Talk:Sykes–Picot Agreement/Archive 3

3 January 1916 memorandum
Many sources state that the agreement was reached on 3 January 1916. I have managed to find their memorandum from that day: Sykes-Picot Memorandum. Do you think that this was the only document from that day, and that the 5 bullets at the end are the agreement as it was at that point? A number of secondary sources I have read suggest that the whole agreement was fixed on 3 Jan, but this suggests otherwise. Onceinawhile (talk) 13:03, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

Lieshout version of events is here https://books.google.com/books?id=_wu3DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 Selfstudier (talk) 14:52, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

Two questions
1) Should this article be about the full set of Russian-Italian-French-British agreements which carved up the Ottoman Empire, or just the French-British agreement re the Fertile Crescent? The term “Sykes-Picot” technically only applies to the latter as the two specific diplomats were not involved in the other agreements, but the term is used in the wider sense by many scholars. In our article, we currently appear to be trying to do both.


 * The prior agreements are antecedents of SP so to the extent that they were valid and operative at the time, then they clearly relate to or are motivation for SP. Rather than just listing them out as has been done, it might be better to include them as appropriate in the motivation and negotiations section (which is where I started a while back).Selfstudier (talk) 10:19, 20 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I agree with you re style. The Italian agreement came after so can’t come under negotiations.
 * What I am keen to decide on is issues like the use of maps such as those in Sykes–Picot_Agreement; these are technically different compilations of Sykes-Picot together with other agreements, but are labelled as if S-P incorporated the Italian and Russian positions. Onceinawhile (talk) 15:26, 20 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Having reflected on this, I think that the way we have it at the moment is not right, the section about the secret agreements is just perched there after the lead and there is no flow at all between the lead and the following section, if you don't mind I will rejig it a bit and see what you think, OK?Selfstudier (talk) 15:55, 24 April 2019 (UTC)

2) Does anyone have access to Documents on British Foreign Policy, series I, vol. IV, pp. 241-251? Numerous sources refer to these 11 pages as containing the full correspondence.

Onceinawhile (talk) 22:01, 19 April 2019 (UTC)


 * Next week. Zerotalk 03:35, 20 April 2019 (UTC)


 * https://books.google.es/books?id=w9TsVxeUkQMC&pg=PA60&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false I think these are them as well (says was alternately known in War Cabinet as the Asia Minor Agreement)Selfstudier (talk) 12:24, 24 April 2019 (UTC)


 * Thanks, this is helpful. It says: "Meanwhile, in March of 1916 Sykes and Picot proceeded to Russia to confer with Sazonov. The Russian foreign minister declared his government's willingness to support the suggestions of Britain and France in return for their backing of Russian territorial claims in northeastern Anatolia. To these claims the two Western allies-France on 13/26 April and England on 10/23 May 1916-gave their sanction, although final clarification did not take place until 10/23 October 1916. The Entente governments formalized the tripartite understanding-commonly labeled the Sykes-Picot agreement though alternately known in the British War Cabinet as the Asia Minor Agreement-in an exchange of eleven letters, of which the four that are reprinted here present all the essential data."
 * It talks of eleven letters, but only prints four. It would be helpful to see the rest.
 * Other scholars have mentioned that the “tripartite” nature includes Sazonov, so “Sykes-Picot” can’t refer to the whole thing. And yet others have referred to the Italian agreement as being an integral part, which is ignored here.
 * My guess is that the confusion exists because the Russian and Italian parts of the agreement became irrelevant after the Turkish War of Independence (pictured right). Onceinawhile (talk) 13:25, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I don't think there is any confusion (other that that caused by somewhat revisionist attempts to paint the thing as somehow being more than what it actually was). Yes, you could theoretically add Sazonov to the name of the agreement as Russian consent to it was requested (it was the British idea to obtain it, they chose not to bother Italy with the same request). When S and P presented their agreement to Sazonov, he objected to the Eastward extent of the blue area and that is all it was about, swapping a bit of blue for something else and giving it to Russia instead, the British discussed it in Cabinet and decided finally not to object to it, I suspect because, by then, they were in a bit of a hurry on the Arab sideSelfstudier (talk) 10:47, 28 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I have found all 11 letters and added them in. Onceinawhile (talk) 22:39, 27 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Yes, very good. I rearranged things a bit, hope its OK. Did a show/hide as was done with Balfour since not everyone will want to read these and they will otherwise stick out too much on the page(the later ones are of little consequence in any case).Selfstudier (talk) 11:16, 28 April 2019 (UTC)


 * My impression is that there is confusion in the sources over the way names are used, with some using "Sykes-Picot" for the final, Russian-agreed, form and others switching to using "Tripartite Agreement". I think that the article should outline that confusion rther than adopting the more limited interpretation. According to the better sources I've read, the whole process was largely driven by Russian territorial ambitions, so I don't think it would be correct to not go into that.      ←   ZScarpia  11:23, 30 July 2019 (UTC)


 * If you look down below, you will see that there is in general a lot of confusion over the "name". Sykes-Picot is by far the most common way to refer to the agreement(s) and then perhaps Asia Minor agreements followed by Anglo French agreement. I would be interested to see the sources that you are referring to as favoring "Tripartite Agreement" for the name. As for the "tripartite" nature, you have exactly the same setup in the Constantinople agreement which is also not really one agreement but three. The Russian "territorial ambitions" started there with Constantinople agreement and Sazonov was certainly the driver behind that, this was much less of an issue in the SP agreements, yes he got another pound of flesh but no big deal really in the grand scheme of things.Selfstudier (talk) 14:32, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Google search on the term "Tripartite Agreement"+Sykes+Picot (ignore results which don't have a capital 'T' and 'A' in Tripartite Agreement): . The original source I read was probably Jonathan Schneer's "The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict", of which I have a hard copy (see Chapter 16]).         ←   ZScarpia  18:15, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * More confusion, haha. One of the results is calling SP as we do and then the "Tripartite Agreement" the St. J de M agreement between France UK and Italy (because Russia wasn't a party to it). The whole set is actually a four way agreement in some sense. Anyway I misunderstood you, I thought you had examined several sources in particular rather than in terms of a generic google search. My impression overall is the same as before, the agreements have lots of names because there is not really an official name. Maybe you could put together a paragraph dealing with the issue of the names and include it somewhere? If you don't want to, I'll try and remember to do it later on.Selfstudier (talk) 21:36, 30 July 2019 (UTC)

Asia Minor Agreements
I have a solution to this: the creation of a new article called Asia-Minor Agreements (note the plural), to cover all the agreements referred to under Sykes–Picot_Agreement.

It would solve a few issues: (1) that the S-P could never have been referred to alone as “The” Asia Minor agreement, given that most of S-P territory lies outside Asia Minor; (2) that the term “Asia Minor Agreement” in google books brings up references to both the Italian and Russian agreements (not just the Anglo-French); and (3) would allow this article to focus only on the pure Anglo-French agreement. Onceinawhile (talk) 22:32, 21 April 2019 (UTC)


 * I am not precisely sure what "official" title would mean in this context, one can readily source "1916 Asia Minor Agreement" as being the "proper" name of this agreement. I suppose the French might even call it something else altogether, lol. Selfstudier (talk) 21:43, 23 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Hi I saw the same, but am not convinced by the quality of the sources which make that claim. I think they are wrong. Could you share a couple of the highest quality sources which make the claim that you have seen?
 * I will look them out and see if they are worth anything. The Brecher source mentioned by Rjensen calls it the Asia Minor Agreement of 1916 followed by "better known as the Sykes....". For practical purposes everyone calls it Sykes Picot anyway so I am happy enough with your idea to have another page that bundles the various related agreements together (redirects and whatnot will be a bit messy).Selfstudier (talk) 11:05, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * https://books.google.es/books?id=w9TsVxeUkQMC&pg=PA127&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false is how the French (translated)(Cambon) referred to it at the end of 1918...."Anglo French Agreement(s) of 1916 on Asia Minor" :)Selfstudier (talk) 11:35, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Thank you. My interpretation of these two is (1) “better known as” is loose wording for “the relevant part of which is known as”; and (2) the “Anglo-French Asia Minor Agreement” is shorthand for “the Anglo-French component of the Asia Minor Agreement(s)”. Onceinawhile (talk) 13:32, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Here are a few which suggest that the term actually relates to a number of the agreements:
 * “Asia Minor. Agreement — Great Britain, France, &c. Italian Sphere. Asia Minor. London, April 26. 1915 Great Britain, France and Italy. Anatolia. Sevres, August 10, 1920”
 * : “The secret treaties included the Asia Minor agreement (which was complementary to the 1915 Straits Agreement), the Sykes-Picot understanding, and the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne. The last two modified the Asia Minor agreement”
 * Onceinawhile (talk) 06:00, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Also, these digitized British Foreign Office papers contain a number of the key contemporary documents. I am working through them. Onceinawhile (talk) 06:01, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I agree with Onceinawhile in favor of a new article on Asia-Minor Agreements.  Here are some useful sources On the French and Italian factors: (1) Helmreich, Paul C. "Italy and the Anglo-French Repudiation of the 1917 St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement." The Journal of Modern History 48.S2 (1976): 99-139. (2) Brecher, F. W. "French policy toward the Levant 1914–18." Middle Eastern Studies 29.4 (1993): 641-663. (3) https://books.google.com/books?id=m6evAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA184  Rjensen (talk) 06:09, 24 April 2019 (UTC)

Sources for Asia Minor Agreements article

 * 'Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others' [‎137r] (3/18), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/D228, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * 'File 53/1915 Pt 2 German War: Turkey; the Caliphate and Pan-Arab movement', British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/524, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * File 53/1915 Pt 5 'German War: Turkey; Arab Kingdom; the Petrograd negotiations', British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/526, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * File 53/1915 Pt 6 'The War: Arab Kingdom; Italian claims', British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/527, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy', British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/616, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * Correspondence between Britain, France and Russia in regards to Arabia, British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/B259, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * Miscellaneous papers on the Near and Middle East, British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/279, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]
 * 'British interests in Arabia', British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/B247, in Qatar Digital Library  [accessed 24 April 2019]

Onceinawhile (talk) 09:37, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Excellent! Rjensen (talk) 09:59, 24 April 2019 (UTC)

Perhaps of interest https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D7642433 (Balfour 1918 Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others.) ....the "Anglo-French Agreements of 1915-16" (incorrectly called the Sykes-Picot Agreement)...anyway, it is another way of viewing all these agreements, he also includes the "Pact of London 1914". Selfstudier (talk) 14:24, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Oh, going through, I see now that this is included in the list above, never mind, haha. Selfstudier (talk) 15:13, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Having gone through my papers, I have come to the conclusion that the person responsible for calling it THE "Asia Minor Agreement" was Sykes, he produced several memoranda with it called that and that's probably how it came to be known as that in the War Cabinet.Selfstudier (talk) 15:23, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * This is his most cited “Memorandum on the Asia Minor Agreement”. In it he refers to the Italian and Russian parts, in addition to the Anglo-French part. Onceinawhile (talk) 22:20, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I am familiar with that missive. He does not actually refer to them as "parts" because they are not in fact, parts, the Russian (Constantinople apart)is an assent to SP in exchange for consideration and the Italian agreement (Treaty of London) predates SP, which then became the cause for the later Italian agreement). The greater part of the memorandum deals with SP and Palestine. If you look at this memorandum being passed around to different people, it is frequently referred to as being re 'the "Asia Minor agreement"' (including the double quotes because as you have pointed out, this cannot be an entirely accurate description). As I indicated before, I think that there is/was no "official" title as such, the letters are referred to by all manner of names; the most common at the time seems to be the Anglo French agreement (with the date 1916 appended or not). And in the end, it didn't matter because everyone came to call it SP.Selfstudier (talk) 09:28, 25 April 2019 (UTC)

Done
All these edits over the last week or so have, I think, addressed the issue pointed out by the IP in this edit on 19 April. I no longer feel it is necessary to have a separate article called "Asia Minor Agreements"; after some reflection I concluded that it would cause more confusion than it would solve. Instead, I have tried to make the choreography and interplay between the various related agreements as clear as possible in the new structure. Onceinawhile (talk) 21:45, 28 April 2019 (UTC)
 * It's good.:)Although the eventual partition did not end up precisely as originally conceived and Turkey did survive, I think it is possible to trace the path from the "plan" (more like a continuous work in progress) to the actuality.Selfstudier (talk) 10:38, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Of course, there were economic/trade reasons involved in all this as well, it was not just about territory for its own sake. I will try to put something together on that front.Selfstudier (talk) 11:10, 29 April 2019 (UTC)

Post Petrograd
The "key to the situation" letter to LG Sir George Arthur Strike that it's to Sir Arthur Nicolson.Selfstudier (talk) 11:22, 2 August 2019 (UTC) is 18 March.Selfstudier (talk) 19:01, 31 July 2019 (UTC) (this was mostly copied out of Balfour Dec article, refs from there are

A better reference is Kedourie's Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 1915-16 which gives the entire letter containing this quote and was written by Sykes as a private response to the reprimand telegram, it begins "Dear Sir Arthur, I am afraid from your telegram that I have caused you some uneasiness in regard to Picot & Palestine...." The rest of the letter is a typical Sykes ramble. I don't think we should selectively quote from this missive, we could put it up complete perhaps?Selfstudier (talk) 12:08, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

So it seems that despite having been reprimanded and told to obliterate from his memory....straightaway after Petrograd goes (with Samuel! (Home Sec!) and puts the exact same scheme to the Zionists (that might explain his stating that he was there informally without authorisation).Selfstudier (talk) 12:22, 2 August 2019 (UTC) Recall the Ormsby Gore minute at the end of 1922 when they were trying to discover how the Balfour Declaration had come about " The matter was first broached by Sir Mark Sykes early in 1916 and he interviewed Dr Gaster and Sir Herbert Samuel on his own initiative as a student of Jewish politics in the Near East......" :) Selfstudier (talk) 12:52, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

British Zionist discussions (continued)
I just realized that this was never implemented. I will add back now with the additional sources. Onceinawhile (talk) 21:18, 29 July 2019 (UTC)

Hi, I'm afraid I am not really following the logic of your additions. What has Asquith's war aim speech of 5 November 1914 got to do with Zionist discussions? What is the date and details of the event that Samuel is supposedly recalling in his memoirs? Why does it matter for SP when Zionism was first discussed by Asquith's government? What has Samuels' memorandum got to do with SP? "may have seen" and "may not have seen" mean the same thing, "may is a weasel word designed to imply something that "may" or "may not" be the case. Regardless, the whole section seems to be trying to synthesize an effect of Zionism on SP without producing any evidence of such an effect. Egyptian protectorate? Belgium? French-English condominium? It's just the collecting up disparate bits of information and trying to present them as some sort of argument and I am not even clear what that argument is? All the sources say that the Zionists did not become aware of SP until via the Manchester Guardian crowd.Selfstudier (talk) 22:46, 29 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Hi what it's trying to do is follow the sources which look to answer the question of why the brown area was proposed. The scholars that cover that topic bring the quotes that are in the section to illustrate the type of discussions which took place in the build up to the agreement. Historians don’t have a black or white answer and neither should we – it’s clear there were discussions at the British Cabinet level, but Sykes never explained how those discussions influenced his negotiation. Onceinawhile (talk) 07:04, 30 July 2019 (UTC)

I don't have any objection to an attempt to discover the logic (if there was any) behind the brown zone and who was responsible if it was not Sykes. What I am primarily objecting to at the moment is the suggestion that there were "prior discussions with the Zionists" (the section title under "Motivation and Negotiations") that related to SP. The agreement itself and the map were already agreed before Sykes met Samuel on his way to Petrograd to get Russian consent. So there could have been no influence from that direction. Hall's comments are as well post fact and no-one appeared to pay any attention anyway. Most of the well known sources say that Sykes had little or no real knowledge of Zionism prior to his meeting with Samuel (Kedourie says that although Sykes knew Gaster from before the war, the relationship only blossomed after Sykes came back from Petrograd when Samuels suggested he see Gaster about his condominium "plan") Sykes antics in Petrograd (for which he was reprimanded) seem to support that view. I think we need to be careful that we do not mix together Sykes growing enchantment with Zionism (which is not disputed) and any effects on Sykes-Picot from Zionism which afaics are none at all (at least there is no evidence of that). You have said that ZIonism and the jewish question were not discussed by de Bunsen, which is true but Palestine certainly was discussed and is far more likely to have impacted on Sykes-Picot than Zionism (the Committee defined a British sphere of influence that included Palestine while accepting that there were relevant French and Russian, as well as Islamic interests in Jerusalem and the Holy Places and “...idle for His majesty’s Government to claim the retention of Palestine in their sphere. Palestine must be recognized as a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested”. As a first step, I have retitled the section "the brown zone" and let's try to follow the trail that you suggest.Selfstudier (talk) 09:37, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Understood. The “Zionist discussions” I am primarily referring to are Samuel’s discussions with various cabinet members and civil servants throughout 1915. Onceinawhile (talk) 13:48, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Btw, do you have or can you get https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C4210238 (this contains the 29 pages of de Bunsen)? Probably we can get by without it, I am just wondering if you have it.Selfstudier (talk) 14:46, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * I don’t have the full report but see:
 * Britain's War Aims in the Middle East in 1915, Aaron S. Klieman, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 3, The Middle East (Jul., 1968), pp. 237-251 (15 pages)
 * An excerpt of the report published in 1939
 * Onceinawhile (talk) 17:31, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Thanks for that, I had the first but I had quite forgotten about the second. Have made a start on trying to chase this down, it's quite interesting that Sykes does not use the word Palestine in that Q&A with Balfour, he merely describes territory and a "Jerusalem enclave" (I don't know if this is just supposed to mean Holy Places or if it means the Mutasarrifate). Of course this was desire, he was not able to get what he wanted from Picot. On his trip he learned about the McMH correspondence so he was up to speed there. Do you have any source indicating that Samuel's memorandum somehow made it into consideration at De Bunsen? IF Samuel only gave it to Sykes before he went to Petrograd then it would seem that Sykes did not know about it when he was contributing to De Bunsen deliberations?Selfstudier (talk) 21:59, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * This runs counter to Kedouries suggestion that Sykes might (possibly) have read the memorandum when he was sitting in de Bunsen. If he did, perhaps he just didn't pay that much attention then.Selfstudier (talk) 14:33, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
 * At the moment I am trying to find sources that would contradict the Verete version of events (which as you probably know by now, I find persuasive).Selfstudier (talk) 23:21, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * As I hinted at above, I am also quite interested in the goings-on in March when Grey asked Sazonov for his views on a proposal that appears to have come about as a result of discussions with both Zionists and the Conjoint, anything on that might be useful (it seems to indicate that any Zionist involvement was occurring only then (and Sykes appears not to know about it) but I am not sure about this at present).Selfstudier (talk) 23:36, 30 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Do we know for certain that "the memorandum" that Samuel showed Sykes is the same "Future of Palestine" memorandum? Did the latter have a map to go with it? The quotation about "less to discuss with the Moslems.." apparently traces back to Stein's opus to which I do not have access, anyone can access here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;cc=acls;view=toc;idno=heb00942.0001.001
 * I only have snippets for Sanders "that the boundaries as marked are more favorable than if they were wider.BY excluding Hebron......" and another on the same page (346 not 347) suggesting that Sykes and Samuel are discussing the SP map (it refer to the Brown Area) which would mean that Sykes had either marked an area out on a map or else showed the SP map to Samuel. Who collected this Sanders ref in the first place? Can they put here a summary of the page 346 if they have the book?Selfstudier (talk) 23:38, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
 * Yes, I think many of these suggestive quotes originate with HS memoirs and then Stein has picked them up from there. Selfstudier (talk) 18:13, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
 * I suppose the reprimand is a kind of confirmation that Sykes had seen the memorandum.Selfstudier (talk) 19:40, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

Finally I manged to get all these odd refs into some kind of sense. According to Friedman, the Belgium (put forward by Picot as a suggestion on 16 January) and the Mosque of Omar quote is contained in a memorandum from Sykes to Samuel of 26 February (Friedman notes that this memorandum is given in full in Stein pp 233-234 would be good to get it if possible). I let it stay as ref to Kamel but it would appear that the memorandum referred to by Kamel is also the same 26 February memorandum. Might have to be some amendment in other articles. Strike that, it's in the BD article already as a note to a map(:Selfstudier (talk) 18:09, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

OK, I got the material into a a kind of outline but it all needs close checking and perhaps more/better references as well.Selfstudier (talk) 17:19, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
 * This is apparently the text of the "aide memoire" given to Sazonov via Buchanan:

'A telegram  has  been received  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  stating  that the attention  of  His Majesty’s Government had recently been drawn to the question of Jewish colonization in Palestine. Although, as  is  known,  many  Jews  are  indifferent  to  the  idea  of Zionism, a numerous and most influential section of them in all countries would   highly   appreciate  the  proposal of an agreement concerning Palestine, which would fully satisfy Jewish aspirations.If the point of view set forth above is correct, it will be clear that by means  of  utilizing  the  Zionist  idea,  important  political  results  might  be achieved. One of these would be the conversion to the side of the Allies of Jewish  elements  in  the  East,  in  the  U.S.A.,  and  other  places,  whose present  attitude  towards  the  cause  of  the  Allies  is,  to  a  considerable extent, hostile.Mr. Lucien Wolf  has  defined  Jewish  aspirations  in  Palestine  in  the following manner: “If as a result of the war, Palestine should fall within the  sphere  of  French  and  British  interests,  the  French  and  British Governments will not fail to take into consideration the historic interests of Jewry in this  country. Both Governments would assure  to the Jewish population equal political rights with other inhabitants, religious and civil freedom,  such  municipal  privileges  in  colonies  and  towns  as  would appear  necessary,  as  well  as  reasonable  facilities  for  colonization  and immigration.”' Selfstudier (talk) 18:56, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

Might as well have the whole thing in here, continues:

"Sir Edward Grey has no objection to the formula quoted above, but in reply he  simply  informed  Mr.  Wolf  that  he  must  discuss  this  question with the Allied Governments, and that this matter will be sympathetically considered by His Majesty’s Government.The  only  object  of  His  Majesty’s  Government  is  to  devise  some agreement which will be sufficiently attractive to the majority of Jews to facilitate the conclusion of a transaction securing Jewish support. Having thisconsideration in view, it appears to His Majesty’s Government that if the  scheme  provided  for  enabling  the  Jews,  when  their  colonies  in Palestine  are  sufficiently  strong  to  be  able  to  compete  with  the  Arab population,  to  take  in  hand  the  administration  ofthe  internal  affairs  of this   region   (excluding   Jerusalem   and   the   Holy   Places),   then   the agreement would be  much  more  attractive  for the  majority of Jews. His Majesty’s Government would not wish to express a preference for this or another solution   of  the  question. However, it  is   informed   that  an international  protectorate  would  meet  with  opposition  on  behalf  of influential Jewish circles.Communicating all this telegraphically, Sir Edward Grey instructs Sir George  Buchanan  to  solicit  from  the  Russian  Government  a  serious consideration  of  this  question  and  to  favour  him  at  the  earliest  possible date with the communication of the Russian point of view."Selfstudier (talk) 13:05, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

It is 13 March and was shown also to Sykes and that led him into the communication with Picot for which he was reprimanded.Selfstudier (talk) 18:59, 31 July 2019 (UTC) What seems to have happened is that Sykes has mixed together (as was his wont) the Samuel memorandum with its British protectorate, the Wolf formula (which is the genesis of the Sazonov telegram) and the SP agreement he has made and produced a Sykes cocktail, Arab Sultanate of Palestine with joint French English protectorate!:)Selfstudier (talk) 19:55, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

We shouldn't forget the French were sent a similar (same?) message, Friedman (QoP) has an account of their reactions. Apparently the proposition as sent out was initially put together by O'Beirne and signed off by Crewe (standing in for Grey, but it was sent in name of Grey (maybe diplomatic protocol?)Selfstudier (talk) 12:42, 2 August 2019 (UTC)


 * In my last comment I mentioned "The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" by Jonathan Schneer, a full version of the text of which is available online [link to blacklisted site removed]. It is useful for answering some of the questions raised here such as why the Brown Area was proposed and what place Zionism had in the way that Ottoman territory was carved up.
 * Chapter 12 deals with Sykes and Picot's March 1916 visit to Petrograd, whose purpose was to turn the Anglo-French (Sykes-Picot) agreement into a tripartite Anglo-French-Russian one. Coincident with Sykes' arrival a telegram, read by Sykes, was sent by Lord Crewe to George Buchanan, the British ambassador to Russia, asking Buchanan to seek a Russian response to a proposal to modify Lucien Wolf's memorandum by adding the intent that control of Palestine would be given into the hands of Jewish colonists when they grew powerful enough to deal with the Arab population. The Tsar's ministers agreed on the proviso that control of the holy places remained in international hands and, when the Tripartite Agreement was signed, it contained a provision to that effect. Sykes responded enthusiastically to the telegram, which gave him licence to express ideas which had been forming in his mind since Herbert Samuel had issued his memorandum. Sykes sought out Picot, who had read sections of Crewe's telegram courtesy of the Russians. Picot was unenthusiastic about the idea of Jewish control of Palestine but Sykes insisted on the necessity of such a move and the advantages to the Allies which would accrue from gaining "the active friendship of Jews of the World." Sykes also explained the preference of Zionists for British, rather than French or international, rule in Palestine. Together, the two men concoted a scheme which they hoped would appeal to the three prospective signatories of the Tripartite Agreement as well as Jews and even Sharif Hussein: "Their plan was that an agent of the sharif (perhaps one of his sons) be made sultan of Palestine under French and British protection and with Russian concurrence; that the three great powers agree upon a method of administering Palestine’s holy places; that the new state establish an incorporated chartered company to purchase land for Jewish colonists, who would then become citizens with equal rights to Arabs; that Britain arbitrate any disagreement between the chartered company and the state; and that France arbitrate any disagreement regarding administration of the holy places." Sykes's London colleagues disapproved ("The chartered company would lead to Jewish domination of Palestine, which the Arabs would oppose; and appointment of an Arab sultan would alienate the Jews.") and sent a telegram telling him to put the Samuel Memorandum out of his mind. However, Sykes considered it further: "First, Britain needed France in order to win the war against Germany, but Britain’s newly revealed interest in Palestine, even if on behalf of the Jews and in order to secure the common cause, might nevertheless estrange her crucial partner. Second, the British and French both needed the Jews (or thought they did), but the Jews’ preference for a British protectorate might cause the French to spurn them. Third, the Allies needed the Arabs to revolt against Turkey. The Arabs might think Britain had promised them Syria including its coastal portions, but France claimed all of Syria, including the coastal portions. Moreover the Arabs had no inkling that Britain and France together were now contemplating making some gesture toward the Jews involving Palestine, which was land the Arabs also wanted and perhaps thought already had been promised to them." Sykes concluded, as he told the Foreign Office, that the Zionists provided the key to winning the war. On returning to London in April, he went to work for the secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defence, where he wrote a series of “Arabian Reports”, started investigating the Zionist movement and acted as "the liaison between government departments concerned with Middle Eastern affairs." One of the first things he did was to meet Herbert Samuel to explain his and Picot's Palestine plan and to ask for meetings with London Zionists to be arranged. As a first false step, Sykes met Moses Gaster. Later he met Aaron Aaronsohn, who played an important role in Sykes's full conversion to supporting Zionism. Later still he met Sokolow and Chaim Weizmann, the latter through the agency of the Persian Armenian, James Malcolm, on January 28, 1917.
 * Chapter 14 explains the changes which accompanied the replacement of Asquith as prime minister by the "easterner" Lloyd George, what it meant for Palestine and how Sykes used Sokolow in order to shift Picot towards revising the Sykes-Picot plan in favour of establishing a British protectorate in Palestine.
 * Chapter 16 deals with the Zionist reaction when they started to find out about the secret British-French agreement on Palestine.
 * Chapter 6 deals with the formulation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. On the Brown zone: "Since both parties coveted Palestine, with its sites holy to Christians, Muslims, and Jews alike, they compromised and colored the region brown, agreeing that this portion of the Middle East should be administered by an international condominium." "Within the Brown Area, Palestine, Britain reserved for herself the ports of Haifa and Acre and the right to construct a railway connecting them with the red-outlined Area B." The necessity for the British of gaining ports on the Mediterranean is explained as an adjunt of acquiring Mesopotamia. Later, the withdrawal of Russia from the war, and hence the relinquishment of her claims on Ottoman territory, the British no longer needed the French to form a buffer between them and the Russians as was the basis of the Sykes-Picot agreement.
 * Chapter 9 deals with the entry of Turkey into the war, the initial contacts made by Zionists with the British government and the formulation of the first Samuel memorandum.
 * Chapter 10 describes how the British cabinet convened to consider a revised version of the Samuel memorandum on 13 March 13 1915. Lloyd George was the only minister who strongly supported its proposals.
 * Chapter 11 details how, during 1916, the British and French came to view the gaining of the support of "world Jewry" as important. "The British never believed that the Jews alone could alter the balance of the war, but they did come to believe that the Jews could help fund it; and perhaps more important, they could persuade mightier forces to weigh in or out or to stand firm." "The French worried that Germany was already outbidding the Entente for Jewish backing and that German success could have serious repercussions, especially in America, where, as they too believed, the Jewish community was financially powerful and politically influential." The French approached the British, Jewish Assimilationist (Anti-Zionist) Lucien Wolf for help. "Wolf recognized a double opportunity. Both as a Jew and as a British patriot, he wanted to win Jewish backing for the Allies; promising Jews an increased role in Palestine after victory, without going so far as to embrace Zionist prescriptions, could win it. Simultaneously such a task would enable him, and the Conjoint Committee, to outflank Dr. Weizmann. Immediately he prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Office. “I am not a Zionist and I deplore the Jewish National Movement,” he began, yet now was the moment for the Allies to declare their sympathy with Jewish aspirations in Palestine and to promise to grant them equal rights there after the war; facilitate their immigration to it; guarantee “a liberal scheme of local self-government for the existing colonies”; support construction of a Jewish university in Jerusalem; and recognize Hebrew as one of the languages of the land. If the Allies did these things, Wolf wrote, they “would sweep the whole of American Jewry into enthusiastic allegiance to their cause.”"
 *    ←   ZScarpia  13:07, 7 August 2019 (UTC)   (Selfstudier and Onceinawhile, I see from the Balfour Declaration talkpage that you were already using the [link to blacklisted site removed] of "The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" as early as 2017.)
 * Yes, I have that book in my collection, quite decent it is too. As you say, we made a fair amount of use of it when we were putting the Balfour Declaration article together. The Samuel memorandum (and Zionism generally) had no discernible effect on Sykes-Picot negotiations although it might have contributed to later views about Sykes-Picot. Similarly, it had some effect on Sykes himself, again only from the time of Petrograd on. I am just really working through this here because it is where we have raised it up, likely though it is going to be better located in the Balfour article because it seems to have more to do with how the Declaration came about than Sykes-Picot per se. Here it seems to be a coincidence of timing and possibly crossed wires that the Wolf intervention crossed with Sykes time in Petrograd. A few months later and it was all dropped until things kicked off again in 1917.Selfstudier (talk) 16:41, 7 August 2019 (UTC)


 * I'd say that there are potentially two ways the issue is relevant here: the effect it had on the British-French-Russian agreement and the way the Zionist goals were used by Sykes as a lever to modify the original British-French agreement in favour of a British protectorate in Palestine.      ←   ZScarpia  18:31, 7 August 2019 (UTC)


 * No, that's wrong, SP and it's map was already signed before Sykes was given Samuel's memorandum so no effect there. This is also very clear from the way Sykes reacted when he saw the Wolf telegram. I don't know what modification you mean, SP was never modified until the Lloyd George Clemenceau meeting where Clemenceau gave up Palestine and Mosul.Selfstudier (talk) 21:57, 7 August 2019 (UTC)


 * I deliberately used "British-French agreement", with a lower case 'a' in agreement. Perhaps it would have been clearer if I had used the word 'understanding' instead. After the Sykes-Picot Agreement had been finalised, the British viewed it as unsatisfactory and made efforts to persuade the French to accept changes in how the division would actually be implemented. On the question of what place Zionism had on the way the division was made, Schneer writes that it appears in some of the differences between the British-French Sykes-Picot and the later British-French-Russian Tripartite Agreement. My impression is that there have been disagreements about the scope of the current article and what, through context, is relevant to it, but the article does in its current state go into detail about what happened subsequently, including the Tripartite Agreement, which makes the affect of Zionism potentially relevant to the material it already contains. After the Tripartite Agreement had been finalised, Sykes developed his contacts with Zionists and then, beginning with a meeting in which he took Sokolow to visit Picot, used Zionism as a tool to persuade the French to accept British control of Palestine.        ←   ZScarpia  13:15, 13 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Where does Schneer write that there were "differences"? Sykes got some silly ideas in his head after the Sazonov telegram reached Petrograd but other than that, which led nowhere, there was only the changes that are already discussed in the article. I agree that Sykes took off on his own after Petrograd. I prefer the simplest explanation for things, if you are looking for an early sighting of the Balfour Declaration (ie Zionism) then it's right there in the Sazonov telegram (which looks suspiciously like an early Balfour Declaration, the Wolf formula plus that which was added by FO). Note there is zero Sykes influence there, he had no idea about it.Selfstudier (talk) 17:21, 13 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Refer to Chapter 12 of the book and the summary I wrote of that chapter in my long comment of 07 August 2019 above. Quoting that chapter: "What would the Russians think of this addition to Wolf’s “formula”? Crewe wanted to know. Buchanan inquired, and the Russians thought it good, he reported to the Foreign Office. The tsar’s ministers would make no difficulties about such promises to Jews, they had informed him, as long as the holy places remained under international control. Eventually this provision would be written into the Tripartite Agreement." The previous chapter, Chapter 11, explains how, among the British and French, the view that gaining Jewish support was essential was reached.      ←   ZScarpia  11:57, 14 August 2019 (UTC)


 * If you look at the Sykes Picot memorandum (received at FO on January 5th), the issue of international control of the holy places was already included in their considerations. In any case, that is not an influence of Zionism, that was a known issue for long already. The Wolf/FO formula had a brief life and was then let drop after several months, the French and Russians were not convinced at that time. Agreed that it is an influence of Zionism but not on SP, it is a good indicator for the later Declaration which is why, when the editing is finished, some version need to go into the BD article (we should have done it before, we are naughty...). There was a stream of Zionist visitors to FO around that time, Horace Kallen, a couple others, again Zionist influence but not on SP. Yes it is true that there were was opposition to SP but not on the grounds of Zionism, it was imperial complaint that too much had been given away to France and yes, Sykes was even sent to try and undo it later but he failed and that was the end of his influence on proceedings. The agreement continued to hold for quite a while even after the LG Clemenceau deal.Selfstudier (talk) 13:41, 14 August 2019 (UTC)


 * We know that Samuel's memorandum was discussed by the cabinet and January 1915 and March 1915. We know that the De Bunsen Committee's report was delivered in June 1915, in which Palestine was earmarked for special treatment but without specific mention of Zionism. We know that the Sykes-Picot agreement was to all intents and purposes complete by the end of December 1915. So the question I would like to nail down is what was the influence of Zionism (particularly Herbert Samuel) between June and December 1915. Samuel was in the Cabinet this whole period, and in light of his prior and subsequent behavior it is extremely unlikely that he did not seek to continue to influence proceedings on the topic during this period. Onceinawhile (talk) 07:16, 8 August 2019 (UTC)


 * As far as I have been able to find there was none, the only concrete sources I have been able to find re Sykes-Picot is in relation to Sykes memorandum that refers to Samuel's memorandum just before he left for Petrograd. Otherwise I find no sources claiming any impact on SP. If you can find some, I too would be interested in that but afaics no-one was much interested in his memorandum at that stage (it is not even clear that the revised version of it was discussed at Cabinet although it was circulated) and the interest that came later had more to do with the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. The Brown zone is clearly a consequence of British imperial interest, the harbor and outlet for rail, a compromise with the French in regard to their claim over "Syria" (used in the sense of inclusion of Palestine) and the reference to consultations with the Sherif/Arab Sultanate is a kind of backhanded recognition of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence.Selfstudier (talk) 08:06, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
 * I would also say that any "influence" Samuel had on affairs is much more likely to have to do with the subsequent development of the Balfour Declaration into which the Wolf formula/Sazonov telegram story fits quite logically.(I remember looking for this same information you are now looking for when we were doing the Balfour Declaration article). I just looked again at Sykes memorandum received 5 January 1916 at FO (referred to as "Arab Question"!) and it is clear from that how SP was worked. It had nothing to do with Zionism or an English protectorate and the only reference to Judaism was re Holy Places. If you think that Samuel somehow "influenced" that, it is not clear to me how he would have done so.Selfstudier (talk) 09:05, 8 August 2019 (UTC)

On this question of Cabinet consideration of Samuels memoranda. The first, usually considered as a draft was circulated and was apparently discussed in cabinet. According to Kamel, Asquith apparently said he was willing to consider a revised version. This revised version bears a date of 13 March and both Schneer and Kamel say that the Cabinet discussed it. I think this is an error. Both Lieshout (p 184) and Friedman refer to a War Council meeting of 19 March, partially given over to the partition question and at the end of his discussion of that meeting, Friedman (p 18) says "This explains why Samuels memorandum was bypassed altogether.." (You can be sure that had it been discussed in Cabinet Friedman would have lots of space devoted to it as he has in any event; note also Kamel discusses a reaction from Montagu (to Asquith) dated 16 March, why would Montagu do that 3 days after a Cabinet meeting discussing it? he would do it before).Selfstudier (talk) 18:30, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
 * Now I notice on p15 Friedman he thinks neither memorandum was considered in Cabinet or the War Council (with a footnote saying that he was unable to find any reference in the Cabinet papers).Selfstudier (talk) 19:14, 9 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Schneer, Chapter 10: "On March 13, 1915, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith’s Liberal cabinet convened at 10 Downing Street to discuss the revised memorandum prepared by Herbert Samuel on the future of Palestine. ... But when the cabinet met, according to Asquith, only Lloyd George strongly supported the proposal, and he “does not care a damn for the Jews or their past or their future, but … thinks it would be an outrage to let the Christian Holy Places … pass into the possession or under the protectorate of ‘Agnostic Atheistic France’!” So, Asquith appears to have written or spoken about the cabinet meeting. The source given, for the "does not care a damn" part of the content at least, is Yehuda Reinharz, "Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman", Oxford, 1993.     ←   ZScarpia  12:39, 14 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Yes, I know about that. That quote is from a letter Asquith wrote to Venetia someone (or it was from his diary, I forget now). Believe me, if there was a cabinet meeting (or war council meeting) discussing it, Friedman would have been singing it from the rooftops (as well as plenty others of the same viewpoint as him). That they do not do so leads me to believe Friedman in this case. I looked and was not able to find any reference anywhere to a cabinet meeting on the 13th, have you found one? You can edit in Schneer as a source contradicting Friedman, people can decide for themselves.Selfstudier (talk) 13:22, 14 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Here's the full quote (including "dithyrambic") and yes, it was written by Asquith to Venetia Stanley on 13th (from Walmer Castle). I reviewed my sources again, Renton, Kedourie, Lieshout and others, none of them say that there were any discussions in Cabinet although most of them mention that the memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet and then give one or more reactions from Cabinet members. All of these reactions appear to date before March (ie they are reacting to the "draft" version). I have some other less used sources I can dig out and look there a bit later. If anyone has Samuels memoirs (there were several different versions none of which I have) maybe we could find out what the horse himself says about it.Selfstudier (talk) 10:36, 15 August 2019 (UTC)


 * "It is not known if the memorandum was formally considered by the Cabinet, but Asquith wrote in his diary on 13 March 1915 of Samuel's "dithyrambic memorandum" of which Lloyd George was the only other partisan. https://www.ihr.org/jhr/v06/v06p389_John.html Selfstudier (talk) 11:01, 15 August 2019 (UTC)
 * Thanks for doing all the investigation and writing it up, though I have to say that we shouldn't be touching anything associated with the Institute of Historical Review with a bargepole. Friedman noted that he hadn't been able to find any evidence in the cabinet papers that the Cabinet had met and discussed Samuels' memorandum. It would be interesting, given that the practice of formally keeping cabinet minutes wasn't started until December 1916 under Lloyd-George's administration, what evidence Friedman would have expected to find.     ←   ZScarpia  12:23, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
 * Just to satisfy myself, I got hold of Asquith memoirs/diary to see what he said. There are in fact two entries, one for 28 January where he starts off by saying "I have just received a memorandum from (HS)..." and the other on 13 March which is above, in both cases no mention of any war council or cabinet meeting (then Schneer is incorrect to imply that Asquith said there was a cabinet meeting, he didn't) even though his diary seems to mention many of these as they occur (eg he mentions a war council on 10 March and a Cabinet on 23 March). While there may be no formal minutes for 1915 that doesn't mean there no papers from 1915 at all, there are many, including Samuel paper itself; and one would have thought that had this matter been discussed (formally) there would be a record somewhere or even in someone's memoirs (Samuel's memoirs??) saying so, or even that there was a cabinet meeting on a certain date. It just seems to me that those saying there was a meeting (Kamel and Schneer at this point, are there others?) are jumping to conclusions without evidence. All the evidence appears to show is that no-one really took the memorandum that seriously (possibly excepting LG) at the time and perhaps that's why it was not discussed in Cabinet (or War Council if you consider it as a war aim).Selfstudier (talk) 14:19, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

Conclusions
There is no secondary source claiming a Zionist influence on the SP negotiation (there is no secondary source claiming the reverse either but one normally does not have to prove a negative). We can't just string random facts or quotes from memoirs (most of the "early" is HS memoirs) together to suggest such an influence. We do have secondary sources showing an imperial effect on SP (SP is itself imperialism). The concern with rail links, desire for harbor facilities, "a line from e in Acre to k in kirkuk", "a belt of English territory", the Egyptian protectorate idea, the de Bunsen conclusions, all this is imperialism not Zionism. The only thing that is clear is the amount of times that reference is made to the "Holy Places" and in a way this is also imperialism (Egypt and India concerns).

The Petrograd events and Sykes conversion (if that's the right word) to Zionism are of some interest in regards to the later issuance of the Balfour Declaration and perhaps to the attitude of (some of) the British to the SP as time went on. In the end though, DLG was the one who pressed to take Palestine (and Mosul) for Britain but it's not clear that he did that on behalf of Zionism even if he was sympathetic to the idea.(I wonder would he have been so keen on all this if he knew that he would later be tangled up in Mandates). Selfstudier (talk) 10:59, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

Taking all the below back out of the article, it seems not relevant to SP at all.(It is in archive 2).Selfstudier (talk) 09:03, 6 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Finally I got around to putting all the Petrograd/early declaration stuff into the Balfour article where it belongs (it fills a hole there that we failed to notice the first time around.Selfstudier (talk) 11:06, 24 September 2019 (UTC)
 * That was a very interesting addition - thanks for finding it. The phrase “the problem is how are they to be satisfied” suggests that he was already well aware in March 1916 of their ambitiousness... Onceinawhile (talk) 16:58, 24 September 2019 (UTC)

A couple of comments on the Lead
(1) Long term Russian territorial ambitions, free maritime access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and the recovery of Constantinople (the Orthodox "Rome"), were a major driver behind the process of which the Sykes-Picot Agreement was part, determining how the spoils from the Ottoman Empire would be divided up. As Schneer writes in the chapter in which the Sykes-Picot Agreement is covered, Chapter 6: "Early in 1915 Russian diplomats informed their Western allies that they intended to take and to keep Constantinople, thereby finally satisfying their country’s centuries-old aspiration for a warm-water port and access to the Mediterranean Sea. They invited Britain and France to claim the parts of the Ottoman Empire that they would require as compensation." For the British, a major objective during the formulation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the creation of a buffer between Russian and British-controlled territory. The Lead currently rather gives the impression that the British and French, without any external prompting, got together and came to an agreement about the division of territory to which the Russians and Italians acquiesced. <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">   ←   ZScarpia  16:05, 21 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Schneer is referring to the earlier Constantinople agreement, not SP. It says something very similar in the section "Prior agreements with Russia and Italy (March – April 1915)" (ie the Constantinople agreement) viz "Sergey Sazonov, wrote to the French and UK ambassadors and staked a claim to Constantinople and the Straits of Dardanelles. In a series of diplomatic exchanges over five weeks, the UK and France both agreed, while putting forward their own claims".Selfstudier (talk) 17:07, 21 August 2019 (UTC)


 * As far as I can tell, Schneer doesn't mention the Constantinople Agreement. The text I quoted leads pretty direclty into a description of Sykes and Picot's negotiations. But, never the less, the Lead is still misleading in that, by not mentioning that Russian territorial ambitions provided an impetus for the process, it gives, as I described above, a false impression.  <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">    ←   ZScarpia  22:30, 21 August 2019 (UTC)


 * "Early in 1915" (Schneer) cannot refer to SP, negotiations for which did not begin until late in 1915. Early in 1915 (March) is the Constantinople agreement in which the Russians were already promised Constantinople so that cannot have been a "driver". The relevant section in the article directly states "it was in force as well as a direct motivation for it at the time the Sykes–Picot Agreement was being negotiated." Let me put it another way, Constantinople, contrary to what you are suggesting, had nothing directly to do with SP, Constantinople had already been promised. And yes, the British and the French did get together and do a deal (mainly motivated by the British desire to deal with the promise to Hussein and the potential conflict with French interests), then ask for Russian assent, because Russia was an ally not because of Russia's territorial ambitions which had already been met. If I may make a suggestion, that you not rely solely on Schneer, he is a decent source but it is necessary to check across multiple sources to be sure of things.Selfstudier (talk) 10:02, 22 August 2019 (UTC)


 * I was specifically writing about the Lead. Context is important to understanding the "Why" of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The absence of context in the Lead gives a false impression: it makes it sound as though, in a vacuum, Sykes, for the British, and Picot, for the French, got together and agreed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; having done that, they approached the Russians and Italians, who, apparently with no previous involvement, gave their assent (and, assent being a rather passive word, it rather implies that the Russians and Italians were rather disinterested).


 * You asked me to refer to other sources. As a source confirming the intrinsic importance of Russian territorial ambitions, at least, in the process of which the Sykes-Picot Agreement was part, may I suggest "The Russian Origins of the First World War" by Sean McMeekin (publidhed 2013). A rough guide to some of the pages of interest:


 * p.3: "In similar fashion, in most of the myriad books, novels, and flms dealing with the notorious Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and its impact on the greater Islamic world, one hears scarcely a word about the Russian side. That Britain and France conspired together to destroy the Ottoman Empire is taken as a given in most books on the modern Middle East, especially those inspired by Edward Said’s famous critique of western attitudes in Orientalism (1979). Although not untrue, so far as it goes, the now-ubiquitous narrative of western perfdy in carving up Asiatic Turkey is nonetheless deeply misleading, for it leaves out the main character in the drama. To tell the story of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire without mentioning the role of Turkey’s age-old Russian enemy, as some authors do, is like writing a history of the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 without reference to American foreign policy and strategy in the Cold War."


 * p.4: "From the Sarajevo incident that sparked the July crisis, to the mobilization drama surrounding the war’s outbreak, the unrealistic timetable of the Germans’ Schlieffen Plan and the bogging down of the western front in trench warfare, the sanguinary tragedy of Gallipoli, the Armenian massacres of 1915, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the subsequent carve-up of Asiatic Turkey, until the Revolution of 1917, all of the most notorious—and enduringly explosive—events of the war were intimately related to Russian foreign policy."


 * p.11: "The Eastern Question—the struggle to manage the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which all powers expected to be imminent—was for neither France nor England terribly urgent. London had long since wrested control of Ottoman Egypt and the Suez Canal, which together formed the linchpin of British global communications. In June 1914, Britain signed an agreement with the Porte that divided the Arabian Peninsula into Ottoman and British spheres of in?uence, with the latter including the entire southern coastal area between Aden and Qatar."


 * p.12: "Berlin and Petersburg, by contrast, were both heavily invested in the Eastern Question and knee deep in the Balkans (even if, in the case of Germany and the Balkans, mostly at second remove via Austria-Hungary). Neither the Germans nor the Russians were anywhere near satisfed in terms of imperial appetite, nor feeling particularly secure in their current positions. ... Finally, Russian plans for seizing Constantinople and the Straits were well advanced and universally supported by policymakers by 1914, even if the Black Sea ?eet was not yet strong enough to carry them out."


 * p.17: "The fall of the last true Ottoman sultan produced a kind of manic glee in the Russian General Staff, where war gaming for the occupation of Constantinople — which had largely ceased following the sinking of the Russian Baltic and Pacifc ?eets in the Russo-Japanese War — now resumed with a vengeance."


 * p.122-123: "The keys to Russia’s diplomatic sleight of hand were Persia and Egypt, both infinitely more important to British imperial interests, circa 1914, than Turkey. ... Persia was the main item on the agenda on 9 November 1914 in the first meeting between Grey and Russia’s ambassador, Count Benckendorff, following Turkey’s entry into the war. The authorities in British India were deeply concerned, Grey told Benckendorff, that the Russo-Ottoman war might spill over into Persia. ... There must have been something in the air in London that week, because Grey was not the only British statesman to channel Russian imperial ambition. Herbert Asquith, the prime minister, made a speech the very day Grey spoke with Benckendorff in which he vowed that Turkey’s entry into the war had “rung the death knell for Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe, but in Asia.” No Russian imperialist could have said it better. ... Yet it is telling that the only significant Tory criticism of Asquith’s program of dismembering Turkey in the House of Commons came from Sir Mark Sykes, who apparently remained immune to the odd virus sweeping through London that November—at least he would be, until he famously helped Russia carve up the Ottoman Middle East just two years later."


 * p.131: "If Turkey was to be torn apart after all, then France must receive its fair share. With an eye on Syria and Lebanon, Poincaré at last instructed Paléologue that “we can agree to the Russian desires only in proportion to the satisfactions that we ourselves receive.” In this way, out of Russian diplomatic blackmail, was born the French end of the notorious Sykes-Picot blueprint for carving up the Ottoman Empire."


 * p.196: "Despite Britain’s continued difficulties in the East, however, in Russia’s own war against Turkey the prospects began to look brighter than ever before with the Erzurum offensive. This strategic fact bears emphasis, for the “Sykes-Picot Agreement” was in fact drawn up against the backdrop of Russia’s victories in Turkey in spring 1916."


 * p.197: "The real inspiration for the Sykes-Picot Agreement, at least from the English end, was Kitchener’s fear that Russia would reemerge as Britain’s primary antagonist after the world war was over, the idea being to create a French buffer zone in between the old Great Game antagonists."


 * p.197-198 [Dealing with the post-SP-Agreement meeting in Petrograd]: "Sazonov was ready to pounce when Sykes and Picot arrived in Petrograd in March 1916, having prepared even more thoroughly than usual for the meeting. To see where the Russians were coming from, we must pause here to examine the well-known but little-understood “Djemal peace offer” of winter 1915–16, which ran parallel to the Sykes-Picot negotiations and, in a sense, overlay them."


 * p.200: "Sazonov’s motive should not be hard to fathom. ... Sazonov knew that the negotiations in Paris between Sykes and Picot had bogged down earlier in December; his Christmas Day offer was issued while Sykes was back in London, receiving further instructions.To a considerable extent Sazonov succeeded, as serious negotiations over the (in fact mythical) Djemal peace deal continued for weeks."


 * p.202: "With the wedge between Sykes and Picot now firmly in place, Sazonov was ready to strike. Showing that he was a professional where the overmatched Briton was an amateur, Sazonov actually ordered Sykes to draw up a new map meeting Russia’s key demands, including the incorporation of “Turkish Armenia” (or “Kurdistan,” depending on demographic taste) as far south as the Bitlis passes in the Taurus mountains and as far east as Lake Urmia, which area had, in the 10 February draft, been placed in the French “blue” zone. Sykes did as he was told, drawing up a new map submitted to Sazonov in the presence of Sir George Buchanan on 11 March 1916 with the “blue” area erased and with a new eastern boundary of the French zone at the Tigris River. ... Meekly, Sykes told Sazonov that he “hoped that all such changes would be acceptable to France, because of his previous discussions with Picot.”"


 * p.203: "So far from realizing the serious imperial stakes he was playing with, Sykes tried to get the Russians to sign off on a French protectorate over the “historical Armenian cities” of Zeytun and Diarbakır on the grounds that the last Armenian king had died in Paris in 1393. As if his amateurish approach to the Armenian question was not enough, Sykes now introduced the classic wartime British red herring into the discussion of partitioning Turkey: Palestine and the Jews."


 * ... and so on. Other relevant sources can be found by doing a Google Books search on terms including 'Sazonov' and 'Constantinople'. One such result, "Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War: The Fateful Embassy of Count Aleksandr Beckendorff (1903-16)" by Marina Soroka, details the effect of Italian war aims on the process by which the Ottoman Empier was dismembered.


 * <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">   ←   ZScarpia  19:27, 22 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Finally, some time to come back here. If you think that the article (lead or body, anything in lead needs to be in the body as well) needs amending, I think the thing to do would be to go ahead and amend it in the usual way. As long as you have RS for any material, no-one can really complain about it unless it is contradicted by other sources, in which case someone will add those as well. I won't do it myself because I don't really buy the idea that Sazonov/Russia is that critical to Sykes-Picot beyond what is already in the article.Selfstudier (talk) 15:02, 18 September 2019 (UTC)


 * I got hold of his 2015 The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923 which has an introduction called "The Sykes-Picot myth and the modern middle east" I'll have a read of that, see what his main point is.Selfstudier (talk) 14:48, 19 September 2019 (UTC)


 * I have read the above introduction and reread your snippets above and I can find nothing in them really at variance with what we have in the article. He says that Sykes and Picot played "second fiddle" to Sazonov but does not really explain how. (I note he also does the same as Schneer and downplays the Constantinople agreement which form the Russian standpoint I think was much more critical). He says that SP doesn't really reflect the divisions that ultimately took place (a position adopted by some and contested by others) but we do not really take a position on that in the article and even if it were true, Sazonov had nothing to do with it by then. I don't dispute his central argument that Russian influence on the war as a whole tends to be understated, I just don't agree that that has anything much to do with SP, it seems he merely uses SP as a convenient whipping boy for the introduction of his main arguments. I still think the context as described in the lead as it is now is the correct one, I do not see the Russian/Italian involvement as other than resultant. Still, as I said, you are quite welcome to amend and try to include relevant material into the body/lead, my impression is that you will have a hard time making it fit, to be honest.Selfstudier (talk) 14:58, 23 September 2019 (UTC)

Your comments on Sazonov/Russia have piqued my interest in the Constantinople Agreement/WW1 so I think I might engage in a little editing there and see where it goes.Selfstudier (talk) 10:39, 29 September 2019 (UTC)


 * Good! Looks as though my evil plan to alter whe whole direction of Wikipedia's Sykes-Picot-related material is coming to fruition.  <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">    ←   ZScarpia  11:03, 29 September 2019 (UTC)

(2) The Lead states: "The agreement effectively divided the Ottoman Arab provinces outside the Arabian peninsula into areas of British and French control and influence." It then describes how the French would gain control of territory including areas in "southeastern Turkey" and "northern Iraq". I suspect that those areas include ones where Kurds and others would be the majority population rather than people who would be considered Arab. <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">   ←   ZScarpia  16:05, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
 * Yes, that is covered at the bottom of the article in the section "The Kurds and Assyrians"
 * viz "As originally cast, Sykes-Picot allocated part of Northern Kurdistan and a substantial part of the Mosul vilayet including the city of Mosul to France in area B, Russia obtained Bitlis and Van in Northern Kurdistan (the contemplated Arab State included Kurds in its Eastern limit split between A and B areas)"
 * I agree it is not specifically in the lead but not everything makes it into the lead, this was not significant in an SP context (compared say, to the Peace Conference where it did have a certain significance at least for a time).Selfstudier (talk) 17:08, 21 August 2019 (UTC)


 * The point I was raising was about whether WHAT IS in the Lead, that is that the Sykes-Picot Agreeement covered specifically "Arab provinces", is accurate, not whether extra material should be included. <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">    ←   ZScarpia  22:38, 21 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Since the territories are specified, I deleted the word Arab. My apologies, I thought you were referring to the Kurds not objecting to the word "Arab". Selfstudier (talk) 10:02, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
 * Thanks.   <span style="font-family: Perpetua, serif; font-size:120%">    ←   ZScarpia  18:18, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Treaty of Sevres map
Please discuss here about this map (recent mini edit war refers).Selfstudier (talk) 09:03, 29 June 2021 (UTC)

"On 23 December 1917, Sykes and a representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had delivered public addresses to the Central Syrian Congress..."

See below, it's committee not congress, some kind of delegation to the Paris conference. Selfstudier (talk) 17:59, 14 August 2021 (UTC)