Talk:Srebrenica massacre/Archive 9

Serb Gen Ratko Mladic Recognized Genocide and Warned Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic about Genocide
Both highest ranking Bosnian Serb politicans, Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik, were warned by Bosnian Serb military commander General Ratko Mladic, also indicted on genocide charges, that their plans could not be committed without committing genocide.

'People are not little stones, or keys in someone's pocket, that can be moved from one place to another just like that... Therefore, we cannot precisely arrange for only Serbs to stay in one part of the country while removing others painlessly. I do not know how Mr Krajisnik and Mr Karadzic will explain that to the world. That is genocide, said Mladic.'

References:

http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2229 Bosnia's Accidental Genocide, Bosnian Institute in UK. September 30, 2006.Bosniak 04:34, 1 October 2006 (UTC)

Bosniak, Mladic's canny discourse to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 12 May 1992 is cited in the ICTY's Krajisnik judgment as follows (at http://www.un.org/icty/krajisnik/trialc/judgement/kra-jud060927e.pdf):

975. The Accused [Krajisnik] did not just know about the operations of Bosnian-Serb armed forces in 1992, he actively supervised them as a member of the leadership. The Bosnian-Serb Assembly was a forum for the formulation and coordination of military strategy. On 12 May 1992, in a long speech to the Assembly, General Ratko Mladiæ explained his “vision” that the Serbs could prevail in the territories they considered theirs without completely destroying the Muslims:(1943) “we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. ... I do not know how Mr. Krajišnik and Mr. Karadžiæ would explain this to the world. ... that would be genocide.”(1944) But there was an alternative to genocide. Mladiæ advised the Bosnian-Serb leadership on how to achieve controversial military objectives quietly, cynically, ruthlessly, while staying below the radar of international attention: “We should not say: we will destroy Sarajevo, we need Sarajevo. We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no, because that would get America out of its seat, but ... one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. What it is we do not know ... And the same with the electrical power ... we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the power supply facilities ... that is what diplomacy is”.(1945)

1943 - P65, tab 127, pp. 38-9.

1944 - P65, tab 127, p. 39.

1945 - P65, tab 127, pp. 42-3.

where P65, tab 127 is "Minutes and record of 16th session of Bosnian-Serb Assembly, 12 May 1992"

Mladic is saying that that what is being proposed is genocide and so he is suggesting an alternative approach that will allow the Bosnian Serb command to achieve the same objectives without them being seen by the international community to have been responsible for genocide.

--Opbeith 21:32, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

How the ICTY found that genocide had been perpetrated at Srebrenica and found General Radislav Krstic guilty of the crime
This summary, although it omits much of the discussion of the joint criminal enterprise and the general nature of the crime of genocide, nevertheless contains most of the substance of the court's reasoning in finding Gen. Krstic guilty of genocide at Srebrenica.

The court notes the Bosnian Serbs' central war objective was "the use of military means to terrorise civilian populations, often with the goal of forcing their flight in a process that came to be known as 'ethnic cleansing'" and how Momcilo Krajisnik and Krstic defined that objective in very similar terms with reference to the Serbianisation of the Podrinje region, ("in [which] goal the cleansing of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica had special advantages").

The court couldn't be clearer in explaining why it found that the killing of the Muslim men of military age in Srebrenica did in fact constitute genocide, leaving no scope for Gen. Lewis MacKenzie's argument that it did not.

All text quoted below has been taken from the full Krstic judgment at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/index.htm

...

3. In July 1995, at the time the atrocities occurred, General Krstic was first the Chief of Staff and, subsequently, the Commander of the Drina Corps, a formation of the Bosnian Serb Army (hereafter “VRS”). All of the crimes committed following the take-over of Srebrenica were committed in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps. ...

...

335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstic was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstic was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town. It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area.

...

335. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic was well aware that the shelling of Srebrenica would drive tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians from the town into the small area of Potocari they thought “safe” because of the UN base there. He must have known that, inevitably, basic needs for shelter, food, water and medicine at that site would prove overwhelming. The Trial Chamber further finds that General Krstic was fully appraised of the VRS territorial goals in the Srebrenica enclave, which included cleansing the area of the Bosnian Muslim population.

...

544. The critical determination still to be made is whether the offences were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

545. The Prosecution contends that the Bosnian Serb forces planned and intended to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age at Srebrenica and that these large scale murders constitute genocide. The Defence does not challenge that the Bosnian Serb forces killed a significant number of Bosnian Muslim men of military age but disagrees a genocidal intent within the meaning of Article 4 has been proved.

546. The Trial Chamber is ultimately satisfied that murders and infliction of serious bodily or mental harm were committed with the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age at Srebrenica. The evidence shows that the mass executions mainly took place between 13 and 16 July, while executions of smaller scale continued until 19 July. All of the executions systematically targeted Bosnian Muslim men of military age, regardless of whether they were civilians or soldiers.

...

547. The VRS may have initially considered only targeting the military men for execution. Some men from the column were in fact killed in combat and it is not certain that the VRS intended at first to kill all the captured Muslim men, including the civilians in the column. Evidence shows, however, that a decision was taken, at some point, to capture and kill all the Bosnian Muslim men indiscriminately. No effort thereafter was made to distinguish the soldiers from the civilians. ... The evidence shows that the VRS sought to kill all the Bosnian Muslim military aged men in Srebrenica, regardless of their civilian or military status.

548. The Prosecution contends that evidence demonstrates an intent to destroy part of a group as such, which is consonant with the definition of genocide. Conversely, the Defence maintains that the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age living in Srebrenica cannot be interpreted as an intent to destroy in whole or in part a group as such within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.

...

557. A group’s cultural, religious, ethnical or national characteristics must be identified within the socio-historic context which it inhabits. As in the Nikolic and Jelisic cases, the Chamber identifies the relevant group by using as a criterion the stigmatisation of the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.

558. Whereas the indictment in this case defined the targeted group as the Bosnian Muslims, the Prosecution appeared to use an alternative definition in its pre-trial brief by pleading the intention to eliminate the “Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica ” through mass killing and deportation. In its final trial brief, the Prosecution chose to define the group as the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, while it referred to the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia in its final arguments. The Defence argued in its final brief that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica did not form a specific national, ethnical, racial or religious group. In particular, it contended that “one cannot create an artificial ‘group’ by limiting its scope to a geographical area”. According to the Defence, the Bosnian Muslims constitute the only group that fits the definition of a group protected by the Convention.

559. ... The evidence tendered at trial also shows very clearly that the highest Bosnian Serb political authorities and the Bosnian Serb forces operating in Srebrenica in July 1995 viewed the Bosnian Muslims as a specific national group. Conversely, no national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristic makes it possible to differentiate the Bosnian Muslims residing in Srebrenica, at the time of the 1995 offensive, from the other Bosnian Muslims. The only distinctive criterion would be their geographical location, not a criterion contemplated by the Convention. In addition, it is doubtful that the Bosnian Muslims residing in the enclave at the time of the offensive considered themselves a distinct national, ethnical, racial or religious group among the Bosnian Muslims. Indeed, most of the Bosnian Muslims residing in Srebrenica at the time of the attack were not originally from Srebrenica but from all around the central Podrinje region. Evidence shows that they rather viewed themselves as members of the Bosnian Muslim group.

560. The Chamber concludes that the protected group, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute, must be defined, in the present case, as the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica or the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia constitute a part of the protected group under Article 4. The question of whether an intent to destroy a part of the protected group falls under the definition of genocide is a separate issue that will be discussed below.

561. The Prosecution and the Defence, in this case, concur in their belief that the victims of genocide must be targeted by reason of their membership in a group. This is the only interpretation coinciding with the intent which characterises the crime of genocide. The intent to destroy a group as such, in whole or in part, presupposes that the victims were chosen by reason of their membership in the group whose destruction was sought. Mere knowledge of the victims’ membership in a distinct group on the part of the perpetrators is not sufficient to establish an intention to destroy the group as such. As the ILC noted:

[…] the intention must be to destroy a group and not merely one or more individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group. The […] act must be committed against an individual because of his membership in a particular group and as an incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group.

562. As a result, there are obvious similarities between a genocidal policy and the policy commonly known as ethnic cleansing. In this case, acts of discrimination are not confined to the events in Srebrenica alone, but characterise the whole of the 1992-95 conflict between the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. The Report of the Secretary-General comments that “a central objective of the conflict was the use of military means to terrorise civilian populations, often with the goal of forcing their flight in a process that came to be known as 'ethnic cleansing' ”. The Bosnian Serbs’ war objective was clearly spelt out, notably in a decision issued on 12 May 1992 by Momcilo Krajisnik, then President of the National Assembly of the Bosnian Serb People. The decision indicates that one of the strategic objectives of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to reunite all Serbian people in a single State, in particular by erasing the border along the Drina which separated Serbia from Eastern Bosnia, whose population was mostly Serbian.

563. The accused himself defined the objective of the campaign in Bosnia during an interview in November 1995, when he explained that the Podrinje region should remain “Serbian for ever, while the Eastern part of Republika Srpska and the Drina river w?ouldg be an important meeting point for the entire Serbian people from both sides of the Drina”.

564. In this goal, the cleansing of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica had special advantages. Lying in the central Podrinje region, whose strategic importance for the creation of a Bosnian Serb Republic has frequently been cited in testimony,1247 Srebrenica and the surrounding area was a predominantly Muslim pocket within a mainly Serbian region adjoining Serbia.1248 Given the war objectives, it is hardly surprising that the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims fought each other bitterly in this region from the outbreak of the conflict.

...

567. ... the Trial Chamber has found that, on its face, the operation Krivaja 95 did not include a plan to overrun the enclave and expel the Bosnian Muslim population. ...

568. The operation, however, was not confined to mere retaliation. Its objective, although perhaps restricted initially to blocking communications between the two enclaves and reducing the Srebrenica enclave to its urban core, was quickly extended. ... Operation Krivaja 1995 then became an instrument of the policy designed to drive out the Bosnian Muslim population. The humanitarian crisis caused by the flow of refugees arriving at Potocari, the intensity and the scale of the violence, the illegal confinement of the men in one area, while the women and children were forcibly transferred out of the Bosnian Serb held territory, and the subsequent death of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilian and military men, most of whom clearly did not die in combat, demonstrate that a purposeful decision was taken by the Bosnian Serb forces to target the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica, by reason of their membership in the Bosnian Muslim group. It remains to determine whether this discriminatory attack sought to destroy the group, in whole or in part, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.

...

569. The Prosecution urges a broad interpretation of Article 4’s requirement of an intent to destroy all or part of the group. It contends that the acts have been committed with the requisite intent if “?the accusedg consciously desired ?hisg acts to result in the destruction, in whole or in part, of the group, as such; or he knew his acts were destroying, in whole or in part, the group, as such; or he knew that the likely consequence of his acts would be to destroy, in whole or in part, the group, as such”. The Prosecution is of the opinion that, in this case, General Krstic and others “consciously desired their acts to lead to the destruction of part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a […] group”.

...

571. ... Some legal commentators further contend that genocide embraces those acts whose foreseeable or probable consequence is the total or partial destruction of the group without any necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the act. Whether this interpretation can be viewed as reflecting the status of customary international law at the time of the acts involved here is not clear. For the purpose of this case, the Chamber will therefore adhere to the characterisation of genocide which encompass only acts committed with the goal of destroying all or part of a group.

572. ... Evidence presented in this case has shown that the killings were planned: the number and nature of the forces involved, the standardised coded language used by the units in communicating information about the killings, the scale of the executions, the invariability of the killing methods applied, indicate that a decision was made to kill all the Bosnian Muslim military aged men.

...

581. Since in this case primarily the Bosnian Muslim men of military age were killed, a second issue is whether this group of victims represented a sufficient part of the Bosnian Muslim group so that the intent to destroy them qualifies as an “ intent to destroy the group in whole or in part” under Article 4 of the Statute.

...

583. The Defence contends that the term "in part" refers to the scale of the crimes actually committed, as opposed to the intent, which would have to extend to destroying the group as such, i.e. in its entirety. ...

584. The Trial Chamber does not agree. Admittedly, by adding the term “in part”, some of the Convention’s drafters may have intended that actual destruction of a mere part of a human group could be characterised as genocide, only as long as it was carried out with the intent to destroy the group as such. The debates on this point during the preparatory work are unclear, however, and a plain reading of the Convention contradicts this interpretation. Under the Convention, the term in whole or in part refers to the intent, as opposed to the actual destruction, and it would run contrary to the rules of interpretation to alter the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the Convention by recourse to the preparatory work which lacks clarity on the issue. The Trial Chamber concludes that any act committed with the intent to destroy a part of a group, as such, constitutes an act of genocide within the meaning of the Convention.

585. The Genocide Convention itself provides no indication of what constitutes intent to destroy “in part”. ...

586. ... According to the ILC, the perpetrators of the crime must seek to destroy a quantitatively substantial part of the protected group:

It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe. None the less the crime of genocide by its very nature requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group. ...

...

587. Benjamin Whitaker's 1985 study on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide holds that the partial destruction of a group merits the characterisation of genocide when it concerns a large portion of the entire group or a significant section of that group.

'In part' would seem to imply a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group, such as its leadership.

The “Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992)” (hereinafter “ Report of the Commission of Experts ”) confirmed this interpretation, and considered that an intent to destroy a specific part of a group, such as its political, administrative, intellectual or business leaders, “may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers killed”. The report states that extermination specifically directed against law enforcement and military personnel may affect “a significant section of a group in that it renders the group at large defenceless against other abuses of a similar or other nature”. However, the Report goes on to say that “the attack on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate of what happened to the rest of the group. If a group suffers extermination of its leadership and in the wake of that loss, a large number of its members are killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example deportation, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose”.

588. Judge Elihu Lauterpacht, the ad hoc Judge nominated by Bosnia-Herzegovina in the case before the International Court of Justice regarding the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, spoke similarly in his separate opinion. Judge Lauterpacht observed that the Bosnian Serb forces had murdered and caused serious mental and bodily injury to the Bosnian Muslims and had subjected the group to living conditions meant to bring about its total or partial physical destruction. He went on to take into account “the forced migration of civilians, more commonly known as ‘ethnic cleansing’” in order to establish the intent to destroy all or part of the group. In his view, this demonstrated the Serbs’ intent “to eliminate Muslim control of, and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Judge Lauterpacht concluded that the acts which led to the group's physical destruction had to be characterised as “acts of genocide” since they were “directed against an ethnical or religious group as such, and they (were( intended to destroy that group, if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent necessary to ensure that that group (would( no longer occup(y( the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina coveted by the Serbs”.

589. Several other sources confirm that the intent to eradicate a group within a limited geographical area such as the region of a country or even a municipality may be characterised as genocide. ...

590. The Trial Chamber is ... left with a margin of discretion in assessing what is destruction “in part” of the group. But it must exercise its discretionary power in a spirit consonant with the object and purpose of the Convention which is to criminalise specified conduct directed against the existence of protected groups, as such. The Trial Chamber is therefore of the opinion that the intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated individuals within it. Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the entire group protected by the Convention, they must view the part of the group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity which must be eliminated as such. A campaign resulting in the killings, in different places spread over a broad geographical area, of a finite number of members of a protected group might not thus qualify as genocide, despite the high total number of casualties, because it would not show an intent by the perpetrators to target the very existence of the group as such. Conversely, the killing of all members of the part of a group located within a small geographical area, although resulting in a lesser number of victims, would qualify as genocide if carried out with the intent to destroy the part of the group as such located in this small geographical area. Indeed, the physical destruction may target only a part of the geographically limited part of the larger group because the perpetrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction as sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic area at issue. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the total context in which the physical destruction is carried out.

591. The parties have presented opposing views as to whether the killings of Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica were carried out with intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. It should be recalled that the Prosecution at different times has proposed different definitions of the group in the context of the charge of genocide. In the Indictment, as in the submission of the Defence, the Prosecution referred to the group of the Bosnian Muslims, while in the final brief and arguments it defined the group as the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica or the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia. The Trial Chamber has previously indicated that the protected group, under Article 4 of the Statue, should be defined as the Bosnian Muslims.

594. The Trial Chamber concludes from the evidence that the VRS forces sought to eliminate all of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as a community. ...

595. Granted, only the men of military age were systematically massacred, but it is significant that these massacres occurred at a time when the forcible transfer of the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population was well under way. The Bosnian Serb forces could not have failed to know, by the time they decided to kill all the men, that this selective destruction of the group would have a lasting impact upon the entire group. Their death precluded any effective attempt by the Bosnian Muslims to recapture the territory. Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb forces had to be aware of the catastrophic impact that the disappearance of two or three generations of men would have on the survival of a traditionally patriarchal society, an impact the Chamber has previously described in detail. The Bosnian Serb forces knew, by the time they decided to kill all of the military aged men, that the combination of those killings with the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica. Intent by the Bosnian Serb forces to target the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica as a group is further evidenced by their destroying homes of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and Potocari and the principal mosque in Srebrenica soon after the attack.

...

597. The strategic location of the enclave, situated between two Serb territories, may explain why the Bosnian Serb forces did not limit themselves to expelling the Bosnian Muslim population. By killing all the military aged men, the Bosnian Serb forces effectively destroyed the community of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such and eliminated all likelihood that it could ever re-establish itself on that territory.

598. The Chamber concludes that the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age in Srebrenica constitutes an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within the meaning of Article 4 and therefore must be qualified as a genocide.

...

619. The Trial Chamber has made findings that, as of 13 July, the plan to ethnically cleanse the area of Srebrenica escalated to a far more insidious level that included killing all of the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica. A transfer of the men after screening for war criminals - the purported reason for their separation from the women, children and elderly at Potocari - to Bosnian Muslim held territory or to prisons to await a prisoner exchange was at some point considered an inadequate mode for assuring the ethnic cleansing of Srebrenica. Killing the men, in addition to forcibly transferring the women, children and elderly, became the object of the newly elevated joint criminal enterprise of General Mladic and VRS Main Staff personnel. The Trial Chamber concluded that this campaign to kill all the military aged men was conducted to guarantee that the Bosnian Muslim population would be permanently eradicated from Srebrenica and therefore constituted genocide.

...

621. The Trial Chamber has concluded that General Krstic was involved in organising the buses for the transportation of the women, children and elderly from Potocari throughout 12 July. He personally saw that the military-aged men were being segregated at Potocari and that they were being detained at the White House in sordid conditions. He must have observed, further, that contrary to General Mladic’s statement at the Hotel Fontana meeting, no genuine efforts were taking place to screen the men for war criminals. General Krstic knew, also on 12 July, that the buses exiting from Potocari were being stopped at Tišca where any men who had managed to get aboard were pulled off and taken to detention sites. On 13 July, when he was preparing the military operation at Zepa which commenced the next day, General Krstic found out that thousands of Srebrenica men fleeing in the column through the woods toward Tuzla had been captured on the territory of the Drina Corps. As the then Corps’ Chief of Staff, “the primary co-ordinator of the Corps’ activities”, General Krstic must have been aware that no adequate measures were being taken to provide for shelter, food, water and medical care for several thousand captured men and that no arrangements or negotiations were ongoing for their prisoner-of-war exchange.

622. On that basis alone, the Trial Chamber must conclude that, by the evening of 13 July at the latest, General Krstic knew that the Muslim men were being executed at a number of separate sites and that none had been allowed to enter government held territory along with the women, children and elderly. General Krstic could only surmise that the original objective of ethnic cleansing by forcible transfer had turned into a lethal plan to destroy the male population of Srebrenica once and for all.

623. In terms of General Krstic’s participation in the killing plan, the evidence has established that, from 14 July onwards, Drina Corps troops took part in killing episodes. The facts in relation to the Drina Corps’ participation at each site may be summarised as follows:

[Details of actions at Orahovac, Petkovci Dam, Branjevo Farm, Pilica Cultural Dom, Kozluk]

624. Thus, the Drina Corps rendered tangible and substantial assistance and technical support to the detention, killing and burial at these several sites between 14 and 16 July. ...

...

630. ... as Commander of the Drina Corps, General Krstic had extensive formal powers over the assets and troops of the Drina Corps. ...

...

633. The Trial Chamber concludes beyond reasonable doubt that General Krstic participated in a joint criminal enterprise to kill the Bosnian Muslim military-aged men from Srebrenica from the evening of 13 July onward. General Krstic may not have devised the killing plan, or participated in the initial decision to escalate the objective of the criminal enterprise from forcible transfer to destruction of Srebrenica’s Bosnian Muslim military-aged male community, but there can be no doubt that, from the point he learned of the widespread and systematic killings and became clearly involved in their perpetration, he shared the genocidal intent to kill the men. This cannot be gainsaid given his informed participation in the executions through the use of Drina Corps assets.

634. Finally, the Trial Chamber has concluded that, in terms of the requirement of Article 4(2) of the Statute that an intent to destroy only part of the group must nevertheless concern a substantial part thereof, either numerically or qualitatively, the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica do in fact constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group, because the killing of these men inevitably and fundamentally would result in the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica. In this respect, the intent to kill the men amounted to an intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. Having already played a key role in the forcible transfer of the Muslim women, children and elderly out of Serb-held territory, General Krstic undeniably was aware of the fatal impact that the killing of the men would have on the ability of the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica to survive, as such. General Krstic thus participated in the genocidal acts of “killing members of the group” under Article 4(2)(a) with the intent to destroy a part of the group.

...

644. In the present case, General Krstic participated in a joint criminal enterprise to kill the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica with the awareness that such killings would lead to the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica. His intent to kill the men thus amounts to a genocidal intent to destroy the group in part. General Krstic did not conceive the plan to kill the men, nor did he kill them personally. However, he fulfilled a key co-ordinating role in the implementation of the killing campaign. In particular, at a stage when his participation was clearly indispensable, General Krstic exerted his authority as Drina Corps Commander and arranged for men under his command to commit killings. He thus was an essential participant in the genocidal killings in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica. In sum, in view of both his mens rea and actus reus, General Krstic must be considered a principal perpetrator of these crimes.

645. General Krstic is guilty of genocide pursuant to Article 4(2)(a).

I am sorry that's a rather lengthy exposition but I trust that it clears up some misconceptions and areas of confusion.

--Opbeith 20:57, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Well, in fact, I may have added an area of confusion - my purpose in giving that lengthy exposition was to establish that genocide had been perpetrated and I left the situation as it stood after the Krstic judgment as handed down by the Trial Chamber.

I should have referred to the outcome of the Appeal, which confirmed the Trial Chamber's view that genocide had taken place, "The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper name: genocide." [para 37] and it goes on to confirm that "In concluding that some members of the VRS Main Staff intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber did not depart from the legal requirements for genocide. The Defence appeal on this issue is dismissed." [para. 38].

However the Appeals Chamber found that all the evidence could establish concerning Krstic's intent to commit genocide was "that Krstić was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of some members of the VRS Main Staff, and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of Drina Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings" and so "There was a demonstrable failure by the Trial Chamber to supply adequate proof that Radislav Krstić possessed the genocidal intent. Krstić, therefore, is not guilty of genocide as a principal perpetrator." [para 134].

Even so "The fact that the Trial Chamber did not identify individual members of the Main Staff of the VRS as the principal participants in the genocidal enterprise does not negate the finding that Radislav Krstić was aware of their genocidal intent. A defendant may be convicted for having aided and abetted a crime which requires specific intent even where the principal perpetrators have not been tried or identified. ... Accordingly, the Trial Chamber’s conviction of Krstić as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide is set aside and a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide is entered instead." [para 143]

So while the level of Krstic's culpability was reduced the genocide itself was confirmed.

Well, in fact, I may have added an area of confusion - my purpose in giving that lengthy exposition was to establish that genocide had been perpetrated and I left the situation as it stood after the Krstic judgment as handed down by the Trial Chamber.

I should have referredto the outcome of the Appeal, which confirmed the Trial Chamber's view that genocide had taken place, "The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper name: genocide." [para 37] and it goes on to confirm that "In concluding that some members of the VRS Main Staff intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber did not depart from the legal requirements for genocide. The Defence appeal on this issue is dismissed." [para. 38].

However the Appeals Chamber found that all the evidence could establish concerning Krstic's intent to commit genocide was "that Krstić was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of some members of the VRS Main Staff, and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of Drina Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings" and so "There was a demonstrable failure by the Trial Chamber to supply adequate proof that Radislav Krstić possessed the genocidal intent. Krstić, therefore, is not guilty of genocide as a principal perpetrator." [para 134].

Even so "The fact that the Trial Chamber did not identify individual members of the Main Staff of the VRS as the principal participants in the genocidal enterprise does not negate the finding that Radislav Krstić was aware of their genocidal intent. A defendant may be convicted for having aided and abetted a crime which requires specific intent even where the principal perpetrators have not been tried or identified. ... Accordingly, the Trial Chamber’s conviction of Krstić as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide is set aside and a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide is entered instead." [para 143]

So while the level of Krstic's culpability was reduced the genocide itself was confirmed.

http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/judgement/krs-aj040419e.pdf

--Opbeith 18:56, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

8000 Figure Has Not Been Verified; Hotly Debated
Evidence given at The Hague war crimes tribunal casts serious doubt on the figure of "up to" 8,000 Bosnian Muslims massacred. That figure includes "up to" 5,000 who have been classified as missing. '''More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in and around Srebrenica, and they include victims of the three years of intense fighting in the area. The math just doesn't support the scale of 8,000 killed.'''

http://www.opensubscriber.com/message/bctf-socialjustice@list.bctf.ca/1738836.html

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.126.253.36 (talk • contribs) 20:15, 8 October 2006


 * This is the article by Gen. MacKenzie, which is already included as external link in the article. However, his analysis differ vastly from the consensus. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 04:50, 9 October 2006 (UTC)


 * May I inquire into who are persons which make this consensus, and how is it determined that there is a consensus? Nikola 06:47, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * "Consensus" refers to consensus on a global scale (i.e., consensus amongst all people on the planet, or at least those that know about Srebrenica), as determined by the editors here, using mainly reports from international organizations and media. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 07:29, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

14 year old girl
With all due respect for the genocide that took place in Sreprenica and its innocent victims, is the picture of the 14 year old girl hanging, for real? Also, how do we know those were the reasons for her suicide? Politis 13:07, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
 * should be eliminated from this article (inflammatory, unknown sources, copyright problems)-- TheFE ARgod (Ч) 15:40, 13 October 2006 (UTC)

The photo of a hunged Bosniak child has a source and it is real, the source can be found here: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/nelson/rohde/followup_otherstories.html

Bosniak 22:23, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

I remember that photograph (with less of the woodland background cropped) being published on the front page of The Guardian a couple of days after the fall of Srebrenica, as survivors were arriving in Tuzla and reporting what had happened. It is not "inflammatory", it is the painful reality of what was being done to children as well as adults. --Opbeith 14:55, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

It seems from the following that the girl's name was Fata Smailovic. There's no direct confirmation here that this girl and her cousin are the two linked to the photograph at the source cited by Bosniak but there seems little reason to doubt that they are.

"Update: Women's Action 3.4 August 1995

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape, Forced Removal, Genocide

On July 11, 1995, the town of Srebrenica was overrun and captured by Bosnian Serb forces. Srebrenica had been declared a "safe area" by the United Nations in the summer of 1993 and United Nations peacekeepers were stationed in Srebrenica when it fell to the Bosnian Serbs. Numerous atrocities were reported by fleeing refugees, mostly women, children and the elderly, who initially went to Potocari, where United Nations peacekeepers guided them to factory buildings for the night and assured them that they would be safe. Among the atrocities reported were incidents of rape by Bosnian Serb forces. A refugee interviewed by the New York Times, 32 year-old Sevda Porobic, recounted sitting in the Cinkara factory in Potocari, near two girls she knew well, 12 year-old Mina Smailovic, and her 14 year-old cousin, Fata Smailovic. Three Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the factory at midnight on Tuesday July 11, and abducted the two girls and another woman, 23 year-old Nizama Oric. The three returned several hours later, bruised, bleeding and crying. Mina said, "We are not girls anymore. Our lives are over." At dawn, Bosnian Serb soldiers stormed through the factory, looking for boys and men. During the chaos, Fata slipped away and, using the scarf she had around her neck, she hanged herself.

Equality Now first called attention to the systematic use of rape by Bosnian Serbs as part of their genocidal "ethnic cleansing" policy against Bosnian Muslim civilians in August 1992. In February and June 1993, and again in April 1994, Equality Now issued urgent appeals calling on the United Nations to take immediate and effective action to stop the rape, killing and other atrocities. In May 1993, when the Security Council of the United Nations established an International Criminal Tribunal for the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, Equality Now called for the swift prosecution of Radovan Karadzic and other war criminals responsible for rape, murder and "ethnic cleansing" of innocent civilians in the former Yugoslavia. Equality Now, through the poster on the reverse side of this page, has tried to highlight that these atrocities have been carried out under orders, and that there are individuals such as Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, directly responsible for them.

..."

http://www.equalitynow.org/english/actions/action_0304_en.html

--Opbeith 15:11, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

Having posted the above a short while ago I've done some further investigation which has complicated matters. At the Guardian Online site http://www.guardian.co.uk/yugo/article/0,,1461800,00.html I found an article from the Observer in April 2005 in which the journalist Lorna Martin looks again at the publication of that phatograph as the tenth anniversary approached:

" Sunday April 17, 2005 The Observer

Fatima Osmanovic has only one photograph of her mother. She cannot bear to look at it. Nine years ago, when aged 10, she caught a fleeting glimpse. Since then, every time she closes her eyes and thinks of her mother, no matter how hard she tries not to see the image, it always appears.

Fatima can no longer remember her mother's face or features. All she has now is that picture, seared indelibly on her mind and inside her eyelids, of her mother in her white dress and red cardigan, hanging from a tree by a noose plaited from her belt and shawl. Fatima and her brother Damir were shocked by their own reaction to the photo. It changed the way they felt about their mother and destroyed all their cherished memories. 'I still cannot picture my mother whole in front of my eyes,' Fatima whispers.

...

In the dawn hours of 11 July, 1995, with Srebrenica on the edge of collapse, the Osmanovic family joined the refugees streaming north to the last haven. Elderly men hobbled on canes. Old women wailed. Young mothers carried suitcases and children. At the UN base, they found the gates locked. About 5,000 people had entered the base by a hole in the fence, 20,000 were in a hysterical state outside. Selman made two attempts to flee through the forest, but he was forced back by shelling. The family huddled together, all trying to sleep on one blanket.

As soon as the Serb troops arrived triumphant in Srebrenica, they made a mockery of the UN and their 'safe area' as they began, aided by UN peacekeepers, to separate all men aged between 17 and 70 for 'interrogation for suspected war crimes'. The next morning buses arrived to take women and children to Tuzla. Damir, a softly-spoken young man, gazes into the middle distance as he recalls what happened. 'The four of us started walking towards the buses. All of the women were screaming. I was clinging on to my father because I always felt, no matter what, he will protect me ... The Chetniks [Serbs] were standing on both sides of the road. Just as we were about to step on to the bus, they grabbed my father. They pointed their guns at him and told him to join the other men. I didn't want to leave him so I started to go too. But my mother jumped off the bus. She was screaming and crying and somehow managed to prise me away from my father. I hugged him and kissed him and everyone was crying, but I never thought that I would never see him again.'

That night and for five days after, the air around Srebrenica was filled with the screams of men and boys being mutilated, slaughtered, some buried alive, others killed and dumped in mass graves; and of women and girls being raped. Damir and Fatima recall their mother becoming distraught. 'At some point, she started repeating over and over again, "My husband is coming, my husband is coming," but perhaps she realised he was never coming back,' Damir says.

'Then my mother said, "Stay there." We fell asleep and when we woke up the next morning we didn't see Mother around. My sister and I went looking for her. For two days we searched the camp, calling out her name. But we couldn't find her anywhere.'

Not far from them, some children had found a young woman in a white dress and red cardigan hanging in the forest round the airfield. They alerted a photographer, Darko Bandic, who shot only two frames as he was not sure whether his picture desk would want it. Nobody knew who she was. As the Guardian, The Observer 's sister newspaper, said the next day: 'No one wept for her when police finally cut down her body and only one single bored policeman kept vigil over the corpse as it lay abandoned by the gate of the heaving camp.'

Police eventually buried her in an anonymous grave on the edge of the refugee camp. On the wooden headboard they wrote: 'Unknown, Tuzla.' It was not until six months later, when a US journalist showed them the photograph, that Fatima and Damir discovered what had happened to their mother. The first time the children visited her grave, they wrote her name on the headstone with a felt-tip pen. When they returned months later, they could not find her grave.

Almost 10 years have elapsed since the fall of Srebrenica, but Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a deeply traumatised country. It is also almost a decade since war crimes warrants were issued for Mladic and Karadzic. Despite the scale of the carnage, there has been little effort by the international community to capture them.

Fatima and Damir are students at Sarajevo University. Fatima is studying political science and dreams of becoming a journalist; Damir is taking a degree in physics and hopes to become a teacher. But the fact that those responsible remain at large makes the process of healing and reconciliation so much more difficult.

'I don't see any purpose in violence and hate,' says Damir. 'But I'm very angry. I know that some ordinary people are sometimes ordered to do things they don't usually do ... so I don't blame all Serbs. But I blame General Mladic and Karadzic. They must be brought to justice. And in many ways I also blame the world because I think all of this could have been stopped should the world have decided to act earlier and stop the genocide. They could have done, but chose not to.'

The sun disappears behind a black mountain. Before they begin the three-hour drive home, Fatima and Damir turn again to the graves at the former UN base where they sought refuge. They bow their heads and say a silent prayer for the souls of those massacred at Srebrenica.

I saw so many awful things in Bosnia'

Darko Bandic was a freelance photographer from Croatia, covering the Balkan wars for the Associated Press news agency when he took the photograph, above, of Ferida Osmanovic.

I had arrived at this massive makeshift refugee camp in Tuzla early in the morning, around 5.30am. Tens of thousands of distraught women and children had poured into the camp the previous day.

Just as I was about to enter the camp, two or three young girls told me they had spotted a woman hanging from a tree in the woods. They took me to her. I was actually a bit confused. I didn't know exactly what to do. From the direction I was walking I could see her face, but obviously I didn't want to shoot that. I shot just a couple of frames, then went back to the UN guard. I remember he was a Swedish soldier and I told him what I had seen. He said: 'For now, let's take care of the ones who are alive.'

I saw so many really awful things in Bosnia's war, that was just yet another of them. I did wonder what horrific things must have happened to her to drive herself to take her own life. But I never found out. I never even knew her name until a year later."

From the above it seems that the photograph is of Ferida Osmanovic, driven to despair by the fate of her husband Selman, not a photograph of Fata Smailovic. The reality behind the image is still as awful, just a different reality. It doesn't change what happened to 12 year old Mina and 14 year old Fata Smailovic. It just tells us about what Srebrenic did to the four members of the Osmanovic family. For us, it means thinking about whether the photograph should remain as a reminder of a different aspect of what the massacre did. It also means that we need to ask Darko Bandic whether the photo can be used. It means that we need to contact The Rohde to Sarajevo website to check whether they have any comments. And perhaps we should contact Lorna Martin at the Observer to find out whether Fatima and Damir Osmanovic would prefer not to have their mother's photo used in this way.

--Opbeith 16:09, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

I've e-mailed Anne Nelson at the "The Rohde to Srebrenica" website and Darko Bandic, whose photograph of Ferida Osmanovic is at his website. I'll come back with any further news. Bandic may be on assignment.

--Opbeith 17:28, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

Hi Owen, excellent job. I am proud of you for contributing to Srebrenica genocide project. Excellent investigative work. If you manage to get in touch with Darko Bandic, ask him can we use his photograph on wikipedia. If he gives us his permission, then nobody can delete the photo.

Bosniak 20:40, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

I remember how shocked I was--Opbeith 21:39, 15 October 2006 (UTC) seeing that picture on the front of the Guardian. I felt it was tearing a away the last veil of privacy that woman had left to her. I was going to complain. But then I thought a while about it and I realised that provoking the horror that photograph had made me feel and that I hope anyone normal would have felt was the most important thing that anyone could have done for her once her death was unavoidable. Having read Lorna Martin's article and Darko Brandic's account of his hesitation and restraint I've got a lot of admiration for him.

--Opbeith 21:36, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

The photo still doesn't look as an adult woman, look http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/nelson/rohde/followup_otherstories.html. Now we have two sources, and guardian's source seems to be more credible. It certainly looks as a child. Bosniak 21:19, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

I think this is the original, at Darko Bandic's website: http://www.dbandic.com/pages/sre02.html

--Opbeith 21:39, 15 October 2006 (UTC)

First Legally Established Genocide in Europe?
While I understand that Srebrenica was the first act of genocide to be perpatrated in Europe after the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was ratified, but couldn't one make the argument that the persecution of crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg Trials was in fact punishing the genocide of the European Jews, which would make the Holocaust the first legally estalished genocide in European history?Trojan traveler 07:33, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

Trojan traveler, I wouldn't want to argue that point with you, but the wording of the introduction here refers to the *crime* of genocide, which did not exist as an offence in international law until the Genocide Convention came into effect.

--Opbeith 16:51, 19 October 2006 (UTC)

The fact that the Holocaust was never tried in court specifically for the charge of genocide is a technicality based on the timing of the genocide convention. Yes, I believe that the Nuremburg trials did establish the facts which would in a modern court lead to a genocide conviction. The current wording of the intro is the result of previous edit wars that included tit for tat exchanges leading to this hair splitting version which is technically correct but gives the casual reader the impression the article is arguing that the Holocaust was not a case of genocide. I do not think anyone is going to argue that the Holocaust was not genocide. I suggest we reword the intro such that it affirms that Srebrenica was determined in court of being a case of genocide without the reference to it being the "first legally established case in Europe" - an esoteric legal point. The Holocaust was a case of genocide and Srebrenica was a case of genocide. The intro should be written such that it is clear that no one is questioning that. Fairview360 03:09, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I agree. I think my last edit addresses this concern. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 07:57, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Fairview360, I agree with you. Jitse, I'd suggest a slightly more economic wording "The Srebrenica massacre is the largest mass murder committed in Europe since World War II and legally an act of genocide. In the landmark ruling "Prosecutor v. Krstic", the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled unanimously that: [quote]". --Opbeith 23:39, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I thought I had already replied, but apparently I didn't (perhaps I forgot to save). Anyway, I generally agree with the wording proposed by Opbeith, except that I doubt it's correct to say that "The Srebrenica massacre is [...] legally an act of genocide." I'd replace it with "The Srebrenica massacre is [...] legally proven to be an act of genocide." However, I'm not a native speaker of English. Fairview, I believe you are; could you perhaps comment on this? -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 13:00, 22 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Jitse, your wording is formally more correct and more likely to avoid dispute. --Opbeith 22:28, 24 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes, I believe "legally proven to be" is better than "legally". If one reads "legally an act of genocide", there is an implication that it is technically an act of genocide but perhaps not really whereas "legally proven to be" definitively affirms that it was indeed an act of genocide. Fairview360 16:21, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Potocari
User:Fairview360 reverted my edits related to Potocari group. He restored the old version which used CNN's story as a reference. However, the CNN story doesn't mention Potocari at all, and as far as I can tell refers to something else. What it does mention however is work of Jean-Rene Ruez, however his work can't refer to Potocari group because it was about the group executed at Petkovci. Note that, according to this article, Petkovci group was "numbering some 1,500 to 2,000" while Potocari had "at least 300 men inside the perimeter of the UN compound and between 600 and 900 men in the crowd outside". Nikola 19:40, 19 October 2006 (UTC)


 * The CNN article indeed does not mention Potocari, though it's well possible that the scenes described in the article took place there. I agree that this needs some clarification. As for Ruez, he has done a lot of work. The CNN article mentions a testimony Ruez gave in 1996, while the report from SENSE is about a testimony in 2006. They may well be about different things. Of course, the text you replaced the old version with is unacceptable, because it fails to mention that the men separated out were killed. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 02:32, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Um, maybe that is because they were not killed? Do you have any reference which claims that they were killed? Nikola 06:43, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes, both the ICTY Trial Chamber in their judgment in the case against Krstic and the NIOD report. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 07:29, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Nikola, either you are highly propagandized, inexcusably ignorant for someone editing this article, or cynically manipulative. None of that will pass here. Fairview360 20:48, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Could you cite a part of the judgement which mentions that, as I can't find it? I am reading http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/ . It mentions several individual cases of executions of separated men but no mass executions. Several witnesses cited in it are apparently men who were separated in Potocari, so at least some survived. Nikola 13:54, 26 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Nikola, feign your ignorance somewhere else. It is not our job to do your homework. Krstic was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide. The judgement is full of references to mass killings. First paragraph: "As thousands of them attempted to flee the area, they were taken prisoner, detained in brutal conditions and then executed." The judgement is littered with as many references to mass killings as there are mass graves in Bosnia. I do not know what kind of game you are playing, but frankly it is boring. It is a waste of my time to be typing these words. Find someone else to wipe the saliva from your slack jawed brain. Fairview360 16:10, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Fairview360, I've just come back from my first visit to the Victoria and Albert Museum in ages. My eye was caught by a beautiful mediaeval German polychromed wooden carving of St Roch and his dog. St Roch was the patron saint of plague victims. He is depicted with plague wounds on his legs, one of which his faithful hound is licking to alleviate his suffering. These denials are rather like unhealing plague sores.

Well, I'm prepared to take on the graphic task you understandably decline and do my best to emulate St Roch's brave companion in the task of enlightening Nikola to the evidence of Ahmo Hasic, who gave evidence at both Krstic's and Blagojevic's trials and this September proceeded to do so again at the Beara, Popovic et al. trial.

"http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=323787&apc_state=henptri IWPR's Tribunal Update No. 467

11 September 2006

Srebrenica Trial Told Of Branjevo Horrors Witness played dead while those around him were executed.

By Merdijana Sadovic in Sarajevo (TU No 467, 11-Sep-06)

The trial of seven Bosnian Serb military and police officers continued this week with the testimony of a survivor of the Srebrenica massacre who described in gripping detail the horrors he suffered after the enclave was overrun by Serb forces in July 1995.

Ahmo Hasic – believed to be one of only 12 men who survived the slaughter of 8,000 Muslim men and boys – told the judges he stayed alive only by playing dead after Serb soldiers started shooting.

The trial chamber heard a similar testimony last week from Mevludin Oric who described how he lay under a pile of dead bodies for several hours.

On trial are Ljubisa Beara, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Vinko Pandurevic and Drago Nikolic, who face genocide and war crimes charges. Radivoj Miletic and Milan Gvero are charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Hasic, 70, is not new to the court. In 2001, he testified at the trial of Bosnian Serb general Radislav Krstic, currently serving a 35-year prison sentence in Britain after being found guilty of aiding and abetting genocide.

In 2003, Hasic was also a prosecution witness at the trial of Bosnian Serb military officers Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic. They were sentenced to 18 and 19 years respectively for their role in the massacre.

Last week, as he had done previously, Hasic told the judges that on July 13 he was separated from his family in Potocari and taken to the nearby Serb-held town of Bratunac, where he and hundreds of other Muslims were detained in the Vuk Karadzic elementary school.

But the true horror began on July 16, when the prisoners were taken to the nearby Branjevo farm. According to the indictment against the seven, it was at Branjevo that approximately 1,200 Bosnian Muslim males were summarily executed by automatic gunfire from members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, the Bratunac Brigade and others.

Hasic's two sons and two brothers died in Srebrenica. Last year he reburied one of his sons after his remains were excavated from a mass grave near Srebrenica. He still hasn’t found his other son.

As he got off the bus, Hasic saw an entire field covered with dead bodies. Serb soldiers then lined up the prisoners from Hasic's group and the mass execution began.

"I fell down before I was shot," he said. "The bullets whizzed past me."

While lying on the ground he saw more buses filled with Muslim detainees arriving, most of whom suffered the same fate. "The buses were unloaded, and the prisoners were lined up and then executed," said Hasic.

Hasic lay under a pile of dead bodies for hours as Bosnian Serb soldiers walked around the field looking for survivors. "One man who was lying not very far from me said, 'I'm alive'. The other one said, 'I'm wounded, come and finish me off'. Serb soldiers then shot them both dead," he said.

He continued, "I knew I didn't have much time, because the Serbs would come back with trucks and bulldozers to remove all those bodies. So I waited until dusk, and… crawled through the layers of dead bodies to the bushes at the edge of the field."

There he found four other survivors. They all stayed hidden until dark, looking at the grisly scene in front of them. "There were between 1,000 and 1,500 bodies lying on the ground. They were all dead," Hasic told the court.

The five slipped away into the forest after nightfall, but Hasic's journey was far from over. The oldest man in the group, he was outpaced and soon got left behind and walked all night in the darkness, thirsty and exhausted.

In the morning, he found an asphalted road, but just as he began crossing, he saw a truck coming along it. "It was a Serb truck, full of dead bodies," he said. He believes the bodies were being taken from the execution site to a mass grave.

"The driver told me to stop, but I kept on walking," he said. "He probably thought I was a Serb too, so he let me go."

Hasic spent another 10 days wandering the hills around Srebrenica, and was captured by the Bosnian Serb military again. He was transferred to the camp in Batkovic, under the watchful eye of the Red Cross, and released five months later.

Merdijana Sadovic is IWPR’s Hague project manager."

I trust that's clear enough for you, Nikola - one of the men separated at Potocari gives his account of the slaughter at Branjevo Farm and the manner in which he and a very small handful of others survived. --Opbeith 23:58, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

Nikola, Ahmo Hasic's evidence given to the Popovic, Beara et al. trial on 6 and 7 September can be read on pages 1170-1293 of the trial transcripts at http://www.un.org/icty/transe88/060906ED.htm and http://www.un.org/icty/transe88/060907ED.htm

At lines 7-10 of Page 1177 Hasic describes the situation at Potocari on the 12th of July, after "the soldiers came".

"7 The moaning, the screaming went on. It couldn't have been worse. I think

8 that it was hell on earth. They say hell is in the other world, but

9 actually there is a hell in this world too, and that night I spent in

10 hell."

That's why I have as Fairview360 puts it "done your homework for you". I really do have other things to do with my time, but when it comes to challenging efforts at what Ed Vulliamy has described (referring to denial of the reality of Trnopolje and Omarska) as "poisoning the well of history" I have to give up some of those other things. I'm not personally or professionally involved, but nevertheless I still found it fairly straightforward locating the evidence. If you couldn't, I don't think you could really have been trying very hard. --Opbeith 12:35, 28 October 2006 (UTC)

Nikola, as you're referring to the Krstic judgment, you might be interested in the following paragraph from the Appeal hearing. The Appeals Chamber rejects some of the evidence on the basis of which Krstic was found guilty of aiding and abetting genocide as being open to alternative interpretations, but nevertheless confirms that the Bosnian Muslim civilians - i.e. the men from Potocari - were escorted by Drina Corps military police to the execution site at Branjevo. You will note the use by the Appeals Chamber of the wording "the evidence linking the Drina Corps to the executions at the Branjevo Farm and Pilica Dom":

"126. ''The Trial Chamber also relied on the evidence linking the Drina Corps to the executions at the Branjevo Farm and Pilica Dom. The Appeals Chamber has already determined that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Krstić deployed troops from the Bratunac Brigade to assist in the executions at Branjevo Military Farm and Pilica Dom was not a finding that a reasonable trier of fact would have made. This conclusion, however, leaves undisturbed the Trial Chamber’s finding that Drina Corps military police escorted the Bosnian Muslim civilians on the buses that had earlier been procured to transport the women, children and elderly to the execution site at Branjevo Military Farm, and that Zvornik Brigade equipment was used for activities related to the burial of the victims. Also undisturbed is the finding of the Trial Chamber that Colonel Popović was involved in procuring fuel from the Drina Corps Command to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to the execution sites. Further, the Bratunac Brigade Military Police Platoon log for 16 July 1995 recorded that “one police patrol remained in Pilica to secure and watch over the Bosnian Muslims”. The Trial Chamber found that as there was no combat in Pilica, this patrol must have been guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners.''"

http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/judgement/krs-aj040419e.pdf

--Opbeith 11:57, 28 October 2006 (UTC)

No. Hasic says that his group numbered 1200. But Potocari group numbered 900 at most, and of those not all were executed. Obviously the group executed at Branjevo was some other group to which he was added. You still provide no clues as to what happened to men separated in Potocari, nor why would the source I used be wrong. Nikola 18:13, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Nikola: "... This conclusion, however, leaves undisturbed the Trial Chamber’s finding that Drina Corps military police escorted the Bosnian Muslim civilians on the buses that had earlier been procured to transport the women, children and elderly to the execution site at Branjevo Military Farm, ...".

Of course there's uncertainty about numbers and fates when the perpetrators of genocide chose not to register their prisoners as they should have, avoided taking them to localities where they would have been registered by the Red Cross, removed their identity documents, killed them in mass executions, buried bodies in mass graves, and then dug the bodies up, mixing the remains and buried them elsewhere. Of course it's not surprising that there's a lack of precision, that was the object of the exercise, in order to conceal and prevent detection of the crime. Tell me you accept that and then perhaps I'll take your queries a bit more seriously.

You say I provide no clues as to what happened to men separated in Potocari? Well, perhaps you will tell me too, when the Bosnian Serb Army did what they did to Hasic and the people he was with, why should we be starting from a position of assuming that they did not deal similarly with the rest of the people in their charge?

And you say "nor why would the source I used be wrong". I don't think you provided any other source than the Krstic judgmentwhich certainly finds nothing to say about separated men at Potocari not being killed. If you are going to come up with a source it had better be an authoritative one. Otherwise you are opening yourself up to the accusation that you may be part of a deliberate campaign of obfuscation, contributing to a general effort to deny the commission of genocide and promote the continued impunity of the architects of that genocide. One has to wonder whether these efforts to maintain doubt as to the facts of the crime are part of a campaign intended to mainipulate support for the perpetrators among the population defending and concealing them. --Opbeith 23:52, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Genocide
There is no such thing as a "legal" genocide. Genocide's a genocide, and it will always be such. --PaxEquilibrium 12:22, 22 October 2006 (UTC)
 * Yes, in the same way that a murder is a murder. If you believe in the rule of law the crime of murder has to be proven.  To bring the perpetrators to justice the crime of genocide has to be proven in accordance with the provisions of the Genocide Convention.  The ICTY has carefully examined the evidence and has reached the decision that what happened at Srebrenica was *legally* genocide - genocide within the meaning of a legal text.  Raphael Lemkin devoted his life to ensuring that the word he coined was enshrined in law in order to ensure that there was a binding obligation on nations to prevent genocide.  --Opbeith 22:40, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

I don't agree fully, surely there must be many historical (and more current) events which were genocide although there was no legal decision on this, in the same way as murder is murder even if it hasn't been proven in court. Eg the armenian genocide was never 'prooven' in any court - still it's still definately genocide. That the icty decided that the srebrenica massacre was 'genocide' is good, but that doesnt mean that other events, eg Darfur, are not also 'genocide'. Was srebrenica not 'genocide' until the icty 'prooved' this in 2005? History doesn't have to be 'prooved' by an intl court. Were Tudjman and Milosevic not war criminals just because they managed to die before any legal decisions by the icty? KarlXII 10:08, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Three issues & POV tag
A couple of questions to the editors of this article:


 * 1) Lenght of article: what are you going to do about reducing the length of the article?
 * 2) Plagiarism: has the issue with copying text from the ICTY judgement against Krstic been properly adressed?
 * 3) NPOV: the overall tone and structure of the article is not NPOV - for example, lumping all criticism of the the view presented in the article as "genocide denial" and "revisionism" are obvious attempts at comparing such criticism to denial of the Holocaust

I have therefore added the POV tag at the top of the page. Note that according to Wikipedia's guidelines this signifies that there is a dispute about the neutrality of the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.224.134.190 (talk • contribs) 22:48, 28 October 2006


 * Replying to points 1 and 2: Wow. Are you for real? --HanzoHattori 01:00, 29 October 2006 (UTC)
 * Replying to point 3: Elementary, my dear Watson. It's because "criticsm" is genocide denial and revisionism. --HanzoHattori 01:00, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * That's only your point of view, and I pity you if you don't have enough intellectual detachment to see that. --estavisti 01:02, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Estavisti, as Bosna has so... well... bluntly pointed out, you call those who disagree with you "faggots", so please do not present yourself now as the champion of intellectual detachment. Fairview360 02:14, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * That was an ad hominem attack if I'm not mistaken. :-) --estavisti 03:08, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * You are mistaken. --Opbeith 00:01, 30 October 2006 (UTC)


 * According to the current practice, you have to indicate how the perceived issue can be solved. Furthermore, you should use Template:POV-section if you're only having problems with one section. Finally, one anonymous editor disagreeing with such a well-discussed article is not enough of a dispute to put up the tag. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 05:50, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

I don't follow this - has this irrupted here from elsewhere? It sounds like it. This business of hopping around Wikipedia is simply confusing to most people as well as being a deterrent to interested newcomers.

The first contributor didn't identify themselves (I think at least twice), so I at first thought HanzoHattori was the author, being the first identified signatory. Is the author actually estavisti? In which case it would be simple courtesy to identify yourself.

The length of the article is a bit of a problem, but it's rather hard to get on with considering how it might usefully be edited overall while at the same time responding to wilfully destructive criticism, not to mention not knowing what may have been altered unilaterally. Quite apart from getting on with the rest of life's problems. All criticism of the point of view presented in this article isn't genocide denial and revisionism, but quite a lot of it is counter-factual, and has to be seen as ignorance or sabotage. The tone in a lot of cases suggests the latter. --Opbeith 09:39, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

1. The so-called "plagiarism" issue (a tendentious description, but let's leave it at that) - I understand from a friend who is a lawyer in the field of intellectual property that normally there is understood to be a general use licence where court rulings are concerned. However he has no specific knowledge about international fora such as the ICTY, so I have e-mailed the Documentation Office at the ICTY with a request for them to clarify the position.

2. The length of the article - it has to be pointed out that one of the problems with this article is the need for it to be explicit about facts in the public domain that are regularly challenged by people contributing to this Talk page and altering the article itself without consultation. --Opbeith 10:01, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I reformatted the conversation in an attempt to clear up who said what. It started with somebody who was not logged in (perhaps Estavisti, perhaps not) adding an NPOV tag and explaining why. HanzoHattori replied, but interleaved the reply with the original message, which made it rather confusing. Then, Estavisti commmented on HanzoHattori's reply. The history of this page (click on the history tab at the top) is very useful to find out who said what.
 * Regarding the length: See Summary style for some general comments on how to split up the page. -- Jitse Niesen (talk) 00:50, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

Thanks, Jitse, that's helpful. --Opbeith 08:49, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

Nikola, thanks for adding the POV tag pointing people to the discussion here. The more people are made aware of the activities of apologists for the Bosnian Serbs' genocidal conduct of the war, the more their general understanding of the war will be confirmed and any uncertainties they may have had will be resolved. Respect. --Opbeith 20:05, 30 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Actually, POV tag is for the other way around. Nikola 19:19, 3 November 2006 (UTC)


 * But credit where credit is due. --Opbeith 23:42, 4 November 2006 (UTC)

I have to beef about the text, hey, it's largely a copy paste from the icty judgement. However, its full of weasel words, insinuations and such. Just take the fact that Orics activities are described as "gurilla raids" and "counter-offensives" and he attacks Serb villages which are "strong military bases" where "mostly soldiers" are killed; when it comes to no of serbs killed only one study is presented (instead of using the icty comments); any texts which are somehow critical of the preferred 'bosniak view' are given labels such as "genocide deniers", "revisionists", "genocidal serbs" or, at least, as "controvertial" or "criticiced" etc. KarlXII 10:00, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Lock
Can someone of the sysops or bur. please lock this page? --Emx 19:47, 2 November 2006 (UTC)

Revisionists
Naturally the whole 'revisionist' issue is a heated one. Her'es my take on it:


 * First of all, could it be useful to differentiate between Bosnian Serbs and Serbs deniers and 'western' revisionist academics/politicians?


 * As for the Serb reaction, I think it's pretty well described in the text today.


 * Regarding the western 'revisinists' I found this text in the blog of Oliver Kamm, which might be useful for summing up their main arguments:

1. The safe areas (including Srebrenica) were not demilitarised, but “served as Muslim military bases … safe bases from which to attack the Serbs”, and UN-protected food shipments were “suspected - correctly” by the Serbs of acting as a front for the shipment of weapons.

2. The Muslim forces in Srebrenica were led by one Naser Oric who “had carried out murderous raids against nearby Serb villages”.

3. The Bosnian Muslim government pulled Oric’s men out of the enclave “deliberately leaving the enclave undefended”. This alleged fact “has aroused strong suspicion of a calculated sacrifice”.

4. The US used the “inevitable failure” of the UN safe area concept as a way of getting NATO to supplant the United Nations.

5. “The number of Muslims killed or missing after the fall of Srebrenica is uncertain and more effort has been made to inflate the figures than to identify and count the real victims”. The original 8,000 figure was made up of 3,000 reported detainees and 5,000 who fled, of whom, according to one newspaper report, 3-4,000 had now turned up. Six years later “ICTY forensic teams had exhumed 2,361 bodies in the region and identified fewer than 50 … some of the bodies were certainly of Serbs as well as of Muslims”.

6. “The original accusation against the Bosnian Serbs was politically motivated.” Johnstone writes that “The accusation of a ‘Srebrenica massacre’ [note, these are Johnstone’s quotation marks] was used by the Clinton administration” to distract attention from Croat activities in the Krajina region, and on to “Serb misdeeds”.

7. “Insofar as Muslims were actually executed [note the use of the quasi-judicial word ‘executed’ rather than ‘murdered’ or even ‘killed’ here] following the fall of Srebrenica, such crimes bear all the signs of spontaneous acts of revenge rather than a project of ‘genocide’”.

How about that?KarlXII 13:59, 7 November 2006 (UTC)