Talk:Soviet invasion of Manchuria/Archive 1

I think, a good developing article. --Tomtom 20:59, 6 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Links
I placed links in various other articles to this one, esp Great Patrioic War.--Numerousfalx 21:02, 6 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Port Arthur
''...entitled to ... pre-eminent interests over Port Arthur and Dairen, with its strategic rail connections. With the exception of Dairen... the other possessions are still administered by the most powerful of the Soviet Union's successor states, the Russian Federation.''

The article Lüshunkou (Port Arthur) seems to imply this is fully owned by China and not Russia. Which version is correct, the above or the Lüshunkou article? --203.52.130.139 03:27, 19 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I beleive that the Soviets turned over all of their gains to show friendship with the PRC--Gary123 22:50, 24 May 2005 (UTC)

Reports of killing of Japanese settlors will be appropriate, afterall what do the Japanese owe to the Russians, yeah like the Red Army knew about the atrocities against the Chinese and acted in vengeance, yeah righto "four legs good, two legs baaaad"

Casualty estimates
What're the sources for the (widely divergent, for the Soviet losses) casualty estimates? Given the decisiveness of the victory, and that nothing in the article alludes to them, the Japanese ones seem very surprising. Alai 06:13, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

Check out this link it is a very big article http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp (Deng 23:45, 13 March 2006 (UTC))


 * According to Krivosheev, Soviet casualties are a bit higher than provided in this article - 12 031 dead, 24 425 wounded/sick Soviet soldiers and 72 dead, 125 wounded/sick Mongolian soldiers. With respect, Ko Soi IX 01:59, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

I'd like to know from what source the Japanese estimates came. Although the Soviet sources would have been open to less criticism owing to the style of government and so could be innacurate, from looking at the comparative strengths and that CGSC article it seems that the Soviets might have had little reason to play down the number of casualties they recieved (at least less that people would like to think; people often underestimate the modern fighting capability of the Russians).

About the Opening Paragraph
Did the Soviets agree not to attack for three months after the defeat of Germany, or did they wait three months? Judging on the dates May 8 and August 8 the former seems more likely. Captain Jackson 04:06, 14 January 2006 (UTC)


 * Neither, they promised (in Yalta I think) to attack within three months.
 * Allied leaders continued to press Stalin to commit his forces against Japan in order to complete the destruction of the Axis combination
 * the anticipated campaign involved extensive planning and preparations stretching over a five-month period from April to August 1945
 * --DelftUser 18:44, 16 January 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes, article is misworded to the effect of stating the exact opposite of what was agreed. The leaders of the three great powers […] have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:[…](Yalta Protocol) ("two or three"? strangely fuzzy wording for a contract) -corrected--84.188.203.180 10:24, 12 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Read the link I gave a few lines up it is the big mega super ultra big article about the war made by the US army, It is B I G (Deng 19:55, 1 April 2006 (UTC))

Better dead than red

 * In particular, it is said that the Japanese were eager to surrender to the United States before they were occupied by the Soviet Union.

I have added a "[citation needed]" to this sentence. For all the Japanese knew the Americans had the capacity to drop any number of atomic bombs on the home islands. What would have been left for the Soviets to occupy if the country had been bombed back into the stone age?

Further as they were asked to surrender unconditionally they could not know in advance who would occupy which parts of Japan, and it was not possible for them to include such terms in surrender document. After all the Western Allies gave up large chunks of East Germany to the Soviets (See section "Rolling the Carpet") and the Soviets gave up chunks of Austria to the western Allies before the Japanese surrender, so for all the Japanese Government knew the Allies might have had a similar deal between themselves for the occupation of Japan.

The whole paragraph in the article seems to me very speculative, so it should have citations to page numbers in reliable references. (See WP:V)--Philip Baird Shearer 19:16, 12 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Read here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp it is a study by the american military and here is another one they are not the same read them both http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz4/glantz4.asp (Deng 20:58, 16 April 2006 (UTC))

That the Red Army which had fought the German army to a standstill and driven it back to Berlin had learnt a thing or two about how to fight a war is not surprising or in dispute. But I see nothing in these documents which states that In particular, it is said that the Japanese were eager to surrender to the United States before they were occupied by the Soviet Union. Perhaps I missed that paragraph, can you point me towards it in either of these two documents?

To invade the home island Japan would take a massive amphibious operation and it was the Western Allies who had the experience of landing armies by sea onto a hostile coast (Operation Torch, Operation Husky, Operation Baytown, (the smaller) Operation Shingle, Operation Neptune, Operation Dragoon, Operation Iceberg and many smaller amphibious assalts in the Pacific theatre) and the equipment to carry them out. The Soviets did not have the experiance or the equipment. --Philip Baird Shearer 00:02, 17 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Learnt a thing or two? They became the best army on earth. If you want to learn more about the Soviet army during ww2 go here and read what professor Overy has written for the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/soviet_german_war_01.shtml. And if you read all 6 pages you will see that they didnt just learn a thing or 2. Also if you look at this campaign the numbers speak for them selves. In 11 days they destroyed the Japanese army in Manchuria which was 1.1 million strong. But perhaps your headline on this topic describes your state of mind. And forbids you to absorb real fact. And only leaves you with the ability to not see anything that speaks positively about the red army fighting ability during ww2. Anyway will find the lines for you but it will take some time, as you know the texts are long. Also you should take note that I am not the creator of this article I just look in time to time on it. Also you are dead wrong about this : " The Soviets did not have the experiance or the equipment." They hade done it many times and atleast twice on the Crimea.(Deng 04:21, 17 April 2006 (UTC))
 * Understatement is a common English speaking world, to emphases a point. I forget that I am not always addressing someone from the same culture and have to be more literal. Sorry. --Philip Baird Shearer 09:58, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

PBS is objecting to "In particular, it is said that the Japanese were eager to surrender to the United States before they were occupied by the Soviet Union." Which is a statement about the Japanese, not the Soviets, so you're not addressing his point. The phrase "eager to surrender" is hardly an accurate description of the state of mind of anyone in Japan. —wwoods 08:30, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Apparently the Soviets believed—rightly or wrongly—that they did have the experience and equipment they needed for a limited invasion of the Japanese home islands. One reference is David M. Glantz, "The Soviet Invasion of Japan," Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 96–97, which discusses new information indicating that Stalin was ready to land troops on Hokkaido two months before the scheduled American landings in Kyushu. 

I haven't read that, but Richard Frank cites it in Downfall (p. 323–324):
 * One of the many important revelations to emerge after the collapse of the Soviet Union was that Stalin's ambitions in the Far East in 1945 extended from the outset not only to Manchuria and Korea but also to Japan proper. ...
 * The Soviet strategy for the campaign also featured a two-pronged thrust to Hokkaido. On August 11, the Red Army had launched an attack from the north via the huge Sakhalin Island. This endeavor made very slow progress against fanatical Japanese resistance. ...
 * For the invasion of Hokkaido, the Soviet First Far Eastern Front intended to assault from Sakhalin. The lead division would seize a bridgehead with only one rifle regiment. The rest of that division would follow, and then two more divisions would land. ... Given the vast size of Hokkaido and its mountainous terrain, the Soviets expected that the Japanese could oppose their landing with only one division. ...
 * The Soviets overestimated Japanese strength ... [which was] oriented toward the American threat from the east, ... The Soviet Navy's amphibious shipping resources were limited but sufficient to transport the three assault divisions in several echelons.
 * ... In retrospect, it appears that Japanese resistance on Sakhalin would have precluded readiness [to invade] before August 24 or 25 in any event, but Truman's firm reply on August 18 was crucial. Moreover, events soon showed that Truman's refusal to permit Soviet advances to Hokkaido saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese from death.


 * (p. 356–357):
 * Soviet intervention would have very likely shaped the prospects for success of any intervention by the Emperor to end the war, but in what direction is not certain. ... Under an optimistic scenario, ... the spectacle of Soviet troops landing on Hokkaido, ... would significantly increase the incentive for capitulation.
 * But Soviet intervention might also have triggered a reaction from the Imperial Army that could have foreclosed peace. The bolt from Manchuria galvanized Japan's soldiers to commence plans to declare martial law, terminate the civilian government, and rule from Imperial Headquarters. Had the Imperial Army seized a position of such absolute ascendancy, it is by no means obvious that the war would have terminated in an organized Japanese surrender.

—wwoods 08:30, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Also this talk has not addressed the point that I made in the first paragraph: ''I have added a "[citation needed]" to this sentence. For all the Japanese knew the Americans had the capacity to drop any number of atomic bombs on the home islands. What would have been left for the Soviets to occupy if the country had been bombed back into the stone age?'' --Philip Baird Shearer 09:45, 17 April 2006 (UTC)


 * The answer to that can most likely be found if you ask the crator/s of the article and the person who put it there. He/she has perhaps access to material/s that gives a Japanese view on the war and how the leaders of Japan felt at that given time. (Deng 01:09, 19 April 2006 (UTC))

Good idea, the text was merged into this article by User:Charles Matthews as a " further merge from Battle of Manchuria" in "Revision as of 10:02, 28 June 2005". The original text was largly written by User:Algebraist in edits to Battle of Manchuria on 28 June 2005. So I have added a request to Algebraist's talk page, but Algebraist has not edited anything since November last year and does not have an email address set up, lets give it a day or two and see if (s)he replies. --Philip Baird Shearer 17:00, 19 April 2006 (UTC)

"Some historians, particularly Soviet and Chinese scholars, have viewed the loss of Manchuria—and the implicit threat of a total collapse of Japanese power in China as a whole—as a decisive factor in the Japanese surrender, perhaps more important than the atomic bombings. In particular, it is said that the Japanese were eager to surrender to the United States before they were occupied by the Soviet Union ." this is the part that was removed to whoever wants to look it up I post it here (Deng 03:06, 26 April 2006 (UTC))

As far as I can remember, that was lifted (and perhaps garbled) from Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They have a bunch of references there, if anyone wants to find out wehat historians have actually said rather than my quick rewrite of it. Algebraist 08:55, 5 May 2006 (UTC)


 * I have no problem with a statement that 'Some historians, ... have viewed the [the Soviet attack] ... as a decisive factor in the Japanese surrender, perhaps more important than the atomic bombings'. They may even be right. —wwoods 01:25, 11 May 2006 (UTC)


 * A WP:V source is needed. Which historians (weasel words)? and if they exist are they considered respectable and notable in the academic community or are they considered to be revisionists? --Philip Baird Shearer 12:15, 19 May 2006 (UTC)


 * From here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki if you scroll down to "Opposition to use of atomic bombs" and almost at the very end you will see this. "Other sources have stated that the atomic bombings themselves were not the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, they contend, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced the Japanese message of surrender on August 15 1945" but before that you have a diffrent view so it does fit the idea of "some historians" (Deng 22:19, 20 May 2006 (UTC))

So what we have to date are two sources that say that the Soviets would have liked to have made amphibious landings on Hokkaido. Wanting to launch an amphibious seaborne assault and succeeding are two very different things as Gallipoli and Dieppe show. Secondly as the Japanese could not know that the Soviets were planning this assault, no one has yet come up with a source which says that the Soviet attack was the decisive factor in the Japanese surrender. It may well be that the Soviet declaration of war was a decisive factor but again that should be sourced. That the Soviet attack on the 8th and possible invasion followup was a decisive issue seems to me to be very speculative (and of a type which occurs regularly in Wikipedia), and as such is an extremely controversial, so it should be linked to the name of a peer reviewed respected historian and not made with a weasel worded phrase such as "Other sources". Because as I said before at the Japanese could not know that the Americans did not have a production line of atomic bombs, and if the Americans did, then worrying about whether the Soviets were going to occupy a land devastated by A-bombs is IMOH not very rational point of view.

That some Soviet historians put forward such views during the Cold war would not surprise me, but are would these still be credible sources? Are there no minutes of the Japanese Cabinet meetings to discuss surrender and in those meetings what was the main perceived threat? From memory in his broadcast the Emperor mentioned the A-bomb as a new an terrible weapon, did he mention the Army's defeat at the hands of the Soviets?--Philip Baird Shearer 23:19, 21 May 2006 (UTC)


 * I dont know any sources. All I can give is common sense. This is what the Japanese knew. They hade 1.1 million men in manchuria and 2.3 million on the main islands. They knew that manchuria had been run over and the 1.1 million had been destroyed in about a week. So 1 million = 1 week then 2 million must be 2 weeks. And you seem to look at this from only 2 points either the atomic bombings ALONE conviced the Japanese to give up or the Soviet Invasion ALONE did. The real answer must therefore be in the middle that the bombings togheter with the loss of Manchuria and the Kwantung Army and the losses of the whole Japanese Empire, which the americans and other allied forces had taken from the with their island jumping and Philippines campaign and other such campaigns, except the home islands. All these factors togheter and probably in equall terms conviced them that surrender was a must. Fighting to the death wouldnt matter because either they would be boombed or they would be over run. Because no matter how bravely they fought they wouldnt be able to stop the Soviets. A leasson they had learned twice once in 39 and now again in 45. And when we look at it from this point of view we can see that yes probably someone would rather surrender to the americans then the soviets. (Deng 23:41, 21 May 2006 (UTC))

I've readded the paragraph with a copy of the text on Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki including the sources provided on that page by —wwoods --Philip Baird Shearer 00:02, 22 May 2006 (UTC)

Article title
Shouldn't this article be moved to Battle of Manchuria? —wwoods 01:25, 11 May 2006 (UTC)


 * I don't think so, reading the article it seems debatable so this is probably the best title.say1988 02:33, 19 May 2006 (UTC)


 * For the record, there was never an Operation August Storm--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 10:25, 8 April 2008 (UTC)

Problem in introduction
It says:
 * "The invasion began on August 8, 1945, precisely three months after the German surrender on May 8."

But as this is about the the Soviet Union, should it not make referance to the fact that in the Soviet Union the German surrender was and is still remembered in former Soviiet state on May 9? That would make it consistant with being within 3 months. As I read within 3 months to mean less than, which excludes on 3 months.say1988 02:33, 19 May 2006 (UTC)

This paragraph needs work:

''Japan's decision to surrender was made before the scale of the Soviet attack on Manchuria, Sakhalin Island, and the Kuril Islands was known, but had the war continued, the Soviets had plans to invade Hokkaido well before the other Allied invasion of Kyushu[1][2]. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings themselves were not the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, he contends, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced the Japanese message of surrender on August 15, 1945[3]''

It contradict's itself and drops Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's name in without explaining who he is. I think that his name should be left out and mentioned later in the article.

This really needs work, as it completely misses Hasegawa's actual point: the main impact of "August Storm" was not the rapid advance of Soviet forces into the Japanese holdings on the continent; it was the Soviet declaration of war itself which crushed any hopes among the Japanese that they could serve as a mediator in a negotiated peace with the US, instead of accepting the demands for unconditional surrender. 80.219.192.183 (talk) 19:15, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

Soviet Invasion of Hokkaido?
Every World War II history notes the fanatical Japanese defenses and stubborn resistance the US would have faced had it attempted an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and such resistance is frequently given as the justification for the quick ending of the war that the atomic bombs brought. Given this context - that the United States Pacific Forces, with all of its naval and air superiority and the superior firepower of its infantry would expect extremely high casualties in any amphibious landings and invasions - how did the Soviets expect to be able to pull off an invasion of one of the Japanese home islands? The Soviet naval assets paled in comparison with the American ones, not to mention that their troops lacked the experience in amphibious warfare that the Americans had. That it is claimed the Soviets would be able to mobilize enough assets to invade even before the Americans simply boggles me. What kind of navy were they planning to invade with? Fishing boats turned into troop carriers? Did they even have sufficient assets to be able to supply an army by sea? Basically, my question is: did the Soviets ever have a realistic chance of taking Hokkaido had the two a-bombs not been dropped?--Yuje 20:24, 28 August 2006 (UTC)


 * I sense subjectivity from you.

Yes, Soviets had realistic chances. Nazis troops were serious, not japanese 195.225.160.109 11:21, 30 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Hehe they had allready taken some Japanese Islands in operation August Storm, what is hard for many to understand and you are no different Yuje, is that the Soviet army in 1945 was the BEST nothing would have stoped it, they blew out the Japanes from Manchuria in less then 2 weeks and the Japanes had 1.1 million troops there. In the home Islands the Japanes had 2.2 million so it would have probably been over in 3 weeks. Study more and you will learn or study nothing and learn nothing it is up to you. The Soviets also had done some amphibious operations the Ilsands for one but more importantly in the Crimea Lokqs 23:26, 30 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Taking some small islands is a lot different from taking on the Japanese mainland. The former require landing several thousand troops, while the latter would require tens and hundreds of thousands. I don't doubt that the Soviet army was the largest and best during World War II, but without sufficient naval assets, all the troops in the world won't matter if they're only capable of mustering enough ships to send them piecemeal a few thousand at a time against a large defending force, and if they lack ships capable of delivering heavy equipment such as tank divisions and artillery pieces. And supposing a million troops do land in Japan, this would require a huge logistics train. Overland supply was possible in Manchuria, but for Japan, a sufficient navy is needed, or else a million Soviet soldiers would have lacked food and water, fuel for their tanks, and ammunition for their weapons and artillery. Perhaps the Soviets really were capable of conquering the home islands, but they would faced all the same conditions predicted by the Americans in Operation Olympic, and would have had to do it without the US navy and army air corps. --Yuje 23:49, 30 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Up above I quoted Frank, summarizing his summary of Glantz. Summarizing further, the Soviets were planning a three-division invasion. Not a huge force, but apparently the Japanese had shifted so much of their strength to Kyushu and Tokyo that only one division remained on Hokkaido, and that was on the east side of the island, in case the Americans tried a landing. It seems plausible to me that the Soviets could have successfully landed and occupied a chunk of Hokkaido. Maybe not the whole island, and going on to invade Honshu would be a different proposition, of course.
 * —wwoods 03:20, 1 October 2006 (UTC)


 * They would probably have taken over Japan very easy, but they might have had bad luck like the Mongolian did when they tried many years earlier. It is very difficult to say. Helpsloose 07:26, 12 November 2007 (UTC)


 * As has been said, a succesful landing on Hokkaido would have been possible. Kyushu or Honshu, however, would have been a pipedream. The Soviets simply didn't have the naval lift to support an invasion force large enough and the soviet navy was utterly inadequate both in numbers and quality to defend such an invasion fleet against the thousands of kamikaze attacks the IJN and IJA would have thrown at it.

More info
Their si alot of valuable info in the article "Evacuatio of Manchukuo which should be added to the campaign section.

Number of Soviet attacks on Japan
In the opening paragraph it says "It marked the initial and only military action of the Soviet Union against the Empire of Japan..." In his book Stalin. The Court Of The Red Tsar, Simon Sebag Montefiore writes that Soviet Union attacked Japan in 1939. Though a limited attack, it was effective and reached it purpose: Japan later never attacked Soviet Union, and it allowed a relocation of some 400 000 soldiers to the defense of Moscow in 1941. --JerryC 18:24, 30 September 2006 (UTC)


 * First of all it was the Japanes who attackked the Soviets, you are looking for the Battle of Khalkhin Gol and dont take what Simon in his books says so seriously he skips the whole part from 43 and onwards when the Soviets were winning. Lokqs 23:21, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

neutrality?
This article is hardly neutral at all. It has a far too pro-Soviet feel with borderline racism. Anyone have any ideas on how to fix this up?

05:00, May 10 2007, (UTC)

Give some examples what do you mean?

Mongolia
Regarding the Mongolian People's Republic's inclusion in the infobox; are the any proves that the Mongolian People's Republic actually provided any military support to Operation August Storm? Regards, --Kurt Leyman 12:56, 21 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Yes they did. Their force amounted to about 16,000 men, out of which they lost 72 dead and 125 wounded. The source for this is Krivosheev (http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_51). Krivosheev also gives slightly different numbers for the Soviets: 1 669 500 men altogether, 12 031 dead, 24 425 wounded. With respect, Ko Soi IX 12:03, 25 September 2007 (UTC)

Map
There is map on the Spanish Wikipedia:. --DelftUser (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 09:11, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

Renaming article
For the record, the first ever document to call this operation "Operation August Storm" comes from February 1983 and is found in August Storm: The Soviet strategic offensive in Manchuria by David Glantz as a presentation Leavenworth Paper for the US Staff College. I have communicated with Mr.Glantz, and he has confirmed that this was not in fact the name of the operation. The correct me of the operation is the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, something that is confirmed in his more recent work The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm (2003). I can provide the rather humorous story related to me on how the operation was named "August Storm", and it is a sad statement of the ability of other writers and editors to check sources since he assures me I am the first (his bold in the email reply) to ask him about this name since 1983. Subject to comments, I will be creating a mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:20, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
 * And, as with the Second Battle of Kharkov, any change you request will have to satisfy WP:V and WP:OR. Unfortunately, we've got repeated reliable sources confirming 'August Storm.' Has Glantz published something saying what he told you? In that case, you might have a case. Buckshot06(prof) 22:31, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
 * Well if mrg3105 is right this must be changed. One note the Battlefield documentary about this battle does not mention the name August Storm anywhere. Either way, unless we find very strong sources proving that this name is wrong I can't support a change. ⇨ EconomistBR ⇦   Talk  18:18, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
 * In a personal correspondence with Mr.Glantz, he advised me that originally the name was coined by his 11 year old daughter (at the time) as a good name for the what was then a presentation because the operation took place with torrential rains. Apparently I have been the first to ask him this question on two decades.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:44, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Yes, you've said that elsewhere. Have you asked Mr Glantz if he's published anything saying that; a letter, a comment, named in conference proceedings, anything? If so it becomes WP:V and we can make the change. Buckshot06(prof) 22:49, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
 * You are frustrating as all hell Buckshot06. What part of personal correspondence do you not understand? You said previously "we've got repeated reliable sources confirming 'August Storm", what are they? There is NOT ONE SOURCE in the entire history of the Second World War outside of Glantz that uses that operational name--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:55, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
 * I know you said personal correspondence. I know what that means. Let me try and be bit more clear. Have you emailed Mr Glantz again and seen whether he has said, now, in any WP:V sources that his 'August Storm' name was an invention? (Yes, our repeated reliable sources for August Storm, are unfortunately in this case, his published work!!) Buckshot06(prof) 00:29, 9 June 2008 (UTC)
 * I will probably be accused of incivility again, but"In a personal correspondence with Mr.Glantz, he advised me that originally the name was coined by his 11 year old daughter (at the time) as a good name for the what was then a presentation because the operation took place with torrential rains. Apparently I have been the first to ask him this question on two decades"
 * ...and no, a title of a book is not a source for anything, and neither is an 11 year old girl. This will forever stand as Glantz's contribution to indictment of all writers who take anything they write about for granted without checking the sources--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 01:03, 9 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Glantz has used the title in multiple works, including the book version of his paper which was published in 2003 (and aimed at a specialist audience given its high price!), which suggests that he, or at least his publishers, regard it as now being a common name for this. That said, I don't see anything wrong with renaming this article to some variant of Soviet invasion of Manchuria as using operational names for semi-obscure operations like this is undesirable and makes the articles inaccessible for non-specialist readers. Nick Dowling (talk) 01:08, 9 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Nick, do you understand what I'm saying? Have you, Mrg3105, emailed Mr Glantz a second time, after receiving that email about his daughter, asking whether, in any WP:V sources, he has said that this name was only his invention? Maybe you can rephrase my question Nick so Mrg understands me. Buckshot06(prof) 01:20, 9 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Yes, I think that I understand you: using only personal correspondence is a violation of WP:OR and a published source where Glantz admits this is needed, especially as there are some WP:BLP-type implications. If Glantz made up the name, he seems to have stuck to it with remarkable (and ill-advised!) tenacity as he's produced two papers (which are now available on the internet and can be easily updated) and two books using the name over the past 20 years, despite the opportunity to make good this error. Moreover, it has been used elsewhere (for instance, Downfall by Richard B. Frank). That said, I agree that it's not a great name for the article, though it is better than something like Soviet strategic offensive in Manchuria as few readers know what a 'strategic offensive' is, and its not a likely search term. Nick Dowling (talk) 06:43, 9 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Buckshot and Nick. Do you appreciate what I'm saying? Glantz was giving a presentation at the college where he was a lecturer at the time. For that presentation, before the transcript was expanded, and published by the Centre (which I have), he was trying to find a "snappy" title, and this was provided by his daughter at a dinner. That is all it was. From then on it was just used by publishers for a title. The name is not used anywhere INSIDE THE BOOK, either the US Army publication, or the subsequent commercial one. That someone can decide the title of a book to be the name of an operation is called something that I will not use words for because of the incivility PC. He has never been ASKED about inventing the name (including book editors). Every other "author" has UNQUESTIONINGLY accepted this to be the actual Soviet codename for the operation (as is the case with Keitel's rubbish)!!! Quite frankly I don't give too hoots about your "WP:OR". You are doing your own "OR" by using pure figments of someone's imagination, Nazi war criminals, and now 11 year old girls, to foist on the unsuspecting public names of operations that never were. Glantz is not subject to Wikipedia's "rules", and neither are the editors of his publishers or ANY OTHER AUTHOR. If they think the book will sell, they can call it "Debby does Manchuria" for all they care, and then someone will suggest that because its really the Battle of Debby does Manchuria because it was even on the news, they will equally argue under the great Wikipedia common English name guideline to adopt that. For the record Nick, the name of the operation was, is, and ALWAYS will be the Manchurian strategic offensive operation. If few readers know what a 'strategic offensive' is, its because people like you and Buckshot here that actually prevent them being in the literature and reference works in the first place!!! If more "authors" actually used the right terms instead of "Battle of...", more readers may be aware of what a strategic offensive is.
 * Quite frankly "Use the most commonly used English version of the name of the subject as the title of the article, as you would find it in verifiable reliable sources" is a convention and not an etched-in-stone LAW. I choose to disregard it based on COMMON SENSE. My common sense says that if a thing was originally named X, then no matter how many people will always be X. If the population of England was denied the awareness of military operations of their own or other countries' during the war, that is no reason to continue denying this information 60 years later when even the Berlin WALL HAS COME DOWN. I kid you not, this is the last straw. The operations were named by Soviet General Staff in this way for a reason, and they are far more useful then what is used in English, and that is how they will be used. I do not care what English sources you can find. I have read most of them, and anything written before John Erickson's books has been stored in my garage for at least 25 years as useless paper. There is a process of historical research that exists outside Wikipedia. If you are unfamiliar with it, I suggest you address it with your MA supervisor
 * As for genuine original research, I can tell you that I can delete articles much faster then they can be created just based on you statements here. The vast majority come unsourced. People submitting articles after 4 years in Wikipedia still have no clue what a reliable source is.
 * I have had enough. Tanking Keitel's word for something is one thing, but taking the work of Glantz's 11 year old daughter is another thing altogether. Next stop will be the ArbCom - I guarantee it as much as I hate it.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 13:45, 9 June 2008 (UTC)

--

Sent this a few moments ago:

Dear Mr Glantz, I've been corresponding with [Mrg3105] in Australia, who has related to me the story of how you named your first piece on the Soviet Manchurian offensive after something your daughter once said, resulting, it seems, in some sources now taking that as the accepted name for the operation.

Have you noted in any of your published work or conference proceedings, etc, that this was a mistaken assumption to make? We would like to amend the article in wikipedia but it would be best if we could refer to something you published saying that your first book title might have created some misunderstanding.

How goes Colossus Triumphant? - I've very keen to see it. Hope all your other work is proceeding well.

Kind regards [Buckshot06] -- Buckshot06(prof) 21:08, 9 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Any words from him? I really hope he answers but if he doesn't how should we proceed? ⇨ EconomistBR ⇦   Talk  18:36, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Ok, I don't what to look as if I am taking sides but: ⇨ EconomistBR ⇦  Talk  12:56, 9 June 2008 (UTC)
 * 1) The russian version of Wikipedia doesn't not use the name "Operation August Storm" anywhere, they simply say that in the West this battle is known as "Августовская буря" (August Storm). This means that the Soviets didn't use this name, the West invented it.
 * 2) The russian version of Wikipedia calls this article Советско-японская война 1945 года or Soviet-Japanese War of 1945.
 * 3) We don't know what name the Soviets gave to this operation, but given this it would have to be either a planet or a personality (I know it's silly to conjecture this, still).


 * No reply yet?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 04:08, 25 June 2008 (UTC)
 * The name of the operation used everywhere in Soviet literature, throughout Glantz's publications and any publications before his "August Storm" in English is Manchurian strategic offensive operation--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 04:08, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

Question, if I may. Glantz uses the wording "August Storm" as a book title. Do I get it correctly that he does not call the operation this way anywhere in the book? Is this assertion by Mrg disputed? --Irpen 05:03, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

Small comment about Soviet/Russian historiography
Soviet-Japan War (August 9 – September 2) include a number of operations including Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation (August 9–20). // Wilderr (talk) 17:59, 30 June 2008 (UTC)
 * No, the other operations are part of the Manchurian operation, which is why it is strategic--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 23:19, 30 June 2008 (UTC)

Letter to Mr Glantz is answered

 * My apologies. I received an answer within about 24 hours (I also asked him when Colossus Triumphant was scheduled to be ready):


 * "Dear [Buckshot06]:


 * Koone has ever heard that story -- and it is the only one I know of.  Colossus Triumphant is years away.  I have just completed volume one in Year of Stalingrad, and hope to finish volume two by 1 August. Volume three will have to wait until after I complete my teaching chair next academic year (at the Citadel in Charleston, SC).  The two-volume Barbarossa study *1,760 pages) is also on hold for at least a year."


 * which has the benefit of telling us about his research/writing plans as well. It seems nowhere in any public forum has Colonel Glantz said that 'August Storm' was a misnomer. Buckshot06(prof) 05:28, 25 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Which part is the answer to the question on the name of the operation?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 06:32, 25 June 2008 (UTC)
 * First sentence: 'Koone has heard that story' - looks like he hit the 'k' key instead of the 'n' key on the keyboard. Cheers Buckshot06(prof) 09:52, 25 June 2008 (UTC)


 * So I take it that now you believe me that none have heard that story until I asked him?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 13:33, 25 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Mrg, I tried to tell you five or six times that I believed you. I could not make myself understood. I sent that email not because I disbelieved you, but because you were having difficulty understanding what I was saying. Buckshot06(prof) 01:22, 26 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Your first answer was a question, "Has Glantz published something saying what he told you?"
 * Now, if I was the only person he has told me about this, he had not published it anywhere. And since it was in a private communication, then essentially you were saying - because Glantz has not published it anywhere, therefore the declaration by you Mrg3105 is not believable since it can not be backed up by an independent source. That means you did not believe me. My problem was only that I had read the original basic research 25 years ago, and although I had seen the two recently published books that are essentially the old reports merged into one volume, it just never entered my mind that no one in 25 years would actually question the operational name. This is why my initial approach to suggestion of renaming was so casual. I assumed, something I generally do not do, that whoever wrote the original article, had in fact read the original publications which were linked in the original created by an IP (?) according to the history. What is more interesting is that the 2nd registered editor to lay his eyes on the article was Philip Baird Shearer who just made an effort to "teach " me about references, and the 3rd was Oberiko currently overseeing the completion of the World War II article. They, and numerous other editors had edited the article had edited it, but apparently failed to read the core sources that the operation "name" came from. And in the end, I have to jump through hoops to prove I am telling the truth? This is PRECISELY why I will continue to demand that all article be properly referenced and cited to an academic standard regardless of the purported experience or authority of any given editor--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 09:37, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

(od). I have significant problems in trying to communicate with you Mrg, or, you do not WP:AGF, rather, assuming I'm trying to pervert your words. I KNEW YOU WERE SAYING IT WAS UNPUBLISHED - I BELIEVED YOU!! But I also knew that it hadn't been publicly published. Are the two statements not able to be held at the same time? Please assume good faith here!! On the substantive question below Irpen, I haven't looked at it; follow up with Mrg I think's the best course. Buckshot06(prof) 12:36, 27 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Nothing can be assumed in Wikipedia, particularly good faith, as my experience has shown. I am not into mantras of political correctness, and avoidance is not my style either as the next article will possibly explain why it is that you find me so difficult to get on with. AGF is a mantra so far as I am concerned. I have seen more dishonesty and conflict in less then one year of Wikipedia editing than in 25 years of my professional working life!
 * No, the two statements are not able to be held at the same time because they are logically contradictory. Something that had only been discussed once between two people in 25 years, is obviously not available to the public--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 23:41, 27 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, I will try to defuse the situation. Conflict in Wikipedia is inevitable, I too have been involved in too much conflict here, in fact conflict is one of the reasons I edit little now. So much stress, arguments and ill will that I started to wonder "why bother?"


 * Thankfully, this present conflict seems to be resolved, from what I've been reading there seems to be a consensus that the article's title should be changed. So if my understanding is correct could someone, please, rename the article so we can put this issue to rest?
 * ⇨ EconomistBR ⇦  Talk  03:04, 29 June 2008 (UTC)

Guys, seems like my question above was again lost in your resolving your past differences. May I repeat it. While Glantz uses the wording "August Storm" as a book title, do I get it correctly that he does not call the operation this way anywhere in the book? Is this assertion by Mrg disputed? Because if this is correct, we are fighting a wrong battle. We are not arguing about a book title but about the operation title. So, does Glantz call the operation "August Storm" inside his voluminous book? TIA, --Irpen 17:03, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

from Front Flap: "... A generation of US Army officers has carefully studied the Manchurian offensive, which has come to be known as Operation `August Storm', (note that 20 years is a generation)
 * I was actually referring to the original Leavenworth Papers publications both linked in the article, on which the two recent books have been largely based. However, this from the 2003 verion

and

In short, they study the Manchurian offensive because it was an impressive and decisive campaign. More recently, Western study of `August Storm' provided inspiration, concrete guidance,

And the original reason for the naming by Glantz that should have made the naming and my correspondence with Mr Glantz beyond doubt Rain storms also impeded the march of Danilov's forces, requiring his forces to take two days to pass through the mountains. Danilov's forces finally entered Tapanshang on 14 August, after dispersing its small Japanese garrison in a brief fight.

But my point was same, the basing of the article title on a publication title --mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 00:07, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

When was war declared?
For ease, please look at Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. i.e. "We are declaring now, on the 8 August 1945, that from 9 Aug 1945 we will consider ourselves to be at war with Japan".
 * The declaration statement was made on 8 Aug 1945.
 * The final sentence of the delaration statement says:
 * the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from Aug. 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan.
 * "On 8th of August the USSR announced that on the 9th it would declare war. Am I interpreting it wrong? IMO that's a declaration informing that war is declared on the 9th, right?"

I don't think you have got it quite right. A declaration of a declaration doesn't seem to make a lot of sense to me! I think that on the 8th they declared that from the 9th they would be at war.

Take a different example. Say that today I declared that, in one weeks time I would be at war. The declaration is today, not in a weeks time.

What do you think? Pdfpdf (talk) 11:11, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Your example is good. You declared war but you are not at war with anybody, how come? You will declare war.
 * Declaration of War states: "is a formal performative speech act or signing of a document by an authorized party of a government in order to initiate a state of war between two or more nations."
 * A declaration of war serves to initiate a war, it happens IMO on the 00:00:00 second of the war. The Soviet declaration of 8th August didn't initiate a war, given that the USSR was not in a state of war on the 8th. That declaration informed that a war would be initiated. It could be argued that it wasn't formal, because of that. EconomistBR  20:39, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * "You declared war but you are not at war with anybody, how come?" - Good question. As I said, I'm not an expert in the field of international law. My guess is that it might have something to do with Politcal, Diplomatic and/or Legal "niceities". But on the other hand, I might be completely wrong ...


 * I had a chat with a colleague about this today. He pointed out that with regard to Pearl Harbour, the Japanese messed up their timing, and actually commenced their attack before the Americans received their declaration of war. Apparently, attacking without declaring war is a "no-no". So it would seem that the Soviets were making sure that they were doing the "right" thing by declaring war a full hour before attacking. Pdfpdf (talk) 16:09, 10 August 2009 (UTC)


 * "You will declare war." - As already stated, I disagree - A declaration of a declaration doesn't seem to make a lot of sense to me.
 * "Declaration of War states ... " - Yes, but your quote doesn't make any mention of timing - it seems to make an implicit assumption that the timing is "now". I'm not sure about that implicit assumption. (i.e. I neither agree nor disagree - I'm not sure.)
 * "A declaration ... " - That is indeed one interpretation. I have a different interpretation. I think we need some advice from an expert! Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 23:48, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Book on Google
 * "Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War"
 * Author: Michael D. Gordin link


 * Copied this section of the book, page 27
 * "Soviet foreign minister Molotov comunicated to Japanese ambassador Sato at about 5 p.m. on 8 August that the Soviet Union had declared war on imperial Japan, and that this would be effective the next day. Sato, perhaps naively, believed that this gave him roughly twenty-four hours to communicate with Tokyo. He actually had one hour. Soviet forces crossed the border into Manchuria at midnight Transbaikal time, 6 p.m. Moscow time."


 * Ok, so you are right and I am wrong. A declaration of war is not issued at 00:00:00 seconds. When the Declaration of War becomes effective the war starts.
 * "The Soviet Union formally declared war on the Empire of Japan on August 8, 1945". So this sentence is correct but IMO it is incomplete since it leads to the conclusion that the war started on the 8th, it makes no mention of the 9th.
 * How could we inform that the declaration became effective on the 9th? EconomistBR  14:48, 10 August 2009 (UTC)


 * "but IMO it is incomplete" - I agree.
 * What do you think of:
 * "On 8 August 1945, Soviet foreign minister Molotov informed Japanese ambassador Sato that the Soviet Union had declared war on Imperial Japan, and that from August 9, the Soviet Government would consider itself to be at war with Japan."
 * Or perhaps:
 * At 11pm Trans-Baikal time on 8 August 1945, Soviet foreign minister Molotov informed Japanese ambassador Sato that the Soviet Union had declared war on Imperial Japan, and that from August 9 the Soviet Government would consider itself to be at war with Japan. At one minute past midnight Trans-Baikal time on 9 August 1945, the Soviets commenced their invasion."
 * Your thoughts? Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 15:53, 10 August 2009 (UTC)
 * (P.S. Thanks for finding some evidence for what happened in which timezone at what time!)
 * Yeah, that part was really interesting. Imagine Sato's reaction!!
 * Yes indeed. (Yet another reason why he was a diplomat and I'm not!) Pdfpdf (talk) 12:04, 11 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Google Books is amazing, it showed me the right chapter on the the right book.
 * As for the options, either one would work, Option 2 has more detail while Option 1 is more compact. I know it might seem nitpicking from my part, but IMO it's necessary to inform the exact day in which the war started. EconomistBR  18:31, 10 August 2009 (UTC)
 * OK. Well, given that you have ideas about what you want it to say, perhaps you should make the change? I have to admit that, as long as it's accurate, relevant and informative, I don't really mind what the exact wording is. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 12:04, 11 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I consider this issue solved. EconomistBR  18:38, 12 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Me too. Pdfpdf (talk) 11:35, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

Accuracy?
I dispute the accuracy of statements attributed to
 * Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Penguin, 2001 ISBN 0-14-100146-1

The article states:

''Japan's decision to surrender was made before the scale of the Soviet attack on Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kurils was known, but had the war continued, the Soviets had plans to invade Hokkaidō well before the other Allied invasion of Kyushu. ''
 * With the exception of Richard Frank, who else is asserting Japan's decision to surrender was made before the scale of the Soviet attack on Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kurils was known? I have seen no evidence to support this claim.
 * "but had the war continued, the Soviets had plans to invade Hokkaidō well before the other Allied invasion of Kyushu." - This may well be true, but so what? What has this got to do with either the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, or Japan's decision to surrender?
 *  'Frank, Downfall, p. 323–4, citing David Glantz, "Soviet Invasion of Japan".'  - What is the point of including a reference to say that this person has copied, and has acknowledged that he has copied, the previous reference?

''Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings were not the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, he contends, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Joseph Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced the Japanese message of surrender on August 15, 1945. His claim, however, has been criticized because it ignores the fact that the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo knew that a full-scale invasion had begun but were unaware of how badly the fighting in Manchuria was going. ''
 * Who says that it is a fact that "the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo knew that a full-scale invasion had begun but were unaware of how badly the fighting in Manchuria was going"? Well, well, well! Richard Frank.

Who is "Richard B. Frank"? What is it that he actually does say? And what supporting evidence does he provide to back up his assertions? Pdfpdf (talk) 14:03, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * To start with the last, Richard B. Frank is the author of Downfall, an award-winning history of the end of WW2. It's probably available in a library near you.


 * The Japanese decision to surrender was made early on 10 August — less than a day after the beginning of the Soviet attack, and several days before their operations in Sakhalin and the Kurils began. I see no reason to question Frank's assessment that the Japanese hadn't grasped the full scale of the Soviet attack; how could they have? They knew the important thing: that the Soviets were now in the war against them.


 * (Actually, it was more than 24 hours, but that's nit-picking.)


 * Despite the new name, this article covers all Soviet operations against Japan; Sakhalin and the Kurils aren't part of Manchuria either. As it explains explained, "Though the battle extended beyond the borders traditionally known as Manchuria ... the coordinated and integrated invasions of Japan's northern territories is still collectively labelled in English as the Battle of Manchuria". Of course, if the Soviets had invaded Hokkaidō, we'd have a separate article on the, and/or the.


 * I included Frank's footnote, rather than simply referencing "Frank, Downfall, p. 323–4.", because it occurred to me someone might be interested in, you know, "what supporting evidence does he provide", and have access to Glantz's article.
 * Google has more of Glantz's book, The Soviet strategic offensive in Manchuria, 1945, than I remember, but it still doesn't have the pages on "the Aborted Hokkaido Offensive".


 * —WWoods (talk) 15:43, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for your reply. You have addressed most of my points and answered most of my questions, but there are still a few loose ends.

On analysis of your response, and with the benefit of hindsight, it would now seem to me that my complaint is/was more about the statement re Hasegawa that:
 * His claim, however, has been criticized because it ignores the fact that the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo knew that a full-scale invasion had begun but were unaware of how badly the fighting in Manchuria was going.

I have problems with that statement.

You say: "I see no reason to question Frank's assessment that the Japanese hadn't grasped the full scale of the Soviet attack; how could they have? They knew the important thing: that the Soviets were now in the war against them."

I agree with you.

I now realise that it is not that bit of Frank's assessment that I am calling into question.

It's the statement that "Hasegawa ignores the fact".

As you say: "They knew the important thing: that the Soviets were now in the war against them."

Hasegawa most certainly does NOT ignore that fact.

I'm not convinced that Hasegawa "ignores the fact that the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo knew that a full-scale invasion had begun but were unaware of how badly the fighting in Manchuria was going." But for the sake of arguement, even if Hasegawa does "ignore" that fact, he does NOT ignore what we both agree is "the important thing".

It's 2am here. I'll briefly touch on the other points, and come back to them tomorrow.
 * "Despite the new name" - Yes, I'm not super-keen on that aspect of the new name either. And I seem to have fallen into the trap of using "Manchuria" as "shorthand" for "all Soviet operations against Japan". I'll be more precise (and less concise) next time. However, I'm not sure what point you are making. My question should have been, "What has this got to do with either the Soviet invasion of Manchuria/Korea/Inner Mongolia/Sakhalin/etc., or Japan's decision to surrender?"
 * Given that the Frank reference is simply a copy of the Glantz reference, what's the point of including it? Isn't it effectively just a duplicate reference?

From "Japan's decision to surrender was made before ... ", I took the understanding that the sentence was implying that Japan's decision was NOT influenced by the fact that the Soviets were now in the war against them.

Your interpretation is/was the opposite of mine. I prefer, and agree with, your interpretation.

So for me, that particular issue becomes: "What is it about that wording that led me to come to the opposite conclusion? Or of more importance: "How can that wording be changed to prevent others from jumping to the same (wrong) conclusion that I did?"

Bed-time. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 17:17, 12 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I haven't been able to get hold of a copy of "Downfall" yet, but I came across:
 * http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000%5C000%5C005%5C894mnyyl.asp
 * "Why Truman Dropped the Bomb" by Richard B. Frank
 * The Weekly Standard, 08/08/2005, Volume 010, Issue 44
 * From the August 8, 2005 issue: Sixty years after Hiroshima, we now have the secret intercepts that shaped his decision.
 * If this is a typical example of his work, then I admit that I am unimpressed.
 * This article presents him as either a poor anaylst, or a poor communicator, or both.
 * It also presents him as narrow minded, biased, overly verbose, and sensationalist.
 * I seriously question the abilities of someone who bases a justification for the use of the atomic bomb on the basis of somebody else's analysis of a translation of ONE sentence in ONE piece of communication between two people.
 * To use Frank's style of writing: "Anyone would know that you can fit any trend line you like to ONE piece of data". This is a long way from "justification" for dropping two atomic bombs and killing about 150,000 civilians.
 * (You tell me he won an award. What for?)
 * I need more supporting evidence before I'm prepared to classify him as a "reliable source".
 * So far I've seen two pieces of evidence of his "dubious" (I'm being polite) abilities, both of which support the theory that he is NOT a "reliable source" on this topic.


 * Awaiting you reply. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 12:13, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact
Source: Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan
 * On the strength of the above and in accordance with Article Three of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the lapse of the five year period of operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes know to the Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941."

Even though it is arguable that the USSR denounced the pact illegally, the fact is that it was denounced and by the time war was declared, the pact was not in effect.


 * Disagree. The pact was still in force, and would be for another 8 months. See below. Pdfpdf (talk) 10:59, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * "This book on google might help us: ... " - That book is fascinating! So much so that I'm trying to get hold of a full copy. Thank you very much for bringing to my attention! (I owe you a beer.)
 * Like other sources, it supports the interpretation that the denouncement was not "illegal", and that it is not a "fact" that "by the time war was declared, the pact was not in effect". I can reproduce the detail if you wish, but in summary, both the Russian author and the English/Australian/Japanese-affiliated translator state that "strictly legally", the treaty was still in force. However, both acknowledge that neither the Japanese, nor the Soviets, were particularly fussed about the "strictly legal" situation, except when it suited them!!
 * The book makes really interesting reading. Again, thank you for mentioning it! Pdfpdf (talk) 14:45, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

The Soviet Union understood that the Article Three gave it denounciations rights 1 year prior to the expiration date.


 * Yes, but that doesn't address the fact of what "denunciation" means. (However, what you quote later does address the issue.) Pdfpdf (talk) 14:45, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

Your TIME's source:
 * http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,775556,00.html
 * "Legally, the treaty still had a year to run after the notice of cancellation. But the Foreign Commissar's tone suggested that this technicality might be brushed aside at Russia's convenience."


 * Not my source. However, I agree with what it says. Pdfpdf (talk) 10:59, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

You could argue that it was an illegal denounciation, but still it was a denounciation meaning "to announce the termination of".


 * I do not see how you could argue that it was an "illegal denunciation".
 * Yes, it did "announce the termination", but not the immediate termination - the termination in 12 months time. (Except, of course, that's not how Molotov chose to state he interpreted it.) Pdfpdf (talk) 10:59, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

A CIA document about that declaration corroborate this view:
 * http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp?doc_no=0000709436
 * "The Soviet denunciation on 5 April of its 5 year pact of neutrality with Japan ended a period..." EconomistBR  09:52, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Corroborates which view? Pdfpdf (talk) 10:59, 9 August 2009 (UTC)
 * (The CIA interpretation supports the opinion that the treaty was still in force, and that this fact was of little (no?) concern to the Soviets! Pdfpdf (talk) 14:45, 10 August 2009 (UTC) )

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what point you are trying to present.

It sounds to me that you are confusing the denouncing of the treaty with the breaking of the treaty, but as I don't understand you, I could be wrong.

In my understanding, there was nothing questionable, ambiguous, uncertain or illegal about the Soviets denouncing the treaty.

On the other hand, I don't think there is any doubt at all that, 4 months later, the Soviets BROKE the treaty when they invaded Manchuria! And yes, it was probably "illegal", (but I don't know by whose laws - I'm not an expert on international law.)

Here's my summary of my understanding of the situation. Please read it and tell me if you disagree, and with what you disagree.

(BTW: All the raw data now appears on Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact).
 * 13 April 1941 - Soviets & Japanese sign a neutrality pact which (article 3) is in force for 5 years.
 * Unless either party disagrees, at the end of 5 years, "it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years." (article 3)
 * HOWEVER, the "automatic renewal" will only occur "In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term." (article 3)
 * One year before the expiration of the term, the Soviets DID denounce it.
 * Denouncing it was not illegal. There is no argument or ambiguity here. If either party did NOT want it to automatically renew for another 5 years, then the ONLY way for them to say so was to denounce it 1 year before expiry/renewal.
 * Denouncing the treaty did NOT mean that the treaty was no longer in force. In fact, it meant that the treaty was in force for another year.

Awaiting your reply. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 10:53, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * This book on google might help us:
 * The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History 1941-1945
 * Author: Boris Nikolaevich Slavinskiĭ - Translated by Geoffrey Jukes"
 * not sure the link will work: link
 * (The link did work, thank you. Pdfpdf (talk) 14:45, 10 August 2009 (UTC))


 * Your interpretation is very similar to Ambassador Sato's interpretation, which is reasonable. IMO, however, Molotov's interpretation is also sound.


 * All of your sources state that their interpretation is very similar to Sato's.
 * They all say that Molotov's interpretation was exactly what Molotov wanted it to be, and bore no relationship to the actual wording of the treaty. So no, Molotov's interpretation was NOT "sound" - it was simply what Molotov wanted it to be!
 * I think it's fascinating that Sato actually had the presence of mind to ask Molotov what he meant. (That's probably why Sato was an ambassador, and why I'm not!)
 * You'll note that Sato simply says something to the effect of, "Well, if that's the way you interpret it, then I guess that's what you think it means." (I repeat, that's probably why ... )

Copied from a section of the book, page 153:
 * "The conversation between them is of scholary interest here are its main points from 'M. V. Molotov's diary.
 * Molotov reads the Soviet government statement.
 * Sato receiving the text, states that all that is left to him is to transmit it to his government. At the same time he permits himself to ask Molotov for some clarifications. He would like to know what the Soviet government thinks of the period that will begin on the 25 of April of this year, and last until the expiration of the pact, that is one more year. The Ambassador says he thinks his government expects that during that year, beginning on the 25th of this month, the Soviet government will maintain the same relations with Japan it has maintained up the present, bearing in mind that the Pact remains in force.


 * Molotov replies that our statement was made in conformity with the Pact, the third Article of which envisages the right and procedure to denounce it. Factually Soviet-Japanese relations revert to the situation in which they were before conclusion of the Pact. Molotov says is acting in conformity with the Treaty. Sato observes that in that case the Soviet and Japanese government interpret the question differently. The Japanese government holds to the view that if one side denounces the Treaty one year before its expiration, the Pact remains in force for one year, denounciation notwithstanding. However, according to the explanations now given by the People's Commissar, it seems from the moment of denunciation, the Pact ceases to exist. If the Soviet government so interprets this question, then its interpretation differs from the Japanese government's.
 * Molotov replies that there is some misunderstanding. The Soviet government's position is expressed in today's statement he reads...
 * "...in conformity with Article 3 of the aforementioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the expiry of the Pact's five year validity, the Soviet Government by this present notifies the government of Japan of its wish to denounce the Pact of April 13, 1941."
 * Molotov explains that on expiry of the five year period ... Soviet-Japanese relations will obviously revert to the status quo ante conclusion of the Pact. Sato replies, if that is so, the Japanese government will accept that interpretation.
 * Molotov says this statement is precisely set out in the text the Ambassador has received."


 * This is indeed a controversial issue given that Sato and Molotov argued about it. In light of the above what should we do? EconomistBR  20:42, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

I think I now see what your point is. Please confirm or correct my interpretation.

You (and the sources you quote) are saying: "Yes, the Soviets denounced the treaty, but what did that mean? Did that mean that the treaty would end in 12 months and would not be automatically renewed? Or did it mean that the treaty ended at the time of the denunciation?"

Interesting!

(And I thought it was quite clear what it meant!!)

"In light of the above what should we do?" - Good question! What are our options?

At the very least, it would seem to me that the article needs to mention this difference in interpretations. Beyond that, I'm not sure. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 23:33, 9 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I am indeed indebted to you for bringing this matter to my attention. I had always wondered what all the fuss was about. To me, the denunciation seemed a pretty minor matter - i.e. the Soviets were telling the Japanese that they did not want the treaty to automatically renew itself. I thought: So what? Who cares?
 * I now understand!!! Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 14:45, 10 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I am glad to know that you enjoyed the book, Google Books is becoming a powerful tool. I too was really surprised to know that a very expensive book had been written about the Neutrality Pact.
 * The Neutrality Pact wasn't even mentioned in this article that's why I added that paragraph back in June 2008 (see edit). I didn't know until then about Article 3 or the controversy.
 * I simply wanted to mention the Neutrality Pact and not be dragged into this controversy, which looked like a can of worms, that's why I chose to leave the controversy out and just quote the Denunciation.
 * I agree with you in that the article needs to mention the different interpretations.  EconomistBR  17:10, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

redux
I've just finished rereading the Slavinskiĭ extracts more closely. It seems I misread it first time.


 * Page 153-154
 * 1)Molotov reads the statement
 * 2)Sato: So it stays in place for a year. Right?
 * 3)Molotov: "Factually Soviet-Japanese relations revert to the situation in which they were before conclusion of the Pact."
 * 4)Sato:
 * "in that case the Soviet and Japanese government interpret the question differently"
 * "However, according to the explanations now given by" Molotov "it seems from the moment of denunciation, the Pact ceases to exist."
 * "If the Soviet government so interprets this question, then its interpretation differs from the Japanese government's."
 * 5)Molotov:
 * "there is some misunderstanding"
 * "on expiry of the five year period ... Soviet-Japanese relations will obviously revert to the status quo ante conclusion of the Pact."
 * 6)Sato: So we DO both agree that it lasts for another year.
 * 7)Molotov: "precisely"
 * 8)Sato:
 * Thanks for the clarification.
 * "I (Sato) deeply regret" you are ending the treaty. The Japanese govt would like to renew it. ... we would like to preserve peace in the east ... rhubarb ... rhubarb ...
 * "I would be obliged" if you could explain the Soviet position
 * 9)Molotov: "the Soviet government's position is precisely formulated in today's statement" ... rhubarb ... rhubarb ... "The period of the Pact's validity has not ended"
 * 10)Sato:
 * Thanks. I'll send the statement, and your clarifications, to Tokyo.
 * I hope you'll tell your govt what my govt's POV is
 * My govt will "surely" wish to negotiate with your govt to preserve peace in the east ... rhubarb ...
 * I hope your govt shares my govt's view on peace.
 * I would be "obliged" if I can talk to you again after I've received instructions from my govt.
 * 11)"Molotov replies that he will gladly meet the ambassador"

In other words:
 * 3) Molotov says something ambiguous.
 * 4) Sato says: "it seems" you are saying the treaty ends now
 * 5) Molotov says: no, I'm saying it lasts for another year.
 * 8) Sato says: Thanks for the clarification. We'd like to renew the treaty. We would like "peace in the east" to continue. Can you tell me what the Soviet govt thinks about "peace in the east"?
 * 9) Molotov: Read the statement. "The period of the Pact's validity has not ended"
 * 10) Sato: Thanks. Can I get back to you when I've heard from the boss?
 * 11) Molotov: "gladly"

However: Malik did not know (had not been informed) that the Soviets were preparing to attack.
 * Page 184
 * Even after Germany's exit from the war, Moscow went on saying the Pact was still operative, and that Japan had no cause for anxiety about the future of Soviet-Japanese relations.
 * 21 May 1945 Malik tells Tanakamura that the treaty continues in force
 * 29 May 1945 Molotov tells Sato: "we have not torn up the pact"
 * 24 June 1945 Malik tells Hirota that the Neutrality Pact ... will continue ... until it expires

But it gets better!

Jukes provides evidence that, in 1944, the Soviet government provided Japan with information, obtained by espionage, about American, British and Australian intentions and capabilities. Jukes suggests that the most likely explanation of this is Stalin's desire ... to keep ... Japan in the war until he was ready to attack (them).
 * Back cover


 * page 185
 * Agreement that the Soviet Union would join the war ... and the rewards it would receive ... had been reached in a meeting between Stalin and Harriman on 12 December 1944.
 * These were "formalised" at Yalta on 11 February 1945.

Page 188 discusses many interesting things
 * At 7:30am on the 9th August, "with the Soviet forces beginning to pour into Manchuria", Suzuki met with the Emperor. He accepted that Japan must surrender (i.e. BEFORE the second bomb was dropped.)
 * The first accusations against the Soviet Union violating the Neutrality Pact surfaced at the Tokyo trial ... "But that was all a waste of time. The Tokyo trial was a trial of the vanquished by the victors ... "

So, anybody who thinks this is "simple" or "black & white" just doesn't know what went on!! Pdfpdf (talk) 13:11, 12 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Ok, I am wrong and you are right again. The Denunciation of 1945 was not meant to terminate the Neutrality Pact. More importantly the USSR understood the Pact to be in effect after the denunciation. EconomistBR  18:36, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

Truman's letter

 * I found 2 books. They both agree with you in that the Denunciation did not terminate the Pact, but they add new information to this issue:
 * The End of the Pacific War
 * Author: Tsuyoshi Hasegawa see page 217
 * Japan's decision to surrender
 * Robert Joseph Charles Butow see page 156


 * Both books mention a letter sent by President Truman to Stalin that suggests that the Soviet Union would have legal grounds to violate the Neutrality Pact on the basis of Article 103 and 106 of the United Nations Charter and on the Moscow Declaration. Should we mention this? EconomistBR  18:36, 12 August 2009 (UTC)


 * The plot just continues to thicken, doesn't it!
 * I haven't had a look at those references yet, but in principle, yes, I think we should mention it.
 * I'm beginning to think that all this information about the neutrality pact, its rise, its fall, and its abuse, should be placed in the Neutrality Pact article, and that this article should make reference to, and quote from, that article (rather than this article containing all the detail.)
 * What do you think? Pdfpdf (talk) 00:05, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Ok, I agree with your proposal. Mentions to Truman's letter, for example, should go into the Neutrality Pact article.
 * I consider this issue solved. EconomistBR  19:46, 14 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Thanks. (So when I've "done enough" here, unless someone beats me to it, I'll move on to the Neutrality Pact article ... ) Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 13:20, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Soviet fronts
IMO, in order to avoid confusion with other Soviet Fronts, the mentions to the Eastern, Western and Northern Fronts in the Soviet sub-section should be removed or replaced. See Category:Soviet_fronts

I prefer removal, do you agree with this change? EconomistBR 22:29, 12 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Good point(s).
 * However, rather than removal, how about some sort of clarification?
 * e.g. That the xxx front was the front in Eastern Manchuria, the yyy front was the northern front, etc.?
 * If this clutters up the text too much, then it could be done as a footnote.
 * e.g. ... the xxx front
 * What do you think? Pdfpdf (talk) 00:13, 13 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I found these Japanese military papers that add new weight to your nomeclature:
 * Record of operations against Soviet Russia on Northern and Western Fronts of Manchuria, and in Northern Korea (August 1945).
 * Record of operations against Soviet Russia, Eastern front (August 1945)


 * Given that I drop my objections against their use. Could we then just add "of Manchuria" to the end of each? EconomistBR  02:01, 13 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I'm happy for you to use whatever nomenclature you think is "best". Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 11:35, 13 August 2009 (UTC)


 * (As an aside: Actually, to say that the Japanese military used that nomenclature is a bit of a stretch. The so-called "Japanese Monographs" and "Manchurian Special Studies" were written after the war by ex-Japanese "soldiers" who were "employed" by the US Army Far East's Military History section, and then edited by US "soldiers". So, I expect it's more "American Army" terminology than "Japanese military" terminology.
 * By-the-way, I will add them to the "further reading" section. Pdfpdf (talk) 11:35, 13 August 2009 (UTC))
 * (Done. Pdfpdf (talk) 11:40, 14 August 2009 (UTC))
 * Yeah, it was nice of you to add those monographs to the further reading section in that detailed manner.
 * I had to call those monographs something so after reading the the first sentence of Monograph 155, page I which says:"prepared by former commanders and staff officers of the Kwantung Army", I decided to settle with Japanese military papers.


 * IMO what's important is that we've found evidence that this nomeclature is used.
 * I will then just add "of Manchuria". EconomistBR  18:17, 14 August 2009 (UTC)
 * That sounds good to me. Thanks. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:20, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Past tense on the Soviet sub-section
The Soviet sub-section is about the role each Front and army would play in the incoming battle according to Soviet plans, that's why the conditional was used.

I would like to restore the conditional, is it ok? EconomistBR 22:29, 12 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I know this is my problem, and not any-body elses, but I really don't like the use of the conditional, because it's my observation that most of the time WP editors use it to describe situations that are not conditional.
 * e.g. "He would go on to do xxx." He would go on to do it if what? If time passed? No! He went on to do xxx.
 * I will now get off my soapbox. (Yes, I am a bit passionate about that topic. Mea culpa.)


 * Yes, you are correctly using the conditional here.
 * However, as you have no doubt gathered, I would prefer that it was worded without using the "would"s. My personal biased opinion is that "it would be better if" the article presented it in the manner: "They planned to do x, y and z. They were successful in x. They were largely successful in y, except for a, b and c. (e.g. running out of petrol in the middle of Manchuria!) But they were unsuccessful in z.
 * Now, I quickly admit that this is much more cumbersome. And also that the way you have had written it, it was quite correct.


 * So, I guess I'll "pull my head in", and suggest that you do it in whatever way you think is best. (And then I'll sit back, bite my tongue, and cringe in silence. ;-)
 * Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 00:30, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
 * That section is based almost exclusively on Glantz's Chapter 6 - Conduct of the Offensive: Far East Command Plan. He used "would" a lot, that's why that section got loaded with "woulds".
 * But no problem, given your your request, we can work around this issue and dramatically reduce the use of "would"s. EconomistBR  01:20, 13 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Thank you! That is both very kind and very considerate of you, and is very much appreciated. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:20, 16 August 2009 (UTC)
 * The conditional was not restored since no "woulds" were used. What was restored was the notion that the section deals with the battle plan and not with what actually happened. IMO text cohesion and coherence were preserved despite of the fact that the conditional was not used. A couple of other changes not related to this issue were also made. I consider this issue solved. EconomistBR  21:38, 30 August 2009 (UTC)


 * That's a good solution. Yes, I agree that you have resolved the issue. Thank you, and Well done. Pdfpdf (talk) 23:51, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Soviet next-generation heavy tank involved?
When reading figures for the number of T-34 tanks deployed at the end of the Soviet section of Combatant Forces, I couldn't help but wonder if the IS-3 was employed against the Japanese as well. If so, I think it would be worth mentioning, somewhat similar to the importance of mentioning when and where Tigers or King Tigers were first deployed, since the IS-3 really was remarkable for that time.

However, I can't seem to find an answer, positive or negative - everything and everyone seems to basically say "maybe" which doesn't help me any. So, does anyone here know if IS-3 tanks were involved in combat against Japan?

I'm leaning more towards probably not, operating under the presumption that the Soviets would have bragged about their inevitable combat success with such an awesome tank and recalling how they flaunted them on parade in Berlin.

--Theanthropic avatar (talk) 08:47, 18 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Nothing conclusive I'm afraid - plenty of mention of "tanks", some mention of T-34s and the ways in which they were superior to Japanese capability, but I haven't come across any mention of IS-3. Due to the lack of evidence, I vacilate between "probably not" and "no information. Good luck, and don't forget to tell us here if you resolve anything. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 09:30, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Although it quotes no sources, Iosif Stalin tank says:
 * "The IS-3 came too late to see action in World War II. Though some older sources claim that the tank saw action at the end of the war in Europe, there are no official reports to confirm this. It is now generally accepted that the tank saw no action against the Germans, although one regiment may have been deployed against the Japanese in Manchuria.''
 * Again, nothing conclusive.
 * IS-3 says there's one at United States Army Ordnance Museum, but that article say's it's a T-34, as does http://ordmusfound.org/Littledavidslideshow.htm On-the-other hand, http://www.peachmountain.com/5star/US_Army_Ordnance_Museum_IS3_tank.aspx has LOTS of pictures of (an?) IS-3 "Photos taken at US Army Ordnance Museum".
 * I think I'm beginning to understand your "cry for help"! Pdfpdf (talk) 09:58, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * P.S. Heaps of pictures at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:IS-3 and http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Iosef_Stalin_tank#IS-3 - it may lead you somewhere useful ... Pdfpdf (talk) 10:09, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * http://www.o5m6.de/is3.html - Nice drawings, but no new information.
 * http://www.internethobbies.com/ro1issttakit.html "Production was started in May of 1945, and continued up to mid-1946. At the end of the War 29 tanks were produced, with their total production number continuing on to 2311. The IS-3 was not used in any military action during World War II, but on September 7th 1945 a tank regiment had taken part in the parade of Red Army Units in Berlin, being dedicated to the victory over Japan." Pdfpdf (talk) 10:44, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I've tried to find information dealing with which type of tanks and their numbers were deployed for that offensive, but didn't find anything.
 * The article informs that 3,700 T-34s were deployed but I've just checked Glantz and he says:
 * "3,704 tanks, 1,852 SP guns total in Soviet Far East Command"
 * This means that we are assuming that all 3,704 tanks were T-34s. Based on the above quotation I will remove that information, if some one finds a source restore it. EconomistBR  18:53, 18 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Pdfpdf, I've restored the figures. I got carried away deleting because the numbers for tanks, artillery pieces and aircrafts were wrong. I had no justification to delete the other figures based on Glantz's paper since this paper doesn't discuss the Navy. I added cn as you advised. EconomistBR  02:21, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

I've heard rumors about that as well, I know they had IS-2 tanks involved but nothing concrete about IS-3s deployed. I treat it as rubbish, the result of tank enthusiasts wanting there to have been IS-3s involved....??? Ihatewheniforgetmydamnpassword (talk) 02:08, 19 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Agreed. The http://www.internethobbies.com/ro1issttakit.html article says they "had taken part in the parade", not that they had been used. In fact, it specifically says: "The IS-3 was not used in any military action during World War II".
 * Regarding the "may have been deployed against the Japanese in Manchuria." quote, I have seen that in a number of places, but none of them attribute the source. I wonder who/what that source is? Pdfpdf (talk) 02:20, 19 August 2009 (UTC)