Talk:Sykes–Picot Agreement/Archive 2

British Zionist discussions?
I don't know why we have this section, the Zionists (nor the Arabs) did not know about Sykes Picot and would probably have objected if they had. Samuel might have had some idea about the goings on, if he did, he apparently didn't let on. This whole section seems at variance with what was actually going on, Samuel may very well have spoken with Sykes before he went to Petrograd, not necessarily in the context of Sykes-Picot though (by that time the deal was done and it was just a question of getting a Russian sign off so why did not Sykes tell him then?). I think this section has seems to mix up a few things that were going on at the same time, namely, the FO O'Bierne memo and the Wolf formula (Grey was apparently discussing what to do for the Jews with the French and Russian ambassadors) and Sykes overstepping and floating an unauthorised proposal to the French and Russians and then as well spinning the same or a similar yarn when he got back from Petrograd. I will do some source investigations to see what is confirmable here, since the Zionists had nothing directly to do with SP I think any confirmable comings and goings in regard to Palestine should be perhaps in the Balfour Declaration article (lead up to the Declaration).

If anything the need for Sykes Picot arose out of the discussions with the Arabs and the need to reconcile what had been said to them with known French claims and interests in Syria (as well as the religious interests in Jerusalem/Holy Places). Selfstudier (talk) 14:58, 15 June 2017 (UTC)

There is hardly any material in the article as to the motivation for the agreement or the actual negotiations and events leading up to it, what I will do is rename this section Motivation and Negotiations and start adding stuff into it and deleting extraneous Zionist materials as I go, while keeping any that fit into the new heading. Selfstudier (talk) 17:22, 15 June 2017 (UTC)

Removed the below 3 paras from renamed section, only point of interest to note from these is that Grey had had prior discussions with Samuel about Palestine desiderata, can insert that at a suitable point:

Zionism was first discussed at the British Cabinet level on 9 November 1914, four days after Britain's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire. David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer "referred to the ultimate destiny of Palestine."ref name="Samuel">Grooves Of Change: A Book Of Memoirs Herbert Samuel ref name="Monroe">Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956, Elizabeth Monroe, p26 Lloyd George's law firm Lloyd George, Roberts and Co had been engaged a decade before by the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland to work on the Uganda Scheme.ref>Conservative Party attitudes to Jews, 1900–1950, Harry Defries In a discussion after the meeting with fellow Zionist and President of the Local Government Board Herbert Samuel, Lloyd George assured him that "he was very keen to see a Jewish state established in Palestine."ref name=Samuel/>ref name="Huneidi">A Broken Trust: Sir Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, Sarah Huneidi, p261 Samuel then outlined the Zionist position more fully in a conversation with Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. He spoke of Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state in Palestine, and of Palestine's geographical importance to the British Empire.

Samuel wrote in his memoirs: "I mentioned that two things would be essential—that the state should be neutralized, since it could not be large enough to defend itself, and that the free access of Christian pilgrims should be guaranteed ... I also said it would be a great advantage if the remainder of Syria were annexed by France, as it would be far better for the state to have a European power as neighbour than the Turk."ref name=Samuel/>ref>Samuel, Grooves of Change, p174 The same evening, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith announced in a speech that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire had become a war aim, "It is the Ottoman Government, and not we who have rung the death knell of Ottoman dominion not only in Europe but in Asia."ref>Melvin I. Urofsky, American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust, p.203 (1995)

In January 1915, Samuel submitted a Zionist memorandum entitled The Future of Palestine to the Cabinet after discussions with Chaim Weizmann and Lloyd George. On 5 February 1915, Samuel had another discussion with Grey: "When I asked him what his solution was he said it might be possible to neutralize the country under international guarantee ... and to vest the government of the country in some kind of Council to be established by the Jews"ref>Samuel, Grooves of Change, p176 ref>In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, Elie Kedourie After further conversations with Lloyd George and Grey, Samuel circulated a revised text to the Cabinet, which was formally discussed on 13 March 1915.

Removed this as well for now, seems not really relevant to Sykes-Picot: Prior to Sykes's departure to meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov in Petrograd on 27 February 1916, Sykes was approached with a plan by Samuel in the form of a memorandum, which Sykes thought prudent to commit to memory and then destroy.ref name="Kamel2015"> He also suggested to Samuel that if Belgium assumed the administration of Palestine this might be more acceptable to France as an alternative to the international administration France wanted and which the Zionists did not. Of the boundaries marked on a map attached to the memorandum he wrote:ref name="Samuel">Grooves Of Change: A Book Of Memoirs Herbert Samuel

"'By excluding Hebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to discuss with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them and further does away with any contact with the bedouins, who never cross the river except on business. I imagine that the principal object of Zionism is the realization of the ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather than boundaries or extent of territory. The moment I return I will let you know how things stand at Pd.'ref>"

Shortly after returning from Petrograd, Sykes briefed Samuel, who then briefed a meeting of Gaster, Weizmann and Sokolow. Gaster recorded in his diary on 16 April 1916: "We are offered French-English condominium in Palest[ine]. Arab Prince to conciliate Arab sentiment and as part of the Constitution a Charter to Zionists for which England would stand guarantee and which would stand by us in every case of friction... It practically comes to a complete realisation of our Zionist programme. However, we insisted on: national character of Charter, freedom of immigration and internal autonomy, and at the same time full rights of citizenship to [illegible] and Jews in Palestine."ref>Friedman, 1973, p.119-120

I only just noticed that this was deleted. I think it should be added back, but I accept your view that it wasn’t fitting well so work is needed to explain the relevance before doing anything.

To my read it is clear from the above sources and quotes that Samuel was aware throughout, that he was in dialogue with Sykes from very early on, and that he was keeping the Zionists updated.

The main point the above should build up to here is why was Palestine proposed to be “internationalized”. That decision undoubtedly resulted from Zionist influence, even if it was indirect influence - most likely via Samuel.

Perhaps a good starting point would be to figure out exactly when that particular decision was made.

Onceinawhile (talk) 23:47, 30 September 2017 (UTC)


 * In relation to Hall’s 12 January 2016 memo, see: :
 * "It is most puzzling to know where Hall got the idea of world Jewry's opposition to any scheme of Arab Independence in the Southern Near-East -something which is completely unknown from any Zionist or general Jewish source-and of the strong political interest that it shows and is liable to show in the future of Palestine. One possible source for his views regarding the future of Palestine could be Samuel's memorandum of March 1915. In the Samuel Papers (Israel State Archives) there is a letter (of April 1915) by Lord Fisher, expressing admiration for the memorandum, also hinting that it might be brought before the de Bunsen Committee. One may assume that from Fisher the memorandum was passed on to the Director of Naval Intelligence. It may also be just possible that Hall was already in possession of some information respecting the attempted contacts between Naval Intelligence in Egypt and Aaronson's 'Nile' organization in Palestine, although these were only in the initial stage. Apparently there was also in those days a generally accepted belief in the magnitude and importance of the influence of world Jewry. On one occasion when the Foreign Office was engaged on the draft of a declaration regarding Palestine (beginning of March 1916, see note 7 below), Lord Robert Cecil observed: 'I do not think it is easy to exaggerate the international power of the Jews.' One should also bear in mind that many of the top people in the Admiralty and the War Office were strongly opposed to most of France's claims in the Levant. Hall’s colleague on the interdepartmental committee for the negotiations with France was the Director of Military Intelligence, General MacDonogh, who seems to have favored Aaronson's plans and became a staunch supporter of Zionism and the Zionist leaders. He too may have read Samuel's memorandum, and there can be little doubt that he read Hall’s above-mentioned comments on the Picot~Sykes Memo. Direct evidence for the dissatisfaction with the proposed agreement of at least one Cabinet member comes from Curzon -'private' to Grey, 3 and 20.2.1916, F.O. 800/106... If Samuel's memorandum was in fact brought before the De Bunsen Committee it is quite possible that Sykes, who was a member, read it for the first time as far back as the spring of 1915. If so, HalTs observations made him aware of the matter once again."
 * Onceinawhile (talk) 00:07, 1 October 2017 (UTC)
 * Two further sources from Kedouri:
 * P.R.O. 30/57/45, the Kitchener Papers, Storrs to Fitzgerald, 28 December 1914: “the inclusion of a part of Palestine in the Egyptian Protectorate [with Jerusalem as a free city could be] a possible solution... [This would make] Jewish infiltration into Palestine ... less obvious and annoying to the susceptibilities of the Moslem and even certain elements in the Christian world”
 * Joint memorandum by Sykes and Picot, 5 January 1916 (F.O. 371/2767/2522): “[There is a need for an] arrangement satisfactory to the conscientious desires of Christianity, Judaism and Mahommedanism in regard to the status of Jerusalem and the neighboring shrines... members of the Jewish community throughout the world have a conscientious and sentimental interest in the future of the country”


 * Onceinawhile (talk) 00:26, 1 October 2017 (UTC)
 * This early January memorandum is published in full in: (note that pages 543-545 are printed in the wrong order, but are all there)
 * It shows that clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 of the agreement were already in place by then (point 3 is the international arrangement for Palestine).
 * This explains Kedouri’s focus on the Hall memorandum, which was commenting on this 5 January proposal.
 * Onceinawhile (talk) 01:30, 1 October 2017 (UTC)
 * I stopped editing here (and McMahon-Hussein) because so many edits on related Balfour page, I decided to wait until that was completed. You can also look at "Captain Reginald Hall and the Balfour declaration" by Jacob Rosen.Selfstudier (talk) 09:05, 1 October 2017 (UTC)
 * Thanks, that’s helpful. FYI another quote related to this from Sykes’ son, Christopher Sykes, in ‘’Memories of My Father’’:
 * "“The reader may think I have forgotten to mention Zionism. This is not so, but Zionism came very late in my father’s short life, and when it did, it came with a bang. To go back a little once more. In the years before the war my father had become friends with a notable Zionist, Rabbi Gaster, the religious head in England of the Sephardic Community. They met as Orientalists, and no word about Zionism seems to have passed between them in those days. There is curious and indeed conclusive proof that in the first part of the war my father had but the haziest notion as to just what Zionism was. His book ‘’The Caliph’s Last Heritage’’ came out in 1915, as mentioned already. Many a curious reader, when the book had readers, must have looked up ‘Zionism’ in the Index. He or she was probably much disappointed to find so meagre an entry : 'Zionism and the New Turkey, p. 509.' Unless a confirmed enemy of Jewish nationalism, he or she was then probably profoundly shocked if research was carried to its logical conclusion, for the little entry in the index refers to a single sentence which is a masterpiece of concision, underestimation and inaccuracy. It appears, on p.509, at the end of a paragraph on the new Turkey. “Superficially the new Turkey was progressive; a mockParliament made mock laws; mock ministries and mock ministers rose and fell; a mock counter-revolution served as a pretext for shattering even a semblance of authority, and set up a mock Sultan... The Greeks were cold-shouldered because they stood by their ancient rights. Zionism was backed because it was bad cosmopolitanism and finance.” That is all. The book was seen through the press by my mother whose notions of Zionism were even hazier in 1915 than my father’s. Neverthess the book must have been read in proof by its author and it is inconceivable that he would have passed this misleading comment a year later. In a speech at a meeting, now famous in Zionist history, which was held in the London Opera House, Kingsway, in December 1917, my father said that he had first learned about Zionism from Doctor Gaster in the last days of 1915. It has often seemed possible to me that the venerable Rabbi was moved to open the eyes of his friend after reading this curious remark in ‘’The Caliph’s Last Heritage’’."
 * Onceinawhile (talk) 12:58, 1 October 2017 (UTC)

I have added a couple of sentences on this to Balfour Declaration. Could you take a quick look? I want to renominate for FAC tomorrow, so keen to ensure you’re in agreement. Onceinawhile (talk) 22:48, 1 October 2017 (UTC)

1918 Clemenceau Lloyd George Agreement
I think we have made more out of this than we should have. It is clear from all the references and material in the article that although there was certainly some kind of agreement(in principle?) no-one really knows what was discussed because there are no real records. The FRUS sources in particular make it plain that the French and British ideas of what this "agreement" was all about are not at all the same. Certainly, LG provided some consideration, we have references to support that even if it is not precisely clear what. It seems to me that we ought not to elevate this event to the status of an agreement merely because some American commentator at the time thought to include it in a list of "secret treaties". It is more realistic to consider this as simply being just another part of the ongoing negotiations between the English and the French over territory/SP and we can simply to mention Stannard as a source alleging it to be a "secret treaty". The reality is that the British had established facts (boots) on the ground and were simply insisting that this reality be recognized no matter what was contained in Sykes Picot to the contrary. So I suggest we simply include the fact of the meeting within the appropriate section (it is in fact already there).Selfstudier (talk) 12:30, 2 May 2019 (UTC)


 * I have gone ahead and done this, is there a reference for the Stannard "secret treaties" thing, I will include it as well under the new Mosul Palestine subsection.Selfstudier (talk) 17:12, 2 May 2019 (UTC)
 * Found the ref and included it. Selfstudier (talk) 17:12, 2 May 2019 (UTC)

Ray Stannard Baker’s straight lines
This map shows two straight lines starting in the North East at Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar, labelled French and British lines, dated December, with an unclear year. Any idea what these refer to? Onceinawhile (talk) 17:45, 1 May 2019 (UTC)

Is that something to do with the French Syria Mandate? Selfstudier (talk) 19:14, 1 May 2019 (UTC)

Could be the Iraq Syria border (sort of, Jordan isn't on there).Selfstudier (talk) 19:55, 1 May 2019 (UTC)

If you look in the section Paris Peace Conference (1919–20) it speaks about an Aide Memoire discussed between Clemenceau and LG ->https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv08/d12....."In the first instance, British troops would be withdrawn to the line which the British Government conceived to be the boundary between Syria and Mesopotamia, and Syria and Palestine respectively. This would be the provisional boundary line....." It might be that to which these lines refer (at this point in l919, the question of mandates and borders of them were still up in the air). Probably the French idea of where the line should be was then a bit different since they were still holding on to Sykes Picot. It looks like those two lines meet at the future tripoint between Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Since that Stannard document is dated 1923 those matters would have been resolved (or being resolved -> Paulet Newcombe?) by then, and maybe he has just marked them for some other purpose that has nothing directly to do with the secret treaties (although you could certainly consider San Remo and the mandates to be a kind of implementation of Sykes Picot).Selfstudier (talk) 11:43, 2 May 2019 (UTC)

Baker's missive talks about the demarcation line and wanting it to be far enough to the North West to accommodate a railway line to be built from Baghdad to Haifa and under British control so as to assure no interruption of oil supply in the event of a future war.Selfstudier (talk) 17:22, 2 May 2019 (UTC)

Early Discussions


Palestine was discussed at the British Cabinet level on 9 November 1914, four days after Britain's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire. David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer "referred to the ultimate destiny of Palestine." In a discussion after the meeting with President of the Local Government Board Herbert Samuel, Lloyd George assured him that "he was very keen to see a Jewish state established in Palestine." Samuel then outlined the Zionist position more fully in a conversation with Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. He spoke of Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state in Palestine, and of Palestine's geographical importance to the British Empire. In 1946, Samuel wrote in his memoirs: "I mentioned that two things would be essential—that the state should be neutralized, since it could not be large enough to defend itself, and that the free access of Christian pilgrims should be guaranteed ... I also said it would be a great advantage if the remainder of Syria were annexed by France, as it would be far better for the state to have a European power as neighbour than the Turk."

In January 1915, Samuel submitted a memorandum entitled The Future of Palestine to the Cabinet after discussions with Chaim Weizmann and Lloyd George. On 5 February 1915, Samuel had another discussion with Grey: "When I asked him what his solution was he said it might be possible to neutralize the country under international guarantee ... and to vest the government of the country in some kind of Council to be established by the Jews" After further conversations with Lloyd George and Grey, Samuel circulated a revised text to the Cabinet, which was formally discussed on 13 March 1915.

3 January 1916 memorandum
Many sources state that the agreement was reached on 3 January 1916. I have managed to find their memorandum from that day: Sykes-Picot Memorandum. Do you think that this was the only document from that day, and that the 5 bullets at the end are the agreement as it was at that point? A number of secondary sources I have read suggest that the whole agreement was fixed on 3 Jan, but this suggests otherwise. Onceinawhile (talk) 13:03, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

Lieshout version of events is here https://books.google.com/books?id=_wu3DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 Selfstudier (talk) 14:52, 5 May 2019 (UTC)