Talk:Verificationism

OCP
Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines verificationism this way:

"verificationism.  Any view which embraces some version of the verification principle. Verificationists characterize the meaning of a proposition, or the conditions required for a proposition to have meaning, in terms of the difference its truth makes to the senses, the conditions under which it is verified (or falsified) by empirical test."
 * I also have concerns about the definition of Verificationism given in this article, in that it bears little resemblance to what is actually taught in epistemology. These key concepts must be conveyed for the definition to be accuate: Firstly it is a 'criterion of meaning'. Secondly, it must refer specifically to 'empirical data' or 'sense data'. Taken together, the Verifiability criterion of meaning asserts: "Only statements that can, in principle, be empirically verified are meaningful statements". The definition, as it stands, seems to be one that presupposes the truth of the Verifiability criterion; so it is both misleading and out of date.109.144.183.183 (talk) 19:39, 25 July 2013 (UTC)


 * > "it is a 'criterion of meaning'."


 * Usually and primarily. The most famous and most important verificationists were the logical positivists. That is also when the verification criterion had its biggest impact in philosophy. But verificationism isn't always about meaning. I was going to say that perhaps the entry should be modified to make clear that verificationism is best known and primarily thought of as a criterion of meaning (even many non-linguistic varieties had and do exist; e.g. C.S. Peirce), but that is exactly what the second sentence of the introduction does: "It is a view mostly closely associated with the logical positivists of the early twentieth century, who established and applied this doctrine to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless assertive sentences."


 * > "Secondly, it must refer specifically to 'empirical data' or 'sense data'."


 * You are definately right about this. Maybe the first line needs an addition like the bolded: "Verificationism is the view that a statement or question is only legitimate if there is some way to determine whether the statement is true or false by empirical means". It would be nice to say "thought the use of our senses" to avoid technical terminology in the introduction as much as possible. But maybe "empirical/sense data" or "empirical means" is what is needed there.


 * > "seems to be one that presupposes the truth of the Verifiability criterion"


 * It shouldn't and doesn't read that way to me. Can you help me see why it strikes you in that way? If anything, verificationism is mostly dead. Although that is probably too opinionated to put into a wikipedia entry.


 * > "both misleading and out of date."


 * It probably would be better if it mentioned empirical/sense data, but I don't understand the "out of date" assertion.


 * - Atfyfe (talk) 22:09, 25 July 2013 (UTC)
 * Putting it in very crude terms, one who assumes 'hard empiricism' as brute fact or truism may see no need to specify 'empiricism' when explaining or defining philosophical positions.


 * Provided there are no objections, I agree that we should at least specify 'empirical data' as part of the introductory definition. Though a less important point, I was thinking of establishing its definition according to its most standard usage in the introduction, and to discuss semantic variations in other paragraphs.


 * I don't see any need to exclude the current consensus with regard to Verificationism, given that its failure is regarded by some modern analytic philosophers to be one of the most significant philosophical events of the 20th century. 109.144.159.163 (talk) 07:18, 28 July 2013 (UTC)


 * Sounds good! I would avoid just outright calling it a "failure" though. Maybe "collapse of widespread support"? That's a clunky, ugly phrase but it better avoids just calling the position false. Maybe something like: "The rise and then eventual collapse of widespread support for verificationism is regarded by many analytic philosophers to be one of the most significant philosophical events of the 20th century." I would also avoid the word "modern" only because of the other sense of the word "modern" for referring to philosophers from the 1400-1900 era. Great work. I look forward to reading your edits. - Atfyfe (talk) 13:56, 28 July 2013 (UTC)


 * As to what you called your "less important point", I think you are right. Roughly speaking, here is what I suggesting for the into: "in the broadest sense, verificationism is the view that a statement is illegitimate if there is some empirical test of the statement. Where illegitimacy may consist in being nonsense, false, unscientific, etc. Although, verificationism is primarily thought of the narrower semantic criteria associated with the logical positivists that a statement is only meaningful if there is some way to determine whether the statement is true or false through empirical means. The logical positivists... collapse... most significant event... etc." - Atfyfe (talk) 14:43, 28 July 2013 (UTC)


 * Okay what about something like this:


 * "Verificationism is any view that would hold a proposition to be meaningless, false, unscientific, or a failure of some other variety unless its truth or falsity would make a difference to our senses by which the proposition could be empirically tested. Verificationism is a view mostly closely associated with the logical positivists of the early twentieth century and their view that a proposition is meaningless unless it could be empirically tested.


 * The verificationist criterion has been invoked by its proponents as a powerful tool for doing away with many philosophical debates due to their positing of unverifiable statements or concepts. Notoriously, verificationism was used by the logical positivists to rule out as meaningless religious, metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical propositions.


 * The rise in the early 20th century and then eventual collapse mid-centry of widespread support for verificationism of the logical positivists is regarded by many analytic philosophers to be one of the most significant philosophical events of the 20th century."
 * - Atfyfe (talk) 14:43, 28 July 2013 (UTC)


 * I'm happy with that, though I think the introductory sentence should be simplified for clarity. With some rewording, I was thinking of incorporating a bit more information in the form of the bolded segments below (hyperlinks excluded). I'd appreciate any feedback:


 * Verificationism is any view that asserts that a proposition is meaningless, or otherwise unacceptable, unless it can be empirically tested (shown to be either true or false by physical evidence).


 * It is most closely associated with the logical positivists of the early twentieth century, who used it as a 'criterion of meaning' to dismiss as 'meaningless' any statement or belief that is empirically unverifiable; including all religious, metaphysical, aesthetic and ethical statements and beliefs. However, the core idea of Verificationism has much earlier philosophical origins, in the empiricist theory of knowledge, which states that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience.


 * Because of its stringency upon physical evidence, and because such stringency entails a broad rejection of metaphysical and theological claims, it is a type of epistemological naturalism. In other words, it is naturalism as a theory of knowledge rather than as a metaphysical position (metaphysical naturalism).


 * The rise and dominance of Verificationism in the early 20th century, followed by its eventual widespread collapse and abandonment mid-century, is regarded by many analytic philosophers to be among the most significant philosophical events of the 20th century. 109.144.253.49 (talk) 06:56, 30 July 2013 (UTC)


 * Barber, Alex and Stainton, Robert J. eds. (2009). Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. --- "Verificationism is the view that the meaning of a (synthetic or empirical) statement is given by its method of verification. A sentence, as used on a given occasion to make a (synthetic or empirical) statement, has meaning if and only if its truth or falsity can - in principle - be determined by experience." Perhaps this reference can be used to support a rewording of the introductory sentence as above 31.55.56.173 (talk) 17:42, 28 August 2013 (UTC)

Wittgenstein
A verificationist? Who says? Certainly he does not describe himself as such. Banno 21:26, 23 July 2007 (UTC)


 * No, Wittgenstein would not. But (1) what the logical positivists interpreted as early Wittgenstein's verificationism was extremely important to the development of the logical positivist's verificationism, and (2) many have seen Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument as a form of verificationism. - Atfyfe 04:04, 24 July 2007 (UTC)
 * I've never seen a link between private language and verificationism - ther is, for instance, no mention of verificationism in the main article linked to from here. I'd be interested in some references. It would appear, prima faci, to be contrary to meaning as use. The section ought be removed if no verifiable source can be found. Banno 09:39, 24 July 2007 (UTC)
 * What is the problem with having a private name for a sensation except that there is no imaginable circumstance where I use the name incorrectly. That is, I can say "I see blarg now, now, not now, now again, now, but not now" and there is no way even for myself to verify my claim. Anyway, the connection was pointed out to me in C.J. Misak's (1995) Verificationism. 53-55; 133. Apparently, it is also brought up in Peacocke (1992) A Study of Concepts. p. 222 - Atfyfe 12:27, 24 July 2007 (UTC)
 * You also could not tell that you were using the word incorrectly. Sounds quite a stretch to me. But if someone re-writes the section so it says something like "C.J. Misak's (1995) Verificationism. 53-55; 133, claims that Wittgenstein is a verificationist" I would drop the objection. Banno 12:38, 24 July 2007 (UTC)
 * Done. - Atfyfe 12:42, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

No, not done. What you have provided is an iteration of part of the private language argument(is it a direct quote? if so it should be in a block quote) which does not mention verificationism. It is not sufficient to support the claim that the private language argument "happens to be an example of later Wittgenstein's verificationism." Indeed, on thinking about it, I am unhappy with the source: secondary, or better, tertiary sources would be preferred in this case. See ''No original research: Primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. Re-inserting disputation. Banno 20:57, 24 July 2007 (UTC)
 * It's a book on the history of verificationism! Why else would Wittgenstein's PLA appear in the book? I'm not an idiot, I just didn't think any of the explicit passages where the author calls Wittgenstein a verificationist were relevant to the article. I wasn't trying to support the claim that Wittgenstien was a verificationist with that direct quote (for that you can check the book I referenced), instead I was trying to give an idea of what Wittgenstein's PLA was in the article.
 * Furthermore, the suggestion that I am violating the "No original research" policy is absurd. I am not the one making the claim that Wittgenstein was a verificationist, I am citing a respected academic work on the history of the very topic of the article (i.e. verificationism). I've provided you with the source, but I'll go ahead and do your work for you. Anyway, I don't have my physical copy of the book with me, but luckily amazon.com lets me read portions of the book. Here is a passage where Misak explicitly uses the term "verificationist" and "Wittgenstein" in the same sentence:


 * Wittgenstein's verificationism, however, survives the loss of its initial rationale. In his later view of meaning, both Wittgenstein (at times) and many of his interpreters see a different argument for a verificationist criterion. It is worth examinging this position carefully, as sustained arguments for verificationism are rare. (Misak 1995:52)


 * I'll leave it to you to remove your disputation. - Atfyfe 00:29, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

The issue is discussed by Kenny in Wittgenstein. The verificationist views found in Bermerkungen are pretty much rejected by the time of the Investigations, and the mature PLA: As we have seen, a crucial part is played in the private-language argument by Wittgenstein's advice 'Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.' This advice has a verificationist ring, and some philosophers have thought that the private-language argument depends, in the last analysis, on verificationist premises. But Wittgenstein's advice is not meant to be followed by the question 'How would you ever find out?' but by the question 'What possible difference would it make?' The private-language argument does indeed depend on premises carried forward from Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy; but they are not peculiar to the verificationist period of the 1930s but date back to the time of the picture theory of the proposition in the 1910s That's on p.195. I'm not accusing you of original research, but rather questioning the suitability of a wording in the article that declares Wittgenstein a verificationist. As Kenny shows here, it's not that simple. Banno 10:24, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

Would you be willing to go along with my re-write? Banno 20:32, 1 August 2007 (UTC)


 * This looks good. I like that we have two different angles on the PLA represented. I changed the wording a bit. I am not sure if Kennedy is representative of the collective opinion of all those closer to Wittgenstein. - Atfyfe 21:31, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

Title
Shouldn't this page be either Verification theory of meaning or Verificationism? Banno 21:51, 23 July 2007 (UTC)


 * I would stay away from "Verification theory of meaning" since not all the forms of verificationism discussed here are theories of meaning (e.g. Popper). However, moving it to Verificationism might be good. - Atfyfe 04:02, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

Done. Banno 20:37, 1 August 2007 (UTC)

Verifiability theory of meaning redirects to this page, so it might be wise to at least state something about it in the introduction, or otherwise clarify the difference between it and the other terms, for instance, the possibly more generalized nature of the term, if it is decided that this is the case in common usage. Mmortal03 (talk) 12:48, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

Cut material on Wittgenstein's PLA
"However, Private Language by its nature is a pseudo concept. the concept and definition of 'language' is the fact that it isnt private."

Well, that is exactly what Wittgenstein's PLA is supposed to show. So I am not sure what the "however" is doing here. Secondly, not everyone would agree that there cannot be a private language.

"A private language is not open to be verified or falsified, therefore making it meaningless."

Okay.

"Language as Ayer suggests is talking about sense data. this sense data is only labeled via ostensive verification and agreed publicly and a definition by more than one person. Therefore the idea of a language that is private only to one person is both a contradiction and a self-refutation."

I am not sure why Ayer was brought into this section out-of-the-blue and I am not sure if relying on the contentious issue of "sense-data" is the right way to give exposition to Wittgenstein's PLA.

- Atfyfe 07:11, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

Popper?
I don't know much about this all, but isn't Popper a falsificationist? 89.27.19.182 (talk) 03:09, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes. Although he might have been part of the "Vienna circle" when he was young, he soon decided he was not wild about verificationism and then promoted falsification instead. Why?--Filll (talk) 05:29, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, obviously because he's listed as a "notable verificationist" which would seem to me a mischaracterization; yes, the article makes note of the (unsourced) fact that Popper is often lumped together with verificationist, but I don't know if that qualifies as criteria to include him in that category here as well. 89.27.19.182 (talk) 00:34, 3 March 2008 (UTC)


 * The difference between Popper and the other verificationists is minimal. Both rule out "untestable" propositions as illegitimate (whether you cash out "untestable" as not verifiable, not falsifiable, or not both). Compare these philosophers to those who do think untestable propositions are perfectly legitimate. The terminology is unfortunate since "verificationism" implies that these philosophers mean "not verifiable" by "not testable", but that is just how the terminology evolved. Here is a good standard for if someone is a verificationist: Do they rule out the "The universe uniformly doubled in size ten minutes ago" as an illegitimate hypothesis? - Atfyfe (talk) 04:02, 3 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok, I see that and if it's a matter of (unfortunate) terminology then so be it. Still, if I've understood correctly, Popper explicitly didn't rule out metaphysical statements as meaningless or not belonging to science, only that they be rejected if the testable (in this case, falsifiable) statements they are dependent on are rejected too. Thus, according to Popper, we can have statements about "space-time" or "electrons" or "aether", but if the hypotheses that apply these notions fail, the metaphysical notions must go as well. Well, go figure, I'm not in a position to really argue this anyway. 89.27.19.182 (talk) 18:00, 3 March 2008 (UTC)


 * My own take: At the time Popper was working, he did seem like a significant alternative to verificationism. He certainly thought so. But looking back, Popper seems to just be a slightly different version of verificationism. One that focuses on falsifying conditions rather than verifying conditions of a theory. As for statements about "space-time" etc., I don't think a verificationist has to reject them as meaningless if they are embedded in a overall theory that might be verified. That would be similar to what Popper would have to say, I think. That a statement about space-time might be be unable to be falsified itself, but once embedded in a theory that is open to being falsified, statements about "space-time" can be counted as legitimate. I don't see any statement that Popper could judge as legitimate that a verificationist couldn't also in similar manner. - Atfyfe (talk) 00:49, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

Criticisms?
Could someone add a section discussing the historical criticisms of verificationist thought? Mmortal03 (talk) 12:36, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

Verificationism and Occam's razor?
It seems to me that verificationism is a very similar concept to Occam's razor. From the article on Occam's razor: "The principle states that the explanation of any phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible, eliminating those that make no difference in the observable predictions of the explanatory hypothesis or theory." Or equivalently, "The principle states that the explanation of any phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible, eliminating those that verificationism characterizes as meaningless."

Is there anything we can add to the article about the relationship between verificationism and Occam's razor? If not, should we at least add Occam's razor as a "See Also" for this article and verificationism as a "See Also" for the Occam's razor article? Or am I overstating the relationship? Capedia (talk) 01:25, 25 July 2009 (UTC)


 * Ockham's razor is different, but I agree that the relationship between verificationism and Ockham's razor does warrant it's own section since many people are sure to notice it. Part of the difference is that Ockham's razor is an epistemological principle about what theory is more likely to be true, where as Verificationism is rooted centrally in the philosophy of language position that certain theories are meaningless. "Is the universe a billion years old or start five minutes ago seeming to be a billion years old?" Ockham's razon would seem to say the second is more likely to be true, where as verificationism would probably judge the whole question meaningless since either way the verification conditions are the same. - Atfyfe (talk) 00:40, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

This included link is hysterical (funny as it could be!)
Verificationism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to:navigation, search Question book-new.svg This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2007) SavantIdiot (talk) 00:57, 22 May 2010 (UTC) SavantIdiot (talk) 00:57, 22 May 2010 (UTC)


 * I love it. No one ever change it. - Atfyfe (talk) 18:29, 22 May 2010 (UTC)

Yes, this is just hilarious! Keraunos (talk) 22:31, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

self-application of verificationism
I'm not trying to be cute here by pointing out a paradox, but is there any literature about self-applying the principle of verificationism to the idea of verificationism?

Is it possible to empirically verify that    something is true     only when it can be empirically verified?

Has anyone considered what Gödel's incompleteness theorems mean with respect to verificationism?

All interesting questions, any answers? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 146.186.237.194 (talk) 14:38, 9 July 2010 (UTC)


 * There may be some things that we'll never know about. --Nerd42 (talk) 23:16, 20 July 2011 (UTC)


 * What I just said is a meaningful idea, which seems to disprove verificationism. There should somewhere be an article on logical/paradox-based critiques of positivism. --Nerd42 (talk) 23:18, 20 July 2011 (UTC)


 * There should be. The critique that verificationism fails to be meaningful by its own standard is definately one of the central criticisms philosophers have made concerning the doctrine. I don't know of any good replies by verificationists, anyone else? One of the most interesting things about the self-defeating nature of verificationism is how even while it has always been widely recognized, the doctrine was still able to become widely accepted by philosophers during the first half of the 20th century. Why, psychologically, were philosophers so willing to look past such an obvious defect in the doctrine? I presume it has something to do with (1) that philosophers have a tendency to look past obvious, self-defeating problems with positions generally and always assume there to be some way around them, and (2) how powerful verificationism is in dismissing other philosophical problems that seem both unsolvable and also as somehow merely arising due to a confusion. "Was there a time before time began?" That's not a difficult or perhaps impossible philosophical question, it's a meaningless one! Not only does verificationism dissolve many hard philosophical problems, it also accounts for our sense that we don't even quite understand what it means to ask them by revealing them to in fact be meaningless questions. - Atfyfe (talk) 00:25, 21 July 2011 (UTC)


 * As far as the statement, "There may be some things that we'll never know about", that can be used to raise a problem for verificationism, but the verificationist could always bite the bullet here. Also, you need to rephrase it a little, since a verificationist could admit that there are things we won't in fact verify, but they do seem unable to allow that there are things we couldn't in principle verify. Also, a verificationist could argue that this is an advantage of their position. For example, it allows them to dismiss extreme epistemological skepticism as meaningless. - Atfyfe (talk) 00:28, 21 July 2011 (UTC)


 * Any criticism section should also include a discussion of the line(s) of objection from Popper, Kuhn, and Quine. Those seem to be what really killed verificationism. Also, the ordinary language philosophy of later Wittgenstein which rejected the whole logical positivist idea of analyzing ordinary language into it's true logical form. - Atfyfe (talk) 00:33, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

A difference which makes no difference ...
In the Pragmatism section, this quote is attributed to William James; however I can see no reference to this in his pages on Wikipedia and Wikiquotes, nor the Pragmatism pages. Can someone find a reference & promote the phrase into other pages if it really is important enough to appear in a summary of Pragmatism? YojimboSan (talk) 04:08, 7 March 2011 (UTC)


 * I think the wording is slightly off. in lecture two "What Pragmatism Means" in his published set of lectures "Pragmatism" James states: "It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere – no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one." However, I think this often gets reworded/summarized and attributed to James in the way this article words the quote. James might use that exact wording somewhere, but I am not sure where. More likely just a common simplification of the actual quote. - Atfyfe (talk) 04:46, 7 March 2011 (UTC)

Merger Proposal
I propose that verification theory be merged into this article. The two articles cover practically the same idea; any extra material in verification theory can easily be woven into this article. ItsZippy (talk) 17:02, 6 September 2011 (UTC)


 * Merge. - Atfyfe (talk) 17:48, 2 February 2012 (UTC)


 * Okay, I just turned verification theory into a redirect to this article. There didn't seem to be any material in that entry that wasn't already included in this one. - Atfyfe (talk) 00:11, 1 April 2013 (UTC)

Verificationism rehab
I majorly overhauled the article by deleting nearly all of it, which followed the thesis of C J Misar, who apparently finds verificationism synonym to empiricism or any trace of it. Misar includes falsificationist Karl Popper and somehow even Pierre Duhem—the conventionalist and instrumentalist who introduced the problem of underdetermination—as "verificationists". Cast the net wide enough, and everyone is a "verificationist" [British J Philos Sci 48(1):140–42]. Misar has some accurate points, and I myself admire key principles of logical positivism, but Misar's thesis certainly is not the general view among scholars on the topic. I have included Misar's viewpoint, but put primary weight on the logical positivist program, the general view among philosophers as to the meaning of verificationism. Should one expand the article, it ought to be done first and principally with details of the logical positivists' verificationism. Then, one can go to the article version before my changes—hyperlinked to here—and expand with such viewpoint as Misar's of the diversity of surreptitious "verificationism". 71.190.193.175 (talk) 06:56, 27 September 2013 (UTC)

Lede
"Verificationism aims to..." I think it should rather start with "Verificationism is a...". What is it? A branch of philosophy? A theory of knowledge? GreyWinterOwl (talk) 14:25, 27 November 2013 (UTC)

Obvious Philosophical Bias
Logical positivism constantly gets infested with biased editors and it needs to stop. Every philosophical issue you can think of will have its supporters and its detractors. That does not mean Wikipedia should take sides in the debate. The final sentence in the introduction is an obvious example of this:

"The verifiability criterion underwent various revisions throughout the 1920s to 1950s, but, by the 1960s, was deemed to be irreparably untenable. Its abandonment signaled the end of the entire movement launched by logical positivism.[2]"

This statement represents the biased opinion of only a few philosophers. There are many philosophers today who will openly defend the ideas of positivism. For example, in the article "What do philosophers believe?" by David Bourget and David Chalmers, it was found that a full 2/3 of modern philosophers alive today were in agreement or sympathetic to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Most textbooks on quantum mechanics will also argue for ideas very similar to verificationism and the A/S distinction. The notion that positivism is dead and everything in it is wrong is a complete fiction. You never see this kind of bias in articles about Platonism or metaphysics, and it does not belong here. Someone needs to clean up this Wiki article and remove all statements to the effect that positivism is dead and gone. They are flat-out false. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Nageljr (talk • contribs) 16:10, 11 January 2018 (UTC)


 * I noticed that you also removed related content at other articles. I didn't edit this very article, but at a few others I've restored some material which summarizes a source that we consider reliable for Wikipedia.  I agree about the removal of the YouTube source there, which I've not restored.  — Paleo  Neonate  – 20:11, 3 February 2018 (UTC)

Check in on criticisms section
Hey - I just did some big edits on the criticism section.

Can someone else look it over and determine if the "encyclopedic tone" note can be removed? Edenaviv5 (talk) 22:37, 10 July 2023 (UTC)