Talk:USS Frank E. Evans/Archive 1

Moved from incorrectly placed, USS Evans (DE-1023)
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE (USS FRANK E. EVANS DD-754) that is wrong hull number >(DE-1023)?

I was a 2nd class aviation electronics technician assigned to VS-29 (an anti-submarine warfare squadron flying S-3 aircraft) aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga in 1969 to 1970. We were in the Pacific doing NATO exercises with a number of other countries including Australia.

Don't remember the exact date, but it must have been in mid 1970 when the accident occurred. It was about 0100 (1:00 a.m.) when we were called to our battle stations. We were notified that there had been a collision at sea. We arrived on site at daybreak and I witnessed the most incredible sight I had seen in my life. There, as if anchored in the middle of the Pacific Ocean was the HMAS Melbourne (Australian aircraft carrier) with the aft half of the USS Evans lashed to the side of the Melbourne. The front half was nowhere to be seen.

After talking with a number of the survivors of the Evans, (they were all brought aboard the Ticonderoga because we had the most extensive sick bay (hospital) facilities), I began to get a picture of what had happened that night.

Shortly past midnight, the USS Evans was sailing along the starboard side of the HMAS Melbourne. The Melbourne was preparing to land aircraft. The signal was sent to the Evans to turn to starboard (right) and circle around behind the HMAS Melbourne to act as plane guard in the event one of the returning planes crashed and the pilot ejected. The Evans would then be in position to pick up the pilot. This was and is standard procedure in recovering aircraft aboard a carrier at sea.

For some unknown reason, the officer of the deck aboard Evans, gave the command to turn to the port (left), which brought the Evans directly in front of the HMAS Melbourne. At this point, the commander of the Melbourne had no options. Stopping or even turning in such a short distance is impossible for a carrier weighing thousands of tons. The Melbourne hit the USS Evans directly amid-ships. The impact left a huge gash in the bow of the Melbourne and cut the Evans almost exactly in half as if an enormous band saw had severed the hull. From first hand accounts of the survivors, the front half of the Evans sunk in less than three minutes. Due to water-tight doors being closed off, the aft half of the Evans remained floating. The officers and chiefs asleep in the bow of the Evans didn't have a chance to escape. They went down with the ship. One of the people at watch on the bridge of the Evans was hurled upward from the impact of the collision and landed on the deck of the Melbourne, only to die later of his injuries.

The remaining crewmen who were in the aft of the ship survived, most with little or no injuries. Not sure about the exact numbers, but approximately 60 sailors lost their lives and 50 to 70 survived.

Now the reason for this article.

I have done extensive google searches and have been unable to find any official reference of this tragic accident at sea. I have also asked may active and retired Navy, both enlised and officers if they every heard about the Evans disaster. They all said no. It seems to me that there must be some official cover-up of this terrible accident. Perhaps the powers that be feel this story is better left untold.

If you have any information regarding the disaster of the USS Evans, I'd appreciate it if you would email me.

I just ran across this page about the HMAS Melbourne. Looks like she was involved in more than one collision at sea. http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/MAJESTIC.html                                           INDEX OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS — Preceding unsigned comment added by Earl.hoverter (talk • contribs) 17:13, 3 July 2005 (UTC)


 * moved by: lots of issues | leave me a message 08:33, 31 August 2005 (UTC)
 * I know I have heard about this before. In fact it is not the USS Evans it is the ship of this article, USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754).  It was indeed rammed by the HMAS Melbourne just as this person remembers, but I do not belive it to be a cover up, just a case of mistaken identity.  The DANFS does not have specific info on the incident, however its records usually stop around 1970.  check out Melbourne history for more details.  Oh and the other reason you might have had problems searching for this is the fact that the Melbourne was later renamed to the Majestic.  Malo 01:09, 3 October 2005 (UTC)
 * While waiting transfer to my ship the US coast guard cutter Sebago I was placed on duty to help remove usable items from what was left of the Evans. I salvaged a chipped up ashtray from the ship. I still have it on my office shelf.
 * Mike Fairman….
 * 2601:343:4100:3640:51F7:4092:7A0B:3107 (talk) 05:04, 23 November 2023 (UTC)


 * Actually, she was originally named HMAS Majestic, and was renamed HMAS Melbourne in 1955, so at the time of the accident(1969), she was called HMAS Melbourne.BrotherEstapol 05:25, 22 August 2006 (UTC)


 * Sorry guys, Melbourne was laid down during WWII as HMS Majestic, the name ship of her class. She was completed for the Royal Australian Navy after the war and re-named HMAS Melbourne. Nick Thorne  talk  23:13, 6 June 2007 (UTC)


 * NOTE: --24.93.111.18 (talk) 16:31, 23 June 2017 (UTC) THE CORRECT NAME AND HULL NUMBER IS "U.S.S. FRANK E. EVANS DD-754"

The USS FRANK EVENS accident
Yes the accident did happen. My father was on the ship when it was hit. I do know that he does not talk about it other than the fact that he should had died that day. He had swapped places with another shipmate and the one that he swapped with died and he servived the accident. He was missing in action for approx. three weeks. He was from Joplin, MO. at the time. If any one else has any information regarding this please I would love to learn More!! Melissa — Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.105.65.5 (talk) 17;21, 25 March 2006 (UTC)


 * Anecdotal. Met a sonar operator in 1976 while overseas. He told of being aboard a destroyer that was in close proximity to the scene of the collision. He told of being able to hear the screams of those trapped in the forward section of the Evans that sank. The screams were heard through the headphones attached to the ship's sonar. Set in the "passive" mode the sonar was not emitting its own sound, merely picking up the ambient sounds within the water. The sound is amplified allowing non-loud sounds to be heard. My own experience with sonar indicates the ability of a sonar to transfer underwater sound at the level those screams were likely being transmitted at. No verification but was told the story long before the Web and during a time when very few people thought of or told of the events of that time. Of course, the event was assuredly in the minds of those who were present along with the kin of those who died. Unable to offer the link I found several years ago where written mention was made of at least one sonar operator who heard those final screams as that forward portion of the ship sank. If found will return and post the link.
 * Obbop 68.13.191.153 04:37, 20 October 2006 (UTC)


 * The USS Frank E Evans was involved in a collision with the Melbourne on June 3, 1969. 74 sailors were lost on that day which includes the three Sage brothers Gary, Gregory, and Kelley Jo Sage. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 137.216.148.53 (talk) 19:42, 8 June 2012 (UTC)

Secondhand story
My father was not on the Evans, but he was a recently-commissioned USN officer stationed at Pearl Harbor when this happened. He says one of the reasons the details have stayed with him so long is that his OCS trainer was an absolute demon about paying attention to details, and when his section graduated OCS and was commissioned, he gave them a speech about how paying attention to detail saves lives. The Evans disaster is a perfect example of failing to double-check the details.

According to my father, what happened was this: The Evans was forward and port of the Melbourne. A destroyer of that class was usually commanded by a Commander or Lt. Commander, not a Captain, with a few lower ranking officers under him. When an Ensign is commissioned, he still has several months of hands-on training before he is certified to be the "Officer-of-the-Deck (OOD)," that is, the officer in command during a watch. The OOD that night was a Lieutenant JG. He was training an Ensign, who was performing the duties of the Officer-of-the-Deck under his direct supervision.

It was 2am, and the fleet was sailing with lights out. All ships had been ordered by the Australian Admiral to never turn toward the carrier. When the watch had changed at midnight, the new officer of the watch and the ensign, who was being trained, were either misinformed or misunderstood their position in relation to the carrier. They thought that they were astern and to port of the Melbourne. Nothing was happening, and it was a very ordinary, boring watch. They began to smell the day's fresh bread being baked in the kitchens below. The officer of the watch, the Lieutenant JG, decided to go get some bread, leaving his trainee ensign in charge for a few minutes.

While he was gone, the order came through to take up position directly astern of the Melbourne to cover for the landing of a crippled plane. This was called "plane guard" and required the covering ship to be one nautical mile (2000 yards) astern of the carrier. The order was couched in "OpImmediate" terms, or "Operate immediately," i.e., do now and ask questions later. So the trainee ensign who had been left in charge of the bridge for five minutes did not have the discretion to wait for his training officer to return or to wake up the captain. He had to act immediately.

He ordered the turn to starboard, which should have put the ship in the exact place it was supposed to be in the minimum time if he had been correct in his belief of where he was in relation to the carrier. This order to starboard was a direct violation of the Admiral's order to not turn towards the carrier. Unfortunately, he (and the rest of the bridge crew) was wrong about the position of the Evans in relation to the Melbourne. Instead of being behind the carrier, they were ahead of it, so the turn to starboard put the Evans in the path of the carrier. When he realized what was happening, he followed the book procedure for an "in extremis" condition where a collision seems imminent: both ships are supposed to turn hard to starboard to avoid the collision. So he turned harder to starboard. Unfortunately, the Melbourne could not alter course for multiple reasons: one, it was physically impossible as it was too large to turn quickly enough to avoid the collision, and two, they were landing a crippled plane in the dark without lights. So the Evans ended up nearly perpendicular to the Melbourne, and instead of a glancing blow was sliced in two.

There was no coverup. The officers were court martialed. The officer of the watch served jail time; all of the others were dishonorably discharged. The trainee ensign was dismissed from the service immediately, but because he was not yet qualified/certified to command the ship while underway (OOD), he was not court martialed as he was not legally responsible. There was of course a lot of confusion. What it ultimately came down to was a failure to pay attention to the details: in the two hours between coming on duty and the receipt of the orders, no one had done any kind of visual check of their position, or looked at the logs for earlier in the day to confirm their position. Many lives were lost because someone did not do their duty and did not pay attention to the details.

This is all according to my father's memory and he may have a few details wrong, but having recently served his own time as a trainee ensign and recently become a lieutenant JG, he had some appreciation of the dynamics involved. And he's always paid attention to details ever since!

Hope this helps. I'm not going to put any of this in the article because my source is my father's memory, which might be great for a research project but not for an encyclopedia article. However, I do question the article's use of the word "inexplicably" to describe the Evans's turn to starboard. It was investigated and explained in great detail: the investigation took nearly a year before the officers were court martialed. Laura1822 23:41, 11 April 2007 (UTC)
 * (edited by — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.72.165.240 (talk) 00:28, 12 April 2007 (UTC) )

Secondhand story (2)
My father was also on board the Frank E. Evans when the accident happened. They have a ship reunion every year, and there is now a memorial plaque dedicated to three brothers that died, located in Niobrara.

Supporting URL --> http://www.destroyersonline.com/usndd/dd754/dd754pho.htm, scroll down to bottom for pictures of memorial plaque. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.107.0.73 (talk) 22:33, 11 May 2007 (UTC)

Photo question
Question - The attached photograph shows the bow of the Frank E. Evens in daylight ? The text says that the bow sank immeadiately (or within the first 5 minutes). So is the attached photograph a doctored photo to show what happened in the accident ? lrowalker@earthlink.net 16Oct2008 192.88.212.34 (talk) 17:46, 16 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Which photo are you talking about? If you are talking about the photos in the link of the section before this, they only show the stern sections of the ship.  In the top photo on that page, the bow you can see is of another ship, pennant number 830, with the aft section of the Frank E Evans lashed alongside.  The second photo clearly shows the after section tied up alongside some warf or jetty somewhere.  The second photo in the Wikipedia article is likewise of the stern of the ship.  You can tell that these sections are not the bows of the ship because they do not have the pennant number painted on them, apart from anything else.  Nick Thorne  talk  10:14, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Survivor Account of June 3, 1969 Collision of USS Frank E. Evans DD-754 with HMAS Melbourne
I just finished logging the readings for the lower level equipment in the forward engine room, Main Control, and was starting up the ladder to the upper level, when all at once the ship raised up and the lights went out, while steam began flowing down and water rushed in toppling me. I was cast adrift in total blackness with whatever breath I had. I began feeling the upper level, from beneath, while attempting to locate the hole where the ladder was. When the collision occurred I was approximately six feet from where the ship was severed. Somehow after a frantic search for access to air I popped up to the surface in what had become a flooded engine room. All was quiet except for a hiss of air or steam and the moans and grones of my shipmates, all who had been scalded by the 950 degree steam. I began surveying the overhead looking for the hatch. I discovered a faint beam of light from the battle lantern as it shown across the exit. I pointed out the location by yelling, "Here it is, here is the way out!" I then began to climb up to the hatch to retrieve the lantern when I was pulled back into the water by someone who needed help. I pushed them up ahead and we tumbled out on to the deck in the mid ships passageway. It was the Chief and he was badly injured. I turned to the hatch and found the electrician Peacock standing there. He and I began assisting the other up and out of the engine room. We then found our way to the rear of the ship and climbed up cargo netting that the Melbourne crew had thrown down from the flight deck. Others were plucked from the sea by rescue choppers and small boats deployed by the Melbourne. We lost 74 shipmates that night. Three brothers from Niroba, Nebraska named Sage and a Chief lost his son, Reilly, Lawrence J, SR & JR. 72.161.170.244 (talk) 04:32, 22 November 2010 (UTC)A. Mulitsch MMFN, Crew member and survivor of the USS Frank E. Evans DD-754 lest we forget

Another Survivor Account of June 3, 1969 Collision of USS Frank E. Evans DD-754 with HMAS Melbourne
I was a QM3 when the collision happened and had been aboard since about April, 1968. I stood Quartermaster of the Watch on the bridge and knew all the bridge watch officers and enlisted watch standers. Ships from several SEATO member countries (SEATO - South East Asia Treaty Organization) had ships in this exercise that was a wartime simulation. Various task forces were made up that included two ASW groups built around the HMAS Melbourne and USS Kearsarge (CVS-33) and a supply group that included naval tankers and supply ships, all ships escorted by destroyers from the SEATO members. Ships were distributed so all had the opportunity to work with the ships of other nations. At night the ships ran without running lights and radar to avoid being detected by the "enemy". At night other ships appeared as dark blobs, only occasionally viewable as a recognizable silhouette. Destroyer screen distance from the carrier was determined by a statimeter a mechanical viewing device that measure distance by triangulation. I remember the night of the exercise being overcast and without a moon. All ships of the Melbourne task force were steering a zigzag course. The course was a series of course changes left or right of our base course determined by a common chart and all ships having the same time. Something to see, the ships all ghosting to a new course. The Officer of the Deck would keep track of timed course changes and the proper time give the course change. What I believe happened is the OD lost track of the zigzag pattern. The Evans was off the port bow of the Melbourne, but the OD thought he was off the st'bd bow. Plane guard station is usually 1/2 mile astern of the carrier. So the ship was turned to starboard and given a course that was thought to be 90° from the base course, crossing the Melbourne's bow at about 1 mile distance. The OD saw the carrier wasn't falling astern quick enough so ordered a slight course change to port, never realizing we were crossing the carrier's bow. In a few minutes the OD ordered another course change to st'bd and ended up bow to bow with the Melbourne. The OD decided to continue his right turn that took the Evans to right angle on the carriers bow. An emergency all back full was ordered after it was too late. I don't think the engine rooms had time to begin reversing before the carrier hit. We were struck near the forward stack. The ship rolled to st'bd, near 90°. The stern rolled back upright, but the bow stayed on its' side. People exiting the bow section had to make their way either to the fos'cle hatch or back thru the mess deck decks and serving line to the hatch on the main deck near the galley. Those I talked to that crossed the mess decks said they had to jump from table to table (while the tables were at 90° of normal). In a minute or so the bow section sank at the back putting that hatch under water and closing what was the normal exit for that area. People gathered on the side of the bow section until ordered in the water and away from the ship by the captain. Many that made it out were pulled down by the suction of the sinking bow. One signalman landed on the carrier's flight deck. I was asleep aft. I awoke to a concussion and loud scraping noises as the ship rolled on her side. We had plenty of time in the stern. It never came close to sinking. I left the navy as a QM2, spent much of my life on the water and live on a former cutter. I think this a accurate account of how the collision happened. We had a good captain, better than most. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Johndapper (talk • contribs) 03:54, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Free pdf Book based on naval inquiries
I think it's worth examining this report (mostly it's about the _previous_ time the Melbourne cut a destroyer plane-guard in half...) because it's reporting of the factual observations of the naval inquiry are no doubt literal.  "The Cruel Legacy: the H.M.S. Voyager Tragedy" it covers the second incident because of course it has to. what actually happened on that bridge — at least in the mind of Lt Hopson — seems unknowable. "'On the night of 2–3 June, Melbourne was exercising in the South China Sea with a combined naval force. Exercise ‘Sea Spirit’ consisted of Melbourne operating her aircraft with five escorts; three American ships—Keys, Larson and Frank E. Evans; the New Zealand frigate Blackpool and the British frigate Cleopatra. Shortly after 0300, Melbourne’s commanding officer, Captain J. Philip Stevenson, ordered Evans, which was ahead of the carrier, to take up planeguard station astern. Having witnessed all that had happened to Robertson five years earlier, Stevenson and the Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral John Crabb, had repeatedly warned all of Melbourne’s consorts never to turn towards the carrier when taking station. Using voice radio, Evans was informed that Melbourne’s course was 260 degrees. The carrier’s navigation lights were then turned to full brilliance. Unlike Voyager, Evans was not working up and had performed the manoeuvre four times already that night. For 30 seconds after receiving the signal, Evans neither altered course or speed and was some 3600 yards ahead of the carrier on her port bow. The destroyer’s first alteration of course was to starboard— towards the carrier. When she continued in this direction, Stevenson took immediate action to warn the destroyer over the voice radio that she was standing into danger: ‘Watch it, you are on a collision course’. At the same time, he directed Melbourne’s operations room to ‘watch Evans. She appears to be on a steady bearing’. Stevenson did everything that Robertson was criticised for not doing." "On board Frank E. Evans, her captain, Commander Albert McLemore USN, was asleep in his bunk with two very inexperienced watchkeeping officers, Lieutenants R. Ramsey and J. Hopson, on the bridge. Ramsey was 24 and not a qualified watchkeeper. Hopson, four years older than Ramsey, was at sea for the first time as an officer. With Evans now on a steady course and heading towards the carrier at a relative closing speed of over 40 knots, Melbourne expected the American destroyer to take action on the warning signal which she had acknowledged. When Evans maintained her course, a collision seemed inevitable and Stevenson took action to best protect his ship. As putting Melbourne’s engines astern would not achieve anything, Stevenson altered the carrier’s course to port, signalling with two blasts on Melbourne’s siren that her rudder was hard to port. For a moment it appeared as though the carrier’s turn would allow Evans to pass narrowly ahead of her. But still at her stationing speed of 22 knots the destroyer reversed her wheel to starboard and proceeded under the carrier’s bows. For the second time in five years, the hapless Melbourne cut another planeguard destroyer in half. Evans’ bow section sank very quickly, although the stern remained afloat for some days having been secured to the carrier after the collision. The ship’s company numbered 273. Of the 74 American sailors lost in the collision, almost all of them were in the forward half of the ship.'" 217.110.184.17 (talk) 18:47, 3 June 2019 (UTC)