Talk:Sharif of Mecca/Archive 1

Patently wrong
Anonymous #82.35.34.11 reverted my edit a few days ago with the edit summary: the "clarification" in the previous edit was patently wrong. That's fine, but I'd like a little more information on why it was patently wrong. The bulk of the edit was that Hussein bin Ali was not the last Sharif of Mecca, but rather his son Ali was. My sources are:, , and. Also Britannica and the Jordanian government that Ali was King of Hejaz. The rest of my edit I don't think is controversial. - Nat Krause 15:49, 17 July 2005 (UTC)


 * Um, there's a problem. I don't think you mean to say that the Saudis conquered Mecca in 2005. Zora 20:57, 31 July 2005 (UTC)


 * I don't think so either; since no one else corrected it, I made the change to 1924, although the ibn Saud article seems to say the year should be 1925. Whoever knows best, please correct.  TresÁrboles 05:39, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

The sharîf of Mecca and the French during the expedition of EgyptHusâm Muhammad 'Abd al - Mu' tii pp. 151-160 Index | Plan | Text | Notes | Quote | Author Index entriesKey words:Egypt expedition, history, Mecca PlanThe first contacts The evolution of the correspondence The point of view of the English and the Ottomans The role of the Hejaz in the resistance to the occupationFull-textNote this document 1 Ismâ' IR Haqqi Ûzuwân, Umarâ' Makka fî - l - 'asr al' - uthmânî (Emirs of Mecca at the time otto)(...) 2 Saleh al-cUthaymîn, Târîkh al-mamlaka al-'arabiyya al - his ' ûdiyya (history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)(...) 3 ' Uthmân Ibn Bishr, ' Unwân fî târîkh Najd al-majd (the history of NEJD), Riyadh, Matâbi' al-Qasim,.(...) 4 Ahmad b. Zaynî Dahlân, Khulâsat al-Kalam fi bayân umarâ' al-balad al-harâm (history of the Gove Brêve)(...) 1In 1202/1787, sharîf Ghâlib b. Musâ'id succeeded his brother, the sharîf Surûr, the Government of the Hijaz1. Scarcely is it inducted, as her al ' mesud, who had managed to unify the NEJD and to make a political entity, concentrate their war efforts to other battle fields, outside the borders of this province. Before the victories won, in al-Ahsâ' and elsewhere in the peninsula Arabian2, aware of the danger which threatened if he undertakes any military action against them, sharîf Ghâlib declares them war in 1205/1790. After several violent, lost fighting most sharîf wiper, at the battle of Hamra, in 1212/1797, armed so terrible that his defeat in is virtually destroyed. Forced to retreat3, he returned to Mecca with the forces that remain, in dhû al - qa'da 1212/April 1797, to prepare for new fighting4. 5 'Ali Ma' tûq al-Qutt, Al-Hijâz fî-l-qarn al-thâmin ' ashar (the Hijâz to xviiie century), thesis of docto(...) 6 The Egypt was to send every year 42 000 bushels of grain, collected the tax foncie (ardab)(...) 7 The Emir of Mecca received 2.5% of the money made by the caravan of the pilgrimage, part d(...) 8 Christopher Herold, FII Misr Bonaparte (Bonaparte in Egypt), translated by Fu'âd Andreos, Cairo(...) 9 ' Abd al-Raheem ' Abd al Rahmân, Al-dawla al - his ' ûdiyya al - ûlâ (the first Saudi state), Cairo, Egyptian(...) 2A few months later, in Rabi ' I 1213/August 1798, the sharîf learns that the French occupied the Egypt. Having received the Sultan ottoman order of fortifying Jeddah and the two holy cities against a possible attack by Bonaparte, he strengthened the walls of Jeddah, up to oversee the work of restoration of the citadels himself5. At the same time, the occupation of the Egypt causes a strong crisis in the Emirate, deprived of most of its economic resources at once: it stops shipments of food base and endowments in cash each year from pious foundations (waqf) located in Egypt6, causing the suspension of the caravans of the pilgrimage, which constituted a source of revenue for the sharîf of Mecca important7, and affects trade between Jeddah and Suez. Sharîf Ghâlib includes much better any danger that threatens one of the main objectives of the Egypt expedition is to reach the Indies8 and must be, to do this, pass through its territory. Furthermore, he knows that as long as the French occupy the Egypt, he can expect no help from the ottoman State in its fight against the Wahhabis9. 10 Dahlân, op. cit., p. 267. 11 Harry St. John Philby, Târîkh Najd wa - da'wat al-shaykh Muhammad b. ' Abd al - Wahhâb (Arabian Days: )(...) 3A critical military situation and the deterioration of the economy are quickly understand that the only way out is to conclude a peace treaty with the Sa al ' mesud. 30 Jumâda I 1213/2 October 1798, he signed an agreement, whereby it recognizes the existence of a Saudi state: it agreed on the border separating it from the areas placed under the authority of the sharîfon collective tribes of each of the parties, and the sharîf allows the pilgrimage of the Al ' mesud towns Holy10. The French expedition thus has an immediate impact on the political conflict in the Arabian Peninsula, each presence seeking powers to preserve his forces for what the future can book him. Despite this agreement, however, the Sa al ' mesud will remain in correspondence with the chiefs of the tribes who, for the most part, had embraced the Wahhabi beliefs. Sharîf Ghâlib must suppress the resentment and the frustration he suffered, but it has no more pressed, learning of the evacuation of the Egypt, to resuming hostilities again declaring war on the Al Sa' mesud in 180111. The first contacts4Bonaparte took contact with sharîf Ghâlib b. Musâ'id, prince of Mecca, from the aftermath of his entry into Cairo, July 23, 179812. His willingness to meet multiple reasons. The wing English, who had to destroy the French fleet in the naval battle of Aboukir (1er August 1798) had, by the blockade of the Egyptian coast, cut the French means supply and communication with the France. Bonaparte, and after him Kléber and Menou pre-dominant him in command of the army of the East, were forced to be allies in neighbouring regions and develop ways to communicate indirectly with the Executive Board in Paris13. 12 Muhammad Zakariyyâ ' Inânî, "Murâsalât mutabâdala bayna al-sharîf Ghâlib b. Musâ'id wa-bayna Napoléo".(...) 13 Herold, op. cit., p. 113. 14 Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Shawkânî, Zikrayât al-Shûkânî, Beirut, Egyptian al' - awda, 1983, p. 30. 15 Gabartî, 'Ajâ' ib al-âthâr fî-l-tarâjim wa-l-akhbâr, Beirut, Egyptian al - jîl, 2e part, p. 350.(...) 16 ' Inânî, op. cit., p. 74. 17 Nabîl al-Sayyid al-Tûkhî, its ' îd misr fî ' ahd al-from hamla al-faransiya (the high-Egypt at the time of the ex)(...) 5By adopting a policy of understanding with the sharîf of Mecca, Bonaparte also sought to prevent the British ships to pass in the Red Sea and take position in Jeddah. The French believed that it was in their power to influence the prince of Mecca and pushing the unreliability doubling of English as the Ottomans, to get him to secede and proclaim its independence from the14door. Bonaparte had seized the importance of trade between Suez and Jeddah, the suspension of commercial activities in the ports of the North of the Egypt, because the British blockade, strengthened still15. The correspondence that he addresses sharîf Ghâlib shows that the French and the sharîf of Mecca were at least on one point: they had any interest in maintaining their relations trade16. The French, whose monetary reserves were exhausted, fired a few customs revenues of the goods from the Hejaz, while the sharîf of Mecca wished to pursue his trade with the Egypt, which his country depended on agricultural production and which at the same time provided an outlet for the Yemen coffee and imported fabrics from India17. 18 Gabartî, supra., II, p. 174. 19 The courier of the Egypt, in Suhuf Bonaparte fî Misr (1798-1801) (Bonaparte in average logs)(...) 20 Ibid., p. 15. 21 Gabartî, supra., 2e part, p. 276. 6Bonaparte knew well, also, that in Egypt, the religion was the main obstacle to its dominance. He knew also the extent of the spiritual and religious influence than the ottoman power was and he tried, arrived in Egypt, to appear in ally of the sultan, come for the sole purpose to purify the country from the tyranny of corrupt Mamluke. The first proclamation that he addressed to the Egyptian people, written on Board of the Orient, put it clearly: "is this not we who have been in all the centuries the friends of the Grand-Lord [that God perform desires!]". and the enemies of his enemies? "18 The proclamation by sultan, September 6, 1798, the war against the French, came soon deny these allegations. Bonaparte then lives in the sharîf an ally that could counter the influence of spiritual and religious of the sultan. It was, it seems, informed of the intentions of the sultan shortly before that not in is made the official statement to the France. As early as August 25, 1798, he sent the sharîf of Mecca first letter, followed soon by an another19, and a third, September 1, 1798, written by members of his20couch sheikhs. This shows enough the importance of Bonaparte granted sharîf Ghâlib. He knew that the prince of Mecca was to his political credit to his kinship with the Prophet and the control it exerted over the major holy sites of islam. Also it putting up all the streets of Cairo, the first letter he received from sharîf. In displaying the good relations between the French to the descendant of the Prophet, protector of the holy sites of islam, he hoped to convince the mass of the population that the French were respectful of religion and are guarantors of the performance of rites21. 22 Al-Qutt, op. cit., p. 112. 7Finally, Bonaparte was anxious to know how he could use the Hijaz as relay of its correspondence to the Orient: to establish a link between the Egypt and his ally Tippoo Sahib in India, he had to enter into agreement with the sharîf of Mecca. To the sultan of Masqat, he wrote, moreover, in the same direction22. The evolution of the correspondence 8Sharîf Ghâlib was the only Muslim prince to respond to the letters of Bonaparte, try even to win his friendship, to establish peaceful relations with. He knew how the weakening ottoman State was unable to protect its provinces. Fearing that Bonaparte on India referred the push to conquer the Hijaz, hastened to respond and come to terms with him23. He was also aware of the economic weakness of the Hejaz and his entire dependence on the Egypt: it is, moreover, for these economic reasons that since a long time, the power of the masters of Cairo extended to the Hijaz. The ancestors of the sharîf Ghâlib had they not to declare their allegiance to the sultan when I when he came to Cairo in 151724 ? Was the Egyptian market not the main outlet for the trade and the Indian and Yemeni goods that arrived at Suez by Jeddah and did it not constitute a significant share of the income of the25 sharîf? For all these reasons, sharîf Ghâlib saw no objection to negotiate with Bonaparte. He had to obtain guarantees on the maintenance of trade between Jeddah and Suez and the arrival of caravans of Egyptian pilgrims. These sources of income were even more necessary than defeats successive that came to wipe his armies to the Saudi Arabian forces had caused him considerable financial losses and that he needed funds to gain the Arab tribes which were not their allegiance for nothing26. 23 ' Inânî, op. cit., p. 86. 24 Muhammad Anîs, al-Dawla al-'uthmâniyya wa-l-mashriq al-' Arabi (1517-1914) (the ottoman State and l & #)(...) 25 Henry Laurens, al-faransiyya fî Misr al-from Hamla: Bonaparte wa-l-islâm (the French expedition in Égyp)(...) 26 Ahmad al-Sibâ'î, Târîkh Makka (history of Mecca), Mecca, printing Egyptian Quraysh, 1385 h, (3)(...) 27 ' Inânî, op. cit., p. 76. 28 Ibid., p. 81. 29 Muhammad Fu'âd Shukrî, al-al-faransiyya wa-khurûj al-faransiyyîn min Misr from Hamla (the expedition of)(...) 9Sharîf Ghâlib and Bonaparte exchanged about ten letters, in which the fundamental questions were addressed: the caravans of pilgrims and the means to ensure their safety until their arrival in Mecca; money and in-kind royalties that the Egypt had to pay to the Hejaz; trade between Jeddah and Suez; arrival at the port of Suez of responsible vessels of coffee and goods from India; the letters that Bonaparte asked the sharîf pass to some27recipients. In this match, to win his friendship, Bonaparte promised the sharîf the arrival of the pilgrims and the goods from the Egypt. He told her, in his first letter: "I reassure you as my strong desire to protect by all means travel of pilgrims to the Mecca." Mosques and all the mortmain property (Waqfs) belonging to Mecca and Medina will remain as in the past, the property of the Hejaz. "28 In his second letter, he announced to sharîf appointment of Mustafâ bey katkhuda as Emir of the pilgrimage (amîr al-hajj) and he announced that preparations were underway for the caravan parte in time. Moreover, on September 1, 1798, Bonaparte did write a letter to the sharîf of Mecca about efforts to members of the divan of Cairo it deployed for the safety of the road of the pilgrims29. 30 The Egypt mail, in op. cit., 2nd part, p. 87. 31 Poussielgue, Deputy head and controller of the expenses of the army of the Orient. See Herold, op.(...) 10For its part, sharîf Ghâlib expressed Bonaparte the joy that he had the idea of the arrival of the pilgrims in Mecca and told her to commit to protect against the raids of nomads (curbân)30. Seduced by guarantees that give Bonaparte on the payment of tribute, sharîf Ghâlib is content not to request payment of the income of the pious foundations, but he also asked the Poussielgue31 administrator to move the curtain covering the Ka'ba (kiswah), traditionally sent each year by the Governors of Egypt. Bonaparte, it sees it, knew perfectly how the sharîf of Mecca had need of grain and money - that only resources he provided the pious foundations made in Egypt for the benefit of the Holy cities-, and he knew admirably the dutiful. But, in reality, what mattered him by this correspondence was to maintain trade between the ports of Jeddah and Suez. 32 ' Inânî, op. cit., p. 81. 33 Plural form of dawâ. It is a ship of 150 to 200 tons, built in form of corvette and comp(...) 34 The sharîf of Mecca was himself a great merchant and he personally owned a d fleet(...) 11In all his letters, Bonaparte was to insist on this point, and to convince merchants of Jeddah send their ships to Suez, he duplicated the assurances that they would enjoy the best home. Sharîf asked in return that the tariffs are fixed before the arrival of the goods to Suez and insisted on the necessity that there was to ensure the security of trade during the transfer of goods of Suez to Cairo32. Indeed, the first ships arrived at destination in may 1799. Gabartî wrote about it: "this day there arrived at Suez nine ships (dawât)33 responsible of coffee, spices and other goods belonging to the sharîf of Mecca including approximately five hundred farq coffee." The English, which had prohibited the passage of these cargoes, liberated them at the request of the sharîf having determined in days time that was to transport, and collected the tithe. While at the request of the sharîf who had sent them a present about twenty days before the arrival of the ships in Suez, the French in had exempted the coffee. »34 35 ' Inânî, op. cit., p. 78. 12Few confident at first, Bonaparte was cautiously when it comes to ask the sharîf Ghâlib to convey to the imam of Masqat, Tippoo Sahib, India, and France consul in the Yemeni port of mocha, the letters that he sent them. It is only at the end of April 1799 that he decided to do so; June 30, he wrote to him a second time to ensure that the letters had been sent to their recipients. The same day, he also wrote the Consul of France to mocha, giving order to pay the sharîf94 000 francs, and stating that its objective was to "find an intermediary of confidence so that we can correspond with you in spite of the English cruisers which devastated the Red Sea"35. 36 Shukrî, op. cit., p. 256. 13To try to attract sharîf Ghâlib on the French and get sends trade ships to Suez, Menou adopted the same policy as Bonaparte. He expected that his efforts would be successful, because the sharîf showed a clear preference for the French in the previous two years: he had refused to the English fleet permission set in the port of Jeddah, while he had allowed it, in October 1800, Menou post which was to France island and the island of Réunion. November 30, Menou wrote to him that Bonaparte had appointed him to renew the peace and friendship treaties and that it would use this opportunity to assure him that all his subjects could without fear to go to Suez. that merchants would be subject to taxation of any kind (atâwât and maghârim), or not would be exposed to no hassle, because it was committed to cancel the taxes which previously weighed on them, except for a single. He added that if he was a single French to take a para more than what had been fixed, it would, on the field, liable to the death penalty. And he concluded by saying that the respect and consideration that he had for the sharîf of Mecca he had only dictated this measure. It was to remind him of his desire to equip the caravan of pilgrimage, to send the money of the two holy cities pious foundations and the transportation of the kiswa. to ensure that only circumstances due to the war had prevented him to carry out these projects; and him promise not to not miss the following year. The sharîf, who was in need of money, allowed himself to convince and sent again, in November and December, shipments of coffee, Indian fabrics and spices36. 37 Gabartî, supra., II, p. 439. 14Despite the efforts made in turn by Bonaparte then Menou from the sharîf of Mecca, the revival of trade between the Egypt and the Hejaz, was doomed to failure: the presence in the Red Sea, warships of the East India Company had indeed to undermine the commercial in Egypt movement during the French expedition. The text of Gabartî evidenced, which opens the year 1801 in these words: "roads are always cut, and supply sources;" the soaring prices affecting imported goods of Greece, Syria, India and the Hijaz has won all other goods and prices eventually increase tenfold. »37 The point of view of the English and the Ottomans15The British and the Ottomans saw obviously not a good look the relations the sharîf of Mecca had with the French. The first, who sought to confine the French in Egypt to go, were of the blockade and the cut-off in the channels of communication with the France a strategic imperative that would strengthen their position38. The battle of Aboukir had given them control of the Mediterranean coastline. The English company of the East Indies, on the other hand, had sent his Admiral monitor the East coast of the Egypt on the Red Sea, to meet any French plan that would use the Egypt as a base on the road to India. This double device was designed to render impossible the establishment of political and economic relations between the princes of the region and the French. In June 1799, after the attack off the coast of Suez of two ships, the Centurion and the albatross, the Admiral of the company at the head of five vessels, began the blockade of Suez39. 38 Mordachai Abir, "Relationship Between the Government of India and the Sherif of Mecca During the French"(...) 39 Eric Macro, wa-l-gharb Al-Yaman (Yemen and the Western World), trans. Qadrî Qal'at ' ajî, Beirut, 1996.(...) 40 Al-Qutt, op. cit., p. 111. 41 ' Abd al-Latîf Muhammad Harîdî, Shu' Venetian al-haramayn al-sharifayn fî - l - 'asr al' - uthmânî, Cairo, Egyptian(...) 16At the same time, the English were also trying to deter the sharîf of Mecca to enter into relationship with the French: they promised him to help him in his fight against the Wahhabis and he offered very advantageous commercial Treaty for him. But the sharîf refused. He also refused to grant them the right to Jeddah and Yanbu' their40food and water supplies. Despite a few incidents, the English East India Company did not come into open conflict with the prince of Mecca. The attack by the English vessels, vessels of the sharîf in the Red Sea created much excitement: case remonta Ambassador of England to London, which the set to Constantinople. In the memory that he sent the Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, stated, in its defence, that there was good cooperation between the French and the sharîf, and that it had sent its ships to Suez and Qusayr. The Grand Vizier (sadr has ' zam) realised to the sultan, in a report that recommended, as necessary, the appointment in Jeddah of a Governor (wâlî) which is able to follow events. But at the same time, the grand vizier assured the sultan that, in the letter that he sent to sharîf, he would hold not against him the charge of cooperating with the French, enemies in religion, but that it would attract his attention to the fact that he had learned by information that were reached, that trade from Jeddah vessels had resumed their traffic to Suez and Quseir, and that he hoped that the sharîf would warn the captains of these ships against cooperation with the French. The ottoman Empire was not in a position that allowed him to adopt a more offensive posture. Using skillfully the hesitations of his opponents, the sharîf of Mecca put thus maintain a policy independent, in line with its interests41. The role of the Hejaz in the resistance to the occupation17The last factor with which he had to compose is resistance and call for jihad movements who left Hejaz to issue the Egypt of the French occupation. The decisive role played by these "combatttants of the faith" (mujâhidûn) in the fight against the French in high-Egypt is well known. It should be noted, first, that is not the sharîf of Mecca, nor even one of the descendants of the Prophet (ashrâf), who took the head of the movement to call for armed struggle, but a Moroccan in the Hijaz, Muhammad b. Tâhir42al-Jîlânî. Sharîf took no part in this preaching: he was neither able to control or suppress this powerful current religious, nor willing to oppose a movement against the foreign invader. But he could not further demonstrate its enmity to Bonaparte, while so cruelly lacking equipment and weaponry. 42 National Archives of the Cairo (Egyptian al-Wathâ'iq al-qawmiyya), Sigillât al-qisma al-'askariyya, registr(...) 43 Lutfallâh Gahhâf Nusûs yamaniyya ' year al-from hamla al-faransiyya ' alâ Misr (Yemeni texts on the shipment)(...) 18Also did it not take the risk of displaying his hostility toward the French. But he did nothing nor to counter the flow of fighters who left the Hijaz to the Egypt. He offered them even his help. According to Lutfallâh Gahhâf, it mit available five ships loaded with weapons and ammunition to transport men and their equipment43. But he did not want to get more directly involved in the military confrontations. This median position is paradoxical in appearance: sharîf Ghâlib was convinced that the French occupation did not last long, that English and Ottomans leave never the French to permanently settle in Egypt. Without compromising its position on the French, he gave to their opponents enough pledges his loyalty to power, after the French parties, argue the new leaders of the Egypt that he had participated in their expulsion. 19Again, he knew so skillfully maneuver. Its flexibility and the apparent ambiguities in its policy will lie mainly to the economy of the Emirate and the weakness where the places the decline of the ottoman power in the French expansion in the Arabian peninsula. His rapprochement with the generals of the expedition at the same time where it is helping the mujâhidûn in their resistance to the occupation, is one of the results of this double constraint. The warnings that he addresses, at the same time, the imam of the al-Mansûr Yemen, are no doubt sincere and best say his actual position: he advising fortify its ports, it warns of the danger of also French and English in the Red Sea. 20Translated from Arabic by Samia Rizk. Notes1Ismâ' IR Haqqi Ûzuwân, Umarâ' Makka fî - l - 'asr al' - uthmânî (Emirs of Mecca in the Ottoman period), translated by Khalîl Murad, Basra, Markaz dirâsât al-khalîj al-carabî, 1980, p. 154. 2Saleh al-cUthaymîn, Târîkh al-mamlaka al-'arabiyya al - his ' ûdiyya (history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), 1re part, 1404/1984, p. 126. 3' Uthmân Ibn Bishr, ' Unwân fî târîkh Najd al-majd (the history of NEJD), Riyadh, Matâbi' al-Qasim, 1385 h., p. 31. 4Ahmad b. Zaynî Dahlân, Khulâsat al-Kalam fi bayân umarâ' al-balad al-harâm (Brêve story of Governors of the Holy places), Cairo, Matba'at al-kulliyyât al-azhariyya, 1305 h., p. 367. 5'Ali Ma' tûq al-Qutt, Al-Hijâz fî-l-qarn al-thâmin ' ashar (the Hijâz at the xviiie century), doctoral thesis, unpublished, Cairo, Mashhad al-dirâsât wa-l-buhûth al-'arabiyya, p. 8. 6The Egypt was to send every year 42 000 bushels (ardab) of grain, collected on the property tax, and 10 million of paras (currency). The pious foundations in favour of the Holy cities in Egypt were similarly to send 32,000 bushels of grain and 15 million of paras. 7The Emir of Mecca received 2.5% of the money made by the caravan of pilgrimage, on the part of traders of Egypt their representatives (wukalâ) in Mecca and Jeddah. These remittances reached are so huge that the course of currencies increased in Egypt about 10 to 15% as the caravan of pilgrimage left Cairo. See Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Tabarî al-Makkî, Ithâf fudalâ' al-zamân bi-sîrat banî Hasan, manuscript, Cairo, Egyptian al-kotob al-masriyya, no. 931, p. 160. 8Christopher Herold, FII Misr Bonaparte (Bonaparte in Egypt), translated by Fu 'âd Andreos, Cairo, al - Hay' was al-'âmma li-l-Kitab, p. 113. 9' Abd al-Raheem ' Abd al Rahmân, Al-dawla al - his ' ûdiyya al - ûlâ (the first Saudi state), Cairo, Egyptian al-Kitab al-gâmi'î, 1982, p. 143. 10Dahlân, op. cit., p. 267. 11Harry St. John Philby, Târîkh Najd wa - da'wat al-shaykh Muhammad b. ' Abd al - Wahhâb (Arabian Days: An Autobiography), translated by cUmar al-Dayrâwî, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-ahliyya, 1966, p. 101. 12Muhammad Zakariyyâ ' Inânî, "Murâsalât mutabâdala bayna al-sharîf Ghâlib b. Musâ'id wa-bayna Napoleon Bonaparte rigâl hamlati wa - hi ' alâ al-sharq" (correspondence between sharîf Ghâlib b. Musâ'id and Napoleon Bonaparte), Majallat al-dâra, no. 3, 1401/1981, p. 76. 13Herold, op. cit., p. 113. 14Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Shawkânî, Zikrayât al-Shûkânî, Beirut, Egyptian al' - awda, 1983, p. 30. 15Gabartî, 'Ajâ' ib al-âthâr fî-l-tarâjim wa-l-akhbâr, Beirut, Egyptian al - jîl, 2e part, p. 350. 16' Inânî, op. cit., p. 74. 17Nabîl al-Sayyid al-Tûkhî, its ' îd misr fî ' ahd al-from hamla al-faransiya (the high-Egypt at the time of the French expedition), Cairo, Al - Hay 'a al - âmma li-l-Kitab, 1997, p. 284. 18Gabartî, supra., II, p. 174. 19The courier of the Egypt, in Suhuf Bonaparte fî Misr (1798-1801) (Bonaparte in Egypt logs), trans. Salâh ad - dîn al-Bustâni, 2e part, Cairo, Egyptian al-'arab li-l-Bustâni, 1971, p. 87. 20Ibid., p. 15. 21Gabartî, supra., 2e part, p. 276. 22Al-Qutt, op. cit., p. 112. 23' Inânî, op. cit., p. 86. 24Muhammad Anîs, al-Dawla al-'uthmâniyya wa-l-mashriq al-' Arabi (1517-1914) (the ottoman State and the Arab East, 1517-1914), Cairo, al-Anglo al-misriyya, 1985, p. 127. 25Henry Laurens, al-faransiyya fî Misr al-from Hamla: Bonaparte wa-l-islâm (the French expedition in Egypt: Bonaparte and islam), translated by Bashîr al-Sibâ'î, Cairo, Egyptian Sina li-l-nashr, 1995, p. 281. 26Ahmad al-Sibâ'î, Târîkh Makka (history of Mecca), Mecca, printing Egyptian Quraysh, 1385 h, (3e ed.), 2nd part, p. 127. 27' Inânî, op. cit., p. 76. 28Ibid., p. 81. 29Muhammad Fu'âd Shukrî, al-al-faransiyya wa-khurûj al-faransiyyîn min Misr from Hamla (the shipment of Egypt and the evacuation of the French), Cairo, Egyptian al-fikr, s.d., p. 98. 30The Egypt mail, in op. cit., 2nd part, p. 87. 31Poussielgue, Deputy head and controller of the expenses of the army of the Orient. See Herold, op. cit., p. 186. 32' Inânî, op. cit., p. 81. 33Pluriel de dawâ. Il s’agit d’un navire de 150 à 200 tonneaux, construit en forme de corvette et comprenant de dix à douze écoutilles pour le chargement. Long de 85 pieds et large de 20, pour une hauteur de 11 pieds, il a habituellement une ou deux voiles, mais avec la possibilité d’utiliser des rames. Voir ‘Abd al-Qawî Shawqî, Tigârat al-muhît al-hindî fi casr al-siyâda al-islâmiyya (Le commerce dans l’océan Indien à l’époque islamique), Koweit, ‘Âlam al-ma’rifa, n° 151, 1990, p. 148. 34Le sharîf de La Mecque était lui-même un grand marchand et il possédait personnellement une flotte d’environ 31 navires, dont deux partaient chaque année pour les Indes, tandis que le reste était affecté au transport du café du Yémen et des marchandises rapportées des côtes africaines. Si le sharîf ne pouvait vendre immédiatement les marchandises ou le café pour son propre compte, il en distribuait le chargement à des marchands locaux aux prix en vigueur sur le marché et proportionnellement à chaque marchand. Et bien qu’il ait imposé lourdement les marchands de La Mecque, il ne les a jamais lésés dans leurs droits. Voir l’extrait sur Djeddah tiré de Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys Collected during His Travels in the East by the Late John Lewis Burckardt, et traduit vers l’arabe : « Djedda, al-Dakâkîn wa-l-mînâ' wa-l-cutûr », Kitâb al-rahâlla al-gharbiyyûn ilâ al-jazîra al-‘arabiyya wa-l-khalîj, 762/1950, Beyrouth, Dâr al-sâqî, 1994, p. 31 ; Gabartî, vol. II, op. cit., p. 276. 35‘Inânî, op. cit., p. 78. 36Shukrî, op. cit., p. 256. 37Gabartî, op. cit., II, p. 439. 38Mordachai Abir, « Relation Between the Government of India and the Sherif of Mecca During the French Invasion of Egypt », Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, p. 40. 39Eric Macro, Al-Yaman wa-l-gharb (Yemen and the Western World), trad. Qadrî Qal’ajî, Beyrouth, 1996, p. 49-50. 40Al-Qutt, op. cit., p. 111. 41‘Abd al-Latîf Muhammad Harîdî, Shu’ûn al-haramayn al-sharifayn fî-l-‘asr al-‘uthmânî, Le Caire, Dâr al-zahra, 1985, p. 117. 42Archives nationales du Caire (Dâr al-Wathâ’iq al-qawmiyya), Sigillât al-qisma al-‘askariyya, registre n° 224, p. 657, mâdda 224. 43Lutfallâh Gahhâf, Nusûs yamaniyya ‘an al-hamla al-faransiyya ‘alâ Misr (Textes yéménites sur l’expédition française en Égypte), édition critique de Sayyid Mustafâ Sâlim, Le Caire, al-Matba’a al-fanniyya, 1975, p. 70. Pour citer cet articleRéférence électronique Husâm Muhammad 'Abd al-Mu‘tî, « Le sharîf de La Mecque et les Français durant l’expédition d’Égypte », Égypte/Monde arabe , Deuxième série , L’expédition de Bonaparte vue d’Égypte , [En ligne], mis en ligne le 08 juillet 2008. URL : http://ema.revues.org/index758.html. Consulté le 06 novembre 2011. AuteurHusâm Muhammad 'Abd al-Mu‘tî Université de ‘Ayn Shams Droits d’auteur© Tous droits réservés ________________________________________ SommaireDocument précédentDocument suivantNavigationIndexAuteurs Mots-clés NumérosTous les numéros Troisième série (2005-...) 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Titre : Égypte/Monde arabe En bref : Revue de sciences sociales traitant du monde arabe et musulman contemporain A social sciences journal devoted to Arab and Muslim contemporary world Sujets : Sociologie, Études du politique, Afrique du nord, Moyen-Orient Dir. de publication : Marc Lavergne Éditeur : Centre d’études et de documentation économiques juridiques et sociales (CEDEJ) Support : Papier et électronique EISSN : 2090-7273 ISSN imprimé : 1110-5097 Accès : Barrière mobile DOI / Références Citer cette référence Outils Signaler cet article Imprimer cet article Original Le sharîf de La Mecque et les Français durant l’expédition d’Égypte Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Ghalib_Efendi&oldid=459267202" Personal tools •	Log in / create account Namespaces •	Article •	Discussion Variants Views •	Read •	Edit •	New section •	View history Actions Search

Navigation •	Main page •	Contents •	Featured content •	Current events •	Random article •	Donate to Wikipedia Interaction •	Help •	About Wikipedia •	Community portal •	Recent changes •	Contact Wikipedia Toolbox •	What links here •	Related changes •	Upload file •	Special pages •	Permanent link Print/export •	Create a book •	Download as PDF •	Printable version •	This page was last modified on 6 November 2011 at 09:15. •	Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. See Terms of use for details. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization. •	Contact us •	Privacy policy •	About Wikipedia •	Disclaimers •	Mobile view •	• — Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.120.63.218 (talk) 09:31, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

Rename the article
from Sharif of Mecca to Sharif of Hejaz, does anyone agree ? Ammar (Talk - Don't Talk) 13:04, 27 June 2007 (UTC)
 * I see the move is done, but I think it's a bad idea. Applying the Google test, there's less than 5 hits for the current title, while there is more than 13.000 for the previous one (search term; "Sharif of [name]" -wikipedia) I suggest to move it back. -- Steve Hart 22:48, 23 August 2007 (UTC)


 * But Generalization is much better for discribtion. i mean, when you say "Sharif of Mecca" the readers will think he is the governer of Mecca only , while in fact the Sharif is the governer of Hejaz. Ammar  (Talk - Don't Talk) 12:13, 24 August 2007 (UTC)


 * I disagree, Ammar. It's true that the Sharifs of Mecca ruled most of Hejaz (and sometimes areas outside the Hejaz as well), but they're most widely known as the "Sharifs of Mecca".  It will be explained in the article that the Sharifs governed a large area and not only the city of Mecca, so there shouldn't be any confusion.  It's like the "Emperor of Rome" or the "Kingdom of Jersalem" or the "Ottoman governor of Baghdad"; all these titles are derived from the names of capital cities even though they refer to larger areas.  Slacker 12:31, 24 August 2007 (UTC)


 * I think you right :) Ammar  (Talk - Don't Talk) 02:06, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

To say any part of history is not important is quite the opposite.

Thank You,there is a great wealth of information in your encyclopedia and we always need to know more about our past to understand better about our future.

If you are searching for history we need to search for the facts understand the events time place and causes.

We can not change facts and we can not erase history.

I sent you before names of books and dates for letters between Napoleon and Al-Sharif Ghalib Bin Musad.Some of the Articals are in the National Libarary in France.To say that this man in not important is to say Napoleon is not important.If Napoleon wrote to him and discussed his suport and knowledge at that time for the whole middle east and had a peace treaty with him, then we need think of this man as a great leader and a great military thinker.

I would like to add my voice to yours in searching for more information and more research is needed.

History always repeat it self,and we need to have all the facts and true events get recorded.Now we have the means and wells since we have internet and close communications between people.This man was known for his justice and wise decisions.we need to know what happend after T.E Lawrance in Arabia. may be this will bring a better understanding to the real events that is some of the problems in the area.

Source:Rulers of Mecca,7 pillars of wisdom, Boudleian Libarary in the U.K Sources: Reecueil des arretes et Proclamatiuons de Lautorite Francaise en Egypte pendant occoupation.

Oeuvres de Nepoleon Bonaparte;F.Rousseau: Kleber et; Menou en Egypte depuis le depart de Bonaparte; Courrier de l'Egypte;La Decade Egyptienne;L'Islam et Bonaparte;Histoire Scientifique et Militaire deL'Expedition Francaise en Egypte fourth Edition by Louis Reybaud ; storys of Sheikh Al Mahdi witten by a great wtitter Jean Marcel. Al Sharif Ghalib Ruled for 20 years in Hijaz Province and is will know as the one of the greats Rulers from 1781 to 1801 Every thing is important in History. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.102.0.102 (talk) 05:21, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

Actully from 1788 to 1803, and then he ruled again from 1813 following the return of Mecca , see the list of Sharif_of_Mecca  A M M A R   14:36, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Al-Sharif Ghalib and decendent web page www.alsharif-ghali.com from:alsharifmalghalib@hotmail.com

Please post useful web references so we can collaborate and update the article. A M M A R 22:51, 24 June 2009 (UTC)

[edit] web references tnks. WIKIPEDIA a AMMAR for your promt respond to my editting notes.In regards to a web reference;you can log in to the temporary web page for Sir Al-Sharif Ghali Bin Fiasal Al-Ghalib www.alsharif-ghali.com.There are some historical and interesting information to be shared and educate the family and the public in the Relationship between the الأشراف Shareefs and آل سعود Al-Saud.The web page is dedecated for any members of AlSharif Ghalib trust الوقفWakaf members to gain access to election Ballot Votting sheets and family election voting results.pictures and drawings for family members,Castles and property sill owned by the trust aWakaf Al-Sharif Ghalib Bin Mussaad أوقاف الشريف غالب بن مساعد. AMTRS

Dear i'll review the website and we will select some points to be discussed here. but first, i assume you think this article is about someone else in the modern age. before we start i want you to know this article is about Ghalib afandi who was Sharif of hejaz during Ottoman Egyptian-Saudi conflict, led hejaz from 1788 to 1808 and from 1811 to 1813. and only about this person. A M M A R 22:51, 26 June 2009 (UTC)

[edit] Abdulmutalib bin Ghalib (1851–1856) Abdulmutalib bin Ghalib (1880–1882) Is the son of Al-Sharif Ghalib Bin Mussaad.His picture/drawing is on the same web page.Al-Sharif Abdulmutalib Bin Ghalib Ruled/Governed Hijaz from 1880–1882 and from 1851–1856.

This cannot be correct due very long period of leadership and due to interaction of dates and also most references deny that. A M M A R 10:10, 27 June 2009 (UTC) Abdulmutalib bin Ghalib Rulled 1827-28 1852-1856 1880-1881 ,his name is listed in your list of Sharif of Hejaz recomend a book to add as a reffrence Rulers of Mecca in the libraryof Congress by De Gaury, Gerald.Reprinted of the 1954 eddition.published by Roy Publishers,New York.Bibljography:p. Includes inex.1.Mecca-History 2- Mecca-Biography.1.Title. DS248.M4D 1982 953,.8 78-63458. Reprinted by arrangement with George G. Harrp & Co.td. frm the edition of 1954 .New York.AMS PRESS New York. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.43.255.154 (talk) 09:43, 28 June 2009 (UTC)

This is kinda the same as listed. A M M A R 08:37, 1 July 2009 (UTC) Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Ghalib_Efendi" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.177.156.197 (talk) 05:33, 8 July 2009 (UTC) Once again,thank you Wikipedia for the your wealth of knowledge we all can enjoy endeavor and seek wisdom, P.S AMMAR Thanks for you notes and replys.Every thing is important in History. Al-Sharif Mujahid Talib Rafiq Sadiq Al-Ghalib email address alsharifmalghalib@hotmail.com

Hawashim
Hawashim are also included under the larger clan of Banu Hashim Ali1407 (talk) 11:59, 17 March 2017 (UTC)