Talk:Texas Revolution/Nofi



p 67 Tex expected SA to wait until spring, so discounted reports that his army was approaching for days

"Not that there was much that could be done to put the town in a state of readiness for defense. Given that there were fewer than 200 men available, any attempt to have defended San Antonio would have been foolhardy" Alamo lacked parapets to shelter troops, had no bastions " to permit flanking fire to enfilade attacking enemy troops, and had a wholly impossible trace, the outer perimeter actually being much too long not only for the number of men available, but also given the amount of space which it enclosed."

p 68 under engineer Jameson, "Where possible, rough parapets had been raised to offer some protection to men manning the walls. A log and earth palisade had been erected to close a gap in the wall on the south side of the old cemetery in front of the chapel, and a gap which had been made in the northern wall when the Texians besieged the place in December was crudely repaired. Earthen ramps were built to provide gun emplacements, so that by late February some 18 to 21 guns had been mounted, mostly along the walls, but with two mounted in the interior facing the main gate. Also inside the enclosure itself, some field works had been erected, and the interior walls of many of the buildings had been pierced, to provide passage from room to room if the main plaza was lost. To improve the water supply an old well had been reopened."

plenty of gun powder, although much in poor quality (had belonged to Mex army), short of ammo Tex made musket balls from the leading of the Alamo windows and other buildings in SA didn't have canister or grapse shot, so used scrap metal, chain, and chopped up horseshoes

end of Jan abt 115-120 men in Alamo 3 Feb Travis arrived with 30 men over next three weeks, more arrived

see page 69 for map

p 70 precise dimensions of the Alamo in 1835-1836 not known, as "no two plans or sketches of the place known from contemporary sources are in more than general agreement"

p 71 Mex army tore down most of the original walls after this battle so it could not be used again as a stronghold

"At the time of the siege, the church was only one story high, and there was no roof over the central portion, it having been torn down by Brig. Gen. Martin Cos when he prepared the Alamo for defense in late 1835: The rubble from the roof was packed against the eastern wall and covered with earth to form the ramp leading up to the 12-pounders sited above the apse"

p 75 " Crockett's arrival helped Travis' control, since he deferred to the younger man, refusing even a command, asking only to be treated as a "sort of high private.""

Despite having Seguin's cavalry, Travis and Bowie did not initiate routine reconnaissance did not bring adequate supplies of food and firewood into the Alamo did not clear buildings, brush, and trees from around the Alamo - these provide cover for attackers

"It is also unclear as to whether the garrison's gunners, Almeron Dickinson among them, attempted to pre-determine the ranges to various prominent features, so as to be able to bring targets under fire without the necessity for ranging shots"

despite Travis's attempts to turn these men into a regular army, about half of the men had homes in San Antonio and did not stay in the Alamo

p 76

Feb 22, SA camped on the MEdian R, 18 mi SW of San Antonio; pickets of his Delores Cavalry ranged only 8 mi from town just about all the Tex army men and most of the town's 2000 inhabitants held a fiesta for George Wash's birthday (left 10 men on duty at Alamo) (the night before had been another fandango)

party ended at midnight during early morning hours, locals got word of SA's imminent arrival and began packing and leaving Travis saw the "unusual pre-dawn movement of wagons and ox carts" and questioned some residents Travis, Dr. James Sutherland, and a third man climbed to top of tower of San Fernando - inadequate lighting (not yet dawn), so third man stayed up there and Travis and Sutherland came down

as Travis returned to his quarters, the church bell began to ring - he said he saw flashes in the distance - Travis could still see nothing, so sent Sutherland and American John W. SMith out on horseback - 1.5 mi south of town they say the troops of the Dolores Cavalry and hightailed it back

p 77 Mex did not pursue; Sutherland's horse stumbled, bucking off Sutherland and then rolling over his legs, breaking one of his kknees; still remounted and rode on

Bexar residents "fled in all directions" while Tex men hurried into the Alamo at last minute, one of the men drove a heard of about 24 cattle into the Alamo

"Santa Anna's troopers approached cautiously. Although some Mexican cavalrymen entered the town, at times forcing those fleeing to the safety of the Alamo to take alternative routes, it was more than an hour before they were present in strength. By then, San Antonio was quiet again, as everyone sought what safety they could, some—apparently including a few men belonging to the garrison—fleeing the town, others sheltering in their homes, and still others ensconced within the Alamo. "

If the Dolores Cavalry Regiment had pursued Sutherland and SMith, they would have found many of the Tex army members running around the streets (SA also later said that the cavalry moved out later than he had ordered that morning)

At this point, Travis counted 146 fighting men in the Alamo

p 78 As Mex cavalry came into SA, Travis sent man named Johnson to take a message to Fannin, 100 mi SE asking for immediate reinforcements

3 pm Smith and Sutherland sent to Gonzales, 70 mi away, with more pleas

by late afternon, Mex Brigada Avanguardia and cavalry had completely occupied Bexar, and above San Fernand for blood red flag of No Quarter bugle sounded for parley

Travis, "perhaps unfamiliar with MExican Army bugle calls", shot off the 18 lb gun, angering Bowie, who say the red flag as a warning

after the Tex army fired, Mex. fired 4 7-in howitzer bombs into interior of Alamo (didnt hurt anyone)

Bowie sent Green Jameson under flag of truce

p 79 "Bowie explained that the round from the Alamo had been fired before the call for a parley had been heard, and inquired, "I wish, Sir, to ascertain, if it be true that a parley was called...?" While Santa Anna and his staff formally considered a reply to Bowie's message, Jameson conveyed the gist of Bowie's intentions informally to Juan Almonte, Santa Anna's American-educated aide"

p 80 "Travis had fired the cannon without Bowie's knowledge or consent, and now Bowie had attempted to negotiate with the enemy without Travis' knowledge or consent. To assert his authority, Travis sent his own parlementaire to Santa Anna, with an oral message. Albert Martin, a young clerk from New Orleans, never got past Almonte"

Bowie then retired to his bed

Travis began arranging guard routines and assigned different companies to defense sectors (had not been done earlier)

that night, Travis sent men to La Villita, settlement of jacales (daub and wattle huts for the poorest of Bexar), SW of the Alamo; Mex army wasn't there yet; foragers came back with 80 bushels of dried corn, some beans, and addl 30 head of cattle

Only 1500 men of Mex army there with a few pieces of cavalry; SA spent the day inspecting defenses & sent message to rest of his men to hurry

p 81 Gaona several day's march away with First Brigade; 400-500 men and most of the artillery mired in mud S of town SA unsure about Tex strength, so did not want to make immediate assault

"Still not strong enough to impose a proper siege, Santa Anna made sure troops maintained a voluminous, if relatively ineffective harassing fire, while trying to prevent any possible movement of men or supplies into or out of the Alamo. The Texians, in turn, returned the harassing fire, with equal lack of effect. Meanwhile, Santa Anna spent much of his time carefully reconnoitering the defenses, searching out the best places to site new artillery pieces as the guns came up, while trying to determine the points along the outer perimeter which would be most vulnerable to an infantry assault, which he concluded were the northern and western faces of the defenses."

"The first guns were emplaced in two batteries about 1,000 feet from the Alamo on 24 February, each of four guns of mixed calibers. One battery was emplaced along the right bank of the San Antonio River, fronting on the south wall of the Alamo, while the other was more or less directly east of the eastern wall—the front—of the mission. The two batteries together totalled two 8-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 4-pounders, and two 7-inch howitzers. None of the cannon were sufficiently powerful to seriously damage the 30-inch thick stone and adobe walls of the mission quickly. Although the 7-inch howitzers could hurl an explosive bomb over the walls, the interior plaza of the Alamo was rather spacious, and the garrison soon learned to avoid it."

p 83 Feb 25, about 200 Mex infantry " filtered through the jacales of La Villita to emerge only a few dozen yards from the walls. As they charged across that last bit of open ground, the Texians opened a furious fire from their artillery and muskets, beating off the attackers with some loss. This convinced Travis that Santa Anna was planning to site a battery at La Villita, close to the front gate of the Alamo"

that night, Travis sent a raiding party out the main Alamo gate; on the walls, other Tex covered them with musket and cannon fire burned down most of La Villita; 300 men of Matamoros and Jiminez Battalions tried to intervene, but garrison increased fire and raiders were able to retreat back into Alamo

Mex did not know that Tex had reopened the old wall in the Alamo; on Feb 27 they tried to dam an acequia (irrigation canal) that flowed itno Alamo from W Tex shot at them, so some MEx infantry and artillery had to go provide cover after 4 or 5 Mex hit, the rest pulled back

weather unseasonably cold - neither side prepared for the below freezing temps (Mex not used to such cold, tex did not have enough firewood)

". On several nights Santa Anna ordered his regimental bands to serenade his troops and incidentally the men in the Alamo as well"

p 84 a few Tex deserted Travis sent several couriers out (at least 16) Seguin left night of Feb 25-26 to ask Houston for reinforcements; " was a good night to make an attempt to slip out of the Alamo, for the raid on La Villita would offer cover, and the light rain still more. As a result, Seguin, who was accompanied by an aide, Antonio Cruz, had little difficulty in slipping through Mexican lines. Once clear, Seguin and Cruz headed up the Gonzales road at a steady pace. Some miles on they chanced upon a Mexican outpost. It consisted of a few dismounted cavalrymen, who had drawn some brush across the road as it passed through a defile. The two riders came up easily, almost casually. A lookout spotted them and raised a challenge. As several of the troopers sprang to arms, Seguin showed no alarm. He called out reassurances in good educated Spanish. The cavalrymen relaxed, thinking an officer was approaching"

p 86 ... "upon the simple obstacle, Seguin and his man put spurs to horse and were off. The horses easily cleared the loosely piled brush, and raced past the startled cavalrymen, and on into the darkness as a few ragged shots rang out, whistling wide of their marks. The troopers sprang to horse and were up and away almost immediately, but by then it was too late, their quarry had flown, taking advantage of terrain which they knew intimately. A "

32 men under Capt George Kimbell and John W. Smith arrived 1 am on 1 Mar 2 previous Alamo couriers with them - Albert Martin and Charles Despalier

brought garrison to 180-190 men 3-4 Mar, Travis sent John W Smith out again (his third trip)

4 Mar, advance elements of Mex first brigade under Col Francisco Duqye arrived; 980 men of Toluca and Aldama Battalions with Zapadores and 1 7-in howitzer

p 89 Fannin had largest number of Tex troops - over 450 men 25 FEb FAnnin learned that Mex were at San Antonio. The letter from Travis said "''We have removed all our men into the Alamo, where we will make such resistance as is due our honour, and that of the country, until we can get assistance from you, which we expect you to forward immediately. In this extremity, you can send us all the men you can spare promptly"

Fannin ordered army to march with 320 men, 2 6 lb cannon and 2 4 lb cannon not much supplies most men had captured Mex muskets and bayonets, but ammo short (only 1 dozen rounds per man)

p 90 "almost no horses, and had to use oxen to pull not only his supply wagons but also his artillery, which made it impossible for him to move quickly. The men were also poorly clothed and lacked adequate footwear"

p 91 "Some 500–600 men and most of the stores and ammunition from the Alamo and Goliad had been committed to the Matamoros expedition, which was concentrating at Refugio by mid-January. At that time Houston had succeeded in convincing many of the men to abandon the effort."

p 92 "change. The Texians had talked so much and so loudly about the Matamoros operation that Santa Anna could not help but hear of it. As a result, in mid-January the general, then camped with the bulk of his army at Leona Vicario, had dispatched the Cuautla Permanente Cavalry Regiment plus two companies of auxiliares, some 250 cavalrymen, eastwards to Matamoros under the command of Col. Jose Urrea, while ordering the Yucatan Activo Battalion to march northwards from Tampico to Matamoros, dragging a field piece with them. By early February the two columns had linked up at Matamoros. Urrea's instructions were simple: first to ensure the safety of Matamoros and then to carry the war into Texas, advancing northwards along the coast parallel with Santa Anna's own drive from the southwest."

around 10 Feb Refugio learned of Urrea's arrival at Matamoros - Fannin then fell back to Goliad with his men, leaving 150-200 men under Grant and Johnson (both had equal authority and often argued; Grant wanted imm advance, Johnson want to prepare) - did agree to go 50 mi to San Patricio on Nueces R (100 mi north of Matamoros)

by late Feb, after desertions Grant and Johnson had 90-100 men

see p 93 for map of Military operations in Tex in Feb 1836

p 94 3 am on 27 Feb Urrea moved into San Patricio in driving rain with 100 cavalry Johnson had not posted sentries, so no warning; in minutes, Urrea had lost no men, but killed 16 Tex and captured 24 with rest fleeing towards Goliad; prisoners ent to Matamoros and Urrea began searching fro Grant

3 Mar battle of Agua Dulce, 20 mi west of San Patricio; only 25 Tex there;  3 survived, one escaping on the trip to Matamoros

Fannin did not know this took Fannin 72 hrs to get his army ready and marched morning of 28 Feb after 200 yds a wagon broke down so they stopped to fix it; 100 yrds futher 2 more wagons broke  down as prepared to ford the SA river river hish, so oxen could not get the artillery across, men had to move them and this too time by early afternoon men had crossed the river with its quipment but no ammo, so made camp to wait for river to subside (only 1/2 mi from fort) no guard on the oxen, which wandered away in the night to forage

p 95 took most of next day to round up the oxen after 2 days, had not made it even 1 mi from Goliad; Fannin called council of war

"As Fannin and his principal subordinates conferred in the cold, a courier came in with word that a considerable shipment of desperately needed supplies had been landed at Matagorda Bay, where it now lay unguarded. It is the nature of councils of war to make the most conservative decisions. And this one was no different. Concern for the safety of the supplies outweighed the desire to march to the relief of the Alamo. Fannin ordered the army back to Goliad, so that he could organize a column to secure the supplies, after which he would resume the march on San Antonio. However, no sooner were the exhausted men back in Goliad when Col. Frank Johnson rode up with the four other survivors of the battle at San Patricio. The presence of Urrea's troops not 50 miles off was startling enough news, but Johnson also told a wild tale of massacre, asserting that all of the prisoners had been brutally cut down by the Mexicans"

". All thoughts of relieving the Alamo, or, indeed, of securing the mountain of supplies at Matagorda, were abandoned, as Fannin ordered Goliad readied for defense against what he believed was the imminent assault by at least a thousand Mexican troops. Although Travis would deliver several additional appeals for aid to Fannin, the latter would not make reply."

at this point, about 1800 men under arms in Texas - Alamo and Goliad were two biggest concentrations of men

"Houston had gone off to negotiate with the Cherokee in January, and was still at it"

p 96 on 1 Mar, consulation reconvened in Wash on Brazos in an incomplete house with no panes on the windows only 59 delegates made it to the deliberations "were fairly representative of the Texians of the day, most had been born in the United States, and most of them were relatively recent immigrants to Texas"

p 97 2 of the delegates were born in Britain, 3 in Mexico (2 in Texas) 2 Mar declared independence without debate then elected David Burnet as Provisional President and Lorenzo de Zavala provisional BP

p 98 "On 29 February Travis' first communique from the besieged Alamo, that carried out by Sutherland and Smith, had reached Washington-on-Brazos. It caused a stir, and Governor Smith ordered copies distributed to all the towns in Texas, to stimulate recruiting. There was little more that could be done until the Convention met to create a sturdier political structure for Texas"

second courier from Travis arrived 3 Mar "One delegate rose to call upon his colleagues to immediately take up arms and ride for the Alamo. A dozen members leaped to their feet to second his proposal. However, Houston took the floor, to urge calm deliberation. Nothing could succeed unless carefully planned. Texas required time to gather its strength. A provisional government was fine, but a proper constitution had to be drawn up before the government could act with determination"

took 2 weeks to complete the Constitution

p 99 Travis sent Bonham back one more time to talk to FAnnin when Fannin said no, "Bonham announced that he would return himself. Fannin attempted to dissuade him from this course, which would mean certain death. Bonham spat on the ground, said something to the effect that Travis at least deserved a reply, mounted his horse, and headed northwest. Once more riding hard, Bonham reached the Alamo on the morning of 3 March. Approaching from the north, the same route used by the gallant 32 from Gonzales, Bonham slipped easily through the Mexican lines, to enter the Alamo at about 11:00 a.m. Now at last Travis knew that no help was coming."

p 100 most weapons were smoothbore muskets and artillery these muskets "were highly inaccurate, unreliable, and of very short range" some of Tex had rifles, which had longer range but a slower rate of fire Mex Army had "very effective British Baker" rifle British Baker rifle could have a bayonet and fired twice as fast as other military or hunting rifles

p 101 muskets were "Tower Musket, Mark III" also called Brown Bess many of the Tex used these too as theyhad been captured at San Antonio and Goliad from Mex army

at beginning of REvolution, many Tex volunteers had only shot guns; by end of war most of the Tex army used captured Mex weapons, although some used US muskets, which were very similar to the Brown Bess

"In all armies infantry firearms were issued in units called a "stand of arms." This consisted of the musket, a bayonet, belt with ammunition pouches and scabbard, and a small tool kit to clean and service the weapon. The cost at the time of the Texas Revolution appears to have been about $20 for a stand of arms, a considerable sum, equivelent to at least $250–$350 in money of 1991"

p 103 "The Texas War for Independence was essentially an infantryman's war. Artillery, although present, played a relatively minor role, even at the Alamo, where a proper artillery preparation would certainly have greatly reduced Mexican losses"

p 105 "Canister was aptly named, for it was essentially a package which released numerous—50–75—musket balls upon leaving the barrel; grapeshot was similar, but consisted of fewer—9–12—but larger balls "

"All of these weapons, muskets and artillery alike, used black powder. This generated lots of thick white smoke. As a result, after a few rounds everyone was literally shrouded in great clouds, making it difficult to observe one's targets"

p 106 " a cannon was in danger of being captured it was standard policy to "spike" it. This was actually a fairly simple procedure, involving the hammering of an iron spike into the touch hole, rendering the piece temporarily unserviceable. A spiked gun could be repaired, usually by extracting the spike, but, if it was too firmly implanted, by drilling a new touch hole"

p 107 " But such repairs were at best crude; the walls of the Alamo had never been intended to withstand artillery fire, and, light as it was, the Mexican artillery was slowly chipping away at the adobe and stone walls. Some trenches had been dug in the interior to provide fall-back defenses should the enemy pierce the outer perimeter. Ammunition was running low, and the men were reminded to conserve it as much as possible. Supplies of food were dwindling too "

p 108 "On the morning of 4 March Santa Anna received his long awaited reinforcements. Three battalions of the First Infantry Brigade, nearly 1,000 men, came up under Col. Francisco Duque, having been delayed largely because Brig. Gen. Gaona had given the men five day's rest in the face of Santa Anna's orders to make haste. This brought the Mexican strength before the Alamo to some 2,500 men and nine pieces of artillery."

mar 4 staff meeting rest of gaona's men (700 ppl and 5 guns) would arrive Mar 7 or 8, bu sa did not want to wait

"Several of the senior officers did bring up the subject of prisoners, urging that a show of mercy be made. Santa Anna, the "President and Major General," listened attentively. Then he overruled them all, disposing of their objections with various arguments, but ultimately by the force of his authority. As he later put it, "Against the daring foreigners opposing us, the honor of our Nation and our Army is at stake""

p 111 although SA had ordered the troops to rest on March 5, he also ordered that they dig a new trench halfway between existing MEx lines N of Alamo and the Alamo iteself "to provide a line of departure for the assault"

p 112 "the men of the Toluca and San Luis Potosi Battalions spent much of the night entrenching under the direction of the chief of engineers, Capt. Ignacio La Bastica, and his two assistants. This was difficult work, which ought to have been performed by trained sappers, but there were none with the army, and so the task fell to the infantry. Noticing the activity, the Texians brought the Mexican troops under a harassing fire for a time. The men of the Second Column got little rest that night."

Travis had not believed that SA was actually in San ANtonio; when Duque's column arrived it was greeted with cheers of "Viva Santa Anna", and Travis thought that he had just arrived in SA

March 4 night, Mex put several cannon within 250 yds of N face of Alamo - Travis thought that this meant SA making final preparations to storm the Alamo

On Mar 5, Tex. "By an enormous effort, the men managed to pile a mound of earth against the back of the northern wall, strengthening it against cannon fire. The available ammunition was issued, and the men on watch were given two or three additional muskets, to be kept loaded at their posts. Shortly after dusk on the 5th Travis dispatched one final courier, James L. Allen, at 16 apparently the youngest man in the Alamo, with a last appeal to Fannin to send aid."

p 113 both Gen Vicente Filisola and de la Pena "recorded that Travis made an attempt to negotiate through intermediaries in San Antonio, it still being possible for men to pass over the walls and into the town. But Santa Anna spurned the offer, saying there could be "no guarantees for traitors" he demanded nothing less than surrender at discretion. "

night of Mar 5-6 was warm and sky cloudy

p 114 around 4am, Travis went to bed

at midnight, Mex cavalry began to work - readied their mounts and moved into positions along the roads and in the fields around the area by 4 am, the assault columns were ready, abt 200-300 yds from the Alamo walls

p 115 SA and his staff took position bythe north battery, 250 yds from the Alamo shorty after 5 am on Sunday the 6th, "Santa Anna signaled to Bugler Jose Maria Gonzalez of the Zapadores. The "¡Adelante! Forward!" rang out, to be caught and echoed in an instant by all the buglers in the army. Swords in hand, officers screamed "¡Arriba! Attack!" And almost as one, the four columns sprang forward, racing to cross the 200 to 300 yards which separated their points of concentration from the Alamo walls."

p 116 Mex held their fire at first as they charged, but then began shouting Viva Sa and Viva La Republica and began firing - now had empty musekts with no change to reload

Travis reached his post by the 8lb battery on N wall just as first Mex began putting up latters; he emptied his shotgun into the mass below and then fell back injured

Col Duque fell, struck by scap metal, and his men charged right over his body the ladders they had were too flimsy to let more than one or two men on them at a time

p 117 lull once the MEx were bunched around the walls SA then ordered Col Amat's Reserve into action to help Castrillon and Romero at the NW corner

p 118 he then ordered the bugler to play "Deguello", meaning "No mercy" "Col. de la Peña, with the Zapadores, would later write that the call "inspired us to scorn life and to embrace death." "

"changed the front to their right, Cos' men slammed against the northwestern corner of the Alamo, as the cazadores of Morales' Fourth Column continued their oblique movement across the front of the Alamo, taking advantage of the cover offered by the numerous half-burned jacales in the area"

p 119 "Men began to climb the wall. Heroically exposing themselves, the defenders poured down a deadly fire, but Mexican muskets kept up a counter fusillade, sweeping the walls of Texians. And, it must be said, the fire from the Mexican troops still to the rear was galling to their comrades in front for some of them fell, shot in the back by "friendly fire.""

p 120 top of church, Dickinson and her men brought the 12 lbers around to get the troops coming from the N wall - Dickinson let for a moment, ran down to the room his family was huddling in and kissed his wife, then ran back

" Having been repulsed from Crockett's position, the cazadores had moved obliquely across the south face of the Alamo, maintaining excellent discipline as they did. Reaching the southwestern corner of the mission, they stormed the earthen redoubt there, climbing up the rough sides to take the great 18-pounder cannon at the point of the bayonet. Now, the piece secured, they turned it upon the interior of the defenses. As some manned the powerful gun, the balance of the light infantrymen, Col. Morales at their head, stormed into the courtyard " Mex troops now coming in at 3 sides of the Alamo (N, NW, and SW) Tex had held the fort for 45 min after the attack, then fell back as Travis planned - first for the entrenchments, then for the buildings

Sue said that she saw Crockett briefly enter the chapel to mutter a prayer, then pulled his men from the palisade on the S side p121 to cover the low wall that divided the cemetery from the main plaza; his men began to fall back towards teh hospital but were trapped against the wall and fought in hand to hand combat

p 122 2-3 men in a room (or all alone) in barracks, hospital, and other men some men retreated from room to room

some tried to surrender, but still killed sun came up about 6 am, and then a struggle on the roof otf the Long Barracks - flag

"Col. de la Peña noted that at least five men were seen to flee over the walls. Finally, only Almeron Dickinson's post in the chapel remained, from whence the 12-pounders still poured death into the courtyard"

Col Juan Morales and the 4th Column dragged the captured 18 lber p 123 and opened fire on thefront entrance of the chapel when the countering fire from the chapel lessened, the light companies of the Matamoros and Jimenez Battalions (now under 50 men total) stormed in with bayonets

Sue Dickinson lightly wounded; women and children then offered protection

as the firing stopped, SA entered the mission "Near the front of the church General Fernandez Castrillon came up to report that several of the defenders had been mistakenly taken alive, a pathetic half dozen men, one a mere boy, another a bent and aged man. Fernandez Castrillon suggested that perhaps a show of mercy might be in order. Angrily Santa Anna demurred, his instructions had been that no prisoners be taken and he ordered the men slain immediately"

just past 7 am now

p 126 Joe had been wounded but was spared because he was a slave (Sam, Bowie's freedman, also spared)

a number of bodies found in the fields to the N of the Alamo - men who escaped but were cut down by the cavalry

Before SA released Sue, he paraded the army in her honor so tthat she would spread word of its strength to the other Texians

p 133 "Casualties  			Texans Mexican Mexican Eyewitnessess Killed Total (K/MW) Col. Juan Almonte 250 288 (65) BGen. Juan Andrade * 311 (260) Sgt. Francisco Becerra * 2300 (2000)  Ramon Maritnez Caro   182 400+ (400) MGen. Vicente Filisola 182–202 311 (60) Col. Jose de la Peña 253 313 (60) Col. Jose Sanchez Navarro 257 387 (121) MGen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, 1836 606 370 (70) MGen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, 1874 * 1000 (*) Other Eyewitnesses     Dr. John Bernard * 500–700 (300–400) Anselmo Borgara * 521 (*) Pablo Diaz * 6000 (*) Susanna Dickinson 160+ 1600 (*) Francisco Ruiz 182 1600 (*) An asterisk (*) indicates that no figure was given. K/MW means "killed or mortally wounded." "

p 135 "which incurred some losses picking off fugitives fleeing the cattle pen and the gunners. The actual figure appears to have been over 300 but probably not more than about 400, including men killed outright or mortally wounded, and those who died from less severe wounds which went untreated since Santa Anna had neglected to bring any medical personnel along on the expedition, but excluding those men who died from disease or exposure, both among the troops present at the time of the assault and among those who arrived over the next few days."

"   The critical witness in the matter of Mexican combat casualties at the Alamo is certainly Filisola, who gives a detailed breakdown of the casualties by unit:  Regiment Engaged K/MW Wounded Surviving Aldama 340 11 46 283 Dolores Cavalry 285 1 3 281 Jimenez 275 9 25 241 Matamoros 275 7 37 231 San Luis Potosi 275 9 37 239 Toluca 320 20 79 221 Zapadores 185 3 24 158 Total 1955 60 251 1644 "

p 136 "So it seems reasonable to conclude that the Mexican Army's battle deaths at the Alamo numbered at least 300 and possibly somewhat in excess of 400."

p 137 "The fall of the Alamo found the defenses of Texas in disarray. Had Santa Anna moved immediately he would have found the Texians largely incapable of defending themselves"

SA had only about half of his army with him, and they needed rest after the Alamo fell, SA sent out his cavalry to find hte enemy and to forage for supplies; Urrea to continue advancing up the coast

Texas now had about 1100 to 1300 men under arms; almost 500 at Goliad with Fannin, 275 at Gonzales, 200 at Matagorda, and about 300-400 in small militias around the nation

p 138 " At about 4:00 in the afternoon two Tejanos arrived in town, Andres Barcenas, a rancher, and Anselmo Bergaras, one of Seguin's men, fleeing Santa Anna's cavalry patrols. A day or two previously they had spoken with a man who had just come from San Antonio, and he had told them a chilling tale: the Alamo was fallen and all within it slain, plus 521 Mexicans as well."

", the details which they provided would be confirmed later, even down to the execution of the handful of prisoners and the mass cremation of the dead, though the identity of their informant, also a Tejano, would never be established. T"

on Mar 12, Houston created the 1st Texas Volunteer Regiment, with Burleson in Command and lt Col Sidney Sherman as second in command

p 139 "The story told by Mrs. Dickinson and the others sparked contradictory reactions among the men; some despaired, others panicked, and still others demanded to be led immediately against the enemy. Houston ordered a general retreat"

midnight on March 13 the 1st Texas, now about 400 men, pulled out of Gonzales, accompanies by many of the women and children of Gonzales whose men had died at the Alamo

"When Houston's orders to evacuate Goliad came through on 12 March, he wasted time trying to get the local settlers moving, rather than just announcing he was pulling out, which probably would have worked wonders toward sparking a panicked flight from the area. "

p 140 "Unwilling to attempt a stand in the ruined mission at Refugio, later that same night Ward ordered his men to escape as best they could, taking advantage of a driving rainstorm. Urrea pursued, and managed to sweep up most of the fugitives. By this time Urrea found himself burdened with prisoners. Although reluctant to do so, his officers pressed him to execute the lot in obedience of Santa Anna's "no quarter" orders. He compromised, ordering that all prisoners who were Mexican citizens be sent to the rear for trial, he had the rest shot. As the prisoners were being readied for the appropriate disposition, Urrea took the bulk of his troops and headed for Goliad, where Fannin was still idling away the days."

Ward reached Goliad on 16 Mar; Fannin called a council or war which debated for a while and then said to retreat

". Unlike the Alamo, the post at Goliad, Presidio La Bahia, had been constructed as a military installation. The presidio stood atop a prominent hill. Built of stone, the roughly square fort had full bastions on two corners and small guard posts on the other two. The walls, which had proper parapets and embrasures, were between eight and ten feet high, and enclosed an area of about 3.5 acres; a good deal larger than the area of the Alamo, but as the plan of the post was square, the trace of the walls was actually not much greater than that of the Alamo"

p 141 Urrea down to about 500 men after casualties and some men providing escorts for prisoners Fannin had more artillery (12) than Urrea (1) half of Urrea's men were seasoned cavalry

"In preparation for the retreat, Fannin ordered the heaviest pieces of artillery dismounted and buried. Then he changed his mind and decided not to retreat, and so ordered the pieces dug up again. Then he once more changed his mind."

rainny morning of Mar 18 Fannin ready to go, with oxen hitched; then saw a MEx cavalry patrol; Fannin sent Col Albert C Horton with his cavalry to drive them off - they took turns chasing each other for a whlie;  Fannin's men lined the walls to watch - neglected to feed or water the oxen, so Fannin ordered the retreat to be postponed a day

p 142 during the night, Fannin's men demolished large parts of the fortress and burned any supplies they couldn't take with them; left at 9 am on 19 Mar towards Victoria

weather meant Urrea's patrols left late, and did not get to presidio until late morning; then learned that Fannin gone

"Fannin's retreat was badly conducted" Took too much artillery and let men bring all of their personal possesions; forgot food and fodder for oxen;  within ours, everyone exhausted and it was hot

7 mi from Goliad they rested, but then Horton's cavalry, who were covering the rear, came to say that Mex patrols were only 4-5 mi behind Fannin said let's go, but 2 mi later the oxen began to fall; Fannin ordered a halt 1 mi from Coleto Creek over the protests of his officers

" As a result, the army took up a position in a slight hollow on the open prairie with no natural cover and no water. Urrea's men were soon upon them. "

p 143 "Urrea's troopers began to harass the Texian camp, aided by occasional balls from his lone 4-pounder. Texian response was feeble. Fannin managed to get his men moving towards the creek, but they barely made it half way before going to ground again, under the harassing fire of the Mexican troops. Although they had more artillery than did Urrea, the Texian fire was slow, there being no water to sponge the pieces between shots; worse, the only trained gunner with them fell wounded. Urrea also made several errors. Anxious to get the business over with, he attempted several frontal attacks, both with cavalry and infantry, which the Texians were able to beat off. Finally he decided to let time do his work for him, and called off the attacks."

Tex began to run out of ammo and food and no water daylight on 20 Mar Finn asked for terms, but agreed to surrender "at discretion" Urrea arranged for care for the wounded - Texian medical personnel treated both Tex and MExicans

"A few of the prisoners were shipped southward under light escort. A few others were brought in: men from Refugio and other small actions, including a party of volunteers from Tennessee who had landed at Copano Bay a few days earlier, thinking it was still in Texian hands, only to be scooped by one of Urrea's patrols."

27 Mar Urrea got orders that all 442 prisoners to be exected

"Urrea saved those few he could, the medical personnel, with the excuse that he needed them to tend his wounded, and those already shipped out. Among those saved were Dr. Benjamin Harrison, the son and father of future Presidents of the United States," - this not reflected on WP

p 144 "Other men were saved by the individual acts of brave officers and a brave woman, Sra. Francisca Alvarez, wife of a Mexican officer. But most were doomed; on that Palm Sunday 342 men were taken down a road a little ways and shot. Fannin was taken back to Goliad, and shot there."

on 14 March, SA sent Gaona with the 1st Frigade to the NW, to get the area between Bexar and the Colorado R, then turn SE to go down right side of Brazos Urrea reinforced with several battalion of infantry and told to continue along coast SA and rest of army left Bexar on 29 Mar and went E towards Gonzales to find and crush the main Tex army

the 3 columns to meet along lower Brazos in late April and press E to the Sabine River

". Houston kept his men well in hand, while constantly sending out "Deaf" Smith and other fine scouts to keep him apprised of the whereabouts of the Mexican Army. As a result, at no time did the Mexican columns ever approach the main body of Texian forces. Flying before the retreating army, panicked crowds of settlers—and the new government of Texas—headed for the relative safety of East Texas"

p 145 "Houston's army grew by fits and starts. It lost strength as some men deserted to go to the aid of their families. Nevertheless, overall strength rose, as new volunteers arrived from the United States. By 26 March, when Houston reached the Colorado River, he had about 1,200 men. Over the next few days there were many desertions, and Houston was forced to assign some troops to help cover the flight of the settlers, among them Juan Seguin's mounted Tejanos, so that on 30 March, when he reached the Brazos River at Groce's Ferry, he had only about 800 men with hi"

12 days at Groce's crossing, organizing the 2nd Texas Voluntee Regiment - now uner Sherman 2-- deserters form US ARmy of Observation along the Sabine joined them and beame the Texas Regular Battalion

"The men were good and tough, but disliked discipline, and were openly contemptuous of Houston's unwillingness to lead them into action immediately."

" confident was Santa Anna that he proposed returning home to take other matters in hand, but his officers convinced him to see the business through. They pressed on. The troops, though tired, were in good spirits."

p 146 SA went ahead tih the vanguard (600-700 men) 18 Apr SA arrived at New Washington, small community on San Jacinto River main body under Gen Filisola was 45 mi behind, at Fort Bend Houston, with 1200 men, at Harrisburg 30 mi awat

"On 18 April "Deaf" Smith—who could not hear very well but could out-track anyone—had intercepted Capt. Miguel Bachiller, who was serving as a courier. In saddle bags stamped "W. B. Travis," Smith found dispatches for Santa Anna from Filisola. These gave full details as to the deployment and strength of the army, including the probability that Santa Anna would be reinforced by some 600 additional troops under Martin Cos within a few days."

19 April Houston crossed Buffalo Bayou 20 April went to "to the plain of the San Jacinto, where that river runs into the bayou, not a dozen miles from Santa Anna at New Washington. Santa Anna spent two days at New Washington, gathering food, including 100 beeves that were rounded up by the lancers of his escort. On the morning of 20 April he ordered the town burned and marched northwards towards the San Jacinto plain. About 2:00 p.m. the outposts of the two armies began a desultory skirmish, with the lancers of Santa Anna's escort and the granaderos of the Toluca Battalion, supported by the single Mexican gun, tangling with some Texian cavalry supported by their own artillery"

towards evening Mex pulled back; a few wounded on each side

start page 149 (chapter "Remember the Alamo")

p 210 "the literature on the Alamo is voluminous" the earliest comprehensive work is Reuben Marmaduke Potters The fAll of the Alamo, published in The Magazine of American History in 1878 - he interviewed most of the Tex survivors

p 211 "Considering how few people were actually involved, the number of diaries, memoirs, and personal accounts of the War of the Texas Revolution is remarkable. Both sides are well represented"

Jose Enrique de la Pena, Santa Anna, Juan N. Almonte, Francisco becerra, vicente filisola and jose juan sanchez navarro all left behind memoirs

p 212 Juan Seguin and JOhn Sutherland left memoirs later

p 213 "The earliest Alamo movie was The Immortal Alamo, filmed in San Antonio by Gaston Melies, brother of the famed French film pioneer George Melies. In this pioneering work, which is lost save for some stills,"

a 1915 movie, D.W. Griffith's The Heroes of the Alamo was thought lost but restored in 1988 other films in the next 4 decades focused on Davy Crockett, Almeron Dickinson, and Louis Rose.

"Walt Disney's Davy Crockett: King of the Wild Frontier (1955), was the first television Alamo. Staring Fess Parker, it repeated most of the myths, and created a few new ones, such as the "good Indian" who chose to die at Crockett's side."

"Last Command (1955) is probably artistically the best of all the Alamo films"

13 days to glory possible most historically correct of the films

p 215 "Rather than merely preserve what is left of the Alamo, the D.R.T. have established a fairly good library and archive devoted to the Texas Revolution, with specific reference to the defense of the Alamo"