Talk:State continuity of the Baltic states/Archive 2

Recognition-non-recognition
I propose to make wording more clear and uniform, because when I read this section, it is sometimes difficult to understand what "recognition" the article is talking about. For instance,
 * "no official relations, no final decision on non-recognition policy"

is quite obscure: no official relation with whom? no decision on non-recognition of what? I think, we can speak about (i) official relation with the USSR; (ii) official realtion with pre-war Baltic states; (iii) recognition of the annexation; (iv) recognition of the Baltic states, etc. For instance, in the case of Turkey "no official relation" could mean that it had no official relation with either the USSR or the Baltic representatives. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:59, 4 May 2011 (UTC)


 * I think (i) and (iii) apply. Recall states like Franco's Spain and many South American countries had no relations with the Soviet Union. --Martin (talk) 01:19, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * The question is not in what applies, but in that the text is unclear. We need to clarify it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:23, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Please read the sources, "no official relations" with the Baltic states of course. Since this article is about Baltic states, it should be self explanatory.--Termer (talk) 05:59, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * If I ask this question, then it is an indication that it is not self-explanatory to ordinary readers, who is supposed to read the sources only when they want to verify the fact, not because the article's content is obscure. Some states had no official relations with the USSR for long time (e.g. Spain), so theoretically it was quite possible that "no official relations" refers to the USSR. I suggest to clarify that.
 * In addition, if some country had no relation with the Baltic states and it expressed no opinion on their annexation, does it mean that they were contemplating the decision, or that they simply ignored the issue?--Paul Siebert (talk) 10:37, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * "No official relations" means with the Baltic states. "No official relations with the USSR" is something else. Where states entered into recognition of the USSR after WWII, if they did so without reservation, they accorded de jure recognition by ignoring the issue. However, if a state had relations with the Baltic states and the USSR prior to WWII and made no official statement post-WWII, we cannot speculate. Nor can we speculate where a post-WWII state was established which did not establish relations with the USSR. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 11:21, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I think the text will be more clear if we write "no official relation with the Baltic states". In addition, it is not clear for me what was the difference between, e.g. Turkey or Greece (had not official relations with the Baltic states before WWII and made no official statements after WWII) and the states that had not expressed their positions formally (fourth category)?--Paul Siebert (talk) 12:06, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I think this is a reflection of the sources and they have been examined closely by all parties as I recall. Probably need to bring in additional sources to resolve any ambiguity. --Martin (talk) 12:18, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * If there were no relations with the Baltic states before WWII, but there were relations with the USSR, and no statement was made subsequent to WWII regarding the Baltic states, then there's nothing we can reliable state about de facto or de jure recognition in the absence of said official statement or strong consensus among scholars of international law with regard to each specific case. Because of the unique and precedent setting nature of non-recognition of annexation, we cannot apply "similar" situations. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 13:32, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * On Georgia, I haven't gone back to check, but I believe that it's not necessarily 'ex factis jus oritur' recognizing USSR sovereignty but that the first Georgian state had not been existed for a sufficient period to have been considered having been fully established and engaged as a sovereign entity with the international community. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 13:36, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I think this is a result of combining different sources. Division on four categories has been taken from Malksoo, who gives just examples, not the exhaustive list, so other countries have been added from other sources that used different categories. In that sense, to combine in the same category the UK, which explicitly declared that it does recognise the annexation de facto and does not recognise it de jure, with Turkey, Greece, and other countries, which had no diplomatic relations with the Baltic countries and simply didn't bother to express their opinion regarding the annexation, is simply not correct. In my opinion, these countries, as well as the states that had no diplomatic relations with the USSR fall into a separate category of states, which, by contrast to Finland, who, despite it, by virtue of its geographical position and close connections with the Baltic states, had almost no choice but to express its position on that account, nevertheless avoided to do so, simply were not interested in this issue.
 * Re Georgia. The article's text correctly reflects what Malksoo says. To that I would add that the events in Georgia happened before the Kellogg–Briand Pact was signed, so the territorial conquest was not something outstanding by those times. In addition, taking into account a large amount of Georgian Bolsheviks in Russian/Soviet leadership, occupation of Georgia can partially be considered as a continuation of a Civil war (in other words, it was not purely foreign occupation). And, taking into account that two major Soviet leaders responsible for repressions in the USSR were Stalin and Beria, and that Georgia, by contrast to most other SSRs had only one (Georgian) state language, it is a big question who was occupied by whom.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:51, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I don't think the view that the ethnicity of the Bolshevik leadership has any bearing on the rejection of Georgian state continuity, I've not seen anything in the literature that gives any currency to that view. The reasons I have seen in the sources relate to the short duration of the first Georgian republic and the length of time of Soviet rule. The timing of the Kellogg–Briand Pact was probably a factor too.
 * In regard to Mälksoo's incomplete list of example recognition/non-recognition countries, he cites a survey by R. Pullat published paper "The Restoration of the Independence of Estonia" published the 1991 edition of The Finnish Yearbook of International Law on page 529. Unfortunately I don't have access to that yearbook, but perhaps that may have a complete list. --Martin (talk) 00:12, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I haven't seen anything talking about ethnicity of leadership of Georgia, either, so that would appear to just be postulation. The only concrete thing I can recall reading specifically refers to the short time that the first Georgian state existed. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 20:47, 5 May 2011 (UTC)

Competing maxims and competing Baltic/Russian theses
I get the impression there is some misunderstanding between the competing maxims of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur on one hand and the competing Baltic/Russian theses of illegal annexation vs. freely joined the SU on the other hand. These are really referring to two distinct ideas. The discussion of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur only comes into play if you accept the Baltic thesis of illegal annexation, because if we accept the Russian thesis of freely joined the SU then ex injuria jus non oritur is irrelevant because no injustice occured and ex factis jus oritur would also be irrelavent because it would have been legal without having to rely on the "fact" of possesion. Thus the question of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur is about at what point in time after the illegal annexation does sovereign title pass to the possessing power. So the text in the lede:
 * The competing maxims of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur in international law, along with other legal and political considerations, have fueled a fundamental confrontation between the Baltic and Russian theses on continuity of the Baltic states and its related consequences.

makes no sense because it jumbles up these concepts. --Martin (talk) 04:12, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I've checked the cited pages of two sources referenced for that sentence above and both have failed verification. --Martin (talk) 09:35, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * That is called paraphrasing to avoid plagiarism. It is also hard to keep the lede concise if we insist on literal copying of the statements from RS. (Igny (talk) 10:08, 5 May 2011 (UTC))
 * I have both sources, unless the wrong page number has been given, there is nothing on those pages that comes close to what is stated by that sentence. Please do not remove those inline tags until this is resolved. --Martin (talk) 10:13, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I say the sources support this statement. Although they do not say it in one sentence, this sentence summarizes well one of the main points that Elsuwege is making in his article. But we obviously can argue forever on this. We would likely need third opinion. (Igny (talk) 21:12, 5 May 2011 (UTC))
 * @Igny, увы, you're going to make me buy these sources so I can confirm that what you say they "say" is a fair and accurate summary. "Ex injuria jus non oritur" is the argument the Baltic states make against third parties recognizing annexation de jure. Neither maxim applies to the positions of Russia and the Baltic states regarding each other. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 21:53, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I have a copy of both Van Elsuwege's paper and Ziemele's monograph. Van Elsuwege states in the introduction on page 378: "According to another principle of international law, that of ex factis jus oritur, a violation of international law should be regarded as legal once evidence of permanence is present", in other words "ex factis jus oritur" maxim is only contemplated if we regard the incorporation of the Baltic states into the SU as illegal. The Russian position is that incorporation was legal. So the two concepts of the legal maxims and the Baltic/Russian theses, while both are discussed by these authors, are distinct. --Martin (talk) 23:30, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I would also note that Igny misinterpreted Van Elsuwege's paper, claiming it said that the Baltic state seceded according to the laws of the Soviet Union, which it clearly didn't. --Martin (talk) 23:54, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
 * No further discussion is in evidence, hence I have updated the text accordingly. --Nug (talk) 03:19, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

freely joined the SU?
Why is this nonsense "freely joined the SU" still keeps coming up? After all this has never been the official position of Russia. Russia at the highest level has made it clear, Putin back when he still was the president of Russia has underlined this long time ago that the Baltic states became part of the SU as the result of Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Please see this in case anybody haven't heard that before. So why is this "joined freely of their own accord in 1940" a part of the wikipedia article?--Termer (talk) 04:39, 6 May 2011 (UTC)
 * Peter Van Elsuwege states in his book From Soviet republics to EU member states: a legal and political assessment of the Baltic states' accession to the EU on page 64:
 * This particular Russian interpretation of Soviet conduct on the eve of the Second World War, sometimes called the "Myth of 1939-1940", is widely held and deeply embedded in Russian historical consciousness. In fact, the presumption that the Soviet Union had neither 'occupied' the Baltic states in 1939 nor 'annexed' them the following year reflects the (Soviet)Russian thesis on Baltic state continuity. As a result, the Russian government does not acknowledge any wrongdoing on the part of the Soviet government and is not prepared to apologise for Soviet actions to the Baltic states. This position is clearly opposed to the thesis that the Baltic states are entitled to reparations for the damage caused by its illegal occupation.
 * Perhaps I have misinterpreted this text? It is quite possible that I have misunderstood what the Russian thesis is, so I invite Paul and Igny being a native Russian speaker and thus able to access sources in that language to fully explain precisely what this Russian thesis is. --Martin (talk) 10:33, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

I agree that "freely joined" is anachronism that reminds Stalin's time terminology. However, in my opinion you both make logical mistakes that stem from wrongly interpreted tertuim non datur. The Termer's mistake is that he believes that the only alternative to free joining is occupation, and Martin (or the source he quotes) mixes up the wrongdoing and reparations. Yes, the idea that the Baltic states joined the USSR freely is not treated seriously by mainstream sources, however, the idea that the Baltic states are entitled to reparations is not supported either. I would say, the issue is not in if these states had joined the USSR voluntarily (obviously they hadn't), but in what was the legal status of these states within the USSR. The point of view that if they were absorbed against their will, therefore they were occupied is not the only majority views. For instance, the summary I found on the Hoover Institution web site (and you must concede that web site of this conservative and libertarian think tank by no means can be pro-Soviet or pro-Communist) uses the wollowing wording to describe these events:
 * "''Undoubtedly, the most difficult period for Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania began with 1939 and the consummation of the Hitler-Stalin pact, part of which assigned the Baltic states to a Soviet "sphere of influence," a move that would lead to the outright Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940. Andrei Vishinskii, already notorious for his roles in the Moscow purge trials, was dispatched to Riga to supervise the annexation of Latvia. The massive Soviet propaganda machine worked at full bore to present this to the world as a freely made choice on the part of Latvia's working class. The Stalinist police state was not shown in the newsreels of Soviet troops entering Riga but operated from the beginning of the annexation to ensure that Latvians complied with rule from Moscow.


 * In the Hoover Institution Archives is the original carbon copy of an appeal, in Russian, made by the Ulmanis government in Latvia to the Soviet authorities just prior to annexation. This appeal, which pledged cooperation while pleading for continued independence for Latvia, fell on deaf ears, and worse was to follow. Karlis Ulmanis was taken into Soviet custody and died a prisoner in Russia in 1942, under circumstances which have never been fully explained, but which were most probably related to the strenuous interrogations he endured at the hands of Soviet security agents. Copies of the records of these interrogations are available in the archives (in the Indulis Ronis collection)."

As you can see the word to describe the absorption of the Baltic states is annexation, not occupation. Going back to the event vs period issue, the same site speaks about "the second period of the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia". Again, to speak that since these states didn't join voluntarily, therefore they were occupied is not correct without reservations, because a very large number of mainstream sources does not say so. These states didn't join the USSR voluntarily, however, they were annexed following some legal procedure that had at least a visibility of legality. It is not an excuse for what the USSR did, however, that is enough to speak about this events using not only the word "occupation" as a sole term. In addition, by making too big stress on that you forget that the practice to install puppet governments in the countries within spheres of their influence was common for many those times' Western states (almost each of which were colonial powers), including the democratic ones. Therefore, the accusations of the USSR in doing something that is unacceptable according to the present days standards is absolutely ahistorical.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:40, 6 May 2011 (UTC)


 * @Paul: Well, here I have to disagree again in that you are fundamentally misinterpreting a source. "Annexation" does not imply any sort of basis in legality. That it was all staged as the Baltic states requesting membership in the USSR does not impart any "visibility of legality." Occupation works just fine, that the Baltics were annexed does not change that they were occupied. Nor can I agree that demands for reparations are not treated seriously, for example, the documents Russia signed to join the Council of Europe specifically refer to making reparations to individuals deported to the Soviet Union from the occupied Baltic states. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 19:50, 6 May 2011 (UTC)


 * @Paul: Would you contend Russia did not know what it was signing or was just paying lip service to its responsibility to make reparations in order to get into the CoE? That would not reflect well on Russia. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 19:52, 6 May 2011 (UTC)


 * @Paul, I was asking for the official view point of the Russian government, but instead you have given me something from the Hoover Institution. But never mind, I have done some digging and apparently the Russian view is that the admission of the Baltic states into the USSR was granted upon the request of the Baltic governments. Russia accepts that the USSR pressured the Baltic governments through the threat of force but this was not prohibited by international law at the time, therefore their incorporation were legal. Is that a correct summary of the Russian position? --Martin (talk) 21:08, 6 May 2011 (UTC)


 * The Termer's mistake is that he believes that the only alternative to free joining is occupation? I have no idea Paul from where do you get stuff like this?--Termer (talk) 00:54, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * RE: Martin the Russian view is that the admission of the Baltic states into the USSR was granted upon the request of the Baltic governments is simply "freely joined the SU" put in other words. The way I'm reading this, the official position of Russia is since the Baltic states fell under the sphere of influence of the SU according to the MR pact, the SU didn't have to occupy the Baltic states "since you cant occupy what's already yours". In other words, I'm not sure Russia has actually thought this true what is their official position. And why should they, it's not like 1/6 of the planet needs to have an "official position" regarding some 3 dots on the map. Lets keep it simple and only list the facts that are clear- meaning "Russia doesn't recognize the Soviet Union occupying the Baltic states and considers modern Baltic states not to be successors of the pre-WWII Republics " and that's it.--Termer (talk) 01:09, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * That works for me. The "illegality" of division into spheres does not invalidate the Soviet/Russian claim of the Baltic states petitioning to join the USSR. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:33, 7 May 2011 (UTC)

Where exactly does Russia claim the Baltic states petitioned to join the USSR? Putin on the video was clear, the journalists asked why doesn't Russia recognize the occupation of the Baltic states? Putin responded, the Molotov-Riepdrop pact was condemned by the SU/Russia, what else do you (Bltic states) want, should we (Russia) do it every year? So from where do you read this "Baltic states petitioned to join the USSR"?

Additionally, Putin suggested that Russia lost the Baltic states in 1918 due to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and then got it back in 1939 thanks to MR pact. There's no mentioning of "freely joining" and/or "petitioning to join'. This was only the "official position" of pre-Perestroika SU, not has it ever been an official position of Russia, If only some nutcake Stalinists would still suggest that the Baltic states voluntarely joined the Stalinist paradise, it may be. This has however nothing to do with "official position" of Russia!--Termer (talk) 16:31, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * I've read several sources that state that Russia's official position follows the pre-Perestroika SU's position, for example the Van Elsuwege paper calls it the "(Soviet)Russian thesis". That is why I directed my question to Paul and Igny, being native Russian speakers may have better knowledge of Russia's official position, something published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs or something. From what I now understand of the Russian position is that while they acknowledge that the request by the Baltic states to join the SU was made under the threat of force, making such a threat was not illegal under international law back in 1940. But I wish either Paul or Igny would state what they understand of the official Russian position. --Martin (talk) 19:30, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * Okay, examining Van Elsuwege's 2003 book he cites a Russian Foreign ministry statement, a copy of which can be found here. --Martin (talk) 20:08, 7 May 2011 (UTC)

I don't understand. Why would Paul or Igny need to state the official Russian position? Are they Russian state officials who have published it in a WP:RS? I've just posted a video of Putin speaking up there where he made it very clear what's the Russian position on occupation. Can it get more official than that when the leader of Russia expresses his position on this question?--Termer (talk) 21:46, 7 May 2011 (UTC)


 * A sound bite from a youtube clip rates as a primary source at best. My question was directed at them for the reasons I have outlined above. --Martin (talk) 00:09, 8 May 2011 (UTC)
 * Who else is there better to express the official position than the top official? I think the source you refed the claim about the official position is still dubious, just on opinion of an outsider. An opinion that in Pauls words an "anachronism that reminds Stalin's time terminology. While there surely are forces in Russia who may see it the way you have put it here, it still isn't any official position!


 * Here is an article that spells out the official position The Baltic-Russian History Controversy: From war to diplomacy by Viktor Makarov on 8 June 2010.

Since the MP pact was denounced by Russia already back on December 24, 1989 this "joining on their own" is some fringe Stalin apologist position at best that has nothing much to do with the official position of Russia. Tagging as dubious.--Termer (talk) 16:42, 8 May 2011 (UTC)
 * PS not to mention Elsuwege doesn't spell out anywhere anything close to "joining on their own". Further on, the following seems to spell out the situation much more clearly, please see Baltic yearbook of international law, Volume 1

So clearly there's more to it and no serious source spells out any "joining on their own" as the official position of Russia.--Termer (talk) 17:17, 8 May 2011 (UTC)


 * Okay, thanks for the additional sources. Clearly as you point out Russia's position is more complex. I'll have a think about how to reformulate better wording to reflect what these sources say. What about this official statement, what is your opinion on this? --Martin (talk) 20:24, 8 May 2011 (UTC)


 * Yes, as in content I've added over time, the Russian position today contradicts Russia's own treaties and convenants in effect acknowledging occupation by the Soviet Union. There's also this, from 1999, in line with the joined legally mantra:


 * as reported in Tass. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 20:57, 8 May 2011 (UTC)

Re Martin. the onlything I got out of this statment was this

basically Russia interprets international law back in 1940 differently. Since "the introduction of additional Red Army units" is called occupation and "the accession of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union" "illegal annexation" by the west that were the basis of nonrecognition policy. The other way I'm reading this, Russia basically says the MP pact that lead to "the accession of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union" wasn't illegal according to international law at the time back in 1939 etc. despite it was denounced by Russia later in 1990's.--Termer (talk) 05:05, 9 May 2011 (UTC)


 * I'm not sure your reading is correct, it's not an interpretation of international law. It's that:
 * the stationing of Red Army was legal under the pacts of mutual assistance (ignoring the rel threat of invasion, viz. what happened to Finland)
 * the Soviet invasion ("entering") was in keeping with the terms of the pacts of mutual assistance to counter regimes inimical to the USSR, moreover,
 * the choice by the Baltics to live to fight another day at the moment of Soviet invasion in the face of overwhelming forces including the Red Army already stationed on Baltic territory being (as I recall) as large or larger than the Baltic's standing armed forces being an act of accepting Soviet presence
 * the puppet governments being a spontaneous uprising against the bourgeoisie fascist governments of the Baltics
 * the petitioning to join the USSR being submitted by the duly elected representatives of the liberated (from their fascist home rule) Baltic peoples
 * everything was legal and above board. The MR pact, as such, legal or not itself, has always been totally irrelevant to this line of reasoning, hence its beauty. (Russia does not mention Stalin's "as far as Hitler is concerned, we could invade you tomorrow", may not have quoted that quite precisely.)
 * In other words, "according to international law" means "in keeping with the terms of the pacts of mutual assistance" as agreed to by the Baltic states. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 23:16, 8 May 2011 (UTC)


 * Not withstanding the fact that accession to the USSR not only violated the constitutional law of the respective Baltic states and did not reflect the freely expressed will of the people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the USSR somewhat ironically protested the incorporation of Bohemia into Germany in March 1939 with these words:


 * Up to 1940 a threat of force was generally considered to constitute "intervention" which in principle was unlawful. According to the "Budapest Articles" (1934) of the International Law Association "a state which threatens to resort to armed force ... is guilty of a violation" of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.


 * Therefore scholars in international law such as Marek and Loeber state that the threat of force was outlawed by the Treaty of Non-Agression concluded between the USSR and Estonia and Latvia in 1932 (and Lithuania in 1926), which included the following obligation in Article 1:
 * The Conventions on the Conciliation Procedure of 1932, which are an integral part of the Non-Agression treaties, confirm that bilaterally both military and political violence including the threat of force was outlawed. In short, the Soviet "threat of force" was in violation of the Soviet agreements of non-aggression, and consequently, invalidated the title of the USSR over the Baltic states. The unlawful incorporation met with resistance at home and comdemnation abroad. This prevented an extinction of the victim states. In fact the claim to a lawful annexation has been characterised in legal writings as a "fringe" position, according to Dietrich Loeber. --Martin (talk) 00:38, 9 May 2011 (UTC)
 * The Conventions on the Conciliation Procedure of 1932, which are an integral part of the Non-Agression treaties, confirm that bilaterally both military and political violence including the threat of force was outlawed. In short, the Soviet "threat of force" was in violation of the Soviet agreements of non-aggression, and consequently, invalidated the title of the USSR over the Baltic states. The unlawful incorporation met with resistance at home and comdemnation abroad. This prevented an extinction of the victim states. In fact the claim to a lawful annexation has been characterised in legal writings as a "fringe" position, according to Dietrich Loeber. --Martin (talk) 00:38, 9 May 2011 (UTC)

The point is nowhere has it been spelled out "joined freely" nor "joined of their own accord" as the current Russian position, meaning such statement should be taken out from the article. The only thing certain seems to be according to Russia everything happening in the Baltic states in 1940 was in compliance with international law. If "the Russian position today contradicts Russia's own treaties" and opposing positions etc. should be left to the readers decide. Just list the facts without any additional interpretations, that's all I'm saying.--Termer (talk) 05:05, 9 May 2011 (UTC)

Van Elsuwege and representation of Soviet laws and constitution
re:  They argued that in accordance to the internal Soviet laws and constitution, restoration of independence is illegal and the Baltic republics could only become newly created sovereign entities upon secession from the USSR  —I would be gobsmacked if Van Elsuwege contends what is stated by this bit of content. Even the most cursory reading of the Soviet Constitution (1936, per Article 14) confirms that the states which were part of the USSR did not surrender, but retained, their individual sovereignty except in matters of purely national concern affecting all union republics. This is concretely demonstrated by the Ukrainian SSR having participated as a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 as a separate sovereign member. Furthermore, membership by any state in the USSR was purely voluntary per (1936) Article 17 (in toto): "The right to freely secede from the USSR is reserved to every Union Republic." P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:33, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * On second reading, it could be that Van Elsuwege recounted the situation correctly, in which case I am even more gobsmacked that post-Soviet Russian authorities could have any basis for making such outlandish contentions. In either case, it's pure fantasy. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:46, 7 May 2011 (UTC)


 * P.S. 1936 Article 14 is expanded (different #'ed Articles) in the 1977 constitution in more detail. 1936 Article 17 is preserved verbatim (as far as I can tell regarding the vagaries of scholarly translations) in the constitution of 1977, Article 72. Still gobsmacked. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:57, 7 May 2011 (UTC)


 * From the Elsuwege(2003):
 * Soviet representatives always took the view that the question of Baltic independence was an internal constitutional issue without international dimensions.11 This point of view reflected the official position that the Baltic states had agreed to the entry of Soviet armed forces in 1939 and 1940, and that, with their incorporation into the Soviet Union, these countries lost their status under international law. Accordingly, the Baltic declarations of in- dependence were considered to be illegal because they violated the constitution of the Soviet Union.12 Article 72 of this constitution assigned each union republic a right to secede. According to Moscow, Baltic independence could only be envisaged on the basis of this provision and should therefore be seen as secession rather than solely as the restoration of independence. On 3 April 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet laid down the modalities for starting the process of secession. The requirement that two-thirds of the permanent residents of a given republic should approve secession by referendum and that final approval remained dependent on the full Soviet parliament after a five-year transition period clearly revealed a strategy for impeding Baltic independence. Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the Lithuanian Sajudis national movement, immediately replied that this law on secession was ‘invalid’ and ‘had no legal basis in Lithuania’.He once again repeated Lithuania’s claim that ‘the basis for the re-establishment of Lithuania’s independence’ was ‘the de jure continuity of the Lithuanian state’. The Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, and his prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, however, reminded Landsbergis that ‘under the terms of the Soviet constitution, Lithuania had no right to restore independence or unilaterally declare it’.
 * --Martin (talk) 19:48, 7 May 2011 (UTC)

well, that's all very interesting just that the Soviet laws were irrelevant since Estonia (followed shortly by other Baltic states) had declared the supremacy of the Estonian laws over the laws of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1988 rendering the "violations of the constitution of the Soviet Union" & not to mention " the USSR Supreme Soviet laid down the modalities for starting the process of secession" from 3 April 1990 irrelevant on the territories of the Baltic states.--Termer (talk) 21:59, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * Finally, an interesting tidbit. So the issue is not the act of secession, "legal" under the constitution, but the act of "unilaterally" seceding and declaring it to be a restoration of independence. But there is nothing in the Soviet constitution that says anything about that, and the whole argument on "can't unilaterally" ignores that the Republics are sovereign under the Constitution in any event and can secede at any time. "Secede" rather includes "unilateral" by definition, which is also problematic for Gorbachev's and Ryzhkov's contentions, clearly they are/were not constitutional lawyers or knowledgeable in their own constitution or historical evolution thereof—or simply didn't care what the constitution actually said. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 23:38, 7 May 2011 (UTC)
 * Of course, as stated, as Soviet laws did not pertain to the sovereign Baltic states in any event and the end was the end as soon as the Union began to unravel. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 00:20, 8 May 2011 (UTC)

Competing maxims
Just to be clear, there are no "competing maxims" as described regarding the Baltic and Russian positions. The (former) Soviet and Russian positions are that the Baltic states joined legally according to international law. There is no result of the use of force which Russia is subsequently contending is recognized as legal. The Baltic states and all reputable Western scholarship (i.e., that is based on verified historical facts) regard the occupation and incorporation of the Baltics into the USSR as forcible and illegal. That some countries specifically recognized USSR incorporation (and in once case rescinded same) of the Baltic states is a separate issue; not does such recognition confer any legality on the original act of incorporation itself. I have to agree with Nug that as written the text mixed apples and oranges. I have no issue with the sources cited, but the content which was constructed from those sources was misleading gibberish. P ЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:31, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Indeed, "competing maxims" are related to illegal acts. I've updated the text to separate out these distinct concepts. --Nug (talk) 03:37, 1 February 2012 (UTC)