Talk:Texas Revolution/Scott

first part
p 60 Fannin believed he and not Houston was commander in chief most of Consultation went home after Christmas; those that were left  passed a resolution Jan 7 1836 that said "  Be it resolved by the General Council of the Provisional Government of Texas, that J. W. Fannin be and is hereby appointed and empowered as an agency, for and in behalf of the Provisional Government of Texas, to raise, collect, and concentrate, at or near the Port of Copano, as convenience and safety will admit, all volunteer troops willing to enter into an expedition against Matamoros " did nothave the min number of delegates in atendance

p 61 Fannin began preparing to invade Mexico and decided to makehis base camp at San PAtricia, 70 mi S of Goliad

Houston confused - still thought he was in charge since Consultation did not have a quorum

p 62 Grant and Johnson also thought they were commander in chief

p 63 Grant and Johnson agreed to cooperate and joined up in REfugio Johnson the senior officer b/c had more experience together had 300 men

25 N of Refugio in Goliad, Fannin ignored Johnson and Grant Fannin and Houston had both heard rumors that SA was preparing an army alon gthe Rio Grande

p 64 Henry Smith ordered Houston to go to Refugio and stop the Johnson-Grant invasion (and ignore he consultation) - Houston to try to unify all the armies and prepare for a Mexican assault

Houston wanted to build a "line of defense along the San ANtonio River/ The river roughly parallelled the key highway running from Bexar to the Gulf Coast.  The defensive position would be anchored ont he west by the Alamo, on the east by Copano Bay, and its strong point would be the fort at Goliad"

Houston gave a speech to 200 of Johnson/Grant's men

p 65 H's words "You aim to take Matamoros. I praise your courage, but I must candidly tell my friends that this plan does not please me. I see no advantage that can emanate from it. I see only an unnecessary sacrifice of the blood of Texans for a town that can have no value for us, and that lies beyond the border of our territory. Shall it be done to injure the enemy? Let us await him and his forces, fatigued by long marches and privations, and let him feel the work of our guns"

many of them agreed to leave with Houston and join his new army others anxious for an immediate fight Johnson angry b/c he said Houston had no right to call his troops together and talk to them

p 66 Houston told Johnson that the Tex armies had to unite to stop a Mex invasion

"The pro-Mexico Hispanics soon organized themselves and became known as the Victorian Guardes. They formed an effective fifth column and began spying on the Texas Consultation, its various army commanders, and its citizens. Over a period of several weeks, this underground movement recruited and trained several hundred civilian spies and regularly fed important information to Mexican commanders. Every move made by Houston, Fannin, Johnson, and Grant was faithfully reported to Santa Anna"

p 67 RCC heavily in favor of remaining with Catholic Mexico; priests encouraged their flocks to resist the independence movement and served as spies

p 68 after leaving Johnson and Grant, houston sent his message to Bowie to look at the Alamo Pres Smith then warned Houston that hostile Indians (Cherokee) preparing to attack several Tex communities, incl Nacogdoches - also reports that the Victorian Guardes were trying to convince the Indians to keep up the attacks

Houston went to Nacogdoches - held a day long meeting on Feb 5 with Cherokee leaders outside Nacogdoches

"During that meeting Houston told the Indians that if they would refrain from attacking the white Texas settlements and would not assist the Mexicans in any of their attacks, the Texas legislature would pass laws recognizing several long-standing Cherokee claims to vast tracts of land in east Texas. The Indians agreed to these terms, kept their promise, and were never a factor in the ensuing conflict"

p 69 after the Revolution, "the new Texas legislature flatly rejected Houston's plan, saying that the general had no authority to negotiate with or make promises to the Cherokees!"

"Because of his experience and training, Santa Anna considered himself the western world's only qualified military leader"

"Santa Anna used his private army to crush the old Mexican army and seize the dictatorship in the first place, and then on three subsequent occasions he used brutal force to crush military uprisings against his regime. "

p 70 SA saw Cos's surrender as hurting Mexico's honor Thousands of Mexican men sent to San Luis Potosi for training, along with hundreds of Mayan Indians in the Yucatan who were kidnapped and pressed into service - "The Indians were not to become soldiers in the normal sense of the word; they were to serve as Santa Anna's shock troops—the first men sent into each battle to test the strength of the enemy."

RCC loaned SA money to finance his war in Texas

Dec 7, 1857, SA sent letter to Gen Joaquin Ramirez y Sesma, "Foreigners who wage war against the Mexican Nation have violated all laws and do not deserve any consideration, and for that reason, no quarter will be given them as the troops are to be notified at the proper time. [These foreigners] have audaciously declared a war of extermination to the Mexicans, and should be treated in the same manner"

p 71 3 weeks after the letter, Mex Congress passed a resolution saying "Foreigners landing on the coast of the Republic or invading its territory by land, armed, and with the intent of attacking our country, will be deemed pirates and dealt with as such, being citizens of no nation presently at war with the Republic and fighting under no recognized flag. All foreigners who shall import, by either sea or land, in the places occupied by the rebels, either arms or ammunition or any kind for their use, will be deemed pirates and punished as such "

in this time period, captured pirates were generally executed immediately

p 73 SA did not issue blankets or coats to most of his troops nor have heavy uniforms for them " Santa Anna shrugged off the superior firepower of the Texans by claiming that his great knowledge of tactics would more than offset the advantage afforded the Texans by virtue of their weapons"

p 74 Despite loan from RCC, Mex govt almost bankrupt; SA and his govt were corrups Mex troops on half rations starting while training - never had enough food during Texas campaign did not purchase or pack any medical supplies and no doctor

"The president and commander in chief of Mexico decided the best way to shore up his reputation among his people and head off potential new trouble was to personally lead a triumphant campaign against the revolutionaries in the north"

"As he prepared to launch his counterattack into Texas, Santa Anna took time to send a strongly worded warning to the government of the United States. Andrew Jackson and the United States Congress were actively encouraging the Texas independence movement. President Jackson was known to be a close personal friend to Sam Houston, one of the leading emerging political leaders of Texas. Santa Anna's letter to the United States White House warned that "any American or other foreign citizen" who"

p 75 pirate letter was printed in at least one NY newspaper, but not widely distributed; mnost recruits probably did not know of it

p 76 Feb 7, 1836 Fannin wrote to gov Robinson that very few Texas residents had joined the armies - almost all of his recruits (as well as those who had already fought) were US citizens

p 77 no response to his letter Feb 17 at 8 am, SA and his 6000 troops began crossing Rio Grande; by noon were on N bank and made their way N for Bexar and the Alamo

"Hundreds of Americans living on ranches in deep south Texas began racing northward in panic just ahead of the approaching Mexican army. A few lingered nearby long enough to watch as invading soldiers ransacked and sometimes burned their abandoned homes"

p 78 Feb 6 Fannin got word that Urrea preparing to cross the Rio Grande with 1000 soldiers gathered at Matamoros and that his plan was to march to Goliad while main body attacked Alamo Fannin finally decided not to invade Mexico

p 79 "Fannin set his men to work making the fort ready to withstand a direct Mexican assault. Although the Bahia was already a formidable structure, Fannin's troops soon made it stronger. They constructed a ten-foot stone wall around the perimeter of the garrison, completed cannon mounts at each corner of the compound, and placed nine other cannons in strategic positions to defend the fort. They also dug a freshwater trench from the interior of the compound down to the nearby San Antonio River so that fresh water came right into the fort—a serious consideration should the presidio be surrounded and besieged." then renamed the fort "Fort Defiance"

Feb 11, Travis arrived at Bexar to relieve Col Neill "Neill warned Travis that Bowie—somehow unaware of the approaching Mexican army—planned to leave the Alamo the following day and was going to take with him all of his followers. If he did so, nearly half of the men on hand for the defense of Bexar would be gone from San Antonio just when the battle began. Travis had to act quickly.    That evening, Travis and Bowie met privately for several hours. When they emerged from their private meeting sometime after midnight, Travis announced that he and Bowie would be equally in command of forces and equal decision-makers at the Alamo. Bowie, in turn, pledged his full support to Travis and to General Sam Houston and to the defense of Bexar from "whatever enemy forces might be coming our way "

p 80 "On several different occasions, Houston suggested to Travis and to President Smith that the best plan of action might simply be to blow up the Alamo and pull all forces back to Gonzales, which he considered a more defensible point. There is no indication that anyone ever responded to these suggestions, and, possibly to his later dismay, Houston never actually issued an order to destroy or abandon the Alamo."

when Fannin got Travis's first missive, he said none of his 400 men were leaving -- all needed to defend Fort Defiance Fannin even questioned whether Houston had the authority to direct any military forces

p 81 "Many Texans still had no idea of the seriousness of Santa Anna's planned response to his recent defeats or of his rapid movement northward. The disinterest in Travis' appeal also probably reflected citizen disdain for the various Texas "governments" and the conflicting orders and instructions each was issuing."

SA's troops had to move more slowly when the weather turned nasty cold (250 miles from Rio Grande to Alamo)

p 82 7:32 am Feb 23 "A guard standing watch on the southeast corner of the Alamo's wall spotted a column of Mexican soldiers approaching from the south. His shouted alarm sent about one hundred forty defenders scrambling for defensive positions throughout the Alamo. Within an hour, the first line of Mexican soldiers was less than a mile away, in plain sight. The Mexicans sat astride their horses, facing the fort, and showed no apparent concern. They also showed no evidence of being in any hurry. The Mexicans simply sat on their horses and waited, as the nervous Texans watched. Several hours passed. By noon, several hundred Mexican foot soldiers had arrived and were loosely surrounding the Alamo, but still they made no effort to approach it."

Crockett had a diary that survived

"  The cannon fire was the result of bad timing and poor judgement, and it has been the subject of great confusion over the years. As Mexican troops moved into place, the Americans decided to fire their cannon in the general direction of the Mexicans, just to show their defiant spirit. By sheer coincidence, the cannon was fired at the precise moment that Santa Anna hoisted a white flag. The Mexican leader planned to confer with the Alamo defenders and tell them it was useless to resist and they might as well surrender. Santa Anna interpreted the cannon shot at that moment as all-out defiance. "

p 84 "Santa Anna later claimed it was the Texans who raised the flag and said he had to restrain his troops while permitting a delegate to meet with the Texas messengers. Santa Anna says the Texans begged for an opportunity to surrender, but that he refused them the opportunity. Enough diaries survive from both sides to know that the Mexican version of this incident is untrue"

SA planned to use his artillery to level the Alamo and then shoot the survivors by the end of the day realized that the Alamo walls were too strong for that to work quickly so instead he decided to order the artillery to fire constantly, day and night, to weaken them by making them tired

p 86 the famous letter- "The impassioned appeal finally focused the attention of the world on the Alamo. It stirred heartfelt sympathy, but surprisingly it did not trigger much of a response from Texans. Local residents may have been still confused over who was in charge of what, and many agonized over whether the territory should even be fighting for independence in the first place. Even in Texas, however, Travis' letter drew attention to the pitiful plight of the little group of brave men defending the Alamo. The letter was printed in newspapers throughout North America and Europe. "

p 89 after Fannin and his men took over Ft Defiance, Tex often laughed at MEx, who gave up the fort with "only token resistance. There was also a great deal of ridicule over the perceived cowardice and inabilities of the Mexican army."

Fannin spent most of his time alone in his quarters men bored, so in the evenings they went into Goliad and drank a lot and caused problems

p 90 locals angry with the brawls and insults to women, and many Hispanic families left the area to avoid the Tex and American soldiers "to say, this created resentment and anger among the villagers, and the bitterness would soon have disastrous consequences for Colonel Fannin's command!"

p 91 many of the Goliad citizens who left were angry at the insults FAnnin's men had offered many of the families moved downriver 10 mi to rance of Carlos de la Garza, who was pro-Mexican govt; he convinced the families to serve as spies and saboteurs

"By the time the Mexican army actually crossed the Rio Grande, the Guardes had established a highly efficient intelligence network and were passing along considerable information regarding the number and disposition of Texas troops, their units, the strength of their armament, and other valuable information."

p 92 400 soldiers at Ft defiance, incl several entire units from US who has retained their company structure when joined Tex army Wm Ward led the largest of these battalions (from Ga)

p 93 Ward named 2nd in command of Ft Defiance "Other groups of American volunteers at Fort Defiance included the New Orleans Grays, the Louisiana Grays, and the Alabama Red Rovers. Each of these units consisted of about thirty to fifty young men who had come to Texas specifically to help the Texans fight a war that most Texans still were not certain they wanted!"

initially, Fannin had his men undergo drills and rifle practice during this time, Capt John Sowers Brooks, who had served as year with the US MC and "had been an engineer in civilian life, devised a death machine that consisted of sixty-eight captured Mexican muskets, mounted on a wooden frame and rigged so that they could all be fired simultaneously by lighting a single fuse. Brooks' plan was to trigger the device if Mexican shock troops rushed the fort during some future encounter. So far as is known, the weapon was never fired."

as time passed, men didn't care about training anymore; food supplies ran short govt had no money

p 94 by early Jan Fannin had rumors that 3 separate Mex armies were heading to Texas when he heard from refugees from south Texas towns that one army was headed his way, he gave up plans of going to Matamoros

p 95 Fannin "confided to his closest friends that Sam Houston really was better prepared for the commander's role than he was. Some thought Fannin was on the verge of offering his resignation to clear the way for Houston's unchallenged leadership. The problem was that a resignation required action, and Fannin had already shown that he rarely took action on anything!"

by mid Feb, decided he would just wiat and see what happened "In a letter penned on Valentine's Day, Fannin indicated openly that he was willing—for the first time—to subject himself to the command of Sam Houston. His letter to Governor Robinson said,  I hope soon to receive some intelligence from General Houston, and to see him at the head of the army. I am delicately situated, having not received any orders from him... 4 "

p 96 "Although a good many Texans clung to the belief that Houston already was the commander in chief, and was acting as such, Fannin (and much of the Consultation) still believed that it was James W. Fannin who had the official government authority to be commander in chief. The colonel also somehow came to the surprising conclusion that Houston was on some kind of voluntary leave of absence, possibly because of confusion over the various appointments of the Consultancy. While Houston was actually up in Nacogdoches negotiating with Cherokee Indian leaders to make certain they would not attack local colonists or give aid to the Mexicans, Fannin was writing several letters demanding to know why Houston was ''on vacation" at so critical a moment. "

p 97 "Not content to wait for a reply nor to take any direct action on his own, Fannin was now writing letters all day long. Many of them—sometimes three or four a day—went to his friend Governor Robinson. Almost all of the letters asked that he be relieved of his command and that someone else be made responsible for making military decisions. Governor Robinson for the most part did not respond to Fannin's letters; he appeared just as confused and caught up in indecision as did his commander in chief. Paralyzed with dread and fear, worried over past decisions and errors, Colonel Fannin, Governor Robinson, and the Texas Consultation for the most part did nothing"

p 98 ". At 10 A.M. on February 25, 1836, Fannin actually ordered his men to prepare for battle"

p 99 "There is a strong suggestion that the Alamo rescue effort was not Fannin's idea, and that he finally decided to launch such an effort only in response to continued pressure from his officers and men. Researcher Robyn Andres says Fannin decided to make the rescue trip to San Antonio only after repeated demands and possibly even threats from his officers"

80 men would stay behind took 2 days to prepare to t ravel the 85 mi to Bexar

12:07 pm on Sat, Feb 27 Fannin and about 300 volunteers marched out of Ft Defiance

p 100 SA River a few hundred yds from the fort took 6 hours to cross the waist-deep water getting dark when they were all across, so they made camp that night, a cold front swept in - heavy rain soldiers did not have enough clothing, and were "quickly chilled and miserable"

"Colonel Fannin later wrote a letter to Governor Robinson in which he seemed to say that at dawn his officers approached him and suggested the Alamo rescue trip be canceled. According to Fannin, the officers were now unanimously of the opinion that it would be a major military blunder to leave Fort Defiance without the bulk of her manpower, when an army under General Urrea was known to be heading toward Goliad. The consensus among the officers, Fannin claimed, was that the Alamo was probably already surrounded and therefore already lost, and that to try to rescue the men there would be committing suicide and would accomplish nothing of significance."

p 101 "The officers (and men) under Fannin say it was the colonel who alone reached the decision to give up the Alamo rescue trip, and that he did so without consulting anyone"

Dr. Barnard wrote in his journal "With but three or four hundred men, mostly on foot, with but a limited supply of provisions, to march a distance of nearly one-hundred miles through uninhabited country for the purpose of relieving a fortress beleaguered by five-thousand men was madness!"

p 102 8:30 am on Feb 27 began recrossing the river second time to cross took less than 3 hrs (1/2 the time of day before)

several Hispanic civilians had seen the debacle and "within hours information had reached Santa Anna that Fannin and three hundred or so of his men were on their way from Goliad to assist at the Alamo." SA ordered Almonte and 800 dragoons to intercept them

"By early afternoon on Saturday Santa Anna learned that Fannin had abandoned the rescue effort, and General Almonte was ordered to return to Bexar to help in attacking the Alamo. " (Sat was day after they left)

p 107 in meantime, Grant was drilling the soldiers Johnson had rrecruit often went on "procurement raids", stealing supplies from Mex-owned ranches around refugio

p 108 on Thur, Feb 25, Johnson and 40 men rode to San Patricio to recruit more toops "Patricio was settled almost exclusively by Mexican citizens, most of whom remained completely loyal to Santa Anna and many of whom were members of the Victorian Guardes!"

by 10 pm, Johnson and his men had bedded down - most housed in large barn near center of town a few officers were staying in private homes

at 6 pm, Urrea had made camp 5 mi south of San Patricio and sent out scouting parties; they returned around 10 pm to say that there were enemy troops in the town

p 109 "To minimize the chances of a friend being hurt, Urrea ordered three of his officers, dressed as civilians, to enter the town. They were to find out exactly what was going on there. If possible, the spies were to seek out loyalists in the village, learn from them the exact whereabouts of the Texans and Americans, and to also warn the loyalists to stay out of harm's way."

spies were to tell loyalists to leave a lantern burning in the window of their homes all night - Mex troops would avoid those houses and attack those without lanterns

by midnight the spies were back - knew that Johnson's men in only 4 or 5 building and said many loyalists were now leaving town to be out of the way

troops roused - by 3 am in San Patricia

"Colonel Johnson and three of his officers—Lieutenant Daniel Toler and Sergeants Love and Miller—were still in a planning session in a small house at the west end of town." - by chance, still working and left lanterns burning

p 110 Mex soldiers had been told that US soldiers were in building, but lanterns were burning; they knocked to see who answered at the same moment, gunfire down the street as barn attacked - Lt Toler looked out window and saw uniformed soldiers on porch Toler inquired in Spanish who was there - said he would open the door, but no Americans gunfire in the street, so soldiers at back of the house raced around to front - the 4 Tex imm dashed out back door; only 4 Tex to escape alive

37 Tex killed or captured in next 15 min, some still sleeping

p 111 diary of Creed Taylor said 11 Tex killed outright, 5 had mortal wounds, and rest taken prisoner half a dozen local cits who had helped Johnson's men were executed in middle of town- although a few taken to Urrea and questioned, but all were dead within 72 hrs

diary of Pena says 1 Mex dead and 4 wounded Urrea had brought < 100 cavalrymen

p 113 Johnson hid during the day, then borrowed a horse from a sympathizer and rode the 75 mi back to Goliad, arriving midmorning Feb 28 "Johnson reported that his "entire command" had been wiped out by the advancing Mexican army. He reported hearing rumors that several of his men had been captured alive, but that all were executed a short time later. Johnson added that some of the men who were tortured and executed had first been wounded, then dragged into the street and publicly shot to death. Several other Americans surrendered and asked to be taken prisoners of war. They, too, were immediately executed. Johnson said he heard that a handful of his men had been taken alive back to General Urrea's camp, but there were reports that they were also subsequently killed, some of them after being brutally tortured. "

p 114 Johnson said he had posten no sentires b/c weather was cold and men did not have warm clothes Also, believed Grant to be in front of him and would have notified them of troops after writing a report of the battle, he gave it to FAnnin and left and didn't participate further in the war

p 115 "At the time Colonel Johnson and his recruiters rode into San Patricio on February 25, Colonel/Doctor Grant and about forty-seven other volunteers were out scouring the countryside "procuring" extra horses they needed for the planned Mexican campaign. They had heard that several ranches owned by pro-Mexico Hispanics were in the area, and from them Grant intended to steal his horses. A Mexican-Texan in Grant's group of volunteers, Placido Benavides, who was now a captain in the Texas army, led this search for horses. Benavides, accompanied by Colonel Grant and Reuben Brown, was riding some distance ahead of the approximately forty-four other men in the raiding party"

main boy of Grant's men leisurely riding along banks of Agua Dulce Creek, just N of Kingsville today - could not see the 3 in front as main group entered a small draw, Mex opened fire - Many of Tex troops did not have time to "unlimber their rifles"

3 in front heard gunfire and raced back

p 116 Brown's words later "My horse was quickly killed with a lance, but [Doctor] Grant told me to mount Major Morris' horse, as Morris had just been killed. Just at that moment, the horses took a stampede, and Grant and myself, finding ourselves then the only survivors of our party, followed in the wake of the horses, the dragoons shooting after us and wounding our horses in several places.   After we had run six or seven miles, they surrounded us, when, seeing no further chance of escape, we dismounted, determined to make them pay dearly for our lives. As I reached the ground, a Mexican lanced me in the arm, but Grant immediately shot him dead, when I seized his lance to defend myself.  Just as [Grant] shot the Mexican, I saw Grant fall, pierced with several lances, and a moment after I found myself fast in a lasso that had been thrown over me, and by which I was dragged to the ground. After Grant fell, I saw ten or a dozen Mexican officers go up and run their swords through his body. He was well known to them, having lived a long time in Mexico. They had a bitter grudge against him. I was taken out to be shot, but was spared through the interposition of a priest and a Mexican lady named Alvorez "

Pena's diary said 42 Americans died here Urrea had wanted Grant to be captured alive, but a Mex officer killed him so as to steal Grant's horse, saddle, pistols, and personal jewelry

p 117 "In his own diary, General Urrea says local pro-Mexican civilian spies—most likely members of the Victorian Guardes—had notified him as to Grant's exact location, the number of men in his party, and other details that made it easy to surprise the Americans"

battle took place between 10 - 11 am Urrea said 41 Tex died, 6 taken prisoner

the lady was Panchita Alavez, who was the soldadera of Mex capt Telesforo Alavez (he had a real wife back home)

p 118 Alavez saved over 100 Tex over next 6 weeks survivors of this battle were Benavides, Randolph de Spain, William Gatlin, David Moses, James Reed, and William Scurlock, and Reuben Brown

taken prisoner; Panchita begged for their lives, and after that they were given temporary reprieve - bound and sent to Matamoros to be tried by Mex court

took 2 day sbefore Fannin heard of the incident soldiers began preparations for fort's defence

p 120 morning of March 3, Capt Luis Guerra approached Fannin - town between loyalty to Mexico and Tex "Guerra said that so long as the struggle had only involved trying to require Santa Anna to grant certain governmental rights and privileges to Texas, he was all for the rebels—but now that Texas was waging an actual war against his homeland, he could not in good conscience fight the battle. He asked for an honorable release from the army of Texas. In a rare display of compassion, Fannin said he understood the young captain's dilemma, that he appreciated Guerra's honesty and admired his patriotism. Fannin accepted the resignation and bid Guerra farewell. He might have guessed that Guerra would go straight to the enemy, taking with him all the intelligence he possessed about Fort Defiance!"

p 121 after hearing of Johnson and Grant's defeats, Consultation wrote to FAnnin on Mar 6 "   In accordance with our official duty and our oaths, we have to say and instruct you to use your own discretion to remain where you are or to retreat as you may think best for the safety of the brave volunteers under your command, and the regulars in the militia, unless you have been instructed otherwise by General Houston, who has been by the new consultation confirmed and appointed commander in chief of the Army of Texas Militia and volunteers, as well as regulars "

same day that Fannin got consultation's letter, he learned from travelers that so far no Tex defenders at Alamo had been killed or seriously wounded, although Mex soldiers had suffered some losses

p 122 59 people signed Tex Decl of Ind; 10 had lived in Tex more than 6 years; 1/4 of then had been in Texas less than a year

p 125 Final assault - SA used 2500 soldiers

p 126 "When one line of attackers would disappear under the withering gunfire from the Alamo, other soldiers immediately took their place and continued the march toward the fortress. Time after time, lines of Mexican soldiers ignored the certainty of death and—stepping over the bodies of fallen comrades—steadfastly marched into the curtain of lead and steel being hurled at them from behind the walls of the Alamo. Each successive line of attackers got a little closer."

" defenders were not the only ones shooting; Santa Anna's cannons were pounding the Alamo. Eventually a chance shot achieved what two weeks of steady shelling had failed earlier to accomplish. The lucky cannon ball knocked down a huge chunk of the Alamo's outer wall. Almost instantly Mexican soldiers were there, laying ladders against the rubble. In seconds those Mayan warriors leading the assault were clawing their way up the ladders and over the debris."

sheer numerical superiority meant Mex certain to win "Colonel Travis died early in the battle, shot through the head as he grappled with a Mexican soldier in the outer courtyard" ??? (also said earlier that Gonzales 32 arrived in broad daylight)

p 127 "Every Texan and every American at the Alamo, save only the wives and children of some soldiers and a few other noncombatants were slain by the Mexicans"

Sam Houston believed that 7 men surrendered and were executed - said so in letter to FAnnin on March 11

p 128 story of execution of prisoners also "widely repeated in Mexico"

p 129 "In fact, the Alamo stirred pity but little else among most Texans.  A part of this apparent apathy can be traced to the fact that virtually all of the men who died at the Alamo were ''outsiders"—men from the United States fighting men from Mexico City "

Mar 7 Fannin decided they should march S and recapture San PAtricio, which Urrea still occupied summoned Capt Jesus Cuellar, who had served under Cos before defecting to Tex side after siege of Bexar; Cuella agreed - he would ride S on spy mission to determine where Urrea was and trick him into riding into an ambush

p 130 "Fannin pointed to a spot on the map he said would be perfect for an ambush. It was a place where the highway passed between two tree-covered hills. Fannin told Cuellar the Mexicans would be like sitting ducks as they rode down the path. If Cuellar could just get the Mexicans to ride along that road by noon on Wednesday, March 9, the Texans could strike a major blow against the enemy"

Urrea at first suspicious of Cuellar, but Cuellar's brother was in the group with some of Cuellar's old companions, all of whom swore to his trustworthiness

"Captain Cuellar told Urrea that he knew where a substantial number of Americans were camped, preparing to make war on the Mexicans. Urrea took the bait and began planning his assault on the "unsuspecting" Americans. The following day, precisely at noon, exactly as planned, Cuellar dutifully led the Mexicans into the planned ambush. He could hardly conceal his excitement as the Mexican troops began passing between the hills where they were to be destroyed. To Cuellar's utter dismay, however, nothing happened!"

after Cuellar left Ft Defiance, Fannin channged his mind and decided it was too risky to try anything outside the fort

Cuellar managed to get to the back of the line of soldiers and slip away - headed for Victoria and found Sam Houston

p 131 Cuellar later fought at San Jacinto

"fairness it should be noted that one reason for Fannin's change in plans may have been a visit the colonel received from a local, pro-independence Texan just after Cuellar departed on his mission. Shortly after dawn on the morning of March 7, a local farmer named Lewis (or Louis) Ayers raced his sweat-lathered horse through the main gate at Fort Defianc"

"Ayers told Fannin that sometime after midnight on February 28, the commander of the hated Mexican underground, the Victorian Guardes—Don Carlos de la Garza—had entered the town of Refugio, twenty-five miles to the south. De la Garza was accompanied by a troop of rampaging Mexican civilians and several unidentified Indian warrior companions. These invaders ransacked the town, mistreating local Anglo civilians and destroying considerable private property."

Ayers said de la Garza and his men camped just S of Refugio; Anglo families trapped in the town and afraid to stay put; Ayers asked Fannin to help rescue the civilians

Fannin called his troops together and asked fro volunteers to rescue civilians at Refugio; Capt Amon Butler King volunteered first

p 132 23 others volunteered to ride with them - took 2 days to get them organized to Fannin's satisfaction (during those 2 days Mex army moving from San Patricio to Refugio)

Thur, March 10 Kin rode into REfugio - found panicked civs but no Mex Army or Victorian Guardes

"Frustrated that he was not going to find any action and operating under the erroneous assumption that time was not a factor, King forgot his primary assignment and decided to have a look around. He set out to scout the area south of Refugio" rode less than 3 mi before ran into advance elements of Urrea's army - Karankaw and Mayan Indians two sides exchanged fire at long range - no casualties

King ordered a retreat to REfugio; as they began to pull back

p 133 another MEx force approachedfrom left - volunteers of Victorian Guardes - no casualties again, but Tex had attackers on 2 sides

"Mexicans moved very quickly to cut off King's retreat. As King's troops raced back into the town of Refugio, they found they had been partially encircled by still more units of the Mexican army. Shooting erupted behind them, then on either side, and eventually in front of them. King was surrounded!"

trapped on open plain near river, but Mex on their path to Refugio left to get cover when rifles began to inflict injuries - they "dash through broken lines and ride into the village" went to an old church; several families of local civilians also sought refuge there

by time got to church, 3 Tex had died, 2 badly wounded, but all survivors made it to the church

", King was delighted to find that it was quite defensible, almost fort-like in construction. The church was originally built as a Spanish mission, and it had been constructed to withstand Indian attacks. The building had heavy wooden doors and thick adobe walls."

p 134 "The church building was surrounded by a wall that afforded excellent protection for defenders, and the Mission River flowed past the church on the south side—offering a natural barrier to the main group of Mexican troops who would be approaching from that direction. Ordering his men to find good positions in the church from which to fire at the approaching enemy, King dispatched one rider back to Fort Defiance to get additional help."

March 12, King's messenger reached Ft Defiance at midmorning

Fannin ordered a group of men to go join that battle - second in command Ward and 120 other soldiers to go now only 250 men at Goliad

Ward's men left within 30 minutes - "Anticipating a quick raid in which they would dash into Refugio, rescue King and the trapped civilians, and then return quickly to Goliad, Ward instructed his men to travel lightly. Each soldier carried with him just thirty-six rounds of ammunition."

rode out at 11:05 am - heavy rainfall made roads hard to pass

p 135 "Slowed by the awful weather—and the high water—it took Ward's men more than eighteen hours 10 to cover the twenty-five-mile distance to Refugio. Ward and his exhausted men did not arrive at the Catholic mission until nearly dawn on Saturday, March 12"

when they arrived, King under attack from 150-200 Mex soldiers, who retreated across Mission river when they saw Ward arrive

two commanders disagreed on what to do - Ward wanted imm retreat to Ft Defiance, with whatever civs they could round up on the way King said church was defensible, and that together they could delay Mex advance shouting match

Ward - "believed that, although he was outranked by Colonel Ward, it was he (King) who actually deserved to be the commander of the troops—especially since he had now been tested in combat"

Ward agreed to wait until weather improved to evacuate - his men were tired, and church was defensible

next day better weather

p 136 next morning, men climbed to church roof, but could not see Mex army - Warn told civs to get ready to evacuate, would leav enext morning - that day many civs joined them in the church, ready to retreat

midmorning, Kin and 6 men scouted downstream along Mission River for 6 mi. "They had hoped to surprise and possibly capture some members of the hated Victorian Guardes. Unsuccessful in their primary mission, the search party burned down the ranch homes of several known supporters of Santa Anna"

March 13, Ward sent Capt Isaac Ticknor and 30 men to find the MEx army - wanted to know where they had gone;

"Ticknor had barely climbed out of the Mission River on the south side of the river when he and his men came under heavy enemy fire. They fought a brief but pitched skirmish with a sizeable Mexican army patrol before the surviving Mexicans fled the battlefield. Ticknor later reported that the Americans killed "about twenty-five" enemy soldiers in the short but fierce engagement."

dawn the next morning, Tex patrol said they found a pile of Mex bodies at battle site, incl Capt Luis Guerra, who had left Fannin a few days previously

about midmorning that day, Capt Francis J. Dusanque arrived at Goliad with messages; 1 from Consulation said Houston now in charge of all army

p 137 2nd was from Houston who said come to me now in Victoria, leave whatever artillery will slow you down in river

"Captain Dusanque added his own personal touch when he told Fannin that General Houston was working around the clock, without sleep, trying to raise an effective army to stop Santa Anna. He told Fannin it was absolutely imperative that the colonel follow Houston's orders exactly and immediately"

at this time, 502 men total were arrisned to Ft Defiance; 193 of them were at Refugio, on furlough, or ill or AWOL

p 138 "Fannin was left with somewhere around three hundred officers and men actually at the fort. (This number increased a short time later when Colonel Albert C. Horton and thirty-one additional men arrived at the fort.) Also at the fort under Fannin's protection were a number of civilians who were not soldiers, but who nonetheless carried weapons and were available to assist in defending the fort or fighting any battle."

Urrea had the Victorian Guardes about 200 men who knew the area, 500 mounted dragoons, and 1400 foot soldiers

"Although many of these men were killed or wounded in battle over the next few days and an unknown number of others became ill with various sicknesses, Urrea probably enjoyed a four-to-one or five-to-one advantage over Fannin in terms of available manpower"

Fannin did not want to abandon his men, who were supposedly rescuing Anglo settlers

rescuers had taken most of the wagons and the draft horses for the rescue operation, so that would make it difficult for Fannin to retreat

"Fannin did as he normally did—nothing. He apparently shared Houston's order with no one and spent the remainder of that day in his private quarters. He did not order his troops to even begin preparations for the evacuation of the fort or to make ready to blow up the buildings as ordered by"

p 139 Later that day, Fannin sent a message to Ward to come to Goliad at once, or, if couldn't do that, go straight to Vicotira, 40 mi to N-NE

"Fannin dispatched a second rider to the town of Victoria with instructions for Captain Samuel A. White, who was then recruiting soldiers in that community. He ordered White to buy as much ammunition and other supplies as he could find and to wait there for the eventual arrival of the men retreating from Fort Defiance"

White had already evacuated E to join Houston

3rd messenger went to Col Abert C. Horton, recruiting in MAtagorda ordered him to come to Goliad at once " The messenger neither found Horton nor returned, but by coincidence Horton rode into Fort Defiance anyway, arriving there on the morning of March 16."

all 3 messengers captured by Mexicans, and Urrea got the messages, thus knew all of Fannin's plans

after 2 days Fannin began preparing for the evacuation

"ordered nine pieces of artillery placed on wagons to be taken to Victoria. After thinking about it for a short time, he ordered that the seven remaining cannons be buried inside the compound. 17 Why he chose to bury the weapons and leave a telltale mound of freshly dug dirt, rather than sink the weapons in the river as instructed by Houston, remains a complete mystery"

p 141 "his excellent and heavily researched book A Time to Stand, author Walter Lord concludes it is quite possible that Crockett did surrender and was executed, just as de la Peña claimed. Long says Mexican Colonel Almonte told essentially the same story in an interview granted the Detroit Free Press, and printed September 7, 1836. Another Mexican officer, not quoted by name, gave identical information to the Frankfort (Kentucky) Common-wealth newspaper in July 1836. Mexican Captain Fernando Urizza told a nearly identical story, except he gave the name as "Cockett"; Lord says everyone knew who he meant. Texas author Mary Austin Holly, daughter of the famous Texas pioneer, included the story of Crockett's surrender and execution in a book she wrote just months after the fall of the Alamo, and the story was "common" in Texas in the weeks after the battle"

Chapt 10 - Battle for Refugio
p 143

March 13, about 9 pm - Ward and King arguing Ward wanted to everyone to go to Goliad ASAP (within minutes) King said no, together we will be finel need to find out more about the MEx army plans and ause them trouble

many of King's men agreed. Ward thought he might not win a showdown

p 144

compromise - King could do one more search of the area, civilians would get ready to evacuate

28 or 43 men volunteered for the scouting party (sources differ)

crossed Mission River and for several hours scouting south of town could find no traces of Mex army

thought the Mex were running from them

decided to ride to ranch owned by Esteban Lopez, a member of the Guardes

it was unoccupied, so they burned it down, then ransacked and burned other ranches of centralist sympathizers in the area (all abandoned)

then headed back to Refugio...where they saw Urrea's men were now there - 1500 of them

p 145

mission just about surrounded, and patrol couldn't see a way to get through

patrol spotted and pursued by 100 Mex cavalry

Tx scrambled for trees a mile SE of town separated into two groups; the second group had only about 6 men

p 146

both groups pursued

King said the 6 had deserted; he said 22 men when they got to the trees

for 30 min, they battled

p 147

Mexicans driven back

Tx had not a whole lot of ammo and no food or water

King said to stay put until dark

after an hour, 200 more Mex soldiers attacked, in two parties, the Tex were in crossfire 1 Tx killed and 4 wounded

after that skirmish, almost out of ammo

decided they had to battle through the lines to get to the church after dark

p 148

night was overcast, so moonlight not visible

9 pm the Tx, dragging their wounded, made their way to the church had to cross a creek, and all their powder got wet

wide circle to the NE, to approach the church that way

in the next hour may have gone 5-6 miles north and then turned to Refugio

40 min after that, in sight of the church tower

and there they found a detachment of soldiers; not in uniform, so prob the Victorian Guarde - incl owners of some of the ranches burned that day

p 149

surrounded quickly and hopeless - no gunpowder

horses exhausted, so couldn't outrun them, and some of the wounded were very, very severely injured and no one wanted to leave them

they surrendered and were taken prisoner, except for 2 of the men - Capt Henry Scott and another man, who were behind some bushes at that prcise moment

these 2 "slipped into a little stream and knelt with just their noses out of the water" no one noticed them so they were not captured

made there was to Houston several days later

de la Pena's diary said that 16 of King's men killed and 45 taken prisoner (ed. says 46 were taken prisoner) says 11 Mex died and 37 wounded

the prisoners, which may have include couriers from Fannin, disarmed and put in a vacant lot at center of town

tied together

p 150

Lewis Ayers said 33 men were captives total; 3 pardoned (2 Germans, incl one who was wounded and died soon after) and Lewis Ayers); others marked for execution

they were marched 1.25 mi toward Goliad (where Refugio cemetery is today)

p 151

no evidence they tried to escape, despite knowing what was going to happen

at a grassy plain, told to stand in line and turn backs to the Mexican soldiers (about 100); they said nope, so just stood facing them after being shot, each stabbed with bayonet to make sure they were dead

the executioners were mostly Victorian Guardes, with a few MExican soldiers there too

Urrea said he authorized the execution because "I had no time to lose. I was obliged to move rapidly"

p 152

Urrea said many of his men infuriated by the treatment of local TEjanos by American soldiers and he motivated them that way

others say 41 captured Americans shot

some MEx soldiers refused orders to take part in the execution

p 154

Ward and the rest of the men and the civilians still trapped in the church Ward assumed that King's patrol not able to make it back

hours after King's men killed, Mexicans again fired on the Refugio church

Ward short of ammo

7 am Mar 14 (Mon) church completely surrounded

he decided to wait and hope Fannin sent reinforcements

p 155

desparate for water, asked 15 civilians to go to Mission River and water before the soldiers got closer

they pulled a small cart to the river and filled several barrels before being spotted fired on, so they raced back to church. Got there safely, with several full barrels

shortly after that, MEx launched frontal assault Tx held their fire until Mex within 10 paces of church and then a simultaneous volley

Mex stopped advancing and then retreated 100 yds away

at this moment, King and his men had approached the church; the Mex who were retreating were between the two Tex groups and concentrated on King, who was exposed

granted respite to Ward and his men

p 156

Mex cannon had put a hole in main church door; Tex now filled the hole with makeshift barrier of church pews and furniture

once King's men captured, Urrea's troops now could advance again

Fannin 25 mi away

p 157

Fannin asked for a volunteer to go to Col Ward with a message. Capt Fraser/Frazer volunteered to go

Fannin put details in the note - that Houston had ordered Goliad abandoned and all troops to go to Victoria also said where he was going to bury the cannon inside the fort, and that he was waiting for Ward, King to return before evacuating

after executiong, two more attacks on the church, both repelled with "massive casualties" for the MExicans

3 pm, a third attack form 3 sides (N, E, S)

Ward prepared for this

fire battle in the graveyard, next to church on north side

p 158

cemetery wall was 3 ft high, and on other side dropped sharply, so 5 ft high

Mex soldiers had crawled up and hidden behind the wall, then pulled themselves up and started to fire while they hoped defenders distracted by fire at front

Tex had already been stationed lying down against the wall on their side

both sides raised up at same time to attack; some rifle barrels actually touched

Mexicans very surprised - many threw down weapons and ran those that didn't flee were beaten by Americans who used guns as clubs

on other side, facing river, Mex in face of heavy fire finally fell back

after about 10 min, all troops retreating; on S it was orderly, otherwise just running

many left their weapons behind

lull for an hour

at dusk, a 4th attack; hard for Americans to see

p 159

Mex reached the door of the church, and the commander, Lt Juan Perez Arze, shot through the head. this caused his men to turn and flee

several dozen Tx followed, mostly shouting, sometimes stopping to fire a shot Ward upset, finally managed to get them back inside

Ward then told them a) King missing and prob dead b) just about out of ammo and not enough for another day of attacks like this c) 4 Tex dead, 4 others wounded (2 too severely to move) d) water almost out again e) no food

p 160

Ward said no choice, we're leaving before sunup

almost midnight, the messenger arrived at the church

Ward read the orders from Fannin

Fraser had been captured before getting there and taken to Urrea, who looked at the letter, handed it back, and told Fraser to be on his way

Fraser said it didn't appear Urrea understood it, but that if he did understand English, likely the MEx were setting a trap

Ward thought that Urrea prob expected them to go to Ft Defiance and would ambush them on the way

called meeting with the civilians and the soldiers

p 161

Ward decided they would go SE, downstream

hoped to get to river unobserved, go through the underbrush along the bank, and leave without being spotted

then go NE to Victoria to join the retreating troops or Houston

Ward said wounded would have to stay behind; he thought it "'unlikely'" the wounded would be harmed

everyone knew little hope of survival for those men, but none for everyone if they all stayed behind

jjust before 2 am, they slipped out the front door, crawling on hands and knees to the water

4 left - 2 civilians and 2 soldiers, all wounded badly and several women

p 162

and kids who decided not to go

one of the men in Ward's command was Jesus Sandoval, who had been with Cos and joined the Tex when Cos retreated after Bexar

Sandoval said the Victorian Guardes would spot a large group of travelers he said to adopt Indian practice - split into many small groups, so army doesn't know who to follow, and most get to escape; if you get pursued, keep splitting up into smaller and smaller groups

Ward said no, "'for mutual protection'" we stay together; Sandoval said this would cost the lives of everyone, and asked permission to leave and go out on his own. Ward said yes

Sandoval survived and joined Sam Houston's forces

Urrea didn't know they had left, and at sunup ordered another attack a scout then came back to say church empty

p 163

the mex soldiers entered the church and killed the wounded men

Abraham Osborn had remained behind; a soldier, he knew his pregnant wife wouldn't be able to evacuate, and he didn't want them to stay alone he hid betwee two mattress; his wife and kids sat on the edges of them

never found

another civilian, Antonio Sayle, had stayed behind; accused of having fought with the Texians he was dragged from church and shot, with his family looking on

women and kids robbed, but otherwise left alone

p 164

Urrea sent troops to look for those who had left

by next morning, 49 people brought into cam; 16 executed imeediately, 31 questioned all day, some beaten; all the male captives dead by nightfall

local residents didn't know where they came from; most assumed that they were from Ward's command

Ward and his men did split into smaller groups after all

3 men rescued by civilians near Victoria - no weapons, horses, or food

23 missed Victoria and went to San Felipe, where they eventually joined Houston

Ward and half of the men were within a mile of Victoria

p 165

when he stopped and sent 2 men to make sure it was safe to enter the two immediately taken prisoner by the army

quietly surrounded Ward, then a captured scout called out that they were surrounded, surrender and he'd be allowed to negotiate the terms with Urrea

Ward went out

Ward did not want to surrender, but the men were too tired, hungry, thirsty and little ammo still couldn't believe that POWs would be killed

"heated discussion" large majority said to surrender

p 166

Ward capitulated

Fannin still not willing to evacuate without knowing what was going on

p 167

afternoon of mar 17, Capt Fraser arrived with news that King's men dead and Ward fleeing eastward and he didn't think they would survive

Fannin's officers agreed it was time to go

p 169

Urrea in his memoirs said he could read English and sent Fraser back on purpose so that they could get the Tex out of the church and get them in the open

Chapter 11: Unforgiveable Delay
p 171

took almost 2 weeks for Fannin to actually act on his orders from Houston

dawn Mar 18, preparations to actually leave patrols the 2 days before already said Mex army advance parties there

9 wagons to carry ammo and cannon

by mid-morning, word that Mex troops within 2 leagues of Goliad

defense maneuvers at same time - the secen vannon dug up to be put in place for defence

p 173

told his men to burn down the rest of Goliad, so they'd be able to see the country to N and West and Mex wouldn't be able to hide ors helter there

all buildings within sight of fort put on fire

men in fort ready to go within 1 hr of evacuation order, just needed Fannin to give final order

but he didn't

he was in his quarters writing letters

p 174

seemed to be defending his reputation wrote to Houston, the Consultation, and Robinson, and maybe to others

8 am, Col Horton and about 30 men came from Gonzales; they had been going to join Houston and decided to accompany Fannin - thought a larger force would be less likely to be attacked by Mex troops, or could at least defend itself better

p 175

Horton said that he had already had to skirmish with small group of Mex soldiers - and they were North of the fort...so Urrea already surrounding their position

no casualties on either side in that skirmish

p 176

"Some researchers believe Fannin's slow pace was due to supreme confidence in his own ability, and that he wanted to evidence his own ability to remain calm in crisis. It appears more likely that his failure to move was due to supreme ignorance-a failure to grasp the significance of events unfolding all around him."

Fannin then walked around asking troops what they thought about staying or going

p 177

Abel Morgan said that most of the troops thought they had already delayed too long

oxen left yoked for hours with no food or water

weather turned bad - rain, so roads becoming difficult and rivers rising to flood stage

after an hour of chatting, Fannin said we'll wait

p 178

until weather gets better

said weather would prob keep Mexican troops away too

some of soldiers agreed, said this would show Mexican we aren't scared of them

oxen left hitched in case of emergency

7 am Mar 19; rain had stopped and was very foggy

after breakfast, they started burning stuff they couldn't carry - incl blankets, clothes, dried meat, corn, etc

p 179

told men to destroy all food they couldn't carry in their knapsacks - no room for food or water in the wagons

said food would be available in Victoria (12-14 hr march) and they had to cross a lot of streams, so plenty of water. Some men did fill barrels with water to be loaded at last minute

some officers urged Fannin to leave the artillery behind so they could move faster and wouldn't fire accurately while fastened

Fannin said 9 had to go

10:15 they finally moved out

bonfire burning in center

Fannin didn't destroy the fort, even though his orders said to some say Fannin too attached to it everything that could be burned was

p 180

several hundred muskets brought - seized with the fort they were mostly useless

some wanted these dumped in the river or lef tbehind, but Fannin said no

this took up most of the space in one wagon

the barrels of drinking water also left behind

only water was in their personal canteens

Urrea hurrying

Mexican troops ready to attack but waiting foor Urrea, who was delayed due to weather

almost 500 soldiers and Victorian Guardes hidden in the underbrush and trees on S and E of the fort

p 181

Mex saw the Tex leave, and there was debate about whether to engage them or not, but decided to wait for Urrea

took 2 hours for the men to cross the San Antonio River, which was nearby, as the river was shoulder deep and the other side was steep and muddy

oxen were exhausted and unable to pull the heaviest ones up - soldiers started just throwing stuff into the water to lighten the load

crossed Manihuilla Creek at noon

after 3 hours on the trail, had only gone 3.5 miles

eastern bank of the creek they found a large pasture - first good forage, so stopped to let animals grave

after 1, began moving again

had to cross a wide prairie, and 6 mi away was Perdido Creek, which was east and parallel to Coleto Creek (2 mi further)

p 182

Horton and his 30 men to stay about a mile ahead of the wagons

the 3-4 other soldiers half a mile behind the column as a rear guard

moving at less than 2 mi an hour

Chapter 12: Surrounded
p 183

after 4, they were still about 3 miles from Perdido Creek, which would provide good resting lace

fog lifted at about that time

4:05 pm exactly, Mexican soldiers spotted to the right

didn't try to approach, just kept pace

p 184

a few minutes later, on the left

still in center of the plain Fannin told the men to stop, pull 2 cannon from the wagons, and fire

aimed toward South too far wide and very short

shot again, also short

then began marching slowly again

p 185

4:15 - 4:20 they saw more troops, now directly behind them

Ehrenberg racing toward them to sound the alarm the other 3 who were with Ehrenberg as rear guard didn't stop - kept moving and went past Fannin; no idea what happened to them

Fannin changed course for Coleto Creek, 2 mi to the north, meant they turned left, directly toward one line

lots of trees along the creek

"great dispute among historians as to exactly what happened next"

some go with Dr Barnard's diary, which said the axle on the ammo wagon broke, so they had no choice but to stop where they wee in the middle of the plain

other diaries say no broken wagon

p 186

those researchers say Fannin overconfident and thought Mexicans incompetent so decided to just stop

many were appalled and wanted to keep marching

either Fannin didn't listen, or didn't think they could make it

Mexican soldiers started spreading out on all sides of them, and within 10 minutes of halting they were surrounded

fannin said maybe 400 MExican troops

p 187

Fannin had men form a hollow square, with a wagon at each corner, and a cannon in each wagon

Mexicans opened fire as Texians were maneuvering and launched direct assault of Mayan soldiers

superior American firepower repelled the advance

two more attacks also repelled

p 188

6 or so of Horton's men got through the MExican lines and joined the rest of Fannin's men

Horton ordered the rest to go east to Victoria to join with Houston

Ward also nearby, trying to sneak to Victoria; they were 7 mi south of colet and could hear it

had no ammo and decided to keep going toward Victoria

Ward and his men made it to Fagan's Ranch on the San Antonio River, 2/3 of distance to Victoria

Ward sent 5 men to go find a creek or other water to drink

p 189

they never came back over next 12 hrs, most of the men wandered off, one by one or in pairs, to find water and didn't come back most taken prisoner by Victorian Guardes and quickly executed after capture, although some taken back to Urrea to be questioned first

Ward ordered the rest to keep heading east

Tx cannons useless - unmounted meant not that effective

p 190

more Mex troops moved into position

most of the ammo in the wagons for the cannon that weren't helping; not much rifle ammo

Mexicans also short of ammo, and Urrea considered withdrawal

p 191

the ammo supply train had been slowed by the mud

he called a council of war to consider a retreat; thought Americans might attack and overwhelm then

they decided not to retreat, that the next morning they'd put bayonets on the muskets and charge

by duck at least 60 Tx struck by gunfire or shrapnel about 6 or so had been killed

Mex snipers started moving into position too

p 192

Mex snipers would crawl through the grass, lie for a while, then jump up, fire, and turn and run for their lives

many Tx wounded

p 193

dusk, an attack on 3 sides at once

almost overwhelmed Texians

each of Tx had 3 rifles with him - one ready to fire, 2 more loaded and cocked, and third had bayonet affixed

Mex got within a dozen yards before being stopped

cold drizzle after dark

Mex had camp fires to cook dinner and be warm

the Tx were afraid to light a fire or they'd be a targt for cannon fire

Mex began singing and shouting demeaning stuff at the Tx

Chapter 13: Surrender and Hope
p 198

Fannin trying to convince the men individually that it was time to try to surrender

Mar 20 - about 400 new soliders and about 100 pack mules arrived to relieve Urrea by sunrise

p 199

seeing the reinforcements swayed many of the Texians who didn't want to surrender

debate still heavy

p 200

Barnard's account said Fannin voted against surrender and the other officers convinced him; the other records all say it was Fannin that pushed for it

p 201

"the surrender negotiations in the middle of that muddy prairie lasted only a few minutes, although the repercussions have lasted fro generations"

Fannin and Urrea met personally

p 202

Col [William C] Hunter, part of the Texian surrender team, said that Fannin lied to the men, that Urrea told the truth later - he had been ordered to give no quarter, but that Urrea said at no time had men who were POWs been killed in Mexican custody; Hunter said the Texians knew better, but Fannin took that at face value

the Texians assumed Fannin had gotten what he asked for - a conditional surrender

p 204 The surrender document, in English, said

"The Commandant Fannin and the wounded shall be treated with all possible consideration upon the surrender of all their arms. The whole detachment shall be treated as prisoners of war, and shall be subject to the disposition of the Supreme Government."

surrendering "at disposition" means unconditionally

p 205

lengthy English surrender document - 16 articles

pp 205-206 Spanish version "straightforward and absolutely uncompromising"

p 206

most of the MExican officers not Hispanic - from European countries, mercenaries

p 207

exact number who surrendered not known estimates from 270 - 350 probably about 50 wounded and about 275 healthy

p 208

about the same time they were surrendering, 50-80 more Americans taken into custody at Copano that same morning, 15 mi away from Coleto and just south of Victoria, the rest of Ward's command captured

now a total of 400-450 Americans and Texians in Mexican custody near Goliad

Urrea - "in a matter of a few hours he had captured the largest single group of enemy soldiers still on the battlefield, had prevented Colonel Ward's veteran fighters form rejoining Sam Houston, and had neutralized another sizeable enemy force before it could even get started."

p 209

40 Americans heavily wounded were left at Coleto for 24 hours while the healthy marched back; MExican troops came back with water; no food, water or medical treatment during that time. Some died

doctors ordered to treat the Mexican wounded first - so many of them after Dr Barnard complained a lot, he was told he could choose a few healthy Americans to be orderlies and help out

p 210

held in the old church at Fort Defiance

no rain, high humidty so building hot and stuffy

by afternoon, on the verge of revolt - no food or water either Mexican soldiers trained the cannon on the doors just in case

Col Holzinger came by, spoke to them, promised food in exchange for peace they each got a hunk of raw beef

some prisoners then allowed in the courtyard to get air; camp followers were there and taunted them for being afraid to fight, then ate in front of them the Americans started bartering - money, blankets, clothing for food

the next day, Mexicans gave them more meat and allowed fires so it could be cooked

p 211

20-mi round trip for Fannin and Holzinger to Copano on mar 24, to check out boats to go to US, but none there

Urrea visited with Fannin several times of the next few days; Holzinger wrote years later that he heard Urrea tell Fannin that they would be allowed to live, but he always thought Urrea lying

p 213

both journals of Portilla and Urrea written years later -" when both men were under international condemnation for their mistreatment of prisoners"

Chapter 14: Massacre at Fort Defiance
p 217

the chapel called Our LAdy of Loreto

50-60 wounded in the large room off of the church where the priest had lived the healthy were in the sanctuary Fannin in a tiny storeroom near the belfry

about 75 outside the church - 4 doctors, their orderlies sleeping in the courtyard, a few even with the Mexican troops

p 218

Fannin had a high fever, infected wound, by Saturday night

p 219

the three officers in charge:

Agustin Alcerrica, Luis Balderas, Antonio Ramirez

p 220

120 wounded Mexicans

Col Francisco Garay had helped get permission for the medical orderlies

he was Greek, spoke English well

p 221

according to Dr Barnard's notes, Garay had intervened to keep Dr Barnard and Dr Shackelford safe; called them into his tent while the others were marched out Garay argued that they were without arms

they had been called to deal with two "wounded" men, who turned out to be two healthy Americans wrapped in sheets - rescued; carpenters

p 223

a fifth man, Andrew Boyle, brought in soon after - promise Garay had made to his sister

Garay also rescued Dr. Field and 10-15 other American soldiers these men eventually gathered in his tent

Panchita Alavez also intervening; she had saved 4 of Grant's men in San Pat probably saved 85+ men - intervened for the men captured at Copano

p 224

she argued with Portilla that they hadn't had weapons when they came off the boat, and said it was because of her that Portilla moved them aside

she was companion of Cap Teleforo Alavez, very beautiful

Angel of Goliad

she saved about 6 more by crying and pleading

p 225

hid several others in her personal quarters or the belfry

"it's not clear who these men were or why they merited her life-saving intervention"

then she found the drummer boy and begged Golzinger not to harm him (Franklin Hughes) because he was a child - probably the last American saved that day

some told to get firewood other round up cattle others tend to livestock

all told later that day taken to Copano and put on a ship

p 226

look for painting by Col Andrew J Houston

p 227

wounded able to walk were told to help another wounded man outside into the courtyard

when asked, were told that they were going to Copano

led out, two by two, to be killed wounded killed in the NW corner of the courtyard, against the outer wall of the church

ordered to sit with back to a three-man firing squad

p 229

some argued, struggled, prayed, some shouted "Remember the Alamo"

one MEx soldier at close range behind each Tx; would shoot him in the head then the third soldier would run up and if he saw signs of life, shoot at point-blank range

at least once, both of the wounded survived; the third Mex soldier shot one in the head and clubbed the other to death

took 45 min to execute all 40 wounded

p 230

Ward was there; marched outside after the wounded were killed

Ward told to kneel and his life would be spared, and he said no, his men had died and he would too

p 231

he was killed outright Fannin was last

Joseph Spohn, an orderly who spoke Spanish, told to go with a MEx capt and 6 soldiers to get Fannin he asked if Fannin was to be killed and was told yes

Fannin asked Spohn what was going on Spohn said that the prisoners, incl wounded, were being executed said Fannin's expression never changed

then said Gannin was next and he had been sent to get him Fannin just nodded and asked if Spohn would help him walk

p 233

some accounts say Fannin was brave others (by Tx) say he begged for mercy and was panicking before being shot

Chapter 15: Escaping the Executioners
p 235

Ehrenberg's group told to get firewood

p 236

lots of survivors initially - inaccurate muskets

p 237

Col Wm Hunter initially shot in shoulder; fell face-first on the ground in shock soldier noticed him alive, bashed his head with rifle butt, slashed his throuat, and ran a lance through his upper chest semiconscious but still alive; stripped naked and left for dead

p 238

floated 6 mi on his back in the river

found by a farmer namedFagan, who took him home; his wife cared for him, and 3 days later he set out on foot to look for Houston's army

6 days after leaving the Fagans, he did find Houtston's men and he later fought at San Jacinto

p 239

John C Duval not hit at all in first volley knocked down by man to his right when he fell played dead

when shooting stopped, all those who survived started running- Mexican guards chased them and ignored Duval, who was still on the ground

Duval then went the other way

p 240

Mexican cavalry rode up and down the riverbank looking for survivors

p 251

not sure exactly how many Texians killed in the massacre Mexican records say 445 in the prison, but don't say how many killed vs survived

battlefield monument says 332 - prob close to accurate 38-40 survived (18-20 escaped from the firing squads) and about 20 rescued by Garay and Alavez plus 85 unarmed men spared

p 252

when massacre over, dead stacked up and set afire in center of field behind the fort

some say not all of them were dead - that there were screams from those burned alive fire not that hot, so vultures settled in to feast on what was left, then coyotes

some entire groups of volunteers died

p 253

"in some cases, the massacre wiped out the bulk of the men of entire American communities"

Chapter 16: Texas Unity at Last
p 256

"Until Goliad, MExican actions may have been cruel, but for the most part they were defensible." Not this one

"Men too sick or too wounded to walk were dragged to the front of a church and then were shot in the back of th ehead"

p 257

after news of this got out, "it was difficult to find anyone, anywhere, who would champion the MExican cause"

"It is not difficult to conclude that Santa Anna lost the war by winning a victory at Goliad" - made martyrs out of the dead Americans

countries which had stayed away from the Tx now pledged help (who?) Texans now chose to join up, and more rushed in from US

p 259

for the most part, Alamo deaths were during combat - honorable

Ft Defiance not so

Runaway Scrape got worse - people feared being murdered

eastbound roads were clogged

p 260

made it harder for Houston to move his troops

also, now the men knew they either had to leave or fight - no surrender

determination to not be captured

"if the war had lasted a little longer, it appears likely the Americans and Texans would soon have far outnumbered the army of MExico; the United States might even have declared war on Mexico"

most, however, didn't arrive in time

Epilogue
p 285

Dr Barnard and Shackelford had been taken with the army to Bexar to treat the wounded from the Alamo

p 286

after news of San Jac, Mex army began moving southward - abandoned tents and supplies ignored the prisoners, who just walked away and into Bexar (May) Dr Field freed this way too

June 3, the three docs and others went to Fort Defiance; gathered all the remains they could find and buried them in a common grave, hill 150 yds east of the Fort Col Sidney Sherman led ; 5 survivors there 21-gun salture following a service

p 286-287 William Brennan, a member of the NO Grays, escaped the massacre but mental trauma was too much; he lived ina home for the rest of his life - severe shock

p 287 a week later, Jun 10, Shackelford and Barnard buried the remains of those who died at Coleto - common grave at the battle site

p 293

"iif Santa Anna had merely sent the captured Americans home as promised, he would have been not only a hero to hese men and their fmailies, but he would have shown the world that he was strong enough to win, yet compassionate enough to do so with the minimum required force"