Talk:Tenerife airport disaster/Archive 2

Missing information
In "Speculations" we are offered the idea: "The flight engineer's apparent hesitation to challenge van Zanten further, possibly because Captain van Zanten was not only senior in rank, but also one of the most able and experienced pilots working for the airline".

This suggestion has been repeated in various sources. However, there is another possible explanation. The controller had continually used the call "Clipper 1736" for the whole time that the Pan Am aircraft was at Los Redeos airport, with just one exception. The message that was overheard by the Flight Engineer was "Papa Alpha 1736 report when runway clear". This can be seen in the CVR Transcript. This is the only time the controller used the phonetic alphabet for either call sign and the only time he used the call sign "Papa Alpha" instead of "Clipper". Remember, other aircraft were also using the radio frequency. Consequently it is very probable that the flight Engineer wasn't certain if the message concerned the Clipper Victor. This is documented in the ALPA report, Page 22. When he asks the pilots if the Pan Am is clear they BOTH replied 'Jawel', see ALPA report page 13. There is an interview, available on youtube, with Paul Roitch. He was head of the American ALPA team and had studied the recordings of the cockpit voice recorder many times. In this interview he states quite emphatically that BOTH the Captain and the First Officer reply 'Jawel' to the Flight Engineer's query. This is extremely relevent, because it demostrates that First Officer Meurs was also convinced that the Pan Am had vacated the runway. It does tend to strongly contradict the idea that both the Flight Engineer and First Officer wished to challenge the Captain further but were reluctant to do so because of his seniority. It suggests instead that the FE lacked conviction in his challenge because he was unsure and he was reassured by both pilots, who believed the runway was clear. I beleieve these two facts should be included in the article and citations made to the APLA report.SAHBfan (talk) 08:16, 27 July 2009 (UTC)
 * On page 17 of the ALPA report I can find the claim that both captain and first officer almost simultaneous responded "yes". Also, on page 22 it's stated that flight engineer's question was dismissed by both pilots.
 * However, this is not in accordance with the CVR transcript which is included in that same report. On page 7 of the KLM transcript (page 39 of the ALPA report) at 1706:34.70 only C1 (the captain) answered "Oh yes". That is also on page 3 of the official CVR transcript ("jawell").
 * Therefore, I cannot find support for the claim. Which is not to say the claim is invalid - I just can't verify it. Do you have any other sources supporting the claim in the ALPA report?
 * Richard 08:05, 28 July 2009 (UTC)


 * If you listen to the documentary "Blackbox 05 part 3 0f 5" then you can hear Paul Roitch, one of the American investigators who studies the original cockpit voice recordings, stating "and BOTH crew members said 'ja,ja, he's clear'..."


 * http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=__sHqYEF204&feature=PlayList&p=E6D0A88F8829058A&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=9


 * Roitch's interview starts at 4:58. The relevent comment is at 7:19.


 * The comments in the ALPA report are based on the personal experience of the investigators who had studied the recordings.


 * The transcripts are someones best attempt at typing what they have heard. Expletives are deleted, Dutch comments are translated into English, or Spanish and best guesses made at intelligble speech or where the identity of the speaker is unclear.


 * There are various versions of the transcripts, as you know, and they do not neccesarily agree. There are discrepencies between the version that appears in the ALPA report and the one in the appendix to the Spanish report. I don't believe, therefore, that the transcript is neccesarily the final word. I believe the testimony of the American investigators is as reliable a form of verification as we will get and better than is available for many other claims in the article. At least we have two seperate sources, a written report and a personal testimony given some years later. SAHBfan (talk) 09:41, 30 July 2009 (UTC)


 * The problem with this source is that it's not an entirely independent one. Furthermore, he's telling a narrative, a recollection of what he heard years before. As far as I know, only "oh jawel" (oh yes) was said, and not "ja, ja, he's clear". Even if the first officer has said "ja", I can't say how he said it - I haven't heard the intonation he used. He might have said "ja?" (meaning "ja toch?" or "he is, isn't he?") thereby seconding the flight engineer rather than the captain. This is speculation, of course, but much of this interpretation is speculation since we obviously can't question the persons involved.
 * Which, again, doesn't mean the claim is false. I think something like this might be added to the existing text (not replacing it) so both theories are voiced. I will give it a try. See how you like it.
 * Richard 13:45, 30 July 2009 (UTC)
 * PS: I have included this new speculation. However, I have used the names "Clipper 1 7 3 6" and "Alpha 1 7 3 6" since those names appear in the vcr transcripts, not "Clipper Victor 1 7 3 6" and not "Papa Alpha 1 7 3 6". The sentence in question was "Roger Alpha 1 7 3 6 report when runway clear".

Hi, Yes, I like it. However, with phrase "Roger Alpha 1 7 3 6 report when runway clear", interestingly this is a very good example of where the transcripts disagree. You have obviously found a CVR transcript which says "Roger Alpha". Here is one (the photocopy included as an annex to the Spanish Report) which says "Papa Alpha".

http://www.project-tenerife.com/engels/PDF/Anexonumero5.pdf

You will need to put your head at 90 degrees to read this - but you can find the 'Papa Alpha' comment on page 3.

I wouldn't bother changing what you have written, as we can not say which is the correct version, but it does illustrate what I was saying about the CVR transcripts not being the final word. There are at least three 'official' versions, Dutch, American and Spanish, each prepared (presumably) by the same Government agency in the US who were given the task of analysing the CVRs. I don't think it is possible to say one is more correct or authentic than any other, but they do differ...(!)

An additional factor which might be relevent to add at this point is that the controller goofed the numbers in the call sign on at least two occassions. He refered to the KLM as 'KLM8705' rather than 'KL4805' (See 17:04:58:2 and 17:05:53:4) This is another reason why the KLM crew may have been more tuned into the names "Clipper" and "KLM" than the numbers, as he seems to be getting the numbers wrong. SAHBfan (talk) 21:18, 3 August 2009 (UTC)
 * Hej,
 * I know ATC made errors in the call signs but since the article doesn't mention that at all I have omitted that information as well - at least, for now. For the point that's being made it doesn't matter anyway.
 * Also, I do know that pdf-file. I have a local copy of it and Acrobat Reader can turn the pages for me so that saves my neck :) But you're right, the transcripts do differ from each other.
 * Last week I sent an e-mail to Project Tenerife for yet another problem in the transcripts. It seems to be an internal inconsistency, but it *might* be at the heart of the claim that both pilots dismissed the engineers question. I will inform you further about that when I have more information.
 * Richard 06:46, 4 August 2009 (UTC)

Personally I think the goofed callsigns on the part of the controller really should be included in the main article. He made three mistakes in as many minutes. They are a vital piece of evidence that he wasn't functioning optimally. Either he was very tired at the end of a very long day or possibly he was distracted by something. Either way I would have thought this was very relevent. SAHBfan (talk) 15:12, 6 August 2009 (UTC)
 * I didn't say it wasn't relevant, I just said it doesn't matter for the point being made. Since it's not included anywhere in the article, I thought I should not introduce new information in a chapter on speculations. That's what I meant with "for now". If you want to add it to the main article, please do... afther that, inclusion in "speculations" might be in order. Richard 08:24, 7 August 2009 (UTC)

OK, I'll see if I can add it later this week. SAHBfan (talk) 07:40, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

I've just found this in the "Dutch comments on the Spanish report". I'm suprised I've missed it before:

"On the question of the flight, engineer: “Is hij er niet af dan?” (Did he not clear the runway then?), repeated with: “Is hij er niet af, die Pan American?” (Did he not clear the runway, that Pan American?). both pilots reply with:; “Jawel” (Yes, he did)."

This is a direct copy, complete with unorthodox use of punctuation and capitalisation. It is on page 7 of 11. The Dutch team are quite independant to the American Team and so I would have thought this was excellent corroboration. We now have three sources (ALPA report, Dutch comments and Paul Roitch's personal recollection). SAHBfan (talk) 07:40, 10 August 2009 (UTC)
 * You're right.
 * Playing the devil's advocate I submit that another Dutch report (the one of the Raad voor de Luchtvaart - Aviation Board) states on page 7 of 9 that "De boordwerktuigkundige vroeg om 17.06.32,43 - alleen in de stuurhut hoorbaar -: "Is hij er niet af dan?". De gezagvoerder vroeg daarna:"Wat zeg je?", waarop de boordwerktuigkundige de vraag stelde: "Is hij er niet af, die Pan American?". De gezagvoerder antwoordde: "Jawel"." (translation: the flight enigineer asked at 17:06:32.43 - only audible in the cockpit -: "Isn't he clear then?". The captain asked:"What did you say?", upon which the flight engineer asked the question: "Isn't he clear then, that Pan American?". The captain replied: "Yes".).
 * Personally, I think most investigation teams were influenced by one another in some way. Meurs may have replied - I don't know. Since it's no longer verifiable it's speculation. But wait - that's where I've added this information in the first place.
 * Richard 08:49, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

Speculations
Under the 'Speculations' section - both of these statements about van Zanten cannot be true at the same time!

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 132.185.240.121 (talk) 16:48, 16 October 2007
 * 1) Captain van Zanten's failure to confirm instructions from the tower. The flight was one of his first after spending six months training new pilots on a flight simulator. He may have suffered from 'training syndrome', having been in charge of everything at the simulator (including simulated ATC), and having been away from the real world of flying for extended periods.[1]
 * 2) The flight engineer's apparent hesitation to further challenge van Zanten, possibly because van Zanten was not only senior in rank, but also one of the most able and experienced pilots working for the airline.[1]


 * Ah, think they can both be true... One can be highly experienced and well-regarded while still being out of touch. In addition, each suggestion is cited with a reliable source. Cheers, Ian Rose 23:02, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

When this accident occurred, I was working at the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission, a state agency that investigated aircraft accidents, among other things. There was considerable speculation at the time of this accident that a strict rule limiting the time that flight crews could remain on duty caused the KLM crew to rush into the air so as to complete their flight before their crew duty limits would be violated. It seems ironic that a safety rule might have contributed to this disaster. However that selfsame irony might also lead to this concept not being reflected in any official government accident analyses. Dick Kimball (talk) 16:45, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Communication Misunderstandings
In this section we have:

"The captain interrupted the co-pilot's readback with the comment "We're going". As noted in the Nova documentary, the subordinate co-pilot this time chose not to embarrass his superior a second time and state they still did not have the proper clearance to take-off."

Surely this is completely inappropriate? The Nova documentary uses cameos played by actors to give one possible interpretation of events. It isn't a relable source of factual information, it is a 'based on the facts' TV drama. The Dutch Captain actually said 'We gaan' in Dutch ('we go' or 'we're going') followed by 'Check Thrust' in English. These were instructions to the Flight Engineer given whilst the FO was giving the read back to the controller over the radio. In the Nova documentary the actor certainly 'interupts' the first officer and is made to seem very arrogant in doing so - but we can not present this as fact in a wikipedia article, the CVR transcript certainly doesn't confirm this, it is pure specuation. In addition, we have now way of knowing what was going on inside First Officer Meurs head, again the idea that he didn't want to embarrass his Captain is pure specualtion. I think this should be removed and replaced with a statement of the what we know actually happened as can be verified from the CVR. SAHBfan (talk) 13:21, 2 October 2009 (UTC)
 * Rewording might be in order. However, that no second objection was voiced is supported by the known facts, and that cockpit hierarchy played a role is widely accepted. It's no coincidence that the NASA workshop on what would later be called Crew Resource Management was held in 1979 - shortly after "Tenerife". Richard 10:42, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

Verified miscommunication
Pan Am's transmission right after the Tower's "OK" seems a verification of how the communication from the tower could be interpreted as a clearance for takeoff. I was thinking of changing the line as follow: The Pan Am crew's transmission, which was also critical, was reporting that "We're still taxiing down the runway, the Clipper 1736!" (A response which seems to indicate that the Pan Am crew also recognized a clearance for takeoff in the Tower's "OK"). This message was also blocked by the heterodyne and inaudible to the KLM crew. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Vernes (talk • contribs)
 * First, KLM transmitted we are now at take-off.
 * Then came two simultaneous transmissions:
 * Ok. (pause) Stand by for take-off, I will call you
 * and
 * No ehm... And we're still taxiing down the runway...
 * The pause seems to indicate that at first, the tower failed to recognize that KLM might already be taking off. As soon as ground control recognized the ambiguity they tried to make sure KLM wasn't doing so. The problem was that PanAm did as well, thereby creating a heterodyne. In chronological order this is what was said:
 * Ok. No ehm... Stand by for take-off, I will call you. And we're still taxiing down the runway...
 * That last remark was made less than a second after the order to stand by. Except for the OK, nothing was audible in the KLM's cockpit.
 * So, PanAm recognized the ambiguity in KLM's transmission. The OK was transmitted after KLM had begun its take-off. It was not interpreted as a clearance for take-off but as an acknowledgement of an ambiguous transmission.
 * Richard 08:51, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Article Photo
What in the world is this CGI image doing here? It's not the actual event, nor does it provide any additional detail or information, which makes it gratuitous. Further, since the planes were on the runway, but the image shows them in the sky, it's misleading as well.

Anyone have any comments before I remove it? FellGleaming (talk) 04:05, 14 April 2010 (UTC)


 * It's fine, leave it, unless you have a better free image we can use. It doesn't show them in the sky and seems reasonably accurate. --John (talk) 04:13, 14 April 2010 (UTC)


 * Those "clouds" are fog. Richard 07:51, 16 April 2010 (UTC)

The CGI Picture
If visibility was 300m, then the CGI rendering of the collision (complete with dramatic comment of "Some fog has been cleared to give a clearer perspective of the aircraft" is inaccurate. 300m may represent poor visibility in aviation terms, but in real life it is only a light fog, not this dense pea soup that the artist has conjured up. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 219.133.145.238 (talk) 06:42, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

ILS Hold Line
I've seen it mentioned a few places online that some feel it was inappropriate for ATC to place both aircraft on the runway at the same time. Since the reason this was done hasn't really been mentioned in any documentary or article I've read I can see how some may feel this is being overlooked. I suspect what may have happened was due to overcrowding of the ramp the Pan Am 747 was parked over the ILS hold line for the runway. If true this would not have been an issue during most of the delay as visibility was good. The airport would have had to close though if visibility dropped until aircraft could be repositionied. When the visibility dropped KLM would not be able to takeoff until Pan Am was repositioned. If for some reason KLM had to return on an instrument approach then an aircraft beyond the ILS hold line could have interferred with the navigation signal of the instrument landing system. The Runway Visual Range required for takeoff takes into consideration visibility required for an instrument approach to return. This scenario would explain why both KLM and Pan Am were required to be on the runway at the same time. Can anyone confirm this was the case? I couldn't find it in the reports I looked in. Google Earth overview of Tenerife appears to show the runway hold line was moved in recent years from near the runway to behind where Pan Am was parked. The old hold line was visibly painted over. This suggests the current hold line may have been the previous ILS hold line but doesn't prove it. Some airports mark the runway hold line where an ILS hold line would otherwise be required but again that doesn't mean this is the case here. Skywayman (talk) 04:08, 24 July 2010 (UTC)
 * First: did they have ILS back then?
 * Second: if there would have been a hold line, why would the Pan Am plane have been instructed to leave the runway?
 * I think the reason that both planes were on the runway is more simple: they tried to get the planes (that shouldn't have been on Tenerife in the first place) away as soon as possible. The weather was already changing and they wouldn't risk having to keep the planes (plus passengers) on an airport that wasn't nearly equipped to handle them. Remember, the two 747's weren't the only planes diverted to Tenerife. That was one (the?) reason they used the runway for taxiing - closest to the terminal the taxiway was unavailable because there were planes parked on it.
 * Richard 18:14, 24 July 2010 (UTC)
 * The official report on this accident confirms an ILS was active at the field on 110.3 MHz although it does not state if this is for runway 12 or 30. I'm not sure I understand your question about why Pan Am would have been instructed to leave the runway since in theory no one could take off until they left the runway. I had always assumed that controllers were eager to get the planes out quickly because as you point out there was a lot of traffic that shouldn't have been there. That doesn't fully explain why both were on the runway at the same time. If it was a controller discretion decision then this should have been more fully examined. If it was required to clear traffic beyond the ILS hold line then it became a mandatory procedure. Skywayman (talk) 12:13, 13 August 2010 (UTC)
 * They were parked beyond where the ILS hold line is at present. I don't know whether they have moved that line since 1977. But even if they were parked before the ILS hold line, the fact remains that control gave Pan Am orders to leave the runway well before its end - in order to clear the way for KLM. And KLM knew that Pan Am was following them. So the reason for the decision to have both 747 taxi on the same runway at the same time is not that important. They were there, and everyone involved was aware of that. Richard 09:33, 16 August 2010 (UTC)

Old report URL
From the NTSB WhisperToMe (talk) 02:52, 24 May 2011 (UTC)
 * http://www.fomento.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/LOSRODEOS/ is the old URL of the Spanish report
 * Photocopy of Spanish report: http://www.project-tenerife.com/engels/PDF/Tenerife.pdf (Archive)
 * Powerpoint about Tenerife
 * Fact sheet including Tenerife

Pages of Spanish report in Spanish
These pages are archived so that future generations can look at them...

Main report
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_1.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjkSimb
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_2.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjlbsmX
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_3.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjmcntb
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_4.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjnlR8T
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_5.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjowQEF
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_6.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjqApjP
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_7.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjrSiFB
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_8.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjtGmwl
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_9.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjvipKv
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_10.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjx48WU
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_11.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZk306TR
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_12.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZk4hrdG
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_13.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZk5j3O0
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_14.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZk758PW
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_15.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZk8CWxL
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_1_16.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZk9f7Tj
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_2_1.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZkAq5Wt
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_2_2.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZkCNTTT
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/PUBLICACIONES/HISTORICOS/A-102-103-1977/los_rodeos_3.htm
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZkDOFV1

Appendices WhisperToMe (talk) 05:35, 20 June 2011 (UTC)
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/AED7D3A7-3DE2-4336-9F07-0BF9CE0698F1/8921/los_rodeos_anexo1A.pdf
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjYTp2M
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/CF1B96A3-1749-4176-A593-BB67F4109C25/8922/los_rodeos_anexo1B.pdf
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjZp1SM
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/B0010532-C9AC-4F2E-A5D9-EC11CD2A4EDF/8923/los_rodeos_anexo2.pdf
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjaydWz
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/CBF59D60-F4F8-450F-AF56-3A334F5D645C/8924/los_rodeos_anexo4.pdf
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjeJZQZ
 * http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/F8D8A242-CA96-495D-9647-328D9D47F7EE/8925/los_rodeos_anexo6.pdf
 * http://www.webcitation.org/5zZjfDXDx

Question about photograph of the two planes at start of article
I remember the Tenerife disaster first hand when it occurred in March, 1977. I also saw a made for TV movie about the disaster. The photograph at the beginning of the article gives false information and should be deleted, because the planes are shown in the air just before the collision takes place. As I recall, BOTH planes were on the runway immedatiately before impact. The pilot of the takeoff plane unsuccessfuly tried to lift off the runway before impact. This was NOT a mid-air collision, as is depicted in the photograph at the beginning of the article. If the photograph gives false information, it should be deleted.

Anthony22 (talk) 00:16, 23 August 2010 (UTC)
 * See also above. If you click on the picture you will see a larger version of it. Then the landing gear of the KLM as well as the runway becomes visible. They're obscured by fog - clouds on ground-level, not in the air. Richard 08:23, 23 August 2010 (UTC)


 * It doesn't appear that way to many people who look at it, so it does give a false impression. --90.220.76.190 (talk) 21:36, 9 January 2011 (UTC)

More image confusion
I'm having trouble reconciling the CGI rendering at the top with the diagram further down the page showing the runway and each flight's respective path. If the diagram is correct (and I believe it is), then can the CGI image be correct? It makes the Pan Am jet look like it's turning sharply left into the path of the KLM jet rather than taking "a sharp left turn towards the grass", as stated in the article. Rivertorch (talk) 05:22, 28 June 2011 (UTC)
 * The CGI image is correct; what you see at the bottom of the image is the runway centerline (each stripe on the centerline of a runway is over 100 feet long). The image depicts the Pan Am jet (which was taxiing along the centerline) attempting to turn left off the runway while the KLM jet attempts to climb away.  N419 BH  05:33, 28 June 2011 (UTC)
 * I was allowing for the scale (and for the speed of the KLM) but it still looked "off" to me. I'll take your word for it, but I think it's confusing. One possible contributing factor to the confusion is the fact that the Pan Am jet appears smaller, even though it's in the foreground. Rivertorch (talk) 05:56, 28 June 2011 (UTC)

Refuelling
In the section on refuelling we are given the following scentence:

"Captain van Zanten had decided to fully refuel at Los Rodeos instead of Las Palmas, apparently to save time, but added extra weight, greatly retarding liftoff (and accident escape) ability, which proved fatal. The refuelling took an estimated 35 minutes. By a factor of just 12 feet of lack of maneuver clearance, due to KLM's refuelling..."

Firstly, a minor point, this is written in a mix of British English and American English.

More importantly it contains several assumptions. Is there any evidence anywhere that Captain van Zanten made the decision to refuel? There are at least two other possibilities. He had just communicated with KLM headquarters via HF radio link. Possibly they had requested he refuel in order to reduce turn around time at Schiphol (The Spanish reports points out that the aircraft had sufficient fuel to reach Amsterdam without refuelling, so this could make more sense than the suggestion that VZ refuelled to save time in Las Palmas). Also possible is that there was a standing KLM instruction regarding the amount of fuel carried when the service is running behind schedule. Extra fuel would carry a large cost penalty due to the weight. Aircraft do not generally 'fill up' for short haul flights, they carry adequate fuel for the journey plus a safety margin. In this case the KLM took on considerably more fuel than was required for the return journey. This does tend to suggest that consideration was being given to what happened beyond the return flight to Schiphol, so it may not have been a decision of Captain van Zanten.

Additionally, do we know what the total fuel load was? I do not recall reading anywhere that the fuel load was at it's maximum capacity, or that the extra load would 'greatly' retard lift off. I believe the 747 was still operating well below it's maximum take off weight and that otherwise the take off run would have been quite normal. Additionally, we know from the official reports that the aircraft wasn't using full engine power, but was taking off on reduced revs. The first officer called V1 well before Charlie 4, so lift off would have been shortly afterwards. That is considerably less than half of the runway, so it would not have been in any way an unusual or 'greatly increased' take off run. The sentence seems to give the impression that the fuel load was a significant factor. Obviously with less fuel it would have lifted off sooner and MIGHT have missed the Pan Am, but this is just one of the very many small factors which, if they had been different... Surely it is not a significant cause or factor in the crash? SAHBfan (talk) 12:53, 2 October 2009 (UTC)
 * I must say, this is the first time I've heard someone question whether Van Zanten was solely responsible for te decision on refuelling. Fact is that he was in a hurry: KLM was strictly enforcing duty time limits and the crew of the plane would be pushing it - even without significant delay on Las Palmas. Plus: had Van Zanten received an order to refuel that he didn't support I think he would have at least said so - and given his status within KLM his objection surely wouldn't have been simply dismissed.
 * The extra fuel weighed reportedly over 40 tons.
 * The plane had exceeded its V1-speed but had not yet reached its V2-speed. There's no way of knowing how much runway it would have needed to reach that speed. The dragging tail reduced the plane's speed so it simply wasn't ready to take off. But even if it had been ready, 40 tons of extra weight surely affected its climbing capabilities - there is also no way of knowing what its ascent ratio would have been. All in all I think the extra fuel did make a significant difference. But as so often, it was only one link in a chain of events.
 * The fact that the fuel literally added fuel to the flame(s) is a different story.
 * Richard 10:03, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

At the point that the plane commenced refuelling Las Palmas was closed and the crew did not know when it would re-open, therefore VZ was unlikely to over-rule a request to refuel on grounds of time. However, my point is that the claim that VZ ordered the plane to be refuelled IS an assumption. We have no evidence that VZ ordered the refuelling. There are other possibilities.

As for the fuel load, 40 tons may sound a lot (I believe he took on 50,000 litres? That is actually nearer 50 metric tonnes) but my point was that it is well within normal operating params for a 747. The max take off weight for a 747-200 is 378 metric tonnes. Maximum fuel capacity is just under 200,000 litres. To put it in context, they added 1/4 of a tank-full. A very rough and ready calculation: A 747-200 has a range of just under 7000 miles with 200,000 litres. The official report claims that prior to refuelling they had enough fuel to return to Schipol, about 2000 miles. So...(2/7 * 200000) about 57,000 litres? So adding another 50,000, just over half the maximum load? All rough guestimation on my part, but I strongly suspect that at take off they were carrying a lot less fuel than they could have done. My point is they did not 'fully refuel' as claimed in the text. It also claims 'fully fuelled' in the intro. I simply do not know how close they were to their max take off weight, but I believe to claim 'fully fuelled' is misleading.

I'm not sure I agree that there is no way to know how much runway would be need to get from V1 to V2min, I suspect it would be possible to make a reasonable estimate if the aircraft weight and point of V1 is known. I suspect someone familiar with the 747 could make an estimate of the effect on performance of the increased payload. So, I'm not at all sure that there is 'no way of knowing' - but I do fully accept that *we* do not know. That rather makes my point - the sentence claims the fuel 'greatly increased' the take off run. How can the paragraph claim 'greatly increased' if we accept we do not know? Without reference to some evidence, I humbly submit that is pure assumption. Obviously the take off run would be increased, but my objection is to the word 'greatly'. It implies a big degredation in performance as if this was therefore an unusually overloaded take off. I don't believe it was, I maintain the aircraft was operating without normal limits, nothing unusual.

I think the sentence should be re-writtenSAHBfan (talk) 08:33, 6 October 2009 (UTC)
 * Then by all means change the sentence into "The KLM Boeing was refuelled at Los Rodeos instead of Las Palmas, presumably to avoid further delay at that airport. However, the extra fuel also meant extra weight, which in turn meant a lower liftoff (and as it turned out, accident escape) capability." Surely that's accurate. The only assumption is the reason why refuelling took place in the first time, but I think that's a safe one. Richard 08:56, 6 October 2009 (UTC)


 * The heavier fuel load meant that the aeroplane would have needed more runway to take-off in, so if he hadn't taken on additional fuel (and not over-rotated and let the tail drag along the ground, thereby slowing the aircraft down when what it needed most of all was airspeed) the KLM 747 may well have been able to clear the Pan-Am aircraft, if only enough to hop over it.


 * However, the point is moot, as without the delay caused by the KLM aircraft's refuelling the accident would probably never have happened. The accident, like so many others, was simply a result of a number of people making poor decisions that, to them, seemed like good ones at the time. In any other circumstances, at any other time, the KLM pilot's decision to go wouldn't have resulted in anything other than a normal flight to their destination. Unfortunately, this time it didn't, due to a conspiracy of events that went unrecognised by the participants at the time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 14:45, 15 September 2011 (UTC)

Contributing factor: Taking off
The section I've removed about van Zanten attempting to take off is in a section headed "Speculation regarding other contributing factors includes:". The citations state it as fact that he did try to take off; they are not sufficient citations to support this as a contributing factor or not. As such, this is uncited speculation. My personal OR is that it was the correct and near-optimal thing to do under the circumstances, not a contributing factor; a head-on impact of two jets with full loads of fuel with one traveling at 145 knots (V1 speed for a 747) would not have had the number of survivors this accident did.--Prosfilaes (talk) 08:06, 10 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The suspected contributing factor was the dragging of the tail (due to the sharp lifting angle). Richard 17:14, 10 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Then cite it. Right now, it's uncited speculation as a contributing factor.--Prosfilaes (talk) 22:21, 10 July 2012 (UTC)
 * That's why it's under a header Speculation regarding other contributing factors. Richard 07:29, 11 July 2012 (UTC)
 * And as per WP:V, Wikipedia doesn't include editors' speculations.--Prosfilaes (talk) 08:12, 12 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Is this in fact speculation by an editor? Or is that speculation by you? Richard 07:11, 13 July 2012 (UTC)
 * If it's published speculation, it needs a citation.--Prosfilaes (talk) 22:16, 13 July 2012 (UTC)

Suggested new lede (13/9/12)
Must disagree with Wolbo about rejecting my redraft as 'not an improvement'.

Unless briefed otherwise, I assume that the test of the lede is whether it will stimulate the first-time site-visitor into reading the main article.

The task is to engage the reader's attention, by highlighting the salient points, and then delivering a clean, bare summary, stripped of all non-essentials, which can be allocated their proper place in the main article.

First taste tells:

His new opening, 'The Tenerife airport disaster occurred on Sunday, March 27, 1977...' is simply not something that will hold the attention.

I think my suggested opening 'The Tenerife airport disaster brought the highest death-count of any incident in aviation history...' is more likely to.

Etc. 86.144.67.80 (talk) 11:30, 14 September 2012 (UTC)


 * This is an encyclopedia. Our goal is not to encourage people to read the main article. It is to provide the information that people are looking for. The lead should almost eliminate the need to read the rest of the article in many cases, by providing the essential facts. The current top two sentences give a precise synopsis of what this accident was; the top 500 words concisely encapsulates the events.
 * This is an encyclopedia written in standard encyclopedia format. There's a place in the world for what you wrote, but it doesn't have the fact-dense, precise, neutral format that is standard for Wikipedia.
 * (Not to mention that neither jumbos nor ploughed is not formal English and your justification of van Zandt is controversial.)--Prosfilaes (talk) 21:53, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

Runway incursion
I deleted runway incursion from the infobox as a cause of the accident as both airplanes were authorized to be on the runway at the time. D O N D E groovily  Talk to me  17:52, 28 October 2011 (UTC)


 * I don't fully agree with this. Yes, both planes had been cleared onto the runway.  However, the KLM plane had only been cleared to backtrack on the runway and move into takeoff position, it had NOT been cleared to re-enter the runway beyond the takeoff position.  By definition, a runway incursion takes place if two planes are on the same runway or section of runway when at least one of them is not cleared for it (if they both have clearance, that's ATC error).  In the case of Tenerife, the Pan-Am plane was cleared to be where it was (leaving aside the "third exit" issue), whereas the KLM plane was not; therefore I believe it is appropriate to include "runway incursion". 198.202.68.212 (talk) 21:41, 18 October 2012 (UTC)

Transcript of NOVA documentary
There is a transcript of the NOVA documentary "The Deadliest Plane Crash" which aired on PBS on October 17, 2006. It is a derivative work of "Crash of the Century," a French-Canadian co-production (Cineflix on the Canadian side). WhisperToMe (talk) 17:46, 30 October 2012 (UTC)
 * http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/space/deadliest-plane-crash.html
 * http://www.webcitation.org/6Bo0fHgNR
 * http://web.archive.org/web/20070309013823/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3315_planecra.html

Robert Bragg's conflicting comments
"Subsequent to the crash, first officer Robert Bragg, who was responsible for handling the Pan Am's radio communications, made public statements which conflict with statements made by the Pan Am crew in the official transcript of the CVR. In the documentary Crash of the Century (produced by the makers of Mayday), he stated he was convinced the tower controller had intended they take the fourth exit C-4 because the controller delivered the message to take "the third one, sir, one; two, three; third, third one" after the Pan Am's had already passed C-1 (making C-4 the third exit counting from there).[11] The CVR shows unequivocally that they received this message before they identified C-1, with the position of the aircraft somewhere between the entrance and C-1. Also, in a Time article, Bragg stated that he made the statement "What's he doing? He'll kill us all[!]" which does not appear in the CVR transcript."

The article states Pan Am received the instruction ""the third one, sir, one; two, three; third, third one" after the Pan Am's had already passed C-1". While the CVR shows this is true, does this still violate WP:OR (specifically WP:SYNTHESIS)? Has the fact that Bragg's comments conflict with the CVR actually been published anywhere?

Bramley (talk) 05:14, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

There is no valid reference to the Time article. In a version I saw, the statement "What's he doing? He'll kill us all[!]" was attributed to Victor Grubbs, and, in a footnote, the assertion that this statement was made was denied. Perhaps the text should be changed on this point, so as not to charge Robert Bragg?

Bomwatty (talk) 22:25, 2 November 2012 (UTC)

Annotations in CVR transcript
Someoone has included a segment of transcript with annotaions.

e.g: KLM FIRST OFFICER Wait a minute, we don't have an ATC clearance. [This statement is apparently a response to an advancing of the throttles in the KLM.]

Whilst these additions in brackets are obviously intended to be helpful, they are not part of the transcript. It is also speculation, how is it apparent that this is a response to advancing the throttles? There are other alternative explanations. I think it would be desirable to include the CVR transcript in it's original form. If it is changed or added to, surely these additions should be clear and they should surely be referenced? SAHBfan (talk) 14:13, 22 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Looking at the Official Report, I'm not seeing a pure transcript of the CVR. It does however make it clear (page 42) that at 1705:41.22 the plane started moving forward due to advancement of the throttles; the statement you list is at being at 1705:41.5. It might be pedantically correct to fix that, but I don't see that as being a huge issue, nor do I see any other problematic comments in that transcript.--Prosfilaes (talk) 16:56, 22 November 2012 (UTC)


 * The transcript from the official report may have been annotated by an air crash investigator in 1977 - that's not quite the same as a WP editor adding comments to reinforce their own interpretation for which they have added no references. The problem is the claim that "The statement is apparently a response to an advancing of the throttles...". It isn't apparent, it isn't established. It does fit in with the idea that Meurs was challenging a Captain who was trying to take off without permission. That is not a trivial claim and surely needs citable references to stand? Otherwise it is a failure of NPOV. There are other good reason why Meurs could have said this at this point apart from reaction to the spin up procedure.

SAHBfan (talk) 08:19, 23 November 2012 (UTC)

Van Zanten being potrayed as a total jerk
In the Crash of the Century documentary from Air Crash Investigation, I could not belive the remarks that came out of his mouth. Especially when he COMMANDED a flight attendant to search for missing passengers. He yelled at that poor woman like he was like a drill seargent!! and he was also very snobbish in that documentary! It was like he thought he was right, everybody else was wrong. Did this really happen? was there any indication that Jacob Van Zanten was that mean in the CVR?
 * fraroc 9:23, 20 January 2010 (Eastern) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.167.72.47 (talk)
 * He was under a lot of stress and a bit agitated. I think the makers of the documentary used their artistic freedom to illustrate that. Maybe Van Zanten did pull rank in some instances, I don't know. If you want to read a CVR transcript, it can be found (among other places) here and here. The second link points to a pdf-file that is a photocopy of a Spanish report. It looks a bit smudged but is more complete than the text the first link points to - there, some timestamps have been omitted. Richard 08:14, 21 January 2010 (UTC)


 * This portrayal is absolutely false and was made for the sake of dramatization . There's absolutely NO evidences he ever screamed at flight attendants or was rude towards his co-workers . But millions of people take this pseudo-documentary for granted and think all these dialogues are taken from the CVR transcripts . Obviously - they aren't . So I wouldn't trust a single word . The producers of this movie made an act of slander, end of story . NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 11:25, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

ATC Error?!
I have read stories about the controllers at Tenerife: you know, a couple of banana republic fellows with their shoes off, feet up on a desk, listening to a soccer match while sipping coffee, totally unprepared and incapable of handling the unexpected increase in traffic due to the terrorism incident at Las Palmas. I have analyzed this tragedy every which way to Sunday, and I can find absolutely no culpability on the part of ATC at Tenerife. None!

Van Zanten took off without clearance and other “contributing” reasons for the disaster are irrelevant. One might as well blame the terrorist who planted the bomb at Las Palmas as a contributing factor along with radio interference. There is never any excuse for taking off or landing without clearance. End of story! At the very least, under disaster “type” I believe ATC error should be removed as inaccurate and potentially libelous! — Preceding HistoryBuff14 (talk) 18:35, 3 November 2011 (UTC)


 * Okay, if no one else cares about Wikipedia perpetrating this libel, then I will remove the offending characterization of ATC error on my own volition. It was absolutely clear that ATC gave ATC clearance only, standard procedure before issuing final takeoff clearance.  They are always two separate orders as the KLM crew well knew.   Even assigning partial blame to the two controllers on duty that fateful day at Tenerife is not only libelous but shameful.  They acted in a completely professional manner under very difficult and stressful circumstances throughout the diversion to the airport.  If no one states a good reason to retain it, I shall shortly remove the offending assertion of ATC error from the article. contribution by HistoryBuff14

Debunking “contributory causes.”
Per my last post, I have removed “ATC error” as unsupported by the Spanish and American reports and by all available evidence, most notably, the tower transmission records. As a sort of compromise, I have left "technical limitations” in place. At least that doesn’t constitute libel towards human beings and their reputations:

Assertion: ATC should not have authorized more than one plane to be on the only runway at the same time.

Response: After long delays, the controllers were trying to expedite matters by having a second plane enter the runway and turn off at a cut through to the taxiway and then get into takeoff position when the first plane had departed. This process would be repeated until the airport was cleared of all planes waiting to depart. In hindsight of the accident, it is obvious had only one plane at a time been permitted on the runway than the tragedy would have been averted. True. However, ATC had the right to assume that no professional pilot would takeoff without clearance from the tower. As long as a safe distance was maintained between two planes on the runway simultaneously, then the controllers acted entirely properly. How much caution is sufficient? Perhaps no plane should ever be permitted to takeoff as airline crashes inevitably occur. Such a measure would eliminate all airline accidents.

Assertion: ATC instructed the Pan Am pilot to take C-3 to clear the runway and head to the taxiway. C-3 was a sharp angle that made it difficult if not impossible for a 747 to negotiate especially in heavy fog. This caused confusion to the Pan Am crew and added to the delay in the plane clearing he runway.

Response: The most probable reason why ATC instructed Pan Am to turn off at C-3 instead of the more logical C-4 was because C-3 was the first cut through in which its intersection with the taxiway was clear of aircraft thus enabling the Pan Am to turn right and head for the runway and takeoff position once the KLM had cleared. The controllers’ lack of experience with such large aircraft as 747s doubtlessly was another reason for the order. Nevertheless, this consideration is irrelevant as KLM was never given clearance by ATC to take off.

Assertion: Pan Am caused a critical delay in clearing the runway by not following ATC’s instructions to take C-3.

Response: This assumes that even had Pan Am attempted to turn at C-3 that the turn would have been less time consuming than proceeding to C-4. Had the Pan Am attempted to negotiate the steep angle turn at C-3 it might have been more time consuming to negotiate than traveling on to C-4, assuming such a turn was possible at all. However, once again this is irrelevant. KLM could not see the Pan Am and was completely dependent upon the tower to advise them when Pan Am had cleared the runway. It was not up to the KLM captain to decide for himself when sufficient time had elapsed for the Pan Am to have cleared the runway and then take off on his volition under such a precarious assumption. Finally, even had the Pan Am captain deliberately cut his engines while on the runway and refused to move as some sort of a sit down strike that would not have excused another pilot running into the craft.

Assertion; The two controllers behaved in an unprofessional manner. They were actually listening to a football (soccer) match on the radio!

Response: The controllers acted entirely properly and  professionally throughout the unusual and trying circumstances of that day. After all the diverted airplanes had safely landed at their airport, only then did they listen to the football game as there was nothing to do until Gran Canaria reopened. When it did, they ceased listening to the game. In any event, the alleged distraction had no bearing on the tragedy whatsoever

Assertion: Technical shortcomings at Los Rodeos Airport contributed to the crash.

Resposne: The lack of ground radar at the airport was irrelevant as the controllers were aware that Pan Am was still on the runway. This was the reason they had not given takeoff clearance. Few airports at that time had the device to eliminate radio interference when two calls were made simultaneously. Van Zanten had no reason to interpret anything the controller said as constituting takeoff clearance. In fact, he hadn’t even waited for his copilot to finish reading back the controller’s ATC clearance—as is standard protocol—before beginning his takeoff! Takeoff clearance is always a separate order subsequent to ATC clearance. Moreover, there had been no radio interference when 24 seconds before impact the Pan Am made another call to the tower advising that they were still on the runway. This call was heard by the KLM’s flight engineer who questioned his captain regarding the Pan Am’s position which the captain chose to discount. At that point, there still might have been time to avert the collision or to at least mitigate its impact. .

Conclusion: Captain Jacob van Zanten took off without clearance. He bears sole responsibility for the disaster and all other alleged causes are irrelevant. One might as well blame van Zanten’s parents for marrying and having him.


 * Yes, ATC errors did play a part in the disaster. While the KLM captain took off without clearance and that was the primary cause, secondary causes/factors were bad weather, crowded airport conditions, and a couple of ATC errors, namely telling the Pan Am to take the third exit (which a 747 would find difficult or impossible to negotiate) and also using nonstandard phraseology, which may have confused the KLM captain into thinking he was cleared for takeoff when he was not. With that said, the infobox should say the primary cause and not the secondary causes. I am changing it to read simply "Pilot Error".  N419 BH  17:18, 5 November 2011 (UTC)


 * Thank you for the input. We can agree to disagree over whether ATC bears any responsibility at all for the tragedy. However, we do agree that the pilot error was at least the primary cause, and I am in full agreement with your edit.  Thank you again.HistoryBuff14 (talk) 18:50, 5 November 2011 (UTC)


 * I've put the contributions under "ATC Error" back in chronological order.
 * Your "if no one else cares" seems a bit harsh - not even one full day had passed since your first post. Furthermore, you could have entered the same information in fewer sessions - that would have kept the revision history much clearer.
 * Although I don't completely agree with your responses I do agree with the change it eventually led to.
 * Richard 09:57, 7 November 2011 (UTC)


 * Richard, as I explained to N4 on his talk page, I am a bit of a tech klutz which led to an unfortunate misunderstanding between us. However, I am not normally this bad of one as I royally messed up this section.  I thank you very much for tidying matters up so nicely in my wake.  In regard to your comment about my being a bit harsh, I agree and I do apologize to you and all.  As I told an administrator, I have learned from this affair and shall endeavor in the future to act more carefully.HistoryBuff14 (talk) 13:31, 7 November 2011 (UTC)


 * Okay, things like that happen. Don't worry about it. Enjoy your "stay" on Wikipedia and until we meet again. Richard 15:30, 7 November 2011 (UTC)


 * The following is a link to the April, 2007 edition of Controller, the Journal of Air Traffic Control. The issue has a section devoted to the Tenerife disaster with comments from Fernando Azcunaga, the approach controller on duty at the time of the incident.  Within the article, Mr. Azcunaaga discusses the conditions under which his colleagues and he were forced to work even in the best of times, as well as the subsequent investigation and his becoming the center of it.  I am linking to the cached version as the relevant portion begins quite a way from the top of the magazine.:

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?hl=en&gbv=2&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=3187l10984l0l12125l17l16l0l6l6l0l188l1296l4.6l10l0&q=cache:j9G6Sq7k_GQJ:http://issuu.com/ifatca/docs/tc_04_2007+FERNANDO+aZCUNAGA&ct=clnk HistoryBuff14 (talk) 19:45, 8 November 2011 (UTC)


 * The KLM aircraft disobeyed orders from ATC so I cannot see how the controllers are in any way culpable. If the KLM (and PanAm in leaving the runway by the designated exit) aircraft had done as they were told the accident would not have happened. One might add the lack of standardised radio terminology at the time as a contributing factor, but that's hardly the fault of the Los Rodeos controllers.


 * The ultimate blame for the accident must inevitably fall on van Zanten's shoulders, however it needs to be born in mind that if he had thought that his starting his take-off run without permission as he did would cause the death of several hundred people, including himself, you can be pretty sure he would not have done it. It was a mistake, a case of bad airmanship on his part. We all make mistakes, but unfortunately as a pilot of a commercial airliner he was in a position where a mistake on his part could, (and did), have tragic consequences.


 * Aviation (like seafaring) is a discipline where, in certain circumstance, you have to get everything right all (or almost all) the time. Mistakes can be very expensive, both in aeroplanes and in lives. As a pilot, you only need to make sufficient mistakes to kill yourself once. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 15:36, 28 November 2011 (UTC)


 * One key distinction here: "contributing factors" does not mean "blame also goes here". It is well established that Van Zanten was the one at fault in this accident.  However, as others have stated, the reality is that people do make mistakes, even ones as serious as taking off without clearance.  The key to safety is to ensure measures are in place to catch and correct those mistakes before they become fatal.  Therefore accident investigators have the responsibility to identify, not just the crucial mistake that led to an accident, but also why that mistake wasn't caught (contributing factors).  It's not about spreading blame to those other areas, but rather about ensuring that if the same mistake is made again, it can be caught in time. 198.202.68.212 (talk) 22:02, 18 October 2012 (UTC)


 * I seriously think claiming that vZ was the only one to blame is just a little bit ... too much . Yes, he have done a bad mistake , no doubt about that . But there were many other factors which contributed to the disaster . VZ's mistake was the final one , but he's no way the only one to blame . He was sure he did got his clearance . He was wrong , but he didn't know that . But the easiest way is to blame the whole thing on the dead man . NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 01:06, 21 December 2012 (UTC)

Heterodyne
The article refers to heterodyne as a noun, and refers to it as "a three second long whistling sound". I can find no evidence for such definition and the word heterodyne in the article links to an article that refers to a form of radio signal multiplexing. Does anyone have a source which explains what a heterodyne is as referred to in the article? If so a new article needs to be created for this sense of heterodyne or the information needs to be added as a new section in the main article for heterodyne. According to the definitions I've seen, Heterodyne can be an adjective or a verb, not a noun. After some more digging around it looks like an erroneous wikifying which I have undone. TimL &bull; talk 03:18, 21 December 2012 (UTC)

Hesitation to challenge Veldhuyzen van Zanten ?
I hope it's OK for a newbie like me to join your conversation ... I think there's a rather important thing that needs to be pointed out ...

During the years we all have been bombarded with a very common propaganda which is supposed to teach us that VvZ was imperious, rude and intimidating towards his colleagues , who were young , meek and lacked experience. Yet - most of those rumours/speculations are coming from people who never knew or even met the pilots involved in the disaster ! And I'm not even going to mention the pseudo-documentary "Crash Of The Century". So I think it's very important to add a different point of view from someone who knew the whole Dutch crew personally. That's why I added 2 quotes from Jan Bartelski. Some might say this source isn't very reliable, as he used to work for KLM. But ... is his opinion less valid than those of people who never met van Zanten at all ?!? I really don't think so ;-)

So I believe it's very important to represent different points of view, especially while talking about speculations and myths , and not proven facts. I think it's deeply unfair to present somebody who died and can't say a word in his protection in such a negative way. He was just a human being, with his good and bad things. A human being who indeed made a terrible mistake, but we should never forget it was an accident , not a murder :-) So while it's OK to criticize a certain mistake - it's no way OK to demonize the man.

Best Regards NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 00:59, 21 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Hi NaturalHeaven, welcome, and thanks for joining in. I saw your recent additions from Bartelski, and am glad to discuss them. To cut to the chase, I think that given the observation about Meurs perhaps being overawed by Zanten is a short paragraph, by an experienced pilot and aviation safety writer, in a section clearly marked "Speculations", we don't need such a detailed counter-view. I'm prepared to accepted on good faith the reliability of Bartelski's book as a source unless someone can demonstrate otherwise, but one or two sentences beginning with something like "According to KLM pilot Jan Bartelski, however..." should suffice. Having read Job (the source for the speculation cited here, though there are others) from cover to cover, I can tell you he's not out to do a hatchet job on Zanten or any other pilot he discusses in Air Disaster -- his attitude, from his own mouth in the introduction, is more one of "there but for grace of god go I". He accepts that Zanten believed (though wrongly) that he had clearance to take off, and highlights the pressure Zanten would have felt to get his flight under way as quickly as possible to avoid breaking Dutch civil aviation flying-hours limits. At no time does he call Zanten arrogant or rude. As for Crash of the Century, I think it's a bit of a straw man, as I could only find one place in the article that it was cited, and it had nothing to do with Zanten's alleged demeanour. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 02:00, 21 December 2012 (UTC)


 * Hi Ian, and thanks for your reply :-) I'm not trying to say McArthur is trying to spread hate towards anybody . But it's important to remember than he never met any of the Dutch pilots and doesn't know much about their personalities . He can SUGGEST that the rest of the crew was a bit intimidated by vZ's "seniority" , but it's just an assumption after all . And the producers of "COTC" created a movie which is full of lies , exhaggerations and made-up conversations . Maybe they read an article or two and decided to highlight the speculation about a senior Captain and his meek coleagues , and millions of people believed it . So it's very important to introduce a different point of view , from someone who knew the people . I guess the majority would still believe the theory about a bossy Captain though . NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 11:28, 22 December 2012 (UTC)


 * I'm with Ian here. We go with reliable sources, who do not need to have known the subject. What an odd assertion! --John (talk) 11:34, 22 December 2012 (UTC)


 * I don't think my sources are less reliable ;-) And I see nothing odd in them :-) NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 12:20, 22 December 2012 (UTC)


 * I mean that it's unusual to assert that sources which derive from a personal knowledge of the subject will be more reliable than those which do not. If anything, I would have thought the converse might be true. --John (talk) 10:38, 23 December 2012 (UTC)

'Dismissal' of engineers question and his hesitation
In the Speculation section it points out that in the ALPA report BOTH the Captain and the First Office reply 'Yes' (Jawel, in Dutch) to the engineer's question. In the CVR it only notes the Captain as saying this. However, it states in this section that both crew members 'dismiss' the engineers question. If you reply 'yes' to a yes / no question, that isn't dismissing it - that is answering it. Obviously, the answer was tradgically wrong. I propose rewriting this sentence.

Additionally, in the same section it asks about "The flight engineer's apparent hesitation to challenge Veldhuyzen van Zanten further...". How is the hesitation apparent? If you hear a pause or a stutter or faltering phrase before someone speaks, we can point to an apparent hesitation. In this case he didn't say any more - so how do we know he was hesitant? Maybe he was satisfied with the answer? 'Apparent hesitation' can not be inferred from this. SAHBfan (talk) 13:46, 22 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Couldn't agree more . I always wondered how can a "yes" be a dismissing . Schreuder asked a question, vZ and Meurs answered . So yes , "dismissed" is indeed a wrong definition , IMHO . NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 01:02, 21 December 2012 (UTC)

The ALPA report states (p.26) that both pilots dismissed the flight engineer's question. Yet the following page says that the question was addressed to the captain, and the same document includes a transcript of the CVR (p.43) which shows that only the captain responds. With such inconsistencies, this source should be treated with caution, at least on this point.

In any case, the source says nothing that justifies the sentence used in the Wiki article: "In that case, the flight engineer might have been either reassured or even less inclined to press the question further." This is pure WP:OR. 86.5.176.168 (talk) 12:00, 5 July 2013 (UTC)

The most senior pilot working for KLM?
Good evening.

I would like to see a reliable source that indeed can prove that van Zanten was "the most senior pilot". Senior in what way? An age? Number of flying hours? His rank was pretty high, but the number of his flying hours wasn't that impressive (11 700 hours in almost 27 years is NOT much, not to mention the fact that in the last 7 years of his life he hardly made any line-flying anymore, and pretty much turned into a simulator pilot), and there were pilots who were older than him. So I think this opinion is doubtful in a way. Best Regards, NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 21:44, 19 July 2013 (UTC)

I have added the official report as a citation for this, and changed the text to the more factual "VvZ was KLM's chief instructor". That could be interpreted as "most senior pilot" but that's a matter of opinion and how you define the term. 86.5.176.168 (talk) 08:02, 24 July 2013 (UTC)


 * That's MUCH better, thank you very much :-) That's a correct definition and should have been used from the start. No need to fill the article up with urban myths and speculations (like the ones about vZ's "worldwide stardom", while in reality he only was photographed for a single advert, and nobody heard about him or knew him before the crash). NaturalHeaven1979 (talk) 19:11, 24 July 2013 (UTC)