Talk:Type physicalism

Token Identity Link?
It links to anomalous monism which is not the same as token identity thesis. 95.8.236.222 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 21:03, 11 August 2012 (UTC)

Some clarification
My understanding of token and type physicalism implies that type physicalism begins and ends with the brain. A type physicalist would believe that intelligence connot exist outside of a human brain. Token physicalism, which is distinguished clearly in this article, believes that though there are physical occurances in the brain that allow thought to occur, actual thoughs and ideas themselves are beyond the workings of the brain and can exist in other organisms and even computers. The distinction that the author gives between these two beliefs is not very clear within the first paragraph and should be clarified.

--Rockergirl164 (talk) 14:04, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Clean up and expansion
Hi all. I just made some changes to the article. It needs a lot of work, though. Hopefully people can work on it. There are plenty of resources out there online to help keep it on track (like the SEP and the IEP entries). - Jaymay 07:24, 9 May 2007 (UTC)

Yea, about expansion, I think the first section after introduction should be some kind of more detailed explanation of the theory. Article talks about types and criticism, but for someone without a good background (like me), it's hard to understand what is being criticized. And second paragraph, those "yellow is yellow is..." need some kind of explanation too, I understood nothing about the difference between two theories after reading it. I think a sentence starting something like "Similarly, token identity theory states that..." Tiredtime (talk) 16:20, 11 April 2009 (UTC)

It was a typo
I rushed through a little carelessly and typed in five tokens. Sorry to mislead. Thanks for spotting the error. --Lacatosias 09:17, 9 February 2006 (UTC)

I think the reply to the final criticism is worded a little vaguely. I've read it several times through but I really don't understand what Smart's reply is supposed to say. I think it'd help if someone who knew the subject very well could reword it.

Fish

 * "pain is identical to C-fiber firings" universally and at all times is highly implausible

Also known as "It's ok: fish don't feel pain". Or, perhaps "what the fish feels isn't pain".


 * Not at all. What it means is simply that the same exact sensation of pain could be realized by, say, Q-fiber firings instead of C-fiber firings in the salmon, by J-fibre firings in the octopus and by some configuration of silicon in a hypothetical silicon-based life form (computer with qualia). --Lacatosias 13:46, 7 July 2006 (UTC)

How ironic that the originator of Type Theory was named "Boring."

Non-eliminative reductionism
Does Nicholson's non-eliminative reductionism fit in here? --Extremophile (talk) 02:31, 29 February 2012 (UTC)

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Incomplete statements on the current popularity of physicalism
This line in the intro "Among professional philosophers the physicalist view of the mind has been diminishing in recent years.[1]"

Ref: Koons, Robert C.; Bealer, George (25 March 2010). The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0191614017.

Seems slightly at odds with this line from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

"According to a 2009 survey, physicalism is the majority view among philosophers,[3]"

Ref: Bourget, David; Chalmers, David J. (30 November 2013). "What Do Philosophers Believe?". Philosophical Studies. 170 (3): 465–500. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7. S2CID 170254281.

For clarity and consistency, perhaps both statements ought to appear on both pages.

81.109.84.66 (talk) 22:24, 7 March 2021 (UTC)