when it comes to their army i will soon put in the Greek Army according to Bulgarian sources, after all this is not your  POV page.--Avidius (talk) 12:53, 3 May 2009 (UTC)

"The territorial aspirations of the Balkan states" Map
The map of the conflicting Balkan territorial aspirations is totally inaccurate:


 * To Serbia leaves outside Northern Albania (with Durazzo) which was inside the per-war agreement between her & Bulgaria and also most of Vardar Macedonia which was the reason going to war with Bulgaria.


 * To Bulgaria leaves outside Western Thrace and especially Salonika which was one of the main reason in entering the war


 * To Greece leaves outside any portion of Asia Minor which was the reason of a prolonged war 6 years later and instead includes near all Albania which is just inaccurate.


 * To Romania leaves outside Silistra which was the very reason Romania went to the war

It's more of an ignorance fantasy. Having so many major errors must either replaced (if there is any better) or removed. Any disagreement? --Factuarius (talk) 04:53, 23 May 2009 (UTC)


 * You are right that the map is very inaccurate (for Greece for instance, you could in an extreme case also add Eastern Rumelia), but it would still be useful to have a map showing these territorial aspirations. Constantine  ✍  07:37, 23 May 2009 (UTC)

Silistra
I am copying word by word what Hall says on page 97 you on the other hand you are adding words and statements that are not present there since Hall is objective enough not to judge which concession is meaningful and which is not especially when it comes to ceding territories that were homogeneous--Avidius (talk) 10:32, 16 July 2009 (UTC).

Hall page 97
What I am mentioning is just the previous phrase of what you are mentioning. Look again. You told me that you have the (real) book so you can see it. Do you see it? --Factuarius (talk) 10:35, 16 July 2009 (UTC)
 * "The resulting agreement was a compromise between the Romanian demands for Dobrudzha and the Bulgarian refusal to accept any meaningful cession of its territory"

Yes however this doesn't mean you should delete the rest of what he says in order to make it look like Bulgaria was stubbornly refusing to give in without any reason to all the Romanian demands which affcourse were about land that was inhabited almost entirely by Bulgarians and not Romanians.--Avidius (talk) 10:41, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

At last for God sake. OK what you want to put the entire paragraph from book? I prefered this phrase because is the more general and clear about what happened. What you suggest?--Factuarius (talk) 10:45, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

After my last edit I think it got a little bit more balanced. If you have any other concerns share them.--Avidius (talk) 10:51, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Avidius don't put me to go to find source for that. It's ridiculous. You know that they refused, everybody knows that, why you are putting me in such trouble for nothing? --Factuarius (talk) 10:53, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Is that logical to you? I am not a Russian apologizer but what Russians tried was to bring the things to a compromize AFTER the Bulgarian refusal to give something that they had promised, so to avoid a war. For what you acused them? For the Bulgarian promise to the Romanians? --Factuarius (talk) 10:59, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

No it is not ridiculous in fact I don't remeber to have read anywhere that Silistra was not handed over. My sources even mention the interesting fact that the soldiers from the 31st regiment who were mostly from silistra that were still at the front became Romanian citizens all of a sudden.--Avidius (talk) 11:01, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

I am not accusing them of anything i am writing the explanation for the Bulgarian behaviour.--Avidius (talk) 11:04, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Can we discuss one at any time? About Silistra: you are confusing the dates. Indeed Silistra became part of Romania but AFTER the war NOT before, together with the Dobroudja. What you are remembering it is possible to be a fact since during the war it is possible soldiers from the area to where in the south or western fronts and to learn the bad news. But that was after the end of war not before, because Bulgarians eventuly refused to give it (before the war)--Factuarius (talk) 11:15, 16 July 2009 (UTC)


 * According to the protocol Bulgaria was giving Silistra with the territory within a radius of 3km aorunf it to Romania so it gave it up which meant that the men from the 31st regiment became Romanian citizens before the signing of the London Peace Treay (18 May) which ended the First Balkan War.i don't have a source that says the Bulgarians didn't give up Silistra which by the way would be againts all logic.--Avidius (talk) 11:22, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

I am going to find the sources you are asking. You try to find also what you can about and we will see. The edit warring as a first option is a very unhealthy option to both of us. Try to discuss it before and if you find that is impossible to come to a consensus, do whatever you want, but after not before. I believe it better. --Factuarius (talk) 11:37, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

English in this article?
Is it just me or is English really pretty bad in this article? --Belchman (talk) 16:04, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

Maybe but you are a little strict in your comments. Your help is needed. --Factuarius (talk) 04:08, 12 September 2009 (UTC)


 * It may need to be revised. I'll have a look in the near future. The trouble is that once you begin "proof-reading", your own opinion starts to take effect and you do more than just amend spelling and grammar. We'll see either way. Evlekis (talk) 12:33, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

WW I and Serbia
On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip a Bosnian-Serb student and member of Young Bosnia, assassinated the heir of the Austrian-Hungarian throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The assassination was organized and facilitated from the Black Hand, a Serbian secret society of political leaders and military officers highly influential in the internal affairs of Serbia. Princip was one of the three assassins sent from Belgrade assisted by three local recruits. The Austro-Hungarian investigation of the assassination rounded up all but one of the assassins and also much of the underground railroad that had been used to transport the assassins and their weapons from Serbia to Sarajevo. Under interrogation, the assassins fingered certain members of the Serbian Military confessing the involvement of active duty members of the Serbian Army and Frontiers Service. As a consequence Austria-Hungary and Germany advised Serbia that she should open an investigation, but the Serbian Foreign Minister Gruic having previously secured the Russian support, replied "Nothing had been done so far, and the matter did not concern the Serbian Government" On July 23, Austria-Hungary demanded Serbia to comply with its March 1909 declaration to the Great Powers to maintain good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary and issued the July Ultimatum together with an annex describing the findings of a criminal investigation into the assassination. Serbia responded by mobilizing its army and then answered to the Austro-Hungarian letter accepting point number 10, but cleverly rewording (providing itself with an out), rejecting, or responding disingenuously to the other nine demands. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador rejected the response on the spot and returned to Vienna. Austria–Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914. The Russian Empire, unwilling to allow Austria–Hungary to eliminate her last source of influence in the Balkans, and in support of its longtime Serb proteges, ordered a partial mobilization one day later. After the Russian involvement German Empire began to mobilize on 30 July 1914 as was provided from their prewar agreements. Same way France, according to the prewar agreement with Russia in case of a German involvement,ordered mobilization on 1 August. Germany declared war on Russia on the same day.

The six assassins caught by Austria-Hungary were put on trial and were convicted of treason. The leader, Danilo Ilić, was hanged. The remaining assassins in custody were not yet twenty years old at the time of the assassination and so were given prison terms. Most of the underground network that transported them were also arrested, put on trial, and convicted. Two of these were executed. Few peripheral conspirators were acquitted. A wide ranging investigation rolled up many additional irredentist youths, and the fifth column that the Black Hand and Serbian Military Intelligence under Dragutin Dimitrijević had tried to organize was eliminated. After receiving an Austrian letter, Serbia arrested Major Voja Tankosić (a member of the Black Hand committee who had been pointed out by the assassins) but then promptly released him and returned him to his unit. The seventh assassin escaped to Montenegro where he was arrested. Austria-Hungary asserted its right to extradite him, but Montenegrin authorities allowed the assassin to "escape" to Serbia instead where he joined Major Tankosić's unit; Major Tankosić died in November 1915 covering the Serbian retreat, but not before confessing his role in the assassination to historians at Azania. Master spy Rade Malobabić, Serbian Military Intelligence's top agent against Austria-Hungary, was arrested on his return from Austria-Hungary after the assassination, but was also later released and given a commission running an army supply store. In 1917 Serbia's government in exile arrested the leadership of the Black Hand wishing to halt their underground influence in both the army and politics. The leadership was put on trial before a kangaroo court and was convicted on false charges unrelated to Sarajevo, such as plotting an assassinations of Nikola Pašić and Crown prince Aleksandar; many were given death sentences. Three of the accused were ultimately shot by firing squad, against the protests of the new Kerensky government of Russia. Before being shot, Dragutin Dimitrijević made a written confession to the court that he had ordered Rade Malobabić to organize the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Malobabić made an implied confession to a priest before he was executed. Vulović's confession came at trial where he said he received orders signed by Serbia's top military officer to send Malobabic into Austria-Hungary just before the assassination.

Dragutin Dimitrijević (also known as "The Bee", "Colonel Apis", "No. 6" or, most commonly, "Apis") (August 17, 1876-June 27, 1917) was a Serbian military officer and nationalist leader of the Black Hand group which assassinated Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria in 1914. He was born in Serbia in 1876. At sixteen Dimitrijević went to the Belgrade Military Academy. A brilliant student, Dimitrijević graduated from the academy with such a good record that he was immediately recruited into the General Staff of the Serbian Army. An ardent nationalist, he decided to become a specialist in terrorism. He and a group of junior officers planned the assassination of the unpopular king of Serbia. On 11 June 1903, the group stormed the royal palace and killed both King Alexander and his wife Queen Draga. Then the Serbian parliament described Dimitrijević as "the saviour of the fatherland" and he was appointed Professor of Tactics at the Military Academy. He visited Germany and Russia where he studied the latest military developments. Dimitrijević's main concern was the liberation of Serbia from Austria-Hungary. Dimitrijević, who used the codename Apis, became leader of the secret Black Hand group. In 1911 Dimitrijević organised an attempt to assassinate Emperor Franz Josef. When this failed, Dimitrijević turned his attention to the heir of the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Dimitrijević was concerned about Ferdinand's plans to grant concessions to the South Slavs, fearing that, if this happened, an independent Serbian state would be more difficult to achieve. When Dimitrijević heard that Archduke Franz Ferdinand was planning to visit Sarajevo in June 1914, he sent three members of the Black Hand group, Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović and Trifko Grabež from Serbia to assassinate him. Unknown to Dimitrijević, Major Voja Tankosić was informing Nikola Pašić, the prime minister of Serbia about the plot. Although Pašić supported the main objectives of the Black Hand group, he did not want the assassination to take place as he knew it would lead to a war with Austria-Hungary. He therefore gave instructions for Gavrilo Princip, Nedjelko Čabrinović and Trifko Grabež to be arrested when they attempted to leave the country. However, his orders were not implemented and the three men arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina where they joined forces with fellow conspirators, Muhamed Mehmedbašić, Danilo Ilić, Vaso Čubrilović, Cvijetko Popović, Miško Jovanović and Veljko Čubrilović. After Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on June 28, 1914, several members of the Black Hand group under interrogation by the Austrian authorities claimed that the three men from Serbia (Dimitrijević, Milan Ciganović, and Major Voja Tankosić) had organised the plot. So Pašić knew very well what happened in 28 June 1914 and the people being behind and he knew before hand that a war would break because of that, but he didn't handed over the (known to him and now also to Austrians) conspirators, although he knew well that they were right about. Why? Because unlike 1913 now a full Russian support had been given.

That caused the crisis and that was the uncompromising position. And the Serbian leadership, both political and military, knew very well that both two would cause a war between Serbia and Austria. And also a war between Austria and Russia. In a similar situation in 1913 over Albania, the very moment Serbia's leadership realized that Russia hesitated to go to a war with Austria, recalled their troops from Albania. In 1914 the very moment they achieved Russia's full support, they did nothing to stop the upcoming war. Serbia's goal, as this is evident from her leadership's key activity and inactivity during the period, was to cause a war between Russia and Austria and she achieved it. That such a war would cause a World War all people of the era knew it for sure because both Austria and Russia were major participants of the two existed alliances and the Serbian top brass was not an exception. --Factuarius (talk) 09:10, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Edit
The main part of the article was COMPLETELY inacurate; so I removed it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Stankarter (talk • contribs) 03:56, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Verification needed
I added a vn tag on this reference: "History of the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps, Petar Darvingov, 1925, book II, p.712-714" and the part in question is "the Bulgarian army continued advancing (ca. the last 3 or 4 days before the armistice), especially in the South". It needs some explanations: which towns, villages, sectors did it captured? On the other hand according to the History Directorate of the Greek Army, the Bulgarian attack on Penchevo and Mehomia had only temporary success.Alexikoua (talk) 10:30, 27 January 2012 (UTC)

Lead: Origins of the First World War
Current version reads:

"Some sources however say that the real reason for war was that Germany and Austro-Hungary saw Serbia as on obstacle to expansion to the east and building of Berlin-Baghdad railway, which prompted Austro-Hungary to push Bulgaria into the war.[8] This also led to the First World War as Austro-Hungary wasn't satisfied with Serbian gains in the Balkan wars and saw Serbia as an obstacle.[8] Therefore Austro-Hungary was looking for a provocation which would trigger the war.[8]"

Only one source is given. And it is mostly nonsense, as well as being not NPOV. The Berlin-Baghdad railway was mostly built by 1913 and passed through Serbia anyway. Austria-Hungary may have seen Serbia as an obstacle to eastward expansion (as it had been from Serbian independence), but was much more concerned about the Serbian threat to its Balkan lands ("better a fearless end then endless fear"). During the course of the war, Austria-Hungary issued two ultimatums against the Serbs to limit their gains. It could easily have entered the war if it had not been afraid of a Russian intervention. They may have looked for a provovation which would have triggered a war (though not a general one) but the assassination of an Archduke, with the complicity of SOMe iN the Serbian Government, was not some accidental incident. --Markd999 (talk) 22:36, 6 July 2012 (UTC)

Greek flag
🇬🇷 🇬🇷

Is there a reason why, in the box at the top right of the article, two different versions of the Greek flag are used? Maproom (talk) 09:57, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
 * I think I know why this was done. At the time, these were the national flag (cross in centre) and naval ensign (striped). The naval ensign has been placed next to the name of Admiral Kountouriotis of the navy. I don't think it is a helpful detail in this context, so I will change that flag to the national flag. — Preceding unsigned comment added by NipsonAnomimata (talk • contribs) 21:29, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

Corrections needed in lead map
After a brief check it appears that the infobox map lacks essential information of the war operations: No sign about the Greek landing and capture of Western Thrace (cities of Komotini, Xanthi, Alexandroupoli/Dede-agatch as well as Kavala.Alexikoua (talk) 20:11, 24 February 2014 (UTC)


 * No map can contain all the operations of the war. Is there no way this can be solved with a more explanatory caption? I think this map is better than no map for the uninitiated. Srnec (talk) 19:45, 26 February 2014 (UTC)


 * I won't have a problem to restore this map temporarily, until we have a new version which will include the operations in eastern Macedonia & Western Thrace. In fact, as soon as I'm available I can create the map we need.Alexikoua (talk)


 * I have restored it with a new caption. Do you think the caption is sufficient? Srnec (talk) 01:39, 27 February 2014 (UTC)


 * Yes, it's the best we can do.Alexikoua (talk) 20:58, 27 February 2014 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 4 June 2016
I would like to make a request in the desription box in which says result : defeat of Bulgaria. I would like to change that to simply placing the two treaties i put below. The reason for this is because if you actually look at the statistics of the entire war, Bulgaria was picking up momentum and began earning decisive victories over its enemies. In the end, a group of stalemates occurred which forced the war into a ceasefire, not a defeat. The war was inconclusive, but afterward when the Great Powers intervened the land was split and given amongst the Balkan neighbors so therefore the defeat of Bulgaria would be better off simply replaced as the two treaties below because that is what the final result had come to.

Treaty of Bucharest, Treaty of Constantinople

73.161.219.233 (talk) 21:18, 4 June 2016 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: as you have not cited reliable sources to back up your request, without which no information should be added to, or changed in, any article. - Arjayay (talk) 15:40, 5 June 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 7 June 2016
I inserted a copy of the results box with the example of the result. This war is very controversial as both sides consider it more of a draw because due to the fact Bulgaria was fighting on four fronts they some how managed to push back a majority of the pressure towards them. They had less casualties than the others and only was the land added and divided when the great powers intervened and forced the treaties. Otherwise the war was not much of a defeat for Bulgaria but more of a ceasefire between the nations.


 * result= Treaty of Bucharest, 1913, Treaty of Constantinople

73.161.219.233 (talk) 21:22, 7 June 2016 (UTC)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format.  B E C K Y S A Y L E S  22:40, 13 June 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 17 April 2017
Change "The Second Balkan War was a conflict which broke out when Bulgaria, dissatisfied with its share of the spoils of the First Balkan War, attacked its former allies, Serbia and Greece, on 16 (O.S.)/29 June 1913." to "The Second Balkan War was a conflict, which broke out by the conflict between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece over the liberated territories from the Ottoman Empire, which started with an alliance formed between Greece and Serbia on the 1st of June 1914, followed by a surprise attack of the Bulgarian army on Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia",

because it is misrepresenting the facts, the armed conflict began on that date by a surprise attack from the Bulgarians, but the war broke out earlier when Serbia and Greece formed an alliance against Bulgaria on the 1st of June 1913. Sources: 1. Encyclopedia Britannica - https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars - "On June 1, 1913, Serbia and Greece formed an alliance against Bulgaria, and the war began on the night of June 29/30, 1913, when King Ferdinand of Bulgaria ordered his troops to attack Serbian and Greek forces in Macedonia." 2. http://cdrsee.org/jhp/pdf/workbook3_eng_ed2.pdf - "II–25. Extracts from the Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, signed on 19 May (1 June) 1913 Article 2 On the occasion of the division of the European Turkish territory, which upon the end of the present war will be ceded to the Balkan States by the peace treaty […] two High Contracting Parties shall undertake not to enter into special agreements with Bulgaria, they will support each other and that they will always act in agreement, mutually supporting their territorial claims and border lines specified below. Article 3 The two High Contracting Parties, considering that it is in the vital interest of their two Kingdoms that no other State lies between their territories west of the river Axios (Vardar), declare that they will lend support to each other so that Greece and Serbia could obtain a common border […]. Skoko, pp. 405-408" 37.120.42.38 (talk) 15:39, 17 April 2017 (UTC)


 * The proposed wording is not an improvement. The signing of a treaty does not begin a war. Srnec (talk) 23:26, 17 April 2017 (UTC)


 * ❌- concur with Srnec - there were several treaties in that period, but treaties do not start wars - Arjayay (talk) 12:05, 21 April 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 14 June 2017
Bulgaria Sign Treaty of Bucherest, in replacement of Bulgarian defeat in the beginning box to be more precise Detroiter313 (talk) 18:20, 14 June 2017 (UTC)
 * It already says the Treaty of Bucharest in the infobox under result. Stickee (talk) 22:44, 14 June 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 11 December 2017
"In the event, during the war, the Serbs succeeded in capturing an area far south of the agreed border, down to the Bitola–Gevgelija line (both in Serbian hands)."

"In the event" is hypothetical but "(both in Serbian hands)" implies they actually did capture the area. So "In the event" should be deleted and the sentence just be:

"During the war, the Serbs succeeded in capturing an area far south of the agreed border, down to the Bitola–Gevgelija line (both in Serbian hands)."
 * ✅. I actually don't know that it means to express that this might not have happened. To me, it reads exactly like it means "during the war." And since those three words are right there, right after this in the sentence, what's the point of having it? (And if I'm wrong and you're right, the phrase would still end up removed. So away it goes.) Thank you for catching this.  City O f  Silver  20:09, 11 December 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 1 June 2018
The introduction says "on 16 (O.S.) / 29 June 1913" Could you add (N.S.) after 29 and before June? 208.95.51.38 (talk) 15:48, 1 June 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes check.svg Done LittlePuppers (talk) 06:42, 2 June 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 9 July 2019
Please make two changes.

(1) "The Bulgarians held firm, the artillery was very successful in breaking up the Serb attacks." This is a comma splice. Please add an "and" after the comma.

(2) "Romania mobilized its army on 5 July 1913, with intention of seizing Southern Dobruja, and declared war on Bulgaria on 10 July." Please change "with intention of seizing" to "with the intention of seizing" or to "intending to seize". 208.95.51.53 (talk) 19:13, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * Yes check.svg Done Highway 89 (talk) 19:36, 9 July 2019 (UTC)

The Romanian Campaign in Bulgaria-second Balkan War
The Romanian Campaign in Bulgaria

With an élan which remained in legend, started to duty our sons ;it has presented at mobilization a much greater number ,than the one asked for. After 35 years of politics of vassality [23] in which many times the prudence was neighbor with cowardice, an entire nation was watching with humid eyes to the reawakening with pride of the ancient vigor. The intention of Romanian Commander was to occupy Cadrilater Region, with a Secondary Army ,and in the same time , the bulk of the Army to force the Crossing of Danube River through a point in amonte , then to advance in quick march to Sofia ,to dictate there the cease of the War and the conditions of the Peace. For the Second time, during His Reign, King Carol of Romania was crossing Danube in the temple of Romanian Army .In the year 1877 he has made it to conquer the Romania Independence. and to help at the formation of Bulgarian State. After 36 years, at the dusk of his life , he had to do it again to give a lesson to the ingrate neighbor and to ensure the peace of evolution of Balkans Countries ,threatened by the aggressive plans of the noisy and bad habited Bulgar hood. By a quick action, the Vth Romanian Army Corps , under the Command of General Culcer , strengthened with a Division of Reserve , occupies Cadrilater until line Turtucaia –Balcic , claimed by us; a Detachment has occupied in a few hours Varna , which then evacuated by the order of the of the Superior Romanian Commander In the same time , the principal mass of the Army ,transported by trains or by long markings , has concentrated along Danube ,between Bechet and Turnu Magurele .By Bechet , have crossed Danube on boats the troops of the Ist Corps of the I-st Division of Cavalry .As the I-st Corps was going from Rahova, towards South ,in direction Vrata , the Cavalry Division ,Commanded by General Bogdan , went oblique towards South-West , orienting towards Ferdinandovo , important nod of communication , where were crossing the driveways coming from Lom –Palanca and from Vidin. These roads were used by the Ist Army Bulgarian ,commanded by General Kutincev ;she was retreating from in front of the Serbs, which attacked her at Belogradcik and from in front of Romanians , which have executed with the Ist Reserve Division a demonstration in front of Vidin. Kutincev Army escapes with one of her Brigades by Ferdinandovo, and was advancing through Ginci Pass towards Sofia when , at 10th of July , her rearguard saw itself in contact with the Romanian Army. It was the Cavalry Division of General Bogdan .The forces in contact were not equal .General Sirakov, the Bulgarian Commander , had under his Command a Brigade of Infantry, made out of two Regiments (17 and 34) with the corresponding artillery ,where as General Bogdan had only 3000 Horsemen, with a little riding artillery and a group of Cycists. He maneuvered with wit and daring, such that the Bulgarians thought they were in the presence of a much superior force ,as number. A telegram of General Sirakov, intercepted by Romanians , said he has to do with the vanguard of an Army Corps and with seven Artillery Batteries .A deep demoralization overwhelms the Bulgarians : the soldiers declare that they do not wish to fight and threatens the Officers. The entire Bulgarian brigade has been made prisoner by the Horsemen of General Bogdan. The Army of Kutincev was decomposed .The deserters and prisoners have been disarmed by Romanian troops and freed, to go back to their homes. Under the protection of this flank guard, the rest of the Romanian Army , composed of Corps II-nd,III-rd and IV-th ,strengthened by an Independent Division of Cavalry and by several Reserve Divisions , were crossing the Danube River by Corabia .The bridge, prepared beforehand , constructed by portieres of five metallic pontoons coupled , has been launched in seven hours , which constituted a remarkable success to Romanian pontooneers. Once on Bulgarian soil, the Romanian troops advanced with vertiginous speed .In a matter of days the Romanian Army was at Balcani .The First Corps was at Orhania , occupying the pass Arab-Konak , the gate of Sofia From the elevation of the pass , the Romanian soldiers were looking at night the lights in enemy’s capital , and the Romanian Aviators , using for the first time the aero plane in War , were flying over Sofia , until Saranci and Novoselti .Te IV-th Corp was at Etropol , having the 2nd Cavalry Division at Zlatita .Fractions of Cavalry were at Tatar-Bazargic , advancing until 10 Km of Filippopol; reconnaissance’s of patrols made the connection with the avanpost of Greek Army .On the second line were II-nd Lucovica Corps and II-rd Zumakov Corps.The results of the campaign were very good;in 18 days the Romanian Army has been mobilized ,concentrated , crossed the Danube , reached 20 Km of Sofia and 10 Km of Filippopol, crossed the Balkans and was shaking hand with the Greek Army. It is true that the Army has missed the baptize of fire, Bulgarians avoided the slightest opposition. But the speed with which the marches have been made, the extraordinary resistance to exhaustion and misgivings of all kinds , not possible without in a campaign of speed, as this one, equivalents with a real military victory. The military goal has been ,however, fully accomplished.The communication of Sofia were completely cut .The Capital of Bulgaria, without a serious defence troop ,was at the hand of Romanians. The fate of Bulgaria was sealed. At 5/18th of July, Tsar Ferdinand addressed to Kink Carol the request to stop the advance of Romanian troops, declaring he is ready to receive the Romania’s conditions and to begin the peace treaties. As the great European powers were fighting between different wishes ; to keep their prestige, to obstacle the outbreak of a European Conflict , to defend their particular interests , and were looking to bring in front of London Conference ,the solution of Balkans Peace ,Romania went ahead. Thanks to the ascendant earned by her intervention, she proposed that the peace to be closed by direct treaties of Balkans States , and as meeting place proposed Bucharest. The proposal has been received .In this way the representatives of Balkans Countries summoned at Bucharest 17/30 of July and 28/10th of August, to set the new geographical foundations and political ones in Balkans peninsula , as the result of the War.here came the Greek Venizelos ,the Serb Pasic ,the Bulgarian Toncev and Montenegrin Vukotic ,for under the presidency of the Romanian prime Minister ,Titu Maiorescu , to give to their countries ,trialed, the wished peace and to ensure the place they deserve to future evolution. In this way was made also the temple place which Romania knew to conquer in Balkans. The Peace treaties ,led with outstanding authority by Maiorescu, have led to closing of the Peace of Bucharest in 1913[24] in which , after the expression of General Ficev , the military delegate of Bulgaria , this one had “to pay the bill” to which has been condemned by greed and myopia of her politics(Bulgaria).As about our country ,she was at the closing of these events with the entire territory which ensured the frontier of Southern Dobrogea , with European prestige considerable increased , but also with an implacable enemy in which all hatred born out of envy , out of the disillusion and by humiliation endured , was taking the most exalted proportions.

The followings of Balkans War

The Romanian-Bulgarian Conflict not only deepened the wound opened before in our rapports  with this country , but had the gift to clarify also the rapports of Romania with the Big Powers/Great Powers.of Europe. Our alliance with the Central Powers, especially with Austro-Hungary  , underwent to the decisive tria,:she showed her real value[25]. It was an unnatural alliance, based on cabinet combinations , estrange by the real feelings of nations , determined only by the commune fear of a third one, but without at its foundation to be nor the feeling which gives strength  to the action ,nether the real interest  which legitimates it. Immediately when the conflict between Bulgarians and Allies started to draw, Austria entered the scene ,without any hiding, for Bulgaria , of afraid to not lose from hand the victim  which she was catching :Serbia .At the entering in the action of Romania , our ally and protector , not only did not support us , but tried everything to not make us give up to it. During the Campaign of 1913 the Viennese press and the one of Budapest was filled of insults and threats at the address of Romania, of which intimidation was tried with the agitation of all kinds of imaginary dangers .In the same time , was suggested to the Bulgarians  strategically operation plans  which had to bring them victory. This attitude belligerent  of “the Austrian ally” culminated  in the celebre telegram send by Chancellor Berchtold[26] to Maiorescu, after the Closing of the Peace of Bucharest .As the ministers of England ,France, Russia , Germany, Italy were recocnizing  to Romania “the decisiveness with which she imposed the solution  and the moderation with which  she fixed  her own requests” and were congratulating  H.M. King Carol of Romania  for the conclusion  of “definitive” Peace , with the purpose to increase the country’s prestige and to increase the popularity of his Dynasty , the Austro-Hungarian  Chancellor treats the results of this Peace  with “ a provisory arrangement “, leaving to be understood that the treaty would have to undergo to the European Powers  to be ratified  and that the majority of those do not approve it. Maiorescu responded though, firmly , that”the Treaty of Bucharest it is a regulation  definitive of the Balkans Matter”. In truth, the Big Powers had the occasion  to intervene  in the Balkans treaties before, because it was decided in them over the rapports with Turkey  and the neighbor states. This time ,at Bucharest, five Christian States gathered  to regulate   the territorial matters  of their own direct interest , among them,  without  treating Turkey matter .The Big Powers  had thus no motive of intervention .Europe was edged thus to take act of Bucharest decisions.

In fact ,”the Romanian Campaign in Bulgaria had been the first chapter  of Romania’s War  against Austro-Hungary “(Nicolae Iorga).This was the solution  of the new political situation ,born by the Balkans Conflict. The national ideal of Romania received a strong spiritual  élan ,its realizing was within possible things, and its dead line seemed to close in.

Parallel with the falling down between Romania and Austria –Hungary, was pronouncing a closing between us and the Alliance French-Russian. After decades of cold and separation in different fields, France  was again beside  Romania[27].

An important turn took the conduct of our foreign politics because of the Balkans War. Romania reputed, above all, a success of prestige ; she gained trust in her own forces. The national pride was awakening .She came victorious from the conflict , emancipated by the paralyzing Austro-Hungarian tutor and was now looking  with trust  and hope  at the unfolding of her future .But on the hard paths  which were taking  towards future ,Romania was feeling  the need  of a friendly and serious support .This one could not be found anymore in to the sharp claws  of the hypocrite protector , but in a tender hand  of a big sister… fromKiritescu2003:CF:BF2F:6482:5468:8DA2:7640:D2CB (talk) 16:39, 11 June 2020 (UTC)Razu

AN AGITATED ANTRACT BETWEEN BALKANS WAR AND THE MONDIAL WAR
2. AN AGITATED ANTRACT BETWEEN BALKANS WAR AND THE MONDIAL WAR

After the Balkans crisis

The Balkans War was ended and the Peace was reestablished in South-Eastern Europe .The follow ups of the War were much more important than the modifying of the map of Balkans Peninsula.

Two nations which were coming out defeated ,from the material point of view out of this War: Turkey in the beginning and the Bulgarians afterwards. But behind Bulgaria defeated, a great European Power  suffered also a great moral defeat .Austro-Hungary  has been forced to look and allow the enlarging and the strengthening of Serbia  and of Montenegro, her death enemies, the exponents of Russian politics  in the Balkans .After futile efforts to provoke the revising of Bucharest Peace of 1913,Berchetold had to declare in the meeting of the Hungarian Delegation at 8th of November 1913 ,that has been renounced to do this revising.

Outside this ,Austro-Hungary seen Romania escaping from her grasp, shaking off from her mastering  and starting to have a politics according to her own interests. But these interests were directly opposite  to those of egoist politics of Austro-Hungary  and at this epoch, they coincided  with the politics which the French-Russian Alliance  were encouraging in the Balkans. More over, this emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian tutor  showed to be a happy one :she led Romania  to a material success and strengthened her prestige in the Balkans, Europe and towards the yoked brothers  in the Habsburg Empire. A strong reviriment was operating in Romanians conscience from all over, aware by the importance taken by the Romanian State  and proud by the earned situation. Romania was not disposed to accept, unconditioned, the choking politics and cuffing one   of the perfidy neighbor pseudo-ally.

It is true that it could not be talk of a breaking .Romania’s politics was too prudent  to risk such adventures .Even, during the Balkans Crisis  ,H. M. King carol of Romania and Prime-minister  Maiorescu renewed –in February 1913- the Secret Alliance treaty, which was connecting Romania by the Central Powers even more. .To neutralize the intentions of closing in ,which Russia of Sazonov  manifested towards Romania  and to ensure the military cooperation  of this one, in the case more and more probable of a war, strengthening the Political Alliance , the Chief of Austro- Hungarian  General Staff  ,Conrad  von Hotzendorf , came to Bucharest  to close a  military Convention  , which was setting to point the conditions of cooperation of the two armies against Russia Warm letters were exchanging  between the two Monarchs  with the occasion of closing of this important act. The unfolding of the events showed ,though, that this kind of hidden acts , closed between the walls of chancelleries ,with the knowledge of very few people, could not change the meaning  of the important events  taking place on the great political arena  of Europe , in the eyes and ears of the nations.

Great and deep changes were announcing in the political rapports of Romania with the neighbor countries. The traditional politics of friendship with Austro-Hungary has been shaken. Bratianu ,immediately after taking the breaks  of the Romanian Government in hand, announces Waldburg, the commissioner of Germany at Bucharest  ,that the events  in the Balkans  have made to appear a disagreement  ,real, between Romania and Austro-Hungary interest ;on the other hand, the Matter of Romanians in Hungary  has taken such a character  that, with all the text of the treaties ,Romania, in case of War , could not go beside Hungary. Concerned by this kind of stories and to gain a better orientation than the one the usual Prime-Minister of Bucharest  could give, Ballplatz* sends in a special mission  Count Hoyos[28].This one notices and reports that Austro-Hungary is on the brink  of losing Romania ,that the Romanian spirit is aimed towards Transylvania. The situation could be saved, either by reforms in Hungary , or by a victorious War of Austro-Hungary.

A serious action of re-closing in  by Romania  had to be fulfilled  by a man with great authority  and diplomatic talent .For this Mission, the Austro-Hungarian Government sends  at Bucharest  Count Ottkar Czernin[29], political figure  of first hand , personal friend of the Archduke inheritor Franz Ferdinand[30] and presumptive future Foreign Minister of future King.

from Kiritescu2003:CF:BF2F:6482:5468:8DA2:7640:D2CB (talk) 16:42, 11 June 2020 (UTC)Razu
 * Synonymous with Foreign Minister of Austro-Hungary Monarchy, after the name of the plaza were was situated this Ministry.