Talk:Surrender of Japan/Archive 2

"the so-called 'Big Six'"
We're told:

Japanese policy-making centered on the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (created in 1944 by earlier Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso), the so-called "Big Six"—the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Army, Minister of the Navy, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Navy General Staff.

with the reference "Frank, 87".

I know little about this subject and do not have Frank's book. But who called these people the "Big Six"? ja:鈴木貫太郎 (of course not a reliable source) tells us:


 * 昭和20年（1945年）4月、77歳の鈴木は枢密院議長になっていたが、戦況悪化の責任をとって辞職する小磯國昭総理の後継者を誰にするか、天皇に誰を推薦するか、それを決める重臣会議に出席した. 構成メンバーは6名の総理経験者と内大臣木戸幸一、そして鈴木であった. 若槻禮次郎、近衛文麿、岡田啓介らは、後継総理に鈴木の名を出した. 鈴木は「とんでもない話だ. おことわりする」と言った. しかし、すでに事前に根回しが行われていた.

There's an obvious opportunity within that to talk of roku-meijin [??] or whatever, but it does not do so. -- Hoary (talk) 14:32, 20 August 2010 (UTC)
 * "Big Six" is the term used by more-or-less every historian to describe them: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&tbo=1&tbs=bks%3A1&q=hirohito++%22big+six%22&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai= Raul654 (talk) 14:52, 20 August 2010 (UTC)


 * How extraordinary. Thank you for the nudge towards Google, which presents two hits from as far back as 1967. I wonder who coined this. -- Hoary (talk) 15:29, 20 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Robert Butow would be my guess. Raul654 (talk) 15:37, 20 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Interesting you say that! I wondered if it may be Butow:

On-line extracts (books.google.com)
 * Certainly Butow uses the term in his 1954 book. (At least 33 times: (books.google.com again!)
 * However, I don't know if he's the originator.
 * His first mention of the Big Six is on page 81, where he cites footnote 16 - However, I haven't been able to track down that particular footnote yet.
 * Pdfpdf (talk) 14:23, 21 August 2010 (UTC)
 * It may appear in the Japanese Monographs - I'll check on Monday. Pdfpdf (talk) 14:41, 21 August 2010 (UTC)

I bought a copy of Butow's book about a month ago. The statement in question says: "The advent of the Suzuki cabinet had of course brought in new faces, but the telling difference was that these particular meetings were attended by only the "constituent" or charter members of the council, that is, by the Big Six: The Premier, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and hte chiefs of the Amry and Navy General Staffs16 Footnote 16 says: Suzuki, Togo, Anami, Yonai, Umezu, and Oikawa, respectively. Admiral Soemu Toyoda succeeded Oikawa toward the latter party of may. This change was sponsored by Yonai who felt that Toyoda, who came from the same clan as Anami and Umezu, might be of more help than Oikawa in persuading the army leaders to place their support behind a termination of the war. See Toyoda, Saigo no teikoku kaigun, 213 and Statements: Oikawaa #61341. Raul654 (talk) 15:43, 21 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Thanks "Raul". Hmmm. So that footnote is no help to us. I guess on Monday, as well as the Monographs, I'll also look at my copy of Butow to see if he explains where the term "Big Six" comes from. Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 16:22, 21 August 2010 (UTC)


 * This is a refernece to the Big Six from 1948, which implies the term came from the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Raul654 (talk) 04:57, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

Celebrations
The article says that V-J Day is celebrated "in Korea" as Gwangbokjeol. The relevant article in ja:WP (of course not a reliable source) says that although liberation from the Japanese is indeed celebrated on that day, it's only called this in South Korea; in North Korea it's called 祖国解放記念日. We need a reliable source for this. -- Hoary (talk) 10:23, 24 August 2010 (UTC)
 * This book has a list of holidays celebrated in South and North Korea. South Korea, August 15 -- Liberation Day ("Gwangbokjeol") On this day in 1945 Korea was liberated from Japan after 36 years of colonial rule. The word Gwangbok means "the restoration of light." There are parades and speeches that recall the difficulties of the struggle against Japan and the importance of Korea nationhood. There is no such listing for North Korea (nothing at all between May 1 and Sept 9). Raul654 (talk) 17:04, 24 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Good sleuthing, Raul, but it's hard to believe that the happy citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea go for one third of a year without spontaneous mass celebrations of joy at the glorious achievements of their Great Leader, their Dear Leader, or their unseen boy leader. This unreliable source too says that 祖国解放記念日 (which it interestingly glosses as a day of the return of the light) occurs on 15 August. (There are piles more of bloggery to a similar effect.) And I also now have a good source for it: here on a web page of the Institute of East Asian Studies of Hokuriku University, Fukuyama Yūsuke writes about the Korean peninsula as seen from its holidays, and specificially says: 8月15日を「祖国解放記念日」として祝する. これは名称こそ異なるが、韓国と共通の祝日である. ("15 August is celebrated [in North Korea] as 祖国解放記念日. Although the name is different, it's the same holiday as in South Korea.") This research note also says that Gwangbokjeol is a South Korean holiday, and that 祖国解放記念日 is celebrated in North Korea -- though unfortunately it says nothing whatever about 祖国解放記念日 (its day or what it commemorates, let alone its reading). &para; Unfortunately Japanese eschews hangul, whereas Korean in the North eschews Chinese characters. Time to call in somebody who, unlike me, reads Korean. -- Hoary (talk) 00:35, 25 August 2010 (UTC) ... PS I've asked here. -- Hoary (talk) 00:47, 25 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Hangul: 조국해방기념일. MR: Choguk Haebang Kinyǒmil. RR: Joguk Haebang Ginyeomil. In the Hanja orthography, 国 should be 國. Here for example is a KCNA report about how it was celebrated in Wonsan. (If you can't read it, excite.co.jp can give you a machine translation into Japanese, and doesn't choke on the North Korean spellings like some other sites). Cheers, cab (call) 03:06, 25 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Well done! I've fixed the matter in the article, tentatively. I hope that we don't need precise sourcing for all of this, but if we do, I'm willing to help with any part of it that's in English or Japanese. -- Hoary (talk) 03:16, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

Changes in Soviet Plans vis-a-vis August Storm
Re: this edit - Yesterday, I recently finished David Glantz's book When Titan's Clashed, and it touched on this subject: Ultimately, because of the United States's use of the Atomic Bomb on 6 August, the Stavka accelerated its offensive preperations on August 9, before its forced had been fully concenrated for the attack.9 The reference provided says: For details on changes in Soviet plans and on the conduct of the operation, see David M. Glantz, August Storm: The SOviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Machuria, which is linked in the external links to here. I skimmed the article for a discussion of changes to the schedule, but the article is quite long and I didn't see any such discussion. Raul654 (talk) 04:37, 1 October 2010 (UTC)
 * I looked at it more carefully:
 * Planning reflected the need for swift operations that would preempt Japanese defense plans, avoid a protracted war, and insure Soviet control over Manchuria before the Japanese surrendered to Allied powers in the Far East. Although the Far East Command had ordered units to be ready to attack by 25 July 1945, it made the final decision on the timing of the attack and the form it should take on 7 August, only two days before it launched the attack. 2 At that time the Far East Command decided to commit the Trans-Baikal and the 1st Far Eastern Fronts to a simultaneous attack. Earlier plans had the Trans-Baikal Front attacking before the 1st Far Eastern Front attacked, an arrangement objected to by several front commanders. Perhaps detonation of the atomic bomb on 6 August prompted the hasty decision and the short two-day period between the decision and the attack.3
 * Source 3 is Shtemenko, Iz istorii razgroma, 65-66; Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff, 338-49; Zakharov. Finale, 83-85. According to Shtemenko, the original attack date was between 20 and 25 August.
 * Another Russian-language source. Raul654 (talk) 21:03, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Also, before I forget, this is interesting and worth expanding, p 282: "[Stalin] was, however, thwarted in his plans to seize Hokkaido. On 22 August, only a day before its launch, he thwarted a joint airborne and amphibious operation against Hokkaido island.18 Note 18 says: Galitsky and Zimonin, Destination Khokkaido, 9''

The full reference is: V.P. Galitsky and V.P. Zimonin. ''Desant na Khokkaido Otmenit! (Razmyshleniia po povodu odnoi nesostoiasheisia operatsii). VIZh No 3. (March 1994), 5-10

The title translates to: ''Cancel the amphibious assault against Hokkaido! (Reflections concerning one operation that did not take place  And VIZh is, I think, a reference to Voenno Istoricheski Zhurnal. Anyone wanna post a translation? Raul654 (talk) 05:24, 1 October 2010 (UTC)


 * Sorry, it seems I've been napping. Hmmm. Interesting. But what's your point? Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 13:57, 27 November 2010 (UTC)
 * (P.S. "August Storm" is an invention of Glantz's then infant daughter. Can you choose a better label please? Pdfpdf (talk) 13:57, 27 November 2010 (UTC))

Nit
Why mention Fat Man but not Little Boy?Anythingyouwant (talk) 07:06, 27 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Fixed.Anythingyouwant (talk) 15:51, 27 December 2010 (UTC)

Surrender date, and mentioning the Surrender date
(If anyone cares, the times are Australian Central Daylight Saving time.)


 * (cur | prev) 22:50, 20 January 2011 78.104.142.80 (Talk) (92,168 bytes) (only after a long-long introduction could I figure out the actual date of it... it's clearer this way.) (undo)
 * (cur | prev) 04:07, 21 January 2011 Raul654 (Talk | contribs) m (92,147 bytes) (Reverted edits by 78.104.142.80 (talk) to last version by Raul654) (undo)
 * (cur | prev) 11:17, 21 January 2011 Pdfpdf (Talk | contribs) m (92,178 bytes) (Why?) (undo)
 * (cur | prev) 15:21, 21 January 2011 Raul654 (Talk | contribs) (92,147 bytes) (Because it's sloppy writing and redundant with the third paragraph of the introduction) (undo)
 * (cur | prev) 21:12, 21 January 2011 Pdfpdf (Talk | contribs) m (92,178 bytes) (Undid revision 409109934 by User:Raul654 (talk) a) Thank you. b) How is it sloppy? c) So what? - I think it's time to stop edit-warring and discuss it on the talk page. What do you think? (I'm off to the talk page.)) (rollback | undo)

I think the above encapsulates the issues, and I am, of course, COMPLETELY unbiassed (cough, cough cough - oh dear - excuse me please). However, I think 78.104.142.80 has a point, and I think that it is indeed "clearer this way".

As has been know to happen in the past, Raul654 has a different opinion. Fair enough, he's entitled to it, but he is not entitled to impose his opinion on others without consensus. I asked him to explain himself. In my (of course, COMPLETELY unbiassed (cough, cough cough - oh dear - excuse me please) opinion, he hasn't. Pdfpdf (talk) 10:56, 21 January 2011 (UTC)


 * Sorry, I'm with Raul654. I think it's terribly clumsy, and since it's also redundant, that's reason enough for it to go. Yaush (talk) 15:05, 21 January 2011 (UTC)


 * Clumsy is the word. I am reverting to before Pdfpdf changed it. The date is already given twice in the introduction: once in the photograph and once in the lede. We do not need it three times. Binksternet (talk) 15:23, 21 January 2011 (UTC)


 * Let's get some facts straight here, and then let's get back on topic:
 * "I am reverting to before Pdfpdf changed it." - Please note that it was not me who changed it.
 * The IP made the change with the comment (only after a long-long introduction could I figure out the actual date of it... it's clearer this way.)
 * I am making no judgement or comment on style - the three of you have already done that, (and as it happens, I agree with you).
 * The point raised by the IP is that "it's clearer this way", and I agree that it is.
 * Please note: I am not saying it is "better", just that it's clearer.
 * You have already commented on style. What do any of you think about clarity?
 * Cheers, Pdfpdf (talk) 12:32, 22 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I think clarity is okay, not great, but the absence of the formal date in the first sentence is not the problem. The date is in the first image, and in the third paragraph of the intro. What is not so ideal about the clarity is the framing of the whole introduction, and the one-sentence fourth paragraph which has no connection to article body text. Binksternet (talk) 13:52, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

In Tokyo, What Broke the Deadlock of Aug. 13-14?
On Aug. 13-14, 1945, as the article states, "The cabinet ... convened and unanimously ratified the emperor's wishes" to surrender. The question arises, which action(s) by the US and allies caused this tipping point? Many historians attribute this to the particular shock of the atomic bombings, but the point is controversial. Two different actions may be cited. First, the article mentions the US leaflets of Aug. 13. Second is the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on Aug. 8.

The Emperor's recorded speech to the nation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyokuon-h%C5%8Ds%C5%8D contains a phrase which supports the atomic-bombing interpretation. However, "the critical 'Imperial Rescript to the Soldiers and Officers' of August 17 that ordered Japanese military forces to lay down their arms ignored the atomic bombs and mentioned only the Soviet entry." Source: John W. Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq (New York: Norton : New Press, 2010. p. 243.

I'm not ready to edit the article on this point. But the way the surrender is attributed has a major effect on US policy to this day. Oaklandguy (talk) 22:39, 5 September 2011 (UTC)


 * That the Atomic Bombs were the primary cause of Japan's surrender has long been the consensus of historians who have written on this subject. The fact that it was not mentioned in the rescript is utterly irrelevant. The claim that it was primarily due to the Soviets, and not the atomic bombs, is a recent revisionist position advanced by Hasagewa et al. I haven't had time yet to read his book (it's on my to-read list) but (a) it's definitely a minority position, and (b) the primarily rebuttal to his claim is that the Japanese did not know the poor situation their troops were in when they made the decision to surrender. Raul654 (talk) 07:14, 6 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Not only Hasegawa, but Pape, and many others. The Pape's analysis has been discussed on this talk page in details, and I do not thing this article, published in 1993, is a recent revisionism. In addition, you misinterpret the viewpoint of these scholars: they do not describe Soviet intervention as the sole and major factor that affected Japanese decision to surrender. In actuality, they list it among other factors, however, they do not consider the atomic bombing as the major (or even necessary) factor.
 * The Pape's rationale is clear and straightforward: in Imperial Japan, the mechanism of making political decisions was organised in such a way that the IJA's opinion played a decisive role. Japanese Army leaders were absolutely no concerned with a possibility of high civilian losses (as conventional bombing of Tokyo and other major cities demonstrated), and the only factor that could affect their position was military vulnerability of Japan. Atomic bombing didn't change the situation much (and it couldn't, because the atomic weapon is not efficient against regular army). However, destruction of Japanese fleet, naval blockade, invasion of Manchuria and conventional bombing of military objects in Home Islands made Japanese military vulnerability extremely high, which eventually made the decision of surrender possible.
 * Re your consideration about Japanese knowledge about the situation, if I am not wrong, it was Suzuki who said "Is our Kwantung Army so weak? Then the game is over." In any event, it was clear from the first days of the Soviet invasion that the situation in Manchuria was desperate, and that the Kwantung Army would be destroyed in the couple of weeks.
 * In any event, if you believe some sources represent minority views, go to WP:RSN.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:54, 6 September 2011 (UTC)


 * "That the Atomic Bombs were the primary cause of Japan's surrender has long been the consensus of historians who have written on this subject." - No, that's not the case.
 * Butow's book published in 1953 (I think) does not assert this. I agree that there is a subset of the historians who have written on the topic who believe this, but they are not representative, and they all post-date Butow.
 * "The claim that it was primarily due to the Soviets, and not the atomic bombs, is a recent revisionist position advanced by Hasagewa et al."
 * a) No, it isn't "a recent revisionist position" - Read Butow and all the other historians you haven't read.
 * b) No, it isn't "advanced by Hasagewa et al." - I have yet to read any published historian that says the surrender was due to just one single cause.
 * "I haven't had time yet to read his book (it's on my to-read list)" - I suggest you read it, and Butow, before you make any further comments.
 * "but (a) it's definitely a minority position," - No, it isn't. Read Butow and all the other historians you haven't read.
 * "and (b) the primarily rebuttal to his claim is that the Japanese did not know the poor situation their troops were in when they made the decision to surrender." - No, it isn't. Read Butow and all the other historians you haven't read.
 * Pdfpdf (talk) 16:27, 7 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Based upon the latest assessments of Japanese archival records by Sadao Asada, dropping of the bomb resulted in an immediate and direct effect on August 7th within the Japanese leadership and the Supreme War Council was convened to make a decision about surrender on August 8th but that was delayed a day due to some members being unavailable. The following day the Soviets entered the war and that was seen as an additional shock that galvanised the Japanese leadership into action in surrendering when the Supreme War Council finally met. Asada makes the distinction between defeat and surrender, the former is an objective fact, the latter is a state of mind, and given that this thread is about what prompted the Japanese to surrender then sources that discuss what the Japanese were thinking, such as Asada's examination of the Japanese archival records is a valid source. In contrast to Nazis Germany which continued fighting until most of Germany was occupied and after Hitler killed himself and they were comprehensively defeated, Japan surrendered while still in control of their home territories and before being completely defeated. While it is entertaining to think "what-if" there was no atomic bomb, it was by no means certain that the cost to the allies of occupying Japan by force was so high as to make them abandon their attempt. Defeating the Kwantung Army in mainland China is one thing, but crossing the straits to amphibiously occupy the Japanese home islands by force is quite another. So yes the atomic bombing was the major factor in the Japanese surrender and most certainly the central factor that shortened the war. See here. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 21:39, 12 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Interestingly, you are repeating the same arguments that had been put forward by you (and refuted by me) elsewhere . Do you sincerely believe that is constructive way to edit Wikipedia?
 * In particular, your attempt to present the article published by Asada in 1998 and re-published later (without serious modifications) as the recent analysis is astonishing, especially taking into account that I have already explained to you this your mistake.
 * Let me also remind you that the same mistake repeated twice is hardly just a mistake, but a deliberate attempt to deceive your colleagues. Please, be careful in future.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:56, 12 September 2011 (UTC)


 * I see no reason to think Martin is posting in bad faith. Tone it down, please. --Yaush (talk) 22:01, 12 September 2011 (UTC)
 * I believe I explained these reasons quite clearly: I admit he could be unaware of some facts during the discussion on the WWII talk page, however, he is informed about them now.
 * Let me also quote a piece of Asada's text:
 * "The effects of the "twinshocks"-the atomic bombing and the Soviet entry-were profound. Early that morning, Togo visited Suzuki to inform him of the Soviet entry. Suzuki concurred that the government must end the war at once. On his way back to the Foreign Ministry,Togo stopped at the navy ministry and told Navy Minister Yonai what he had said to Suzuki."
 * In addition, Asada correctly writes that the bombing of Hiroshima convinced Hirokhito that the war should be ended. However, taking into account the peculiarities of the Japanese decision making mechanism, that was not sufficient to end the war.
 * I agree (and I already wrote that elsewhere) that the bombing was an excellent pretext for surrender, as Asada explains in the "The Atomic Bomb as a "Gift from Heaven" chapter. However, the pretext and the reason is not the same.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:13, 12 September 2011 (UTC)
 * More quotes from the same Asada's article:
 * "It must be stressed again that the bomb did not "produce the decision" to end the war, nor did it set in motion the political process that led to Japan's surrender."
 * "''Thus, the atomic bombing was crucial in accelerating the peace process. The impact of the bomb was such that it brought further urgency to the governmental machinery for achieving peace, enabling the prime minister to bring Hirohito directly into a position where his "sacred decision" for surrender could override the diehards. In the apt words of Robert Butow, the atomic bombing, followed by the Soviet entry, had created "that unusual atmosphere in which the heretofore static power of the emperor could be made active in such an extraordinary way as to work what was virtually a political miracle."
 * In other words, bombing, along with the Soviet entry, just accelerated the end of the war, and Martin is supposed to have read that.
 * Re crossing the channel, the loss of Manchuria, the vital Japanese continental possession, would be a huge blow by itself, so no invasion of Home Island would be necessary in this case.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:30, 12 September 2011 (UTC)


 * To remain unpersuaded by a particular bit of evidence does not amount to bad faith. --Yaush (talk) 22:27, 12 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Correct. However, to repeat the same factual mistakes does.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:30, 12 September 2011 (UTC)
 * It speaks volumes that Paul cannot present a critique without embellishment with ad hominem arguments. Apparently to bring another viewpoints that may contradict Paul is a "factual mistake". Can we focus on the sources rather than these odious personal attacks and assuptions of bad faith, otherwise some may think you do this on purpose to drive off editors. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 00:24, 13 September 2011 (UTC)
 * I admit that I, being just a humble mortal, do resort to ad hominem arguments from time to time. However, I never restrict myself with just that type arguments, and always present something concrete. In connection to that, do you have to say anything concrete regarding my posts (including the quotes from the Asada's article), or you prefer to focus on just my humble person? --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:46, 13 September 2011 (UTC)
 * People can read Asada's viewpoint for themselves in the link I provided above, so I won't rely upon selective cut and pasting quotes. Asada concludes that with just the Soviet attack alone, the Japanese would have in all probability continued fighting beyond November 1st, the day the Americans were due to launch their amphibious landings on the home islands. In Kyushu alone some 900,000 troops massed along with kamikaze planes and human torpedoes in preparation for the anticipated American landings, and the Americans were not unaware of the fanaticism of the Japanese Imperial Army and the resultant high casualties that were to be expected. Asada states in final paragraph of his conclusion:
 * "In the end, Japan needed "external pressure" in the form of the atomic bombs for its government to decide to surrender."
 * So in that sense the atomic bombs proved to be the key psycholgical element that led to Japan's early surrender. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 02:24, 13 September 2011 (UTC)
 * The conclusion you made does not follow from the quote presented by you. Yes, the bomb was an important additional component of external pressure, and it severely affected the "peace party" in Japanese government. However, it is not clear, and Asada tells nothing about that, how did the bomb affected a war party, which possessed a very significant weight in the decision making process.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:56, 13 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Asada states that after days of discussion the Supreme War Council remained deadlocked at three for surrender and three against surrender. No unanimous decision meant maintaining status quo of continuing the fight. So the War Council, unable to decide, went to Hirohito and laid out their opposing arguments before him. Hirohito's "sacred decision" was for immediate surrender, Asada quotes Hirohito: "Especially since the appearance of atomic bomb, he said, continuation of war spelled needless suffering for his subjects and Japan's ruin as a nation" Thus the decision to surrender was made at 2.30am on August 10th. Hirohito had to intervene again August 14 to insist on surrender, after the War party wanted to reject the American government's reply. The Emperor was no rubber stamp, the War Party were of the samurai class loyal to the emperor above all else. So clearly it was Hirohito that made the decision to surrender and reason he decided on surrender was contained in his speech to the people: the appearance of the atomic bomb. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 20:51, 13 September 2011 (UTC)
 * I do not understand why do we need to waste our time in discussion of these things when the Asada's article contains a separate chapter named "The Bomb or Soviet Entry?" In this chapter (I suppose you have read it, although it is a little bit puzzling for me why do you prefer to ignore the Asada's conclusions) Asada analyzes a relative contribution of these two events into the Japanese decision to surrender. His conclusion is that, whereas different opinions exists among scholars (some of them, e.g. Robert Butow, Herbert Feis, and Barton Bernstein consider the bomb as a primary factor, while others, such as Gar Alperovitz and Robert L. Messer - and most Japanese historians - make emphasis on the Soviet entry), Asada's personal opinion is that, whereas the Soviet entry spelled a strategic bankruptcy of Japan and "served as a confirmation and coup de grace", the bomb had probably a greater impact, being a direct shock (as opposed to the indirect effect of the Soviet entry) for the Japanese elite. However, it is clear from what Asada writes that impact of these two factors was of comparable scale, so we cannot speak about any single "decisive" factor.
 * It is also interesting to point your attention at the fact that the cessation of the Soviet neutrality had much wider implications than just military ones. Yukiko Koshiro in his recent article (Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II. The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 417-444) explained how important were the relations with the USSR for Japan. According to him, the peaceful relations with the USSR was the conditio sine qua non for continuation of the war with the US, and according to Japanese war planners, "the Soviet attack alone would be an end of Japan's war in Asia and Pacific". --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:11, 14 September 2011 (UTC)
 * While undoubtably the entry of the Soviet Union would have eventually led to the crushing defeat of Japan maybe after several months, the entry alone would not have prompted Japan to surrender as quickly as it did, as it became a matter of honour for the japanese military to fight the Soviets according to Asada. Stimson wrote that the intent of the atom bombing was to shock the japanese leadership so that the peace party had a stronger position while the war party were weakened politically, to facilitate surrender, and that is what happened. The atom bomb gave the war party a way to save face, attributing surrender to technological advantage held by the USA rather than a lack of courage in facing a conventional attack. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 12:23, 14 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Wasn't just the psychology of the Japanese. Possession of the overwhelming power of the atomic bomb may well have influenced American attitudes, allowing them to slightly relax the surrender terms (specifically, to permit retention of the Imperial institution) with less risk of this being perceived as a show of weakness. I know, WP:OR. This is a talk page, not the article. --Yaush (talk) 13:52, 14 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Martin, I am not sure I understand your point. Could you please explain what concrete changes to the article do you propose?--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:00, 14 September 2011 (UTC)
 * I was addressing User:Oaklandguy's question "which action(s) by the US and allies caused this tipping point?" Since he started this thread, perhaps he should tell what changes he may be proposing. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 01:44, 15 September 2011 (UTC)
 * As we can see from the arguments and sources presented during this discussion, no consensus exists among scholars about the factor that served as a sole cause of the surrender, therefore, I see no reason in any modification of the text.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:43, 15 September 2011 (UTC)
 * I don't see any need for a change either. However if User:Oaklandguy has something in mind, I'd like to hear it. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 07:20, 15 September 2011 (UTC)

arbitrary break

 * One thing to add to the threat of atomic bombs is that Japan had no idea how limited the ability of the USA was to create them, at that time. As far as they knew, they could be dropped en masse, and thus would be militarily significant, in addition to wiping out the entire civilian population. StuRat (talk) 03:29, 13 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Indeed, after the second bombing at Nagasaki, the Japanese leadership began to believe the USA had stockpiled a number of atomic bombs and there was a rumour that Tokyo would be bombed next on August 12th and many other cities would soon be incinerated. Asada states that the Army Minister Anami gave some credence to the account of an American pilot captured on August 8 that the USA had a stockpile of 100 atom bombs. Suzuki thought that "the United States, instead of staging the invasion of Japan, will keep on dropping atomic bombs". Asada states that although Japan had measures in place to deal with the American invasion, nothing could be done about a continuation of atomic bombings. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 06:12, 13 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Please, keep in mind that the real devastating effect of conventional bombing was greater than that of the atomic bomb. Therefore, the conventional bombers stationed in Korea or Sakhalin would inflict even greater losses on Japanese civilian population.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:56, 13 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Yes, but the point is that the perceived threat of atomic bombs was much greater than the actual threat, in that Japan imagined a stockpile of them being dropped soon. Under those circumstances, the damage from the atomic bombs would have been greater.  And, even though the US didn't have them available immediately, if the war had lasted another 5 or 10 years, the threat of atomic bombs may have become a reality. StuRat (talk) 22:10, 14 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Yes, conventional bombing was significantly more destructive than the two atomic bombs. Even more problematic was the choking of Japan by sea, with naval mines laid around the main ports, and various air, surface and undersea attacks on Japanese shipping, reducing foodstuffs to a trickle. Japan was starving in August 1945. Nonetheless, the atomic bombs were important debate points—they stood out from other more widespread strategies. Binksternet (talk) 15:19, 13 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Glad to see that there are some areas where our opinions coincide.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:33, 15 September 2011 (UTC)

new sub-thread
Just a clarification note for someone wandering in here 'after the discussion' - while technically the massed effect of carpet bombing with incendiaries had produced wide-scale damage over time, no conventional attack had the punch - both physical and mental - of the two atomic bomb blasts. Additionally, there was the increased human misery from radiation poisoning. The Japanese cabinet had many people in it that clearly understood that continued nuclear attacks on Japan would destroy the nation - the history and culture of an ancient country would have been utterly erased. The emperor had also been deeply shocked by this and that is what put in motion the surrender. The Soviet declaration of war - which had a great impact - was still not the 'turning point' - i.e., if there had been no atomic bomb attacks, the militarists would probably have still gone with defending the homeland by meeting the invasions at the beaches with massive military/civilian resistance. That plan would have had no success against an increasing rain of atomic bombs on Japan, which the Japanese military had no chance of stopping. There's also been some argument as to doubting the great majority of historians supporting this view - even with a few dozen 'revisionists' (not my word) historians making counter-claims, that is still a less than a 10% or so view of current academic thinking. As a professional historian, I can tell you very little credence is put into the claims of Soviet involvement in causing the surrender at conventions of university professors, etc. Most sources - a big majority - will state that the Soviet attack was an important additional shock, but not the cause of the surrender. HammerFilmFan (talk) 18:38, 20 April 2012 (UTC)
 * no conventional attack had the punch - both physical and mental - of the two atomic bomb blasts. - Not so. The fact that the Soviets over-ran the whole of Manchuria in a matter of a few days was a huge punch - both physical and mental.
 * Additionally, there was the increased human misery from radiation poisoning. - Many more people were dying from, and being injured by, conventional bombing. They were also being starved to death. These were all far quicker and more obvious than radiation poisoning.
 * the great majority of historians supporting this view - Perhaps the great majority of American historians, but not the great majority of Russian, Chinese, Japanese, British and other nationalities' historians.
 * even with ...  - As a professional analyst, I place no credence in your "statistics".
 * Most sources - a big majority - will state that the Soviet attack was an important additional shock, but not the cause of the surrender. - Similarly, most sources - a big majority - do also state that the atomic bombs were not the cause.
 * In fact, (not opinion), almost all sources say the surrender was due to a combination of factors. --Pdfpdf (talk) 19:42, 20 April 2012 (UTC)
 * Sorry, VERY MUCH so. Everything I stated is fact. HammerFilmFan (talk) 22:31, 21 April 2012 (UTC)
 * No dice, Hammer. The conventional bombing of March '45 Tokyo was worse than either nuke. The effects of starvation from naval blockade were much worse and felt much more widely. Binksternet (talk) 01:19, 22 April 2012 (UTC)
 * Everything I stated is fact. - False. And easily demonstrated to be false. If you insist that "Everything (you) stated is fact", then provide some independent evidence (not opinion) to support your "facts". Pdfpdf (talk) 02:50, 22 April 2012 (UTC)

Title
Title should make reference as to what War the Japanese surrendered from. Other wise it implies it's an article about how japan surrenders in any fought war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.232.144.47 (talk) 05:32, 15 November 2011‎ (UTC)
 * That suggestion has been made twice already and rejected. There's no need to disambiguate because Japan has never surrendered except at the end of World War II. Raul654 (talk) 17:07, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

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Nagasaki
As horrific as it may be - I still prefer this atomic bomb on Nagasaki to this: Nagasaki for the lede, even though it was doubled up...Modernist (talk) 01:08, 1 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Okay. If you think of any other changes to what's been done so far, please make a note here. I am thinking about cutting the off-topic stuff in citation #35. I am off to WorldCat to get the info on the source, so please check out the proposed edit and give me your opinion in the meantime. Thanks. -- Dianna (talk) 01:35, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * It always seemed to me that the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact was absolutely crucial to the outcome of the war. The outcome of the war might have been very different had the Japanese not been engaged in neutrality with the Soviets...Modernist (talk) 02:22, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * I am suggesting snipping out the overly-detailed day-by-day points that are part of citation #35. Do you think that content needs to stay? The material was added by Pdfpdf and he later . My opinion is its overly detailed, even for the footnote. -- Dianna (talk) 02:55, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Truthfully I hadn't read it carefully but it certainly is interesting - considering the Soviet invasion plans. I think there is a lot of relevant content there especially the chain of events at the end after Germany left the war; if you can condense the beginning without losing the essence you might try...Modernist (talk) 03:11, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * That's a good idea. Not tonight, though. It's getting to be too late for any complex work. See you later, -- Dianna (talk) 04:20, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * There is valuable information held in the day-by-day breakdown. I would not like to see it removed or greatly reduced. Binksternet (talk) 04:30, 1 June 2012 (UTC)

Importance of Soviet declaration of war
Found a potential reliable source from the journal The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus: Hope this helps. The essay appears to put forward that the Soviet declaration of war was far more important in bringing about the surrender of the Empire of Japan rather than the Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Additionally, I have to wonder if the possible dividing (similar to the Division of Korea) of Japan also played a part into the decision, as has been suggested as a possible outcome by Bryan Suits: --RightCowLeftCoast (talk) 15:11, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

Hasegawa makes an additional statement about a possible Soviet occupation of Hokkaido on page 296 of his book: --RightCowLeftCoast (talk) 15:35, 20 August 2012 (UTC)


 * Scholar Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is a good source, certainly. His voice provides the largest alternate viewpoint, not the major one, though; his view that has not completely replaced the mainstream one. Binksternet (talk) 15:47, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
 * What weight, if any should be given the the possible new content, a single paragraph? Nothing?--RightCowLeftCoast (talk) 16:14, 21 August 2012 (UTC)


 * Two answers occur to me. Hasegawa's conclusions may call into question any one of a number of declarations and assumptions stated unchallenged in the article, so his work could be brought into play anywhere, to give an alternate view. Otherwise or also, Hasegawa's views could be described in a paragraph in the section "August 8–9: Soviet invasion and Nagasaki". Binksternet (talk) 17:40, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

What is the mainstream viewpoint? Below are two quotes from mainstream peer-reviewed reliable sources.
 * "Similarly, most American leaders did not believe that the Soviet entry into the Pacific war would make a decisive difference and greatly speed Japan's surrender. Generally, they believed that the U.S.S.R. entry would help end the war ideally, before the massive invasion of Kyushu. They anticipated Moscow's intervention in mid-August, but the Soviets moved up their schedule to August 8, probably because ofthe Hiroshima bombing, and the Soviet entry did play an important role in producing Japan s surrender on August 14. Soviet entry without the A-bomb might have produced Japans surrender before November." (Barton J. Bernstein. The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1995), pp. 135-152}
 * "Third, the atomic bombings were not decisive even in the timing of the surrender. Hiroshima did bring the emperor and some civilian leaders to favor immediate surrender, but did not influence the Army. The Army refused to attend a meeting called after Hiroshima to discuss surrender. Had the civilians tried to surrender at this point, senior military leaders would likely have supported a coup.126 However, the next day, after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, senior military leaders did agree to attend surrender discussions.127 While Army leaders arguing against surrender contended either that no atomic bomb had been dropped or that, if it had, it was of little significance, none ever tried to argue that defeat in Manchuria was irrelevant to Japan's prospects for defense. Thus, the timing of surrender was determined by the Soviet attack and not by the atomic bomb." (Robert A. Pape.Why Japan Surrendered. International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 154-201)

These quotes demonstrate that Hasegawa's view are hardly revisionist, and they just support one of two mainstream viewpoints. IMO, the mainstream viewpoint has been summarised by Yukiko Koshiro (Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II. The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 417-444):
 * "Concerning Japan's "abrupt" capitulation, most studies ascribe it to the shock of either atomic bombs or "surprise" attack by the Soviet Union, or both..."
 * --Paul Siebert (talk) 20:09, 21 August 2012 (UTC)
 * Therefore, it can be stated in the main article, with the verification using Hasegawa's book (or journal essay), about the possibility of Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, and the role that had in the surrender?--RightCowLeftCoast (talk) 02:01, 22 August 2012 (UTC)


 * I'm puzzled by the source indicating most American leaders didn't think Soviet entry to the war in the Pacific would make a material difference. As I recall, some of Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin were predicated on (faulty) intelligence indicating that the U.S. required Soviet assistance to defeat Japan. Whether required or not, or for its own territorial gains or not, whether materially affecting the outlook of the Japanese military command, the USSR would have at some point declared war if only to validate the concessions received in anticipation of their military involvement. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 14:13, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

The Emperor
When referring to the Emperor of Japan, "Emperor" is ALWAYS capitalized, just as are "King" and "Queen" referring to the United Kingdom. Likewise, the "King" when referring to Spain, Sweden, Norway, or Thailand, and the "Queen" when referring to Denmark or the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It is really argumentative and dense to revert these capitalizations. Likewise, the President when referring to the United States, France, Mexico, et cetera, and the Prime Minister when referring to any country that has one: Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,... Likewise for the Chancellor of Germany or Austria. 98.67.175.254 (talk) 02:56, 9 October 2012 (UTC)


 * Wikipedia has its own house style which is not exactly what you are recommending. At WP:JOBTITLES we see that president and emperor are lower case unless a specific person is being discussed at which time it is capitalized. We would write "Emperor Hirohito" (capital) but "the position of emperor" (lower case).
 * Other manual of style nuances that you will want to take a look at apply to dashes (WP:DASH) and dates (MOS:DATES). Em dashes are never spaced on Wikipedia, but you have been adding spaces. Dates are never given ordinal endings such as 6th of August or 6th August. Wikipedia writes that date as 6 August or August 6. Binksternet (talk) 03:31, 9 October 2012 (UTC)

History Missing
The negotiations section only covers events after May of 1945, but there were negotiations before that. In fact, in May of 1945, the Japanese were ready to surrender under certain conditions, such as the emperor remaining in power. This is significant, especially because it contradicts the view that dropping the atomic bombs was necessary.

--Coching (talk) 01:36, 7 January 2013 (UTC)


 * What books would you cite?
 * I would remind you that one voice or a few voices in the Japanese government were not enough to change from continuing the war to surrendering, even in early August after Hiroshima was destroyed, and for six days after Nagasaki was destroyed. If they were really ready to surrender they would have. Binksternet (talk) 03:09, 7 January 2013 (UTC)


 * If they were really ready to surrender they would have. - Yes and no. The Japanese were ready to surrender under certain conditions. If the allies had accepted those conditions, the Japanese would have surrendered. But as we now know, the allies were not interested in a conditional surrender, and at that time, the Japanese were not interested in an unconditional surrender. So I'm not sure what point you're addressing with the "If they were really ready" statement.
 * However, I am interested to read which sources would be quoted, and also, how the article would be changed. Pdfpdf (talk) 12:39, 7 January 2013 (UTC)

''The negotiations section only covers events after May of 1945, but there were negotiations before that. In fact, in May of 1945, the Japanese were ready to surrender under certain conditions, such as the emperor remaining in power.'' - Both of these statements are, to be blunt, wrong. (1) The "negotiations" began in earnest after the appointment of Sato as the ambassador to the USSR in/around May of 1945. Except they weren't really negotiations since his government had no defined bargaining position and Sato spent most of the summer of 1945 exchanging cables with Tokyo attempting to define one. (2) That the Japanese were ready to 'surrender' on highly favorable terms that the allies were absolutely unwilling to accept is already covered in this article, and does not prove the bombs were unnecessary. Raul654 (talk) 17:02, 7 January 2013 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the clarification. Pdfpdf (talk) 23:00, 7 January 2013 (UTC)

Appropriate sources
For reference, with regards to our friend the IP editor (who really should make himself an account), here's the explanation and source I left on his talk page, but which he will not have seen because his IP address keeps changing. Vashti (talk) 08:07, 12 October 2013 (UTC)

"Hi. Regarding this diff, I think you will want to review Wikipedia's policy on reliable sources. Since Wikipedia is a tertiary source, 'I read it in a book' is indeed an appropriate source. Ideally, we do not collate primary sources; we summarise secondary sources that others have produced. Bix's Pulitzer-winning history, 'Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan' is reliable, as well as already being extensively cited; and £7.99 later, I can tell you the citation in question is probably page 528 of the Kindle ebook edition, 'In the weeks and months that followed, vast amounts of secret materials pertaining to Japanese war crimes and the war responsibility of the nation’s highest leaders went up in smoke—in accordance with the August 14 decision of the Suzuki cabinet.' Please review the policy. Vashti (talk) 16:15, 11 October 2013 (UTC)"

Archives?
This is possibly the wrong place to ask - if so, please redirect me to the right place ... The archives box in the top right corner of the page says "Threads older than 3 months may be archived by MiszaBot ". Item 1) was last edited 27 March 2012; 2) 1 June 2012; 3) 22 August 2012; 4) etc. ... Huh? Pdfpdf (talk) 14:28, 14 October 2013 (UTC)
 * Note the "may". MiszaBot is configured to leave a minimum of five threads. Since the talk page has been busy, I guess next time the bot runs on this page, two of those old threads will disappear. Vashti (talk) 10:15, 16 October 2013 (UTC)

Article fully protected from editing until content dispute resolved
The current content dispute between the IP editor and other editors on this article needs resolution on the talk page, not via edit warring on the article. The article is fully protected until dispute is resolved. Proper edit requests will be handled in a timely manner. --Mike Cline (talk) 13:58, 14 October 2013 (UTC)
 * It would be far easier to discuss with the IP editor if he would access his countless talk pages. Vashti (talk) 17:30, 14 October 2013 (UTC)
 * Looking over the edits, it appears the IP editor has a burr in his saddle over the reliability of Bix, and refuses to bring it back here for discussion. --Yaush (talk) 02:29, 15 October 2013 (UTC)
 * The article already draws heavily on Bix's work, and he is a reliable source according to WP:RS. We're dealing with an anonymous editor who won't discuss and who reverts in violation of policy, and every other editor on the article gets dinged for edit warring. He's been referred to the talk page and he's had comments left on his talk page. What are we supposed to do that we haven't already done? Vashti (talk) 05:08, 15 October 2013 (UTC)
 * In revision 577095871 the IP editor is inserting his opinion of Bix, clearly not a "vast improvement" as claimed; he can continue to participate by using the talk page (and maybe gain understanding of the the guidelines on sourcing) but consensus appears clear, so maybe just reduce to semi. Peter&#160;James (talk) 17:21, 15 October 2013 (UTC)
 * Please also note this edit where the anon tells us that "'I read it in a book' is not a source!", demonstrating a serious misunderstanding of WP:RS and of Wikipedia as a tertiary source. Vashti (talk) 10:12, 16 October 2013 (UTC)

Protection changed to Semi-Protected. Play nice everyone. --Mike Cline (talk) 14:47, 17 October 2013 (UTC)

Neutrality Issue
In section 6.3 on the Japanese reaction to the Potsdam Declaration, the article implies that there is certainty about what Suzuki meant with his use of the word "mokusatsu," and that the interpretation presented is the only plausible one. This violates Wikipedia's neutrality standards because a variety of sources, including this NSA publication (http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/mokusatsu.pdf) suggest that there is quite a bit of ambiguity surrounding his intentions with that word, and therefore whether the bombings were provoked by a mistranslation or not. I suggest that both interpretations be represented; otherwise, we can't consider that section neutral. 72.195.134.106 (talk) 19:58, 28 December 2013 (UTC)

Remaining Japanese naval forces in mid-1945
In the chapter "Impending defeat" the article states that "Following a series of raids on the Japanese shipyard at Kure, Japan, the only major warships in fighting order were six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and one battleship..." The suggested number of aircraft carriers surviving after the US air attacks on Kure in June-July 1945 is surprising, and I would like to know which ships are being referred to. Of the Japanese fleet carriers, Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū had been sunk at Midway, Shōkaku, Hiyō, and Taihō at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Zuikaku and light carriers Zuihō, Chiyoda, and Chitose at the Battle of Cape Engaño (part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf), while Unryū and Shinano had been sunk by submarines. Only Junyō and Katsuragi were still afloat after July 1945, but neither was seaworthy, not to mention battleworthy; they were little more than floating hulks unable to sortie, much less launch or land aircraft. Junyō had been torpedoed on December 9, 1944 by three US submarines and attempts to repair her had been abandoned in March 1945, while Katsuragi was severely damaged by a heavy bomb in the US air raid on Kure on July 28, 1945 and was only repaired after the war, though no longer to carrier status. Of the light carriers, only the 22-year old Hōshō survived in working order, having served mainly as a training carrier in the Inland Sea since Pearl Harbor; Shōhō had been sunk in the Battle of Coral Sea and Ryūjō in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The only other light carrier still afloat, Ryūhō, was badly damaged by aircraft near Kure on March 19, 1945 and was considered a total loss. Of the escort carriers, Kaiyō was also badly damaged by air attacks at Kure in July-August 1945 and was not usable. Kumano Maru, a landing craft carrier with a small flight deck insufficiently long for landing was unharmed, but all other escort carriers had been sunk. The total useful carrier strength of Japan after July 1945 was thus one light carrier (Hōshō) and one landing craft carrier with flight deck (Kumano Maru); the other two fleet and one light carriers still afloat (Junyō, Katsuragi, and Ryūhō) were unseaworthy hulks not capable of supporting flight operations. I would change the number of carriers in "MAJOR warships IN FIGHTING ORDER" to ONE, since Kumano Maru does not classify as a major warship and the other three were not in fighting order.--Death Bredon (talk) 21:38, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Discussion among cabinet members
I have some problems with the recent addition by :


 * Cited reference:

Google books offers only a "snippet" preview of this book. Through this snippet mechanism I can search successfully for words such as "surrender" and "defenses". However, the following search terms returned nothing at all:
 * Sakomizu
 * Mizuho
 * Yasuoka

When I searched for "Ise Shrine", I got only two instances of the "Shrine of Ise", both describing a visit by Hirohito to celebrate a victory in battle. These are on pages 60 and 257, not in the range 234–240. Nothing in the book appears to be a discussion among cabinet members Sakomizu, Mizuho and Yasuoka about the fear that the Ise Shrine would be destroyed.

Does anyone here have the ability to quote from the book's page range 234–240 such that the text can be verified? Binksternet (talk) 21:14, 16 February 2014 (UTC)

FAR?
I have just looked at the article today and there is some big problems with the featured article criteria]. These problems include: And a couple others. If these issues are not finished within 14 days, I will send this to FAR. Thanks to those who contributed to it, Tomandjerry211 (Let's have a chat) 11:18, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Several paragraphs with out citations (I've put citation needed tags next to those paragraphs)
 * A lot of Harv errors.
 * Inconsistency: Page_, p._., or just _ in citations
 * _ for page numbers in citations is unclear

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Atom bombs
The article talk a lot about atom bombs on the surrender of Japan in WWII, like if it was a major cause of the surrender. What have atom bombs to do with that? The Japanese didn't care at all about atom bombs; as it was just a public excuse to surrender, it have never been a cause of it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.53.169.124 (talk) 23:10, 28 September 2015 (UTC)
 * The main reason for Japan's surrender was the Soviet invasion. (79.67.113.117 (talk) 16:20, 15 October 2015 (UTC))


 * In the emperor's surrender speech to the Japanese people, he mentions the atomic bombs but he doesn't Mention the Soviet Union at all. Does that sound like they didn't care about the atomic bombs at all? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.32.199.148 (talk) 15:35, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 14 August 2016
please change the date "formally signed on September 2, 1945" to "September 4, 1945" I have read the date as 4 September in Indian newspaper article in "Indian Express" published on 14th August 2016 on there web portal. In above referred article in 6th paragraph "On August 15, 1945, Japanese Emperor Hirohito gave a recorded radio address, which later came to be known as the Jewel Voice Broadcast. In the radio address, he announced the surrender of Japan to the Allies. Mountbatten remembered hearing the news of Japanese surrender that day sitting in Churchill’s room, and as the Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia Command signed the formal Japanese surrender of Singapore on September 4, 1945."

The date given is September 4 1945 and not September 2 1945.

Abhikadam24 (talk) 12:51, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

❌ - because the "Indian Express" is wrong - Arjayay (talk) 10:08, 15 August 2016 (UTC)

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tennōzan
What does tennōzan mean in this sentence? I mean, why is it there? According to the diary of Grand Chamberlain Hisanori Fujita, the Emperor, looking for a decisive battle (tennōzan), replied that it was premature to seek peace "unless we make one more military gain" Wünscher (talk) 19:52, 27 July 2017 (UTC)

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The Potsdam Decalration: contradictory
Hi! There are two contradictory senteces in the "The Potsdam Declaration" section: First: "It was decided to issue a statement, the Potsdam Declaration, defining "Unconditional Surrender" and clarifying what it meant for the position of the emperor and for Hirohito personally." Second: "Contrary to what had been intended at its conception, the Declaration made no mention of the Emperor at all." Please clarify! Thank you. Wünscher (talk) 20:36, 7 February 2018 (UTC)

Spam links
There are some spam links added by Chris99460 back in March. Can someone remove these, please? 2604:2D80:803D:8C7D:CA08:E9FF:FEF8:98C8 (talk) 18:35, 17 June 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes check.svg Done — IVORK Discuss 01:51, 20 June 2018 (UTC)

Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact
Right here on this article, in the end of 5th paragraph of the "Divisions within the Japanese leadership" section, states "Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, in Moscow, and Yakov Malik, Soviet ambassador in Tokyo, went to great lengths to assure the Japanese that "the period of the Pact's validity has not ended"". Slavinskiĭ (page 153-4), quoting from Molotov's diary, recounts the conversation between Molotov and Satō, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow: After Molotov has read the statement, Satō "permits himself to ask Molotov for some clarifications", saying he thinks his government expects that during that year April 25, 1945 – April 25, 1946, the Soviet government will maintain the same relations with Japan it had maintained up to present, "bearing in mind that the Pact remains in force". Molotov replies that "Factually Soviet-Japanese relations revert to the situation in which they were before conclusion of the Pact". Satō observes that in that case the Soviet and Japanese government interpret the question differently. Molotov replies that "there is some misunderstanding" and explains that "on expiry of the five year period … Soviet-Japanese relations will obviously revert to the status quo ante conclusion of the Pact". After further discussion, Molotov states: "The period of the Pact's validity has not ended".

Boris Nikolaevich Slavinskiĭ, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History 1941–1945, Translated by Geoffrey Jukes, 2004, Routledge. (Extracts on-line). Page 153-4.

Later in his book (page 184), Slavinskiĭ further summarizes the chain of events: Note, however, that Malik did not know (had not been informed) that the Soviets were preparing to attack.
 * "Even after Germany's exit from the war, Moscow went on saying the Pact was still operative, and that Japan had no cause for anxiety about the future of Soviet-Japanese relations."
 * May 21, 1945: Malik (Soviet ambassador to Tokyo) tells Sukeatsu Tanakamura, representing Japanese fishing interests in Soviet waters, that the treaty continues in force.
 * May 29, 1945: Molotov tells Satō: "we have not torn up the pact".
 * June 24, 1945: Malik tells Kōki Hirota that the Neutrality Pact … will continue … until it expires.

Slavinskiĭ, pg.184.

On the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact article, in the second to last paragraph of the "Background and history" section, states "On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Union denounced the pact, informing the Japanese government that "in accordance with Article Three of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the lapse of the five-year period of operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes known to the Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941." The wording of the denunciation suggested that the Soviet Union wished to see the treaty go out of effect immediately, and Time magazine reported that the Soviet Foreign Commissar's tone indicated that the Soviet Union might go to war with Japan soon. However, the text of the treaty clearly stated that the pact remained in force until April 1946. When pressed by the Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato, Molotov confirmed that the treaty did remain in force until April 1946."

A quick search for a number for multiple other sources also say the pact was violated. Fortunatestars (talk) 00:36, 28 August 2018 (UTC)
 * the article currently lacks a RS stating there was a violation. That leaves us with an editor who made up his own mind after looking at primary sources, which is not allowed. This is a serious flaw but it can be fixed by an addition to the main text (not the lede) with a suitable cite. Rjensen (talk) 00:45, 28 August 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes, "denunciate" was indeed from a primary source. Now added reliable third-party sources saying violation. Neither were wrong, just wasn't the whole information. Fortunatestars (talk) 01:26, 28 August 2018 (UTC)

Unconditional surrender
The main problem with unconditional surrender wasn't necessarily that it was an unreasonable demand, but that the U.S. and Japanese governments had a fair amount of difficulty directly communicating with each other, or understanding exactly what the other side was trying to convey, and the unconditional surrender demand added another layer of difficulty to such problems. AnonMoos (talk) 20:12, 26 June 2019 (UTC)
 * Do you have a Reliable Source with information that would improve the article's content? The Talk Pages are not for users' idle speculation/views on the topic. See WP:FORUM and WP:SOAP. HammerFilmFan (talk) 15:18, 26 January 2020 (UTC)

August 9 Supreme Council Meeting
I would like to request an addition to the paragraph on this meeting that occurred at 1030 before the report of Nagasaki came in at 1100. The addition is the position of War Minister General Anami, who was in favor of continuing the war until one final last battle had been fought in keeping with national honor. And particularly the following quote from him: "Would it not be wondrous for this whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?" This quote succinctly captures the philosophy of militarism and is comparable to Hitler's idea of Germany being utterly destroyed if it could not win. Source: McCullough, David, Truman, Simon & Schuster, New York (1992), p. 459. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.30.93.144 (talk) 02:47, 23 July 2020 (UTC)


 * Agreed, added to the paragraph about the Imperial council's deliberations on August 9th. In the future don't hesitate to be bold and make edits yourself. Wikipedia runs on the ideas of users like you! Voteins (talk) 04:45, 12 August 2020 (UTC)

Another shit article from Wikipedia
This is what you get with amateurs. Huge wholes in the narrative.

There is absolutely no mention, none at all about Iejima!!!? Without the first meeting between Japanese delegates and Americans, none of the events in this entire article would have happened. But is there any mention of Iejima? None, because the people on this site are more interested in petty scrabbles about who controls the topics rather than the content that goes into them.

There should be a whole section about the preparatory meeting that went into setting up September 2, 1945. It dumbfounding to think that it would appear from this article the American Fleet just sailed into Yokohama without a by-your-leave.

But hey!?

From the article on Iejima

The surrender preparations started on August 17, 1945, with the flight of two Japanese Betty bombers to Iejima where the Japanese emissaries transferred to U.S. Army Air Force C-54s to complete their journey to Corregidor to meet with General Douglas MacArthur's staff. B-25 Mitchells of the 345th were assigned to escort the Japanese bombers from the Japanese mainland to Iejima, and P-38s were assigned the duty of top-cover. Japanese officials ordered the remaining Japanese Air Force to shoot down their own bombers, because they believed that honor required that Japan should fight to the very last person. Instead of flying directly to Iejima, the two Japanese planes flew northeast, toward the open ocean, to avoid their own fighters. One of the Japanese delegates aboard remarked, after looking through a bullet hole in the side of the plane, that a squadron of fighters was approaching and he thought that their surrender mission had failed. However, the squadron of fighters were U.S. P-38 Lightnings assigned as top-cover. The 345th had been directed to send two B-25s as escorts. However, fully aware of the difficulty in communication with the Japanese and correctly anticipating the possibility of necessary deviation from plans, the 345th had dispatched three flights of B-25s so as to bracket the enemy's proposed flight path. This proved to be excellent planning, as only the second of the three flights intercepted the Japanese and the top-cover, off-course and headed on a route that would not have brought them to Iejima. Operating under orders to come no nearer than 1000 ft to the Japanese planes, Major J.C. McClure found it impossible to keep the Japanese on the proper course flying abreast of them, so he pulled out well ahead of them to lead their formation. Seconds later he was surprised to find the Japanese tucked in tightly under his wings. To them it was the safest way to approach the island which had only days before been their target. The four planes arrived over Iejima in perfect show formation.

The Japanese emissaries continued on to the Philippines as planned, concluded the arrangements for the formal surrender scheduled to take place on September 2 in Tokyo Bay, and returned to Iejima on August 18. As the Bettys were taxiing into place to receive their passengers for the return trip to Tokyo, one of them ran off of the runway and broke its landing gear, leaving it unable to continue the trip that day. The Japanese delegation split, with the less important delegates staying on Iejima overnight as the damaged plane was repaired, while the operable aircraft proceeded that evening. For some unexplained reason, that plane ran out of fuel some 130 mi from their destination and was ditched in shallow water. The emissaries waded ashore and arrived in Tokyo the next day. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.141.33.140 (talk) 14:31, 19 March 2020 (UTC)


 * Well, that Iejima artice is lacking too many references to be incorporated here. More work needs to be done there first.-- occono (talk) 11:14, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

When did Japan surrender?
The article talks about the emperor's broadcast at 1200 Japan Time on August 15th. If I'm not mistaken, that would have been 0300 GMT. But Truman announced the surrender at 1900 Eastern Time on the 14th, according to what I heard on the BBC (Newshour, Aug. 15, 2020), and Attlee announced it at midnight London time. Those two announcements seem to be three hours before the emperor's broadcast. So what's the explanation? Eric Kvaalen (talk) 13:04, 18 August 2020 (UTC)

Why we should mention the number of bomb the US had
Binksternet, since you disagree with the inclusion of the section discussing the true number of bombs the US had I'm opening up a section here for some consensus building.

First off, to me this seems a rather critical piece of information. One needs to know two sides to understand this story: the actions of the Japanese leadership that eventually lead to their decision to surrender, and the actions of the allies that forced that decision. Part of the latter is of course the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which many argue was the decisive factor in that decision. It would be a worthy question to ask then why the Japanese did not immediately surrender on Aug 6 after the bombing of Hiroshima, or over the following days after it became clear a devastating new weapon had been employed on the city. The answer is that the Japanese on Aug 9 was met by shock, confusion, and denial by the Japanese government. They refused to believe that the US had an atomic weapon, and then refused to believe the US had more than one. The US anticipated this reaction, and so on Aug 9 dropped a second bomb on Nagasaki.

This gets us to the important point. On Aug 13, the Japanese cabinet met for a final time to discuss surrender, and on that date the militant faction made the argument that it was better for Japan to be destroyed rather than surrender. A discussion point in this meeting was that Japan had received "intelligence" that the US processed 100 atom bombs. This is an important concept for readers to understand, that the idea of Japan being annihilated without so much as an opportunity to fight back was not a hypothetical debate. So they went to the Emperor, who told them "continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer". And so Japan surrendered. (the Soviet invasion also played a role, of courses, but as well documented on this wiki which was more important is debated. Both can and should be mentioned)

But if we leave that critical section in the article, it leaves a massive falsehood uncommented on: the US didn't have 100 atom bombs. At the time of the Japanese surrender the US had one atom bomb, and parts for perhaps two others. Japan would not be annihilated, at least not without the long and costly ground invasion Japan's militants had staked so much of their hopes on. Japan surrendered on a bluff.

So there is no two ways about it. Either we confuse the reader as to exactly what threat the Japanese thought they faced in those final hours, and why the idea of a US ground invasion now seemed unlikely, or we leave a blatant lie (that was believed by the Japanese) uncontested and uncommented upon. Not to mention, an important historical fact is missed. And so, we need to mention somewhere that the US didn't have 100 atom bombs in 1945 05:41, 25 August 2020 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Voteins (talk • contribs)


 * Your argument is fine until you get to "massive falsehood". There was never a massive falsehood. The article said, before you got to it, that there was not really 100 bombs coming, "In reality the United States would not have had a third bomb ready for use until around August 19, and a fourth in September. However the Japanese leadership had no way of knowing the inaccuracy of this faulty intelligence, and assumed the United States had the capacity not just to devastate individual cities, but might even wipe out the Japanese people as a race and nation."
 * So we don't have any kind of falsehood to correct. Your additions are absolutely irrelevant to the surrender. It's just extra unneeded dross. Binksternet (talk) 14:25, 25 August 2020 (UTC)


 * Delete the unnecessary stuff: The article reads fine without the deleted content. I feel the "testimony" proving the number of A-bombs adds unnecessary length, and steers focus from the internal discussions of the Japanese Emperor and Supreme Council. Without the stuff being argued about present in the article, there is no confusion between the threat the Japanese believed they faced vs. the actual A-bomb capacity of the Allies. sbb (talk) 18:49, 25 August 2020 (UTC)

About the statement that Japan has never lost a war
"For the most part, Suzuki's military-dominated cabinet favored continuing the war. For the Japanese, surrender was unthinkable—Japan had never been successfully invaded or lost a war in its history."

I'm fairly certain that the Japanese had lost the Imjin war to the Koreans and Ming dynasty, doesn't this make this quote untrue as they have lost numerous wars in their history? Sefog (talk) 12:10, 15 March 2021 (UTC)
 * Correct, the foolish Korean invasion under Hideyoshi was a disaster, and immediately after his death the ruling regency got the Japanese armies out pronto - it could also be argued that Commodore Perry's expedition and the following ones 'invaded' Japan successfully. 50.111.63.192 (talk) 15:21, 16 April 2021 (UTC)

Should date format change from MDY to DMY?
This is an attempt to seek consensus, one way or the other, on whether to change the article's date format from MDY to DMY date format.

Background: this is moving a revert war from the article edit summaries to Talk in order to achieve consensus for a change from MDY to DMY. The texts of the edit summaries are:

02:59, 20 April 2021 (UTC) sbb (talk) 02:59, 20 April 2021 (UTC)

I was just writing my own post here when I got the notification for this, of which this is what I was saying:

I have recently tried to make a minor edit to this page to change the date format from mdy to dmy. The purpose was to the bring it in line with the vast majority of other articles in relation to World War II, including the main article for the war itself. These include other central articles to do with the war, such as the Pacific War and the European theatre of World War II. The majority of articles for key battles such as the Battle of France, Operation Barbarossa, Guadalcanal campaign, Battle of Stalingrad, Operation Overlord, Battle of Saipan, Battle of Peleliu, Battle of Iwo Jima, and Battle of Berlin all use the dmy format. The Surrender of Germany article, which is the equivalent of this article, also uses dmy. It is a de facto standard used for WWII-related articles, presumably because it was a globally significant and consequential event, and a far greater number of countries use dmy rather than mdy. So I tried to make the change here to bring the article in line with other WWII-related articles, which ultimately is a minor change that doesn't affect the substance of the article in the slightest. This change has faced resistance from user Sbb, on the grounds of maintaining the status quo. To me at least, it makes sense to make the change to dmy for the reasons explained above, though at this stage it's now essential that there be a consensus. I've now given my two cents, at least. Thescrubbythug (talk) 03:10, 20 April 2021 (UTC)
 * Cooee Cobbers, I agree that the article should be changed to a DMY format because besides the US, the majority of the world uses either the DMY or YMD format. Now since this is the english wikipedia, with primarily english speaking countries the YMD format is not used as frequently as the former, the DMY format should be used. IronBattalion (talk) 08:41, 20 April 2021 (UTC)
 * For the record, this discussion by extension now encompasses the Battle of Peleliu page - dmy and mdy had been almost equally used before (mdy had maybe one more example, while dmy was more prominently used at the start of the article, including the infobox). Sbb moved to make it all mdy, though I disagreed and believe it should be dmy, largely for the same reasons I outlined here. Thescrubbythug (talk) 01:51, 22 April 2021 (UTC)
 * Off-topic: changes to Battle of Peleliu are not germane in this article's Talk page. sbb (talk) 05:25, 22 April 2021 (UTC)
 * My position on the reversions is simply: WP:MILDATE and MOS:DATERET require consensus to change an article is otherwise already consistent (i.e., MOS:DATEUNIFY-audited). Projects (such as MILHIST) don't "own" individual articles; each article's revision history may or may not have long-standing reasons for a particular / . Consensus on Talk is required per both policies above. The policy exists specifically to prevent WP:BOLD changes to established consensus. That is all. sbb (talk) 05:32, 22 April 2021 (UTC)


 * I support changing the date format to dmy. &emsp;—&#8239;sbb&#8239;(talk) 22:33, 26 April 2021 (UTC)

Amending a section

 * Privately Truman despaired that the Japanese government's failure to surrender meant the only escalation left to him was to order an atomic bomb dropped on the Imperial Palace,[121] as had been repeatedly proposed by several members of the USAAF high command,[122] killing the Emperor and his cabinet in a decapitation strike that would cripple the Japanese military's command and control but would leave no one left with the authority to order the Japanese people to accept a surrender agreement.

While it is true — as the source says — that Truman was reported to have "sadly" remarked that he would have to order a bomb to be dropped on "Tokyo," the rest feels rather embellished. Truman never said the Imperial Palace, there was no discussion of command and control. Tokyo is a big city and there are other places you could drop it to send quite a message without killing the Emperor (the bombs are not "all destroying," as even Nagasaki showed), and in any event, it is not clear that Truman literally intended to drop a bomb on Tokyo or whether he was using metonymy (Tokyo for Japan), assuming that what he said was not part of some game with the British, or even reported accurately (lots of "ifs").

I would change the paragraph to something like this:


 * Truman had ordered a halt to atomic bombings on August 10, upon receiving news that another bomb would be ready for use against Japan in about a week. He told his cabinet that he could not stand the thought of killing "all those kids."[109] By August 14, however, Truman remarked "sadly" to the British ambassador that "he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb dropped on Tokyo,"[121] as some of his military staff had been advocating.[122]

This version completely avoids unnecessary interpretation and elaboration and sticks very closely to the facts and context of the matter. The important facts still come across, without excessive (and probably inaccurate) interpretation. --NuclearSecrets (talk) 18:03, 3 May 2021 (UTC)

Seeking consensus: convert refs to harv/sfn style
I'd like to convert as many of the plain-styled "Frank, p. ###" refs (as an example) to harvnb/sfn-style references as possible. There's quite a few of them s in the article, and they lack the hyperlink functionality that  or  provide. (edited strike/ins text).

Any objections to me converting refs to harvnb/sfn where I can? Please comment. Thanks. &emsp;—&#8239;sbb&#8239;(talk) 22:16, 25 May 2021 (UTC)


 * You write "the hyperlink functionality" above; perhaps you intended to write "they lack the hyperlink functionality" or similar. But that little matter aside, no objection from me. -- Hoary (talk) 22:51, 25 May 2021 (UTC)
 * Thank you, I was typing slower than my brain was thinking. Yes, I meant that there were plenty of refs that don't provide the hyperlink functionality. I've edited my opening question with ins/strike text. &emsp;—&#8239;sbb&#8239;(talk) 23:54, 25 May 2021 (UTC)

Downfall
It is misleading to say the invasion of Japan was imminent as many historians believe Downfall was a deliberate bluff. A naval blockade with conventional bombings would have forced Japan to surrender. (86.179.156.23 (talk) 16:34, 6 August 2021 (UTC))

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment
This article is or was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment. Further details are available on the course page. Peer reviewers: Jenny.Yu60.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 10:29, 17 January 2022 (UTC)