Talk:Teletransportation paradox

Clarity...
I really like this idea for an article, but I found it to be difficult to follow. Also, there is no definition(s) in the first part of the article. Please provide clear definition(s). Thank you. Misty MH (talk) 03:47, 2 January 2020 (UTC)

I don't think the proposed thought experiment is a very persuasive proof that identity is not tied to physical parts. Detractors can simply say all of those clones are not really "you" at all. I think a far more persuasive argument is partial-brain-replacement scenarios, where you replace a portion of the brain but in the end it's physically identical. There's no line you can definitely draw that says "this is the point I became someone else". Something like my blog post https://blog.maxloh.com/2019/06/mind-uploading-wont-kill-you.html but from a more credible source. Does anyone know of any? Theguyi26 (talk) 20:50, 2 December 2020 (UTC)


 * I am familiar with Lem's chapter from Dialogs (1957) later enlarged in Summa Technologiae (1964) in original Polish. He presents two teleporters in exactly the way Parfit did later, and shows that it is not possible for a person to experience being teleported. The original person experiences everything up to the scan (if destructive) or through the scan and for however long the original lives (if non-destructive). The original never experiences being successfully teleported. It's the copy that has the memory of first being the original, and continuing existing as the copy. If there are multiple copies, each has the same experience. Lem does not draw any conclusions as to whether any copy can claim to be a continuation of the original. He only says each copy would naturally make such a claim. This is the paradox: the original and the copy(ies) have different experiences, and from the viewpoint of the original, teleportation is unsuccessful. Morycm (talk) 02:57, 20 May 2023 (UTC)

No-cloning theorem
Should the no-cloning theorembe mentioned in this article? Reciprocist (talk) 07:43, 4 September 2023 (UTC)


 * No-cloning theorem describes properties in quantum world. Consciousness and 'self' of a human being are properties of neural networks functioning on neurons, in turn being superstructures based on protein machines. Since proteins don't exhibit quantum properties (neither do amino acids that comprise them -- and even atoms comprising those don't), this theorem would have no point of application in the concept. Neuroconstruct (talk) 01:27, 9 June 2024 (UTC)

There's no real paradox here
What is perceived like a paradox here is based on two concepts. First being a clear distinction of physical object our human body is and logical object our consciousness is. The second is the idea of our conscience being rooted deeply in the body (which is true in general, but is not strictly necessary). In physical world, there can be an original and a copy of that original. In logical world the object copied is no different from original unless changed (effectively, both are equally original). Considering how our consciousness is formed in what is essentially 'frames', being teleported in a period between those frames (with fast enough process or delayed frame generation such as death or any other kind of anabiosis) creates a duplicate body with the same consciousness. As such, when we take biology/bioinformatics into account, there's no paradox. Neuroconstruct (talk) 01:49, 9 June 2024 (UTC)