Talk:Surrender of Japan/Archive 1

Fact questions
Did not the Koiso cabinet fall because of the Invasion of Okinawa? From Koiso's wiki page: "Koiso resigned in April 1945 when American forces invaded Okinawa" bosoxrock88 (talk) 14:42, 18 August 2009 (UTC)bosoxrock88

Another questionable fact: "This plan was to be a radical departure from the "defense in depth" plans used in the invasions of Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Instead, everything was staked on the beachhead."

Whereas the wiki article for Ketsugo says "For the defense of Kyūshū, the Japanese took an intermediate posture, with the bulk of their defensive forces a few kilometres inland from the shore — back far enough to avoid complete exposure to naval gunnery, but close enough that the Americans could not establish a secure foothold before engaging them. The counteroffensive forces were still further back, prepared to move against whichever landing seemed to be the main effort." bosoxrock88 (talk) 14:59, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

"Emperor Hirohito and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido were also present for Supreme War Council meetings."

The citation references Frank's "Downfall the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire". In that work Frank hypothesizes that the Emperor and Kido were probably present for some of the meetings of the Supreme War Council. He does not claim that the Emperor and Kido were present in all meetings.bosoxrock88 (talk) 15:07, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

old comments
What does "shusen-kinenbi" (first paragraph) mean in Japanese, word for word? I know it's another name for VJ day, but what does it mean literally? Thanks! - Tronno ( t | c ) 06:06, 7 March 2006 (UTC) Never mind. - Tronno ( t | c ) 14:42, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

Break down by word: 終戦 [しゅうせん] /(n) end of war/ 記念 [きねん] /(n) commemoration/memory/ 日 [ひ] /day/

Break down by character: 終 [おわり] /(n) the end/ 戦 [いくさ] /(n) war/ 記 [き] /(n,n-suf) chronicle/ 念 [ねん] /(n) /attention/

Mlewan 10:32, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Merge with Japanese Instrument of Surrender ?
I am opposed to such a merge, as the Japanese Instrument of Surrender article now contains the full text of the treaty, which is a proper level of detail for an article on the treaty, but would be an excessive level of detail in this article. StuRat 23:32, 29 June 2006 (UTC)


 * I concur - what is the method of getting rid of the proposed merger tag? Its been there one and a half months. I'd say delete it (if nobody else has substantial opposing reasons) after two months. MadMaxDog 05:56, 10 August 2006 (UTC)


 * I agree. StuRat 06:54, 10 August 2006 (UTC)
 * Same here. Its been there one and a half months ? I'm removing the {merge} tag. --PFHLai 20:51, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

I read...
I read that one soldier surrendered not earlier than 2000. It was a few years ago, when I read it in a newspaper. He gave up only when he received the order from his commander, who was shipped there especially for this act.--Nixer 16:36, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

suggest removal of POV language
In the sentence ending, seeking to maintain its neutrality, or more fantastically, to form an alliance. I'm strongly inclined to delete "or more fantastically," as, at best, there's no clear context in that paragraph supporting it, and at worst it's a statement of bias, which is not encyclopedic style. Can anyone rewrite to show specifically who (in the context of the article) thought Shigenori's alliance-idea was "fantastic"? (and of course I'm talking about the "fantasy-like" definition of "fantastic," not the one where something's super awesome.) If not, I'll delete -- but very delicately, so as not to damage surrounding tissue. :)

Sugarbat 00:19, 22 November 2006 (UTC)


 * What's an nicely NPOV way of saying the Japanese were out of their minds if they seriously thought there was any chance that Stalin, having just defeated Germany and seized the spoils of victory in Europe, would switch alliances to support Japan, which was clearly facing defeat, and with which the Russians had several disputes of their own? :-)
 * I think "fantastically" was my choice of wording, but here's a quote from Richard B. Frank's Downfall:
 * "The Army sought primarily to keep the Soviets out of the war, ... The Navy's vision did not pause there but roamed on to hallucinate an exchange of some cruisers and resources for oil and aircraft, with a distant goal of forming an alliance with the Soviets. Foreign Minister Togo stomped on thse fantasies by noting acidly that diplomacy depended on the military situation and warning that the Soviets might well have already reached an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom." [emphasis added.]


 * I need to go through this article and footnote the quotations. Not this week, however.
 * —wwoods 07:20, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

surrender of japan
I've read that actually Japan was willing to make a peace treaty weeks BEFORE the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 62.78.255.80 (talk • contribs).


 * Yes, here is one place [] where some attempts are described. I have read about several other attempts. Some of this seems to be described in the article in a different perspective, but it is the same story, really. As I read it, the conditions that the Japanese were looking early on were what they got in the end anyway, so some have questioned why the bombs dropped. DanielDemaret 19:20, 5 May 2007 (UTC)


 * A few more examples: http://www.greenwych.ca/dulles.htm http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/aug2006/jap_midway.html . Also, one of the attempts at surrendering before the bomb was a telegram of surrender from the emperor, at one time famous among translators, where it is suggested that had this telegram been correctly translated, it would have stopped the war there and then. I have read the telegram, and although a possible surrender, it did not seem to me like an unconditional surrender, but I may have misinterpreted it, since my Japanese is too awful. Oh, and, no, I can not claim that any of my sources are very good. On the other hand, some sources tell the same story as this article, just with a slightly different angle to it. DanielDemaret 19:28, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

Japanese name order
If I understand the Wikipedia style manual correctly, the Japanese names in this article ought to be given in Western order (e.g., Hideki Tojo, not Tojo Hideki). Comments? Richwales 05:38, 11 December 2006 (UTC)


 * When I wrote this, I tried to make it about 'what the Japanese did', rather than the usual 'what the Americans did'. As part of that, I put the names in the Japanese order, but for clarity I used just the surname on the next references. (Disclaimer: I think Japanese order ought to be the norm for Japanese names.)
 * —wwoods 19:06, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

Soviet entering into the war
No mention of Soviet entering into the war which in fact caused the surrender.--Planemo 17:06, 14 December 2006 (UTC)


 * In the section titled "Hiroshima, Manchuria, and Nagasaki":
 * "At 04:00 on August 9, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the neutrality pact, declared war on Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria. The senior ..."
 * —wwoods 19:06, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

Yes, this section is going to have to be significantly revised. I've just finished writing an article about the Japanese surrender which will be published in International Security this Spring. I argue that the Soviet intervention was decisive. Ascribing most of the cause to the Soviet intervention is not an unusual position among historians. It is not, however, yet the consensus position. Having just read all the sources for my article, I'm in a position to comment. Most historians believe that the Soviet Invasion was primarily responsible for the Japanese decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Almost all of them (Hagesawa is the exception), however, ascribe some influence to the Bomb as well. (I believe they're wrong, but Wikipedia is not about what I believe, or even what I publish, but the best consensus of experts at the current moment.) In order for this Wikipedia article to accurately reflect the consensus, it will have to be rewritten to emphasize the importance of the Soviet intervention.WardHayesWilson 00:08, 15 December 2006 (UTC)
 * Agree. It is not clear from the article that Manchuria was both a Japanese Achilles' heel (the most convenient place for the attack of the home island) and one of the most important industrial regions. Until Manchuria and Korea were under Japanese control, it was extremely hard to defeat Japan. For instance, Donald E. Shepardson wrote: "Following the Yalta conference, the (American) War Department formulated plans for the final assault on Japan. Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for December 1945. Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu, would follow in April 1946. Both operations, and especially Coronet, depended on transferring men and material from Europe. Approximately 400,000 Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Security Forces were scheduled for direct transfer from Europe to the Pacific from September 1945 to April 1946, with another 400,000 allowed a delay en route in the United States, with all projections subject to available shipping.Conquest of the Home Islands might take until the end of the year, still leaving the Japanese in control of Burma, Formosa (Taiwan), Manchuria, and large parts of China. The Kwantung army in China and Manchuria had lost much of its strength, but still had a million men. For those Americans who survived Okinawa, as well as those who joined them later, "The Golden Gate in '48" might be the best they could hope for." (The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth. Author(s): Donald E. Shepardson Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 135-153) Therefore, it would be great if some explanations of the real effect of the invasion of Manchuria were added.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:53, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

Significance of the Surrender of Japan
Much of our thinking about nuclear weapons is based on our interpretation of the Surrender of Japan. Much of the reputation that nuclear weapons have for power and influence and military effectiveness stems from this historical event. The Surrender of Japan is one of the more important historical events, because it fundamentally shapes out view of nuclear weapons. Which are rather important. WardHayesWilson 04:49, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

WOW. Just wow. Togo's communique.
Togo's communique of around 19-22 june here reads, with it's many "..."s, as peaceful and pro-surrender, while most historians have pointed at this as an example of Japan explicitly REJECTING surrdender before the a-bombs. I'd like to see the source document on this, becuase it looks as if wikipedias has been victim of some very un-neutral snippet making here.

86.6.11.56 16:11, 3 July 2007 (UTC)


 * The quote in question is,
 * "With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."


 * A longer quote, with the ellided text in italics is,
 * "With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, which is not so-called unconditional surrender, through the good offices of Russia. It is necessary that we exert ourselves so that this idea will be finally driven home to the Americans and the British.
 * Therefore, it is not only impossible for us to request the Russians to lend their good offices in obtaining a peace without conditions, it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."
 * The quote hasn't been messed with — since it starts by saying "we are unable to consent to [unconditional surrender]", I didn't think the repetition was worth the space. My source was Richard Frank's Downfall, p.230; he was quoting Magic Diplomatic Summary No. 1214, 22 July 1945, which is available from the National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162, in (Document 40 [pdf]).


 * I need to go through this and add all the cites. —wwoods 19:53, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

When

 * In the spring and summer of 1945
 * it took until the spring of 1946
 * ...when they attempted to invade Kyūshū in the fall

These time periods are ambiguous and not suitable for a global audience. They should be replaced by more precise time units that don't implicitly assume that seasons and dates are interchangeable (they are not because the corresponding southern hemisphere seasons do not occur at the same time of year as northern hemisphere seasons, and the tropics do not have temperate zone seasons). --B.d.mills 01:11, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Tennozan?
The Emperor, looking for a tennozan, replied that it was premature to seek peace, "unless we make one more military gain".

It would probably be worthwhile to (i) explain what a tennozan is (I've found http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718%28199401%2958%3A1%3C167%3ATTBFOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&size=LARGE&origin=JSTOR-enlargePage, which is admirable) and (ii) explain how we know so precisely what the Emperor was thinking. jiHymas@himivest.com 216.191.217.90 17:39, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

Planned work, barring objection
If no one objects, I plan to redo the Notes and References sections of this article similarly to History of the Philippines (1898–1946). Comments? Objections? -- Boracay Bill (talk) 04:06, 19 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I object. That article does not have standard Notes and References sections.  I applaud your desire to work on the Wikipedia but
 * (1) Harvard style referencing is in text and you have put them all into the middle of ref tags. See: WP:CITE (Inline citation styles: Harvard referencing) and WP:HARV
 * (2) The References section repeats several full citations. A full citation should appear only once in any citation style.
 * patsw (talk) 20:55, 19 February 2008 (UTC)
 * I don't understand
 * (1) This Surrender of Japan article currently does not use in-text Harvard referencing. It, like the History of the Philippines (1898–1946) uses Harvard-style references placed along with footnotes into an endmatter section named "Notes".  The big difference between the referencing styles of two articles is that the Harvard-style references here are not wikilinked to the corresponding items in the References section as they are in that other article.
 * (2) The References section in Surrender of Japan does not repeat any full cites (or, if it does, it shouldn't). It does individually cite individual chapters of particular works where those works are available online and it is possible to provide individual external links directly to those individual chapters. I wouldn't anticipate doing that in this article.
 * To clarify, I would anticipate using the Harvnb and Citation templates here to provide the aforementioned links, and also would anticipate placing a citation in the References section for &mdash; currently one element of a double-barreled citation. Some additional issues might emerge during this, and I'd handle those as they came up. -- Boracay Bill (talk) 04:26, 20 February 2008 (UTC)


 * (1) History of the Philippines (1898–1946) has Harvnb inside tags. Harvard references should appear in the text and not inside tags.  I object to your plan to put this style of double reference into the article (i.e. text->notes->references)
 * (2) History of the Philippines (1898–1946) has the full references which are repeated. This is one example where the full reference is repeated three times:
 * This clutters the References section. The full reference should appear once.  The style guides tell you how to write a partial reference. I'm not objecting to Harvard referencing in principle, I'm objecting to its incorrect implementation in History of the Philippines (1898–1946) being repeated in Surrender of Japan. patsw (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2008 (UTC)
 * This clutters the References section. The full reference should appear once.  The style guides tell you how to write a partial reference. I'm not objecting to Harvard referencing in principle, I'm objecting to its incorrect implementation in History of the Philippines (1898–1946) being repeated in Surrender of Japan. patsw (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2008 (UTC)
 * This clutters the References section. The full reference should appear once.  The style guides tell you how to write a partial reference. I'm not objecting to Harvard referencing in principle, I'm objecting to its incorrect implementation in History of the Philippines (1898–1946) being repeated in Surrender of Japan. patsw (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2008 (UTC)
 * This clutters the References section. The full reference should appear once.  The style guides tell you how to write a partial reference. I'm not objecting to Harvard referencing in principle, I'm objecting to its incorrect implementation in History of the Philippines (1898–1946) being repeated in Surrender of Japan. patsw (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Wikipedia allows both in-text harvard references and footnote-style harvard references. Footnote-style rather than in-text style happens to be used by both this article and by the other article mentioned here. I have no desire to get into a discussion about the merits one citation style vs. another, and if I were to get into such a discussion I probably would not do it in WT:CITE rather than here.


 * Incidentally, it is my understanding that when when originated by Edward Laurens Mark in 1881, harvard referencing used footnote-style references (though formatted somewhat differently than is popular today). See this.


 * Regarding those three references, as I explained previously each references and provides a clickable link to a particular chapter of the same book. It's a matter of editorial judgment whether or not the convenience provided by clickable links to referenced chapters outweighs the clutter their presence produces, and I'm not arguing that point either way here.


 * I'm removing this page from my watchlist. -- Boracay Bill (talk) 03:36, 21 February 2008 (UTC)

Outstanding
This section is outstandingly well-written! I am intimately familiar with this subject, having just written a couple of articles about it, and this account carefully and faithfully presents the facts without once stepping into controversy. There are so many land mines in this topic area that it is breath-taking to watch the author calmly and skillfully avoid them. This is an amazing, virtuoso performance of encyclopedia writing. No one, except a person who was well versed in the myriad controversies that surround this subject, can appreciate how carefully and artfully the author (or authors) have managed this problem. I am going to nominate this. It is excellent, excellent work.WardHayesWilson (talk) 13:49, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

A couple of points
(1) I really think that this paragraph in Divisions within the Japanese leadership shouldn't be the section's lead, but should go after the naming of Council participants:
 * Legally, the Japanese Army and Navy had the right to nominate (or refuse to nominate) their respective ministers. Thus, they could prevent the formation of undesirable governments, or by resignation bring about the collapse of an existing government.[9][10]

(2) The caption of the surrender photo is awfully long. Maybe in this case we could get by with abbreviated names, to tighten it up?

—WWoods (talk) 22:51, 26 February 2009 (UTC)


 * I was mulling over switching the two paragraphs myself. I've gone ahead and made the switch. I've also used your shortened caption. Raul654 (talk) 02:58, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Juggling images a little
I'm going to juggle the images just a little, so that Suzuki faces into the text, instead of away. Feel free to revert if there's any problem.Ferrylodge (talk) 03:35, 19 March 2009 (UTC)

Congratulations
Well deserved, a terrific piece of hard work...good article..Modernist (talk) 02:01, 22 March 2009 (UTC)
 * What Modernist said. :-)Ferrylodge (talk) 18:15, 22 March 2009 (UTC)

Forgotten final raid on Japan
Why does almost every program on TV say the Atomic Bomb is what ended the war in the pacific. This is not exactly true, the fact is One hundred thirty two B-29s attached to the 315th Heavy Bomb Wing flew the last mission of WWII August 14/15—6 days after Nagasaki was struck by the second atomic bomb. It was after this last raid, in which B-29s flew over Tokyo, Then, during this raid disrupted indirectly an attempt to capture the emperor and force Japan to continue fighting. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.210.25.201 (talk) 07:40, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

It's mentioned, in the section on the Japanese decision to surrender: —WWoods (talk) 15:26, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

Supreme War Council
Contrary to what user:Raul654 seems to infer, the SWC (Gunjji sangi'in) must NOT be confused with the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (Saikō sensō shidō kaigi), which was in power from 1944 to 1945...

Among many, many sources, one must read on this : In the Service of the Emperor : Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army by Edward J. Drea, p.195 and Japan's decision to surrender by Robert Butow p.81 .... --Flying Tiger (talk) 16:33, 1 January 2010 (UTC)-


 * Supreme War Council for the Direction of the War, used in the first paragraph, is redundant (War council for the direction of the war?) and gets 0 hits on google. It sounds like someone made it up. Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (used in the linked article) does get google hits, and I'd be fine using that consistently throughout this article.


 * As for the rest of the edits I removed, they are full of unsourced claims that I think are wrong (like the multiple claims that the Soviets gave the Japanese war intelligence) and things that are flat-out untrue (like the claim that Iwo Jima was used as a base for bombing Japan. It was not. It was used as an emergency landing strip). I am reverting back to my version. Raul654 (talk) 17:26, 1 January 2010 (UTC)

Yeah.. I meant the references to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. As for your other move on the earlier edits, I do not mind at all but you should be more careful in your reversion as all your changes are mixed up, so the job to put back what was right and clean the mess goes to others.... --Flying Tiger (talk) 18:03, 1 January 2010 (UTC)

Images of some document
I'm not really familiar with World War II, but I found three images   of a document signed by Yasuji Okamura that has to do with the Japanese surrender. Source is a forum thread. If someone can identify it, I think it might be useful to incorporate them or some of them in the article. 174.23.246.33 (talk) 00:22, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

Lede
The old version of the lede contained some inaccuracies. Firstly, the way the USSR joined the war contains unneeded parallellism with Nazi attact of the USSR. In actuality, these two events were completely different. Germany directly violated the neutrality pact with the USSR and declared a war only post factum. By contrast, the USSR denounced the pact with Japan in April, then it declared a war on Aug 8, and only after that did it start invasion. Secondly, Manchuria was not a Japanese colony. It was a semi-independent puppet state. I fixed that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:45, 19 February 2010 (UTC)


 * I'm not clear on what distinction you're drawing between
 * "launched a surprise invasion of the Japanese colony in Manchuria (Manchukuo), in violation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact"
 * and
 * "denounced Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact and ... after declaration of a war on Japan launched a massive invasion of the Japanese puppet state"
 * Are you thinking that "denouncing" the pact was the same as breaking it? No, that merely prevented its extension through 1951; the pact was still legally in effect when the Soviets declared war.
 * " Article three: The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years."
 * —WWoods (talk) 07:40, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Did you even read that section of this article? The "denouncement" was a notification that the Soviets were not going to renew the pact. It did not break the pact - it meant that on April 13, 1946, 5 years after the original came into force, the pact would expire instead of being automatically renewed, as article 3 of the pact states. I am reverting to the original correct version. Raul654 (talk) 16:28, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Also FWIW, I don't have a problem with changing "Japanese colony in Manchuria" to "Japanese puppet state of Manchuria." They're basically the same thing. I do object to removing the "surprise attack" part though - the Japanese, despite warnings signs, were taken completely by surprise by the attack. Raul654 (talk) 16:36, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Undefined reference to "controversy"
"Controversy still exists..." is in the introduction without a context. I don't know what controversy is being referenced here and it doesn't seem to be developed later in the article text. Text should be added to define the specific controversy if that's the editor's intent. patsw (talk) 18:04, 14 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Controversy exists in the sense that opponents of the use of the atomic bomb cling to the premises that Japan either (a) tried to surrender to the allies prior to the atom bombs, or (b) would have surrendered within a few months of August 1945 to the allies without the use of atomic bombs. In either case, the argument goes, the bombings were unnecessary.
 * Both of these claims ignore the simple fact that in order to surrender, Japan would have to do so on terms acceptable to the Allies, and the terms the majority of the cabinet were advocating would never have been acceptable to the allies. Thus, the former of these claims is demonstrably false, and its proponents must go to great lengths to ignore essentially all historical evidence of the Japanese cabinet's internal deliberations.
 * We cannot "rerun" history without the atomic bombs, so we can never conclusively show that B is false, but those same records from Japanese deliberations also show that the latter is wrong as well. They were clearly positioned to fight at least one more big battle (the invasion of Kyushu) in the hopes of securing better terms. Thus, premise B must also be false. (Note: the deaths resulting from this battle would have dwarfed the atom bombs to insignificance. The destruction of the Japanese rail system - a prerequisite to the invasion - would have caused a famine that - conservatively - would have killed several million people.) Raul654 (talk) 18:18, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

United States Strategic Bombing Survey rejected the notion that Japan gave up because of the atomic bombings. In its authoritative 1946 report, the Survey concluded:


 * The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the enemy leaders who ended the war did they persuade Japan to accept unconditional surrender. The Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Navy Minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that the war should be ended even if it meant acceptance of defeat on allied terms ...


 * The mission of the Suzuki government, appointed 7 April 1945, was to make peace. An appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous than unconditional surrender was maintained in order to contain the military and bureaucratic elements still determined on a final Bushido defense, and perhaps even more importantly to obtain freedom to create peace with a minimum of personal danger and internal obstruction. It seems clear, however, that in extremis the peacemakers would have peace, and peace on any terms. This was the gist of advice given to Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared conclusion of Kido in April, the underlying reason for Koiso's fall in April, the specific injunction of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier which was known to all members of his cabinet ...


 * Negotiations for Russia to intercede began the forepart of May 1945 in both Tokyo and Moscow. Konoye, the intended emissary to the Soviets, stated to the Survey that while ostensibly he was to negotiate, he received direct and secret instructions from the Emperor to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding its severity ...


 * It seems clear ... that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan's surrender and obviated any need for invasion.


 * Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945 [the date of the planned American invasion], Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.91.131.238 (talk) 22:59, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

The USSBS not at all an impartial source. It was written in 1946 by people advocating the creation of an independent air force. To that end, they set out to write a document that proved that strategic bombing alone could win wars. It is not a surprise that these people would conclude that conventional bombing alone could have forced Japan to surrender. See Richard Frank et al for further details about this. The statement that this conclusion is supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved is particularly dubious (a) since it was contradicted by the Emperor's own statement, and (b) in the interview in which Koichi Kido allegedly stated this, he was badgered by the person asking the questions into saying it (I think this much is stated in Frank, or Dower, or one of the other related books). Raul654 (talk) 23:06, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

If American war crimes alone had the ability to end the war then it would have ended months earlier with the fire-bombing of Tokyo. These raids produced higher death-tolls, did more collateral damage and didn't have the logistical limitations of nuclear attacks. No impartial person with access to all the facts publicly available today could believe that the nuclear bombings made any difference at all. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 149.254.51.14 (talk) 18:47, 1 April 2010 (UTC)

Stalin giving intelligence to Japan?
On 27 December 2009 Rupertslander added unsourced statements to this and two other articles  that Stalin gave intelligence to Japan to prolong the war against the Western allies. I have not heard of this claim but nobody has questioned it in 3 months. Does somebody know a source? I got no reply at User talk:Rupertslander. PrimeHunter (talk) 01:19, 22 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I removed it from this article because it strikes me as almost certainly incorrect. I didn't realize he had added this to other articles too. I suggest removing the claims from the others articles as well, until and unless reliable sources are provided that support these claims. But I doubt any will be forthcoming. Raul654 (talk) 01:22, 22 March 2010 (UTC)


 * OK, I see you removed some of it a few days later. The first new paragraph in Rupertslander's edit is unchanged and includes: "prior to the surrender of Nazi Germany the Soviets had frequently provided Japan with military intelligence that proved to be of significant value in the war against the Western Allies in the Pacific." PrimeHunter (talk) 01:57, 22 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I deleted the para per WP:BURDEN--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:53, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Bias, OR, ignorance and false statements

 * 03:03, 4 May 2010 Pdfpdf (Y'know, Frank isn't the ONLY person who has documented this, but he's the ONLY one quoted. eg Robert Butow's "Japan's decision to surrender pre-dates Frank, and gives uses a MUCH broader information base. Frank is somewhat narrow in his coverage.)
 * 13:26, 4 May 2010 Binksternet (Undid revision Pdfpdf - rv poorly spelled edit that put Manchuria in the Pacific Theater and changed surrender to September without changing August context.)
 * The fact that I use English spelling and don't always remember the American variations does NOT mean I spell poorly.
 * If there are spelling errors, correct them - don't revert the edit.
 * "changed surrender to September" - Pardon? The Japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945. That's a FACT. It's NOT original research. It's NOT an opinion.
 * BTW: In case you hadn't noticed, 2 Sept is not now, nor has it ever been, in August.
 * FACT: The Japanese did NOT surrender in August 1945.
 * 22:52, 4 May 2010 Pdfpdf (Corrections and additions)
 * 01:08, 5 May 2010 Raul654 (rm Tehran - no promises made there; restore august 1945 date; rm specious citation for text taken verbatim from the Potsdam declaration; rm)
 * "Tehran - no promises made there" - I beg your pardon? Do your homework!
 * "restore august 1945 date" - Why? It is a FACT that the Japanese did NOT surrender in August 1945.
 * "rm specious citation for text taken verbatim from the Potsdam declaration" - I don't understand. Can you be more specific please?
 * 01:16, 5 May 2010 Raul654 (more fixes;)
 * Errrr. No they weren't.
 * You restored the false statements that support your biassed point of view, where you display a level of ignorance of the same order as that displayed with your "Tehran - no promises made there" statement, and CONTINUE to display with your "the Japanese surrendered in August 1945" statement.
 * 10:21, 5 May 2010 Pdfpdf (Please review your reversions. The changes I made were indeed corrections and facts. e.g. There most certainly WERE promises made at Tehran, the Americans were NOT the only nation involved in the war, and the Japanese did NOT surrender until 2 September) (undo)
 * 11:32, 5 May 2010 Binksternet ("5-year" => "five-year". U.S. spelling.)
 * 23:50, 5 May 2010 Pdfpdf (Clarifications.)
 * 09:29, 6 May 2010 Wwoods (→Defense preparations: The Japanese weren't preparing to face a Soviet invasion, they were transferring forces from Manchuria to Kyushu)
 * Sorry Wwoods, the Japanese were doing both of those things, not just one of them. Suggest you read Butow, Glantz and Hasegawa. Then have a look at Soviet–Japanese War (1945)
 * 09:46, 6 May 2010 Paul Siebert (Reverted good faith edits by Wwoods; Manchuria was vital for Japan. They even considered a possibility to move a government there to continue resistence in case of US invasion of Home islands.)
 * I agree, and so do Butow, Glantz & Hasegawa.
 * 09:47, 6 May 2010 Raul654 (rv - the Japanese did not believe an invasion of manchuria imminent. It is misleading to state this.)
 * I'm afraid Messrs Butow, Glantz & Hasegawa ALL say that the Japanese KNEW (not believed, KNEW) that an invasion was imminent. Somehow I'm more inclined to pay attention to their books than I am to your POV.
 * 09:48, 6 May 2010 Raul654 (this is bad, redundant writing - the august 15 annoucnement is mentioned in the next paragraph)
 * Yes, it isn't the best of English. However, it is an accurate statement. Saying that the Japanese surrendered in August 1945 is a FALSE statement. I was under the impression that WP thought accuracy was more important than writing style.
 * 09:50, 6 May 2010 Raul654 (All the references I've seen refer to a soviet build up starting after Germany's defeat. Back to previous version)
 * I doubt it. There is no doubt that the rate of the buildup increased after Germany's defeat, because the Soviets were now able to move their troops which were previously occupied on the Western front to the Far East. But they did not START the buildup then, and I doubt that your references say that they did. Can you provide specific citations to support your false claim? If you can, then I'm afraid the references are making false statements. Which references have you seen? Obviously you have not seen Butow, Glantz or Hasegawa, because if you had, you would have seen that the Soviets commenced their buildup after Tehran.
 * Still awaiting your reply. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:16, 13 May 2010 (UTC)
 * 6 May 2010 Raul654 (rv - stop substituting your own OR for what the cited article actually says)
 * Since when does placing "see Butow, Glantz or Hasegawa" at the end of a comment, to support my statements, get classified as OR?
 * Why is my "OR" with supporting references inferior to your OR and false statements, all of which have NO supporting references?
 * Still awaiting your reply. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:16, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

Unless your have a good reason for me not to, I will revert your false statements and OR. Pdfpdf (talk) 10:58, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Agreed. In addition, the phrase "Simultaneously, the Soviets had been building up strength around the Manchurian borders since the Tehran Conference in 1943" is somewhat misleading. The Soviets kept forty divisions there since 1941, during whole war, which forced Japan to keep about 1.2 million troops there. That fact must be reflected in the article's text. Source: Bellamy's "Absolute War" page 676.
 * Re: "The Japanese weren't preparing to face a Soviet invasion..." Incorrect. The quote below tells directly the opposite.
 * "By mid-1945 in Tokyo, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters' (IGHQ) scenario for a Manchurian campaign foresaw the probability of a two-stage Soviet invasion in the Spring of 1946. During stage one, the Soviets would take about one month to reduce Japanese fortified areas along the border. For the next two months, the Imperial Japanese Army's (IJA) Kwantung Army - the designation for Japanese forces in Manchuria - would withdraw gradually to a new defensive line 40 to 70 kilometers behind the original fortified zones."
 * (Source: Edward J. Drea. Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945. Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 66-73 )
 * The reason for these plans were obvious. Manchuria was the last and the major Japanese resource and industrial base (Margaret S. Culver. Manchuria: Japan's Supply Base. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, No. 12 (Jun. 20, 1945), pp. 160-163) and the most valuable continental possession. Moreover, Pape mentioned that JCS considered a possibility that Japanese government might move to the continent in the case of American vnvasion of Home islands (Robert A. Pape. Why Japan Surrendered. International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 154-201.)
 * In connection to that, let me point out that, although Pipes has been cited in the article, the main Pape's ideas have not been reflected. Concretely, he concluded:
 * That Japan was governed by oligarchy, which was composed of three principal groups; the military were the most powerful group, they controlled strategic planning without civilian oversight;
 * That formation of Kwantung Army, gave the IJA an instrument wholly beyond central control.
 * That, whereas military vulnerability considered as the most important factor affecting Japanese strategic planning, civilian vulnerability was not taken into account seriously;
 * That the degree of Japanese military vulnerability changed as follows: (i) before July 1944: nil; (ii) July 1944-April 1945: low; (iii) April 1945-June 1945: medium; (iv) June 1945-August 8 1945: high;
 * That even despite that the IJA planned to be able to inflict punishing losses on the invaders of Home islands.
 * That only after Soviet invasion of Manchuria had military vulnerability increased to a "very high" level. By invading Manchuria and by quickly defeating the Kwantung army, the major Japanese fighting force, the Soviet destroyed the major stronghold of the hawks' party in Japanese leadership and demonstrated that Japanese army had no chances to resist to invasion of Home island. Atomic bombing had much lesser effect.
 * In my opinion, all of that should be reflected in the article. Selective citing of sources is unacceptable.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:59, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Regarding the surrender date - while the surrender ceremony took place in September, the actual surrender (which is to say, the end of hostilities) took place in August, as did the occupation of Japan. Pdfpdf seems to be confusing the surrender ceremony with the actual surrender.
 * Huh? Just because I don't agree with you doesn't mean I'm confused. I just think you are wrong. Please find me a reliable source that says the Japanese surrendered in August 1945. Until you do, I'll continue to think, and state, that the Japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Still awaiting your reply. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:16, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Regarding the Soviet invasion of Manchuria - the sentence I changed said: Faced with the prospect of an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands starting with Kyūshū, and an imminent invasion of Manchuria, (their last source of natural resources),
 * The claim that the Japanese new the Soviets were going to attack is not credible.
 * Why is it not credible? Please explain. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Still awaiting your reply. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:16, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Some of them may have suspected something like that was in the works, but that is a far cry from knowing of an imminent attack, which is what this sentence states outright. Until and unless someone provides a specific source (a book and page number which actually says what you say it does) to back this up, it stays out.
 * In the fullness of time I shall eventually find and identify the relevant paragraphs.Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Also, regarding the Drea source cited above -- the Japanese in mid-1945 anticipating a Soviet attack in Spring 1946 (presumably after April 25) hardly qualifies as imminent.
 * There were several points-of-view amongst the Japanese, that an invasion would occur from Spring 1945. Spring 1946 was but one of them. As it happened, all but a few were wrong, and none of them had much idea at what point or points the invasion would occur. Yes, I know, I need to identify specific paragraphs. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Regarding the Soviet troop build-up on the Manchurian border which allegedly began in 1943 - nobody has yet provided a source (book and page number) to back up this fantastic claim.
 * Why is this claim "fantastic"? Hasn't Mr. Seibert provided you with enough specific information about the topic-in-general for you to realise that it was credible? Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * In anything, the Soviets would have had fewer troops on the Manchurian border than 1941, as experienced, winter-equipped Siberian troops were transferred west to fight the Germans. Raul654 (talk) 18:04, 6 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Do you have a reference to support that pov? Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Regarding Papes's conclusions above, while I agree with most or all of it, I believe that most of it is outside the scope of this article. Raul654 (talk) 18:10, 6 May 2010 (UTC)
 * LOL! Ummm. Errr. Ummm. (Long slow intake of breath and big sigh.) I don't agree. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * (edit conflict)Re: "The claim that the Japanese new the Soviets were going to attack is not credible." The quote provided by me suggest the opposite. In addition, why, in your opinion, did the Japanese keep their best Kwantung Army in their most remote continental possession? This army would be extremely helpful in Burma are mainland China.
 * Re: "Regarding the Soviet troop build-up on the Manchurian border which allegedly began in 1943 - nobody has yet provided a source (book and page number) to back up this fantastic claim." The claim is really fantastic, because the buildup started even before 1941.  40 Soviet divisions  were stationed in the Far East from the very beginning of the war, which forced Japan to keep her best Kwantung Army there. Source: Bellamy, p. 676. Additional quote:
 * "After 22 June 1941, Stavka systematically took forces, including 8 rifle and 3 tank divisions, from the Far East while local authorities mobilized formations to replace them. Almost 30 divisions and brigades organized in the Far East alone. These formation movements also coincided with the removal of tens of thousands of additional men in draft units. However, th e mobilization of new troops allowed the strength in the Far East to double over the prewar level. " (Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28)
 * And one more source (Raymond L. Garthoff. The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945. Military Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Oct., 1969), pp. 312-336) states that the Soviets kept 750,000 men, 1000 tanks and 1000 aircrafts in the Far East from 1942 to 1944, and that the buildup of these formidable troops started in February 1945. Plus the Soviets sent reinforcements to Kamchatka after Japan seized Aleutians in May 1942.
 * Re: "Regarding Papes's conclusions above, while I agree with most or all of it, I believe that most of it is outside the scope of this article." Rather interesting opinion, taking into account that the Pipe's article (named "Why Japan Surrendered") tells about the factors that affected the Japanese decision to surrender. What other WP article is more appropriate to discuss that?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:59, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * A staff study of a "Soviet invasion [of Manchuria] in the Spring of 1946" does not suggest much concern about an "imminent" invasion.
 * Reference please. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:07, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Nor do the Japanese actions: continuing to hollow out the Kwantung Army to build up the forces to fight the "Decisive Battle" in Kyushu.
 * And the "possibility that Japanese government might move to the continent" implies that they thought Manchuria was at less risk than Honshu, not the reverse. One does not deliberately move one's capital into a war zone. When Stalin prepared to move his capital from Moscow east to Kuybyshev, it wasn't because he wanted to be closer to the front lines.
 * The decision to surrender was made on 10 August — less than 24 hours after the start of the Soviet invasion (and the 2nd bomb) — well before the actual defeat of the Japanese forces.
 * —WWoods (talk) 18:45, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Re: "The decision to surrender was made on 10 August — less than 24 hours after the start of the Soviet invasion" The decision had not been made until it became clear that Kwantung Army would be crashed soon. Pipes quotes the Suzuki's words: "Is our Kwantung Army that weak? Then the game is over."--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:07, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Right, ... 'cause the Japanese hadn't prepared to deal with a Soviet invasion.
 * —WWoods (talk) 19:20, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * No. Because their Kwantung Army appeared to be unable to resist to the Soviets. At least that is what Papes/Suzuki say. Note, I provide sources whereas your assertions are based just on your own speculations. However, I also am able to speculate. Imagine that you are a Japanese Chief of staff and you are aware of more than 700,000 Soviet troops on the Manchukuo's border. Would it be wise from your side not to expect the Soviets attack at any moment?
 * In addition, taking into account that Japan expected American invasion to start only in late 1945-early 46, does it mean that it didn't see that invasion as imminent?--
 * Re: "he "possibility that Japanese government might move to the continent" implies that they thought Manchuria was at less risk than Honshu, not the reverse. " I didn't compare risks. My point was that Manchuria was a very important Japanese possession that, according to their (and American) expectations was capable to provide Japan with resources for prolonged resistance. Paul Siebert (talk) 19:56, 6 May 2010 (UTC)

arbitrary section break to facilitate editing

 * The military chiefs of any country bordering Russia would not be doing their job if they weren't planning how to deal with an invasion; that doesn't mean they'd be specifically expecting one. —WWoods (talk)
 * And it doesn't mean they weren't expecting one either. I'm don't understand how that adds to the discussion. Please clarify. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:29, 12 May 2010 (UTC)
 * I was responding to Paul Siebert's question above ("Imagine that you are a Japanese Chief of staff...") —WWoods (talk) 20:17, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * I've read Butow and Hasegawa, but I don't have copies handy. Perhaps you could quote their statements the Japanese "KNEW (not believed, KNEW)" the Soviets were going to attack in the summer of '45?
 * —WWoods (talk) 18:37, 7 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Nobody has claimed any relationship between "the Japanese" and "the Soviets were going to attack in the summer of '45".
 * "KNEW (not believed, KNEW)" is your comment, quoted above. If you were not claiming the Japanese KNEW the Soviets were going to attack in the summer of '45, what were you claiming?
 * That the Japanese KNEW the Soviets were going to attack. But they didn't KNOW where or when. Pdfpdf (talk) 23:22, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * In your latest comment you say, "There were several points-of-view amongst the Japanese, that an invasion would occur from Spring 1945. Spring 1946 was but one of them. As it happened, all but a few were wrong, and none of them had much idea at what point or points the invasion would occur." It sounds like you're saying the Japanese didn't know when, where, or in what force the Soviets would attack.
 * —WWoods (talk) 20:17, 13 May 2010 (UTC)
 * That's correct. They knew it was coming, but they didn't know when, where, or in what force. They had some ideas, but very little accurate knowledge. The Soviets employed very tight OPSEC, and executed a very effective deception campaign, displaying activity in the east whilst concealing activity in the west. For example, from the west, their invasion was over land which the Japanese had classified as "impassible". Pdfpdf (talk) 23:22, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * i) Certain Japanese intelligence analysts had observed that the Soviets were building up on the borders, and that the Soviets did not have any winter gear with them. Hence, the Soviets must be planning to be out of the area by mid-autumn, hence they must be planning to attack in summer. However, this scenario didn't suit the views and agendas of many of those in the chain-of-command. (And yes, )


 * ii) The Japanese knew the Soviets were building up forces and equipment around the borders. They knew that the Soviet troops were no longer engaged on the Western Front. They knew there was only one reason why the Soviets were building up forces and equipment. They knew an invasion was imminent. What they didn't know was where. This was compounded by a number of factors. (And yes, )


 * Pdfpdf (talk) 13:29, 12 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Eh. An interesting point, but not persuasive to anyone who didn't want to be persuaded. Obviously if the Soviets could ship troops across the length of Russia, they could also ship their winter gear in plenty of time, should it be needed. —WWoods (talk) 20:17, 13 May 2010 (UTC)
 * "Obviously, ... " - Yes. But they hadn't. And they didn't. Pdfpdf (talk) 23:22, 13 May 2010 (UTC)
 * "but not persuasive to anyone who didn't want to be persuaded" - Well yes, but nothing is persuasive to anyone who doesn't want to be persuaded. (c.f. Kenny Loggins & Michael McDonald wrote a popular song on the topic.) Pdfpdf (talk) 23:22, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * We are at the point where you need better sources for your text changes. Binksternet (talk) 14:39, 12 May 2010 (UTC)
 * How interesting! I agree with you. Pdfpdf (talk) 13:00, 13 May 2010 (UTC)


 * It has occurred to me that we're getting hung up on the meaning of 'prepared for a Soviet invasion'. The Japanese were making tangible preparations to oppose the American invasion coming sometime in the summer or fall: amassing hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of aircraft in Kyushu, and to a lesser extent in the Tokyo area. They were doing no such thing in Manchuria. Instead two more of the Kwantung Army's divisions (the 25th and 57th) were taken away, to reinforce Kyushu. According to Frank, in the event of attack the Japanese plan was to abandon most of Manchuria, holding on to only the southeast part along the Korean border. (I know you don't like Frank, but it's the source I've got.)
 * —WWoods (talk) 20:17, 13 May 2010 (UTC)
 * "It has occurred ... " - Yes. Perhaps "expecting" might be a better word to use than "prepared for"? Pdfpdf (talk) 23:22, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

Declarations

 * Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, April 13, 1941. (Avalon Project at Yale University)
 * Declaration Regarding Mongolia, April 13, 1941. (Avalon Project at Yale University)
 * Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan. (Avalon Project, Yale Law School.) Text from United States Department of State Bulletin Vol. XII, No. 305, April 29, 1945.
 * Soviet Declaration of War on Japan, August 8, 1945. (Avalon Project at Yale University)

Bellamy
Chris Bellamy. Absolute war: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007 ISBN 0375410864, 9780375410864, p. 676.

40 Soviet divisions were stationed in the Far East from the very beginning of the war, which forced Japan to keep her best Kwantung Army there.

Booth
Alan Booth. Lost: Journeys Through a Vanishing Japan. Kodansha Globe, 1996, ISBN 1-56836-148-3. Page 67

Butow
On-line extracts (books.google.com)

Culver
(Margaret S. Culver. Manchuria: Japan's Supply Base. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, No. 12 (Jun. 20, 1945), pp. 160-163)

Manchuria was the last and the major Japanese resource and industrial base

Despres
Despres, Dzirkals, and Whaley, “Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy”, Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, July 1976, 84pp. (RAND Report R-1825-NA for the Director of Net Assessment [Andrew Marshall]).

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R1825/ and http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R1825.pdf

Page 17: TECHNIQUES AND CALCULATIONS OF SOVIET DECEPTION PLANNING

Since V-E day on May 8/9, 1945, Stalin had been formally bound by Russia’s Allies to wage war on Japan and invade Manchuria by August 10, but the Japanese knew only that Stalin intended to attack sometime in the future. At this juncture the Japanese government invited the Soviet Union on June 24 to become a party to negotiating a conditional surrender between Japan and the Anglo-American Allies. The Japanese clearly signalled that, in return for his good offices, they were prepared to pay Stalin a high territorial and political price. Stalin quickly seized this opportunity for secret bargaining and strategic deception to explore his diplomatic options and to influence Japanese perceptions about Soviet intentions and schedules for invading Manchuria.

Through both his Foreign Minister in Moscow and the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Stalin managed to arouse Japanese beliefs that he was indeed seriously interested in negotiating with them. The overall effect of this secret diplomacy was to reinforce, in the weeks before the planned attack, official Japanese illusions that Stalin was prepared to negotiate tolerable terms for an end to the war. The Japanese government expected on August 8 that the Soviets would soon deliver a specification of terms, an ultimatum perhaps but not a declaration of war.

Page18: This account of Soviet efforts to manipulate Japanese perceptions of their intent comes only from Japanese documents. Soviet writers have not publicized their diplomatic deception efforts. Especially useful were the Japanese monographs prepared by U.S. Army Forces Far East, Headquarters, Military History Section (published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.). See, for example,
 * Small Wars and Border Problems, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XI, Part 1 (authored by Takushiro Hattori, Teizo Kubo, and Nizo Yamaguchi), 1956;
 * Record of Operations against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front (August 1945), Japanese Monograph No. 154 (authored by Genichiro Arinuma et al.), 1954; and
 * Study of Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities of Far Eastern Russia and Soviet Far East Forces, Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XIII (authored by Saburo Hayashi), 1955.

Dower
Dower, John (1999). Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. W.W. Norton & Company Inc. ISBN 0393046869.

Drea: "Missing Intentions"
Source: Edward J. Drea. Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945. Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 66-73.

Re: "...They knew an invasion was imminent. What they didn't know was where." Compare that claim with:


 * "Paradoxically, a variety of Japanese sources make clear that the Japanese expected a Soviet invasion of Manchuria, although the exact timing of such an operation was unknown."


 * "The U.S. War Department was providing Ultra-level order of battle information to the U.S.S.R. just before the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. As the Soviets were piecing together a comprehensive picture of Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Japanese were also sorting out various intelligence indicators to determine not if but when the U.S.S.R. would strike against Manchuria."


 * "In the Fall of 1944 (September 1944), IGHQ Army staff officers began a study of Soviet logistics capability in the Far East. The Japanese, then, had no illusions about an eventual Soviet invasion of Manchuria."


 * "In late January 1945, then Vice-Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Hata Hikosaburo, sent to Japanese military attaches in Europe a forecast of the world situation as it might appear in mid-1945. Concerning the U.S.S.R., the message acknowledged that the Soviets would probably abrogate the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact (due for renewal in April 1945), but "for a while" thereafter would remain neutral. Hata cautioned, though, that if a favorable opportunity presented itself, the Soviets would enter the war against Japan in the latter half of 1945."


 * "The Japanese remained unclear, however, about whether or not the Soviets could achieve their objectives before the onset of the severe Manchurian winter. Thus while Soviet preparations for an attack would be completed by August or September 1945, it was uncertain that the Soviets would attack then or await the milder Spring weather.' A possible variation of this plan envisaged a Soviet invasion of Japan in early Spring of 1946. That scenario meant that sometime before December 1945 - the onset of Winter months in Manchuria - the U.S.S.R. would have to occupy strategic areas in northern Manchuria. In order for the Soviets to seize these jump-off points, hostilities would have to commence at least three months earlier. Thus August and September 1945 became the pivotal months for Soviet action ."


 * "A similar view of potential Soviet conduct pervades the 8 June 1945 "Estimate of the World Situation" (Sekali josei handan) prepared from estimates provided by the 12th Section Wartime Planning and Guidance) to IGHQ for an Imperial Liaison Conference that same day. According to this document, when the U.S.S.R. felt it could achieve its ambitions with minimum sacrifices, it would strike Japan. The authors did not, however, believe that the Soviets would use military force at an early date. In case of American landings in Japan or China, the Soviets might attack, but given the adverse climatic conditions in Manchuria - which the Japanese felt precluded a Soviet Winter offensive - special vigilance against the U.S.S.R. was needed during the Summer and Fall of 1945 "


 * "Pessimists like Colonel Shiraki Suenari, Director, Fifth Section (Soviet Intelligence), Second Department, could note that the Soviet troops arriving in the Far East were not equipped for Winter operations. Consequently the Soviets would have to complete their Manchurian campaign by September or October. This meant, to Shiraki, that the Soviets had to attack during August 1945."


 * "On 24 July 1945, following the recall of Soviet embassy personnel and their dependents from Japan, IGHQ warned the Kwantung Army to be especially alert against the possibility of a Soviet attack in August or September. IGHQ prefaced its remarks with the caveat that the probabilities of such action in 1945 were slight because of the serious Soviet losses on the European front."


 * "IGHQ's July assessment also predicted that the Soviets would be ready around August 1945 to enter the war against Japan, but that they would do so only if they enjoyed an absolute superiority of troops and anticipated a short, victorious war to gain their objectives."

I believe, this source serves an adequate support for the thesis that the Japanese saw the Soviet invasion imminent in late summer-autumn of 1945 or spring 1946. Although the later date was seen as more realistic by IGHQ, the possibility of Soviet attack in August 1945 also was not ruled out by the Japanese. BTW, the last para may serve as an explanation when Japan surrendered almost immediately after Soviet attack: since they believed that the USSR would attack only if it was confident in its full superiority, the very fact of the attack on Aug 9 meant that Kwantung Army was facing overwhelmingly superior opponent, so any resistance is useless. However, the last thought is just my speculation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:48, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

Added a few paragraphs. Pdfpdf (talk) 11:34, 17 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Also
 * "By mid-1945 in Tokyo, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters' (IGHQ) scenario for a Manchurian campaign foresaw the probability of a two-stage Soviet invasion in the Spring of 1946. During stage one, the Soviets would take about one month to reduce Japanese fortified areas along the border. For the next two months, the Imperial Japanese Army's (IJA) Kwantung Army - the designation for Japanese forces in Manchuria - would withdraw gradually to a new defensive line 40 to 70 kilometers behind the original fortified zones."

Drea: "In the Service of the Emperor"
In the Service of the Emperor : Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army by Edward J. Drea, p.195

Frank
Frank, Richard B. (1999). Downfall: the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin. ISBN 0141001461.

Garthoff
Garthoff, Raymond L. The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945. Military Affairs XXXIII (Oct 1969): pp. 312-336.

By June 1941, at the time of the German attack on European Russia, the Soviet Army in the Far East had been built up to 30 reasonably well-equipped divisions. Japanese intelligence estimated that the Soviet moved 15 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 1,700 tanks, and 1,500 aircraft from the Far East to the German front in the crucial period June through December 1941. (The first transfer in fact had begun as early as March 1941.) New units were mobilized to replace them, including 9 infantry divisions and 4 brigades, and an air army headquarters. By December 1941 the Japanese estimated that Soviet forces in the Far East numbered 23 infantry divisions with some 800,000 men, with about 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft, although of course at a lower level of training and combat readiness than before June. This Japanese estimate was fairly accurate. By the time major Russian transfers westward ceased, at the end of 1942, the estimated Soviet order of battle in the East stood at 19 infantry divisions, 10 infantry brigades, 750,000 men, 1,000 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft. Approximately these Soviet force levels were maintained until the end of 1944. (There were some variations in deployment; after the Japanese seizure of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians in May 1942, the Russians increased their forces in northern Sakhalin and Kamchatka.)

A Soviet build-up began in February 1945 and accelerated greatly after April. From April to August the Russians moved 30 divisions, 9 brigades, and other units from Europe to bolster their forces already in the Far East. Japanese intelligence erroneously estimated that during this period the Russians had moved only 20 to 25 divisions, and that by the end of July 1945 the Soviet force totaled only 40 to 45 divisions. Since the Japanese expected the Soviets to build a force of 60 divisions before attacking, this discrepancy influenced them toward the conclusion that the Russians were not ready to attack in early August.We now know that Soviet forces in the theater had in fact been much stronger than the Japanese estimate at the end of 1944 (40, not 19, divisions), as well as that larger forces were moved than the Japanese realized. In terms of over-all Soviet force levels of manpower and material, on the other hand, the Japanese were much closer to the truth in their estimate.

Glantz
Glantz, David M, “August Storm: the Soviet 1945 strategic offensive in Manchuria”, 1983, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth Paper No. 7

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#aug

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/augustst/augst_intro.pdf

Most Kwantung Army intelligence agencies assessed that the Soviets would not conduct major operations until the fall of 1945, after the end of a rainy season, and perhaps even as late as the spring of 1946. Even the most pessimistic estimates insisted on the inability of the Soviets to attack on a large scale before September 1945.
 * 10. Analysis of the Offensive

Among the few relatively accurate assessments was that of the Japanese 4th Army commander, General Uemura, who warned of a Soviet attack occurring as early as August 1945 and had his subordinate units prepare for that eventuality. Japanese complacency, however, smothered most warnings.

Hallman
Hallman, “Battlefield Operational Functions and The Soviet Campaign Against Japan in 1945”, 1995, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/HAL.htm

Background:
 * Executive Summary

Operation AUGUST STORM, the Soviets' victorious attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945 was a decisive campaign. Japan was pushed from the Asian mainland and the Soviet Union was established as an Asian power.

The collapse of the Kwantung Army shocked observers who had expected a tougher fight for Manchuria. Our assessment of the campaign shows that the Soviets were superior in all six of the US Army's Battlefield Operational Functions: intelligence, command and control, synchronization, movement and maneuver, protection, and fires.

Recommendation:

When combined with knowledge of a force's doctrine and organization and the local geography, analysis of a force's capabilities in terms of Battlefield Operational Functions can serve as a useful planning and execution tool for today's military professional.

Soviet and Japanese strategic goals for the campaign in Manchuria present an interesting contrast. Moscow's strategy was clear, set according to realistic assessments of the political and military situation in the theater, and looked to the future. Tokyo's strategy for defending Manchuria was simple, but unrealistic and not supported by Japan's national strategy. Japan merely wanted to hold Manchuria, whereas the Soviets developed a viable plan to seize the Japanese possessions in Northeast Asia.
 * Combatants Strategic Goals

Soviet strategy regarding Japan changed in the late 1930's and early 1940's from one of wariness to one of opportunism, i.e., attack when Japan was so weakened as to be judged incapable of strong resistance. Stalin committed the Soviet Union to attacking Japan at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. At that time, the United States and Britain anticipated a long, bloody campaign on the Japanese mainland in late 1945 and wanted Soviet support. Later, when the United States had produced nuclear weapons, the other allies would have preferred to finish off the Japanese by themselves, and keep the Soviets' role in East Asia to a minimum. The Soviet leadership realized its people were tired of war, but believed it had to seize the chance to increase their influence in post-war Asia. Other than wanting a role in the peace settlement with Japan, Stalin wanted to retake southern Sakhalin Island - lost in the 1905 war with Japan - and take Japan's Kurile Islands. Also, the Soviets sought to gain influence in post-war China by getting some trade concessions with that country.

At the strategic level, there is no published evidence that Tokyo had any reliable information on Soviet intentions concerning relations with Japan other than that of official statements or contacts. They had no spies in the Kremlin. High-level Japanese intelligence must be faulted in its estimate of 14 June 1945, in which it stated that a Soviet attack on Manchuria would not be made with a large force before September.
 * Intelligence

From an operational perspective, Japanese intelligence failed their commanders badly by underestimating the size of the Soviet forces surrounding Manchuria, especially from the west. The Red Army's capability to cross the desert of Inner Mongolia and the Greater Khingan mountains was also misjudged by the Kwantung Army. Subsequently, strong Japanese forces and fortifications were placed on only two avenues of approach into western Manchuria, in the vicinity of the cities of Hailar and Wuchakou. On 9 August 1945, the Soviet Trans-Baikal front advanced into Manchuria on seven major axes, rendering the Japanese 3rd Area Army's defense plans useless.

Hasagawa: Racing the enemy
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi (2005). Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674016934.

Hasagawa: The End of the Pacific War
Hasegawa, T. (Ed.) (2007). The End of the Pacific War.

Pape
(Robert A. Pape. Why Japan Surrendered. International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 154-201.)

Concretely, he concluded:
 * 1) That Japan was governed by oligarchy, which was composed of three principal groups; the military were the most powerful group, they controlled strategic planning without civilian oversight;
 * 2) That formation of Kwantung Army, gave the IJA an instrument wholly beyond central control.
 * 3) That, whereas military vulnerability considered as the most important factor affecting Japanese strategic planning, civilian vulnerability was not taken into account seriously;
 * 4) That the degree of Japanese military vulnerability changed as follows: (i) before July 1944: nil; (ii) July 1944-April 1945: low; (iii) April 1945-June 1945: medium; (iv) June 1945-August 8 1945: high;
 * 5) That even despite that the IJA planned to be able to inflict punishing losses on the invaders of Home islands.
 * 6) That only after Soviet invasion of Manchuria had military vulnerability increased to a "very high" level. By invading Manchuria and by quickly defeating the Kwantung army, the major Japanese fighting force, the Soviet destroyed the major stronghold of the hawks' party in Japanese leadership and demonstrated that Japanese army had no chances to resist to invasion of Home island. Atomic bombing had much lesser effect.

Rotundo
(Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28)

"After 22 June 1941, Stavka systematically took forces, including 8 rifle and 3 tank divisions, from the Far East while local authorities mobilized formations to replace them. Almost 30 divisions and brigades organized in the Far East alone. These formation movements also coincided with the removal of tens of thousands of additional men in draft units. However, the mobilization of new troops allowed the strength in the Far East to double over the prewar level."

Slavinsky
Boris Nikolaevich Slavinskiĭ, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History 1941-1945, Translated by Geoffrey Jukes, 2004, Routledge.

Slavinskiĭ (page 153-4), quoting from Molotov's diary, recounts the conversation between Molotov and Sato, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow: After Molotov has read the statement, Sato "permits himself to ask Molotov for some clarifications", saying he thinks his government expects that during that year April 25, 1945-April 25, 1946, the Soviet government will maintain the same relations with Japan it had maintained up to present, "bearing in mind that the Pact remains in force". Molotov replies that "Factually Soviet-Japanese relations revert to the situation in which they were before conclusion of the Pact". Sato observes that in that case the Soviet and Japanese government interpret the question differently. Molotov replies that "there is some misunderstanding" and explains that "on expiry of the five year period ... Soviet-Japanese relations will obviously revert to the status quo ante conclusion of the Pact". After further discussion, Molotov states: "The period of the Pact's validity has not ended".

Boris Nikolaevich Slavinskiĭ, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History 1941-1945, Translated by Geoffrey Jukes, 2004, Routledge. (Extracts on-line). Page 153-4.

Later in his book (page 184), Slavinskiĭ further summarises the chain of events: Note, however, that Malik did not know (had not been informed) that the Soviets were preparing to attack.
 * "Even after Germany's exit from the war, Moscow went on saying the Pact was still operative, and that Japan had no cause for anxiety about the future of Soviet-Japanese relations."
 * 21 May 1945: Malik (Soviet ambassador to Tokyo) tells Tanakamura that the treaty continues in force.
 * 29 May 1945: Molotov tells Sato: "we have not torn up the pact".
 * 24 June 1945: Malik tells Hirota that the Neutrality Pact ... will continue ... until it expires.

Slavinskiĭ, pg.184

USMCU CSC
USMCU CSC, “The Soviet Army Offensive: Manchuria, 1945”, 1986, US Marine Corps University Command and Staff College. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm


 * EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Modern Soviet Army tactics began their evolution in Manchuria, 1938-1939.

Major border confrontations with the Japanese Kwantung Army reaffirmed developing offensive tactics emphasizing the use of fire and maneuver with armor and massive artillery support. In his effort to ensure Soviet supremacy in the Northern Pacific and North Asian continent, Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan soon after Hitler's defeat.

The Soviet Army began an impressive redeployment from Europe to the Far East under strict security measures. Meanwhile, Japan's strength in Manchuria was slowly bled away by her war in the Pacific and concerns for homeland defense.

Achieving tactical and strategic surprise, the Soviets launched a classic double envelopment along the Manchurian border on 9 August 1945. Advancing under the cover of darkness and pouring rain, the Soviets advanced along three axes covering a frontage of more than 3000 miles. Using armor-heavy forward detachments and displaying flexibility, audacity and initiative at all levels, the Soviets crushed what opposition the Japanese afforded and achieved impressive advances along what the Japanese considered to be untrafficable terrain.

The Japanese Kwantung Army faced severe shortages in all areas and was in the middle of the redeployment of her defensive forces when the Soviets attacked. Japan's lack of armor and anti-tank weapons, failure to correctly estimate the size of the Soviet force build-up and predict the Russian avenues of approach were all reminiscent of her defeat at Nomonhan in 1939.

In May 1945, the Japanese commenced their unit redeployments and construction of fortifications and barriers to conform with the new defense plan. [18-134] The Japanese problem and "Achilles heel" was simply that their troop redeployments and military construction projects were underway and incomplete when the Russians attacked on 9 August 1945.
 * Japanese prediction of invasion

Although the Soviet movement of troops and material by rail was readily apparent to the Japanese after February 1945, they grossly underestimated the rapidity of the Soviet force buildup. [18-138] The Kwantung Army's intelligence noted absolutely no concentrations on the western border of Manchuria (where more than 650,000 men were massing) and expected only 8 infantry and 2 tank divisions with 1,000 supporting aircraft on the eastern Manchurian border (the Russians launched the attack with 31 infantry divisions and 12 tank brigades). [20-100] With significantly increased Russian actrivity in July 1945, the IGHQ'S last estimate on 31 July 1945 still fell short of the mark:


 * "....Russian attitude toward Japan will reach a crisis in this early autumn. Recent Russian war preparations against Japan have made unexpected progress. The Soviet Union will be ready to launch hostile action by the end of August. Because of military considerations, it is highly probable that she will enter war against Japan in early autumn." [18-162]

18. U. S. Forces Far East, Military History Section, Japanese Monograph #138. Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria; Jan 43-Aug 45. Tokyo, 1953.

Pdfpdf (talk) 13:43, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

US Strategic Bombing Survey
Citation?

United States Strategic Bombing Survey rejected the notion that Japan gave up because of the atomic bombings. In its authoritative 1946 report, the Survey concluded:

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the enemy leaders who ended the war did they persuade Japan to accept unconditional surrender. The Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Navy Minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that the war should be ended even if it meant acceptance of defeat on allied terms ...

The mission of the Suzuki government, appointed 7 April 1945, was to make peace. An appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous than unconditional surrender was maintained in order to contain the military and bureaucratic elements still determined on a final Bushido defense, and perhaps even more importantly to obtain freedom to create peace with a minimum of personal danger and internal obstruction. It seems clear, however, that in extremis the peacemakers would have peace, and peace on any terms. This was the gist of advice given to Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared conclusion of Kido in April, the underlying reason for Koiso's fall in April, the specific injunction of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier which was known to all members of his cabinet ...

Negotiations for Russia to intercede began the forepart of May 1945 in both Tokyo and Moscow. Konoye, the intended emissary to the Soviets, stated to the Survey that while ostensibly he was to negotiate, he received direct and secret instructions from the Emperor to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding its severity ...

It seems clear ... that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan's surrender and obviated any need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945 [the date of the planned American invasion], Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.91.131.238 (talk) 22:59, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

1945 Japanese wish for alliance with USSR
Raul654 and I have been restoring the word "fantastically" or "unrealistically" to refer to the Japanese idea that the Soviets would consider an alliance with them rather than attack after finishing with Germany. Richard B. Frank wrote "The [Japanese] Navy's vision did not stop there but roamed on to hallucinate ... the distant goal of forming an alliance with the Soviets. Foreign minister Togo stomped on these fantasies." The Yomiuri Shimbun wrote that it was "extremely foolish" for Japan to seek mediation through the Soviet Union, their potential adversary. Observers and commentators who give their opinion of Suzuki's proposal are scathing of its lack of basis in reality. Binksternet (talk) 15:08, 20 May 2010 (UTC)
 * I have, at last, a copy of "Downfall".
 * Richard B. Frank wrote "The [Japanese] Navy's vision did not stop there but roamed on to hallucinate ... the distant goal of forming an alliance with the Soviets. Foreign minister Togo stomped on these fantasies."
 * What Frank actually wrote on Pg 94, 5th sentence and beyond is:
 * "The [Japanese] Navy's vision did not stop there but roamed on to hallucinate an exchange of some cruisers and resources for oil and aircraft, with a distant goal of forming an alliance with the Soviets. Foreign minister Togo stomped on these fantasies by noting acidly that diplomacy depended on the military situation and warning that the Soviets might well have already reached an agreement with the US and the UK."
 * Yeah. OK. So what? I think even Mr Frank himself would complain about the way you are abusing his words and misrepresenting him!
 * The Yomiuri Shimbun'' wrote that it was "extremely foolish" for Japan to seek mediation through the Soviet Union, their potential adversary. Observers and commentators who give their opinion of Suzuki's proposal are scathing of its lack of basis in reality.
 * Yeah. OK. So what? Whether or not is was realistic etc. is a long way from the point. The facts are, and the various texts & quotes you are misusing actually present these facts, that the Japanese had a plan. Comments about the quality of the plan are somebody's POV and/or OR, and are irrelevant to the facts of the matter that the Japanese had a plan. What a complete waste and misdirection of everyone's time, effort and energy. Pdfpdf (talk) 15:37, 31 May 2010 (UTC)
 * It seems to be a recurring problem that we are talking at cross-purposes and not communicating. There are several aspects to this lack-of-communication. Some of them are:
 * I am trying to communicate that "In wikipedia, you can't present somebody's POV as though it was a fact; you must present it in a manner that makes it clear that it is a POV".
 * For example, just before the section heading Surrender of Japan, there is the sentence "The Japanese hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an agent for Japan in negotiations with America and Britain." That sentence is quite clearly a statement of the Japanese POV. There is no ambiguity, and it is not asserting anything as fact, other than that the Japanese hoped something.
 * The sentence we disagree upon is currently worded:
 * "As a result of these meetings, Tōgō was authorized to approach the Soviet Union, seeking to maintain its neutrality, or more unrealistically, to form an alliance."
 * What was Tōgō authorized to do? "Tōgō was authorized to approach the Soviet Union, seeking to maintain its neutrality, or seeking to form an alliance."
 * Where does the "more unrealistically" come from? It is/was THE OPINION of a number of people that to seek an alliance was unrealistic. It is a fact that it is/was their opinion. It is a fact that Frank reported / recorded / noted / mentioned / etc. their opinion.
 * But: It is NOT a FACT that "Tōgō was authorized, more unrealistically, to form an alliance".
 * How does one "unrealistically authorize" someone to do something?
 * It may be that the thing he was authorized to do was unrealistic.
 * It may be that it was unrealistic to expect such an activity to have any chance of success.
 * A number of other things may also have been the case.
 * But the sentence doesn't say any of those things.
 * Thus, the sentence needs reconstruction.
 * One way to do it is to remove the "more unrealistically", but you don't like that.
 * An alternative approach might be: "As a result of these meetings, Tōgō was authorized to approach the Soviet Union seeking to maintain its neutrality or, less realistic in the opinion of many,[1][2][3] seeking to form an alliance.[Frank]"
 * An no doubt there are other alternatives, too. Pdfpdf (talk) 19:12, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

I don't understand your objection to characterizing the military leaders' notion of an alliance with the Soviet Union as a fantasy. You obviously know how absurdly little chance there was of such a thing; you've quoted Japanese sources saying there was a good chance that the USSR would attack Japan.

"And unless you actually have a copy of Frank, you don't really know what he actually wrote ..." What this supposed to mean? Did you suppose that when I cited "Frank, 93–94", I was just making up a page number? I gather you haven't actually read Frank yourself; apparently there are several Adelaide libraries which have copies. —WWoods (talk) 20:26, 20 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "I don't understand your objection to characterizing the military leaders' notion of an alliance with the Soviet Union as a fantasy." - Possibly this is because I don't object to that? (Provided it has supporting references, and it is made clear that it is their OPINION .) Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "You obviously know how absurdly little chance there was of such a thing; you've quoted Japanese sources saying there was a good chance that the USSR would "attack" Japan." - Your point being? Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "What this supposed to mean?" - It is supposed to mean what it says. Perhaps it's clearer if stated: "unless one actually has a copy of Frank, one doesn't really know what he actually wrote"? Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "Did you suppose that when I cited "Frank, 93–94", I was just making up a page number?" - Is that a rhetorical or a genuine question? If genuine, Answer: "Of course I didn't" Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "I gather you haven't actually read Frank yourself;" - I have read a number of Frank's works. I'm disppointed that none of those I've read have particularly impressed me. I have read the writings of a number of American authors addressing the history of that area at that time, and Frank confuses me. Rather than being an objective historian, he generally seems to have an agenda to push. Analytically, I feel he presents himself poorly, seemingly ignoring large areas of fact in order to present his current point of view or agenda. Given the obviously superior quality and thoroughness of authors like Butow, Glantz and a number of the others mentioned above, I find it difficult to comprehend why Frank is so highly regarded.
 * However, you are correct in deducing that I haven't read "Downfall" - You might find it interesting to know that people outside of the USA do NOT hold Frank in the same regard that people inside the USA seem to hold him, and although his book on MacArthur is popular and readily available, "Downfall" is rather harder to get hold of. Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Regarding "Adelaide libraries ... " - Thank you. I already have an Inter-library-loan request in place. If it doesn't happen, I will use your information. I genuinely appreciate your help here. Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Since we're all in agreement that the Japanese military leaders' avowed position with regard to the Soviet Union was wildly out of touch with reality, why are you opposed to calling a spade a spade?
 * I don't see why you're so assured that Butow et al. are "obviously superior" to a book you haven't read. However, it happens that Frank shares your opinion of their quality:
 * "Furthermore, I do not believe the superb work of David Glantz on the military aspects of Soviet intervention can be improved upon, and therefore no effort was made to conduct independent research [on that topic]. ...
 * ... Outstanding among these secondary sources are the works of Sadao Asada, John Dower, and Edward Drea, as well as those of Herbert Bix, with some reservations as to his interpretations. In a special category is the classic work of Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, published in 1954 but still invaluable as a guide to sources and as an exemplar of scholarly analysis and supple prose." (Frank, p.446–7.)
 * —WWoods (talk) 04:15, 23 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "why are you opposed to calling a spade a spade?" - I'm not. Did you read any of what I wrote? If you had, you would know that your comment is irrelevant. I'm opposed to inserting WP:OR and opinion that does not have verifiable supporting references. I would have thought that, by now, this was blatantly obvious. Pdfpdf (talk) 14:01, 24 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "I don't see why ... " - Is any comment from me necessary? You seem to have contradicted yourself and explained why you do see why. What question are you asking me? Pdfpdf (talk) 14:01, 24 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Pdfpdf, I concede that the current wording could be amplified, specifically by moving the "unrealistically" or "fantastically" to a subordinate clause or a new sentence modifying Tōgō's authorization. Yes, he was authorized to seek mediation and possible alliance. Yes, his seeking mediation has been called "foolish" [The Yomiuri Shimbun] and Suzuki's wish for an alliance has been called hallucinatory and fantastic. [ Richard B. Frank ] All of the above is worthy of inclusion, not removal. Binksternet (talk) 20:47, 20 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Regarding "subordinate clause or a new sentence" - That sounds good to me. Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Regarding "Yes, he was... Yes, his seeking..." - I have no problem with that, either. Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Regarding "inclusion, not removal" - I have  NO  problem with the above being presented, as long as it is presented as opinion with supporting references being included. My problem is with some of it being presented as fact, without attribution. Pdfpdf (talk) 20:05, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

Talk by Richard Frank
Richard Frank gave a talk at the US Army Heritage Center on Wednesday night about the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II. (The page describing the event has disappeared but Google cached it). I went and took copious notes. (I also got Frank's email address) Here is what he said. Raul654 (talk) 17:43, 21 May 2010 (UTC) :

A King an An Emperor: Contrasts in Civil-Military Relations

The "traditionalist" view of the end of World War II: 1) The Atomic bombs were justified 2) The Atomic bombs ended the war 3) The Use of atomic bombs was morally justified. Although many people today don't realize it, the traditionalist view went unchallenged for 20 years after the war, until the mid-1960s.

The "revisionist" view 1) Japan's position was hopeless 2) Japan's leaders knew the situation was hopeless and were going to surrender 3) American leaders knew Japan was going to surrender but dropped the bombs anyway The revisionist view began in the mid-1960s, and peaked in 1995. Starting after 1995, declassification of radio intelligence (release of the full Magic text) began to discredit this thesis.

All this came to a head with the 1995 proposed Enola Gay exhibit.

At the end of World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to see the difficult of ending the war from different perspectives. The Army was concerned with time - that prolonging the war could undermine national morale. The navy was concerned with causalities - that excess casualties could undermine national morale.

The "nightmare" scenario, outlined in an April 1945 memorandum, was that there would be no organized Japanese surrender.

Japanese strategy was based on the premise that American national morale was brittle. The Japanese mobilized all men aged 15-60, and all women aged 17-40. While this substantially increased the size of their fighting forces, there was no way they could put all of these new recruits into uniform. This creates significant issues for Americans with regard to distinguishing non-combatants with combatants (and legal issues as well).

According to papers written by the Imperial staff for the June 8 conference, even if Ketsu-Go succeeded, a mass famine would have killed hundreds of thousands of people.

Prior to the battle of Okinawa, Nimitz had (contrary to most Navy officers) supported an invasion of Japan. After Okinawa, he was against it.

The Magic summaries of decrypted signals consisted of two streams - the diplomatic summaries, and the magic far east summaries. The diplomatic summaries show only one authorized negotiation attempt - the attempt to parlay with the Soviet Union. The far east traffic stream consisted of decrypted military traffic.

When pressed to formulate terms to end the war, Anami said: "The only basis on which I will do this is that Japan was not lost the war."

The reaction of Japanese leaders to the bombing of Hiroshima - to disregard it - shows that the probability of them surrendering following a demonstration bombing was "nil." Following the bombing of Nagasaki, the Japanese switched from thinking the US had few bombs to over 100 bombs. This undercuts revisionist claims that Nagasaki had little effect.

Following Soviet entry into the war, one of the big six commented that "Soviet entry is unfavorable but doesn't negate Ketsu-Go."

The reasons for Hirohito's surrender, as given by Hirohito shortly after the end of the war, were: 1) He had lost faith in Ketsu-Go 2) Fear of the "domestic situation" 3) Fear of conventional and atomic bombing and blockade. (The US Navy's preferred method) The "domestic situation" refers to a possible popular revolution against the imperial institution.

Though "much ink has been spilled" discussing the August 14-15 coup, the coup itself was not a threat to peace. However, it does raise interesting questions about what could have happened if the planners had had more time to plan and recruit officers to their cause.

The initial Soviet landing in the Kuriles - which the Japanese had anticipated - was nearly annihilated. The Japanese fighting in the Kuriles refused orders, even from the Emperor, to cease fighting. Hirohito was worried that the refusal to cease fighting in the Kuriles could endanger the peace. Moreover, two of the three Japanese overseas commanders - in China and Indochina - initially refused to surrender.

We take it today as inevitable that the Japanese were going to surrender in an organized fashion. In fact, this was a very "lucky" outcome that may not have occurred had events gone differently.

Admiral King was opposed to an invasion of Japan, but went along with preparations for an invasion from April until August. Shortly before the end of the war, he was preparing to re-argue the issue, which would have triggered a huge inter-service dispute. The end of the war meant this debate never happened.

The Emperor kept his real fears a secret. That is to say, he did not want to "fess up" about his fears of a possibility of a popular uprising or military based coup or refusal to surrender.

There is no evidence of Leahy's opposition to the Atomic bombs prior to circa 1950. Contemporary evidence shows his concerns were that they would not work.

3000-6000 non-combatant Asians were killed every day that the war went on. More Japanese combatants died in Soviet captivity than were killed by the Atomic bombs.

"It's important to hate MacArthur, but it's important to hate him for the right reasons."

Truman was extraordinarily sensitive to casualties.

60% of all American battle deaths occurred in the last year of the war.

The initial belief regarding the radioactive fall-out from the bomb was that anyone close enough to the blast to be injured by radiation would be killed by the explosion or the heat. When reports of radiation sickness came in to Groves and Oppenheimer, they were not believed.


 * Cool! Looks like it was a very informative talk. The 60% figure refers to the Pacific War or the whole world? Binksternet (talk) 19:13, 21 May 2010 (UTC)
 * He meant the whole world, which makes sense. Obviously the vast majority combat deaths in the Pacific occurred in the Phillipines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. But the same is also true of Europe. The last year of the War saw Overlord, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Huergten Forest, which dwarfed previously European operations. Raul654 (talk) 19:36, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

Intro
Regarding this edit, could others weigh in on it? I think it's obviously bad writing to repeat a claim immediately after it's already been stated, but Pdfpdf thinks otherwise. Raul654 (talk) 22:42, 7 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Typical. It's THIS edit that is the relevant one.
 * Typical. It would be bad writing to repeat a claim immediately after it's already been stated. But it doesn't do that.
 * Typical. "Pdfpdf thinks otherwise" - No, I don't think otherwise. As usual, you are misrepresenting me, attributing to me your interpretation of my words, rather than either stating my opinion, or asking me what my opinion is.
 * You are incredibly good at wasting my time with your biased and unsupported opinions, and you have yet to mount any argument with any supporting evidence. Pdfpdf (talk) 12:02, 8 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Pdfpdf, I don't want to revert you before giving you an opportunity to give a better explanation that I can understand. The lead already says "in fulfillment of their promise....". So, why is it helpful to mention again --- later in the lead --- that there was a "promise"?  This seems kind of redundant, and might even confuse readers into thinking that the second mentioned promise was separate from the first mentioned promise.  We want to keep the lead chronological so that it's as easily-understood as possible, so I think the promise should only be mentioned in chronological order.  After all, it's important that the promise was made to Roosevelt at the notorious Yalta summit, rather than to Truman.  Please help me to better understand your objection.  Thanks.Anythingyouwant (talk) 07:29, 11 June 2010 (UTC)


 * I was rather hoping that Raul654 might want to ask these sorts of questions. But he hasn't. Oh well.
 * Greetings Anythingyouwant!
 * I agree that the wording is not ideal, but I have not yet thought of a better way to flag the important facts related to the invasion, without going into a level of detail greater than is expected in the lead. The issues that I feel need to be captured are:
 * The Soviets made a promise (to Roosevelt & Churchill) to attack within 3 months of the German surrender. They executed (kept) the promise on the last day before the deadline.
 * It is one thing to make a promise, and this is noted chronologically.
 * It is quite another thing to keep a promise, and my original edit noted this chronologically.
 * So, in answer to your questions/comments/statements:
 * "I don't want to revert you before giving you an opportunity to give a better explanation that I can understand." - Thank you. It is my understanding that this is how WP is supposed to work. I find it sad that your attitude and behaviour seems to be in the minority.
 * The lead already says "in fulfillment of their promise....". - Agreed. It says it in the context (and chronology) of them having made a promise.
 * So, why is it helpful to mention again --- later in the lead --- that there was a "promise"? - I would argue that it does not mention later "that there was a promise". I would argue that it mentions later (in chronological order) that they kept the promise.
 * We want to keep the lead chronological so that it's as easily-understood as possible, - Agreed.
 * so I think the promise should only be mentioned in chronological order. - I don't agree, in that we need to do more than "mention the promise". I believe we need to "mention the making of the promise", AND I believe we need to "mention the keeping of the promise".
 * Another reason I believe we need to do this is the juxtapostion with the Neutrality Pact - in order to keep the promise to the allies, the Soviets broke the promise to the Japanese made in the Neutrality Pact. Perhaps the second mention needs to emphasise this better?
 * e.g. Instead of: as promised to the Allies, and in violation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact.,
 * something like: thus keeping their promise to Allies and breaking the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact..
 * "After all, it's important that the promise was made to Roosevelt at the notorious Yalta summit, rather than to Truman." - Is it? Why do you say that? Why was the Yalta summit notorius? (You obviously know something that I haven't paid enough attention to!)
 * "Please help me to better understand your objection." - I hope the above does so.
 * Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 12:09, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Sorry, but the text looks a little bit awkward:
 * "Between those two events, on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and just after midnight launched a surprise invasion of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, as promised to the Allies, and in violation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. These twin shocks caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene..."
 * Firstly, no details of Soviet invasion were discussed in Yalta; it was a Soviet entry into the war, not invasion of Manchuria that was promised in Yalta. Secondly, not invasion, but declaration of a war was a violation of the non-aggression pact, so it would be more correct to say that:
 * "Between those two events, on August 8, the Soviet Union, in accordance with Yalta agreements, but in violation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, declared war on Japan..."
 * Thirdly, every military operation has an element of surprise, so the word "surprise" is redundant here. A real surprise attack is an attack without declaration of a war (e.g. Barbarossa). The major element of surprise was the Soviet war declaration, not invasion itself.
 * Fourthly, after numerous modifications and additions the initial text's idea have been lost: the "twin shocks" was supposed to refer to atomic bombing and Soviet joining the war. However, it is not clear from the present version what these twin shocks were: for instance, it may be equally understood that these shocks were the Soviet declaration of a war and subsequent invasion.
 * In connection to that, I propose to simplify the text by removal of all redundant statements:
 * "After the first atomic bomb was dropped, on August 9, the Soviet Union invaded the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. These twin shocks caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene..."
 * It is clear from this text that the twin shocks were bombing and invasion. Since, as a rule, a war declaration used to precede large scale hostilities, the mention of declaration is redundant and can be discussed in the main article. It is also obvious that declaration of a war by a neutral state is a violation of some treaty. To make it more clear, I propose to modify the preceding para as follows:
 * "... were privately making entreaties to the neutral Soviet Union, to mediate peace on terms favorable to the Japanese."
 * I believe removal of redundant details will make the lede more readable. --Paul Siebert (talk) 14:12, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks, Paul. Binksternet (talk) 14:51, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
 * That looks good to me Paul. Regarding Yalta, my understanding is that many historians think FDR gave away too much to Stalin, in part due to FDR's frail physical (and mental) health.  One of the alleged giveaways was Eastern Europe.  Another was inviting Stalin to share in the spoils of victory over Japan.  By the time Truman was President (and had the A-bomb in his back pocket), the US desire to have Stalin declare war against Japan had not just vanished but reversed.  Anyway, Paul's changes look okay to me.  Readers should be able to see that Stalin was technically keeping a promise when he declared war on Japan, and if readers overlook that point in the lead, then surely it will be apparent from the main text of this article.Anythingyouwant (talk) 16:39, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
 * This speculations about FDR/Truman are not shared by all historians. Many authors think that we cannot speak about "invitation to share in the spoils", because Japan was not defeated by that time and American military expected the invasion of Home Island to be bloody and long. Therefore it would be more correct to say that FDR/Truman tried to avoid to irritate Stalin in Europe expecting his help in Pacific. With regard to the A-bomb, its devastating effect used to be exaggerated (conventional bombing of Tokyo and other cities caused greater devastations and more deaths), and many historians believe it was not a decisive factor that affected Japanese decision to surrender. --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:45, 11 June 2010 (UTC)

Capitalization
When I encountered this article the other day after an interval of some months or even years, I was of course impressed by it but also surprised by some odd wording, perhaps epitomized by "In Japan, August 15 often is called Shuusen-kinenbi" -- in my idiolect, not wrong but far less natural than with "is often". So I fixed some of these and more, and as so often happens (especially when I really ought to be busy with "RL" concerns) found more and more oddities. Time permitting, I'll fix plenty more that I have already noticed.

Capitalization seems strange. I realize that some people associate capitalization with dignity or similar, and in connexion with this I'm egalitarian by inclination and thus have no personal objection to lowercase "emperor". However, in conjunction with uppercase "Imperial" this and that, "emperor" seems odd. The general pattern here seems to be that when a position immediately precedes the name of the holder, the former too is capitalized, but that when it's free-standing it isn't. Thus "Emperor Jones", but "Jones, the newly elected emperor", "the emperor of Ice Cream", and "the Ice Cream emperor". So we have the "Army minister", which is OK, but also "Foreign minister", which to me is very strange indeed -- "foreign minister" looks less odd, but raises the question "What, he wasn't Japanese?"

I think it would be easier if all positions were capitalized throughout. (Not "Farmer" or "Soldier", but "Emperor" and "Private".) -- Hoary (talk) 15:01, 19 August 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree that some of the wording is "odd".
 * I also think the capitalisation is somewhat random, and is also inconsistent and unpredictable.
 * I think it would be easier if all positions were capitalized throughout. (Not "Farmer" or "Soldier", but "Emperor" and "Private".) - Mmm. Maybe. I'm not sure I understand. That seems to contradict your "Jones, the newly elected emperor" statement, doesn't it? Please clarify. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 15:59, 19 August 2010 (UTC)

I wrote the previous comment when too sleepy by half. I wanted to say that as "private" and "emperor" (unlike "soldier" or "aristocrat") are positions, they could be capitalized; and that if they were consistently capitalized ("Emperor Hirohito", "the Emperor"), then this would lead to fewer oddities than what we now have ("Foreign minister", etc). Little though I like capitalization. -- Hoary (talk) 14:20, 20 August 2010 (UTC)