Talk:USS Fitzgerald and MV ACX Crystal collision/Archive 1

Photos
Photos of ACX Crystal need to be added, and probably some more photos of Fitzgerald. -- 65.94.169.56 (talk) 21:38, 18 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Two here, showing bow damage, arriving Tokyo, if photographer will license suitably:
 * http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=2682629
 * http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=2682627
 * Davidships (talk) 22:18, 18 June 2017 (UTC)

Infobox
Can someone please fix the lack of italics for the infobox heading. Davidships (talk) 23:11, 18 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Fixed, by coincidence 1 minute after you posted the request. - Bri (talk) 23:30, 18 June 2017 (UTC)

Before and after images of Fitzgerald
This might come in handy if USN releases more images of the damage to Fitzgerald. - Bri (talk) 04:22, 20 June 2017 (UTC)

Washington Free Beacon
According to the article Washington Free Beacon, this is a website that says it is "dedicated to uncovering the stories that the powers that be hope will never see the light of day". Sounds very iffy as a RS for this article. Bri (talk) 19:34, 24 June 2017 (UTC)


 * Yes. Their disjointed writing style is amateurish, and their suggestion ("nevertheless") that the Crystal's autopilot could have been hacked is simply incredible. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 20:09, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

Animated gif of vector map?
Over at Tableau Public I've uploaded a version of the detail map File:AIS map of MV ACX Crystal 2017-06-16 detail.png that shows the course and speed with varying size arrows, sort of like vectors. You can click the arrows in the upper right by "Timestamp (UTC)" to advance time. With some effort I could make a ogg or gif animation and upload it, if it would add value to the article. Or anyone is welcome to copy the images from the workbook and make the animation themselves. Is it worth while? It's the same data that's in the maps we already have, just displayed differently. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 18:40, 25 June 2017 (UTC)

Recommended source(s)
I have a potential conflict of interest on this article and won't contribute further directly, instead recommending changes on the talkpage. Here's a source that could be used:

- Bri (talk) 16:59, 26 June 2017 (UTC)

Here's another written by a former Navy captain and law professor.

☆ Bri (talk) 06:13, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

A maritime company has posted some analysis of tracks, speeds, limitations of AIS, and unique look at what's identified as "trouble" with ACX Crystal several hours after the collision. Preliminary USN inquiry results including this diagram ☆ Bri (talk) 18:08, 18 August 2017 (UTC) Shake-up at 7th Fleet ☆ Bri (talk) 01:59, 23 August 2017 (UTC)

AIS
The article says "As U.S. Navy ships do not transmit their location data openly the way commercial vessels do, the path of Fitzgerald leading up to the collision cannot be independently confirmed and has not been announced by Navy officials", and cites a WaPost article. The WaPost article says nothing that I can find about whether Navy ships transmit their location data, and I can't imagine they don't at least turn on their AIS when they're in a shipping lane. (Whether the Fitzgerald's AIS was in fact turned on is of course a different question.) If there isn't a source that speaks to the Navy's use of AIS, I suggest omitting this sentence. Mcswell (talk) 05:11, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
 * The Ars Technica story listed under Further reading describes this in detail. - Bri (talk) 05:42, 27 June 2017 (UTC)

US Navy ships are capable of receiving AIS data for merchant ships. But they do not transmit AIS data of their own. AIS is only a source of intel for our Naval Ships on the location of merchant ships, it is not used by our ships for own own positioning information. US Naval vessels use our own CLASSIFIED networks to share our own position information. Transmitted through our own Navy owned satellite network.

Seriously.. why would we use an open public network to broadcast our own positions? THINK, Man.

But what would I know? Electronic Warfare Technician, SLQ_32 Operator, CIC Watchstander... USS Halsey CG 23, and USS Kitty Hawk CV 63. Cg23sailor (talk) 06:21, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Seems like an electronic warfare technician ought to be able to cite a source for these facts. We don't just believe it because some guy on the internet said he is an expert. I realize the military benefit of not broadcasting your position and you wouldn't expect the Navy to be so foolish. But then again you wouldn't expect a fast and agile destroyer to just sit there and let a big dumb slow container ship run into it. Perhaps there is a military benefit to not having the Fitzgerald sitting in dry dock with a big hole in it. We should find the published policy and find out the rationale behind it. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 14:45, 27 June 2017 (UTC)


 * Just sitting there? Wouldn't it be more stable (and maneuverable) if it was "under way"? Besides, I read somewhere that the freighter captain said the war ship "suddenly" turned toward the starboard (that's "the right" for you civilians and landlubbers) and cut across the freighter's path.


 * On the other hand, everyone seems to think the freighter didn't have anyone steering or on watch, so how would the captain know that?


 * Isn't there any information at all on the Fitzgerald's bearings, speed, or direction? (Hate waiting for a one-sided report to come out months later!) --Uncle Ed (talk) 23:53, 14 July 2017 (UTC)


 * In addition to the Ars Technica article Brian mentioned above, this says : "the Navy pointed out that while its ships are equipped with AIS transponders, they're often turned off based on ships' missions". So the statement "they do not transmit AIS data of their own. AIS is only a source of intel" is false. They can and do transmit AIS data when they choose to. "Why would we use an open public network to broadcast our own positions?" So civilian ships don't run into you.So this leaves us back with the original question: what was the status of the Fitzgerald at the time? If they were in a relaxed, no-combat posture with no lookouts and everybody chilling, why not turn AIS on to help with all that traffic? If they had AIS off because they were carrying out a sensitive mission, why weren't they alert to nearby ships? We won't know until the investigation is over, I suppose.By the way, the article Automatic identification system goes on for a few thousand words sifting through the minute technical details of how AIS works without so much as mentioning the Navy or the intelligence and/or public relations aspects of AIS. There's one sentence at the end about spoofing, but that's all. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 15:25, 27 June 2017 (UTC)

Synonyms for said
This kind of pedantry requires some scrutiny. If you're going to be scrupulous about using 'stated' rather than 'said' because the communication was written, then consider the following: Also: our article says "a report to the ship's owners which was shown to the press". Reuters says it is an "exclusive", and that a copy of the report "was seen by Reuters". It doesn't say it was "shown to the press". "The press" being plural, the opposite of exclusive. Reuters does not say it was "shown" to them, they say they saw it. Did they steal it? Spy it through an open window? Find it in a bus station? We do not know. We only know Reuters, and Reuters alone, saw it. To be pedantic. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 16:55, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
 * 1) Say does not mean only oral, spoken words. OED: " I. To utter, speak; to express in words, declare; to make known, tell." M-W: "a :  to express in words :  state"
 * 2) The Reuters source does not say it's a paper document. It calls it a "report" and "account" which they "saw". We don't know if it's written, in video, PowerPoint, spoken at a press conference, or interpretive dance. Don't torture the definition of "said" while making assumptions not contained in the source
 * 3) Even if the report that Reuters saw was on paper and not some other medium, Reuters tells us that "the cargo ship's captain said the ACX Crystal had signaled with flashing lights". Said is what we have been given by the source. Why are we presuming to change it to something else?
 * 4) Stated is a synonym for said, but the connotation is a level of formality greater than said. We're told this is a report the Captain gave to the shipowners, but we do not know how formal this report was. Was it a screengrab of the Captain Skyping to his boss? Notes on a napkin? A sworn deposition? It sounds like a formal statement, but we don't know that. We only know it's some kind of report.


 * Know what? We all make mistakes sometimes. Writing "press" instead of "Reuters" was my bad, I should have been more precise (though, if you really want to dig into technicalities, "Reuters" is part of the press). The "said/stated/wrote" thing is a honest mistake I made while trying to be (probably too) precise. Sorry for the inconvenience. 69.165.196.103 (talk) 21:27, 30 June 2017 (UTC)

Before somebody reverts again
Is this reliable enough or should I try another page? 69.165.196.103 (talk) 21:30, 30 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Defense News is considered reliable. Tons of articles use it without controversy. - Bri (talk) 21:56, 30 June 2017 (UTC)
 * It's a big scoop and a good find. Also this. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 22:43, 30 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Added. Will somebody check the comments I've put within the text and see if the relevant text needs to be inserted or not. 69.165.196.103 (talk) 00:30, 1 July 2017 (UTC)

Landlubberly POV?
Does anyone working on this article have bridge experience? I ask because the article is permeated with a certain awkwardness that suggests the editors are largely unfamiliar with the topic and its context.

E.g.: the article refers to the Fitzgerald's "sensor systems". The source referenced (Scott Shane, NYT) says nothing about "sensor systems"; this seems to be an editor's vague awareness of "radar". And it shows a landlubberly lack of understanding that the primary "system" of avoiding collisions at sea is the age-old, tried-and-true use of lookouts. There should have been a lookout on the starboard bridge wing, and what amazes everyone with maritime experience is why he did not give alarm that a huge freighter was coming right at him. What is so amazing as to be stupefying is that the collision alarm was not sounded prior to impact.

Similarly, where the article says: "the rules of the sea suggest Fitzgerald failed to give way...." Not really. These "rules" say (generally) that when two vessels are on converging courses the one on the left must give way. It is the observed fact that the Fitzgerald was hit on its right side that strongly "suggests" it was in the wrong.

Under "Discrepancies about the time of collision", the first sentence – "The time of the collision was unclear at first, but in the days after the collision a time of 01:30 was generally accepted" (by whom?) – is quite suspect. The initial reports, originating from the Navy, clearly stated "about 02:30" local time. Perhaps someone was simply confused about what timezone was "local", perhaps that was the time Fleet Command heard about it (because the Fitzgerald's radios were out of commission). But that was the basis for reports that the freighter doubled-back prior to the collision, the implications of that being so dire that the discrepancy warrants clarification.

There is a problem in instances like this where massive replication of non-expert reporting tends to blur and bury pertinent information. Expert advice and guidance would help make this article much better. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 22:18, 24 July 2017 (UTC)
 * I have naval experience but can't edit this directly due to conflict-of-interest. Other editors may be in the same fix. The July 12 source I recommended above is really good IMO, but hasn't been incorporated yet. It talks about the time discrepancies specifically: "The available electronic data of the track of ACX Crystal suggests that the collision occurred almost due west of the northernmost point of Toshima (34.5222 deg North, 139.072 deg. East) if the collision occurred at about 0130 as the containership contends. If, however, the collision occurred about 0220-0230 as the US Navy initially contended, then the site would be slightly to the northwest. The 50-60 minute time gap could make all the difference in determining the causal fault resulting in the casualty." Timezone errors are unlikely, as the collision occurred in Japanese waters, USFJ and 7th fleet HQ are located in the same time zone (which does not observe summer/daylight savings time), and USN has plenty of experience doing correct conversions to/from Zulu time when necessary. Note that inexperienced or misinformed press reporters have made lots of errors in items about the collision, most frequently stating that it was fifty-plus nautical miles off of Honshu, not under 12 as it actually was (e.g. CNN); they apparently are mistaking distance from port from distance from the coastline. The distinction could be important because of jurisdictional issues due to the definition of territorial waters. ☆ Bri (talk) 22:38, 24 July 2017 (UTC)


 * Your comments are exactly the kind of critical assessment needed to sort out what really happened. E.g.: I agree that an error in noting the time is unlikely. (But then-- so was the collision!) But what does that initial time of 02:30 refer to: the collision itself? Or when 7th Fleet got the message? Or what? Did some yeoman mistype the time? This is where seeing the actual press release by the Navy would be helpful.  Likewise any message traffic by the Japanese CG. Most news agencies don't carry those details, which means burrowing down to the actual sources, which comes back to needing expert guidance.


 * I wonder if it would be useful to list (here, on the talk page) the various apparent or possible elements of the event, which we could evaluate for inclusion in the article. Comments? ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 21:00, 25 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Well, the Japan Coast Guard is going to release findings soon, and there are purported leaks from the USN investigation available as well. So it might be best to just wait a few more days. As to your specific question, 0225 (± an unknown delta) was when the collision was reported to Japan Coast Guard. Some media have stated that Fitzgerald's radio room was destroyed and AFAIK no reliable reporting on when 7th Fleet became aware of events.
 * There are USN press releases now, but like I said, until the actual investigation results are released, they (unsurprisingly) don't really say much about the events prior to the collision.
 * A thought on a major point missing in the current revision of the article: there are multiple overlapping authorities, we could discuss who they are and what is their ambit. Japan Coast Guard and USN are only two of them. There's also (at least potentially) the ship's insurers, US National Transportation Safety Board, US Coast Guard, Japan Transport Safety Board and various Philippine authorities including the coast guard and even US Congressional committees (hinted at by USN 21 July). I'm a bit surprised that US–Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is still only in the See Also section and not discussed in the body of the article. ☆ Bri (talk) 22:29, 25 July 2017 (UTC)

Opinion of Steffan Watkins
I have deleted the following sentence and cites: Independent analyst Steffan Watkins said it is likely there was no one on the bridge of the ACX Crystal, though investigation officials have not commented on this. __________________________________________

The investigations undoubtedly will go into this matter. Is there a reason why we should be reporting the opinion of an IT security consultant?

Kablammo (talk) 22:54, 25 July 2017 (UTC)
 * According to Irish Times, he writes for Jane's, so yes, that's a reason. ☆ Bri (talk) 23:01, 25 July 2017 (UTC)
 * I agree. I will restore his opinion (with his qualifications in a footnote or text) when I get to my desktop.  Kablammo (talk) 23:51, 25 July 2017 (UTC)
 * The article now refers to his opinion. Kablammo (talk) 15:29, 26 July 2017 (UTC)


 * Perhaps more to the point, because he might know something. (Of course, that was speculation, so needs to be presented as such.) However, that remark seems to have been taken down. My recollection is that he said something like "there was no one the bridge [of the Crystal] that knew how to turn off the auto-pilot". Which would readily explain: 1) why the Crystal did not take evasive action (as they were required to do when collision was eminent), 2) why the Crystal's course around 1:30 becomes erratic (assuming that is time of the collision), and 3) why the Crystal continued on her course for another 30 minutes or so before turning back. In that these are curious points the readers might be wondering about, but for which there is yet no definitive information, it seems reasonable to offer a hypothesis (provided it is properly presented as such).


 * Another hypothesis (and I see I am not only one to have thought of this) is that the collision was indeed at 2:30, and that the Crystal was deliberately turned back before hand, with a possible intent of seeking and deliberately colliding. This is why the time discrepancy was significant. That could also be a teaching moment in why details are so important and first impressions often so wrong. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 23:56, 25 July 2017 (UTC)


 * I thought it was clear with the in-text attribution per BIASED, that this is an expert's opinion, not a fact. But if that isn't clear enough we should adjust the wording so no one is confused. We should also work to include other significant expert opinions. If another reputable source thinks it happened differently, or thinks these conjectures are premature, we want to include that. Dennis Bratland (talk) 16:16, 26 July 2017‎
 * Mr. Watkins likely does qualify as an expert on the tracking of ships. From his conclusions there he expresses a further opinion-- that no one was on the bridge. I believe that it is a close call as to whether that second opinion should be included.  Kablammo (talk) 17:20, 26 July 2017 (UTC)
 * But we're also allowed to use basic common sense. If someone was on the bridge, they would have tried to do something, even if they couldn't turn the ship. If nothing else, they would have reported it. No one being on the bridge does explain the delay. So really, it's not far fetched. But again, if we have other sources who contradict that, we should give their alternative view. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 21:46, 26 July 2017 (UTC)
 * The NYT June 23 piece considers "the possibility that no one was awake" on ACX Crystal, which sort of implies that they weren't on the bridge doing what they usually do. This backs up what Dennis is saying, but of course it should be stated as journalistic opinion not our own. ☆ Bri (talk) 22:54, 26 July 2017 (UTC)


 * Yes. It's not so much whether a particular view is contradicted or not, but more of: what are the possibilities? (Including the possibility that the Fitzgerald, having lost their radio room, either did not have, or could not fire up, an auxillary transmitter.) But we do need to take care that statements about hypotheses and opinions are clearly understood to be only hypotheses and opinions. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 23:43, 26 July 2017 (UTC)


 * I would keep this. Maybe not keep the commentary (for the reasons already stated) but I think the link ought to stay. The analysis of the AIS track is valuable, even if conclusions can't (at this point) be included in the article. Although I would support keeping those too (against this removal), as I see the wording used as acceptably non-committal. We do know that one commentator has made these claims, so long as we don't also claim that they're the truth, or WP's agreed truth, then we're good. Andy Dingley (talk) 20:27, 18 August 2017 (UTC)

Some points to work on
I think the following points need some attention. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 23:46, 26 July 2017 (UTC)


 * "US Naval casualties" leaves the reader wondering about non-"US Naval casualties". I suggest that the section be "Casualties", with the first sentence explaining that the only casualties were on the Fitzgerald.


 * Same section: Commander Benson will certainly be a "casualty" (he will never again command a naval vessel), but does this really belong in this section?


 * "Discrepancies about the time of collision": as I've said before, the "time of the collison" was not "unclear it first": the Navy clearly and definitely said: 02:30 local time. The non-clarity arose from the discrepancy with the subsequent reports from the Japanese.


 * As I have also said before: the "rules of the sea" do not "suggest" the Fitzgerald was at fault; that inference arises from the nature of the collison. (If I get some time perhaps I'll take a whack at this.)


 * "Personnel involved": this section seems quite misnamed. "Sensor systems" is nonsense: what "sensor systems"? The source cited says nothing about "sensor system". But that source (and others) do relate how there must have been multiple failures of the crew.


 * "Investigations": "Preliminary findings suggest" is quite weak (what "pelimnary findings"?), particularly as the basis for thinking the Fitzgerald was at fault is quite evident in that the collision was on their starboard side.

Some points not mentioned (yet) in the story
Something that caught my attention. The official Navy press release (at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=101098) says the Fitzgerald was navigated home by means of "a magnetic compass and backup navigation equipment." Normally there two gyrocompasses, located near the centerline of the ship, one forward and one aft, with the bridge able to switch their repeater to either gyrocompass. If they could not do that then either the damage incurred was MUCH greater than a couple of compartments flooded, or (possibly "and") the fundamental design philosophy regarding redundancy is severely flawed. It is possible they had a general failure of electrical power, which is NOT supposed to happen except under the most extensive battle damage. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 23:50, 26 July 2017 (UTC)


 * Good catch, J. Johnson (JJ).


 * My wild (un)educated guess is that they were consciously playing with fire, something akin to the USSR engineers testing the design limits during the Chernobyl disaster, that is they switched off anything electrical: their radars, the AIS, ARPA, GMDSS, what not systems, and even gave up on the human lookout, to test the conditions after a (North Korean?) nuclear strike or an EMP. That is why they keep it all secret, including the (automatic) logs of the collision, speed, course, vibration, proximity, ultrasound, etc.


 * Or else they were all drunk or stoned.


 * They violated the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and the age-old laws of the sea thereby, but, hey, it is an USA ship protecting the democratic world, so... Zezen (talk) 07:11, 18 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Is your "they" the naval ship designers (who I think have been shaving too closely), or the crew? Big difference there.


 * The latest info is that the Fitzgerald lost electrical power forward, which imples they had power aft. That suggests a problem not with the generators, but with the feeders. Unless ship design has totally failed they have independent feeders port and starboard, with critical equipment — such as the radio room — having a switch to select either feeder. Flooding of a transfer switch could compromise both feeders, but I see no credible reason why the electricians couldn't have rigged emergency power cables. Even if the radio room was flooded (and the lack of an auxillary radio room aft is a failure of ship design) it is a good question why they (apparently) did not have power to the bridge.


 * I very much doubt "they were all drunk or stoned", and your notion of some kind of secret test is wholly uncredible. As has been commented already elsewhere, a likely possibility is that the OOD (Officer Of the Deck) thought they were going to cross ahead of the Crystal, and failed to recognize the significance of "constant bearing". (Such an egregious failure of training would account for the XO getting sacked.) More likely everyone was waiting for the the OOD to take proper action, and he did not realize how dire the situation was until it was too late. As for the Junior OOD jumping in: consider why he is considered junior, and read The Caine Mutiny. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 21:17, 18 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Your speculation is no better than Zezen's wild guess. Assuming the OOD was actually on the bridge - and that there was no problem with radar - then, as he saw the cargo ship slowly lumbering into his own ship's path, he would have had plenty of time to make a slight rudder adjustment and prevent the collision. It's not like they were real close and the cargo ship suddenly veered into them; these are not sailboats racing toward the same flag buoy. --Uncle Ed (talk) 11:19, 19 August 2017 (UTC)


 * My speculation is a LOT better then Zezen's, as it is based on a likely physical reality rather than his self-admitted "wild (un)educated guess". E.g., naval ships typically (but perhaps not the Arleigh Burke class??) have dual electrical feeders, port and starboard. And I will attest based on personal observation that critical equipment is connected via an "Automatic Bus Transfer" (ABT) switch to access either feeder, and that this a potential common point of failure.


 * For sure, given "plenty of time" even a slight adjustment of course would have been sufficient to avoid the collision. But so-called "crossing encounters" can be tricky to judge (as has been noted on the blogs). My point (above) is that the OOD might not have realized that he was on a collision course, that a "slight adjustment" was even needed.


 * "Assuming ... that there was no problem with radar ...." Those ignorant of ship handling think that "radar" is the nub of the matter, where it is actually the least. For sure, the quartermaster assigned to watching the radar plot should have noticed, and reported, the converging course, and that will undoubtedly be a point of investigation. But the key element here is the lookout, who is the ship's "eyes", and charged with keeping the OOD updated on other ships.


 * And note: the ships had been on parallel courses, about two miles apart, and the Crystal did change course, about four minutes prior to the collision. (All of that can be inferred from the Crystal's track and the angle of the collision.) So in effect the Crystal did veer, and in terms of ship handling it was fairly sudden. Yet that change of course was so gradual that the lookout might not have noticed it for a minute or two. So when he does notice, and report, the OOD's first response is likely "what the hell? they've been parallel to us" for however long. So by the time he steps out to the wing bridge to be sure, the situation was already dire and collision imminent.


 * By the way, I reverted your "many speculations" edit. There have been reasonably authoritative statements that the Crystal was likely on autopilot, but if you want to add that you need to provide a source. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 23:08, 19 August 2017 (UTC)


 * I stand corrected. Now can I get out of the brig? :-) --Uncle Ed (talk) 00:49, 20 August 2017 (UTC)


 * No shore leave until you polish those citations! :-) ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 19:48, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

Something curious. Last night I looked at the Navy's preliminary report on the post-collison response (available here), and was struck by something that does not seem to have been reported before: the Navy's investigator (it's not "Navy" until signed by higher authority) says the Fitz was on course 230T (nearly due southwest), outbound from Yokosuka to Subic Bay (Philipinnes). This is corroborated by a note in her history that after a recent exercise she had moored in Yokosuka, departing June 16.

The significance of this is that the vessels were approaching nose-to-nose, which was definitely NOT the case in the actual collision. (See diagram above.) Resolving this difference requires a radical change of course of some 140&deg;, and that would certainly have brought the Captain to the bridge. (Alternately: only 50&deg; if the collision came after the Crystal's 90&deg; turn to the right, but that does not seem to be the case.) And would show that the OOD was aware (albeit inadequately) of a potential problem.

More mystery. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 19:55, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

Is there a pattern?
J. Johnson, have you heard about the USS McCain collision? --Uncle Ed (talk) 10:41, 21 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Yup. Two such events in two months is most likely coincidence.


 * That collision looks much less baffling. (For starters, the Navy seems to have got the time and date right, right off the bat.) The damage was probably from the "nose" of the other ship, which is normally underwater, and being higher here than with the Fitzgerald (perhaps because the other ship was not loaded), and possibly less severe in respect of puncturing the hull, may have slowed the flooding. Though in that case I wonder why there were more fatalities.


 * The lack of scraping on the side suggests a nearly right-angle collision, though perhaps slightly from astern. Much will depend on whether either ship made, or perhaps did not make, any changes of course just prior to the collision.


 * While the McCain was struck on the port side, and thus might have been the "stand-on" ship, COLLREGS isn't that simple, so the admiralty lawyers might have a field day here. But aside from that I suspect this is going to be a fairly simple case of two ships getting into a bind, and touching. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 22:12, 21 August 2017 (UTC)
 * Of interest here: CNO's tweet, reported by major media outlets. ☆ Bri (talk) 17:49, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * No, not really of interest. CNN reported that some Navy officer (unidentified) said the McCain had a "steering malfunction", and some alleged cyber-security person suggested cybernetic sabotage. Unlike with the Fitzgerald, where someone suggested that the Crystal's autopilot might have been hacked, this time the Navy responded. Which may have only stirred things up.


 * Of course, I've heard the Navy is still running XP, so there are possibilities. But I wouldn't go there until there is more info.


 * What is interesting is the possibility of a steering failure. That would, at the very best, be awkward in such a crowded sea lane. The comments as to why they didn't go to "back-up" steering are wrong in their premise. The key question (assuming there was a steering malfunction) is: how long did it take? Depending on the nature of the failure, how long it took to identify the nature or location of the fault, and how quickly key personnel could respond (they probably were not stationed in the steering gear room), it could have taken ten minutes or more to regain steering. Meanwhile, some very large vessel only two miles away that is heading for the spot the McCain was vacating might not immediately realize there has been a breakdown in the plan. Oh ....! ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 22:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
 * Off topic perhaps, but lots of things run XP including hospital equipment and ATMs as well as industrial controls. It's in one of the sources I added to the electric squirrels article (a talk sponsored by the National Science Foundation) and other sources like this and this.
 * Back on topic, I just added at a 40-minute old story that will definitely be of interest. ☆ Bri (talk) 02:01, 23 August 2017 (UTC)

Navy's report
The Navy has released (yesterday) a "Memorandum for Distribution" from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, dated 23 October 2017, covering both the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions. Very definitely incomplete (I get the feeling there are aspects that they do not want to mention, probably for reasons of legal liability), but a much fuller picture than we have had so far. In regards of the Fitzgerald: nothing at all sinister, just some really egregious failures of the OOD, and failures generally all across the board. (And a very curious statement that "physical lookout duties" were not "performed" on the starboard side. Yeah..."HUH???") The basic plot line: they were headed south (course 190T, speed 20 knots), the OOD miscalculated the situation regarding the Crystal, then couldn't figure out what to do. Bang. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 03:49, 2 November 2017 (UTC)
 * Thanks for posting this update. The course of Maersk Evora (IMO 9458080; see Maersk Edinburgh-class container ship) is shown in the navigation diagrams in the new Navy report. If you read between the lines here, Fitzgerald may have mistaken Evora for Crystal on their radar when incorrectly assessing they would pass starboard-to-starboard. ☆ Bri (talk) 16:39, 2 November 2017 (UTC)


 * Doesn't take any "between the lines" reading. From page 5 of the report:


 * Initially, the Officer of the Deck intended to take no action, mistaking CRYSTAL to be another of the two vessels with a greater closest point of approach.


 * Still, does it matter which ship was which? They had a radar contact that was closing rapidly, never mind the name painted on the bow. Did the OOD get hung-up on the second closest contact? Don't know. Though it hardly matters, as there was such a train of failures, including training. And where the hell was the starboard lookout? ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 22:13, 2 November 2017 (UTC)

Criminal charges
Could someone (with more free time than me) please follow up on the court-martial charges? I'm particularly interested in the following points: I'd also like to see some data on whether the various leaders have been jailed, or consulting with lawyers, and of course what the progress is with the courts-martial. --Uncle Ed (talk) 14:07, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * 1) Is the Trump administration blaming Obama for "lax oversight" - letting the Navy become lazy and complacent?
 * 2) Will Trump and his supporters blame Obama for cutting the Navy's budget while doubling or tripling the burden of remaining ships and crews?
 * 3) More to the point, is this the traditional Navy way of holding leaders accountable for negligence?
 * This kind of politicized theater and spin is generally not relevant to this type of encyclopedia article. I would expect to see mentions of blame shifting to the previous administration not here, but on articles about the Trump administration, in that it says more about them than it does about the Navy or the accident. 'Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan'. The Navy only just announced a week ago that hearings for possible charges are going to begin. Possibly up to three individuals may be charged. That is all the "data" there is. Questions like "Is this the traditional Navy way of holding leaders accountable for negligence?" are matters of opinion and analysis. You could certainly start quoting pundits who sound off one way or another on this question, but anyone who takes a strong position on this at such an early date is almost certainly a political hack. In five or ten years possibly, reputable historians might express their opinions, but even then, those are just opinions.We don't need to expunge all commentary or reaction; there is some room for that. But it should be kept to a minimum and only summarize what the most prominent or reputable individuals have to say. --Dennis Bratland (talk) 19:25, 21 January 2018 (UTC)