Talk:Subprime mortgage crisis

The Title Of This Article Violate Wikipedia's NPOV Policy.
Whatever is being described in this article is as much caused by various other activities that took place in the US financial industry, as by the underlying subprime mortgages. To label this the Subprime mortgage crisis is incorrect, and shows a POV. Glkanter (talk) 20:18, 18 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Formerly this article was about the entire recession, but now it is about the real estate and mortgage aspects. Note the link to "2007–2010 financial crisis" in large lettering at the top right. Potatoswatter (talk) 07:11, 19 July 2010 (UTC)


 * I just looked at the history of this article. Originally it was about a subprime mortgage problem that was affecting homeowners and certain lending institutions. Glkanter (talk) 06:27, 23 September 2010 (UTC)


 * I have two questions: First, what options or abilities do we have to re-title the article as, for instance, the Mortgage Banking Crisis? Second, should there be at least some emphasis or effort to describe events that led up to the crisis -- including mortgage banking fraud incidents, and political events in various states that led toward the crisis? Richard Katz (talk) 06:47, 29 May 2012 (UTC)

Yes, thanks for your reply. It is my understanding that many activities on Wall Street were more contributory to the real estate bubble and mortgage crisis than the sub-prime mortgages. Glkanter (talk) 21:25, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

I am unable to edit the article because I am not as articulate as the authors. However, having been a Real Estate Agent during this time period, I do feel it is worth mentioning that the Administration in the 80's and 90's made bold statments to the effect of "It is my goal to see 60% of Americans own a home....". As a result, lending guidelines were VERY relaxed; the Sub-Prime Loans were born. If one cold fog a mirror, they could get a mortgage. Greenspan's famous words "irrational exuberance" were announced, which he has recently regretted. This, of course, festered more in the next Administration, which repealed Depression Era controls on non-banking companies to enter into banking/stock market/insurance functions. How to 'fix it'..... those involed should relent their greed.... just lower the interest rates of the ARM's to a 'workable' Fixed rate and let the Homeowner's stay; pay their property taxes and take the lost value (which the IRS does not recognize) on the chin. Thank you.... Wes Hagerty (talk) 01:05, 21 September 2010 (UTC)


 * This is a common name for this crisis; you can find articles using this name from about every major media source. Granted, lots of causes beyond subprime but this is what many call it. Folks are taking a broader view now and someday perhaps we can change the name of the article.Farcaster (talk) 01:10, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, until excessive leverage and excessive risk taking on Wall Street became apparent, loans to unqualified buyers was assigned blame for the so-called 'need' for the TARP bailout. We know better now. The title of this article should be revised to reflect this correction, not perpetuate the misinformation. Glkanter (talk) 20:53, 22 September 2010 (UTC)


 * The text of the article is accurate — you don't seem to be disputing that. To be sure, there is an ongoing crisis where many people who were given subprime mortgages are getting their homes repossessed by banks other than the original lender. So, the title doesn't suggest any thesis that isn't backed by the text. What title do you propose? Potatoswatter (talk) 21:17, 22 September 2010 (UTC)


 * No, clearly the text of this article is inaccurate, starting with the title. There is no mention of the fact that other loans failed at a higher rate, no mention of housing bubbles in spain, latvia, etc, WORLD WIDE - and no mention of how any of the "causes" listed that apply only to the united states caused these bubbles in foreign countries.  Now that we know more, and realize that "thunder" isn't "god clapping his hands" - maybe this article should be revised as to reflect reality...  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.60.82.197 (talk) 22:27, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

I looked at the article's table of contents. The article is a survey of many aspects of the many different aspects of the 2008 near collapse of the world wide banking system. To name the article after a subject that is not the primary subject of the article is inaccurate. There really wasn't a Subprime mortgage crisis anyways. It was made to look like there was, in order to gain sympathy for Wall Street institutions, so they could get bailed out. The crisis was a housing bubble. Made possible by derivatives. Some were based on subprime mortgages. Many more $ worth were based on other derivatives.

I posted my concern on the NPOV article title board (or something like that), but it gained no traction. In fact, most editors disagreed with me. Thanks for discussing this with me. Glkanter (talk) 05:55, 23 September 2010 (UTC)


 * The Panics, which caused this Great Depression, were more like a series of multiple car crashes on a freeway with some causal and some coincidental. More unifying titles would be something like Greed Crisis of 2007 or Wall St Gambling Crisis of 2008. There was a Housing Bubble which deflated in 2007, but was not a "crisis" nor The Crisis. I would argue that this was not a "Real Estate Crisis" either, but a Greed Crisis spilling out because of "De-Regulation".

There was a Crude Oil Speculation bubble from Summer 2007 to Fall 2008. There were sausagemaking CDOs, which started exploding, causing AIG to implode. Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Bros are each a cause and effect in themselves. But, underlying all of this was whirlpool of "front running" and "flash trading", which encountered a "Black Swan Event" in Aug/Sep '08, partially because of the effects of exorbitant oil prices, and partially because of a glut of out-of-work construction workers, but largely because the atmospherics of unease and unraveling reduced the stake of fresh cash with which the Big Banks and Brokerages, both on Wall St and 'the City' in the UK, sustained the enormous amounts they were gambling in 'front running' and 'flash trading'. While true, faulty 'sub-prime' mortgages amounted to $30B perhaps $40B, in Nov '08, however, the 'overhang' of CDOs amounted to $21T! Clearly, 'sub-prime' mortgages contributed to this Great Depression mostly by "bad press" and excuses. And "irresponsible homeowners" became scapegoats instead of blame aimed directly at criminally reckless "Bankers". As the volume of Un-Employed stays un-employed or is increased, the further the ripple effects of this Great Depression spread. More homes and family savings are lost. Greece. Spain. Italy. It is all connected, only partially by Real Estate. CDOs, 'front running' and 'flash trading' have only increased geometrically since, e.g. CDO 'overhang' exceeded $200T by Aug 2011. If the same mistakes (deliberate) are not to be made again, this title and explanation needs to be re-crafted. Tgsherer (talk) 00:02, 23 September 2012 (UTC)

I see that you are a long time contributor to this page Farcaster. I also see that the article originally *did* focus on the then-happening subprime mortgage crisis of 2006/2007 which is different than near-collapse of the entire banking system in 2008. So the title at one time did represent the subject being discussed. But not now. And I see from the charts you prepared, you have quite a broad knowledge of the 2008 near-collapse. Those 2 prominent charts that Farcaster prepared are captioned 'Factors contributing to housing bubble' and 'Domino effect as housing prices declined'. Which is consistent with my argument about the title. The first paragraph (the whole section, really) of the Causes section cites many causes, and subprime mortgages are not the most prominent. It's pretty clear that as the crisis grew from a lender/borrower problem affecting certain involved lending institutions into one affecting the whole global banking system, the article grew in scope. The title just never changed with the article. But it needs to be changed. Glkanter (talk) 06:27, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

One last comment and question. From what I've looked at, this is a very well done article. I just don't like the title is all. Farcaster, how does Wikipedia reconcile that those two prominent charts are not credited to a source, rather, it's indicated that you prepared them independently, with the 'no OR' rule? I'm in a dispute on another article regarding an image that is being challenged as being OR and therefor not appropriate for inclusion in the article. Thanks. Glkanter (talk) 06:41, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

Believe me, those charts got debated a lot out here and went through several iterations. These are in the archive, probably the first or second one. You can create a chart yourself, provided it is based on factual sources. For instance, the foreclosure bar chart is easy to trace to sources. The two diagrams you mention are more complex and try to illustrate the factors involved, sequence of events or cause/effect. These charts actually found their way into official UK government documents and are in multiple locations on the web. Multiple sources corroborate the logic in those charts, but please see the archive on why they were kept. This is a high traffic article and they've been out there a long time.Farcaster (talk) 14:05, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

Three observations: first, the above is correct, this article expresses a point of view of a "subprime" crisis, when in fact it was a broad base crisis brought on by worldwide mortgage bubbles - this might as well be called a "non conforming mortgage crisis" because of all the Alt A loans that also deteriorated, a "conforming loan crisis" because of all the conforming loans that collapsed, and so on. The whole premise of this article is not rooted in reality, but instead in a point of view. Second, i am still waiting for this article to address the fact that A) the CRA only applied to the united states, but the mortgage bubble popped WORLD WIDE including places like Latvia and Spain, and how our governments supposed "pressure" to lend these "subprime" loans caused these bubbles in far off places too...along with the fact that less than 10% of loans were subject to the CRA (and a fraction of a percent of the total amount of mortgages that failed WORLD WIDE), and the gross majority of "subprime" lenders were not subject to the CRA...even though it is listed as one of the causes of the "subprime" crisis in this article. Third, jumbo mortgages of the rich are defaulting at a higher rate than "subprime" mortgages, yet there is no wikipedia article about that?

This article is the equivalent of blaming a "weak heart" for the death of someone who was electrocuted, because the heart was unable to work at a high enough level to sustain life at 50,000 volts. The subprime loans were one of the first to go when the bubble collapsed, it was not the other way around. And every other loan type has failed too. My question is - how do you delete an article? Should i do it paragraph by paragraph or can the whole thing be deleted at once? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.60.82.197 (talk) 22:19, 18 November 2010 (UTC)


 * The article is outstanding. Just the title needs fixing. Glkanter (talk) 22:23, 18 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Clearly it is not for the reasons above that no one can seem to answer/dispute. How did "subprime" loans in the US, or their supposed causes, cause worldwide bubbles?  Why do "subprime" loans get an article when there is no "alt A loan crisis" article or "jumbo loan crisis" or "subprime irish loan crisis" articles?  This article clearly attempts to rewrite history, calling an EFFECT of a worldwide mortgage bubble popping, a CAUSE of said event.  CAUSATION MATTERS - just not in this article i guess.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.60.82.197 (talk) 22:30, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

The first sentence of the article - "The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing real estate and financial crisis, characterized by a fall in U.S. housing prices, a rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, and severe disruption in the shadow banking system, with major adverse consequences for the economies of the U.S. and Europe."

First, it is not the "subprime crisis" that is an ongoing real estate crisis, it is a REAL ESTATES CRISIS OF ALL LOANS that is on ongoing real estate crisis. Second, the "subprime crisis" is not a FINANCIAL CRISIS, the FINANCIAL CRISIS is the financial crisis that is ongoing. The "subprime crisis" is not uniquely characterized by a fall in housing prices, the entire mortgage bubble popping is... There is no "subprime crisis" anymore than there is an "alt a" crisis, jumbo loan crisis, etc. How do "subprime" loans uniquely cause "severe disruption" in the shadow banking system more than Alt A, jumbo, etc? Subprime loans are being blamed for the ENTIRE COLLAPSE of mortgages bubbles in LATVIA, SPAIN, etc, according to this article - "major adverse concequences for the economise of the U.S. and Europe." Again, when the article later blames the CRA, how does that have anything to do with the inflation or subsequent popping of Ireland's real estate bubble? Anyone? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.60.82.197 (talk) 22:37, 18 November 2010 (UTC)


 * I'm with you. I started this section, and I posted about this on some board specifically for this problem some months ago, but I didn't manage to convince anyone. I'll support your efforts 100%. Glkanter (talk) 22:49, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

How about this - the article gets rewritten along something like this factual premise - "The US subprime mortgages crisis was one of the first effects of the deflation of the united state's real estate bubble, and at the time of its initial decline was thought by some to have been the cause of said real estate bubble's collapse. It was one of the first effects that foreshadowed the impending collapse of the real estate bubble and subsequent financial crisis."

The get rid of all the lies about the CRA, etc, and its fixed. Fair enough? Oh - and where is the mention that housing prices in the united states followed close to inflation for over 100 years, until 1997 when the bubble actually started? From reading this article, i find that subprime lending took off in 2004, 7 years after the bubble actually started, but now they are a "cause" and a "crisis"? How so? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.60.82.197 (talk) 22:45, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

Let me argue that "subprime mortgage crisis" does deserve its own article. Yes, it is part of the wider mortgage crisis but it is the riskiest part and led the bursting of the bubble. I'd like to add that subprime, in particular no-downpayment loans, enabled price inflation in states that had severe constraints of land-usage such as California and Nevada. Thomas Sowell argues this in his book on the topic. Otherwise, the availability of subprime, like all other mortgages, would have caused an expansion of housing units instead of housing prices. I haven't edited an article yet, so I will learn more before I add this factor. --Jason from nyc (talk) 04:09, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

There are three related articles about crises that people may regard as part of the same worldwide event. The intro should state this more prominently to guide readers to the information they need: Subprime mortgage crisis, Financial crisis of 2007–2008, and Great Recession. Bolarno (talk) 11:11, 25 June 2018 (UTC)

So many errors
Where do I start? "During the crisis and ensuing recession, U.S. consumers increased their savings as they paid down debt ("deleveraged")"  This is absolutely not true, people didn't "pay down" their debt at all, the reduction in debt is totally a result of defaults.  "Borrowers in this situation have an incentive to default on their mortgages as a mortgage is typically nonrecourse debt secured against the property.[68"  Again not true, only 11 states are nonrecourse states http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1432437

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.78.16.77 (talk) 01:39, 20 January 2013 (UTC)


 * I'll look into it. The FRED database indicates the personal savings rate rose considerably during the crisis and some of the period thereafter. Further, the U.S. has a large private sector financial surplus, meaning savings exceeds investment by about $800 billion (it was about $1 trillion at one point). Perhaps we should specify the time period when it rose and then returned to the pre-crisis level. See Krugman "The Problem" for the savings surplus and FRED for the savings rate FRED-Personal Savings rateFarcaster (talk) 17:24, 20 January 2013 (UTC)


 * Krugman has pointed out that savings relative to GDP has risen quite a bit since the pre-crisis levels and remains elevated. Krugman-See chart on savings as % GDPFarcaster (talk) 04:10, 21 January 2013 (UTC)


 * We should specify that 11 states are non-recourse and several others are "one-action" states where the lender chooses between foreclosure or suing to collect the debt. Bear in mind, I haven't heard of too many banks suing when folks walk away from their properties but data on that would be helpful. These two categories include the the "sand states" where the bubble was most prevalent (Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada). See List of recourse and one-action statesFarcaster (talk) 17:24, 20 January 2013 (UTC)

Use of image
What is the purpose of the image? Is it a positive contribution to Wikipedia? It doesn't really help to explain nor understand the economic problems. I request that it be removed.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/64/Banks_are_bastards.jpg/295px-Banks_are_bastards.jpg —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mrpops2ko (talk • contribs) 14:08, 22 September 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree with removing the image...and with the image.Farcaster (talk) 20:21, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

What is a GSE? Aias1996 (talk) 05:13, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

The GSE contribution
I've been looking into the GSE contribution to this crisis lately - there's a 2010 Republican report on it, [www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-High-LTV-Subprime-Alt-A.pdf Pinto's estimate] that the GSEs contributed a heckuva lot, and some commentary on Pinto's analysis from Belsky and colleagues (1, 2). However, I'm still trying to work it out all out. Putting this down for the record, but help would be appreciated. II | (t - c) 00:29, 30 October 2010 (UTC)

Check out this article: NYT - Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping PointFarcaster (talk) 16:18, 30 October 2010 (UTC)

The claims that the GSEs are responsible have been debunked by both the FCIC report and others. The data does not even remotely support them. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924831 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.52.212.151 (talk) 21:44, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Requested move

 * The following discussion is an archived discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section. 

The result of the move request was: no move per objection below. - GTBacchus(talk) 04:54, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Subprime mortgage crisis → US subprime mortgage crisis — This article is only about the subprime mortgage crisis in the US and nowhere else, its title needs to be changed to reflect that. I have no other issues with the article. Eyreland (talk) 08:47, 15 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Is it necessary to disambiguate? The US usage seems to be the primary topic and there is no contention for this title. — HELL KNOWZ  ▎TALK 20:30, 16 December 2010 (UTC)
 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

subprime mortgages weren't really ARMs
I can't come up with the research to verify the facts from independent sources; my statements below are based on direct experience, which is a form of original research, disallowed on Wikipedia. And a good write-up demands more skill than I can muster. But I want to post this request that someone come up with a source and rewrite the second sentence of this article, which reads: "Approximately 80% of U.S. mortgages issued to subprime borrowers were adjustable-rate mortgages.[1]" I'm concerned this sentence creates an erroneous impression that rising interest rates triggered subprime defaults. These were loans that were unsustainable as written, whether interest rates rose or not.

In an adjustable rate mortgage, as more generally understood prior to the advent of what are now called subprime mortgages, the original loan documents contained language on when the rate would re-set, what index would be used and the margin above the index. In general, if there were no change in the index, the interest rate on the adjustable rate loan did not change. (Later, while there were ARMs with teaser rates, set to rise even if the index stayed constant, the provisions were less aggressive than still later, subprime mortgages.)

Rising interest rates couldn't have been the cause of defaults in the subprime mortgages made in 2004-2006, because rates didn't rise. Instead, provisions in the original loan documents committed the borrower to either refinance and pay off the loan, sell the house, or make much higher monthly payments. The rate of interest charged (and in some cases the rate of amortization) were set up in the original loan document for automatic, large, upward revision. There was no intention that anyone would actually make those higher payments, but that continuously rising home values and continued easy borrowing would allow the borrower to either refinance the loan or sell the house at a profit and pay it off. By the time those original payment increase provisions took effect, lending standards had tightened and home values had fallen, preventing refinance or sale of the house, leading to default. --Madison Max (talk) 19:56, 28 November 2010 (UTC)

It is not clear that rising interest rates directly caused the problem with subprime mortgages because they were ARMs. Even after the Fed eased in 2007 and interest rates on ARMs reset to lower rates, that did not stop the defaults. The failure of housing prices to increase enough to allow a sale before the 1st reset caused an increase in defaults. This caused MBS investors to back away, which choked the origination of subprime mortgages. We need clarification on the scenario that led to the inability of home-ownering speculators to keep the bubble expanding.--Jason from nyc (talk) 03:53, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

According to Thomas Sowell it was the Clinton’s administrations goal to increase home ownership and its use of the Reno justice department’s to punish any bank executives that didn’t go along with its plan that caused this crisis. Aias1996 (talk) 05:16, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

According to Thomas sowell it was the Clinton administrations desire to increase home ownership in the USA and its use of the Reno justice department to prosecute bank executives who didn’t go along with the plan that caused this crisis. The Clinton administration forced those banks to lower the standards for loaning money. Aias1996 (talk) 05:19, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

What a Toothless Article
An article about the mortgage crisis with only three mentions of President Bush and his policies. This is one toothless article! It's plain to objective observers that Bush hands-off policy in regard to regulating the banking industry is primarily responsible here. If Gore had been elected president in 2000, none of this would have happened. SCFilm29 (talk) 19:55, 8 December 2010 (UTC) And without any mention of Barney Frank brow beating the Bush administration for attempting to apply regulations years before the crisis. But yeah, blame Bush, not dancing queen Barney Frank! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 97.117.146.181 (talk • contribs) 04:07, 14 April 2021 (UTC)

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are not in receivership
This statement is incorrect:


 * Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac either directly owed or guaranteed nearly $5 trillion in mortgage obligations, with a similarly weak capital base, when they were placed into receivership in September 2008.[203]

The GSEs were placed into conservatorship, not receivership.

The statement's footnote's link ([203]) is dead, so this (possible) source of the error is not available.

Omni4 (talk) 03:19, 12 December 2010 (UTC)

Spitzer's "Partners in Crime" revelation
Being new to this article I didn't want to just jump in on the editing, but I was surprised there was no mention of Eliot Spitzer's revelation re: the bush admin's role in blocking investigations into predatory lending in all 50 states. This is a crucial piece of evidence of deliberate wrongdoing.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/AR2008021302783.html

This is at a time when insiders were betting against the mortgage market while selling MBS's to unwitting investors. A little intelligence like this could make them a heck of a lot of money. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Rwinkel (talk • contribs) 12:19, 20 June 2011 (UTC)

fraction of adjustable-rate mortages
The lead says, "Approximately 82% of U.S. mortgages issued to subprime borrowers were adjustable-rate mortgages." (It did say 80% until just recently.) The link provided as a reference is a dead link. Searching for something similar brings me here, where it says, "2/28 adjustable rate mortgages comprise up to 80% of subprime loans today" (where "today" was February 7, 2007). "Up to" 80% is different than "approximately" 80%. Unfortunately "up to 80%" is almost meangless, and so I don't think just changing the phrasing in the article will help. We need a better reference if that's worth keeping. C RETOG 8(t/c) 16:29, 16 September 2011 (UTC)

Modifying Subprime Mortage Crisis Diagram 2 and Citation
Very nice work on the Diagrams- I would like to modify it in terms of the Australian Government's response to the crisis but also cite your prior work. As a doctoral student, I am trying to stay clear of wikipedia cites... is there another option I could use?

JulesMSJulesMS (talk) 07:31, 3 October 2011 (UTC)


 * I updated the first citation; Bush's speech of September 24, 2008 covers some of this. Mark Zandi published the first chapter of his book "Financial Shock" online via his website as well, which walks through a series of facts much like the diagram. Bernanke has summarized the crisis as well in his speeches; there are a couple that cover how we got here from 2009.Farcaster (talk) 14:09, 3 October 2011 (UTC)

Why did lending standards change?
Shouldn't this question merit a separate section?

Only the "award-winning" NPR point of view is included in this article.

A notable and reliable POV is that the US federal government contributed to the change in the lending standards of mortgage lenders by punishing or threatening to punish evidence of discriminatory lending practices. Why isn't this POV included in this article? Here's an example of this POV: [] Michael H 34 (talk) 20:29, 12 November 2011 (UTC) Michael H 34

Pezzuto references (COI?)
I removed recent additions of links to works of Dr. Pezzuto by User:I.Pezutto because there appears to be a conflict of interest. Do those of us who do not have a COI with this content see a need for this material? Joja lozzo  05:40, 29 November 2011 (UTC)

Copyright problem removed
Prior content in this article duplicated one or more previously published sources. Infringing material has been rewritten or removed and must not be restored, unless it is duly released under a compatible license. (For more information, please see "using copyrighted works from others" if you are not the copyright holder of this material, or "donating copyrighted materials" if you are.) For legal reasons, we cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or published material; such additions will be deleted. Contributors may use copyrighted publications as a source of information, but not as a source of sentences or phrases. Accordingly, the material may be rewritten, but only if it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously, and persistent violators will be blocked from editing. While we appreciate contributions, we must require all contributors to understand and comply with these policies. Thank you. JamesMLane t c 05:03, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Re the above and my reversion today of an anon's insertion of a huge chunk of copyvio text, here's a link to the source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2011/11/10/media-parrot-obama-financial-crisis-campaign-propaganda/  JamesMLane t c 05:03, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Real Estate Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and the Housing Market Crisis
Staff report number 514 of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York adds significant research to the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2006 and 07. "Real Estate Investors, the Levhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Edit_summaryerage Cycle, and the Housing Market Crisis", by Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Joseph Tracy, Wilbert van der Klaauw was published on September of 2011.

The report and additional articles are available at

http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/12/flip-this-house-investor-speculation-and-the-housing-bubble.html

http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr514.html

http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr514.pdf

The synopsis is;

"We explore a mostly undocumented but important dimension of the housing market crisis: the role played by real estate investors. Using unique credit-report data, we document large increases in the share of purchases, and subsequently delinquencies, by real estate investors. In states that experienced the largest housing booms and busts, at the peak of the market almost half of purchase mortgage originations were associated with investors. In part by apparently misreporting their intentions to occupy the property, investors took on more leverage, contributing to higher rates of default."

Some significant statements include;

"[R]eal estate “investors”—borrowers who use financial leverage in the form of mortgage credit to purchase multiple residential properties—played a previously unrecognized, but very important, role. These investors likely helped push prices up during 2004-06; but when prices turned down in early 2006, they defaulted in large numbers and thereby contributed importantly to the intensity of the housing cycle’s downward leg.

As mortgage lenders have long known, investors are more likely than owner-occupants to walk away from an underwater property. So when a borrower acknowledges on the mortgage application that she won’t live in the house, the lender will typically require a higher down-payment and charge a higher interest rate to reflect the additional default risk. Within the category of real estate investors, some buy properties with the intention of renting them out, while others intend to simply “flip this house,” selling quickly and reaping a capital gain."

"At the peak of the boom in 2006, over a third of all U.S. home purchase lending was made to people who already owned at least one house. In the four states with the most pronounced housing cycles, the investor share was nearly half—45 percent. Investor shares roughly doubled between 2000 and 2006. While some of these loans went to borrowers with “just” two homes, the increase in percentage terms is largest among those owning three or more properties. In 2006, Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada investors owning three or more properties were responsible for nearly 20 percent of originations, almost triple their share in 2000."

-- This seems significant. It isn't necessarily adding new information to the statements by David Lereah, Economist Robert Shiller, Warren Buffet. The section, "Homeowner speculation" does include the existence of speculative purchasing in the housing market. The research presented in SR514 provides stronger evidence of the magnitude and effect of speculative investment in the run up and collapse of the housing bubble and the sub prime mortgage crisis.

Wording things appropriately, in keeping with the tenant of objectivity, is not as easy as it may seem. While I would love to make a statement of causality, this may not appropriate.

On the other hand, the research provide substantial weight to the picture painted in the section of "Homeowner speculation". Where the section suggests it as "a contributing factor to the subprime mortgage crisis", it seems to prove the case, or at least ties together the observations and conclusions of David Lereah, Economist Robert Shiller, and the cited sources.

(Dogsinlove (talk) 21:46, 25 February 2012 (UTC))

I think the section on Government Policies needs more organization and updating, and could be more balanced
I think we are jumping around, leaving some important information out and, in some cases, not wording things in a balanced way.

Paragraph 2 discusses AMTPA

Paragraph 3 briefly raises the criticism of affordable housing, but in a biased way ("...a number of politicians, pundits, and financial industy-funded think tanks"???) This is not very objective.

Paragraph 4 discusses the GSE mandates.

Paragraph 5 gives subprime purchase amounts without sourcing, and these amounts are obviously based on the early Fannie and Freddie financial statements, which were repudiated by the GSEs in 2009. (Also, remember that the SEC alleged in December 2011 that the two GSE held over $2 trillion in subprime as ob June 2008.)

Paragraph 6 very briefly discusses GSE net worth and Fannie's and Freddie's eventual conservatorship.

Paragraph 7 says the Financial Crisi Inquiry Commision did not find the GSEs to be a primary crisis cause. However, the case against the GSEs is not presented, and none of the arguments of the Commission's 100-page Dissent is not stated.

Paragraph 8 - We are back to regulations - specifically Glass-Steagall. Also, this is kind of biased because one would think Phil Gramm created this legislation without any help. (Bill Clinton signed it enthusiastically, and still strongly supports it.)

Paragraphs 9 and 10 discusses more regulation - specifically CRA.

Paragraph 11 gives Krugman's argument for why Fannie, Freddie, CRA, and predatory lending were not causes of the crisis. However, there is a specific counter-argument to Krugman's assertion, and it is not stated.

Paragraph 12 says the Financial Crisi Inquiry Commision did not find the CRA to be a primary crisis cause. However, the case against CRA has not been presented, and the arguments of the Commission 100-page Dissent are not stated.

Paragraphs 13 and 14 address failed efforts to regulate the GSEs.

Paragraph 15 (the last paragraph in this section) notes that the SEC charged ex-Fannie and Freddie executives for "misleading investors about the risks of subprime-mortgage loans." However, it leaves out the most important finding of the SEC: that the GSEs had purchased massive quantities of subprime and Alt-A loans, and concealed them. This has huge implications because, as I stated with regard to paragraph 5, the early analyses grossly understated the subprime purchases of Fannie and Freddie, and this understatement may have caused some analysts to understate the role of the GSEs in causing the crisis.

I will wait a couple of days to hear any feedback. Then, I will make an effort to restructure the material. I will not eliminate any of the facts or arguments now presented (They will just be meshed into the new outline.) Anything I add will be properly sourced.

Nicholas007 (talk) 01:53, 5 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Give it your best shot. Note also the supporting article on the government elements. But keep in mind the conservative case ("Fannie & Freddie did it") has been widely debunked and is a minority view (say 80% of the evidence is against it). Keep in mind this was/is a global phenomena, with housing and other bubbles all over Europe too. So keep that in mind, as "he said/she said" should not replace the preponderance of the evidence on one side of the argument, the FCIC's main report by far being the most credible analysis so far. The main dissenter advocating the "F&F did it" hypothesis works for the American Enterprise Institute, a right-leaning think tank.Farcaster (talk) 03:35, 5 November 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for the feedback. I will keep these things in mind, and try to keep unsupported opinions out.Nicholas007 (talk) 11:43, 5 November 2012 (UTC)


 * I have added material and restructured the section on Government Policies, as I said I would a few days ago. The only paragraph left out is this one, simply because it has no source: If I can find the source I will add the paragraph. Or, perhaps someone else will source it and add it.


 * "From 2002 to 2006, as the U.S. subprime market grew 292% over previous years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined purchases of subprime securities rose from $38 billion to around $175 billion per year before dropping to $90 billion per year, which included $350 billion of Alt-A securities. Fannie Mae had stopped buying Alt-A products in the early 1990s because of the high risk of default. By 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned, either directly or through mortgage pools they sponsored, $5.1 trillion in residential mortgages, about half of the total U.s. mortgage market."


 * I will continue to review what I added during the next few days to check for typos, sourcing, etc.
 * Nicholas007 (talk) 23:55, 6 November 2012 (UTC)


 * We created a detail article on government to capture this kind of detail. Look at the table of contents now for this article and see how bizarre it looks. Please try to summarize or write in more detail in the subordinate article and bring the key points back to this one. I'll revert over the next couple of days if this isn't fixed.  We're trying to summarize here.Farcaster (talk) 02:30, 7 November 2012 (UTC)

Ok. Good advice. I will try to summarize and keep detail in main article. Thanks.Nicholas007 (talk) 04:22, 7 November 2012 (UTC)


 * I have tried to get this section summarized. It is still long but there are many very important and major topics that fall within the "government" category, such as CRA, HUD, and Fannie and Freddie. My preference would be to not reduce it further. What do you think?Nicholas007 (talk) 13:18, 7 November 2012 (UTC)
 * I dislike the way you made subheadings italics, bold italics might work better. Raquel_Baranow (talk) 14:57, 7 November 2012 (UTC)


 * I've reverted to pre-Nichola007 edits. I suggest editing the subordinate article first, as the edits included were making the government topic takeover the article.Farcaster (talk) 18:13, 7 November 2012 (UTC)

Farcaster, please look at the Government policies section as it is now, after the revert. You have taken a great deal of important information out; in fact, you took 100% of the conservative argument out.

I feel that, at the very minimum we need to mention the 1992 legislation establishing affordable housing mandates and HUD's role in setting the on-going levels.

We need to mention the 1995 "National Homeownership Strategy," which had the stated goal of creating 8 million new homeowners, and which was targeted at the entire industry. It is important to mention the $5 trillion in affordable housing commitments made by Fannie and Freddie, and some of the ways they planned to meet those commitments. In other words, we need to summarize some of the key arguments.

Right now we are just citing the parties who are on each side of the argument, and we aren't doing it in a very objective way. To describe critics as "politicians, pundits, and financial industry-funded think tanks" is to denigrate the critics. In response to your first comments I shortened everything considerably, and I would be glad to shorten it more. However, I strongly feel that we need a little more specificity. I think I can do this without making the article too much longer. Here is another idea. Perhaps it is not realistic to put everything related to government in one section. A solution might be to have three categories:

Nicholas007 (talk) 23:13, 7 November 2012 (UTC)
 * Government legislation and regulation related to the crisis
 * The Community Reinvestment Act's alleged impact on the crisis
 * The alleged role of the GSEs and their regulator, HUD


 * Put as much into the detail article as you want. Summarize your inclusions in four or five sentences here. I think the conservative argument is already well summarized and has the minority position it should have. Don't forget to balance the 1995 strategy with Bush's strategy, as he made a similar argument (see citation already in there). Further, what happened in 1995 probably has little to do with the massive increase in subprime lending that happened 2004-2006 (see the chart on that). CRA has been debunked so many times more ink is a waste of time, with the FCIC saying it had nothing to do with the crisis (quote is in there). GSE were "not a primary cause" and are mentioned several times though already. So a few sentences at most. 2-3 subsections might be OK. I would drop the "alleged" and make it topical. Maybe "Regulatory," "GSE and Affordable Housing" and "Other legislation" would be good subsections. Farcaster (talk) 13:49, 8 November 2012 (UTC)

OK. I will try to adhere to your recommendations, which seem reasonable. Thanks. Nicholas007 (talk) 21:16, 8 November 2012 (UTC)


 * As I indicated in previous posts, I felt that the old "Government Policies" section was missing a lot of information - even for a summarized section. Also, it seemed a bit disorganized. I think we were trying to fit too much into one section so I have split it into 3: U.S. Government policies, State and local policies, and the Role of Fannie and Freddie. The role of the state and local governments has been almost totally ignored in this debate, and I feel that the very small section I created will alert people to the fact that there were many substantial programs in states such as California. Fannie and Freddie warrant their own category for a couple of reasons. First, they were huge players in the mortgage loan market, having purchased nearly half of all mortgages. Although some GSE defenders say their role was small, recent revelations say otherwise (namely, the reclassification of their loans in 2009 and the SEC fraud case brought in Dec. 2011). The second reason Fannie and Freddie need their own category is that they were not, of course, part of the government. Although they were sponsored by the government (and implicitly backed), they did have a profit-seeking motivation, and many analysts believe it, more than government policy, played a role in their acquisition of subprime loans. Nicholas007 (talk) 16:33, 12 November 2012 (UTC)


 * I've reverted (again). We have a detail article for this. Why are you so opposed to writing there? Why must you add 30k worth of stuff to the summary?  The FCIC, the most credible source on the topic, reported that Fannie and Freddie "were not a primary cause" and that CRA had nothing to do with it.  So help me understand why 30,000 characters of new text is appropriate in this summary article?  Again, 4-5 sentences if you feel something is missing.  Not a quadrupling of the length of the section and dramatically adding undue weight to debunked hypotheses.Farcaster (talk) 18:27, 12 November 2012 (UTC)

You had already agreed to splitting government into 2 or 3 sections so why do you now want to go back to just one? Surely, the new section on state and local government is not long? I realize that most detail should be in the main article but people need a reason to go there. Key issues must be, at the least, mentioned in the summary. There is absolutely no mention, right now, of the issue of state and local programs, and no mention of HUD's National Homeownership Strategy for getting 8 million tenants to become homeowner. There is no mention of the $5 trillion in affordable home comittments made by Fannie and Freddie, and there is no mention of the $2 trillion in substandard loans found on the books of Fannie and Freddie by the SEC - after the FCIC issued its report. In your version only 2 pieces of legislation are mentioned - the 1982 legislation and the 1999 repeal of Glass. Why mention 2 pieces of legislation and ignore the others, such as the Commodity Futures Modernization Act? It makes no sense. If you want it short then leave out all mention of legislation, but that will make the summary a joke. I will attempt - once more - to significantly shorten the 3 articles I have posted; however, I will resist any efforts to completely undo them. And, your limitation of "4-5 sentences" is not realistic. All alleged involvement of government can not fit into such a small space - even if summarized severely.Nicholas007 (talk) 18:45, 12 November 2012 (UTC)

One more thing. Although Fannie and Freddie were affected by government policy they were, of course, for profit businesses, and many analysts believe there participation in subprime was related to profit motives. For that reason alone, Fannie and Freddie warrant their own section - outlide of government policies.Nicholas007 (talk) 18:48, 12 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Farcaster, I just cut the last version down to 69%, in deference to you. If you still don't like it please give me the specific items that you feel need to be eliminated. I respect your desire to avoid verbosity but I want to make sure the casual reader of this article is clued in to items that may warrant detailed investigation. I want the article to lead to more thought and analysis - not less. When I first saw this article it seemed to be saying "you don't need to look further. The FCIC has ruled that the government had little involvement in this crisis." I would prefer to let people validate that conclusion based on their understanding of all relevant facts.Nicholas007 (talk) 19:47, 12 November 2012 (UTC)


 * This article was pretty stable for the past year until your edits; that should tell you something. Why the aversion to putting all this verbiage in the detail article? Further, I noticed you are doing the "he said, she said" with Mr. Wallison, who works for AEI, a right-leaning think tank. You're going to give him point and counterpoint to the main FCIC report? You consider that balanced? His was a minority view and debunked widely. I suggest taking the original section, separate it into three sections we discussed, and add 4-5 sentences to the original. For example, to cover Mr. Wallison, maybe say (once) there were dissenting views on the FCIC and leave the details in the other article. Is every point in the Kennedy assassination article rebutted by minority views given equal weight?Farcaster (talk) 21:37, 12 November 2012 (UTC)

Farcaster, While you denigrate Wallison and describe the AEI as right wing you fail to note that the FCIC report was the product,exclusively, of the 6 Democratic members. Here is how the NY Times described it on June 25, 2011: "Of the 10 commission members, only the 6 appointed by Democrats endorsed the final report. Three Republican members have prepared a dissent; a fourth Republican, Peter J. Wallison, a former Treasury official and White House counsel to President Ronald Reagan, has written a dissent, calling government policies to promote homeownership the primary culprit for the crisis." So, if the House and Senate were in Republican hands in 2009 and 2010 then, perhaps, 6 of the members would have been Republicans and we would have a completely different conclusion as to the causes of the crisis. Your comparison of the partisan report of the FCIC to the nonpartisan and independent Warren Commission report is a stretch. Also, I am not giving "equal weight" to Wallison because I am making it clear his view is a minority opinion. I think that is balanced. After the FCIC issued its report the SEC came out with an estimate of GSE subprime that even exceeded the Edward Pinto estimates of that right-wing organization, AEI. That is an important point. In any event I will look one more time for ways to condense this. Would you like me to remove mention of some of the legislation? If so, which legislation?Nicholas007 (talk) 22:40, 12 November 2012 (UTC)

Farcaster, I can live with your changes if we keep the 2 sentences I just added. One simply makes a brief reference to Erik Sirri, who completely debunked the conventional wisdom about SEC and leverage ratios. (He pointed out that, since the 1970s, the 5 big investment banks were using an optional standard based on 2% of receivables. Therefore, the SEC leverage changes had no impact.) My other sentence simply points out that, based on the SEC's Dec 2011 securities fraud case against ex-executives of the GSEs, the estimate of subprime and Alt-A, as of 2008, is much, much higher than earlier estimates.Nicholas007 (talk) 03:39, 13 November 2012 (UTC)
 * We're getting there. Bear in mind, the big 5 investment banks collapsed with over $4 trillion in liabilities leveraged close to 30:1 on average (see the color chart). The leverage rose considerably from 2004 to 2006. He may have tried to debunk the relaxation of the net capital rule as a cause, but the dangerously high leverage (Goldman is now about 11:1 for example) has not been debunked. Perhaps clarify that.Farcaster (talk) 05:54, 13 November 2012 (UTC)

Yes, there is no question that the big banks had inadequate capital reserves. Sirri's point was simply that the problem did not arise due to the 2004 SEC changes. Rather, there had been a loophole in the capital requirements all along, and in years just before the crisis that loophole was exploited.Nicholas007 (talk) 13:50, 13 November 2012 (UTC)

Mortgage Fraud vs. Predatory Lending
I just made a few changes that I regard to be technical changes. The section that used to be titled "Mortgage Fraud" was confusing because it covered both mortgage fraud (which the FBI defines as fraud against the lender) and predatory lending (which is fraud by the lender against the borrower). To make it clearer I added definitions and changed the title to cover both types of fraud. Also, the last paragraph used to be this:
 * "New York State prosecutors are examining whether eight banks hoodwinked credit ratings agencies, to inflate the grades of subprime-linked investments. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Justice Department, the United States attorney’s office and more are examining how banks created, rated, sold and traded mortgage securities that turned out to be some of the worst investments ever devised. As of 2010, virtually all of the investigations, criminal as well as civil, are in their early stages."

I thought that paragraph, which seems to pertain to fraud against rating agencies, belonged in the rating agency section. I don't believe that I removed anyone's commentary - just reorganized it.Nicholas007 (talk) 16:32, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

Merger proposal
I was attempting to improve the Causes of the United States housing bubble article when I stumbled upon this article. Obviously the Subprime mortgage crisis and the housing bubble are not the same but there is such a large amount of overlap that I felt compelled to make this merger suggestion, if only to draw attention to the duplication in the articles. Before I started adding links there was no link to the (much better) Subprime mortgage crisis article in the Causes of the United States housing bubble article. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:26, 15 February 2013 (UTC)
 * Many articles overlap in this space. I suspect the Causes of the United States housing bubble was a detail carve-out from the United States housing bubble article to try to keep the latter shorter. Perhaps we can more clearly point it back to the U.S. housing bubble article and shorten it a bit. Also, we might want to include the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 template with it.Farcaster (talk) 22:09, 15 February 2013 (UTC)
 * We might also consider merging it with "Causes of the subprime mortgage crisis"Farcaster (talk) 22:17, 15 February 2013 (UTC)
 * Yes, merge it with the section, not the whole Subprime mortgage crisis article. --BoogaLouie (talk) 01:46, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

Deleting Subprime I
Farcaster, I hereby argue it is important to include something on Subprime I in the article, such as what you deleted, because
 * 1) someone researching old news articles from 1999, 2000 which talk about a subprime mortgage bubble and then looking at this article might be confused.
 * 2) knowing there was a subprime bubble complete with foreclosures, cries of predatory lending, subprime mortgage originators going bankrupt, etc. less than a decade earlier gives some perspective on the 2008 crisis --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:19, 19 May 2013 (UTC)

New graph on loss of household net worth
I just downloaded this chart

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fredgraph-houshld-net-worth.png

... but I just noticed we already have "Impacts from the Crisis on Key Wealth Measures" in the Impact in the U.S. section, one of which covers the same net worth change.

IMHO those Impact charts are hard to read, and lack the dramatic visual impact that the Fred graph has.

Any opinions? --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:28, 19 May 2013 (UTC)

I strongly object to the new chart, it may have strong visual impact but this is simply because it is visually misleading. This data should be presented on a logarithmic scale to accurately reflect the relative nature of the changes. Presenting the data on a linear scale may make the drop LOOK more dramatic, however on a relative basis this is simply inaccurate. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.69.93.75 (talk) 21:43, 8 June 2013 (UTC)


 * I'm a big FRED fan. Perhaps you could use a shorter date range (2000 to present perhaps) to better show the impact of the crisis and the reversal.  The section on ongoing effects of the crisis would be a great place for that. In terms of the other chart, I think it's fine but you have to expand it to see it, true enough.  You also put a section on "Subprime I" in there which I removed; if you want it re-included in the body let me know and since you took the time to include it I'll find a spot for it.  I just thought it disrupted the flow of the lead too much.Farcaster (talk) 02:21, 20 May 2013 (UTC)
 * Have added the chart making it the same size as the "impact" charts box -BoogaLouie (talk) 23:09, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

"clarifying" Krugman's position
Farcaster, again I have to contest your edits here. Krugman is not saying "those agencies [the GSEs Fannie and Freddie] and goals were not involved in housing and commercial real estate markets outside the US."  He is saying what I orginally wrote before you edited it. "agencies and goals were not involved in commercial real estate market in the US or any real estate market outside it" i.e. Fannie and Freddie were not involved in commercial real estate period, and not involved in housing outside the US.

PS, it's not to big a stretch to describe an economist as "liberal" when the name of their blog is "The Conscience of a Liberal" --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:34, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

PPS, Krugman does "disagree" with Wallison, see: here BoogaLouie (talk) 22:02, 24 June 2013 (UTC)


 * Wikipedia doesn't generally tag people with their philosophy in advance (e.g., Conservative economist X, liberal economist Y). So that comes out. However, I think your initial edit looks fine on a second read. I wouldn't put Krugman in disagreement with Wallison, as one is a giant and the other is somebody who's views have been utterly rejected.  And I do appreciate your ongoing efforts to "balance" the arguments when there are 10 units of evidence on one side versus one unit on the other (e.g., the view that Fannie & Freddie were a primary cause, when both the majority and minority FCPA dissent disagreed).  We'll have to discuss paring back the he-said/she-said in the Government article as well.Farcaster (talk) 22:11, 24 June 2013 (UTC)
 * BoogaLouie, where in that link does Krugman talk about real estate outside of the USA? Did I miss it? Jason from nyc (talk) 22:26, 24 June 2013 (UTC)
 * You're right. No mention in that post by Krugman that the fact that the crisis was global indicates US Federal housing policy is innocent of its cause. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:01, 26 June 2013 (UTC)


 * At some point we'll have to dial back the conservative noise in the Government article supporting the subprime. The he said/she-said just doesn't bear out. We probably should use the majority report as our guide and mention (in a separate section on dissenting views maybe) some of the conservative hype and its debunking. I enjoyed this tidbit from Krugman: "And the other Republicans on the commission knew how bogus Wallison’s stuff was. They even worried that Ed Pinto, who was responsible for the data, might have been on the take: 'Maybe this email is reaching you too late but I think wmt [William M. Thomas] is going to push to find out if pinto is being paid by anyone.' But while the non-Wallison GOP commissioners basically agreed that the whole thing was bogus, they avoided saying so clearly. And that was clearly political."Farcaster (talk) 22:35, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

Securitization practices
Have rewritten this section adding explanation for tranches which IMHO is pretty important concept for private label mortgage MBS --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:06, 3 October 2013 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the hard work that went into this re-write. The newly rewritten “Securitization” section is good in many respects but it, like the old, it still has some problems.


 * The 2nd paragraph implies that only private institutions securitized lower credit loans. While the GSEs had an advantage in securitizing higher credit (i.e. conforming) loans it did branch out into lower credit (see Morgenson & Rosner). And GNMA has always securitized lower credit and low down-payment loans. The FHA is suffering from the losses and is essentially bankrupt. Jason from nyc (talk)
 * Adding another cite with quote. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:36, 6 October 2013 (UTC)


 * Paragraph 4 discusses the disposition of lower credit tranches. From this paragraph one gets the impression that lower credit tranches were always recycled into CDOs. This, of course, isn’t true. Hedge funds were buyers of lower credit tranches (see Conard). Even when CDOs were created using mezzanine tranches from CMOs, the lower credit tranches from the CDOs had to be bought. There wasn’t an infinite regress; the last CDO (squared, cubed, or whatever) had mezzanine tranches that were bought by institutions, usually hedge funds (see Conard). Jason from nyc (talk)
 * Changing The 20-30% remaining mezzanine tranches were usually bought up by other CDOs
 * to: The 20-30% remaining mezzanine tranches were sometimes bought up by other CDOs --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:36, 6 October 2013 (UTC)


 * Paragraph 5 has the most important information: the assumptions that went into pricing. Regardless of whether loans are securitized or not, they were priced assuming low probability of housing price declines. The aggregate losses would be exactly the same. The distribution of losses is determined by securitization, but not the aggregate losses. If one had a portfolio of loans, one is inherently diversified across default severity as one has both first loss and last loss positions. By dividing the loans into credit positions, one may have increased or decreased the risk of loss. Risk is transferred, not created. And they can fall more heavily on those that buy the mezzanine tranches directly or through CDOs. Of course, even if you held a portfolio of sub-prime loans, you (expected) long-term losses approached 50% in many cases. Jason from nyc (talk)


 * Diversification (whether on the loan level or via securitization) depends on idiosyncratic risks but economic cycles always involves systematic risk. This leads to the next point. The section properly mentions problematic pricing with respect to correlation of risks. The modeling of such risks is attempted with scenario analysis or option-adjusted-spread models. But garbage-in leads to garbage-out. With an inadequate weighting for “down scenarios” both individual pricing of a loan, a pool, or a tranched instrument will be off. It’s the failure of good inputs in terms of possible down scenarios of housing prices that plagued the models as Samuelson and Kourlas note in the references. This should really be the main point. Jason from nyc (talk) 15:05, 6 October 2013 (UTC)
 * Not sure I buy all of of what you are saying. It seems intuitive that small real estate bubble might be localized but a large one more national. But I will try to up-play the belief that home prices would always rise, and downplay the "Gaussian copula". IMHO the problem is we need a source saying something like "despite all the talk of the faulty model, the real problem was garbage-in, garbage-out, and the garbage was the assumption that home prices would always rise."   Samuelson and Kourlas mention the assumption of perpetual rising prices in passing but don't contrast it with the idea that the model was the culprit.  we can't assume you are right and  is nonsense. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:20, 6 October 2013 (UTC)

Inaccurate credit ratings
Have rewritten the ‎Inaccurate credit ratings section also.

The rewrites both add a large number of bites to the article, but much of that is in footnotes which are longer than normal because they include quotes. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:28, 5 October 2013 (UTC)

CONSUMERS GROOMED TO BE VICTIMS OF FRAUD
Before the days of computerized checkouts shopping required that the shopper decide what he/she needed to buy before leaving the house. He/she then checked to see that there was enough money in his/her wallet or checking account, also before leaving the house. At the checkout line the sales clerk rang up the purchases on a cash register and the shopper could read the printout before handing over the money or writing the check. Discrepancies were resolved on the spot, before payment.1 A consumer would plan his/her purchases, verify that the necessary money was there, shop, verify that the amount charged was correct, and pay. The process was straightforward and the consumer was in control.

In today's computerized checkouts we hand over the payment before the salesclerk gives us the receipt. If there is a problem we must choose between taking the loss and standing in line at the customer service desk. Most shoppers leave big box stores and groceries without checking their receipts. In addition, many are using checking accounts with overdraft protection or credit cards that do not have to be paid off so long as the cardholder can pay the interest.2 These shoppers can buy without having money to pay or without knowing whether they have money to pay. The many shoppers who do not check their receipts may pay too much and others using credit cards or checks may not pay and may find themselves in complex adversarial situations with their credit card company or bank.3 This confusing, devious and dangerous process dis-empowers shoppers. Instead of of planning a purchase, planning the method of payment and verifying that the amount charged is correct we shop without planning and often end up in trouble. When enough of us end up in trouble the nation has a financial crisis.4

The sub prime mortgage crisis was driven by adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). An ARM is a bait and switch proposition: a low interest rate/monthly payment is the bait. After the mortgagee has committed him/herself it is switched when the interest rate/monthly payment is raised. Foreclosure follows. 5

Our parents were young consumers in the 1950s and 1960s, before there were computers, checking accounts with overdraft protection and credit cards. For the most part they habitually planned their purchases and their method of payment, and they verified that they were getting what they intended to buy for the agreed upon price. Their children, however, were young consumers in the 1980s and 1990s. They had no experience with a straightforward experience of shopping. Planning their purchases and the method of payment is not even a concept for too many of them. These young people were groomed to buy now and take the consequences later. Their parents and grandparents would, for the most part, have recognized the danger of the ARM and avoided it. The younger generation were ready victims.

It is important to understand the fraud and irresponsibility that led to the sub prime mortgage crisis, to punish wrongdoers and to impose regulations to prevent future abuses. Still, wherever there are victims there will be scoundrels to exploit them and the scoundrels are always one step ahead of the regulators. Consumers who plan, who are not ready victims, would be a bulwark against future fraud.6

1 Personal experience being a consumer in this time period. 2 Personal experience being a consumer during the past thirty years. 3 Experience of younger acquaintances. 4 Conclusion drawn from the above experience. 5 Experience of younger acquaintances and information from many news sources. 6 This is an important idea.

I know what I have written does not look like the usual Wikipedia article: still, I had to start somewhere, and I am willing to learn.

Jason from nyc (talk) 12:22, 3 December 2013 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hotcinnamontea (talk • contribs) 22:03, 8 November 2013 (UTC)

Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - changes I made
Although some changes made were minor or grammatical, I felt this section downplayed the SEC's criminal fraud case against Fannie and Freddie executives. They were not simply charged with "misleading investors about risks of subprime-mortgage loans," as originally stated in this article. They have been charged with grossly understating the amount of substandard loans in the portfolios of Fannie/Freddie. Prior to this SEC case, most analysts were estimating GSE subprime loans by merely taking the figures (the false figures) off the financial statements of Fannie and Freddie. Many of the estimates cited go back to 2008 and are simply wrong. By the way, there is a false citation in this article (and I did not remove it). It is the reference cited to support "Fannie's share of the subprime mortgage-backed securities market cropping from a peak of 44% in 2003 to 22% in 2005, etc." Needs to be checked.

I added in a quotation from Daniel Mudd (former Fannie CEO) and another Fannie executive because I think those quotes show that governmental policies were on their minds (not just profits). Also, I put back in something that used to be in this article. Krugman cites that fact that there was a commercial bubble. Others cite the fact that there was a real estate housing bubble in other countries. But, Wallison make an important counterargument: It is not the bubble that necessarily leads to financial crisis - it is the bubble that is supported with low downpayments. Commercial loans have much higher downpayments that do housing loans.Jason from nyc (talk) 12:22, 3 December 2013 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Nicholas007 (talk • contribs) 01:37, 3 December 2013 (UTC)


 * A few points: There is a question as to whether everyone is using the same definition of "subprime." Ten years ago the word didn't have a rigorous meaning. The exact dividing line between subprime and alt-A wasn't clear. It was left up to the loan originators and often seen as part of the marketing plan. I remember asking the people at "Loan Performance," a major supplier of data from the majority of issuers, why a loan from A was classified as subprime when a loan from B wasn't (same characteristics) and they said each issuer was free to define the term. Eventually the term was rigorously defined but when I read historic documents the term seems to be used differently depending on contexts. Some use subprime as simply "less than prime," i.e. non-conforming. In this case they are including alt-A. Thus, be careful when comparing one person's stats with another's.


 * The second point I want to make is that many references note the most important "less than prime" characteristic is the inadequate downpayment (i.e. less than 20%). For instance, Kourlas, (one of our references) emphasizes this but so do others. Wallison makes an important point here.


 * Finally, my last point is that the GSEs had two roles: one in securitizing loans and a second (since the 90s) of investing and holding a portfolio of loans. In the latter case they could buy loans securitized by others. Early reports seemed to focus on the 1st role and therefore downplayed the GSEs. Overall, there are many straws that broke the camel's back (GSEs, banks, investors, foreign lending, Fed). There is no "one cause." Jason from nyc (talk) 12:22, 3 December 2013 (UTC)

Links
>> ‘Ring of Death’ Throttles Georgia as Small Banks Close: Economy(Lihaas (talk) 17:09, 19 March 2014 (UTC)).

Narratives?
Should we define "major narratives?" I appreciate the intention if we're trying to introduce the reader to different descriptions of what caused what; but should we decide which narrative is "major" and how many there are? Is there widespread agreement in the economic profession on such contending narratives? For example, decades ago when I was a student one could say there was a policy debate on business cycle regulation and whether fiscal policy or monetary policy should be the main tool. One could have said there were two major camps. Do we have anything like that with regard to the subprime crisis and subsequent recession? I'm not even sure the "Great Depression" has a finite number of narratives. I worry that we are doing original research. Of course, we can and must summarize the article in the lead. But I worry about casting in stone competing theoretical constructs that may or may not overlap in one author vs. another author's writings. Jason from nyc (talk) 14:33, 3 July 2014 (UTC)
 * I removed the "major". There are generally narratives on any major issue where the cause is debated. Krugman's piece on Geithner's book is an excellent read and he mentions two "narratives" in there, calling them such (the shadow banking crash and household debt narratives). Sowell's entire book is about the "government caused it" narrative.Farcaster (talk) 17:33, 3 July 2014 (UTC)

NYT's article on Lehman Brothers
The decision to not bail out Lehman Brothers was closer than previously known, see this NYT's analysis. User:Fred Bauder Talk 06:44, 1 October 2014 (UTC)

Non sequitur
Hi. There is a step missing in this sequence: "It was triggered by a large decline in home prices, resulting in mortgage delinquencies". A decline in prices does not cause delinquencies. The decline in prices let to selling houses to those who normally would not be able to afford, which in turn resulted in morgage delinquencies. Rui &#39;&#39;Gabriel&#39;&#39; Correia (talk) 13:56, 9 November 2014 (UTC)
 * That wasn't the sequence in this case. The folks got higher priced houses due to lowered lending standards, then prices fell starting in 2006. Delinquencies happened thereafter as they walked away or were unable to refinance.Farcaster (talk) 14:20, 9 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Whichever way it happened or what the stahes were, at the very least something is required in the sentence to not make it sound as if these two followed each other in direct sequence, ie, we can't say "decline in prices = delinquencies". If nothing else, at least something like "It was triggered by a large decline in home prices, ultimately  resulting in mortgage delinquencies". Rui &#39;&#39;Gabriel&#39;&#39; Correia (talk) 20:11, 9 November 2014 (UTC)
 * OK. I added "leading to..." per your suggestion. Inability to refinance is probably a good choice for the intermediate link in the chain, but is discussed in the body.Farcaster (talk) 22:02, 9 November 2014 (UTC)

Article has broad gaps
The article must incorporate the works: M. Jay Wells, "Why the Mortgage Crisis Happened" in IBD (http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=487515&Ntt=jay+wells) and Paul Sperry, The Great American Bank Robbery: The Unauthorized Report About What Really Caused the Great Recession. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Details4details (talk • contribs) 20:23, 14 May 2015 (UTC)
 * I took a quick look at the IBD article. It seems to be a re-hash of the "government housing policy caused the crisis narrative" which has been thoroughly debunked by the facts yet remains a popular conspiracy theory among conservatives.  See "The Big Lie" by Barry Ritholtz for a summary of the case against that narrative.14:38, 20 January 2016 (UTC)

Time for an update on long term effects
It's 4 years since the bulk of this article was written and we've seen several popularizations in the movies. Perhaps it's time to think about the long term consequences and regulatory responses (or lack thereof)and how the economy can function when the bulls get out of control. --16:53, 19 January 2016 (UTC)Mccainre (talk)

Beazer
Seconding User:Mccainre. Also, it would be good if an editor who knows this topic would do a little editing at Beazer .E.M.Gregory (talk) 15:49, 15 February 2016 (UTC)

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Dr. Gerardi's comment on this article
Dr. Gerardi has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:

""Declines in residential investment preceded the recession and were followed by reductions in household spending and then business investment. Spending reductions were more significant in areas with a combination of high household debt and larger housing price declines.[2]"

I don't think the above two sentences belong in the opening paragraph since the article is supposed to be about the "subprime mortgage crisis," not the recession that subsequently followed the crisis. I would substitute the following sentence: "The subprime mortgage crisis precipitated the worst U.S. recession since the Great Depression and had severe ramifications on the global economy."

"Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market."

This sentence is in the 4th paragraph of the "Background and timeline of events" section. It is referring to mortgage-backed securities and how they became extremely popular during the housing boom in the early-mid 2000s. Mortgage-backed securities had been around for decades before the housing boom, so I do not think it is appropriate to refer to them as a "financial innovation." As a substitute I would prefer the following sentence: "MBS provided an easy way for institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market."

"Excessive consumer housing debt was in turn caused by the mortgage-backed security, credit default swap, and collateralized debt obligation sub-sectors of the finance industry, which were offering irrationally low interest rates and irrationally high levels of approval to subprime mortgage consumers because they were calculating aggregate risk using gaussian copula formulas that strictly assumed the independence of individual component mortgages, when in fact the credit-worthiness of almost every new subprime mortgage was highly correlated with that of any other because of linkages through consumer spending levels which fell sharply when property values began to fall during the initial wave of mortgage defaults."

I would replace with the following paragraph:

"Excessive consumer housing debt was in turn caused by the mortgage-backed security, credit default swap, and collateralized debt obligation sub-sectors of the finance industry, which were offering irrationally low interest rates and irrationally high levels of approval to subprime mortgage consumers because they were calculating aggregate risk using gaussian copula formulas that strictly assumed the independence of individual component mortgages, when in fact the credit-worthiness of almost every new subprime mortgage was highly correlated with that of any other because of common exposure to housing price declines."

I have an issue with the following paragraph:

"Among the important catalysts of the subprime crisis were the influx of money from the private sector, the banks entering into the mortgage bond market, government policies aimed at expanding homeownership, speculation by many home buyers, and the predatory lending practices of the mortgage lenders, specifically the adjustable-rate mortgage, 2–28 loan, that mortgage lenders sold directly or indirectly via mortgage brokers."

There is nothing inherently predatory about the 2-28 (or 3-27) adjustable-rate mortgage. It is simply a mortgage with a fixed interest rate for 2 (or 3) years at which point the rate resets to a rate that adjusts (typically every month) and tracks a particular aggregate interest rate (or index). Also, there is little-to-no evidence of systematic predatory lending that directly caused subprime mortgage borrowers to default. There are certainly some anecdotes of predatory behavior on the part of mortgage brokers, but often this took the form of misleading the lender by filling in false information on the borrower's income/assets on the mortgage application.

I also do not agree with the manner in which the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report is held up as the definitive document about the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis. I, and many other researchers, do not agree with the commission's conclusion that the crisis was avoidable. I lay out the reasons for my disagreement in some detail in a paper that I wrote with coauthors:

"Why did so many people make so many ex-post bad decisions? The causes of the foreclosure crisis" (with Chris Foote and Paul Willen) 2012. Prepared for the conference, ``Rethinking Finance: New Perspectives on the Crisis," organized by Alan Blinder, Andrew Lo, and Robert Solow and sponsored by the Russell Sage and Century Foundations.

I have some serious issues with the "Narratives" section:

Narrative #3: Record levels of household debt accumulated in the decades preceding the crisis resulted in a balance sheet recession (similar to debt deflation) once housing prices began falling in 2006. Consumers began paying down debt, which reduces their consumption, slowing down the economy for an extended period while debt levels are reduced.

There is very little evidence backing this narrative. Moreover, it not consistent with the fact that we saw millions of defaults and foreclosures in which borrowers were offloading their debt obligations (so that they did not have to reduce their consumption).

The final paragraph in the section is pure speculation, with absolutely no evidence to back it up:

"Underlying narratives #1-3 is a hypothesis that growing income inequality and wage stagnation encouraged families to increase their household debt to maintain their desired living standard, fueling the bubble. Further, this greater share of income flowing to the top increased the political power of business interests, who used that power to deregulate or limit regulation of the shadow banking system."

There is no evidence in the academic literature that ties rising income inequality and/or wage stagnation to the housing bubble -- ZERO. this paragraph should be eliminated."

We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.

We believe Dr. Gerardi has expertise on the topic of this article, since he has published relevant scholarly research:


 * Reference 1: Kristopher S. Gerardi & Eric Rosenblatt & Paul S. Willen & Vincent W. Yao, 2012. "Foreclosure externalities: some new evidence," Public Policy Discussion Paper 12-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.


 * Reference 2: Christopher L. Foote & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2012. "Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions?: the causes of the foreclosure crisis," Public Policy Discussion Paper 12-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.


 * Reference 3: Kristopher Gerardi & Lauren Lambie-Hanson & Paul S. Willen, 2011. "Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes?: evidence from the foreclosure process," Public Policy Discussion Paper 11-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.


 * Reference 4: Kristopher Gerardi & Harvey S. Rosen & Paul Willen, 2006. "Do households benefit from financial deregulation and innovation?: the case of the mortgage market," Public Policy Discussion Paper 06-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.


 * Reference 5: Adelino, Manuel & Frame, W. Scott & Gerardi, Kristopher S., 2014. "Economic & Financial Highlights Economists Inflation Project Publications Research Centers Seminars Small Business Focus The Effect of Large Investors on Asset Quality: Evidence from Subprime Mortgage," Working Paper 2014-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

ExpertIdeasBot (talk) 19:40, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

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Turns out that subprime borrowers were NOT the proximate cause
The day does not support what "everyone knows". History as it was written needs to be rewritten.

"House flippers triggered the US housing market crash, not poor subprime borrowers" https://qz.com/1064061/house-flippers-triggered-the-us-housing-market-crash-not-poor-subprime-borrowers-a-new-study-shows/ Refers to http://www.nber.org/papers/w23740 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.97.11.54 (talk) 13:29, 7 September 2017 (UTC)
 * This is just one source; we don't want to over-weight it. We'll see how the consensus changes over time. I'll remove the tag but add some text from this interesting research in the article. Note also that the lead section says "A proximate cause" not "The proximate cause" and the preceding sentences explain how there were many causes and much debate about them.Farcaster (talk) 22:55, 7 September 2017 (UTC)
 * The source and the data it cites are convincing. I believe this article should be renamed in light of the inherent bias of its current name, to something more neutral in light of the evidence.  E.g. "2008 U.S. mortgage crisis" Parallel49 (talk) 22:29, 6 November 2017 (UTC)


 * As Wikipedia editors, our proper role is not to "re-write" history -- regardless of whether it "needs to be rewritten".


 * And, although the source and the data it cites are "convincing" in the view of a particular Wikipedia editor, I'm not "convinced" that this is a sufficient reason to change a title that an editor views as being inherently "biased." Famspear (talk) 22:57, 6 November 2017 (UTC)


 * The Equifax data revealed from this new study shows unequivocally that among mortgage defaults, the top two quintiles of credit scores, particularly those owning multiple homes, were the ones who registered by far the highest increase in defaults in the U.S. during the crisis period. I'm curious to see why you're not "convinced" by this data?!  Are you aware of opposing viewpoints to this new evidence that can be cited to put this explanation into question?!  That would be very relevant right now.


 * In the spirit of Wikipedia's NPOV rule, if the cause of a subject is contested within sources, then I would recommend pursuing a name change that can as best as possible refer to the subject at hand, without giving undue balance to any particular point of view. As far as I can tell, there are plenty of possible names for this article which can fulfill that goal.  E.g. "2008 U.S. mortgage crisis", "U.S. housing loan crisis" among others.  (Indeed, the current name is troublesome for other reasons: namely, it's overbroad and non-international, referencing a specific moment in history as pertains to the U.S. during the specific timeline of the Great Recession) Parallel49 (talk) 04:05, 7 November 2017 (UTC)


 * "Subprime mortgage crisis" is the name the Fed gave it. Subprime mortgage crisis. We could have a section on why some published sources think that's a bad name. While the studies above indicate housing speculation was an important cause, so were subprime mortgages and their derivatives, so the name is appropriate anyway. There is another branch article called the "Financial Crisis of 2007-2008" that could be combined with this one. The Subprime mortgage crisis was the parent article that most of the others copied from.Farcaster (talk) 15:34, 7 November 2017 (UTC)

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When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

Cheers.— InternetArchiveBot  (Report bug) 14:26, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

External links modified
Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified 9 external links on Subprime mortgage crisis. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:
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When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

Cheers.— InternetArchiveBot  (Report bug) 22:13, 20 November 2017 (UTC)

Deletion of citations to widely cited academic article by MrOllie based on Off-wiki personal attack; see wikipedia's page on reliable sources re: Mortgage Securitization
I wrote the following on MrOllie's talk page following his deletion of citations to a particular academic author. Mr. Ollie did not respond on substance but rather responded with ad hominem attacks. Please discuss so that we can reach consensus.

Dear MrOllie,

You recently reverted edits to articles about mortgage securitization, the GSEs, and the subprime mortgage crisis. I believe these revisions reduced the substantive quality of the wikipedia articles and the edits should be restored. My explanation is below. I look forward to working with you amicably to reach consensus. I believe that our goal should be to improve the article and cite to high quality, relevant sources whenever possible.

The edits you reverted included substantive improvements to the articles and cited an award-winning (see also here), widely-cited, widely-read academic journal article by a tenured professor at a leading research university with relevant expertise.

According to Wikipedia's policy on reliable sources:

″Many Wikipedia articles rely on scholarly material. When available, academic and peer-reviewed publications, scholarly monographs, and textbooks are usually the most reliable sources. . . . Material such as an article, book, monograph, or research paper that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable, where the material has been published in reputable peer-reviewed sources or by well-regarded academic presses. . . . One can confirm that discussion of the source has entered mainstream academic discourse by checking the scholarly citations it has received in citation indexes.″

Thus, the source cited is among the most reliable sources under Wikipedia's definition of reliable sources. You reverted it while suggesting that it might be reference-spamming, but given the relevance of the academic article to the wikipedia article, and the high quality of the academic article--demonstrated by its placement, its citations, its readership, its awards and the institutional affiliation and status of its author--it is not a form of spam but rather a legitimate effort to improve the article.

Please note that news articles in journals with an ideological valence, think tank reports and other materials are considered less reliable sources than academic research. See Biased or Opinionated Sources Many of the other sources in the article are editorials and think tank reports, not academic articles, and the inclusion of more high quality and up-to-date academic articles would therefore improve the article.

Many of the think tank reports cited in the article are written by organizations that receive financial sponsorship from private lenders and therefore have an interest in portraying the financial crisis as having been caused by government policies rather than by private financial institutions. One of the few academic reports cited is years out of date, claims to provide a "comprehensive" bibliography of articles, but was published in 2012. Much has been written in the ensuing 7 years--the article is no longer a comprehensive review, if it ever was. And indeed, the author claiming otherwise has a think-tank affiliation.

In addition, self-published material is generally considered an unreliable source, except when published by well-published academic experts. Per Wikipedia policy, self-published material:

″are largely not acceptable as sources. Self-published expert sources may be considered reliable when produced by an established expert on the subject matter, whose work in the relevant field has previously been published by reliable third-party publications.″"

You cited to self-published blog by a self-employed blogger / part time document reviewer which contains an off-wikipedia criticism of a scholar with whom he disagrees about the benefits of legal education.

It may be helpful to understand the context of this post. The blogger apparently posted this criticism as a form of revenge for having been made to appear foolish for making substantive mistakes about legal education and student loans --subjects about which the blogger purports to be an expert--even in a publication to which he has contributed.

Citing to the post you cited violates wikipedia policies including No_personal_attacks and []. Indeed, the author of the post you cited acknowledged "that this post might be construed as an “off-wiki attack” ... that Wikipedians may perceive as harmful to their community."

Edits are supposed to be evaluated on substance based on established wikipedia policies about reliable sources, not based on snap decisions based on []

I recognize that my edits only added one source and that it would be better to include multiple sources. If you would like to add additional high quality academic sources rather than deleting the few high quality citations that are in the wikipedia article, I would encourage you to do so. I have reviewed Wikipedia's Conflict of Interest policies and I am in compliance. Mbs6446 (talk) 17:00, 31 March 2019 (UTC)