Talk:Special Night Squads

This article is worthless, and completely inaccurate, much as is the material it is based on. It was written according to biased secondary sources which failed to bother to even consult the copius documents that pertain to Wingate's assignment to the Mandate. Works that should have been consulted include Avraham Akavia's Orde Wingate: Chayav O'Foalo, Christopher Sykes' Official Biography of Wingate (flawed as it may be in some regards), Bierman and Smith's Fire in the Night, Trevor Royle's Irregular Soldier, Robert St. John's They Came From Everywhere, and Michael Oren's excellent articles refuting the garbage embodied in the article herein. Not to mention Rex King Clark's memoir Free For a Blast, or his reports on SNS activities, while he was temprorary OIC. Any reading of this tripe leads to the inevitable conclusion that it was either written by someone with a serious grudge against Wingate and the SNS, or one with no actual knowledge thereof.

Furthermore, had this article even a pretense at scholarship, it would have noted that even Wing Commander Ritchie and Lt. General Haining, who made the determination that Wingate be reassigned, both commended his ability, and in fact noted in their official reports (and private handwritten notes) that his ability was unquestioned, and that he would surely find fame in some other arena, that would be of more use to Britain. Montgomery, moreover, was aping a sentiment made by officers at India GHQ, to whom Mountbatten turned in fury at that display of unprofressional hatred for a fallen fellow soldier-at-arms. Van Creveld, presumably, knew little more about his sources than the questions he asked.

Policy condradiction

 * Nish, that is a considerable improvement, and you are correct in that there appears to be confusion as to the sourced history. Your reword I think is a fix which I think can hold things together in the article architecture for some time. I hope you can see my original concern. It was basically a flat and un-nuanced contradiction, which disfigured the article, esp as it occured in the lede. p.s, considering Montgomery's mental issues, he was a fine one to talk ;) Simon Irondome (talk) 15:53, 28 August 2016 (UTC)
 * No probs. Montgomery was a complete nutter, of course. I happen to know quite a bit about Wingate because I've read fairly widely on the military campaigns in Asia, including memoirs of the Burma campaigns. Like all outstanding military campaigners he had a penchant for, or romance with, death of course. He did get on outstandingly well with Kachins, Karens and other tribesmen - but that is where his empathies stopped.By the way, thinking of Asia, the British did form squads with the exact same modus operandi among the Gurkha in the tribal frontiers in the subcontinent, from the units repatriated from the Western front after WW1 - Anglim's book has something on that. A military authority once told me he thought Gurkhas the best soldiers in the world, because unlike all other candidates, they passed this test. If their commanding officer ordered them to slit the throat of the next man coming through a door, they'd do so, even if he was the man who walked in.Nishidani (talk) 16:18, 28 August 2016 (UTC)
 * Another common interest there Nish. I have studied the Burma campaign to some depth, and the two Chindits offensives. In my opinion William Slim was the best army commander this country has produced, and Wingate certainly had genius. His 1941 operations leading Gideon Force in Italian-occupied Ethiopia are greatly overlooked. Shortly after he attempted suicide. I believe he thought he had fucked up. Certainly a troubled but fascinating character. The use of Gurkas post WW1 by the Brits is a new one to me. Were they deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan? I'm thinking early 20's, Trenchard, "air policing", the use of poison gas etc. That noble period. Si. Irondome (talk) 22:07, 28 August 2016 (UTC)
 * Yes, I agree re Slim. There are far more, numerically, courageous men ready to do battle, than intelligent men, who know how to win with rational efficiency. The Germans, experts remind us, were a far 'better' (ruthlessly efficient) army than anything the Allies had, including the US forces, but fortunately, the major decisions were never made by rational commanders, who know battles are won most often by a combination of logistics, military hardware, and tactical strategy, not by men. The Gurkhas were used in Iraq in 1920, definitely. What particularly put the wind up units opposed to them was their habit of crawling distances at night to infiltrate enemy positions and cut throats. Shades of Meir Har-Zion.  An encampment would wake up and see the silent havoc.
 * I've checked where I read the precedent for Wingate. It's in Simon Anglim,Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944, Routledge, 2015 p.37 who states that the Palestine night squads were not so much an innovation, but continued a practice in British imperial military thinking after WW1, when Gurkha units were deployed in similar function at night on the northern frontiers of India, and also successively in Ireland (well, this is part of family memory, but I repressed it evidently. It's one reason I see things differently from you. Background does alter our perceptions, whether we like it or not)  Black and Tans were deployed to put down the Irish War of Independence. Paradoxically, the Irish insurgency was the dominant model in Revisionist strategic thinking, as you no doubt know. He then goes on to mention the recruitment of Burmese in 1931 and G-men in Hoover's outfit (I think that parallel far-fetched)Nishidani (talk) 12:59, 29 August 2016 (UTC)