Talk:Srebrenica massacre/Archive 2

The Role of the Drina Corps in the Srebrenica Crimes
1.Preliminary Matters

Prior to examining the role the Drina Corps played in the events following the take-over of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber will first address preliminary matters relating to the formation and operation of the Drina Corps, as well as the nature of the evidence presented by the Prosecution linking the Drina Corps to the crimes in this case. This analysis will provide an important backdrop to the remainder of the Judgement, which addresses the central issue in this case: the criminal responsibility of General Krstic, both individually and as a senior officer of the Drina Corps, for the Srebrenica crimes.  (a) Background to the Drina Corps

The Drina Corps of the VRS was formed in November 1992, with the specific objective of “improving” the situation of Bosnian Serb people living in the Middle Podrinje region, of which Srebrenica was an important part.203 It was organised along the lines of the former JNA Corps204 and, as was the case with the VRS generally, JNA operating methodologies were almost completely adopted.205 The Drina Corps Headquarters was established first in Han Pijesak and later moved to Vlasenica .206 A map depicting the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps is annexed to this Judgement.

General Zivanovic assumed the role of Drina Corps Commander at the time of its formation. In addition to the Commander, the Drina Corps also had a Chief of Staff and three Assistant Commanders. As will be discussed further below, in July 1995, General Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps until his appointment as Corps Commander. Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic was Assistant Commander for Security; Colonel Slobodan Cerovic was Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs; and Colonel Lazar Acamovic was Assistant Commander for Rear Services (or Logistics).207 A chart showing relevant Drina Corps personnel as of July 1995 is annexed to this Judgement.

In July 1995, the Drina Corps was composed of the following subordinate Brigades : Zvornik Brigade; 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade (“Bratunac Brigade”); 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade (“Vlasenica Brigade”); 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade (“2nd Romanija Brigade”) 1st Birac Infantry Brigade (“Birac Brigade”); 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade (“Milici Brigade”); 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade (“ 1st Podrinje Brigade”); 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade (“5th Podrinje Brigade ”) and the 1st Skelani Separate Infantry Battalion (“Skelani Battalion”).208 These Brigades had combat capabilities and were supported by the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, the 5th Engineers Battalion, 5th Communications Battalion and the 5th Military Police battalion.209

The Drina Corps came under the Command of the Main Staff of the VRS, along with the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, the Hercegovina Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Two units were also directly subordinated to the Main Staff: the 10th Sabotage Detachment (a unit primarily used for wartime sabotage activities) and the 65th Protective Regiment (a unit created to provide protection and combat services for the Main Staff.)210 In July 1995, the Commander of the Main Staff was General Mladic. In turn, the Main Staff was subordinate to President Karadzic, the Supreme Commander of the VRS .211

(b) Codes and Numbers Used by the Drina Corps in July 1995

Much of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber took the form of military orders and reports issued by the VRS during July and August 1995, as well as conversations between Drina Corps and other VRS personnel that were intercepted by members of the ABiH during that period. Code-names and numbers were frequently employed throughout this documentary and intercept evidence. Some explanation of these codes is necessary before proceeding to analyse the evidence.

There was no dispute between the parties about the code names used to refer to relevant Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, as well as the Drina Corps Headquarters. Specifically:“Palma” was the Zvornik Brigade;212 “Badem” was the Bratunac Brigade;213 and “Zlatar” was the Command of the Drina Corps.214

Examination of the evidence as a whole reveals that “Zlatar 385” was a telephone number associated with General Krstic during July 1995. In an intercepted telephone conversation at 0954 hours on 14 July 1995, General Zivanovic advised Colonel Ljubisa Beara, the head of Security of the VRS Main Staff, to contact Zlatar 385 about some assistance that Colonel Beara was seeking.215 A few minutes later, a conversation was intercepted between Colonel Beara and General Krstic in which Colonel Beara raised the same request with General Krstic.216 In addition, on 18 July 1995 at 0716 hours, General Krstic called and asked for Colonel Cerovic to be connected to extension 385. This was done and General Krstic and Colonel Cerovic subsequently conversed,217 further confirming that “385” was General Krstic’s telephone extension during July 1995.  (c) Reliability of Intercepted Communications

Prominently featured in the evidence presented by the Prosecution in this case, were transcriptions of conversations between VRS personnel in July and August 1995 that were intercepted by intelligence officers from the ABiH. These documents were handed over to the OTP by the Bosnian government. Monitoring enemy communications was a standard military practice, employed by both parties to the conflict, the objective being to discover the plans and movements of the opposing side in order to take pre-emptory action.218 Although the VRS did have secure means of sending communications, the Trial Chamber heard evidence that these systems were not always functional and that often unsecured lines were used for expediency; secured communications took much longer to prepare and send.219 The Prosecution relied upon intercept evidence as proof of key elements of its case. The reliability of these intercepted conversations, however, was the subject of strenuous debate between the parties.

A former employee from the OTP, who worked on compiling the intercept database, testified about the procedures established to test the accuracy of the intercept evidence received by the OTP from the Bosnian Government.220 The “intercept project”, as it became known, was handled by a team of analysts, investigators, translators and others with language skills, who collected, assembled , analysed and translated the material that had been provided to the OTP in its original Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (hereafter “B/C/S”) form. Both the ABiH and the State Security Services of Bosnia provided intercept material to the OTP.221

Additionally, a number of Bosnian Muslim witnesses, who were involved in intercepting and transcribing the VRS conversations, testified before the Trial Chamber about the methods employed.222 The contents of the conversations were first recorded on tape by Bosnian Muslim interceptors, then transcribed onto a piece of paper or into a notebook and finally typed out on a computer and sent to Headquarters.223 Although the transcribers generally made a note of the time at which the conversation commenced, the date was not always recorded for each conversation. However, dates could usually be ascertained by looking back through the notebooks to find the last recorded date and then tracking the times at which the subsequent conversations occurred, to determine when a new day had begun.224 The Trial Chamber viewed several of the original notebooks in which intercepted conversations were transcribed.

Very often the participants in the conversations identified themselves by name, or their identities could be ascertained from the context of the conversation. In addition, the Bosnian Muslim interceptors became familiar with the voices of the VRS participants in the conversations over the course of time. Witness U said that he had been monitoring conversations for almost two years prior to July 1995 and was very familiar with the voices of the participants in the conversations he was intercepting.225 When participants could not be identified, they were referred to as “X” and “Y”.226 On some occasions a single conversation was monitored by different intercept operators working in different locations which, in the Trial Chamber’s view, is a factor supporting the authenticity of these communications.227

The Trial Chamber was told that all possible measures were taken to ensure the accuracy of the transcribed conversations. According to Witness W:

It was essential that every word, literally every word be recorded and that it should be audible, properly heard. You couldn’t guess because these were serious matters, and anything that was not sufficiently clear … any word not heard well enough was not recorded.228

Nonetheless, Witness Z conceded:

We did our best to be as precise as possible. However, there are many, many reasons why that was very difficult to achieve.229

In the event that a particular word could not be understood, the transcriber rewound the tape until it became clear and, if necessary, sought assistance from a colleague. If this was unsuccessful, the missing words were indicated with three dots or a question mark.230 These gaps in conversation reflected the fact that, usually, one of the participants in the conversation could be heard more clearly than the other one.231 On some occasions the version of a conversation recorded in the notebook differed from the typewritten text. Witness Z explained that the person doing the typing may have requested clarification of some portion of the conversation and, accordingly, the tape would be replayed.232 The typist could only change the contents of a conversation with the approval of the original transcriber or after personally listening to the tape.233

The Defence objected that the Bosnian Muslim interceptors were not properly trained for the work that they were doing and had inadequate technology at their disposal. As a result, it was argued, the intercepts were filled with assumptions as to what had been said during the course of the conversation.234 Prosecution Witness Y conceded that some of the soldiers intercepting conversations for the ABiH were better trained than others.235

General Radinovic testified that, although the VRS used intercepted radio communications in their intelligence work, he did not consider them to have a high degree of reliability .236 There was, however, evidence to the contrary. A VRS document dating back to 1993 indicates that radio reconnaissance platoons, or intercepting groups, had provided the VRS command structure with about 70 percent of all intelligence data gathered, which shows how heavily they relied upon the interception procedure.237 Indeed the Trial Chamber heard evidence that the VRS was relying on information obtained from intercepted ABiH communications during the events in Srebrenica. For example, a Daily Combat Report of the Zvornik Brigade on 14 July 1995 refers to information about the Bosnian Muslim column (which at that time was fleeing the enclave towards Tuzla) obtained from intercepted conversations between the military leaders of the column and personnel from the 2nd Corps located in Tuzla.238

The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the VRS was constantly concerned about the possibility of their communications being overheard. In 1992, the VRS noted:

So far we have registered nine enemy interception groups, exceptionally well manned and equipped.239

Defence Witness DB (who in July 1995 was a communications officer in the Drina Corps ) agreed that the lack of attention paid to securing communications in the VRS was a problem and he did not dispute that the ABiH did intercept communications being made during the Srebrenica and Zepa operations.240 Defence Witness DC, who was also an officer in the Drina Corps in July 1995, agreed that intercepted communications, although not always trustworthy and reliable, could be useful sources of information.241

General Radinovic argued that, in order to be considered a reliable source of information, the intercepts would have to be collated, cross-checks made between the tapes and the notebooks, and military experts, linguists and so on called in to assess them.242 The Trial Chamber accepts that the OTP did in fact diligently check and cross-reference the intercept material as part of the “intercept project”. In order to determine whether the material was reliable and genuine, the OTP looked at the internal consistency between the notebooks and the printouts of each conversation. Transcripts of a single conversation, which was recorded by two or more interceptors, were also compared. The OTP also embarked on a process of corroborating the intercepts with information obtained from other sources, such as documents acquired from the VRS, the RS Ministry of Defence and UNPROFOR, as well as aerial images.243 A former OTP employee assigned to the “intercept project” testified that, as a result of this corroboration process, she became convinced that the intercepts were “absolutely reliable”.244 Although, at times, the OTP was unable to determine the significance of some aspects of the conversations , there was no information in the intercepted conversations that was completely at odds with the other evidence uncovered by the OTP.245 Meticulous procedures were used by the OTP for tracking the dates of the intercepted conversations and the former OTP employee who appeared before the Trial Chamber testified with “absolute certainty” that the dates ascribed to the individual conversations were accurate.246

The testimony of Mr. Butler provided corroboration of the careful consideration given to the intercept evidence during the course of the OTP’s investigation. Initially, in the course of preparing his expert military report, Mr. Butler viewed the intercepts with some scepticism.247 However , after detailed examination of the complete body of intercept evidence, he was convinced that they were reliable and, to the extent that he was able to draw firm conclusions from the individual conversations, he incorporated them into his military analysis.

On the whole, the Trial Chamber considers the intercepted communications to be a reliable source of evidence. All possible measures were taken by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors to ensure the accuracy of the recorded conversations, as would be expected in any prudent army. This fact was reinforced by the measures taken by the OTP to verify the reliability of the intercepted evidence as part of the “intercept project”. The Trial Chamber accepts that, often, aspects of the intercepted conversations can be corroborated by other evidence of events occurring at the time and it is impossible for the Chamber to imagine that this level of documentable detail could have been completely manufactured by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors. For example, on 16 July 1995 a conversation was recorded regarding a request made by Colonel Popovic for 500 litres of diesel fuel.248 Written records obtained from the Zvornik Brigade confirm that 500 litres of diesel fuel were in fact released to Colonel Popovic on 16 July 1995.249 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the intercept evidence is a reliable source of information. The weight and meaning attributable to each intercepted conversation will be considered on a case by case basis and in light of the wider context in which the conversation took place. Certainly, several of the intercepts tendered by the Prosecution were extremely fragmented, with numerous gaps where transcribers were unable to determine what was being said with precision. In those specific cases, the Trial Chamber has obviously not been able to draw any firm conclusions from the intercepts.

Having considered preliminary matters relating to the establishment and formation of the Drina Corps, as well as the nature of the evidence presented in this case, the Trial Chamber now considers the Drina Corps’ role in the commission of the crimes that occurred following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995.

2. Krivaja 95

The Drina Corps was the VRS military formation tasked with planning and carrying out operation Krivaja 95, which culminated in the capture of Srebrenica town on 11 July 1995. However, the Indictment against General Krstic does not allege that the military invasion of the Srebrenica “safe area” was itself a violation of international law. Rather, it is the events that followed the military assault, namely the bussing of the women, children and elderly out of the Srebrenica enclave and the wholesale slaughter of the military aged men from Srebrenica that are the focus of this case. Nonetheless, the role of the Drina Corps in Krivaja 95 provides an important backdrop to the Trial Chamber’s consideration of the acts that followed.

(a) The Objective of Krivaja 95

The precise objective of Krivaja 95 was the subject of argument between the parties during the course of the trial. There was no dispute that the initial plan did not include taking the town of Srebrenica.250 Despite the fact that Srebrenica was a “to be or not to be” issue for the VRS, an assessment had been made by the VRS command that conditions were not right at that moment for capturing Srebrenica town.251 The Defence, however, argued that the plan for Krivaja 95 was limited to effectively separating the two enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa (with no significant modification of the “safe area” boundaries) and represented a direct response to the military offensives being conducted by the ABiH in the area of the enclave.252 The Prosecution disputed this, claiming that the objective of Krivaja 95 was not only to split Zepa and Srebrenica, but also to reduce each enclave to its urban core. Shrinking the enclaves, the Prosecution contended, would undoubtedly trigger a humanitarian crisis and force the UN to abandon the “ safe area ” concept, which had proved such a thorn in the side of the Bosnian Serbs.253

The Prosecution’s argument is supported by reference to the documentation prepared by the Drina Corps Command for Krivaja 95.254 The plan specifically directed the Drina Corps to “split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban areas”. The plan also refers to “reducing the enclaves in size” and specified that the Drina Corps was to “improve the tactical positions of the forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves”.255 The Defence argued that the reference to eliminating the enclaves was directed to a separate and future operation and not to the immediate campaign.256 Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber is persuaded that, although the initial aim of Krivaja 95 was limited, it was an important step towards ultimately establishing Bosnian Serb control over Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber has no doubt that, consistent with the March 1995 directive issued by President Karadzic mandating the blocking of aid convoys into the enclave,257 plunging the Bosnian Muslim residents into a humanitarian crisis was an integral component of the long-term VRS strategy for Srebrenica. On its face, however, the plan for Krivaja 95 certainly did not include a VRS scheme to bus the Bosnian Muslim civilian population out of the enclave, nor to execute all the military aged Bosnian Muslim men, as ultimately happened following the take-over of Srebrenica.


 * 1) The Trial Chamber finds that the plan for Krivaja 95 was aimed at reducing the “safe area” of Srebrenica to its urban core and was a step towards the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave.

(b)The Shelling of Srebrenica: Terrorisation of the Civilian Population

Numerous witnesses gave evidence that, during Operation Krivaja 95, the VRS shelled the Srebrenica enclave intensively with the apparent intent to terrify the populace.258 Evidence suggests that shelling commenced on 6 July 1995, as Krivaja 95 got under way.259 On 8 July 1995, an eyewitness saw columns of refugees coming under VRS (Drina Corps ) artillery fire.260 On 9 July 1995, a Dutch Bat platoon commander saw VRS tanks firing in the direction of Srebrenica town, even though there were only refugees and a UN base in the vicinity.261 Again on 10 July 1995, despite the military success that had already been achieved by the VRS, shelling continued all that day and the next. Shells fired by the VRS hit a hospital where 2,000 civilians had gathered for refuge and six of them were killed.262 An UNMO who witnessed the unfolding events that day remarked upon the intensity of the shelling:

[a]t times we could count over a hundred shells landing in the same place. You know, a continuous shelling of up to a hundred shells in the same area, and this is quite high intensity, considering the size of those villages.263

Thousands of residents, desperate for protection, crowded around the UNPROFOR Bravo Company compound in Srebrenica, eventually forcing their way inside. The chaotic scene was exacerbated when mortar shells landed inside the compound around noon, wounding several people.264 Following the shelling of Bravo Company and with the encouragement of the Dutch Bat troops, Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica began to move north towards Potocari. Shells fell alongside the road and VRS forces were seen bringing up the rear of the crowd. Many witnesses believed this was a deliberate attempt to “herd ” the crowd out of Srebrenica.265 The VRS also embarked upon a campaign of burning Bosnian Muslim houses to ensure there would be no possibility of their former occupants returning.266 Further evidence that Srebrenica town was extensively shelled and that civilians came under fire was provided in combat reports filed by the 28th Division of the ABiH in the days immediately following the commencement of Krivaja 95.267

General Krstic268 and several other Defence witnesses who took part in Krivaja 95,269 denied that Srebrenica was shelled, or that civilians were deliberately targeted by the Drina Corps during Krivaja 95. One Defence witness stated that:

The town of Srebrenica was not shelled at all. Not a single shell fell on the urban part of town, not a single building was damaged when we entered the town on the 11th of July.270

Mr. Richard Butler, the Prosecution’s military expert, expressed the view that shells did not target the civilians of Srebrenica.271 However, he subsequently clarified his position, stating there was no evidence that shells were fired directly at civilians by the VRS, and he did not dispute the testimony of the Dutch Bat soldiers and other witnesses about the impact of the shelling upon the civilians.272 Mr. Butler did, however, say that there is little evidence of the calibre of shells fired or the extent of the damage caused.273

While the Prosecution may not have conclusively established the precise number of shells fired, or the type of artillery used, the Trial Chamber finds that the shelling of Srebrenica carried out by the Drina Corps, on 10 and 11 July 1995, by which time the original objectives of Krivaja 95 had already been achieved, was calculated to terrify the Bosnian Muslim population and to drive them out of Srebrenica town.

3.Involvement of Drina Corps Personnel in the Events at Potocari: 11-13 July 1995

(a) Transport of the Bosnian Muslim Civilians out of Potocari

(i) Meeting at Hotel Fontana on 11 July 1995 at 2000 Hours

As the humanitarian crisis in Potocari escalated, at around 2000 hours on 11 July 1995, General Mladic summoned UNPROFOR leaders for the first of three meetings with VRS officials at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac.274 General Mladic led the meeting, which lasted approximately one hour. General Zivanovic, then-Commander of the Drina Corps, was present along with other Drina Corps officers , including Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric, the Drina Corps Chief of Intelligence , and Captain First Class Momir Nikolic, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bratunac Brigade.275 Colonel Karremans stated that there were about 10,000 women and children within the Potocari compound and sought assurances that Dutch Bat and the Bosnian Muslim population would be allowed to withdraw from the area. General Mladic stated that the Bosnian Muslim civilian population was not the target of his actions and, subsequently, asked whether UNPROFOR would be able to provide any buses for their transportation out. Colonel Karremans replied that he thought that could be arranged.276

During the meeting, General Mladic asked the UNPROFOR leaders to put him in contact with a representative of the ABiH, as well as Bosnian Muslim civilian representatives. At this point, the VRS appeared to have no idea where the ABiH was. The 28th Division had disengaged from the VRS in the southern part of the enclave and the VRS had not yet realised that ABiH troops were rallying in the column to make a push towards Tuzla. Like General Mladic, however, Colonel Karremans had no idea how to get in contact with military or civilian leaders of Srebrenica. The meeting concluded with General Mladic telling Colonel Karremans to return later that same evening at 2300 hours for a second meeting.

(ii)Meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 11 July 1995 at 2300 Hours

As General Mladic had directed, the second meeting convened at the Hotel Fontana took place around 2300 hours that same evening. General Mladic again presided at the meeting. This time General Zivanovic was not present but General Krstic was .277 Colonel Kosoric and Major Nikolic from the Drina Corps were also in attendance at this meeting. The Dutch Bat representatives arrived with a schoolteacher named Nesib Mandzic, an unofficial Bosnian Muslim representative who was plucked from the crowd in Potocari.278 The consensus of the UN and Bosnian Muslim participants in the meeting was that General Mladic was putting on a show calculated to intimidate them. As the meeting began, the death cries of a pig being slaughtered just outside the window could be heard in the meeting room. The Prosecution witnesses all thought this grisly interruption was deliberately designed to frighten them.279 General Mladic then placed the broken signboard from the Srebrenica Town Hall on the table. Mr. Mandzic thought this too was meant to symbolise the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had taken Srebrenica and the Bosnian Muslims could no longer stay there.280

Plans to transport the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the enclave crystallised at this second meeting. The Dutch Bat officer present stated that between 15,000 and 20,000 refugees, mostly women, children and elderly, had gathered in and around Potocari by that time and recounted the developing humanitarian crisis.281 General Mladic stated that he would provide the vehicles to transport the Srebrenica refugees out of Potocari.282

Although General Mladic said that the population had to choose whether to stay or, if they were not staying, where to go, he used threatening language. He demanded that all ABiH troops within the area of the former enclave lay down their arms and made it clear that, if this did not happen, the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population would be in danger. General Mladic said he wanted a clear position on whether the Bosnian Muslims wanted to “survive, stay, or disappear”. Turning to Mr. Mandzic, General Mladic said:

Do you understand me Nesib…And the future of your people is in your hands…not only in this territory.283

Mr. Mandzic was in an untenable position. He pleaded with General Mladic that he did not know where the 28th Division was and, in any event, had no power to commit the ABiH to any course of action. Nor did he have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the civilian population. His explanations, however, fell on deaf ears. General Mladic concluded the meeting, saying:

That is your problem, bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction. 284

To those present at the meeting that night it seemed clear that staying would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica.285 General Mladic scheduled a follow-up meeting for the next morning.

(iii)Meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 12 July 1995 at 1000 Hours

On 12 July 1995 at about 1000 hours, General Mladic convened the third and final meeting to discuss the fate of the Srebrenica Muslims. Once again, General Mladic dominated the meeting, with General Krstic sitting at his side.286 In addition, Colonel Popovic joined Colonel Kosoric as a representative of the Drina Corps at the meeting. By this time, the VRS had obtained information about the existence of the Bosnian Muslim column attempting to break out of the former enclave .287 The Dutch Bat representatives, still unable to contact the official Bosnian Muslim military or civilian leaders of Srebrenica, had again brought Mr. Mandzic, along with two more unofficial representatives from the Potocari refugees: Ms. Camila Omanovic, an economist; and Mr. Ibro Nuhanovic , a businessman.

General Mladic again made it clear that survival of the Srebrenica Muslims was conditional upon a military surrender. He said:

…you can either survive or disappear…For your survival, I request: that all your armed men who attacked and committed crimes-and many did-- against our people, hand over their weapons to the Army of the Republika Srpska…on handing over weapons you may…choose to stay in the territory….or, if it suits you, go where you want. The wish of every individual will be observed, no matter how many of you there are.288

General Mladic stated that he would provide the vehicles, but that the fuel would have to be provided by someone else and suggested that UNPROFOR assume responsibility for this.289

Mr. Mandzic and Ms. Omanovic both testified before the Trial Chamber that the clear message conveyed by General Mladic in this meeting was that the Bosnian Muslim refugees could only survive by leaving Srebrenica.290

General Mladic also informed those present that all men between the ages of about 17 and 70 would have to be separated and screened to separate out possible “war criminals”.291

(iv)Organisation of the Buses

After the meeting at the Hotel Fontana on the morning of 12 July 1995, two of the Dutch Bat soldiers went back to Bratunac to meet with VRS officials to work out an evacuation plan. As it turned out there was no need for such a meeting. By around noon on 12 July 1995, dozens of buses and trucks were arriving in Potocari to collect the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. The VRS had already made all the necessary arrangements.292

The Defence argued that Drina Corps personnel were not involved in the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Potocari following the take-over of Srebrenica. However, there is abundant evidence showing the participation of the Drina Corps in this operation.

Early in the morning of 12 July 1995, General Zivanovic signed an order addressed to all the subordinate units of the Drina Corps directing that “all buses and mini -buses belonging to the VRS be secured for use by the Drina Corps,” arrive at the Bratunac stadium by 16.30 hours and follow instructions about locations for fuel distribution.293 The order further stated that the Drina Corps Command had sent a message to the RS Ministry of Defence asking for private buses to be mobilised. The same morning, the RS Ministry of Defence sent three orders to its local secretariats directing them to procure buses and send them to Bratunac.294

Intercepted conversations throughout 12 and 13 July 1995 reveal that other Drina Corps officers were also working on matters relating to the transportation. These include the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation, Lieutenant Colonel Rajko Krsmanovic,295 and Major Momir Nikolic, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade.296 The specific involvement of General Krstic in the organisation of the buses is considered below in Part II C.

Logs seized from the Bratunac Brigade show that this Brigade was monitoring fuel disbursements to buses and trucks on 12 and 13 July 1995.297 The Trial Chamber accepts that the Drina Corps command must have been informed about the enormous quantities of fuel being disbursed given the scarcity of this precious commodity in Eastern Bosnia at the time.

Although the Drina Corps ultimately managed to find enough buses it was a scramble. Up until the evening of 11 July 1995, General Mladic had appeared to be working on the assumption that the buses to move the civilians out of Potocari would be provided by the UN. This was logical given the limited resources of the VRS and particularly the scarcity of buses and fuel in Eastern Bosnia at the time. The Drina Corps, after requesting buses from the Ministry of Defence in the early morning hours of 12 July 1995, succeeded in gathering the number of vehicles required for the transport of the entire population of women, children and elderly within a 48 hour period. The Prosecution expert, Mr. Butler, testified that an operation of this size –moving in the vicinity of 25,000 people – would normally have to be planned days in advance.298

On the evening of 13 July 1995, Colonel Jankovic, a VRS Main Staff officer, prepared a “wrap-up” report about the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari, which was sent to the Drina Corps Intelligence Department, further confirming that the Drina Corps was an interested party in the transportation operation .299

The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps was instrumental in procuring the buses and other vehicles that were used to transport the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the Potocari compound on 12 and 13 July 1995, as well as the fuel needed to accomplish this task.

(v)The Presence of Drina Corps Officers in Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995

On 12 and 13 July, as the evacuation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly proceeded, many witnesses saw General Mladic in and around the compound in Potocari, as well as other Main Staff officers.300 Although it appeared that General Mladic was in charge of the transportation operation during the time he was there,301 there is also compelling evidence that Drina Corps personnel were present in Potocari, on 12 and 13 July 1995, to assist with moving the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the enclave. The presence of General Krstic in Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995 is considered in Part II C below. However, among the other Drina Corps Command Staff identified by witnesses in Potocari, on 12 and 13 July 1995 were: the Corps Commander, General Zivanovic;302 the Assistant Commander for Security, Colonel Popovic;303 the Assistant Commander for Rear Services, Colonel Lazar Acamovic;304 and the Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Kosoric.305 On 12 July 1995, a Dutch Bat soldier spoke to Colonel Kosoric about arranging for Dutch Bat troops to accompany a convoy of Bosnian Muslim refugees from Potocari.306 Eyewitnesses also identified six persons, all of whom appear on the roster of the Drina Corps’ Bratunac Brigade, as being present in Potocari at the time when the women, children and elderly were moved out.307 One of these, Major Momir Nikolic (the Bratunac Brigade Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security), was known to Dutch Bat/UNMOs in the area as a liaison officer prior to the take-over of Srebrenica.308 Major Nikolic was seen in Potocari on both 12309 and 13 July 1995.310

The Trial Chamber finds that Drina Corps Command officers and units were present in Potocari monitoring the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the area on 12 and 13 July 1995.311

(vi)A Forced or Voluntary Movement?

General Radinovic testified for the Defence that the flight of the women, children and elderly from Potocari was voluntary and could in no way be viewed as a forced movement.312 He acknowledged that fear was a factor in their decision to leave, but insisted this was the case in all wars. During the war in Bosnia, as elsewhere, the mass movement of civilian populations was a regular occurrence whenever enemy forces captured territory.313 Mr. Butler, the Prosecution’s expert, agreed that the flight of civilians from conflict zones is a recognised phenomenon of war and often represents a rational choice on the part of the civilians.314 Indeed, as already noted, in 1993 the UNHCR had assisted the evacuation of many thousands of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.

Certainly, faced with the reality of their disastrous situation by the evening of 11 July 1995, the Srebrenica refugees in Potocari were clamouring to get out of the enclave. As Colonel Karremans said at the first meeting held at the Fontana Hotel at 2030 hours on 11 July 1995, many of the Bosnian Muslim women in the compound had already told Dutch Bat that they were waiting for buses to arrive so they could escape.315

Overwhelming evidence presented during the course of the Trial, however, demonstrates that, in July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica was not faced with a genuine choice as to whether to leave or to remain in the area. The shelling of Srebrenica, particularly on 10 and 11 July 1995, and the burning of Bosnian Muslim homes was calculated to terrify the population and make them flee the area with no hope of return. Further, it was General Mladic who initiated the meetings at the Hotel Fontana when he made it abundantly clear that he wanted the Bosnian Muslims out of the area. On 12 July 1995, as the bus convoys were being organised, General Mladic was heard to say during an intercepted conversation:

They’ve all capitulated and surrendered and we’ll evacuate them all – those who want to and those who don’t want to.316

Certainly, the Bosnian Muslim refugees were not consulted or given a choice about their final destination. An UNMO in the Srebrenica area testified to an incident he witnessed in which Serb soldiers threatened to shoot an elderly woman if she did not leave Srebrenica, despite her pleas to remain. As a result of this threat and to ensure her safety, the UNMO physically removed the woman from the Srebrenica hospital where she had been and took her to Potocari.317 All of these factors, against the backdrop of the terror campaign waged by the VRS against the refugees in Potocari, make it clear that the Bosnian Serbs wanted the area cleansed of Bosnian Muslims.

Yet the VRS sought to make the flight of the Srebrenica residents look like a voluntary movement. On 14 July 1995, the UN Security Council expressed concern about the forced relocation of civilians from the Srebrenica “safe area” by the Bosnian Serbs, asserting it was a clear violation of their human rights.318 On 17 July 1995, in the face of growing international condemnation, Major Franken, the Deputy Commander of Dutch Bat, met with a VRS delegation to discuss the situation of wounded Bosnian Muslims in the area of the former enclave. During the meeting, he and the unofficial Bosnian Muslim representative Mr. Mandzic, who was also present, were told to sign a declaration specifying that the transfer of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Potocari was voluntary, supervised and escorted by UNPROFOR and carried out by the VRS without any irregularities.319 VRS officers made it clear to Major Franken that he was required to sign the declaration in order to ensure that 59 wounded patients could be promptly evacuated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).320 When he testified before the Trial Chamber, Major Franken described his forced assent to the declaration as “worthless”.321 In reality, he said General Mladic “ordered the population to go to Kladanj, period ”.322 General Krstic, during an interview with the OTP shortly after his arrest, acknowledged that it was a forced movement of the population, although he denied that he was involved.323

The Trial Chamber finds that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica who were bussed out of Potocari were not making a free choice to leave the area of the former enclave. The Drina Corps personnel involved in the transportation operation knew that the Bosnian Muslim population was being forced out of the area by the VRS.

(b)The Crimes Committed in Potocari on 12-13 July 1995

On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the arrival of Serb forces in Potocari, the Bosnian Muslim refugees taking shelter in and around the compound were subjected to a terror campaign comprised of threats, insults, looting and burning of nearby houses, beatings, rapes, and murders.324 Drina Corps officers were present in Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995325 and, in addition, Drina Corps units were seen in the vicinity of Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995.326 The Petrovic video of the Potocari area, filmed on 13 July 1995, shows an armoured personnel carrier with a military registration number matching that of a vehicle assigned to the Command of the Bratunac Brigade.327

There was also an array of non-Drina Corps Serb forces present in Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995. There were VRS Main Staff officers reporting directly to General Mladic.328 Some eyewitnesses also reported seeing members of the paramilitary group Arkan’s Tigers in Potocari .329 Other witnesses said that some of the Bosnian Serb soldiers appeared to be “irregulars” or “Rambo types”.330 Serb military police wearing blue uniforms with black belts and driving police vehicles were identified,331 as well as a person who identified himself as Captain Mane from the police and his commander who went by the code name of “Stalin”.332 Witnesses spoke of soldiers dressed in black who appeared to be operating under their own command structure,333 a unit that had dogs with them334 and soldiers dressed in a combination of camouflage and civilian clothing.335 Numerous witnesses, who reported the presence of “VRS soldiers” in green camouflage uniforms in Potocari, were not able to identify them as belonging to any particular unit.336 These disparate groups all appeared to have their own commanding officers.337 While Bosnian Muslim witnesses were sometimes able to recognise individual Serb soldiers, suggesting that at least some units were from the local area,338 there was evidence that Serb forces from outside the Srebrenica area had also been brought in.339 Colonel Karremans, the Commander of Dutch Bat recalled hearing that General Mladic brought new troops into the enclave, including militia and Arkan’s Brigade, a few days prior to the commencement of Krivaja 95.340

Not surprisingly, given the chaos that enveloped the Potocari compound on 12 and 13 July 1995, most witnesses were unable to specify which units were responsible for the crimes committed during those days. Many witnesses heard screams, gunshots and stories of murder, without directly observing the crimes themselves.341

The Trial Record suggests that non-Drina Corps troops were highly visible perpetrators of the opportunistic crimes committed as part of the terror campaign in Potocari. One witness saw “Rambo types” burning houses and crops on the hillside around Potocari on 12 July and, later that night, threaten to slit the throat of a young wounded Bosnian Muslim man.342 Only one witness directly implicated the Drina Corps in any of the mistreatment. A Dutch Bat soldier testified that members of the Drina Wolves, a sub-unit of the Zvornik Brigade, went inside houses in the vicinity of the compound and “started to plunder those houses”. He identified the men as belonging to the Drina Wolves because he saw them wearing the Drina Wolves insignia depicting a wolf’s head.343 The witness heard screams from inside one of the houses and a burst of fire from an AK-47. The witness concluded that the Bosnian Muslim refugees inside the house were being killed.344 Although this witness was confident about his identification of the Drina Wolves in this criminal activity, the Trial Chamber heard no other evidence corroborating the participation of this unit in the crimes. Furthermore, the same witness testified that he saw soldiers wearing HVO (i.e. Bosnian Croat forces) insignia in Potocari and there is no other support for the notion that these forces played any part in the events in Srebrenica.345 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber cannot discount the possibility that this witness, although on the whole credible, was mistaken in his identification of the unit involved in the crimes he described. Indeed, upon cross-examination, the witness accepted that he was not close enough to directly observe whether the unit plundering the houses was from the Drina Corps. He merely thought it was the unit of the Drina Wolves that he had seen earlier.346

In the absence of direct identification evidence, the Prosecution was left to rely on the fact that regular soldiers in green camouflage uniforms, of the type usually worn by the Drina Corps including General Krstic,347 were involved in the commission of crimes in Potocari.348 However, the Trial Chamber cannot discount the possibility that there were also non-Drina Corps troops in Potocari wearing this standard military uniform.349

The evidence suggests that the various Serb units who entered Potocari had each been assigned a designated role in the well co-ordinated Serb campaign waged there between 12 and 13 July 1995. A Dutch Bat soldier recounted before the Trial Chamber that Potocari:

… was a well-prepared stage. Everybody had been assigned a task, everybody knew his position. There were people who had to guard the compound, who had to guard the surroundings. There were units who had to clear out the houses, and there were other units who had to do the interrogations…It was indeed well organised…350

Although the Trial Chamber cannot conclude with certainty the extent of the assignment given to the Drina Corps within this well-planned operation, the record does establish that Drina Corps officers were heavily involved in organising and monitoring the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Potocari. This appears to have been one of the more disciplined aspects of the Potocari operation. One witness recalled that:

…during the deportation of the Muslim refugees, there was some kind of discipline. But for the rest of it, there was no discipline.351

The absence of any substantial direct evidence showing the involvement of Drina Corps troops in the opportunistic crimes committed against Bosnian Muslim civilians in Potocari, tends to suggest that the majority of these crimes were committed by irregular Serb forces that had entered the area on 12 July 1995. Nonetheless, as Prosecution witnesses testified, Drina Corps officers present in and around the Potocari compound could not but have been aware of the deteriorating situation of Bosnian Muslims who had gathered there and the mistreatment occurring at the hands of other Serb forces who were present in the area.352 By all accounts, the harassment of the Srebrenica refugees by the Serb forces was too widespread and pervasive to be overlooked. These Drina Corps officers did nothing to prevent the criminal conduct.353 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that Drina Corps officers and units present in Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995 must have been aware of the catastrophic humanitarian situation confronting the Bosnian Muslim refugees, as well as the general mistreatment being inflicted by Serb forces, but took no action in response.

(c)The Separation of the Men in Potocari

At the Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July 1995, General Mladic had said that military-aged men in the crowd at Potocari would be screened for war crimes.354 The Prosecution’s military experts accepted that it was not inherently unreasonable or criminal for the Bosnian Serbs to conduct such screening given widespread and plausible allegations that Bosnian Muslim raiders from Srebrenica had committed war crimes against Bosnian Serb villages.355 Indeed, the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade had prepared a list, dated 12 July 1995, of 387 suspected Bosnian Muslim war criminals in the Srebrenica enclave.356 Throughout the war, large-scale prisoner exchanges were conducted between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims and a new infusion of Bosnian Muslim prisoners would have been a potentially useful bargaining tool for the Bosnian Serbs in future exchange negotiations.357

Consistent with this, the men and boys in Potocari were separated from the women, children and elderly and taken to the White House for interrogation. Contrary to the claims made by General Mladic and other Serb soldiers that these men would be screened and ultimately exchanged for Bosnian Serb prisoners of war,358 when they were taken to the White House they were forced to leave their belongings, including their wallets and identification papers, in a large pile outside the building prior to entering.359 The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that some of the men detained at the White House were killed and mistreated in sporadic attacks360 and, more generally, that all of the Bosnian Muslim men who were separated were held in appalling conditions.361

Again, the Trial Record is not clear as to which Serb units were involved in the separation and detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Potocari. One witness recalled that police with dogs were involved in the process of separating the men, which may suggest the involvement of the 65th Protection Regiment.362 Another implicated the bodyguards of General Mladic in a shooting incident in the vicinity of the White House.363 More generally, witnesses reported well-organised and well-dressed soldiers in and around the White House.364 Some witnesses specifically recalled that all the soldiers around the White House wore green camouflage uniforms365 although , again, the Trial Chamber is unable to thereby conclude that they were Drina Corps troops. Certainly though, Drina Corps Officers were involved in procuring the buses and overseeing their journey out of the enclave, giving rise to an inference that they also played a part in boarding the Bosnian Muslim refugees onto the buses. Drina Corps officers were also seen in the vicinity of the White House during the time the separated men were detained there.366 They must have been aware that the Bosnian Muslim men’s belongings had been taken from them and piled out in front of the White House, as well as the terrible conditions in which these men were kept. By the late afternoon of 12 July 1995, terror in the Potocari compound had developed to such intensity that Major Franken was prompted to draw up a list containing the names of the men in and around the compound. In his view, the conduct of the VRS signalled to all who were present that the survival of the men was at risk and Major Franken made his list in an effort to safeguard their lives by establishing a record of their presence in the compound.367 The Drina Corps officers present must have also known that there was a terrible uncertainty about what was going to happen to the separated men. One Dutch Bat witnesses summed it up in this way:

[Y]ou could see the total fear, and I never thought that it really existed, but you could even smell death there because it was total fear, what you saw on the faces of the men and the young boys.368

Beginning on the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and continuing throughout 13 July 1995, men detained in the White House were bussed out of the Potocari compound to detention sites in Bratunac.369 Colonel Kingori testified that:

…the men who were being taken from that white building, the ones who had been put together earlier. They were put on their own buses, different from the ones carrying the women and children and we did not know where there destination was…370

[the men who had been separated] could [sic] shout and say, ‘You know these people are going to kill us, and then you are not doing anything about it.’ …Something bad was actually going to be done to them. You know we could see it…you could see there was a lot of fear. They were crying, You know, men –you can imagine men crying in front of you and seeking assistance from you, assistance which you cannot give --it had gone beyond my control.371

Drina Corps officers present in the compound, particularly those in the vicinity of the White House, must have known that the separated men from Potocari were bussed out to detention sites in Bratunac. Indeed, the fact that the buses transporting the Bosnian Muslim men from Potocari were diverted from the transportation of the women, children and elderly, which the Drina Corps was overseeing, to carry out this task made that knowledge on their part inevitable.372

Later, after all of the Bosnian Muslim civilians had gone from Potocari, the piles of personal effects, including identity cards, that had been taken from the Bosnian Muslim men and boys were set on fire.373 At that point Dutch Bat soldiers were certain that the story about screening for war criminals could not be true: something more ominous was afoot.374 The Chamber accepts that, at the stage when the Bosnian Muslim men were divested of their identification en masse, it must have been apparent to any observer that the men were not being screened for war crimes. In the absence of personal documentation, these men could no longer be accurately identified for any purpose. Rather, the removal of their identification could only be an ominous signal of atrocities to come. However, the evidence suggests that the destruction of the identity documents did not occur until the late afternoon or evening of 13 July 1995. On the basis of the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber is unable to positively conclude that any Drina Corps personnel were still in the compound at the time the personal belongings taken from the Bosnian Muslim men detained in the White House were burned.

The Trial Chamber finds that Drina Corps personnel present in the Potocari compound, on 12 and 13 July 1995, knew that the Bosnian Muslim men, who were separated from the women, children and elderly, were not treated in accordance with accepted practice for war crimes screening and that there was a terrible uncertainty about what the fate of these men would be. The Drina Corps Command also knew that the separated men from Potocari were bussed out to detention sites in Bratunac using busses that had been diverted from the transportation of the women, children and elderly, which the Drina Corps was overseeing.

4. Involvement of the Drina Corps in Action against the Bosnian Muslim Column

Immediately following the take-over of Srebrenica, the whereabouts of the 28th Division of the ABiH were unknown.375 This was of great concern to the VRS, as was the possibility that forces of the 2nd Corps of the ABiH attacking from the direction of Tuzla and Kladanj would link up with elements of the 28th Division.376 Radio intercepts indicate that the VRS first became aware of the formation of the column around 0300 hours on 12 July 1995.377 At the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995, General Mladic had attempted to secure the surrender of the ABiH forces in the area of the former enclave. He was, however, unsuccessful and, in the ensuing days, VRS units, including units of the Drina Corps that were not engaged in the Zepa campaign, were assigned to block the column.378 In addition to these Drina Corps units, non-Drina Corps units, including a Special Brigade of the police units of the RS Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo Unutrasnih Poslova, or MUP), elements of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment and subsequently elements of the municipal police, also took action to block the column.379 Over the course of 12 and 13 July 1995, a series of intercepted conversations track the developing knowledge of the Drina Corps,380 and the VRS generally,381 about the column.

About one third of the Bosnian Muslim column was comprised of soldiers from the 28th Division, and about two-thirds were Bosnian Muslim civilian men from Srebrenica .382 The military experts for both the Prosecution and the Defence agreed that, under VRS regulations, the column qualified as a legitimate military target.383 Certainly the Indictment in this case does not allege that the combat activities against the column were deliberately or indiscriminately directed against civilians in the column. However, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were also captured from the column, most of them civilians, transferred to detention sites, and subsequently executed. Consequently, the knowledge the Drina Corps had of the column, as well as Drina Corps involvement in action taken against it, particularly the capture of Bosnian Muslim prisoners, forms a critical backdrop to the Trial Chamber’s findings on the criminal responsibility of General Krstic for the Srebrenica crimes.

(a) Combat against the Column

As the Bosnian Muslim column attempted to break out of the enclave, it first moved through the area of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade. The 13 July 1995 Combat Report sent by the Bratunac Brigade to the Drina Corps Command discussed military activities related to encircling and crushing groups of Bosnian Muslims attempting to escape the area.384 The combat against the column in the Bratunac zone of responsibility, however, appears to have been of low intensity.385

Leaving the area of the Bratunac Brigade, the column moved up towards the Zvornik Brigade’s zone of responsibility. On 12 July 1995 at 16.40 hours, the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, Major Dragan Obrenovic, was heard in an intercepted conversation discussing matters relating to the column and the activities of the MUP who were deployed to ambush the column along the Konjevic-Polje road.386 In a conversation at 20.35 hours on 13 July 1995, Major Obrenovic is again heard reporting on the movement of the column to an unidentified General.387 The General ordered Major Obrenovic to take urgent steps to ensure he did not “let anything through”. On 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade reported to the Command of the Drina Corps that troops not engaged for Zepa were being deployed to deal with the enemy forces known to be moving out of Srebrenica and towards Tuzla. Clashes between the Zvornik Brigade and the 2nd Corps of the ABiH from Tuzla were also noted .388 The Daily Combat report sent to the Drina Corps Command by the Zvornik Brigade on 14 July 1995 reveals that clashes with the 2nd Corps continued and, in addition, the Zvornik Brigade encountered the Bosnian Muslim column at around 18.00 hours.389 Later that same day, the Zvornik Brigade reported to the Drina Corps Command, in an Interim Combat Report, that the Bosnian Muslim column had broken through the defences of the Zvornik Brigade.390 By 10.00 hours on 15 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of the presence of a column “of between four and five thousand”.391 The Daily Combat Report sent to the Drina Corps Command by the Zvornik Brigade on 15 July 1995 reported heavy combat with the Bosnian Muslim column, as well as the actions of Bosnian Muslim forces who were attacking the front line in an effort to assist the column in breaking through.392 An Interim Combat Report of the same date states that the Zvornik Brigade was completely engaged by enemy forces.393 On 16 July 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, reported that, in view of the enormous pressure on his Brigade, he had taken a unilateral decision to open up a corridor to allow about 5,000 unarmed members of the Bosnian Muslim column to pass through.394 Following this, on 17 and 18 July 1995, Zvornik Brigade units engaged in pockets of combat with Bosnian Muslim stragglers who remained in the zone of responsibility .395

Undisputed evidence thus demonstrates that the Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, particularly the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades, engaged in combat with the column as it attempted to break-through to Bosnian Muslim held territory. These Brigades were continuously reporting to the Drina Corps Command about matters relating to the column between 12 and 18 July 1995.

(b) Capture of Bosnian Muslim Men from the Column

Mr. Butler calculated that, from the afternoon of 12 July 1995, or the early evening at the latest, the Bosnian Serbs were capturing, within the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps, large numbers of the men from the column.396 How much the Drina Corps knew about the capture of the men and the involvement of Drina Corps units in these events, proved to be the subject of a critical debate between the parties in the case.

(i) General Knowledge that Bosnian Muslim Men were Being Captured from the Column

There is persuasive evidence that the Drina Corps Command knew that prisoners were being captured from the column from 12 July 1995 onwards. An intelligence report prepared by the Zvornik Brigade on 12 July 1995 and received by the Drina Corps Command in the early morning hours of 13 July 1995, expressly referred to the fact that Bosnian Muslims in the column were “fleeing in panic, without any control, in groups or individually and giving themselves up to the MUP/Ministry of the Interior/ or the VRS/Republika Srpska Army.”397 On 13 July 1995, the contents of this report were subsequently conveyed by the Drina Corps Intelligence Department to, inter alia, the Main Staff and the MUP, in a document that stated “our soldiers were using megaphones asking them to surrender” (emphasis added).398

Certainly the Drina Corps Command was well aware of the general VRS plan to capture the Bosnian Muslim men trying to breakthrough to Tuzla. Indeed, the Drina Corps Command received direct orders from the Main Staff to take prisoners from the Bosnian Muslim column. On 13 July 1995,399 in an attempt to forewarn Drina Corps Brigades who were in the approaching column’s line of attack, Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero, the Main Staff Assistant Commander for Moral Legal and Religious Affairs, issued an order about the column to the Drina Corps Command.400 The order was also sent to the Drina Corps Forward Command Post (hereafter “FCP”) and directly to the relevant subordinate Brigades, namely the Zvornik Brigade, the Birac Brigade and the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade. General Gvero described the column as comprised of “hardened criminals and cut-throats, who will stop at nothing in order to avoid capture and escape to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory.” The Corps and Brigade commands were ordered to use all available manpower in “discovering, blocking, disarming and capturing” men from the column. To this end, the Drina Corps was ordered to set ambushes along the Zvornik-Crni Vrh-Sekovici-Vlasenica road. General Gvero specified the procedure to be followed when Bosnian Muslims from the column were captured, one aspect of which was reporting immediately to the “Superior Command.” Later that same day, General Zivanovic issued an order at 16.00 hours largely reproducing the order sent by General Gvero.401

The Trial Chamber finds that, from 12 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command knew Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being taken from the column by Bosnian Serb forces within its zone of responsibility. The Drina Corps Command was informed of the Main Staff policy of blocking and capturing the Bosnian Muslim men in the Column and the Main Staff had directed that Drina Corps units be deployed in setting ambushes for the column.

(ii) 13 July 1995: Participation in the Capture of Prisoners along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road

The vast majority of prisoners were seized along the road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje on 13 July 1995. An intercepted conversation on that day indicates that about 6,000 men had been captured by 1730 hours.402 Witnesses estimated that between 1,000 and 4,000 Bosnian Muslim men captured from the column were detained in the Sandici Meadow on 13 July 1995.403 The soldiers guarding the men forced them to drop their belongings into big piles and to hand over their valuables. Late in the afternoon of 13 July 1995, General Mladic visited the meadow and told the men that they would not be hurt but would be exchanged as prisoners of war and that their families had been transported safely to Tuzla.404 The Bosnian Serb forces on the scene began shepherding the men out of the meadow. Some were put on buses or marched towards the nearby Kravica Warehouse.405 Others were loaded on buses and trucks and taken to Bratunac and other nearby locations .406 In addition, an estimated 1 ,500 and 3,000 men captured from the column were held prisoner on the Nova Kasaba football field on 13 July 1995.407 As in the Sandici meadow, the men at Nova Kasaba were forced to turn over their valuables and abandon their belongings.408 General Mladic visited that field in the afternoon of 13 July 1995 as well, but this time he told the prisoners that the Bosnian Muslim authorities in Tuzla did not want them and so they would be sent somewhere else.409 Most of the men at Nova Kasaba were subsequently loaded into buses and trucks and taken to Bratunac and other holding sites.410

The evidence conclusively establishes that, on 13 July 1995, MUP forces were deployed along the stretch of road between Konjevic Polje and Bratunac where the bulk of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners were captured from the column.411 The Prosecution argued that Drina Corps units were also present there, but the Defence adamantly denied this.

A video taken by Serb journalist, Zoran Petrovic, in the company of Lieutenant Colonel Ljubisa Borovcanin, the Deputy Commander of a Special MUP Brigade, recorded the activity along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on 13 July 1995.412 Mr. Butler presented circumstantial evidence indicating that military equipment shown in the film belonged to units of the Drina Corps, specifically the 4th Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade (a Zvornik Brigade unit, that at the time was functioning as a Bratunac Brigade unit) and the 2nd Romanija Brigade.413 However, this evidence is not sufficiently reliable to support a firm conclusion by the Trial Chamber that these Drina Corps units were engaged in the capture of Bosnian Muslim men along that stretch of road. For example, during his testimony, Mr. Butler suggested that a photograph of soldiers wearing flak jackets who were guarding a group of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in Sandici probably belonged to the 4th Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade. He drew this conclusion based upon information the OTP uncovered during the course of its investigations about the equipment inventories of the various units in the area.414 However, when Mr. Butler was recalled during the Prosecution’s rebuttal case, he informed the Chamber that ongoing investigations had revealed that the individuals in the photograph were members of a police unit and not in fact members of the army .415 Similarly, during his initial testimony, Mr. Butler concluded that the army owned a tank shown in the Petrovic video.416 During rebuttal, the Prosecution filed a stipulation, with the agreement of the Defence, that a witness would testify that the tank in question belonged to a police unit.417

The Prosecution also relied upon general evidence that army units, in addition to the MUP, were present along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on 13 July 1995. First, Mr. Butler doubted whether the entire stretch of road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje could have been secured by the MUP, given the breadth of the area involved and the limited number of MUP formations known to be present.418 Second, Mr. Butler testified that, when interviewed by the OTP, the police who were filmed by Petrovic guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in Sandici on 13 July 1995, confirmed that there were army members with them in the Sandici meadow area that day.419 The Bosnian Muslim men who made it through to Tuzla after being caught up in the second part of the column, stated that both the MUP and the VRS were engaged in capturing Bosnian Muslim men .420 The women, children and elderly who had been bussed from Potocari to Kladanj also told members of the ABiH, who met them upon their arrival, that they had seen dead men lying by the road and also claimed that the army had been involved.421 Witnesses captured in several locations remembered only seeing “Bosnian Serb soldiers ,” in green camouflage uniforms, without knowing which unit they came from.422 Some remembered blue camouflage uniforms423 and police cars.424 Other witnesses recounted rumours that members of the paramilitary group, called Arkan’s Tigers, were in the area;425 some reported seeing Bosnian Serb soldiers dressed in stolen UN uniforms.426 There was, however, virtually no evidence demonstrating that units of the Drina Corps were amongst these army forces. The only exception is one eyewitness who recalled seeing a truck with a wolf’s head on the door, the emblem of the Drina Corps, at the football field in Nova Kasaba, where captured men were collected.427

Although there is some persuasive force in the arguments and evidence presented by the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Drina Corps units participated in the capture of the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column who were taken along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road on 13 July 1995.

Although the Prosecution was unable to identify specific Drina Corps units along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on 13 July 1995, there is strong evidence that the Corps Command knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been captured along that stretch of road throughout the day. A series of intercepted conversations show close co-operation and co-ordination between MUP units and Drina Corps units, particularly the Engineers Battalion,428 who were jointly engaged in action to block the Bosnian Muslim column.429 The Drina Corps Command was also in contact with the MUP unit along the Bratunac -Konjevic Polje road, monitoring their progress. A conversation, intercepted on 13 July 1995 at 2040 hours, reveals that General Krstic spoke to Colonel Borovcanin, the Deputy Commander of the MUP unit, asked how things were going and stated that he would be in touch.430

Also on 13 July 1995 at 2100 hours, a conversation was recorded involving Colonel Krsmanovic, the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation Services.431 Colonel Krsmanovic, who on 12 July 1995 had been involved in procuring the buses for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari, told the other participant in the conversation that there were “700 people in Sandici village ” and that “(t)he buses need to stop there, load 10 pieces and bring them here to me.” Between 1,000 and 4,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners taken along the Bratunac- Konjevic Polje road were detained in the Sandici Meadow throughout 13 July 1995. It is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to the statement Colonel Krsmanovic made about loading “10 pieces”. At a minimum, however, the conversation shows that Colonel Krsmanovic was still involved in directing the movement of buses in the area of the former enclave one hour after the transport of the Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly had been completed on the evening of 13 July 1995. More particularly, Colonel Krsmanovic was directing the movement of buses in the very areas where thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been collected on 13 July 1995 and at the time when they were being transported to holding sites in Bratunac.

The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Command knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been captured along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road on 13 July 1995. The Trial Chamber further finds that an officer in the Drina Corps Command was still involved in directing the movement of buses in the area of the former enclave where the prisoners were being held, despite the fact that the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the enclave on the evening of 13 July 1995 had already been completed an hour earlier.

(iii) 12-15 July 1995: Involvement with the Detention of Bosnian Muslim Prisoners in Bratunac

Most of the Bosnian Muslim men separated at Potocari and captured from the woods were held in Bratunac for one to three days before being transferred to other detention and execution sites. Evidence that Drina Corps units knew about the detention of men in Bratunac, though circumstantial, is persuasive.

The town of Bratunac is in the zone of the Bratunac Brigade of the Drina Corps .432 The arrival of many thousands of military aged Bosnian Muslim men could not have escaped the attention of the Brigade Command. In fact, a Bratunac Brigade military police log on 14 and 15 July 1995 reveals that military police from the Bratunac Brigade “were engaged in the escort of Bosnian Muslim refugees.”433 Since the women, children and elderly had already been transported from Potocari by the night of 13 July 1995, it appears likely that this referred to an assignment to escort the busses of male prisoners as they commenced their journey up north towards the Zvornik Brigade.434 The Prosecution also relied on the presence of soldiers in green camouflage at the detention sites in Bratunac as evidence that Drina Corps troops were present there .435 However, as previously noted, this evidence, of itself, is insufficient to establish the involvement of the Drina Corps.

The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade could not but have known that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained in Bratunac between 12-15 July 1995. The Trial Chamber also accepts the evidence adduced by the Prosecution showing that Bratunac Brigade military police were engaged in escorting these prisoners to northern detention sites on 14 and 15 July 1995.

Mr. Butler further concluded that the Drina Corps Command must have been involved in making the arrangements to detain the men at Bratunac. He based this conclusion on the fact that the resources involved were over and above those owned by the Bratunac Brigade and that an intensive level of co-ordination with the Command level of the Corps would have been required.436 However, the Trial Chamber is unable to make any specific finding that the Drina Corps Command was involved in making the arrangement to detain the men in Bratunac based only on theories as to how such a task would normally be carried out.

Nonetheless, the Prosecutor made a compelling argument that the Drina Corps Command must have known the Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained in Bratunac on the nights between 12 and 15 July 1995. Certainly, the Bratunac Brigade Command would be expected to have informed the Drina Corps Command about the arrival of thousands of military-aged Bosnian Muslim men within its zone of responsibility. This is especially so given that the whereabouts of the 28th Division was an issue of great concern to the Drina Corps units involved in preparing for the operation in Zepa.437

The Trial Chamber also notes that many men were transported to Bratunac from Potocari at the same time that Drina Corps troops were present and actively engaged in organising the buses for transporting the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the compound. Throughout the trial, the Prosecution relied upon the fact that the Drina Corps Command had procured the buses for the transportation of the women, children and elderly out of Potocari, to support an inference that they must have also known about the transport of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to detention and execution sites, including those in Bratunac, between 12 and 17 July 1995. The timing of the events suggests that the same buses used to transport the women, children and elderly were used to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. Certainly, it is clear from eyewitness testimony that buses used to transport the men from Potocari to Bratunac on 12 and 13 July 1995 had to be diverted from the parallel task of transporting the women, children and elderly to Kladanj.438 Further, it was not until the bussing of the women, children and elderly from Potocari was finished in the evening of 13 July 1995, thus making the entire convoy of buses and trucks available, that the transportation of the men from Bratunac to the detention and northern execution sites in zone of the Zvornik Brigade commenced. Officers in the Drina Corps Command had co-ordinated the procurement of the buses in the first place and were monitoring the transport of the women, children and the elderly out of the enclave. They must have known that, first, the buses were being diverted to the parallel task of transporting the Bosnian Muslim men from Potocari to Bratunac on 12 and 13 July 1995 and, second, that they were subsequently used to transport the men up north to the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade after the transport of the women, children and elderly was completed. Buses were scarce in Eastern Bosnia during July 1995. The Drina Corps had scrambled to obtain the requisite number of buses on 12 July 1995 casting its net far and wide, including calling upon the resources of private companies. One witness who saw the long line of buses transporting the Bosnian Muslims out of Potocari remarked how strange it was to see them given that, in the three years prior, there had barely been a single vehicle in the enclave.439 It is difficult to imagine that different buses were then acquired to transport the thousands of Bosnain Muslim prisoners to detention and executions sites. An eyewitness testified that some of the buses that arrived to transport the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Potocari, bore the inscriptions of companies in the region such as “Sembrija Transport” from Bijeljina, and “Drina Trans” from Zvornik.440 Mr. Erdemovic then testified that one of the buses used to transport Bosnian Muslim men to an execution site on 16 July 1995 bore the inscription of a Zvornik transportation company.441 This is consistent with the notion that the buses originally procured by the Drina Corps were still in use. As previously noted, intercept evidence also suggests that the Drina Corps Transportation Chief was involved in directing the movement of buses subsequent to the conclusion of the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from the enclave. Overall, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the buses procured by the Drina Corps were used for the transportation of Bosnian Muslim prisoners to detention and execution sites. It follows from this that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have been informed about the diversion of the buses from their original task of transporting the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly into transporting men from Potocari to Bratunac. The Trial Chamber also finds that, from the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have known that their buses had been put to further use in dealing with the Bosnian Muslim prisoner population remaining within its zone of responsibility.

Another factor supporting the proposition that the Drina Corps Command knew of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners detained at Bratunac is that, as Mr. Butler pointed out, it was very likely that the prisoner convoys leaving from Bratunac would have had to obtain route clearance from the Drina Corps for their journey up into the zone of the Zvornik Brigade since combat was ongoing in that area.442

The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Command had knowledge of both the fact that Bosnian Muslim men were being detained in Bratunac between 12 and 15 July 1995 and that, from the evening of 13 July 1995, they were transported to detention sites in the north, following completion of the removal of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly.

(iv)13-16 July 1995: Zvornik Brigade Knowledge of Bosnian Muslim Prisoners detained in its Zone of Responsibility

There is evidence that, from 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of the plans to distribute, throughout the Zvornik area, the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men being detained temporarily in Bratunac. Vehicle records443 show that, on 13 July 1995, an Opel “Record”, assigned to the Command of the Zvornik Brigade, travelled from the Zvornik Brigade headquarters to Orahovac (where a mass execution took place on 14 July 1995444 ) and Bratunac (where the Bosnian Muslim men were being detained at that time). On 14 July 1995, the vehicle visited Orahovac two more times and also went to Rocevic (where Prosecution investigators believe Bosnian Muslim men were subsequently detained in a school445 ). On 15 July 1995, it went to Kozluk (a known crime scene between 15 and 17 July 1995), Kula (where men were detained in the Pilica school on 14 and 15 July 1995), Pilica (where a mass execution took place on 16 July 1995446 ) and Rocevic. On 16 July 1995, it went to Kozluk, Pilica, Rocevic and Kravica. As is readily apparent, the timing and location of these visits correlate strongly to the timing and location of the detentions and mass executions.

The Defence argued that the Opel “Record” is known to have been the personal vehicle of Colonel Beara of the Main Staff and that he was responsible for these scouting visits.447 However, the documentation for the vehicle demonstrates that the vehicle was operated by three members of the Zvornik Brigade military police company.448 Even if Colonel Beara was involved in directing the trips, the Zvornik Brigade must have known it was being utilised for this purpose.

In a conversation intercepted on 14 July 1995 at 21.02 hours, the Zvornik Brigade duty officer was heard speaking to Colonel Beara, the Security Chief of the Main Staff, about “big problems…with the people, I mean, with the parcel.”449 Mr. Butler confirmed that the word “parcel” was used throughout the intercepted conversations to describe the prisoners taken from the Bosnian Muslim column as opposed to the column itself.450 This intercept is further evidence that the Zvornik Brigade was fully aware of the existence of the Bosnian Muslim prisoner population within its zone.

By 15 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevic, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, was complaining loudly to the Drina Corps command about the “additional burden” on his Brigade caused by the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners distributed throughout Zvornik.451

The Trial Chamber finds that, from 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade became aware of plans to transport Bosnian Muslim prisoners to its zone of responsibility and began locating detention sites for them. From 14 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were distributed throughout Zvornik.

(v) Capture of Prisoners during Drina Corps Sweep Operation in the Former Enclave

Pursuant to an order issued by General Krstic on 13 July 1995, Drina Corps units were also involved in conducting sweep operations in the area of the former enclave. Three subordinate units of the Drina Corps, namely Bratunac Brigade, the Skelani Separate Battalion and the Milici Brigade, were directed to conduct search operations in and around the former enclave of Srebrenica for Bosnian Muslim stragglers and to report back to General Krstic by 17 July 1995 on their efforts.452 In response, Colonel Ignjat Milanovic, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence, reported back to General Krstic on the situation within the zones of the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade and the Skelani Separate Battalion on 15 July 1995.453 Colonel Milanovic wrote that he had acquainted himself with the situation to the east of the Milici-Konjevic Polje-Bratunac road and that large groups of enemy soldiers were still present in this area. He indicated that the Bratunac Brigade was still searching this terrain. Colonel Milanovic proposed, in the absence of available personnel from the Drina Corps Command, the appointment of the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Blagojevic, as the commander of the forces engaged in sweeping the terrain. General Krstic subsequently accepted this proposal.454 Accordingly, the Bratunac Brigade Daily Combat Report for 16 July 1995 stated that the Brigade Commander had visited all the units blocking the enemy retreat and listed them (the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, units of the 65th Protection Regiment, parts of the MUP and the Drina Corps 5th Engineer Battalion), defined their tasks and organised their joint action and communication.455

Nonetheless, the Prosecution conceded it did not have any evidence about the numbers of prisoners taken as a result of the sweep operations ordered by General Krstic, although Mr. Butler maintained that there is evidence showing that prisoners were being taken in the area after 15 July 1995.456 Although General Krstic agreed that, pursuant to his 13 July 1995 order, the area being searched by Drina Corps troops coincided with the route traversed by the column, he pointed out that the search took place on 14 July 1995 after the column had already passed through.457

The Trial Chamber is unable to make any specific finding about the capture of Bosnian Muslim prisoners during the sweep operations conducted pursuant to the 13 July 1995 search order issued by General Krstic. The manner in which the order was implemented, however, demonstrates that Drina Corps forces were operating hand in hand with non-Drina Corps forces, whether military (the 65th Protection Regiment ) or non-military (the MUP).

5. Involvement of the Drina Corps in the Mass Executions

The vast amount of planning and high-level co-ordination that had to be invested in killing thousands of men in a few days is apparent from even the briefest description of the scale and the methodical nature in which the executions were carried out. The Trial Chamber now turns to the evidence presented by the Prosecution, including vehicle records, personnel records and radio intercepts, linking the Drina Corps with the various known execution sites for the Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica between 13 and 17 July 1995.

(a) The Morning of 13 July 1995: Jadar River Executions

A small-scale execution took place at Jadar River on 13 July 1995. Witness S, who survived this execution, testified before the Trial Chamber. Witness S recounted being captured near Konjevic Polje in the early morning hours of 13 July 1995 from where he was taken to a hut in front of a school building.458 From there he was taken across a meadow to the front of a house where four uniformed men proceeded to interrogate him.459 As this was happening, between about 7.00 and 9.00 hours in the morning of 13 July 1995,460 Witness S observed buses loaded with women and children going past.461 Witness S was moved on to yet another house462 and, subsequently, to a warehouse on the banks of the Jadar River, where his Serb captors beat him.463 Later, a bus arrived in front of the warehouse464 and Witness S, along with 16 other men, was transported a short distance to a spot on the banks of the Jadar River.465 The men were then lined up and shot.466 Witness S, after being hit in the hip by a bullet, sprang in to the River and managed to escape.467 The execution at Jadar River took place prior to midday, on 13 July 1995.468

Evidence directly implicating the Drina Corps in the Jadar River execution is slim. Witness S was unable to specifically identify any of the people involved in his detention or the executions as belonging to the Drina Corps. Certainly it appears that army personnel, in addition to police,469 may have been involved. At the hut in front of the school building, and later in the warehouse, Witness S saw soldiers in camouflage uniforms.470 He was also interrogated by a moustached man wearing a soldier’s camouflage uniform .471 This interrogator revealed that he had been in command of the Srebrenica operation in 1993.472

The Prosecution identified the area where Witness S had been interrogated as near the headquarters and COMS (communication) building of the Drina Corps 5th Engineering Battalion. Involvement of this Battalion in the Jadar River executions was, however, strongly contested by Defence Witness DE, an officer in the 5th Engineers Battalion in July 1995, who testified that the premises identified by Witness S were utilised by other units who had no command relationship with the Engineers Battalion.473 Indeed a series of intercepted conversations from 12 July 1995 reveal that a MUP company was in the area of the Drina Corps 5th Engineers Battalion on that day. However, the intercepts also indicate that this MUP unit could receive orders through the Drina Corps Engineers that day, thereby refuting Witness DE’s claim that the Engineers had no connection with this MUP unit.474

Mr. Butler further pointed out that Colonel Milanovic, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence in July 1995 and previously the Chief of Staff of the Bratunac Brigade in 1992-1993, was heard in several intercepted conversations on 13 July 1995 trying to acquire bulldozers or backhoes. The Prosecution argued this equipment was probably related to executions in either the Jadar River, or subsequently in Cerska valley, but could not specify which.475

On balance, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence presented is insufficient to support a finding that the Drina Corps was involved in the Jadar River execution on the morning of 13 July 1995. It is possible that the army personnel Witness S recalled were non-Drina Corps units in light of the fact that many non-local units were in the area following the take-over of Srebrenica.476 Similarly, the Prosecution was unable to conclusively establish that the engineering equipment referred to by Colonel Milanovic was used to bury the prisoners at this execution site. While the fact that prisoners were being interrogated near buildings utilised by the 5th Engineering Battalion may support an inference that this Drina Corps unit knew that several Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been taken by Bosnian Serb forces, it is insufficient to demonstrate that the Engineering Battalion thereby knew of, or was involved in, their subsequent execution.

(b)The Afternoon of 13 July 1995: Cerska Valley Executions

The first of the large-scale executions happened on the afternoon of 13 July 1995. Witness M, who was hiding in the woods, saw two or three buses followed by an armoured personnel carrier (hereafter “APC”) and a backhoe driving towards Cerska at around 1400 hours. Afterwards, he heard small arms fire for about half an hour. The buses and the APC then returned along the same road, but the excavator remained there longer.477 Some of the men with whom Witness M hid in the woods later told him that they saw a pool of blood on the road to Cerska on 13 July 1995.478 Some weeks after, Witness M and his companions came across a mass grave near Cerska, which they believed contained the bodies of victims from the 13 July 1995 executions .479

Witness M’s testimony as to the fact (if not the precise timing) of the execution at Cerska Valley is corroborated by physical evidence. Aerial photos show that the earth in this spot was disturbed between 5 July and 27 July 1995.480 Between 7 and 18 July 1996, investigators from the OTP, in conjunction with a team from Physicians for Human Rights, exhumed a mass grave to the southwest of the road through the Cerska Valley from the main road from Konjevic Polje to Nova Kasaba.481 It appeared from the location of shell casings that the victims had been placed on the roadside while their executioners stood across the road. Soil from the northeast side of the road was used to cover the bodies where they fell. One hundred and fifty bodies were recovered from the mass grave and the cause of death for 149 was determined to be gunshot wounds. All were male, with a mean age from 14 to 50 and 147 were wearing civilian clothes. Forty-eight wire ligatures were recovered from the grave, about half of which were still in place binding the victims hands behind their backs.482 Experts were able to positively identify nine of the exhumed bodies as persons listed as missing following the take-over of Srebrenica. All were Bosnian Muslim men.483

The Prosecution sought to prove Drina Corps involvement in the Cerska Valley executions from circumstantial proof. First, the Cerska Valley road is in the zone of operations of the Drina Corps, specifically either the Milici Brigade or the Vlasenica Brigade.484 Second, Witness M’s eyewitness account of the buses followed by an earth loader driving up the Cerska Valley road into a wooded area, roughly corresponds in time to intercepted communications on 13 July 1995 in which Colonel Milanovic, the Drina Corps Chief of Anit-Aircraft Defence, asked for engineering equipment to be sent to Konjevic Polje.485 The Prosecution also relied upon the fact that the executions at Cerska Valley appeared to be planned in advance and were well-organised, to suggest co-ordination at the level of the Corps Command. The convoy to the Cerska Valley execution site included digging equipment and the Cerska Valley detention site had an adequate number of guards.

The Trial Chamber does not consider the intercept evidence, which loosely corresponds with the events in the Cerska Valley, together with arguments based upon the scale and planning required for this crime, sufficient to implicate the Drina Corps in its commission and is unable to conclude that Drina Corps units were involved in the Cerska Valley executions on 13 July 1995.486  (c)Late Afternoon of 13 July 1995: Kravica Warehouse

Between 1,000 and 1,500 Bosnian Muslim men from the column fleeing through the woods, who had been captured and detained in Sandici Meadow, were bussed or marched to the Kravica Warehouse on the afternoon of 13 July 1995.487 At around 18.00 hours, when the warehouse was full, the soldiers started throwing grenades and shooting directly into the midst of the men packed inside. Witness J, a survivor, recalled: all of a sudden there was a lot of shooting in the warehouse, and we didn’t know where it was coming from. There were rifles, grenades, bursts of gunfire and it was – it got so dark in the warehouse that we couldn’t see anything. People started to scream, to shout, crying for help. And then there would be a lull, and then all of a sudden it would start again. And they kept shooting like that until nightfall in the warehouse.488

Witness K, another survivor, could not find words to describe the massacre:

It is hard for me to describe it. I haven’t seen anything like it in any of the horror movies that I saw. This was far worse than any film.489

Guards surrounding the building killed prisoners who tried to escape through the windows.490 By the time the shooting stopped, the warehouse was filled with corpses. Witness J recalled that “(n)owhere could you stand on the concrete floor without stepping on a dead body. The dead bodies had covered the entire concrete.”491 Witness K, who was only slightly wounded, described crossing the warehouse to make his escape through a window after the shooting stopped:

I was not even able to touch the floor, the concrete floor of the warehouse… After the shooting, I felt a strange kind of heat, warmth, which was actually coming from the blood that covered the concrete floor, and I was stepping on the dead people who were lying around. But there were even people who were still alive, who were only wounded, and as soon as I would step on him, I would hear him cry, moan, because I was trying to move as fast as I could. I could tell that people had been completely disembodied, and I could feel bones of the people that had been hit by those bursts of gunfire or shells, I could feel their ribs crushing. And then I would get up again and continue. . . .492

Soon after Witness K crawled out the window, he was shot by a Serb soldier still standing guard. He fell to the ground and lay quietly, pretending to be dead, until the morning. He then escaped while the soldiers were otherwise occupied. Witness J somehow escaped injury and spent the night inside the warehouse hiding under a dead body. The next morning, the soldiers called out to see if any of the wounded men were still alive. Upon identifying some wounded prisoners, the guards made some of them sing Serb songs and then they killed them.493 After the last one had been killed, an excavator began taking the bodies out of the warehouse. A water tank was used to wash the blood off the asphalt.494

Other evidence corroborates the survivors’ testimony.495 An aerial reconnaissance photo, taken on 13 July 1995 at 14.00 hours, shows two buses outside the Warehouse, just as Witness K remembered.496 In addition, the OTP sent a team of experts to examine the warehouse on 30 September 1996.497 Analyses of hair, blood and explosives residue, collected at the Kravica Warehouse, provide strong evidence of the killings. Experts determined the presence of bullet strikes, explosives residue, bullets and shell cases, as well as human blood, bones and tissue adhering to the walls and floors of the building.498

Forensic evidence presented by the Prosecutor suggests a link between the Krivaca Warehouse, the primary mass grave known as Glogova 2, and the secondary grave known as Zeleni Jadar 5. These links were made by matching two shell cases found at the warehouse with shell cases found at the Zeleni Jadar 5 gravesite, which demonstrates that either the shell cases were fired by the same weapon (which must have been present at each site), or that the shell cases were transported from one site to another.499 In turn, forensic tests link Zeleni Jadar 5 with the primary grave of Glogova 2.500 The Glogova 2 gravesite was exhumed by the OTP between 11 September and 22 October 1999. A minimum number of 139 individuals were found. The sex of the victims could be determined in 109 cases and all were male. Predominately the victims died of gunshot wounds and in 22 cases there was evidence of charring to the bodies. No ligatures or blindfolds were uncovered.501 The OTP exhumed the Zelenia Jadar 5 site between 1 and 21 October 1998.502 Of at least 145 individuals in the grave, 120 were determined to be male with the remainder undetermined, and the predominant cause of death was gunshot wounds. Two ligatures were recovered, but no blindfolds were found.503

Exhumations conducted between 7 August and 20 October 2000 at the primary gravesite of Glogova 1 also revealed matches between broken masonry and door frames, and other artefacts found at both the gravesite and at the Kravica Warehouse execution site, suggesting that some of the victims from the Kravica Warehouse were buried there .504 The bodies of at least 191 individuals were located, but autopsies had not been finalised prior to the close of this trial.505 In one of the subgraves at this site, 12 individuals bound with ligatures were found, along with evidence of blindfolds on three bodies.506

One of the few survivors said the soldiers outside the Warehouse were Bosnian Serbs wearing camouflage uniforms, but could not identify the specific unit they came from.507 The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that one individual, (hereafter “OA”), who was a member of the Drina Corps in July 1995, was informed sometime prior to 20 July 1995 that members of the army and the police had committed crimes in the Kravica Warehouse.508 Primarily, however, the Prosecution was left to rely upon three categories of circumstantial evidence that Drina Corps troops were involved in the Kravica Warehouse executions.

First there is evidence that Drina Corps units were in the vicinity where the executions was carried out. In particular, the bodies were taken from the Kravica Warehouse to the gravesite in Glogova, which is less than 400 meters from the command post of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade.509 There is also an annotation in the Bratunac Military Police Platoon orders book discussing a military police detachment sent to provide security to public utility workers at Glagova on 19 July 1995.510 The Prosecution argued that this may have been related to the burial of victims from the Kravica Warehouse. As already described, the bodies of victims from the Krivaca Warehouse were subsequently buried in a gravesite at Glagova.

Second, the Prosecution argued that the Krivaca Warehouse execution was well organised and involved a substantial amount of planning, requiring the participation of the Drina Corps Command. The Prosecution maintained that the Kravica Warehouse victims came from preliminary prisoner collection sites such as the Sandici meadow and Nova Kasaba football field which had to be set up well in advance as holding places for so many prisoners. Similarly, the Prosecution argued that the Kravica Warehouse must have been pre-designated as a holding site, since a concerted effort was made to bring prisoners there from several different intermediate sites on the afternoon of 13 July 1995. The Prosecution further suggested that the Drina Corps would have had to authorise the diversion of buses from the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari for this purpose.

Third, Mr. Butler relied upon the arrival of a bucket-loader after the killings to collect the bodies as evidence of knowledge at either the Brigade or the Corps level, since those are the levels at which the allocation of heavy equipment must be made.511 However, there was no direct evidence that the equipment belonged to, or had been procured by, a unit of the Drina Corps.

Overall, the evidence presented does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Drina Corps troops were involved in the executions at the Kravica Warehouse. The Trial Chamber does, however, find that the Drina Corps Command must have known that prisoners were transported to the Kravica Warehouse given that buses were diverted from the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Potocari for this purpose. Furthermore, given the proximity of the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade to the execution and burial sites and the massive scale of the executions, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that, by the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have been well aware of the fact that the executions had taken place at the Kravica Warehouse. The Warehouse was situated on the main road between Bratunac and Konjevic-Polje, which was heavily utilised by military vehicles that day. Some of the Bosnian Muslim refugees reported that, on 13 July 1995, as the busses they were travelling on passed through Kravica, they saw the bodies of men lying down in the meadow and others lined up with their hands tied behind their necks.512 The noise and high levels of activity associated with this massive scale crime could not have escaped the attention of the Drina Corps.

(d) 13-14 July 1995: Tišca

As the buses crowded with Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly made their way from Potocari to Kladanj, they were stopped at TišCa, searched, and the Bosnian Muslim men found on board were removed from the bus. The evidence of Witness D, who was separated from his family at the TišCa checkpoint on 13 July 1995, reveals a well-organised operation in Tisca. From the checkpoint, Witness D was taken to a nearby school, where a number of other prisoners were being held. An officer directed the soldier escorting Witness D towards a nearby school where many other prisoners were being held. At the school, a soldier on a field telephone appeared to be transmitting and receiving orders. Sometime around midnight, Witness D was loaded onto a truck with 22 other men with their hands tied behind their backs.513 At one point the truck carrying Witness D stopped and a soldier on the scene said : “Not here. Take them up there, where they took people before.”514 The truck reached another stopping point and the soldiers came around to the back of the truck and started shooting the prisoners.515 Witness D, who had managed to untie his hands, leaped from the truck and fled into the woods, narrowly escaping the gunfire. After an arduous journey through the woods, he eventually reached safety.516

There is evidence that Drina Corps personnel were present in Tisca on 12 July 1995. Witness C, a Dutch Bat officer escorting one of the first convoys of buses and trucks, came across Major Sarkic, the Chief of Staff of the Milici Brigade, at the Tisca checkpoint. Major Sarkic told Witness C that he had been ordered by the Drina Corps Command to send people from his unit to Tisca. Major Sarkic expressed discontent about this assignment, in light of the other work he had to do in order to secure the enclave. Witness C also said it was clear to him that Major Sarkic was trying to avoid discussing what was being done with the men taken off the buses. At that time, Witness C was already contemplating the terrible possibility that the men may have been taken somewhere for execution and later informed his battalion about what he had seen in Tisca.517

However, it is not clear from Witness C’s testimony what Major Sarkic’s troops had been tasked to do at Tisca. He simply said that his men had been ordered to Tisca “to escort this group of people”.518 Witness C said that he did not make any inquiries into exactly what Sarkic’s men were doing with the Bosnian Muslim prisoners.519 Whether troops from the Milici Brigade were actually involved in taking the men from Tisca to the execution sites remains unclear.

The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove that Drina Corps units either knew of, or were involved in, the subsequent executions of the Bosnian Muslim men screened at Tisca. Certainly though, the Milici Brigade knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being pulled off the buses at Tisca and taken to separate sites.

(e)14 July 1995: Grbavci School Detention Site and Orahovac Execution site

A large group of the prisoners who had been held overnight in Bratunac were bussed in a convoy of 30 vehicles to the Grbavci school in Orahovac early in the morning of 14 July 1995.520 When they got there, the school gym was already half-filled with prisoners who had been arriving since the early morning hours521 and, within a few hours, the building was completely full. Survivors estimated that there were 2,000 to 2,500 men there, some of them very young and some quite elderly, although the Prosecution suggested this may have been an over-estimation and that the number of prisoners at this site was probably closer to 1,000.522 The gym was packed and stifling; occasionally the guards would shoot at the ceiling to quiet the panicked prisoners.523 Some prisoners were taken outside and killed. At some point, a witness recalled, General Mladic arrived and told the men: “Well, your government does not want you, and I have to take care of you”.524

After being held in the gym for several hours, the men were led out in small groups to the execution fields that afternoon. Each prisoner was blindfolded and given a drink of water as he left the gym.525 The prisoners were then taken in trucks to the execution fields less than one kilometre away. The men were lined up and shot in the back; those who survived the initial gunfire were killed with an extra shot.526 Two adjacent meadows were used; once one was full of bodies, the executioners moved to the other.527 While the executions were in progress, the survivors said, earth-moving equipment was digging the graves .528 Witness N, who survived the shootings by pretending to be dead, reported that General Mladic drove up in a red car and watched some of the executions.529

The forensic evidence supports crucial aspects of the survivors’ testimony. Aerial photos show that the ground in Orahovac was disturbed between 5 and 27 July 1995530 and again between 7 and 27 September 1995.531 Two primary mass graves were uncovered in the area, and were named “Lazete-1” and “Lazete-2” by investigators. The Lazete 1 gravesite was exhumed by the Prosecution between 13 July and 3 August 2000. All of the 130 individuals uncovered, for whom sex could be determined, were male. One hundred and thirty eight blindfolds were uncovered in the grave.532 Identification material for twenty-three individuals, listed as missing following the fall of Srebrenica, was located during the exhumations at this site.533 The gravesite Lazete 2 was partly exhumed by a joint team from the OTP and Physicians for Human Rights between 19 August and 9 September 1996 and completed in 2000. All of the 243 victims associated with Lazete 2 were male and the experts determined that the vast majority died of gunshot injuries.534 In addition, 147 blindfolds were located. One victim also had his legs bound with a cloth sack.535 Twenty-one individuals, listed as missing following the take-over of Srebrenica, were positively identified during the first exhumation of the Lazete 2 gravesite; all of them were Bosnian Muslim men.536 Identification documents for a further four men listed as missing following the fall of Srebrenica were uncovered during the exhumations at this site in 2000.537 On 11 April 1996, investigators from the OTP uncovered numerous strips of cloth in a “rubbish” site in the grounds of the Grbavci School next to the gymnasium. These cloth strips were indistinguishable from the blindfolds uncovered during the exhumation of the Lazete 2 gravesite.538

Forensic analysis of soil/pollen samples, blindfolds, ligatures, shell cases and aerial images of creation/disturbance dates, further revealed that bodies from the Lazete 1 and Lazete 2 graves were removed and reburied at secondary graves named HodZici Road 3, 4 and 5.539 Aerial images show that these secondary gravesites were created between 7 September and 2 October 1995540 and all of them were exhumed by the OTP in 1998.541 Following a similar pattern to the other Srebrenica related gravesites, the overwhelming majority of bodies at HodZici Road 3, 4 and 5 were determined to be male and to have died of gunshot wounds.542 Although only one ligature was located during exhumations at these three sites,543 a total of 90 blindfolds were found. The total minimum number of individuals exhumed at the three gravesites was 184.544

Substantial evidence links the executions at Orahovac to the Zvornik Brigade. First, Orahovac is located within the zone of responsibility of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade. Second, as previously noted, an Opel “Record” belonging to the Zvornik Brigade visited this area on 13 and 14 July 1995. Third, at some point late in the evening of 13 July 1995, a detachment of military police from the Zvornik Brigade was dispatched to Orahovac.545 It appears that the personnel roster was later altered to conceal this fact. The originally pencilled text was erased, but the words “O-Orahovac” are still visible. The letter “O” was written next to 10 names, then erased and replaced with other letters, in what must have been an attempt to conceal their involvement in the crimes .546 Fourth, one of the Orahovac survivors recognised the voice of a former colleague, Gojko Simic, among the executioners .547 Personnel records show that a Gojko Simic matching the description given by the survivor was the Commander of the Heavy Weapons Platoon of the 4th Infantry Battalion of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade.548 The witness heard Simic tell the other executioners: “Collect your ammunition and let’s go to the meadow to kill the men.”549 Fifth, records of the Zvornik Brigade’s Engineer Company reflect the presence of a number of vehicles in Orahovac on 14 July 1995: a TAM 75 (small size transportation vehicle550 ), which made two round-trips between the base and Orahovac; a Mercedes 2626 which towed an excavator to the village of KriZevici (located one kilometre from Orahovac ); one excavator, which went from the base to Orahovac, spent six hours digging and then returned to base; and an excavator-loader that went from the base to Orahovac and spent 5 hours working.551 The Zvornik Brigade’s fuel dispersal log shows that 200 litres of diesel fuel were distributed to the Engineer Company on 14 July 1995.552 In addition, the Engineer Company Daily Orders Journal lists the following items on both 15 and 16 July 1995: work with BGH-700 (excavator) in Orahovac; work with ULT 220 (loader) in Orahovac.553 Zvornik Brigade vehicle utilisation records also show that, on 15 and 16 July 1995, one ULT 220 (loader) was operating for five hours at Orahovac and a TAM 75 truck made three or four trips between the base and Orahovac.554 Also on 15 July 1995, 40 litres of diesel fuel were disbursed to the Rear Services Battalion, operating out of Orahovac and, on 16 July 1995, a Mercedes truck towed an excavator with a trailer between the base and Orahovac, and a TAM 75 truck made two trips to Kozluk.555 This evidence is consistent with accounts given by survivors who stated there were large vehicles shining lights on the execution site.556

The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Zvornik Brigade participated in the execution of Bosnian Muslim men at Orahovac on 14 July 1995. Members of the military police company of the Zvornik Brigade were present immediately prior to the executions, presumably for such purposes as guarding the prisoners and then facilitating their transportation to the execution fields. Personnel from the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were present at Orahovac during the executions, assisting in their commission. Further, machinery and equipment belonging to the Engineers Company of the Zvornik Brigade was engaged in tasks relating to the burial of the victims from Orahovac between 14 and 16 July 1995.  (f) 14 - 15 July 1995: Petkovci School Detention Site and Petkovci Dam Execution Site

Another large group of about 1,500-2000 prisoners from Bratunac was driven north to the Petkovci School on the afternoon of 14 July 1995. As at the other detention sites, the conditions at Petkovci School were deplorable. It was extremely hot and crowded, the men had no food or water and some prisoners became so thirsty they resorted to drinking their own urine.557 Periodically, soldiers came in and beat the prisoners or called them out to be killed. A few prisoners discussed trying to escape but the others said it was better to remain; that surely the Red Cross was monitoring the situation and they would not all be killed.558 Eventually, however, the men were called out in small groups. They were told to strip to the waist, take off their shoes and their hands were tied behind their backs.559 Sometime during the night of 14 July 1995, the men were taken in trucks to a stony area near the Petkovci Dam. As soon as they saw their destination the prisoners recognised their fate. Witness P recalls seeing a large “field” already filled with dead men lying face down with their hands tied behind them.

Groups of five or ten prisoners were taken off the trucks. They were then lined up and shot. Some begged for water before being killed, but none was provided. Witness O recalled what he expected to be his final moments:

I was really sorry that I would die thirsty, and I was trying to hide amongst the people as long as I could, like everybody else. I just wanted to live for another second or two. And when it was my turn, I jumped out with what I believe were four other people. I could feel the gravel beneath my feet. It hurt. . . . I was walking with my head bent down and I wasn’t feeling anything. . . . And then I thought that I would die very fast, that I would not suffer. And I just thought that my mother would never know where I had ended up. This is what I was thinking as I was getting out of the truck.560

In fact Witness O was only wounded and lay still expecting another round of gunfire to end his life.561 When the soldiers were finished with a round of killing, they laughed and made jokes: “Look at this guy, he looks like a cabbage.”562 Then they walked around killing the wounded.563 Witness O almost called out for the soldiers to put him out of his misery:

I was still very thirsty. But I was sort of between life and death. I didn’t know whether I wanted to live or to die anymore. I decided not to call out for them to shoot and kill me, but I was sort of praying to God that they’d come and kill me. But I decided not to call them and I was waiting to die.564

After the soldiers had gone, however, Witness O was still alive. Another man, Witness P, was also alive a few rows ahead of him and they helped untie each other. Together they crawled across the field of bodies to hide in the woods nearby.565 They spent the night on a hill overlooking the “field” and, in the morning, they looked down at between 1,500-2,000 bodies in the “field”.566 By then mechanical loaders had arrived and were collecting the bodies.567

The accounts given by the survivors are supported by forensic and other evidence. Aerial images show that earth around the Petkovci Dam site was first disturbed between 5 and 27 July 1995, and then again between 7 and 27 September 1995.568 A team of investigators from the OTP exhumed a gravesite at the Petkovci Dam between 15 and 25 April 1998.569 Experts determined that this gravesite had been “robbed”, using a mechanical excavator that resulted in “grossly disarticulated body parts” throughout the grave.570 The minimum number of individuals located within this grave was 43, but only 15 could be identified as male with the remainder undetermined. Six body parts showed definite gunshot wounds, with a further 17 showing probable or possible gunshot wounds.571 One ligature was located on the surface of the grave and one “possible” blindfold was found loose in the grave.572

Forensic tests show that a mass grave site known as Liplje 2 is a secondary gravesite associated with the primary gravesite at Petkovci Dam and this gravesite was exhumed by the OTP between 7 and 25 August 1998.573 Aerial images reveal that Liplje 2 was created between 7 September and 2 October 1995.574 Traces of mechanical teeth marks and wheel tracks show the grave was dug by a wheeled front loader with a toothed bucket.575 A minimum number of 191 individuals were located in this grave with 122 determined to be male, and the remainder undetermined. Where cause of death could be determined, gunshot wounds predominated .576 While 23 ligatures were uncovered, no definite blindfolds were found.577

The Zvornik Brigade was also much in view in the area of Petkovci and the Dam on 15 July 1995. The execution site at the Petkovci Dam is located less than two kilometres from the command post of the Zvornik Brigade’s 6th Infantry Battalion in Baljkovica.578 Further, the Zvornik Brigade Daily Orders record shows that, on 15 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was assigned to work with an ULT and an excavator in Petkovci,579 although vehicle records do not show that any of the Engineer Company’s earthmoving equipment was at the Petkovci execution site. However, vehicle records for the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade show that two trucks made a total of 10 roundtrips between Petkovci and the Dam on 15 July 1995, with two members of the 6th Infantry Battalion assigned as drivers of the vehicles.580

The Trial Chamber finds that drivers and trucks from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were used to transport the prisoners from the detention site to the execution site at Petkovci Dam on 15 July 1995 and that the Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was assigned to work with earthmoving equipment to assist with the burial of the victims from Petkovci Dam.

(g)14 - 16 July 1995: Pilica School Detention Site and Branjevo Military Farm Execution Site

On 14 July 1995, more prisoners from Bratunac were bussed northward to a school in the village of Pilica, north of Zvornik. As at other detention facilities, there was no food or water and several men died in the school gym from heat and dehydration .581 The men were held at the Pilica School for two nights.582 On 16 July 1995, following a now familiar pattern, the men were called out of the school and loaded onto buses with their hands tied behind their backs.583 They were then driven to the Branjevo Military Farm, where groups of 10 were lined up and shot.584

Mr. Drazen Erdemovic was a member of the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment (a Main Staff subordinate unit) and participated in the mass execution.585 Mr. Erdemovic appeared as a Prosecution witness and testified:

The men in front of us were ordered to turn their backs. When those men turned their backs to us, we shot at them. We were given orders to shoot.586

Mr. Erdemovic said that all but one of the victims wore civilian clothes and that, except for one person who tried to escape, they offered no resistance before being shot.587 Sometimes the executioners were particularly cruel. When some of the soldiers recognised acquaintances from Srebrenica, they beat and humiliated them before killing them.588 Mr. Erdemovic had to persuade his fellow soldiers to stop using a machine gun for the killings; while it mortally wounded the prisoners it did not cause death immediately and prolonged their suffering.589

One of the survivors, Witness Q, recalled the moment when he was confronted by the firing squad:

When they opened fire, I threw myself on the ground. . . . And one man fell on my head. I think that he was killed on the spot. And I could feel the hot blood pouring over me. . . . I could hear one man crying for help. He was begging them to kill him. And they simply said “Let him suffer. We’ll kill him later.”590

Between 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of that day at this execution site.591 The next day, Witness Q, who had crawled to safety and was hiding nearby, heard heavy machinery going back and forth from the killing field.592

The testimony of the survivors has other support in the Trial Record. Aerial photographs, taken on 17 July 1995, of an area around the Branjevo Military Farm, show a large number of bodies lying in the field near the farm, as well as traces of the excavator that collected the bodies from the field.593 The Branjevo Military Farm gravesite (also known as the Pilica gravesite) was exhumed between 10 and 24 September 1996 by the OTP and a team from Physicians for Human Rights.594 Where the sex of the bodies could be determined it was male and where cause of death could be determined it was gunshot wounds. Eighty-three ligatures and two cloth blindfolds were located 595 and, in this grave, positive identification was made for 13 individuals who were missing following the take-over of Srebrenica: all of them Bosnian Muslim men.596

On the basis of forensic examinations, a gravesite known as Cancari Road 12 was determined to be a secondary grave associated with the primary site at Branjevo Military Farm.597 Aerial images show this secondary grave was created between 7 and 27 September 1995 and back filled prior to 2 October 1995.598 The bodies of 174 individuals were uncovered and, again, where the sex and cause of death of the victims could be determined, it was male and gunshot wounds respectively .599 Sixteen ligatures and eight blindfolds were also uncovered in this grave.600 One individual was positively identified as a Bosnian Muslim man listed as missing following the take-over of Srebrenica.601

There is compelling evidence that Drina Corps units were connected with the atrocities at Branjevo Farm. Mr. Erdemovic and the other members of his unit received orders relating to the executions on the morning of 16 July 1995. They first stopped at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters, where they met a Lieutenant Colonel who, although wearing a VRS uniform, did not have any insignia denoting the unit he belonged to .602 Two military police officers wearing Drina Corps insignia accompanied the Lieutenant Colonel.603 The Defence suggested that the description of this person given by Mr. Erdemovic accords with the physical appearance of Colonel Beara, the Main Staff Chief of Security .604 The Prosecution, on the other hand, pointed to the fact that he was accompanied by Drina Corps military police and was able to give orders to personnel at the Farm and so concluded that he must have been a Drina Corps officer.605 The Lieutenant Colonel and the police officers went with Erdemovic and his fellow -soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Detachment to the Branjevo Military Farm. The Lieutenant Colonel then left.606 About half an hour after his departure, buses began to arrive carrying the Bosnian Muslim men, some of whom were blindfolded and had their hands tied. The buses that brought the prisoners to Branjevo Farm displayed the markings of “Centrotrans Sarajevo ” and “Drinatrans Zvornik” transportation companies.607 These buses must have been the ones originally procured by the Drina Corps for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Potocari. The fact that the Bosnian Muslim men were not transported to detention sites until after the transportation of the women, children and elderly was finished supports this conclusion, as does the fact that the Drina Corps are known to have procured buses from, inter alia, Zvornik.608 Mr. Erdemovic also testified that policemen wearing the insignia of the Drina Corps military police escorted the buses of prisoners.609 Upon reaching the Farm, these Drina Corps military police began unloading the Bosnian Muslim men ten at a time to be then taken away and executed.610

The shootings began at 10.00 hours and continued until 1500 hours.611 Mr. Erdemovic explained that around ten soldiers, whom he was told were from Bratunac, joined his unit between 13.00 and 14.00 hours to assist with the shootings.612 These men were dressed in VRS uniforms and it was clear to Mr. Erdemovic that they knew some of the Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica, suggesting that they were local people.613 The Prosecution was, however, unable to identify any particular member of the Bratunac Brigade present at Branjevo Farm during the executions.614 The Lieutenant Colonel, who had been there earlier, returned to the Branjevo Farm with the Drina Corps military police who accompanied the last bus of Bosnian Muslim prisoners.615 The participation of personnel from the Bratunac Brigade in the executions in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility on 16 July is further corroborated by a Zvornik Brigade Interim Combat Report dated 16 July 1995 stating that, in addition to the regular troops of the Zvornik Brigade, forces operating under the Brigade’s command included two platoons from the Bratunac Infantry Brigade.616

It is important to note that the Branjevo Farm itself was under the direct authority and control of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade.617 Further, Zvornik Brigade vehicle records show an ULT 220 in operation at Branjevo for eight-and-a-half hours on 17 July 1995 and that a truck towed a “BG-700” that day.618 Although there are no utilisation records for a BGH-700 excavator, the Fuel Dispersal Log reveals that 100 litres of diesel fuel were disbursed to a BGH-700 on 17 July 1995.619 The Daily Orders Journal of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company records work assignments of an ULT 220 in Branjevo and transportation of a BGH-700 to Branjevo on 17 July 1995.620 Aerial photographs show an excavator digging a hole at Branjevo on 17 July 1995.621

There is also evidence implicating the Drina Corps Command itself in the Branjevo Farm executions. At around 1400 hours on 16 July 1995, a series of interconnected conversations were intercepted relating to the executions. To begin, the duty officer at “Palma” (the Zvornik Brigade) called “Zlatar” (Drina Corps Headquarters) urgently requesting “500 litres of D 2” (diesel fuel) to be released to Colonel Popovic.622 The Zvornik Brigade duty officer stressed that unless he received the fuel, Colonel Popovic would stop the work he was doing. Later in the conversation “Palma” stipulated to “Zlatar” that “(t)he bus loaded with oil is to go to Pilica village” and that Colonel Krsmanovic, the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation, was to arrange the transportation. This fuel, the Prosecution argued, was necessary for the transport of Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Pilica to the execution site at the Branjevo Military Farm.623 Records for 16 July 1995 confirm that 500 litres of diesel fuel was dispatched for Colonel Popovic and the Drina Corps Command624 is listed as the “recipient’ on this document.625 Mr. Butler concluded from the timing of the executions and burials and the fact that the fuel was to be sent to Pilica Village where the Pilica school is located, that the fuel was most likely used for transporting the prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo Farm.626

The Trial Chamber finds that members of the Bratunac Brigade arrived at Branjevo Farm during the course of the afternoon on 16 July 1995 and participated in the killings.627 The Trial Chamber also finds that Drina Corps military police were engaged in guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the buses that took them to the Farm and that Zvornik Brigade equipment was used for activities relating to the burial of the victims. Finally, the Trial Chamber accepts the intercept evidence demonstrating that Colonel Popovic was involved in organising fuel to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo Farm and that the allocation of fuel was co-ordinated through the Drina Corps Command.  (h)16 July 1995: Pilica Cultural Dom

Mr. Erdemovic testified that, at around 1500 hours on 16 July 1995, after he and his fellow soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Detachment had finished executing the prisoners at the Branjevo Military Farm, they were told that there was a group of 500 Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Srebrenica trying to break out of a nearby club.628 Mr. Erdemovic and the other members of his unit refused to carry out any more killings. They were then told to attend a meeting with the Lieutenant Colonel at a café in Pilica. Mr. Erdemovic and his fellow-soldiers travelled to the café as requested and, as they waited, they could hear shots and grenades being detonated.629 The sounds lasted for approximately 15-20 minutes after which a soldier from Bratunac entered the café to inform those present that “everything was over”.630 No survivors from the Pilica Cultural Dom execution site appeared before the Trial Chamber.

The OTP sent a team of experts to conduct a forensic examination of the Pilica Dom between 27 and 29 September 1996, and again on 2 October 1998.631 As with the forensic tests conducted at the Krivaca warehouse, analyses of hair, blood and explosives residue, collected at the Pilica Dom, provide strong evidence that mass executions had occurred in this location. Experts determined the presence of bullet strikes, explosives residue, bullets and shell cases, as well as human blood, bones and tissue adhering to the walls, ceilings and floors.632

The Pilica Cultural Centre is in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility.633 The Prosecution also relied upon the evidence of Mr. Erdemovic to establish that the same soldiers from Bratunac, who had arrived to assist the 10th Sabotage Detachment with the Branjevo Farm killings, carried out killings at the Pilica Cultural Dom. According to Mr. Erdemovic these soldiers from Bratunac left the Farm as soon as the executions there were finished and travelled to another location to continue with the killings.634 As already noted, the presence of the Bratunac Brigade, in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility finds support in a Zvornik Brigade Combat Report from 16 July 1995, which indicates that personnel from the Bratunac Brigade were operating under the command of the Zvornik Brigade that day.635 In addition, the Bratunac Brigade Military Police Platoon log for 16 July 1995 indicates that “one police patrol remained in Pilica to secure and watch over the Bosnian Muslims.”636 Mr. Butler argued that, since there was no combat in the Pilica area at that time, the Bratunac Brigade police must have been guarding the Bosnian Muslim men at Pilica who were subsequently executed in the late afternoon or early evening hours of 16 July 1995.637

The Prosecution also adduced some evidence that the Drina Corps Command knew about the prisoners in the Pilica Cultural Dom and was involved in co-ordinating action relating to them. A conversation was intercepted at 1111 hours on 16 July 1995 between Colonel Beara, the Security Chief of the VRS Main Staff and Colonel Cerovic, the Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs. Colonel Beara stated that “triage” had to be done on the prisoners.638 The Prosecution argued that Colonel Beara and Colonel Cerovic must have been referring to the prisoners in the Pilica Cultural Dom: at around this time the executions at the Branjevo Military Farm were already underway, but the prisoners in the Pilica Cultural Dom were still alive. Both parties agreed that the military term “triage ” is used to describe the separation and further treatment of the sick and wounded .639 The reference to “triage” remains an unexplained aspect of the conversation and Mr. Butler conceded that attributing any particular meaning to it would be speculation.640 The Defence, by contrast, argued this reference to “triage” demonstrates an intent to spare some of the prisoners from the fate of the others.641

The Trial Chamber accepts the forensic evidence showing that executions took place at the Pilica Cultural Dom, as well as the evidence linking the Bratunac Brigade to these crimes. The Trial Chamber cannot attribute any particular meaning to the conversation between Colonel Beara and Colonel Cerovic. The most the Trial Chamber can conclude from this conversation is that, on 16 July 1995, a Drina Corps officer was discussing matters relating to Bosnian Muslim prisoners with Colonel Beara, who both parties identified as having been involved in the executions.

(i) Kozluk

In 1999, the OTP exhumed a grave near the town of Kozluk. Information obtained from a community of refugees in Germany about rumoured killings led to the identification of the Kozluk site and investigations carried out at the site confirm that mass executions had occurred there. According to the OTP investigator’s conversations with the refugees, about 500 prisoners were forced to sing Serb songs while being driven on army trucks to the Kozluk site, where they were killed by an execution squad.642 However, the Trial Chamber heard no direct testimony about these events and the Prosecution was unable to specify the timing of crimes committed in this location.

The minimum number of bodies uncovered from the Kozluk grave was 340 and all the individuals for whom sex could be determined were male. Gunshot wounds were the overwhelming cause of death for those bodies in which a cause could be ascertained. A number of bodies showed signs of pre-existing disability or chronic disease ranging from arthritis to amputations.643 Fifty-five blindfolds and 168 ligatures were uncovered.644 Aerial images show that the Kozluk mass gravesite was created between 5 and 17 July 1995645 and that it was disturbed again between 7 and 27 September 1995.646

The Prosecution’s forensic experts have linked the Kozluk primary grave with the secondary grave at Cancari Road 3, which was exhumed by the OTP between 27 May and 10 June 1998.647 Aerial photographs show the Cancari Road 3 gravesite was first excavated after 27 September 1995, and back filled prior to 2 October 1995.648 In addition to the usual analyses of soil, material and shell cases, the link between the two graves was established by the presence at both sites of fragments of green glass bottles and bottle labels known to have come from the Vetinka bottling factory near the Kozluk mass grave.649 All of the bodies for which sex could be determined were male and gunshot wounds were the predominant cause of death for those individuals for which a cause could be ascertained.650 Eight blindfolds and 37 ligatures were located during the exhumation.651

The Kozluk execution site is located within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade652 and there is evidence linking this Brigade with the Kozluk site on 16 July 1995 and in the days immediately following. On 16 July 1995, an excavator-loader belonging to the Zvornik Brigade operated for eight hours in Kozluk.653 A truck belonging to the Zvornik Brigade made two trips between Orahovac and Kozluk on that same day.654 A bulldozer operated in Kozluk for 1.5 hours on 18 July 1995 and another hour on 19 July 1995 .655 The Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company Orders Journal shows assignments on 18 July 1995 to improve the trench in Kozluk and the transport of a bulldozer to Kozluk.656

The Trial Chamber is persuaded that the Zvornik Brigade excavators and bulldozers operating in the Kozluk area from 16 July 1995 were involved in work related to the burial of victims from the Kozluk execution site. The executions in Kozluk must have occurred between 14 July and 17 July 1995, given that aerial images show the mass grave in the Kozluk area was created prior to 17 July 1995 and the prisoners were not transported to the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade until 14 July 1995. The location of Kozluk, between the Petkovci Dam and the Branjevo Military Farm, also suggests that the executions were likely to have taken place around 15-16 July 1995. Such a finding fits with the overall sequence of the northern executions: the crimes at Orahovac occurred on 14 July 1995; the crimes at Petkovci Dam, located to the north of Orahovac occurred on 15 July 1995; and the crimes at Branjevo Military Farm and the Pilica Dom, both of which are located to the north of Kozluk, occurred on 16 July 1995. The Trial Chamber finds that this extensive amount of Zvornik Brigade engineering work at Kozluk around this time was connected to the burial of bodies in the Kozluk grave.

(j)Smaller Scale Executions following the Mass Executions

In addition to the planned mass executions described, the Trial Chamber heard evidence about smaller scale executions in which small groups of Bosnian Muslim stragglers trying to escape the enclave were killed on location after capture by the VRS.657 Witness R was captured on 19 July 1995 with a group of about 11 stragglers and escaped being executed along with all the others at a location known as Nezuk within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade.658

The Prosecution argued that these executions were carried out by the 16th Krajina Brigade which, at the time, was operating under the command of the Zvornik Brigade. An eyewitness identified Serb soldiers with yellow patches on the sleeve of their left arm reading “Krajisnik” or “Krajisnici”.659 The Zvornik Brigade Daily Combat Report to the Drina Corps Command on 19 July reveals the presence of the 16th Krajina Brigade amongst the Zvornik Brigade’s available units. This Report also stated that 13 Muslim soldiers had been eliminated that day, which approximates the number killed at Nezuk.660 Other records indicate that a unit from the 1st Krajina Corps had been deployed to the zone of the Zvornik Brigade to operate under the command of the Zvornik Brigade from about 16 July 1995 and that they remained there until about 22 July 1995.661

In light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber accepts that units under the command of the Zvornik Brigade participated in the executions at Nezuk on 19 July 1995.

(k)The Reburials

The forensic evidence presented to the Trial Chamber suggests that, commencing in the early autumn of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs engaged in a concerted effort to conceal the mass killings by relocating the primary graves to remote secondary gravesites. All of the primary and secondary mass gravesites associated with the take-over of Srebrenica located by the OTP were within the Drina Corps area of responsibility .662 However, the Prosecution presented very little evidence linking any Drina Corps Brigades to the reburials663 and no eyewitnesses to any of this activity were brought before the Trial Chamber.

One exception to this general paucity of evidence was a document sent by the VRS Main Staff to the Drina Corps Command on 14 September 1995 and copied to the Zvornik Brigade for their information.664 The document, which was signed by General Mladic, authorised the release of five tons of diesel fuel to carry out work in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility. The document specified that the fuel was to be delivered to Captain Milorad Trpic, which the Prosecution argued was probably a reference to a Zvornik Brigade security officer.665 Another order that same day from the Main Staff Technical Service Division authorised the release of the fuel to the Drina Corps.666 Mr. Butler pointed out that, normally, fuel for engineering works would be the responsibility of the Rear Services branch and the involvement of the security personnel on this occasion supported an inference that the fuel was linked with the criminal activity .667 Given that aerial images confirm the reburial activity was ongoing at this time and the fact that there is no information establishing that any legitimate engineer work was being carried out by the Zvornik Brigade, Mr. Butler concluded that the fuel must have been used for the reburial activity.668 More generally, the Prosecution argued it was logical that the Zvornik Brigade would be tasked with digging up the bodies, as they had been involved in the original burials and knew where the gravesites were.669

A journal, recording the issues raised during periodic meetings convened by the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade with his Corps Command Staff, indicates that, on 16 October 1995, Captain Nikolic, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security, stated that the Brigade was engaged in tasks issued by the VRS Main staff. Captain Nikolic used the word “asanacija” to describe this work.670 “Asanacija” (which translates as “restoration of the terrain”) is used in military lexicon to refer to finding, identifying and burying the dead.671

Investigators from the OTP estimate it would have taken at least two full nights and several trucks to move the bodies to the secondary gravesites. The longest distance between primary and secondary gravesites (Branjevo Farm to Cancari Road ) was 40 kilometres. 672

Overall, however, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution about the reburial activity is too scant to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that units of the Drina Corps were engaged in the reburial of bodies from primary to secondary gravesites during the early Autumn of 1995. However, the Chamber is satisfied that, given the scale of the operation and the fact that it was carried out entirely within their zone of responsibility, the Drina Corps must have at least known this activity was occurring.

6. The Chain of Command in Operation for the Drina Corps: July 1995

Having concluded that Drina Corps units and equipment were involved in carrying out many of the acts charged in the Indictment against General Krstic, the Trial Chamber now considers the Drina Corps chain of command in operation during the relevant period. This discussion provides an important backdrop to Part II C, where the Trial Chamber considers the issue of what General Krstic knew, or should have known, about the activities of the Drina Corps as a result of his position in the Corps Command, first as Chief of Staff and then as Corps Commander.  (a) Parallel Chains of Command

The Defence argued that, even if Drina Corps personnel and resources were implicated at various crime sites, General Krstic had no knowledge of their involvement. One of the key arguments advanced in support of this position was that there was a parallel chain of command operating during the relevant time.673 Specifically, the Drina Corps had no control over the Srebrenica follow up operation, primarily due to the intervention of the Main Staff under the command of General Mladic. The Defence also argued that the activities of the VRS security organs, including those of Colonel Popovic, the Drina Corps Assistant for Security, were conducted independently of the Corps Command. As a result, argued the Defence, the Drina Corps Command was excluded from knowledge of the detention and execution of the Bosnian Muslim men, despite the fact that the illegal activities were carried out in its zone of responsibility. In addition, the Defence cited command competencies being exercised by the President of RS and the newly appointed civilian authority in Srebrenica, who reportedly also had certain duties and responsibilities regarding prisoners and refugees.674 However, as to the latter, the Trial Chamber emphasises it heard no evidence that the civilian Commissioner in any way exercised such authority or otherwise affected the involvement of the Drina Corps Command in the Srebrenica crimes.

(i) Did the VRS Main Staff exclude the Drina Corps Command from the Srebrenica Follow -up Operations?

The Defence pointed to four significant junctures at which the Main Staff directly intervened in Srebrenica-related operations in July 1995, thereby effectively rendering the Drina Corps Command powerless. The first point was on 9 July 1995 when General Mladic arrived at Pribicevac, where the Drina Corps had established its FCP for Krivaja 95, and took over command of the continued attack on Srebrenica and, in the process, expanded the original goals of Krivaja 95 to include its capture. The second was General Mladic’s assumption of control over the movement of the civilian population out of Potocari. Third, General Mladic, rather than the then Corps Commander, General Zivanovic, made the decision to appoint General Krstic commander of the VRS forces engaged in the Zepa operation. Fourth, on 17 July 1995, despite the fact that the Drina Corps Command had earlier made its own arrangements for sweep operations in the Srebrenica area, the Main Staff appointed a Main Staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic, to take over command of the search.675 Moreover, the Defence argued, General Mladic had expressly stated that the whereabouts of the 28th Division following the take-over of Srebrenica was his concern676 and, in the words of General Radinovic, “the command of the Drina Corps was… completely excluded from any kind of command competence and, therefore, command responsibility .”677

The Trial Record is indeed replete with evidence demonstrating that the Main Staff was heavily involved in the direction of events following the take-over of Srebrenica.678 Further, there are indications that Drina Corps units were not always informed or consulted about what the Main Staff was doing in their area of concern during the week that followed 11 July 1995. For example, in an intercepted conversation, on 13 July 1995 at 1829 hours, “Zile” (a nickname frequently associated with General Zivanovic) discussed records on war criminals with an unknown participant, although only the words uttered by the latter were audible.679 During the course of the conversation, the unknown participant asked whether it was “possible to make a list of those from Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde urgently?” and expressed concern that “they’ll get away scott-free.” At this time, captured Bosnian Muslim men had already been executed at Jadar River and Cerska and the executions at Kravica Warehouse were imminent. The unknown participant in the conversation appeared to be unaware of this and was still working on the assumption that a formal vetting process had been implemented, as foreshadowed by General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July 1995. It is also apparent that the 13 July 1995 search order issued by General Krstic680 was subsequently modified by some other authority.681 Indeed the Trial Chamber heard evidence that one Brigade was searching land on the other side of the enclave altogether from that specified by General Krstic.682 Further, in a report on 18 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevic, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, complained of the fact that “someone” had brought thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners into his area of responsibility over the preceding ten days.683 The reference to “someone” admits of possible intervention by an authority outside of the Drina Corps in matters within the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility. It is also true that Colonel Beara from the Main Staff was heard issuing orders directly to Drina Corps officers.684 In addition, an intercept, dated 15 July at 0954 hours, between General Zivanovic and Colonel Beara,685 suggests that, on about 13 July 1995, General Mladic may have issued orders directly to members of the Drina Corps 5th Podrinje Brigade regarding the executions. It also suggests that General Zivanovic was not fully appraised of the implementation of those orders prior to his conversation with Colonel Beara.686 Finally, in a conversation intercepted on 17 July 1995 at 2030 hours between General Krstic and an unidentified person, General Krstic asked “(w)ith whose approval did you send soldiers down there?” The other participant said “(o)n orders from the Main Staff,”687 suggesting the Main Staff was directing events at that time without informing the Drina Corps of all the details.688 The Trial Chamber has already noted the presence of non-Drina Corps units within the Drina Corps zone of responsibility from 11 July 1995 onwards. The evidence demonstrates that several of these non-Drina Corps units were heavily involved in the capture and execution of the Bosnian Muslim men, including the police battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment, the MUP, and the 10th Sabotage Detachment.689

Nonetheless, an evaluation of the complete Trial Record makes it abundantly clear that the Main Staff could not, and did not, handle the entire Srebrenica follow -up operation on its own and at almost every stage had to, and did, call upon Drina Corps resources for assistance. As acknowledged by the Defence’s own military expert, General Radinovic, the Main Staff did not have any resources of its own and could not carry out any operation without relying on those of its constituent Corps.690 It is clear from the details of the mass executions recounted previously that Drina Corps troops and resources were regularly called upon to assist with the executions.

General Radinovic, however, argued that the senior command of the Main Staff had the power to requisition the resources of the subordinate brigades and to dispense with notification to the Corps in crisis situations.691 This, said General Krstic, was exactly what happened following the take-over of Srebrenica: Colonel Beara, the Main Staff Security Chief, used the facilities of the Zvornik Brigade for the operation he had been tasked with by the Main Staff without notifying anyone at either the Brigade Command or Drina Corps Command level. General Krstic was adamant that Colonel Beara had not formally issued any assignment to the Zvornik Brigade involving the executions.692 Further, General Krstic maintained, the Drina Corps Command did not receive any records about the utilisation of Drina Corps personnel or vehicles by Colonel Beara .693

The Trial Chamber accepts that, from 9 July 1995, when he arrived at the Pribicevac FCP in the midst of Krivaja 95, General Mladic, as Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, entered the zone of operation of the Drina Corps and may have directed key aspects of VRS activities, including the continued attack on Srebrenica, the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari and, ultimately, the executions. Certainly, the evidence portrays General Mladic as a dominating personality, who was actively involved in both the public and behind-the-scenes aspects of the unfolding events.694 Indisputably, General Mladic directed the meetings at the Hotel Fontana while the Drina Corps representatives sat in silence. He was also sighted in Potocari, and at several of the execution sites. However, the evidence does not support a finding that the Drina Corps Command was, thereby, completely excluded from all knowledge or authority as to the involvement of its troops or assets in the operation. Nor does the Trial Record support the Defence argument that orders to the subordinate Brigades of the Drina Corps thereafter came directly or exclusively from the Main Staff. As a military principle, it would be untenable if the Main Staff came into the Drina Corps zone of responsibility and took complete control of Drina Corps assets and personnel without the assent, or at least the knowledge, of the Drina Corps Command, especially in the midst of ongoing combat operations. No army could function under these circumstances and VRS principles did not admit of such a possibility. As reflected in the words of Defence Witness DE who was a Drina Corps officer in July 1995:

Our army functioned according to two basic principles: The principle of having one command and the principle of subordination. One command meant that every person in the chain of command above him has only one man who can issue orders to him, one superior; and the principle of subordination implied that the subordinated persons must act on the orders of their superior unless an order of that kind represented a criminal act, which was regulated in other rules and regulations positive.695

This accords with the testimony of Mr. Butler who stated that, in light of JNA regulations, it would be unheard of for a Commander of the Main Staff to interfere with the chain of command and assume direct command over subordinate units. Such a practice would be evidence of a poor and undisciplined army and, in Mr. Butler’s view, the VRS was a very well organised army.696

The evidence does not, in any way, support a finding that the Drina Corps was completely excluded from matters relating to the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Potocari or the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. As described above, officers of the Drina Corps Command were engaged in the procurement and organisation of the buses on which the Bosnian Muslim civilians were transported out of Potocari. This is clearly inconsistent with the notion that the Main Staff had taken over direct command of the subordinate Drina Corps Brigades.697 The Drina Corps Intelligence Department also received a Main Staff document dated 13 July 1995 reporting on the completion of the transportation operation, showing that the Main Staff ensured the Corps Command remained informed about the activities being conducted within its zone.698 Further, when the Main Staff issued orders to the Drina Corps about blocking and detaining the Bosnian Muslim column, the orders were sent through the Corps Command .699 It is true that these orders were also copied directly to the relevant Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, but the Trial Chamber accepts the explanation given by Mr. Butler that this was purely a time-saving device in an emergency situation.700 The most important factor is that the Drina Corps Command itself was included in the chain of command by the Main Staff and remained informed about the tasks being issued to its subordinate brigades.

There are many other examples of the Drina Corps chain of command operating in a normal manner in the period following the take-over of Srebrenica. On 15 July 1995, a conversation was intercepted between Colonel Beara and General Krstic in which Colonel Beara made a direct and urgent request to General Krstic for assistance in finding men who could assist him in the work he was carrying out.701 In response, General Krstic directed Colonel Beara to contact Colonel Blagojevic, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade and to utilise his Red Berets (a reconnaissance unit subordinate to the 3rd Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade702 ). This episode is totally inconsistent with the notion that the Main Staff was directing the activities of Drina Corps subordinate Brigades without reference to the Drina Corps Command. Further, there is documentation showing that the subordinate Drina Corps Brigades were constantly reporting to the Drina Corps Command on matters relating to the Bosnian Muslim column and the prisoners. In his 15 July 1995 Interim Combat Report, Colonel Pandurevic, Commander of the beleaguered Zvornik Brigade, which was caught up in combat with the Bosnian Muslim column, pleaded with the Corps Command for help with dealing with the prisoners being detained in his zone of responsibility. Colonel Pandurevic warned the Drina Corps Command that if the situation were not alleviated, he would be forced to let the prisoners go.703 Similarly, on 16 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevic made another urgent request to the Corps Command for assistance.704 This demonstrates that the Zvornik Brigade was still utilising the regular chain of command and that it was not reporting directly to the Main Staff about Srebrenica related events. Overall, the Prosecution produced 54 documents showing the involvement of the Drina Corps Command in the VRS chain of command in the wake of the take-over of Srebrenica.705

Further, records were kept by the Drina Corps subordinate units about the use of resources for matters connected to the executions. One would naturally expect the Drina Corps Command to have been closely monitoring the use of all its resources given the high level of military activity occurring in the week of 13 July 1995, including the commencement of the Zepa Operation, the combat with the head of the Bosnian Muslim column composed of members of the 28th Division, the ABiH forces attacking from the direction of Tuzla, and the search operations around the Srebrenica area. It is inconceivable that Brigade commanders would fail to notice that the Main Staff had requisitioned Drina Corps personnel and resources for its own uses or fail to inform its own Command of such requisitions.

Aside from the documentary and intercept evidence adduced by the Prosecution, showing that the Drina Corps Command was not excluded from the Srebrenica follow -up activities, the proximity of Drina Corps Command to the crime sites strengthens the confidence of the Trial Chamber that the Corps Command could not be, and was not, oblivious to these events.  (ii) Were the Security Organs Operating in Secret?

The Defence also argued that prisoners of war were the exclusive responsibility of the security and intelligence organs, particularly the former.706 Moreover, according to the Defence, the security organ of the Drina Corps, in conjunction with the Main Staff security organ, formed an independent command line whereby operations were conducted secretly from the Drina Corps Command.707 In particular, General Radinovic postulated that the VRS regulations governing the security organs permit security officers in the Corps Command to make their own assessment as to what is an official secret, which can only be divulged with the permission of the Assistant for Security of the Main Staff.708 The Defence hypothesised that Colonel Popovic, the Assistant Commander of Security for the Drina Corps, received his assignments as to the prisoners directly from Colonel Beara, but that pursuant to VRS regulations he was not allowed to report about them to anyone in the Corps Command.709 Accordingly, the Drina Corps Command and the Commands of the subordinate Brigades were unaware of the crimes being committed by the security organs.710 This, argued the Defence, is corroborated by the absence of documents from the security organs, during the relevant period, reporting to the Drina Corps Command about the fate of the prisoners.711

The Prosecution’s view of the relationship between the security organs in the Main Staff and the Drina Corps during the critical period is entirely different. It maintained that, according to VRS regulations, the Assistant Commander for Security was directly subordinate to the commanding officer of the unit of the armed forces under whose command he is placed: in this case, Colonel Popovic was subordinated to the Drina Corps Commander.712 Mr. Butler argued that, while the Main Staff security organ provided “technical advice, technical assistance, in some cases, resources, guidance, and direction for the more technical aspects of security operations…”, it did not form an alternative chain of command.713

Mr. Butler conceded that there could be some circumstances in which the Corps Commander would not be informed of the work of the security officer, for example, if the Commander himself was the subject of the investigation. However, he maintained that for “daily activities” of the security branch, one would expect the Corps Commander to be fully informed.714 The criminal activity involved in the execution of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men is hardly a “daily activity” and it is to be expected that some attempt would be made to shroud the commission of such crimes in secrecy, although their massive scale necessarily made that difficult. Nonetheless, the evidence, viewed in its entirety, does not support the view that the Main Staff and Drina Corps Security organs were carrying out activities relating to the executions without the knowledge of the Drina Corps command. Even if Colonel Beara and Colonel Popovic were primarily directing this criminal activity under orders from General Mladic, they were continually communicating and co-ordinating with personnel from the Drina Corps Command. On 16 July 1995, around the time of the Branjevo Military Farm executions, Colonel Beara had a conversation with Colonel Cerovic from the Drina Corps Command, during which Colonel Beara informed Colonel Cerovic that “triage” had to be done on the prisoners.715 On that same day, Colonel Popovic co-ordinated his requests for fuel to be used in conjunction with the executions through the Zvornik Brigade, which in turn passed this request on to the Drina Corps Command.716 The Drina Corps Command is also mentioned in the paper work for this fuel allocation .717 In total, the Prosecution pointed to 11 exhibits718 refuting the contention that the VRS security organs were operating secretly.

(iii) Conclusions

Overall, the Prosecution has made a compelling argument that, due to their massive nature and the level of co-operation and co-ordination required, the executions could not have been accomplished in isolation from the Drina Corps Command. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, the Drina Corps Command continued to exercise command competencies in relation to its subordinate Brigades and that this command role was not suspended as a result of the involvement of the VRS Main Staff, or the security organs, in the Srebrenica follow-up activity.

(b) Responsibility of the Drina Corps Command for the Actions of Non-Drina Corps Units Operating in the Drina Corps Area of Responsibility in July 1995

The evidence adduced indicates that two units of the VRS, that were normally subordinated to the Main Staff, were operating in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility during July 1995 and are implicated in the crimes committed: the 10th Sabotage Detachment was involved in the executions at Branjevo Military Farm719 and the Trial Chamber heard evidence that the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment was involved in the assembly and detention of Bosnian Muslim prisoners near Nova Kasaba.720 Further, MUP forces, including a special MUP unit as well as units of municipal police, were also operating in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility during July 1995. MUP units were present in Potocari, on 12 and 13 July 1995721 and were involved in the capture of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the Nova Kasaba region on 13 July 1995.722 The Prosecution also maintained that MUP personnel are implicated in the executions that took place at Jadar River on the morning of 13 July 1995.723 The Prosecution has argued that all of these units were resubordinated to the Drina Corps “during various times in July 1995”, so that the Drina Corps Command bears responsibility for their actions.724

(i) The 10th Sabotage Detachment

The video of the VRS victory walk through Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 shows the presence of soldiers of the 10th Sabotage Detachment at a checkpoint and, subsequently, the Commander of that unit, Miso Pelemis, is shown in the centre of Srebrenica town.725 Mr. Erdemovic, who was a member of the 10th Sabotage Detachment at that time, confirmed that members of his unit were present in Srebrenica on 11 July 1995.726 General Krstic, however, denied that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was engaged with the Drina Corps units for the purposes of Krivaja 95. He testified that he was unaware of the presence of the 10th Sabotage Detachment on 11 July 1995, despite the fact that the video shows General Krstic walking past soldiers wearing uniforms belonging to this unit.727 Defence Witness DB, who was a Drina Corps officer present at the Pribicevac FCP during Krivaja 95, contradicted this. Witness DB confirmed that the 10th Sabotage Detachment had arrived around 9 or 10 July 1995.728 Witness DB believed that General Krstic also knew the 10th Sabotage Detachment had arrived by this time.729 Further evidence as to the knowledge General Krstic had about the involvement of the 10th Sabotage Detachment in Krivaja 95 came from Witness II, who was a member of the Drina Corps in July 1995 and was with General Krstic during the walk through Srebrenica on 11 July 1995. Witness II said that he saw Miso Pelemis at that time and that, quite possibly, General Krstic spoke to Pelemis in Srebrenica town.730 However, as argued by the Defence, the 10th Sabotage Detachment comprised about 30 men and they arrived around 10 July 1995 by which time the VRS was already on the brink of capturing Srebrenica. It seems unlikely that the Command of the Drina Corps would have called upon this unit to assist in the military attack at this stage.731

It is known that, on 16 July 1995, members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment participated in the execution of the Bosnian Muslim men at Branjevo Farm and that troops from the Bratunac Brigade were also involved in the commission of these atrocities .732 Prior to proceeding to the execution fields, the 10th Sabotage Detachment called in at the headquarters of the Zvornik Brigade where they met a Lieutenant Colonel accompanied by two members of the Drina Corps military police. This officer was clearly in charge of directing the subsequent executions, including the participation of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, at the Branjevo Farm.733 This scenario, the Prosecution argued, demonstrated that the 10th Sabotage Detachment had come under the command of the Drina Corps at the time. However, the Defence argued that this Lieutenant Colonel was in fact a member of the Main Staff and not the Drina Corps and the Trial Chamber is unable to rule out that possibility.734

General Radinovic testified that not a single piece of evidence existed showing the Main Staff authorised the Command of the Drina Corps to act with the 10th Sabotage Detachment.735 Mr. Butler conceded that there was no specific document indicating the 10th Sabotage Detachment was acting under the command of the Drina Corps736 and accepted that he knew of no “technical evidence” to support the theory of resubordination .737

The Trial Chamber is unable to conclude that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was formally resubordinated to the Drina Corps Command on 16 July 1995 when members of this unit were involved in the executions at Branjevo Farm. Nonetheless, it is clear that there must have been close co-operation and co-ordination between the Drina Corps and this unit from the time they arrived in Srebrenica and continuing throughout the follow-up action thereto. The Drina Corps Command must have been fully aware of the presence of this unit within its zone of responsibility and, as has already been determined, units of the Drina Corps acted together with the 10th Sabotage Detachment in the commission of the executions at Branjevo Farm on 16 July 1995.  (ii) The 65th Protection Regiment

The Prosecution pointed to documents indicating that a Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment, which was based in Nova Kasaba, fell under the control of the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade and, by extension the Drina Corps Command, on or about 15 July 1995.738 However, the Trial Chamber heard no persuasive evidence that the 65th Protection Regiment was involved in any illegal activity after this time.739 Certainly though, the Drina Corps Command was well aware of the presence of this unit within its zone of responsibility following the take-over of Srebrenica and was organising co-operative action with them to block the column.740

'''(iii) The MUP ''' The Prosecution argued that MUP forces were subordinated to the Drina Corps for the purposes of Krivaja 95 based on the order for active combat, which designated “two or three companies of MUP” amongst the reserve forces for the operation.741 Defence Witness DB agreed that, by virtue of the orders, MUP forces were to be involved in the attack on Srebrenica as reserve forces.742 The Prosecution pointed to regulations specifying that, when conducting operations with the army, MUP units are subordinated to the army for the duration of those operations,743 and argued that, therefore, the MUP had been resubordinated to the Drina Corps Command.

Although General Krstic agreed that a special detachment of the MUP, commanded by Colonel Borovcanin, had arrived in Bratunac by 11 July 1995,744 he denied that any MUP forces acted as reserves for Krivaja 95.745 Certainly, Mr. Butler could not refer to any documentation indicating that the reserve MUP forces referred to in the plan were actually deployed.746 In order to engage the special MUP unit commanded by Colonel Borovcanin, permission had to be obtained from the RS Minister of the Interior and no document to that effect was ever produced during the course of the trial.747

Another Defence witness testified that the special MUP unit, commanded by Colonel Borovcanin, did arrive on or about 10 July 1995. However he too disputed that this unit was the same one mentioned in the plan for Krivaja 95. If it had been, he said, the Krivaja 95 plan would have referred to “the special MUP units”, whereas the MUP units referred to in the plan were the local public security stations in local communities.748 On the other hand, Mr Butler believed the MUP forces specified as reserves in the Krivaja 95 plan would have been Special MUP forces rather than municipal police, given that they were included as a military infantry company in the plan.749

Regardless of whether the MUP forces that arrived in the Srebrenica on about 10 July 1995 were engaged by the Drina Corps for Krivaja 95 or not, it is clear that, upon the withdrawal of the 28th Division from the enclave following the take -over of Srebrenica, MUP forces were incorporated into the ‘‘follow-up” operation. MUP units were present in Potocari750 and they were also placed along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, where they engaged in blocking and capturing large numbers of men from the Bosnian Muslim column on 13 July 1995.751

The Prosecution pointed to intercepted conversations that, in its view, demonstrate that these units were acting under the command of the Drina Corps.752 Certainly the evidence reveals that there was close co-operation and co-ordination between the MUP and Drina Corps units. On 11 July 1995, before the VRS found out about the formation and movement of the Bosnian Muslim column, the Main Staff ordered the Drina Corps to take pre-emptive steps, “by arrangement and co-operation with the MUP” to block the passage of Bosnian Muslims to and from the enclave.753 A Dutch Bat officer in Potocari spoke to a member of the police present there who said that his unit “had a sort of liaison with…the Drina Corps” and that, although his unit was not a part of the Drina Corps, they were “more or less working together .”754 During a conversation between two unidentified participants at 0656 hours on 12 July regarding the Bosnian Muslim column, one participant suggested “Maybe we should see or you could see if the MUP …can set up some ambushes and so on.”755 The language of this intercept suggests a co-operative relationship rather than one in which the MUP could be directly ordered to carry out tasks by the Drina Corps. Similarly, in a further intercepted conversation, on 12 July 1995 at 1305 hours, General Krstic is heard ordering the Vlasenica Brigade to “Get in touch with these guys from the MUP. That means you, your Brigade and them.”756 Another intercepted conversation, on 13 July 1995 at 1945 hours, took place between a person, “X”, who was calling from “General Krstic’s” and looking for Ljubisa, which was probably a reference to Colonel Ljubisa Borovcanin the Deputy Commander of the special MUP Brigade.757 Shortly thereafter at 2040 hours, General Krstic spoke to Colonel Borovcanin, asked how things were going and stated that “we’ll be in touch.”758 Furthermore, as noted above, MUP forces were engaged with Brigades of the Drina Corps in blocking the retreating Bosnian Muslim column and in searching the former enclave.759 On 15 July 1995, Colonel Ignjat Milanovic the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence, recommended the appointment of Colonel Blagojevic, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, as the Commander of all of the units who were sweeping the terrain of the former enclave in accordance with the order issued by General Krstic on 13 July 1995.760 The following day, Colonel Blagojevic reported that he had visited all units involved in blocking the enemy, including the MUP, and that he had “defined their tasks, and organised their joint actions and communications.”761 The Defence maintained that this was evidence only that these units were working together and did not speak of a formal command relationship. This position is supported by the fact that, on 17 July 1995, the Main Staff issued an order appointing an officer of the Main Staff to take over the co-ordination of these forces, indicating that the Main Staff was directing the activities of all these units.762 In an intercepted conversation on 15 July 1995, Colonel Beara spoke to General Krstic about acquiring some additional men for the work he was engaged in.763 When General Krstic suggested to Colonel Beara “…then take those MUP guys from up there”, Colonel Beara replied “No, they won’t do anything, I talked to them”. Thus Colonel Beara had obviously already spoken to the MUP without going through the Drina Corps Command first, yet he clearly considered that he had to get permission from General Krstic to use Drina Corps personnel.

Mr. Butler conceded that, during the period between 11 and 13 July 1995, when all the activity was occurring along the Bratunac/Konjevic Polje Road, there is no document demonstrating that the MUP was subordinated to the Drina Corps.764 Moreover, he accepted that there was no evidence showing that MUP reported to the Drina Corps Command or subordinate Brigades about their activities along the Bratunac Konjevic-Polje road.765 The only information the Prosecution obtained from their investigations into this matter is that MUP personnel were reporting up through Colonel Borovcanin. Mr. Butler accepted that there is no evidence to link the MUP with any of the local army commands other than their physical presence.766 Under cross-examination, Mr. Butler conceded that an order sent from the Main Staff on 12 July 1995 specified that the MUP was to act “in collaboration” with subordinate Brigades of the Drina Corps and that a command relationship was not specifically indicated.767

The Trial Chamber is unable to conclude that the MUP units present in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility were subordinate to the Drina Corps during July 1995. The evidence presented, although certainly demonstrating close co-ordination and co-operation, does not conclusively establish that the Drina Corps had assumed command of MUP units. There is no doubt, however, that the Drina Corps was well aware of the presence of MUP units within their zone of responsibility, as well as the action being taken by MUP units to block and capture Bosnian Muslim men in the column.

'''7. Conclusions about the Involvement of the Drina Corps in the Srebrenica Crimes ''' There is no evidence that the Drina Corps devised or instigated any of the atrocities that followed the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. The evidence strongly suggests that the criminal activity was being directed by the VRS Main Staff under the direction of General Mladic. It was General Mladic who victoriously lead the VRS officers through the streets of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and it was he who threatened and intimidated the Bosnian Muslim and UNPROFOR representatives at Hotel Fontana meetings, on 11 and 12 July 1995, while demanding the surrender of the 28th Division. He was directing events in Potocari, both the transport of the women, children and elderly from Potocari768 and the separation of the men and their detention in the White House.769 Eyewitnesses reported the physical presence of General Mladic at the Sandici Meadow and Nova Kasaba football fields where thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were detained on 13 July 1995.770 He was also identified as being physically present at the Grbavci School Detention Site and at Orahovac, observing the executions on 14 July 1995.771 Colonel Beara, the head of the Security Administration of the VRS Main Staff, was also much in view772 and there is further evidence suggesting the involvement of other individuals from the Main Staff in the criminal activity.773

However, the Main Staff did not have the resources to carry out the activities that occurred in the area of the former enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica on its own. The Main Staff was an organisational shell and was largely dependent upon the personnel and equipment of its subordinate Brigades to implement its objectives. It stands to reason that the Drina Corps, the VRS subordinate Corps stationed in the area of Srebrenica would have been called upon and the evidence consistently bears this out.

The Drina Corps was not oblivious to the overall VRS strategy of eliminating the Srebrenica enclave. This had always been the long-term Drina Corps objective in the area. Although Krivaja 95 started out as a limited operation, it quickly accelerated to a plan for taking over Srebrenica town when the opportunity presented itself on the evening of 9 July 1995. From that point, the Drina Corps continued to shell the enclave intensively with the intent to cause the Bosnian Muslim civilians to flee the area. The Drina Corps was also fully cognisant of the catastrophic humanitarian situation of the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Potocari and the fact that Bosnian Serb forces were terrorising the population there.

When the plan to transport the Bosnian Muslim population out of Potocari was devised, the Drina Corps were called upon to procure the buses. Drina Corps personnel were also present in Potocari, overseeing the transportation operation, knowing full well that the Bosnian Muslims were not exercising a genuine choice to leave the area.

It has not been established that the Drina Corps was involved in devising the plan to execute the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica. However, although there may have been some initial desire on the part of the Main Staff to limit knowledge about the executions, this could not be sustained for three reasons. First, the executions formed an integral part of the VRS follow-up activities after the take -over of Srebrenica and could not be neatly or secretly compartmentalised. So, for example, the Bosnian Muslim men were being captured from the column at the same time and along the same road used for the transportation of the women, children and elderly out of the enclave. The Drina Corps was preoccupied with both the transportation operation and the passage of the Bosnian Muslim column at the time and thus inevitably had to know that the men were being taken prisoner. Second, the massive scale of the atrocities, all of which occurred within a section of the Drina Corps zone of responsibility (in an area that was no more than about 80 kilometres at its longest and widest points774 ) meant, inescapably, the Drina Corps must have known about their occurrence. Third, in the absence of sufficient personnel and equipment of its own, the Main Staff had to rely upon resources of the Drina Corps to assist with the executions.

Certainly the evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that the Drina Corps was informed of all aspects of the executions plan from the outset. Rather, it appears that the Corps’ knowledge of, and involvement in, these atrocities gradually increased as the events unfolded. On 12 July and 13 July 1995, Drina Corps personnel knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being separated from the women, children and elderly in Potocari, taken from the buses passing through Tisca and detained, and that there was a real question as to what the fate of these men would be. From the evening of 12 July 1995, the Drina Corps knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being captured from the column attempting to break out of the enclave and that, on 13 July 1995, thousands of prisoners had been taken along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. The act of capturing the prisoners, of itself, was not unlawful. It could have been consistent with a plan to screen them for war crimes and/or ultimately exchange them for Bosnian Serb prisoners of war. However, it quickly became apparent that this was not the case. Bosnian Serb plans for the Bosnian Muslim men were radically revised in light of the knowledge that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, some 6,000 prisoners had been taken from the column fleeing through the woods. On 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command could not but have known that thousands of these captured Bosnian Muslim men had been taken to the Kravica Warehouse aboard busses originally procured by the Drina Corps for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim refugees from Potocari and that these men were subsequently executed that same day. The Drina Corps Command must also have known that the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim men were not transferred to regular prisoner of war facilities but instead were detained in Bratunac without any provisions made for food, water or other necessities. For thousands of prisoners, arranging such provisions would have been no small task. Yet there was no evidence of any steps being taken in this regard, nor of inquiries made by the Drina Corps Command about what plans were being made for the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. It is also apparent that, by 13 July 1995 when a vehicle began scouting for detention sites, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of plans to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoner’s northward, to sites within its zone of responsibility. This decision to transport them to remote locations up north (again with no provision made for food or water ), rather than to recognised prisoner of war facilities, amounted to an unequivocal signal that a mass executions plan was in operation. The Trial Chamber finds that, by the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have been aware of the VRS plan to execute all of the thousands of military aged Bosnian Muslim mens who were captured in the area of the former enclave.

In contrast to the scant evidence implicating the Drina Corps in the commission of the mass executions that took place on 13 July 1995, there is substantial and compelling evidence showing that between 14 July and 17 July 1995, the resources of subordinate Drina Corps Brigades were utilised to assist with the mass executions. Given that these subordinate Brigades continued to operate under the Command of the Drina Corps, the Command itself must have known of the involvement of its subordinate units in the executions as of 14 July 1995. This is particularly so in view of the pressing military situation facing these units which must have prompted especially careful monitoring of Corps resources.