Talk:Sell v. United States

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Both http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-5664.ZS.html and this wikipedia article quote the Supreme Court decision. I have put it in quotes. I think this is a false alarm. Josephgrossberg 02:15, 23 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Yep. No problem.  :) &mdash; madman bum and angel 04:15, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

Unclear point
I found the article hard to follow about the actual result and its rationales, because of a missing link here: on the one hand, it says that forcibly medicating a non-dangerous defendant is now allowed (compared to Washington v. Harper); but on the other hand, the ruling used Sell's non-dangerousness as a major point for two aspects. How the two mesh is unclear.

My vague understanding after re-reading is that forced medication of a non-dangerous defendant was now allowed (within newly-defined criteria) but that Sell didn't actually meet those newly-defined criteria? Or is it only an issue of non-retroactivity, i.e. the old decision was ruled invalid under the previously established rules, but would now be valid if Sell was to be tried tomorrow? Hm. I don't even know if that's correct, but right or wrong it shouldn't take several readings. I think it should be directly addressed in the WP:LEAD so that a layman reader has at least a key or compass for reading the rest of the article. &mdash; Komusou talk @ 21:34, 5 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Washington v. Harper refers to the forced medication of a convicted person while he is incarcerated within a prison system for the purposed of managing his behavior in the prison environment while he is serving his sentence, since the the inmate had a history of being violent when not medicated. Since the prison followed its own polices and procedures in making this decision, the court ruled it was constitutional.


 * Sells was not convicted of anything and was being held pretrial as his bail had been revoked. He had not been tried yet because he had be found to be incompetent to proceed. The reason for medicating him was solely to render him competent to stand trial. There was no evidence presented to the court that indicated he was dangerous. The criteria laid out by the Supreme Court in previous cases specifically stated that that defendant had to be dangerous, in addition to the other  criteria. The Supreme Court concluded that although Sells met the first two criteria, because he was not dangerous, he could not be forcibly medicated. Hope that helps. I will work on making it clearer. (However, it is not a clear or settled area yet, legally.)  Mattisse  22:41, 5 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Thanks. The inmates vs. pretrial was an important point for the lead. But I still have trouble about this: the first "held" outlines 3 points for allowing forced medication of a defendant and doesn't mention dangerousness by name – so, which one of these points was broken, thus ruling in favor of Sell? Is it buried in the definition of "The medication must be necessary to restore the defendant's competency" (or in another precedent) that being dangerous makes it necessary, and not being dangerous makes it unnecessary? &mdash; Komusou talk @ 20:53, 6 November 2007 (UTC)
 * I take back the statement above I made about dangerousness having been specifically stated in a prior case. This is how I have pieced to together Sell v. United States now (although I may be wrong).


 * Although dangerousness was not in the criteria previously set forth by the Supreme Court, in Riggins v. Nevada the Court emphasized that an individual has a constitutionally protected "interest in avoiding involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs" and this interest is one that only an "essential" or "overriding" state interest might overcome.


 * In Sell v. United States, dangerousness was, along with incompetency, the justification for the forcible medication originally. Therefore, dangerousness was made a major issue in the case.  However, no evidence of dangerousness was ever provided. When the Eighth Circuit threw out  dangerousness as an issue, that left only incompetency as a justification. The Supreme Court has said that each case is to be considered individually, balancing the individual rights versus state responsibilities. Here you have a person who has already served more time pretrial that he would have served if found guilty. Without dangerousness, the state did not have an "overriding" interest in forcibly medicating the defendant.  -- Mattisse  23:09, 7 November 2007 (UTC)


 * The court opinions did not say that "no evidence of dangerousness was ever provided." The magistrate found that some behavior was dangerous (inappropriate behavior to a nurse). The district court found that this was not sufficient evidence of dangerousness, but that regardless of whether he was dangerous, the drug was needed to make him competent. The Supreme Court reviewed all of the hearings in the case. It didn't like that the judges had not been clear that there were different criteria - one based on dangerousness and one based on competence. The Supreme Court found that the final decision of the courts to allow the drug based just on competence was not supported because the first decision of the magistrate to allow the drug HAD been based on dangerousness. In other words, go back and use the right rules, and the right evidence, to make this decision.  I tried to clear up some of this in the facts section. I have not edited the holdings section. --Tinned Elk 02:59, 8 November 2007 (UTC)
 * The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found no evidence of dangerousness had been presented and it threw out dangerous as an issue, even though it up held the lower court ruling. Therefore, when the case was presented to the Supreme Court, dangerousness had already been removed as an issue, leaving only incompetency as the justification for forcible medication.   Mattisse  17:25, 27 November 2007 (UTC)

There is a difference between a finding of "no evidence" and the finding that the 8th circuit made in this case which is: "the evidence does not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or others at the Medical Center." The psychiatrist saying "he is a danger to himself" is evidence. The district court and 8th circuit agreed that the evidence presented in the lower courts was not enough to show that he was a danger. You are correct that the Supreme Court was not deciding the factual issue of whether Dr. Sell was dangerous. The Supreme Court was only looking to see if the correct standard was used to determine whether the drug could be administered involuntarily solely in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial. It held that the lower courts had not met that standard and sent the case back to the lower courts where Dr. Sell underwent subsequent hearings on his competence and the use of drugs to make him competent. --Tinned Elk (talk) 22:48, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
 * Actually, Sell plead guilty and was released with time served. Mattisse  23:10, 27 November 2007 (UTC)

Self?
The article keeps referring to someone called Self, but never mentions who this person is. Some cleanup is required. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Ciderbarrel (talk • contribs) 21:44, 7 November 2007 (UTC)

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