Talk:Turkish Airlines Flight 981

Reference to Apollo 1
I find it warranted to include a Link to Apollo_1 where the plug-type hatch prevented the astronauts being rescued because of the self-securing design. Gonesoft (talk) 11:57, 15 May 2017 (UTC)

Comments
The article for Charles de Gaulle Airport states that airport opened on March 8, 1974. Yet this crash occurred on March 3 of that year, and the article states that it took off from CDG on that date. Could someone explain this? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 207.212.81.20 (talk • contribs) 23:43, 28 December 2005 (UTC).


 * The aircraft departed Orly, according to the report and Job's book. -- Charlene 22:31, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

I have added a section referring to my wiki article on F.D."Dan" Applegate. Does anybody know what happened to Dan? His later career etc? Is he still with us? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Ed@islandnet.com (talk • contribs) 10:45, 21 April 2006 (UTC).

I've tried to edit this so that things are in a bit better order. Some information was repeated; some didn't seem to show up in a logical order. I've kept the Applegate paragraph. Also, the report and Job's book are unanimous that the flight was out of Istanbul, not Ankara. -- Charlene 22:33, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

Do we really have to put "[citation needed]" after the part where it says their reputation was harmed because one of their planes fell out of the sky? I'm pretty sure that's a citation in and of itself.

981 did not take off from CDG. All French (like my wife) refer to De Gaulle Airport as "Roissy" (the suburb in which it was built) and all French witnesses in March of '74 were hoping this DC10 was attempting a landing at giant airport in Roissy that was STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.90.209.4 (talk) 20:59, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

Was there an indicator window?
My uncle was an aircraft engineer and he told me about this crash several times. As he told the story, a "burly Turkish baggage handler" put his knee up on the handle to force it to turn. Normally the handle moved the bars thact latched the door. The door was not closed properly, so the bars could not slide into their holes. When the baggage handler forced the handle, the bars bent, allowing him to turn the handle to the proper alignment. After this accident, a window was added so that the person turning the handle could see the bars.

The article says the indicator window was already there, which does not make sense. Perhaps it was part of the upgrade kit which Turkish Airlines had not yet installed. Also the article says "only a slight amount of extra force was required". I believe this is correct but misleading; this refers to a step after the step where he bent the bars. Bending the bars took much more force than usual.

I don't have any source materials, but sumbuddy who does should check this out. -- Randall Bart 19:25, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

The story your uncle told is true, however he wasn't a Turkish baggage handler, but an African boy who didn't speak Turkish, French or English. --88.234.142.43 (talk) 14:52, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

The misuse of baggage handler is true. After the similar accident with American Airlines Flight 96, Douglas sent 3 instructions showing the precautions. They were followed and Turkish Airlines put warning stickers in English & Turkish to the cargo door opener. Unfortunately ground worker in Orly was an Algerian who didn't speak any English and he forced the cargo door handle breaking the hinges locking the door. You know the rest.. Stupid engineering mixed with uneducated staff took almost 400 lives. Tragedy..


 * Read the article. It's likely the baggage handler didn't force the door since the pins were probably already bent from an earlier incident. (American Airlines Flight 96 also says the same thing) Nil Einne (talk) 21:49, 28 September 2008 (UTC)


 * There's a 1974 Flight International article on the aftermath of the THY accident here: - The DC-10 cargo door  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 19:20, 27 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Turkish Airlines shouldn't have needed to install anything, the aircraft was purchased new by them from McDonnell Douglas some time after the modifications were introduced and the factory documentation for TC-JAV stated the cargo door modifications had been incorporated. On examination of the wreckage this was discovered not to have been the case. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.11.156 (talk) 19:53, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Yes! There WAS what you call an "indicator window" (I had no idea what the heck you were referring to at first). A porthole was retroactively installed, but it was not the responsibility of Mahmet Mamouhdi (the French/Algerian) baggage handler who secured the door, to look through it. He testified that HE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW ITS PURPOSE. Visually inspecting the latches through the porthole was the purview of the Turkish Airlines mechanic responsible for the flight, but no one can ever recall even seeing him on the ramp. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.90.209.4 (talk) 21:06, 28 July 2016 (UTC)


 * The 'Recommended' modifications were three in number and only the first - the observation window - had been incorporated into the accident aircraft, although the aircraft documentation that THY received with the aircraft stated all three had been. The other two modifications if they had been incorporated would have prevented the baggage handler from closing the cargo door, and hence prevented the flight. The investigation also found that the door indicator micro switch indicating the unlocked/locked state of the door via a light in the cockpit had been packed with shims to give a 'door locked' indication when the door was in fact still unlocked.


 * The observation window itself was found to be of little practical use as it required the shining of a torch through it in order to see the state of the door locking indicator pin.


 * The discrepancy between the aircraft documentation and the actual aircraft modification state when delivered to THY was probably due to the hurried implementation at the factory of incorporating the modifications into aircraft already built and due to confusion and mix-up over what modifications had been applied, and to which aircraft. An alternative less charitable view would be that the documents had been deliberately falsified in order to quickly get the aircraft 'out the door' and into the hands of a paying customer.


 * The baggage handler was absolved from blame because it was deemed unreasonable to expect a mere baggage handler - an essentially unskilled labouring job - to be familiar with the complex engineering of an aircraft, and because if the modifications had been carried out on the aircraft as stated by the manufacturer in the aircraft documentation delivered with the aircraft, he would never have been placed in such a position as to unknowingly jeopardise the safety of a flight.


 * If the accident aircraft had been in the condition it was stated to be in the documentation delivered with the aircraft when it was new, the aircraft would not have been able to take-off on the accident flight, as the cargo door would not have been able to have been closed.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.18.158 (talk) 11:27, 29 November 2016 (UTC)

Chuck Miller
Maybe something on Charles O. Miller (ntsb) could be added; he investigated the first accident, and according to "Mayday" (tv-series), informed a journalist after he looked at the cargo door and saw it hadn't been changed after the first incident. More on Miller: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_20_13/ai_54665096/ 84.197.187.119 (talk) 03:28, 22 August 2011 (UTC)

Suggested new lede (13/9/12)
Small disagreement with MartinVillafuerte85 about his re-inserting details in the first para of the lede.

I believe the priority is to highight the biggest single point of notability, and then deliver a clean, bare summary, stripped of all non-essentials, which can be allocated their proper place in the main article.

If the reader's attention is not held by 'the highest-ever death-count of any single plane crash with no survivors', it will not be held by the other classifications'. 86.144.67.80 (talk) 13:18, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

Contradictory statement?

 * It took off in an easterly direction, then turned to the north to avoid flying directly over Paris.

Orly is at the south of Paris. A flight departing to the east would exit Paris quickly; a turn to the north would actually take an aircraft over central Paris ...? Can anybody make any sense out of that? Guinness2702 (talk) 13:13, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Maybe I'm presuming too much, but could it not just be a typo? If it took off in a westerly direction and then turned north, that would make perfect sense. I guess it's possible that it took off in an easterly direction and was intended to fly east of Paris and then directly north of it after turning towards London. Flight paths are sometimes strange, but I don't know enough to say what the deal is here. I agree it is unusual as written. At first I myself confused west and east and thought it made perfect sense. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.179.189.144 (talk) 00:04, 11 June 2016 (UTC)

There is nothing "dubious" or "inaccurate" about this comment. The author is absolutely correct. Back then and up to the present day (by the way, I am a senior Captain for a major US airline), SIDs - A/K/A "standard instrument departures" (assigned or filed even when the weather is good, as it was on March 3, 1974), are routine procedures for aircraft departing from airports of any significant size. Their primary purpose is to assist in traffic management (I.e., departures in a particular direction off of a particular runway are all adhering to the same, known path), with secondary purpose of mitigating noise. That is why so many SIDs restrict turns overflying populated areas until either a certain altitude is reached (the higher the aircraft is, the smaller the sound footprint) or a geographical point is reached (likely some distance away from population centers). Flight 981 actually flew past the first waypoint permitting a turn - Coloummier - and proceeded to a further point - Montdidier - (I may have the waypoints reversed) before resuming its course. Nonetheless, appropriate procedures were being followed, with no query or concern on the part of Orly Departure Control. This entire sequence regarding Turkish 981 is completely normal. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.90.209.4 (talk) 20:54, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

Query
Per OTRS#2015072710012968, I'm posting this question on behalf of an editor who cannot edit this page (he's on a public library computer whose IP is blocked, and has asked me to raise this here). The following is a direct quote from his email:

The authoritative account of the accident, Destination Disaster by Paul Eddy and others (referred to in the entry), says all the crew were Turkish. They are listed in the book and do indeed all have Turkish names, but the entry says three of the cabin crew were French and four British.

The book also says all passengers were identified. It lists them, and they do add up to the total known to have been on board, 335. The entry, however, says nine passengers were never identified. It's not clear whether this means their names were not known (which is denied by the book), or remains were found but could not be matched to anyone known to have been on board.

Please bear in mind when responding that the questioner is unable to respond, but would simply like to raise the issue for editors here to consider. Yunshui 雲 水

He additionally points out that the accident report used as a source (, presumably) also states that the crew members were Turkish. Yunshui 雲 水 08:13, 3 August 2015 (UTC)

History has generally accepted the death count as 346, but questions will forever remain. The BEA strike that forced the airline to reaccomodate over 200 passengers on THY 981 was obviously chaotic. Keeping in mind that this was in an era pre-dating computerized reservation systems, it is entirely conceivable that fewer or even more passengers were on board than now assumed. The Chief Pathologist responsible for identifying the remains went to his grave absolutely convinced that he examined portions of at least 360 bodies. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.90.209.4 (talk) 21:15, 28 July 2016 (UTC)


 * IIRC, BEA actually did have a computerised flight reservation system in 1974 however I don't know if THY did. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.18.158 (talk) 10:17, 29 November 2016 (UTC)

Rugby team passengers
This section is unclear; it says the rugby team were passengers, but then it says they took another aircraft instead. 68.156.95.34 (talk) 09:42, 7 August 2015 (UTC)

Yes, the English rugby team from Bury-St. Edmunds was on board. They obviously all died. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.90.209.4 (talk) 21:08, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

Error in section "Similar Accidents"
The words "outward-opening" and "inward-opening" in the first sentence of this section are obviously reversed. A plug door on an aircraft would only be able to open inward - while the door on TAL Flight 981 opened outwards - which caused the crash.

I'm going to go ahead and make the correction, I invite any warranted discussion of my edit here.

Big Lew 00:12, 29 May 2018 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lew Sheen (talk • contribs)


 * Hi there Big Lew. I'm sorry to have to do this to you but...


 * A plug door opens inwards so when the cabin is pressurized (high pressure inside vs. low pressure outside) the door is forced into its housing causing a tight seal. The door cannot go beyond that point because it's not designed to open outwards, therefore it's the most safe design. The alternative outward-opening door could potentially blow open due to the pressure differential if its latch was faulty.


 * Therefore the correct logic is that a plug door is more resistant or less likely to blow open than an outward-opening door. Or an an outward-opening door is less resistant or more likely to blow open than an inward-opening (plug) door.


 * If you look at the original text carefully, you will see that it was in fact correct. Your revised version is now incorrect so I suggest you revert your edits. Thanks. Rodney Baggins (talk) 16:46, 29 May 2018 (UTC)


 * Also, PLEASE DO NOT remove the tag. It is referring to the fact that the whole of the Cause section, all the way down to the Aftermath section, does not have anywhere near enough citations (in the References section) to back up the facts given in the text. It has nothing to do with wikilinks (as these are "circular" references), it requires primary (or secondary) sources from elsewhere. A minor wikilink to another Wikipedia article will have no effect on it whatsoever! Rodney Baggins (talk) 17:24, 29 May 2018 (UTC)


 * I've not had any response here for over a week so I decided to just go ahead and revert back to the original version which was already correct. The word "resistant" means "able to withstand" and therefore "less likely to fail", so "less resistant" means "less able to withstand" and therefore "more likely to fail". Since a plug door is less likely to fail, it's correct to describe it as more resistant to the pressure. It's just a logic thing. Rodney Baggins (talk) 22:14, 6 June 2018 (UTC)


 * Rodney, you said EXACTLY what I said in my explanation of my recent edit! Please refer to the history of my edit and carefully read the article before I implemented my change. When you undid what I edited, you just screwed up the article AGAIN! From the current wikipedia article: "The passenger doors on the DC-10 are inward-opening plug doors, designed to prevent opening while the aircraft is pressurized. However, due to its large radius, a cargo hatch on the DC-10 could not open inside the fuselage without taking up valuable cargo space, so the hatch was designed to open outward, allowing cargo to be stored directly behind it. The outward-opening design presents the risk of the hatch being blown open by the pressure inside the cargo area if the latch were to fail during flight." Rodney, it was the OUTWARD-OPENING CARGO DOOR that failed, and that, BY DEFINITION is NOT a "plug door." I don't know what else to say here. We've got to be able to read and comprehend in order for wikipedia to be reliable...Big Lew 03:33, 8 June 2018 (UTC)


 * Yes I agree with all that but the part that makes no sense is the line "an inward-opening cargo hatch, also called a "plug door", is inherently less resistant to blowing open than an outward-opening cargo hatch." That is the part that I changed because a plug door is inherently more resistant to blowing open than an outward-opening hatch. I'm fully aware that it was the outward-opening cargo door that failed. The problem is with the comparison between the two types of door! I may ask for a second opinion on the best wording to use, but I assure you that the original text was absolutely fine in the first place. Rodney Baggins (talk) 18:41, 10 June 2018 (UTC)


 * User:Lew Sheen, I've just read the first paragraph of the "Similar accidents" section and to me it's 100% correct. Do you have any issue with it? Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 18:34, 11 June 2018 (UTC)


 * Hi Martin, I agree that the article as currently written is correct. For the record, here is the text of the article before I edited: "An inward-opening cargo hatch is inherently less resistant to blowing open than an outward-opening one, also called a plug door." I think the original wording is either incorrect or poorly-structured. To me, this says that an "out-ward opening [cargo door], [is] also called a 'plug door.' " I only corrected the apparent false assertion that an "outward-opening" door on an aircraft is called a "plug door". If you look at the article's edit history, you'll see that I was both correct and justified in implementing my original edit. I'm not sure why Rodney Baggins questioned my edit, but I'm glad that we have improved the veracity of this Wikipedia article. Big Lew 01:21, 12 June 2018 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lew Sheen (talk • contribs)
 * Thanks for your input. I thought I was going mad...
 * I'm still finding your input very confusing. You told me above that I had "screwed up the article AGAIN!" but now you tell Martin that the article is correct. How can both of these things be the case? I've just made some final tweaks and the section is fine now, so let's just leave it shall we?


 * For the record... Having carefully looked over the revisions, your first edit was this:


 * Revision as of 00:15, 29 May 2018 (edit) (undo) (thank)
 * Lew Sheen (talk | contribs)
 * (Corrected obvious mistake in first sentence of section titled Similar Accidents - "outward-opening" and "inward-opening" were obviously and incorrectly reversed)


 * (changed from)
 * An outward-opening cargo hatch is inherently less resistant to blowing open than an inward-opening one, also called a "plug door".
 * (to)
 * An inward-opening cargo hatch is inherently less resistant to blowing open than an outward-opening one, also called a "plug door".


 * The original version was correct and your edit was unnecesary and in error. This is what you are failing to admit! Rodney Baggins (talk) 08:37, 12 June 2018 (UTC)


 * Hi Rodney, I now see that I was confused, clumsy, and incorrect in my original edit. Apologies, and thank you for reverting my mistaken edit. I will endeavor to take more care in the future.Big Lew 00:06, 17 June 2018 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lew Sheen (talk • contribs)


 * Providing there is no physical damage to the door or door jamb it is a physical impossibility for an inward-opening 'plug door' to blow open, as the door is larger than the door aperture. This and other related accidents were caused by the failure of the door securing mechanisms, which on an inward-opening door merely secures the door before the cabin is pressurised. Once pressurised the door is pushed into the jamb and door seal by the cabin air pressure, and the door cannot then be physically opened until the cabin is de-pressurised upon descent to an altitude where the pressurisation can be dispensed with. The impossibility of opening the doors against pressurisation was thought to be the cause of many of the fatalities on Saudia Flight 163 as the crew were overcome by smoke before they were able to de-pressurise the aircraft immediately following the otherwise safe landing, making it impossible for anyone still conscious in the cabin from opening the cabin doors.


 * On an outward-opening door OTOH, the only thing securing the door closed against the cabin or hold pressurisation are the door latches, which therefore assume a safety importance not present in the 'plug door' design as they and the door hinges have to bear the full force of the pressurisation loads all the time.


 * Whilst the DC-10's and the other competing cargo door designs could hardly be called shining examples of the engineer's art, it may be as well to remember that this and similar accidents were actually due to inadequacies or faults in the aircraft electrical systems. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.137 (talk) 10:23, 2 December 2018 (UTC)


 * Just to clarify the above last paragraph, the problem for the DC-10 was that the door latch actuator electric motors had insufficient power (i.e. torque) to reliably move the latches through the over-centre position and into the locked position and had a tendency to stall before the latches were fully closed. The manufacturer was aware of this and after the Windsor Incident increased the wire gauge of the actuator motor's power supply leads, hoping this would allow the motors to draw increased current and so be more able to close the latches fully, however subsequent events were to prove this solution to have been unsuccessful. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.145.115.25 (talk) 08:36, 11 March 2021 (UTC)

Recent edits
Thanks for the edits to the article, but they are removing some pieces of information, introducing grammar issues and using slang. I've rolled them back. If you would still like to make them, please discuss it here before doing so again. Thanks

Cadar (talk) 17:34, 29 June 2019 (UTC)

Dubious assertion regarding the galley on AA Flight 96
Note 2 ("The control cables were not completely severed on ...") asserts that the lesser weight of the galley on AA Flight 96 vs. passengers prevented that floor from completely severing the control cables. That is very dubious, since the pressure differential (sudden decompression of the cargo hold vs. slower venting of the cabin pressure) over such a large area (the cabin floor on a wide-body aircraft) would be a far greater force than the difference in the static weights of galley vs. passengers. Even just 1 psi differential over only 12 square feet is more force than the weight of 10 passengers. BMJ-pdx (talk) 10:59, 30 June 2023 (UTC)


 * it is more likely that the presence of the galley on the AA aircraft increased the structural stiffness of the cabin floor in the rear cabin area in a way that the additional passenger seats that were installed on the THY aircraft did not. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.8.126.91 (talk) 14:48, 3 April 2024 (UTC)