Talk:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive/Archive 3

Soviet Losses
To clarification on the ongoing edit issue by IP user 83.229.149.252.

While Soviet data covers whole of the time period of the offensive Krivosheyev's data does not. This has been discusses repeatedly in the talk page. Manninen's values are actually based on Krivosheyev's values but expand on the time period. To read the previous discussions, see Talk:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive/Archive 1. In other words Krivosheyev's values are not valid to be used in this context without either blanking Finnish losses (since they are not corresponding) or providing explicit and clear notes on the limitations of the data, as was done previously.

Edit warring is not the solution. If any one has something to contribute to this discussion please do so. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:54, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Why did you remove the note that I put? Maninen used Soviet archives, but he is the one who counted the losses and made his own estimates when he did not find some data. The numbers still come from a Finnish source. -YMB29 (talk) 16:02, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Because your note did not include notice that the data Manninen used was from Soviet archives. Instead the tag applied only hinted that the value was based on Finnish values regarding Soviet losses. It was not it is based on the Soviet values regarding Soviet losses. It is actually stated clearly in the reference section. Trying to muddle the waters with NPOV statements does not contribute to the article. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:13, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Reverting everything that does not agree with your POV does not contribute to the article...
 * It is still a Finnish estimate from a Finnish source, so there was nothing wrong with that note. -YMB29 (talk) 16:51, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * There was actually. Your note only hinted that it was solely Finnish estimate. As have been seen previously, and from archives of both sides, it was very much different from the Finnish estimates of the Soviet losses done relying solely in the Finnish data. Your note did nothing to resolve the ambiguity between values from the Soviet archives compiled by a Finn (which is what Manninen did) and values of the Finnish estimates based on Finnish data (which were observed by Manninen to be very different from his values). Your note did not resolve this issue which is rather critical with regards to the reliability of the values. Had it stated "Soviet archival data compiled by a Finn" then it would have been both valid and also truthful without any NPOV issues. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:59, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * That is what it said in the note below.
 * The note I added does not mean that it was only from Finnish data; that is your interpretation. -YMB29 (talk) 18:41, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * How else would you decipher it? Finnish estimate can refer to both of the things i stated before. Placing such an ambiguous statement to the article does nothing to improve it. Do note that i have no objections for the information to marked as something being written by a Finn, however the source of the data should also be named to avoid the ambiguity related to the expression you used in the note. As for that matter if the note below already said everything that was required then why write another? As for that matter now that we are discussing it, what would you now place in the note? How would you phrase it? You are a Russian (or so I have understood) so your view is valuable when we are finding out how it could be expressed without the said ambiguity? Or could it be written as a link to notes section where the source of the information could be disclosed in more detail? I am open to suggestions. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The numbers don't come from the official Russian source (Krivosheev) and it must be clear in the infobox where they come from.
 * If someone wants to know more details, they can click on the note. I will edit it differently later. -YMB29 (talk) 20:22, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * I fail to see what is the relevance of the Krivosheyev in this, he is the author but he is hardly the sole authority in the matter even in Russian texts. Infobox should be clear and given that Manninen's values had already their own separate citations had led me to believe that they already were. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:37, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Not clear to others.
 * Your opinion about Krivosheev's book is known, but it is not relevant here. -YMB29 (talk) 20:51, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Sigh.. its not mine, it comes also from Glantz and from Manninen. So its a sources opinion of the quality of Krivosheyev with regards to the issue at hand. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * I was talking about your overall negative opinion on the book. It is an authoritative source that is used by historians, including Glantz and Manninen. Just because some operations or sub-operations are not included, does not make it non-authoritative... -YMB29 (talk) 23:23, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Being authoritative has very little relevance if it is not representative of the matter at hand. And Krivosheyev is not with regards to the this offensive or even with other actions of the Continuation War. Krivosheyev may be accurate within the limits that has been stated in the book. However that does not change the matter that the book itself terminates the casualties for the Leningrad Front offensive to 20 June when in reality it kept going until mid July. Nor does it change the fact that very large portion of the Soviet formations which actually took part into the offensive under Leningrad Front are totally omitted from his data. Which has been noted by several authors, and even been supplemented by data acquired from the Soviet archives to make it more representative (which is exactly what Manninen was all about - he did not replace Krivosheyev, he appended the data). The authors who used it clearly noted that the source was not representative (ie. was lacking) with regards to the offensive in question. My negative view is based on that. The book simply is not representative with regards to the offensive and it is even clearly noted in the book itself. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:22, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
 * It was not written just to cover the offensive and the Continuation War... If other authors supplemented data, that has to be noted. As far as the Soviet formations, I already explained it to you on the other page, so I am not going to repeat it again. -YMB29 (talk) 20:57, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
 * If it was not written to cover the offensive or the Continuation War then how can it be used as a representative source for providing values for either? Reference notes regarding Manninen (for example) already made it clear that he supplemented Krivosheyev. You stated - if i recall correctly - that it was the initial number of committed units. That may be so, but then it must not be used to represent the number of Soviet forces actually deployed against the Finns since it is not the same value. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:07, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The topic is not the number of Soviet forces... I don't know why you are bringing it up here.
 * I am not saying that you can't use other sources that are specifically written for this war, but it has to be indicated where the numbers come from in the infobox itself. -YMB29 (talk) 00:04, 29 July 2012 (UTC)
 * No actually they do not. As long as they are properly referenced they do not need additional notes since proper cited and referenced data already gives that information. That is why we are using citations. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:13, 29 July 2012 (UTC)
 * If there are frequent edit wars because of this then it is not clear. -YMB29 (talk) 22:05, 29 July 2012 (UTC)

It is time that this dispute was escalated through the dispute resolution process I suggest that you start with a third opinion (I will not get involved in the content of this article as I have taken some administrative actions over it). -- PBS (talk) 19:12, 27 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Such approaches have been attempted repeatedly in the past without results, as have other dispute resolution means (see for example Mediation_Cabal/Cases/24_October_2011/Battle_of_Tali-Ihantala which included this issue as a peripheral matter). I had thought that status quo had been reached when it ended though but apparently i was wrong. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:18, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * As seen several editors provided third opinions to the result option but were promptly ignored when they expressed their preference to have no result and discuss the result thoroughly in the article itself. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:20, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Twisting facts is not going to help you. -YMB29 (talk) 20:22, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Can you please tell what do you think i did now? What in the above was twisting of facts? You ignored the third party comments that the use of separate aftermath section was preferable. That is not twisting of a fact, it is the fact. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:37, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Slightly more preferable to "Soviet victory," but nothing was said about "strategic Soviet victory." So you are twisting it... I did not ignore anything. -YMB29 (talk) 20:51, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * No one changed their stance after your changes to your statement. So i fail to see how you can claim they would have agreed with the second expression when they actually explicitly stated supporting the use of no result and instead relying on separate aftermath section in accordance to the guidelines from infobox military conflict. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * I did not say they agreed; they just did not comment after. I said that no one objected it, so you can't claim that I went against what others have said. -YMB29 (talk) 23:23, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Actually i can. Others had stated already at the time that they preferred to have no result. You choose deliberately to ignore them and instead went ahead with a crusade to force there to be a result line - which already in itself was against what others had said. None of this argument had existed if you had followed the advice of the third opinion which you had yourself requested. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:22, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
 * More accusations from you... I did not go against the third opinions. I already explained it to you many times. -YMB29 (talk) 20:57, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
 * So after third opinions had been given and you disagreed with their resolution you came up with a new solution which did not agree with what the editors giving the third opinion had provided. Those editors stated that they would prefer not to have result entry at all. By giving a result you already went against the third opinions as giving anything is already opposed to leaving it blank. So what exactly in what i stated above was false? - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:07, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Everything is false; I explained it above. -YMB29 (talk) 00:04, 29 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Sorry, i reposted even their responses, you can read it up there. Both state they prefer not to have result at all. I can not understand why you refuse to accept it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:13, 29 July 2012 (UTC)
 * See above. -YMB29 (talk) 22:05, 29 July 2012 (UTC)

Tactical Soviet Victory?
How can this be a tactical Soviet victory when Soviets had planned to occupy whole Finland but they failed to do that? --Taistelu-Jaska (talk) 07:48, 6 February 2012 (UTC)
 * They achieved tactical goals, including Vyborg, didn't they? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 08:26, 6 February 2012 (UTC)
 * There were many tactical goals... It should say strategic Soviet victory. -YMB29 (talk) 22:17, 1 June 2012 (UTC)
 * And why exactly would it should it state so? Soviet offensive failed in 1944 didn't it? War as a whole might have been Soviet victory but the offensive was not - as proven by the fact that as the result of the offensive Soviets reduced their demands on the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:01, 2 June 2012 (UTC)
 * No matter how many sources I bring up that prove you wrong, you will not change your mind. It is all because of that "polished historiography" you adhere to... -YMB29 (talk) 00:27, 3 June 2012 (UTC)
 * No, that is a matter of an opinion, not polished historiography. Besides there are sources against your statement. On the other hand hiding matters, like done with LF 21 June - mid July, is totally different. How would you describe Soviet result of the offensive as from the sources it is quite apparent that offensive resulted in Soviet concessions to their offer done before it? - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:07, 3 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Soviet "concessions," if you can call them that, were due to international pressure if you forgot. We have been through all this many times. You brought up some Finnish source that says the offensive failed strategically, but that hardly changes anything. -YMB29 (talk) 01:37, 4 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Can't really see anything there which would state it had been due to international pressure. The whole statement starts with 'was probably in part' which can be said also as 'had an effect to' not that they would be the sole cause which is saying that even the writer only notes that the listed issues contributed to it not that they would have caused it alone. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:18, 4 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Well we don't see him mentioning that Finland won those "concessions." There is just your speculation about it. -YMB29 (talk) 21:02, 5 June 2012 (UTC)
 * We see nothing you claimed there was either so i fail to see how that proves anything. On the other hand like you said there are several sources which state that the Soviet Offensive failed. End result is still the same, terms from the Soviets perspective were worse after than before the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:28, 5 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The terms were changed a little, but where is your proof that it was due to Finnish "victories" and not international pressure like the source suggests?
 * And I said that you found only one source that says the offensive failed. -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 7 June 2012 (UTC)
 * A little? Cutting reparations by 50% (which was not the sole Soviet concession) was apparently little? I suppose Finnish land yields (10%) were then marginal or non-existing in that case? Actually there were several sources stating so feel free to search for the discussions. So far there has been no sources stating it would have been because of the international pressure, only speculation in a source that it might have been partially be caused by it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:14, 7 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Well "speculation" by an author is always better than your speculation... What sources would those be?
 * Finland was making concessions, not the USSR... There was little changed besides that reduction in reparations, and that did not make much of a difference since 1938 prices were then demanded... -YMB29 (talk) 00:21, 11 June 2012 (UTC)
 * We were discussing the effect of the offensive - not the whole war. And with regards to the offensive it's only apparent result is that Soviets made concessions to their earlier demands. Also the claim regarding 1938 prices is of very dubious value since we have no idea if the earlier sum would have been in the same currency like has been discussed several times - neither of the agreements mentioned anything with this regards. You also need to remember that 1938 was the last year currencies were still stable and not in rapid inflation in Europe - so on hindsight it is likely both reparation demands would have been in 1938 currency (last stable). - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:46, 11 June 2012 (UTC)
 * That is not what the source suggests, as the Finns complained that the Soviets pretended to relent.
 * You can continue making dubious claims about the offensive and have your own opinion, but it is all about what reliable sources say. -YMB29 (talk) 20:54, 11 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The source you provided says nothing of it as it clearly states that it is mere speculation and even then it only could have contributed to it. Not that it would have been the cause. Several sources (reliable) state that Soviet offensive failed. There is not much more to say. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:38, 11 June 2012 (UTC)
 * So far I only saw one Finnish source.
 * Once again, speculation in a source is much better than your speculation. -YMB29 (talk) 21:14, 13 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Again, what is in the source you provided is nothing but speculation. And that does not even try to claim that foreign politics would have caused the events but rather it speculates that foreign politics contributed to the events. Quite a bit different from what you claimed it said. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:24, 13 June 2012 (UTC)
 * That is the only reason for the changes it talked about, so we have nothing else to go by. It said nothing about Finland winning these new terms like you speculate. -YMB29 (talk) 21:47, 13 June 2012 (UTC)
 * It is not 'a reason' it is talking about. It is speculating that foreign politics might have contributed to it. By representing it as 'a reason' you are already abusing the source - it does not state in any manner that foreign politics would have even been a reason for it, it only speculates that in some part it might have contributed. Source is indeed saying nothing, it is saying nothing at all with regards to the events. You seem to be forgetting the sources which were presented to you earlier but which you seem to have dismissed - as they were Finnish. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:03, 13 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Once again there was only one quote from a Finnish book provided.
 * So yes, I guess the source (Ziemke) is saying nothing at all... In fact I think I can convince myself that you are saying nothing at all too; it is just my imagination... -YMB29 (talk) 21:19, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * That is not what i meant and you know it too. You just can not represent something specifically stated already in the source as a speculation for having a contribution as a solid and sole reason. First the speculation part already makes it clear that it is not solid and second the fact that author writes that it may have contributed means that even if the speculation was true it would not be the sole cause for the event. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:46, 18 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Well the fact that the author does not mention any other reason gives it much more weight.
 * If you don't like that source here is another (War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Major Belligerents, 1939–45 by V. Rothwell, p. 144):
 * More important, Britain helped in persuading the Soviet government to back down from two earlier demands that would have threatened Finland's independence. One of these was that the Red Army should have the right to enter the country if Finland could not itself immediately expel all German forces from its soil. It was now given a period of grace to do that. The other was that Russia reduced its demand for reparations from $600 million to be paid over five years to $300 million to be paid over six years. The latter amount could be paid, albeit with pain; the former would have been impossible and would have afforded another excuse to intervene.
 * -YMB29 (talk) 21:26, 19 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Actually it does not. In case like this absence of something is not evidence of the opposite. Again, this source states that Britain helped in persuaiding, it is more solid than what the previous source was but still is not stating at any level that it would have been the sole cause and thus can not be represented as such even if other causes are not mentioned. Stating contributed to would be correct with this source. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:39, 19 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Helped means that Britain was not the only country.
 * The quote is very clear. You are in denial again... -YMB29 (talk) 21:47, 19 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Not actually, it is merely stating British influence contributed to the matter and that other factors also affected it. Those might have been other countries but the source does not in any way disclose that they would have been, you can not extrapolate from the source that it would be stating something that it in reality is not. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:02, 19 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Well it is always amusing to read your excuses when sources prove you wrong.
 * You are the one trying hard to extrapolate something that is not there. The source clearly says that the Soviets had to be persuaded; there is nothing about them being forced to soften the terms due to those Finnish "defensive victories"... -YMB29 (talk) 21:27, 21 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Again, source does not any way disclose what exactly the persuasions were, Finnish success in blunting Soviet offensives could well be understood as 'persuasion'. Also the phrasing 'helped in persuading' is already stating that some other factors also persuaded the Soviet government. Neither of your sources actually discloses what these factors could have been. All what they are saying is that British government contributed to the Soviet decision making, nothing more, nothing less. So you can not state from either of the sources that Finnish successes were not the reason behind it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:49, 21 June 2012 (UTC)
 * So where does it say that they were? You can speculate and see something that is not there all you want, but you have no sources supporting your claim.
 * Anyway, the sources obviously say the offensive was a strategic victory, so I am going to change the result to that. -YMB29 (talk) 22:21, 23 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Neither of the sources you presented actually disclosed anything with that regard. Both only mentioned that they either believed or had information that British diplomatic efforts contributed to the result. Not that they would have caused it. And neither of the sources is stating (of the quotes you presented) that it would have been a victory of any kind - even more so as the sources seem to be discussing the war and not the offensive, since they are separate matters they should be handled separately as you seem to be forgetting that war did not end into the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:31, 23 June 2012 (UTC)
 * I meant the sources about the offensive that I quoted before, see below. They mention the main strategic goal (knocking Finland out of the war) and then say that it was accomplished as a result of the offensive, so it is a strategic victory at least.
 * As far as the softening of terms, yes the sources say nothing about your claim and you can't find any that do, so it remains your claim... -YMB29 (talk) 21:04, 25 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Except the sources represent the pushing Finland out of the war as the goal of the offensive. That was the goal of the war, not of the offensive. Goal of the offensive was something else and it never reached those as discussed several times before. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:10, 25 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Comments regarding the quotes; As it is known offensive ended in all practical form well over a month before any talks were made. That is only area with combat activity was Ilomantsi, battle which Finns soundly won (Lunde p.298-299 After July 17 the front became stabilized and later actions can best be described as positional warfare - describing the area north of Ladoga). Soviet offensive (& the perceived unconditional surrender demand) led to President Ryti's personal alliance with Germany, which happens to be the opposite of the offensive's its stated goal. Only after the offensive had ended was Finland again willing to talk (Lunde p. 315-316). Sources seem to be neglecting to mention what took place in Karelian isthmus after 20 June, which seems rather blatant omission. Second source even contains error, Meretskov received his accolades only after Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, not after this one unlike Govorov. Also Mannerheim's letter to Hitler hardly passes for an actual situation report. And again a slight problem, on July 28 only area with any activity was Ilomantsi. The reason Ryti brought the matter up was because the Soviet offensive had been dealt with (see Lunde p. 314). Also described in several other sources. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:10, 25 June 2012 (UTC)
 * We have been through this many times. The sources speak for themselves. Your own analysis (or that of other wiki users) means nothing here. -YMB29 (talk) 21:43, 27 June 2012 (UTC)
 * In other words you chose to disregard all the sources opposing you and present only the sources which endorse the result you wish to achieve even though you are perfectly aware that it is now the whole issue as there exists several opposing sources your point of view just as well? How is that NPOV? - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:10, 27 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The other sources actually make clear separation between the war and the offensive. And as can be seen offensive was a failure for the Soviet Union. Discussion of the war on the other hand is out of scope of the article at hand. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:40, 28 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Like always you ignore what you don't want to see. The sources I quoted clearly say that the offensive led to the end of the war for Finland.
 * As for the sources you quoted, again only one Finnish source says that it was a failure.
 * The other sources you misuse for your purpose. You quote Platonov out of context, as he clearly is talking about only the Vyborg part of the offensive. Glantz also only talks about the first part of the offensive and the failure to advance into southern Finland, not the whole offensive like he does in his other book. The Ziemke quote you took from an older version of the book; he corrected the text in his newer version. The passage from Lunde does not analyze the offensive at all and just talks about the situation, while you make the conclusion that it failed (because the situation was quiet) without taking into consideration its strategic consequences. -YMB29 (talk) 22:59, 28 June 2012 (UTC)
 * And i pointed out that there are plenty of sources which state the opposite. That the result of the offensive was tighter integration between Finland and Germany, and that only after the offensive had been stopped, but not because of it did progress towards cease fire continue - given that Soviets themselves had cut off the negotiations with Finns in Spring 1944 that also is telling. Platonov actually states that even the offensive in Southern Karelia (ie. north of Ladoga) was not enough. Glantz's Southern Finland is vague enough expression that it could refer to any offensive south of the operational boundary between Finns and Germans - as it has been used in such a context before. Ziemke's 'corrected' version has exact same message in it. And again you are mixing the result of the offensive with that of the war. They are not the same, either discuss what the offensive did or place it in some other article. You could well add section (if there isn't one already) that offensive did contribute the ceasefire between Finland and the Soviet Union. That part is not the problem. Problem is that you are representing the offensive as a success because of the events that took place around it instead of in it. This article is about the offensive, it is not even about the war in general in Karelia in summer 1944 let alone whole of the Continuation War - it is just about the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:54, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The article is about the offensive that forced Finland from the war or played a great part in this, so it has to be a strategic victory. This is not my conclusion but that of the sources.
 * You can manipulate and misinterpret sources all you want, but that is not going to change the fact that sources (at least non-Finnish ones) are against you on this. -YMB29 (talk) 05:23, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * No, the article is solely about the offensive - of which we know what goals it had, ie. where it was supposed to advance to. Not of anything else, by discussing the actual end of the war you are already stepping out of the scope of the article. Same is true with the articles you provided they are discussing the whole of the war, not the offensive which happens to be the topic of this article. In addition some of the sources you added are not in any way relevant or have actually anything to say with regards to the result of the offensive. All of them neglecting to mention the actual goal of the offensive which was never achieved (again, goal of the war =/= goal of the offensive). Also similar results with 'Finland stopped the offensive' can be provided with quick google search but i see no point in doing so since everyone interested in the matter can do that on their own. Also deleting sources added to the page, like you did, or changing them so that their meaning changes, like you also did, is not exactly polite. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:13, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * It is ridiculous to use quotes that are outdated. Also keep your quotes separate; I know you are trying to confuse people...
 * The strategic goal of the offensive and the war was the same; don't pretend that you do not know that.
 * My quotes unlike yours talk about the strategic results of the whole offensive. -YMB29 (talk) 14:10, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The quotes are all of equal value when they are referring to the event in question. Goals of the offensive were well defined (ie. the river lines and the destruction of Finnish Army), the success of the offensive must be measured against those (operational goals), not against the ideas as to how to win the whole of the war (ie. by definition strategic goals). Your quotes are discussing the perceived - yet still opposed by several sources - effect of the offensive to the war which, while worthwhile to be mentioned in the article, is not the actual result of the offensive itself. The actual result of the offensive is still separate from that as explained by several authors in the quotes below. Which has been the point i have referred to for this whole discussion. - Wanderer602 (talk) 14:30, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Furthermore it seems rather dubious to use claims like "led to the reopening of bilateral negotiations" as basis for Soviet success since it was the Soviet Union which broke off from the negotiations in April 1944 - not to mention the reduction of Soviet demands on the terms which had been the points of contention in April or the surrender demand of June 1944. - Wanderer602 (talk) 14:39, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * You are just repeating the same claims that have been proven wrong to you many times. Will you ever learn?
 * So the main goals in a strategic offensive are operational and tactical goals, not strategic ones? The offensive must be judged only by the tactical and operational goals achieved? This is just amusing... You are making yourself look bad. Just admit that you are wrong. -YMB29 (talk) 16:18, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Which of the claims were false? You have made this statement before but never actually saying what exactly was wrong. Could you finally define what exactly is it that you are referring to? If the article is about the offensive then the article should concentrate on the offensive. Not on some extrapolation of the offensive. Soviet offensive had strictly defined goals so it should be considered as per that criteria. How would you define the result? Take into consideration that Soviet offensive failed in all but one of it's stated goals - only stated goal achieved was the Viborg. Keep in mind that there are several sources which dispute the claim of the Soviet victory (even in strategic level). - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:43, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Only one Finnish source disputes it.
 * You are getting desperate... I am not going to repeat something I just explained hundreds of times. If you don't get it then that is your problem.
 * It will probably take another RfC again for you to admit that you are wrong...
 * Also, I suggest you stop reverting my changes here to the quotes section. I have a right to separate my quotes from your poorly selected ones. -YMB29 (talk) 17:52, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Please read through the quotes, several of them dispute the result you stated. Furthermore that view (that offensive was a failure) is even more predominant in the sources which actually handle the Continuation War or the offensive itself - compared to sources which are generic descriptions of the Eastern Front. So you refuse to state what was, according to you, false? And then go off claiming that it apparently blatantly obvious which it clearly is not. Could you please tell what exactly what it is? And you still did not answer my question. Regardless of that your hostile or negative attitude does not help to resolve the issue. Please try more constructive methods of conversion. Also you already stated there the reason why i reversed the change - by placing it you are already predefining those quotes as of being 'of poor quality' or 'poorly selected' which is not in any way in accordance with NPOV that wikipedians should be following - instead you are trying (as per your stated reason) to predispose any one actually participating to the debate. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:10, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * I told you I have the right to separate the quotes I found. You put the ones that you think support your view into another section. You are trying to confuse others. This is the last time I am going to tell you this.
 * You were told that your quotes (except the Finnish one) are taken out of context, don't talk about the entire offensive, and are not about its strategic results. Again, both Platonov and Glantz only talk about the Vyborg part of the offensive; they don't comment on the strategic value of the entire offensive. The first Glantz quote is actually about the situation prior to the fighting after June 20. Lunde does not even talk about any goals or consequences of the offensive. And Ziemke corrected his error in the new version of his book, but you still cling on to his mistake...
 * You are manipulating sources as you always have done. You were doing the same thing with the unconditional surrender "as it was written" claim. This is disruptive behavior. -YMB29 (talk) 18:50, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * How exactly are they taken out of context, as they refer exactly and precisely just to the offensive, not to anything else? Lunde discusses the events related to the offensive so his comments are valid while Platonov separately mentions that not even 'South Karelian' offensive was enough. Ziemke does not actually change his 'error' at all its just more politely phrased 'failure'. How exactly are they manipulated? You are seem to refusing to take any opposing views into account which also is hostile & disruptive behavior. So far you have steadfastly refused to build any type of consensus or even acknowledge the sources on the opposing side. Also given how you have setup the headers trying to toss opposing ones into separate group 'other' is already trying to form predispositions on the matter and hence NPOV - try forming more neutral setup and i have no problems with it. Also you have not answered the question, how would you define the result knowing that offensive failed to gain its set objectives (as it failed to do, proven both by several sources as well as even by STAVKA source)? - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:47, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * So you are pretending to forget everything that was explained hundreds of times to you? Some tactical or operational goals failed, but the strategic goal was accomplished.
 * I would accept opposing sources if they actually were opposing... Just because there was no advance into Finland, does not make the overall offensive a failure... You are doing a selective quoting of sources, which don't say that the offensive was a strategic failure and don't judge the entire offensive at all, and concluding from this that it failed strategically, which is original research.
 * Once again, Lunde does not make any conclusions about the offensive being a failure and neither does Platonov. You are making that conclusion yourself. "Failed" and "did not have the success it ought to have had" are two different things, but you like to think that they are the same... -YMB29 (talk) 21:12, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Also I am warning you to stop edit warring. If you don't like the header's name, change it but don't remove it. -YMB29 (talk) 21:13, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Operation failed to achieve most of the goals set for it. Sole part of the operation that actually succeeded was capture of Viborg, like you are perfectly aware. Even the Karelian Front's offensive failed to reach its goals and less said what LF actually achieved after Viborg the better. I'm still trying to figure out what result you are actually after. Operationally it was Soviet failure. Also given that Soviets had broken off the negotiations in April 1944 i can't really see how it forced the Finns to the negotiations and even then the terms were reduced according to what Finns had complained in the spring (so 'victory' would be stretching it). So Operational Soviet failure, Strategic Soviet success? They are perfectly valid sources, just because you do not like what they are saying does not make them any less valuable. There is no selective quoting, i only picked the sections that actually handle the offensive. Not anything else. For example your addition of Koivisto's quote is on the other hand selective. It in no way connects the offensive to the armistice (like was your premise) but yet you chose to include it the quotes while it has no relevance to the offensive or its result. So what do you think Platonov refers to when he quite clearly mentions that operation in South Karelia was not enough to force Finns to negotiation table? "Did not have the success it ought to have had" is the same as "failed to reach its goals" which when we are examining an operation is the same as failure. Lunde on the other hand makes it clear that by mid July operation (in any practical sense, what took place at Ilomantsi by 2 divisions is not exactly 'strategic') had ended and that Finns had stabilized the fronts - indirectly stating that Soviet had failed to reach their goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:36, 30 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Failed to reach what goals? Not strategic ones, but you are giving more weight to tactical and operational goals... "Did not have the success it ought to have had" means it had success but could have done better, not failed, but I guess you are desperate... Platonov does not talk about the operation in South Karelia nor the entire offensive. Are you seeing things?
 * You can't just quote that the offensive was stopped and omit the part where the consequences are mentioned. Your quotes don't talk about the actual topic; they don't judge the entire offensive by the effect it had on the war. So that is why your quoting is a poor attempt to counter my quotes.
 * You also continue to repeat the same claims that were proven wrong and are not backed up by sources. The offensive cannot even be said to be a tactical-operational failure, since major tactical-operational goals, like breaching the Finnish defensive lines, capturing Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Vyborg Bay islands, were accomplished. The result should be Soviet strategic victory, or at least the reverse of what it is now - tactical-operational stalemate and Soviet strategic victory. -YMB29 (talk) 22:42, 30 June 2012 (UTC)
 * We are not discussing the whole of the war in this article, we are not even defining the eventual effect it had to the war - though there is 'aftermath' section for discussing exactly this in the article. The article is solely about the offensive hence we need to observe the result of the offensive it self - not that of the war. "Did not have the success it ought to have had" is stating that it failed to reach it's goals. Platonov actually makes the point of mentioning that even operation in Southern Karelia was not enough. You were already earlier shown to be wrong with in your interpretation of the result when matter was queried directly from Glantz (who stated that SU failed to force Finland out of war in this offensive). You seem to be forgetting that breaching of the lines was not a major goal of the operation and neither was capture of the islands - even capture of Petrozavodsk is rather dubious as being 'major goal' of the offensive. Known major goals were i) Capture of Viborg by LF (was achieved), ii) breakthrough Finnish defenses by KF (was never achieved) to threaten Karelian Isthmus from the north (didn't happen either), iii) trapping bulk of Finnish army against the northern the shore of Ladoga (since breakthroughs did not materialize neither did this) by LF & KF, iv) advancing to Virojoki-Lappeenranta line by LF (never achieved), v) further advance to Kouvola-Kymi River line by LF (never achieved). You even got the smaller ones wrong, at Viborg Bay the goal of the 59th Army was never to capture the islands but instead to create a beachhead to the northern shore of the bay (to achieve which they needed the islands but those were not the goal of the 59th Army's attack). You seem to be grasping straws here. Fighting stalemated indeed, but operationally the offensive failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:22, 1 July 2012 (UTC)
 * You are the one grasping at straws here. Sources prove you wrong about the strategic result of the offensive, but you cling on to failures to achieve secondary non-strategic goals.
 * The goal of the Vyborg Bay operation was to capture the islands and the shore, and the islands were captured.
 * The goals you list are tactical-operational, just like the ones I listed. The capture of Petrozavodsk was important (why do you think the offensive was partially named after it), so you can't just dismiss it.
 * You are talking about the email Whiskey claimed he received from Glantz? You think that should be taken seriously as a source here? I know you are desperate for sources, but that is too much...
 * Your interpretations of Platonov and Ziemke are also dubious. I don't know how you think the two phrases from Ziemke mean the same thing. Maybe you are limited in your understanding of the English language...
 * So are you saying that the strategic impact of a strategic offensive cannot be taken into account? The result of the offensive led or greatly contributed to the result of the war, which was the offensive's purpose. This is what reliable sources say, including Glantz.
 * Anyway, this will probably need to be resolved through third opinion, dispute resolution or an RfC, where you will be confirmed to be wrong once again. Do you really want to waste time with this?
 * Arguing with such historians as Glantz and Erickson is beyond ridiculous... -YMB29 (talk) 00:05, 5 July 2012 (UTC)
 * So are you saying that the strategic impact of a strategic offensive cannot be taken into account? The result of the offensive led or greatly contributed to the result of the war, which was the offensive's purpose. This is what reliable sources say, including Glantz.
 * Anyway, this will probably need to be resolved through third opinion, dispute resolution or an RfC, where you will be confirmed to be wrong once again. Do you really want to waste time with this?
 * Arguing with such historians as Glantz and Erickson is beyond ridiculous... -YMB29 (talk) 00:05, 5 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Goal of the 59th Army was to flank Finnish positions at Karelian Isthmus. To do that it needed to actually land onto the opposing shore. As stated several times. You seem to be quite willing to use lower level (tactical) goals to determine success when it suits to you and ignore higher level (operational) ones, while on the next turn ignore the lower level goals and only accept the higher level goals. Petrozavodsk was probably used since it was the only other notable town Soviets captured in addition to Viborg - it however was not goal of the operation like Kymijoki or Viborg or other such. And I'm not interpreting anything, in neither case there are anything left into doubt. Both Platonov and Ziemke make it quite clear. I did not say they could not be taken into account, I'm saying they cannot solely used like you are doing. You cannot arbitrarily decide to ignore the actual 'non-strategic' progress and goals of the offensive in favor of 'strategic' ones. You can demand RfC, and i have no problems with it, that is your right after all. Also could you finally cut out the insinuations, they are childish not to mention degrading your own position. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:47, 5 July 2012 (UTC)
 * To get to the shore the Soviets needed to capture the islands first and they did that. From that position they could have tried to capture the shore again after they could not do it the first time. So you can't ignore the capture of the islands and say that the operation was a total failure, but this discussion should be left for the article dealing with this battle.
 * I don't use lower level goals to determine the success or failure of the whole offensive. That is what you do, and plus you only look at the lower level goals that were not accomplished (like claiming that the capture of Petrozavodsk was insignificant compared to advancing to the Kymi River).
 * Once again, for a strategic offensive the strategic goals are the ones that matter. You can dispute this, but that is just your opinion.
 * After you claimed that two different phrases are the same, you can't blame me for questioning your English.
 * So I am going to try getting third options first. Enter your point of view below. -YMB29 (talk) 20:47, 6 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Capture of the islands was required for crossing, no one is disputing that, but it was not the goal of the 59th Army. Goal was to cross the Bay of Viborg. No you not using lower level goals, you are using goals which suit your own preferences. Which is far worse because it is in no way neutral. Offensive is only 'strategic' in Soviet/Russian parlance, no others attach such tag to it. Offensive is an offensive and it should be judged as such regardless of added tags. Opinion added. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:57, 6 July 2012 (UTC)
 * It is a strategic offensive; you can't ignore this fact. It is also a Soviet offensive, so we have to look at how the Soviet military defined it. I guess I should not look at strategic goals because they do not suit you...
 * And no, the goal of the Vyborg Bay operation was to capture the islands also, but, again, leave this discussion for the actual article. -YMB29 (talk) 03:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Just because the name of the offensive in one language includes term 'strategic' does not mean all other aspects should be ignored as by doing so you are introducing bias to the article. Actually it is stated in sources that the goal of the 59th Army was to cross and to flank Finnish positions at Karelian Isthmus. Capture of the islands was not the goal of the operation but required for it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:38, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Well we can look at what sources say later, but not here.
 * Again, for the final result, the main goal is what matters. -YMB29 (talk) 17:35, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Main goal which is not constant but dependents heavily on your deliberate choice to consider only strategic effect of the offensive. We can just as well consider the main goal purely on the operational level in which case offensive was a failure. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:27, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Sorry, but you don't make sense... -YMB29 (talk) 20:46, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Something about the goals of the operation from Solonin's book: 25 июня. Глупость или агрессия?
 * Со взятием Выборга все еще только начиналось. Вечером (в 23.30) 21 июня была подписана оперативная директива штаба Ленинградского фронта № 74/оп, в которой войскам фронта было приказано: «…продолжать наступление с задачей не позднее 26.6.44 г. главными силами овладеть рубежом Иматра, Лаппеенранта, Виройоки (подчеркнуто мной. — М.С.). Одновременно очистить от противника Карельский перешеек северо-восточнее реки и озера Вуокси наступлением части сил на Хиитола–Кексгольм…» [365]. citation 365. ЦАМО, ф. 375, оп. 6675, д. 76, л. 22–23.
 * В многостраничной директиве нет ни одного упоминания о том, что после выхода на рубеж Иматра–Лаппеенранта (т.е. ЗА линию границы 1940 г.) войска должны были остановиться и перейти к обороне. Фактически выход на этот рубеж был обозначен лишь как задача ближайшей (после взятия Выборга) недели! Интересная, хотя и не вполне конкретизированная информация обнаруживается и в опубликованных 40 лет назад воспоминаниях генерал-полковника М.М. Попова. В апреле 1944 г. он вернулся на «свой» Ленинградский фронт, на этот раз — в должности начальника штаба фронта. Генерал Попов по-солдатски прямо пишет: «Задачей операции было уничтожение основных сил финских войск на Карельском перешейке и выход наших войск северо-западнее и западнее Выборга с тем. чтобы создать угрозу важнейшим жизненным центрам Финляндии на юге страны (здесь и далее подчеркнуто мной. — М.С.)… 21 июня 1944 г. Ставка приказала Ленинградскому фронту продолжить наступление на перешейке для вторжения вглубь Финляндии» [194]. citation 194. Оборона Ленинграда. 1941–1944. Воспоминания и дневники участников. Л.: Наука, 1968, С. 32, 35, 41–42, 61, 73.
 * После прекращения наступления на главном стратегическом направлении Выборг–Хельсинки боевые действия в Приладожской Карелии и вовсе потеряли всякий разумный смысл
 * In other words it describes the various goals of the offensive - none of which were achieved. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:53, 1 July 2012 (UTC)


 * What was the point of quoting an amateur historian? Your sources are bad enough already...
 * This is not about strategic goals. Advancing into Finnish territory and creating a threat to the major population centers was meant to only serve the main strategic goal - forcing Finland from the war. -YMB29 (talk) 00:05, 5 July 2012 (UTC)


 * So every source provide is perfect but opposing sources are worthless? How is that NPOV attitude with regards to the issue. Its about the whole of the offensive - you can not arbitrarily decide that it is solely strategic goals that needs to be taken into consideration. And by the way, creating a threat failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:47, 5 July 2012 (UTC)


 * All I can say is that you do not know what a strategic offensive is. Enough of a threat to Finland's survival was created for Finland to be forced from the war.
 * You don't even know who Solonin is... If there are books written by real historians, why use a book by a controversial amateur historian? -YMB29 (talk) 20:47, 6 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Again, we are discussing the offensive itself. Not just single aspect of it. Soviet failure of achieve their set goals of the offensive is as valid point as any other. Solonin is an author who has written fairly well referenced books regarding historical events, often with critical view. There seems no reason not to use him. Just because you don't like his writing is not a reason to ignore or censor him. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:57, 6 July 2012 (UTC)


 * You read Solonin's books? How do you know that they are well referenced? If you want to, you can use him here, but that won't help you. I reference historians like Glantz, while you a publicist like Solonin... It is not what I think about him; Russian historians consider his works to have no historical value. -YMB29 (talk) 03:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)

Quotes
''The Soviet General Staff then recommended that the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts launch an offensive against Finnish forces in the sector from Leningrad to Petrozavodsk. The strategic objective of the offensive was to defeat the Finnish Army and force Finland from the war. On 10 June 1944, the Red Army began the offensive against Finnish forces north of Leningrad and quickly captured Vyborg, thereby threatening the capital, Helsinki. As soon as the Finnish military command transferred forces from southern Karelia to meet this threat, Soviet forces of the Karelian Front, under Army General K. A. Meretskov, attacked northward and westward out of Soviet Karelia and quickly advanced through the area between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. '''This offensive, known as the Svir-Petrozavodsk Operation, continued until 9 August and was strategically significant in that it led to the reopening of bilateral negotiations between Finland and the U.S.S.R. on 25 August. On 4 September, the two sides signed an armistice that required Finland to expel or disarm all German troops still on its soil by 15 September.' 
 * Leavenworth Papers # 17 - The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, by Gebhardt (p. 2)

'' The Karelian operations of 1944, the first phase of the summer campaign, were designed to drive Finland from the war, divert attention from Soviet offensive preparations further south, and embarrass the Germans by driving one of their allies from the war. The Stavka ordered the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts to secure the Karelo-Finnish isthmus and the expanse of Karelia north and northwest of Leningrad. Govorov's front, supported by the Baltic Fleet, was ordered to attack on 10 June 1944 to secure Vyborg within 10 days and Meretskov's front was to strike north of Lake Ladoga beginning on 21 June. The Soviets commanders well recalled the difficulties they had experienced penetrating the Mannerheim Line in 1939/40. To avoid replicating the earlier four month struggle, planning was careful, and the Soviets built up a sizable force superiority prior to the offensive. Govorov's offensive unfolded virtually as planned. By 21 June, the left flank of his 21st Army had secured Vyborg despite intense and sordid negotiations between the Finns and Germans over the possible dispatch of German assistance. Govorov then reinforced his forward forces at Vyborg with units of 59th Army, which were transported by ship to the Finnish city. The same day Meretskov's 7th Army commenced operations into Central Karelia from its positions along the Svir River. The combined Soviet operations north and south of Lake Ladoga ultimately forced the Finns to sue for peace in September, and although token German assistance finally did arrive, the die was already cast for the Finns. Soon events elsewhere rendered the Karelian operations a distinct sideshow to the main military effort taking place to the south of Belorussia. For their efforts against the Finns, both Govorov and Meretskov were promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Finnish campaign had the added bonus of keeping German attention focused away from Army Group Center. In fact, an organized strategic deception campaign portrayed major Soviet offensives on the northern and southern flanks, with only limited attacks on Army Group Center expected later in the summer.''
 * When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, by Glantz (pp. 202-203)

 The General Staff plan envisaged the summer offensive being opened with the Leningrad Front attack, timed for the beginning of June and aimed at Vyborg, to be supplemented by the Karelian Front striking out for Svirsk—Petrozavodsk to knock Finland right out of the war...  '' The moment to tighten the screw on Finland had finally come; the first June attacks, though ultimately contained, virtually exhausted Finnish reserves (so Marshal Mannerheim reported to Hitler), and after another month of ceaseless hammering the situation had grown desperate. The Finns struggled furiously to seal up every path and passage from the defile between the two great lakes but it was, as Meretskov observed, a losing battle. Soviet troops bored on with Finnish resistance stiffening nearer to the frontier; roads were mined and barricaded, bridges blown, stretches of open country mined. '''The Red Army pounded the Finns into asking for an armistice and into repudiating the Waffenbrudenchaft with Germany. Already on 28 July President Ryti appeared at Finnish Headquarters to inform Mannerheim of his decision to lay down his office and begged the Marshal to assume the presidency. President Ryti resigned on 1 August and Mannerheim took up his new post, intent on leading Finland out of the war.' 
 * The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany, by Erickson (pp. 197, 329-330)

 The Russians now made plans for a major attack which would take Finland out of the war by crushing it as the first step in the 1944 summer offensive...

''As a preliminary to the planned Soviet major offensive, the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts opened an attack against Finland on June 10. The Finns were both surprised and overwhelmed as the Red Army battered in the westernmost section of the Finnish front facing Leningrad. In a few days the Red Army forced the Finns back on the Karelian isthmus, breaking their intermediate defensive position and pushing them back to their last line of defense on the Soviet side of the 1940 border. The Finns appealed for help to the Germans, who sent supplies and weapons withheld earlier when it looked as if Finland might leave the war.'' ''The assistance of the Germans, an evacuation under Soviet pressure of almost all of the eastern Karelian territory occupied by the Finnish army in 1941, the exhaustion of the Red Army offensive, and the transfer of Soviet units from the Leningrad Front to the south enabled the Finns to hold on during July. '''Their situation was, however, most precarious. They could not replace the casualties suffered. They had promised the Germans, in effect in exchange for the aid received, that they would stay in the war; but there was no real prospect of halting any new major Soviet attack.'  ...'the Finnish government realized that there was no choice but to accept whatever terms the Soviet Union offered. The President who had promised the Germans to stay in the war resigned and was replaced by Marshal Mannerheim, who persuaded the Finnish parliament to agree to the demands placed before them and sign an armistice on September 4, 1944.' 
 * A World At Arms: A Global History Of World War II, by Weinberg (pp. 660, 703)

Diversionary moves were co-ordinated at the extreme southern and northern ends of the whole theatre of operations — the latter not merely diversionary, since a subsidiary component of the summer offensive was intended to be a surprise attack designed to drive Finland out of the war...  The attack on Finland by the Leningrad Front began on 9 June and, though mounted only with marginal force, soon consumed the tiny Finnish army's reserves. On 28 July the Finnish President asked leave to transfer his office to the national leader, Marshal Mannerheim, who at once began negotiations for a separate peace. ''
 * The Second World War, by Keegan (pp. 479-480)

While commander of the Leningrad Front, Govorov cracked the Wehrmacht's siege of Leningrad in January 1943, planned and conducted the massive offensives that raised the siege of Leningrad entirely and liberated the southern portion of the Leningrad region in January and February 1944, and orchestrated the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, which liberated the region from Finnish control and ultimately drove Finland from the war, in June and July 1944. 
 * Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943, by Glantz (p. 494)

''After Stalingrad in February 1943, Finland's leaders realized a German defeat was inevitable and re-established contacts with the Soviets. The intermittent negotiations broke down in February 1944. but the massive Soviet offensive of June 1944 forced Finland out of the war. Mannerheim stabilized the front with the help of emergency aid purchased from Germany. In return Ryti, the Finnish president, gave an undertaking that Finland would not make a separate peace. However, after the Soviets shifted troops away from Finland for the drive on Germany, Mannerheim replaced Ryti and promptly reneged on the promise. To the disgust of Hitler, Finland made that separate peace and subsequently used force to evict German forces from its territory.''
 * Hitler's Arctic War: The German Campaigns in Norway, Finland and the USSR, 1940-1945, by Mann and Jörgensen (p. 208)

''As a prologue to the main operation in White Russia, an offensive against Finland began on 9 June 1944, and Viipuri (Vyborg), the Finnish stronghold (which had German troops among its defenders), was taken on 20 June. On 21 June another attack was begun in southern Karelia north of Lake Ladoga. Both offensives were successful, and in September 1944 the Finns asked for peace. ''
 * Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944, by Dunn (p. 18)

The Vyborg and Svir-Petrozavodsk front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk strategic operation...  'Soviet troops liberated the territory of the Karelo-Finnish ASSR, the northern regions of the Leningrad oblast, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Finnish Army. Successful actions of this operation significantly changed the situation in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front, predetermined the withdrawal of Finland from the war, and created conditions for the liberation of the Soviet Arctic and northern regions of Norway.' 
 * The Stamp of Secrecy Is Removed: Soviet Armed Forces Losses in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts, by Krivosheev (pp. 177-178)

'' In order to divert enemy troops away from the target area, Soviet troops would attack Finland prior to the beginning of the main offensive. On 10 June 1944 the assault on Finland began and continued through the next phase of 'Operation Bagration'. Despite German reinforcements, by late August Finland sued for peace. ''
 * Strategy and Tactics: Infantry Warfare, by Wiest and Barbier (p. 65)

''After the Soviet government failed to drive Finland from the war by diplomatic means in the spring of 1944, the Soviet forces did so militarily in June of that year. On June 10, the troops of General Govorov's Leningrad Front began the Vyborg operation to drive the Finnish forces from the Karelian Isthmus. On June 20 they succeeded in seizing Vyborg but were then rebuffed in their attempts to penetrate deeper into Finland between June 23 and July 13. At the same time, the Soviet forces of the Karelian Front commanded by General Meretskov carried out the Svir-Petrozavodsk offensive... The offensive was designed to clear Finnish forces from the area east of Lake Ladoga. The offensive lasted until August 9 during which time General Meretskov's troops liberated the territory between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega. By August 10, 1944, the battle for Leningrad had come to an end. All the German and Finnish forces had been driven from the Leningrad region.''
 * Frozen Tears: The Blockade and Battle of Leningrad, by Pleysier (p. 163)

''In September 1944 Finland was at the end of its tether. The resources of this tiny Scandinavian country had been stretched to the limits in its war against Russia. The Soviet offensive in June 1944 had shown Finland this, and Finnish delegates began asking for terms.''
 * WWII Journal: Waffen-SS, by Merriam (p. 23)

The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation of 1944, although small in scope and conducted by a portion of the forces of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts as well as the Baltic Fleet, 'ended with a major defeat for the enemy troops on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia. The enemy was thrown back to the Soviet-Finnish frontier virtually along its entire extent and this accelerated the pulling out of Finland from the war.' 
 * Military History Journal - On the Question of Strategic Operations in the Great Patriotic War, by Gurkin and Golovnin (p. 12)

''When the cease-fire came into effect at noon on the 2nd, the remaining 207,000 Germans in Italy surrendered. On the eastern front, meanwhile, a Soviet offensive, begun on June 9, had driven Finland out of the war by September 19. ''
 * German Wars 1914-1945, by Goodspeed (p. 502)

''In the far north, the Soviets moved to take Finland out of the war in June, smashing through Karelia, the scene of humiliations in 1940, to take Vyborg. By September the Finns realized their attempt to hold on to what they had lost in 1940 was hopeless, and they agreed to terms with the Soviets.''
 * A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya, by Stone (p. 210)

''The Finnish government turned down the Soviet peace terms at that time. After the Soviet summer offensive of that year broke the Finnish front and it was becoming increasingly obvious that Germany was rapidly losing the war, the Finns once again sought peace. This time the terms offered to them in September - which they felt obliged to accept - included both the cession of the Petsamo area and a Soviet base at Porkkala instead of Hango.''
 * Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders, by Weinberg (pp. 119-120)

''Germany's other Axis ally Finland had sought a separate peace with Stalin in February 1944, but would not accept the initial terms offered. On June 9, the Soviet Union began the Fourth strategic offensive on the Karelian Isthmus that, after three months, forced Finland to accept an armistice.''
 * Politics of Convenience: Upset the Balance of Power, by Pal (p. 129)

In the Red Army's gigantic 1944 offensive Russian troops cracked the Mannerheim Line a second time (in June) and Finland had to accept another humiliating peace (September 19, 1944).
 * Encyclopedia of Battles: Accounts of Over 1,560 Battles from 1479 B.C. to the Present, by Eggenberger (p. 142)

''In June 1944, the Soviet Union launched a major offensive on the Finnish front, following which, at the end of July 1944, the Finns were ready to negotiate terms of peace again. The Finnish Government accepted the armistice terms suggested by the Soviets.''
 * Implementing Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Case of Finland, by Hannikainen, Hanski and Rosas (p. 42)

The Soviet summer offensive in the Baltic region brought Finland to an armistice on 4 September and by breaking through to Riga in mid-August, also made the German position in the Gulf of Finland untenable.
 * Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, by Polmar and Noot (p. 108)

In June 1944, Soviet troops began the destruction of German Army Group Center (Operation Bagration), while supplementary offensives drove Romania and Finland out of the war in August and September, respectively.
 * Stress of War, Conflict and Disaster, by Fink (p. 279)

Quotes 2
After July 17 the front became stabilized and later actions can best be described as positional warfare (p. 298-299) ''The Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement had served Mannerheim's purposes by obtaining the aid needed from Germany to stabilize the fronts. By the end of July the fronts were quiet and Germany was withdrawing the reinforcements it had sent to Finland. (p. 314) The military situation in Finland had returned to positional warfare and the Soviets continued to withdraw forces from the fronts. The Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus were reduced to 10 infantry divisions and 5 tank brigades by mid-August. The military situation looked more promising than even the most optimistic observer could have predicted only four to six weeks earlier.'' (p. 315-316)
 * Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in WWII, By Henrik Lunde, 2011.

It appeared that as in the Winter War of 1939-40, although the Soviet Union could claim a victory, its offensive fell short of the success it ought to have had, largely for the same reasons — underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical leadership.
 * Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East, by Earl Ziemke (p. 388)

It appeared that as in the Winter War, although the Soviet Union could claim a victory, its offensive had failed, largely for the same reasons - underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical leadership.
 * German Northern Theatre Of Operations 1940-45, by Ziemke, p.288
 * Hitler's Forgotten Armies: Combat in Norway and Finland, by Bob Carruthers (2012)

''Which quite bluntly states that Stalin's great offensive against Finns failed to reach its conclusion: Finland was not defeated militarily. In fact from military strategic view point the offensive was Soviet Union's failure, which was caused by the fact that neither of the fronts participating to the offensive managed to accomplish their respective operational/strategic missions... ''
 * Kun hyökkääjän tie suljettiin, by Moisala & Alanen (1988) (When attackers road was blocked)

''In mid-July the front line along the entire Karelian Isthmus stabilized, and further offensive operations by Soviet forces were not attempted. Active combat no longer took place here for the rest of the war. Despite the defeat of its army, Finland continued the war. The Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Belorussia, the Baltics and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force the reactionary Finnish government to accept the conditions of the Soviet government and exit the war from the side of Hitler's Germany.''
 * Bitva za Leningrad, by Platonov

''During the final assault on Vyborg, the Stavka radioed a directive to the Leningrad Front promoting Govorov to the rank of Marshall of the Soviet Union and both Zhdanov and Gusev to the rank of Colonel General. Although the capture of Vyborg and the Red Army advance to the Vuoksi River line essentially ended the Vyborg operation, it did not satisfy the STAVKA's strategic aims. & By 14 July it was clear to Soviet and Finn alike that Govorov's offensive into Southern Finland had failed.''
 * The Battle for Leningrad, by David Glantz

''By the middle of July, the Soviet offensive was stopped before it had reached the 1940 border. The Finnish army was severely bloodied but still unbeaten. Once again Finnish resistance succeeded in raising the cost of conquest beyond what Soviet leaders were willing to invest on a peripheral front''
 * Finland in the New Europe, by Max Jacobson

In the event, when this Soviet offensive emerged in 1944, it did push the Finns back out of East Karelia, but the Finnish lines then held further to the west, at great cost to the Finns, but also at great costs to the Soviets
 * Preemption, Prevention and Proliferation: The Threat and Use of Weapons in History - Page 92by George H. Quester

The danger was averted all thanks to the fact that the Soviet offensive had been stopped close to out borders... && ''Finland's second war with the Soviet Union began in June 1941 and ended in September 1944. The Finnish army weathered the storm, and the main offensive mounted by the Soviet Union in June 1944 was stopped after heavy fighting...'' 'In consequence Finland lost territory to the Soviet Union, and in addition the armistice concluded in September 1944 obliged Finland to lease to the Soviet Union an area west of Helsinki for use as a naval and military base. Finland also had to pay considerable war reparations. Its situation was weak.'
 * Witness to History, by Mauno Koivisto

Following their successes on the German front in 1943-44, the Soviet Red Army carried out the fourth of its ten strategic attacks, and it proved to be the only one which failed to reach its goal
 * Finnish Aces of World War 2 by Kari Stenman

Comments to Quotes
You took your quote of Vehviläinen's book out of context. He writes right after that: p.140:It was decided to leave the Soviet demand (for surrender) unanswered, and consequently the German demand had to be accepted. p.142:''In Moscow, Stalin told the American Ambassador that the Finns had not responded to the Soviet Union's demand for surrender. He said that the leading members of the Finnish government were agents of Hitler and completely under the control of the Germans. The terms of surrender for the "satellites" of Germany had been drafted by a comittee under the presidency of Marshal K.J. Voroshilov. The secretary of the comittee had sent a draft of those conditions that concerned Finland to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 June. They stipulated that Finnish territory should be occupied partially or completely as deemed fit by the Sopreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces, that the Finnish Army was to be disarmed, that the Civil Guards be interned, and that the civilian administration and the entire economy of Finland be placed under the control of the Soviet Union. These terms were never presented to Finland, because it refused to discuss capitulation. The Finns learned of them only fifty years later, when the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and its archives began to be opened up to researchers.''

So, Finns were shaken by the strength of the Soviet offensive and asked for peace. When they heard the Soviet reply which demanded capitulation, they said: "Hell, no!" and continued fighting. And finally fought the Soviet offensive to standstill. After that Soviet's changed their demands to something more acceptable. --Whiskey (talk) 21:09, 28 November 2012 (UTC)

Request for Comment: Result of the Offensive
Following extensive discussion during formal mediation, the two parties involved have agreed to bring their dispute to an RfC, as an effort to gain broader community consensus. They have each agreed not to post here themselves as an effort towards preventing a rerun of the heated arguments the they've already had between each other. Additionally, they have agreed on the wording of the question at issue and have drawn up short statements supporting their respective interpretations of how to move forward.

In 20 days (unless there is lengthy discussion, then it would be moved to the regular 30), they've asked me to close the discussion. The question and their statements are below:

'''What is the best way to accurately describe the result of this specific offensive? Was it a "strategic Soviet victory" or not? How should that be reflected in the infobox and the article text?'''

--Lord Roem (talk) 04:18, 28 November 2012 (UTC)

Position A
My solution is simple: leave the result empty as per guidelines. It is important to notice that the RfC is about the result of the offensive and not that of the war. Also Soviet's only eased their demands following the offensive. The existence of various conflicting sources cast doubt on setting clear and definite answer for the RfC especially with YMB29's refusal to accept opposing sources. In addition to Finnish sources also non-Finnish sources discussing the offensive - instead of that of the war - explicitly mention that the Soviet offensive failed (Ziemke) or that it fell short of STAVKA's strategic aims (Glantz). Both answers to the request for third opinion ended up suggesting leaving the result entry blank as suggested in the guidelines for the military conflict infobox (...better to omit this .. than to engage in speculation about which side won or by how much).

Position B
The result Strategic Soviet victory is supported by most reliable sources found on this topic, including books by known historians Glantz and Erickson (see Quotes section here). The strategic goal of this strategic offensive was to force Finland from the war and this was accomplished. Not all the tactical goals were achieved, but for strategic victory only the strategic goals matter.

The guidelines say that the result should reflect what sources say and should be omitted only when it can’t be described by standard terms. Strategic victory is a standard term as it is used in featured and good articles (see Battle of Coral Sea and Battle of Antietam).

Only a few sources linked above actually dispute this result, but they should not be given undue weight. Please note that [the other party] uses an outdated quote from Ziemke and quotes Glantz out of context.

Discussion
As far as Wikipedia policies are considered (especially WP:RS/AC), I don't think there are good arguments against Position A. However, position B could be much better explained in the Aftermath section, attributed to the relevant sources. In turn, the section should be linked to the infobox (Soviet victory). --Jaan Pärn (talk) 22:14, 2 December 2012 (UTC)

It is interesting to note, that those authors who use only few paragraphs to describe the whole latter half of the Soviet-Finnish war view the result of the offensive more positive to the Soviets than those who use tens of pages to the offensive. So one should really be careful how the sources should be emphasized. It is peculiar to claim that the offensive forced Finland out of war, as the front had been stable and mostly inactive 1-1.5 months before peace negotiations even began. On the comparison, Jassy–Kishinev Offensive (August 1944) forced Romanian capitulation during the offensive. Anyway, Soviets did gain land in the offensive, so they were victorious in that sense, but as the offensive bogged down in the end, which forced both sides, Soviets more than Finns, to change their objectives of the war. So in the infobox there should be: "Soviet land gain, eventual stalemate". --Whiskey (talk) 23:33, 2 December 2012 (UTC)
 * The trouble with that is we have really few sources that actually state it was a stalemate. Modern Finnish works dedicated to the Continuation War or the offensive tend to conclude it was a Finnish defensive victory, so it is really hard to use these to support "stalemate" as the result. Let me also point out that the "land gain" is more appropriate to the "Territorial changes" section. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 00:03, 3 December 2012 (UTC)
 * I think we should (typo) ^[instead of] putting "stalemate" in the result section, we should put "ceasefire" (as was done for this article: Operation Pillar of Defense, and then either list the territorial changes in bullets, or provide a link to the aftermath section. -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 16:41, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * 'Ceasefire' does make sense as part of the result and I don't think anyone would dispute that, as opposed to 'stalemate'. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:54, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * FutureTrillionaire, just to be clear, your position is that neither A or B's proposals work and that it should instead read "stalemate" in the infobox section? Thanks, Lord Roem (talk) 20:07, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Sorry, I made a typo. I think it's best to put "ceasefire" in the result section rather than "victory" or "stalemate", because "ceasefire" is probably the least controversial wording. -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 20:17, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Just 'Ceasefire' would be insufficient. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:47, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * True. I guess we could add bullets summarizing Soviet land gains? -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 20:52, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Well, the mainstream view is Moscow Armistice was the result of the offensive, which had the following conditions: 1) $300 million reparations ($4 billion in inflation adjusted dollars), later cut to $226,500,000, 2) demobilisation of the Finnish Army, 3) Finland expelling the German forces from Lapland, 4) prohibition of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist organisations in Finland, 5) permission of Communist organisations in Finland, 6) Soviet and Estonian citizens in Finland handed over to to the Soviet authorities, 7) Finnish political leadership, including the President, convicted and imprisoned, 8) cessation of Petsamo and rental of Porkkala to the Soviet Union. Now the question is how to summarise that, if not a Soviet victory? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 21:58, 7 December 2012 (UTC)

I don't think we need to summarize everything. Take a look at the WWII article. It gives 4 bullets of brief facts, and then a redirect to the aftermath section of the article. We could do something similar here. List the important points in the infobox, and then a redirect that will take the reader to the info concerning the rest of the ceasefire conditions/results. The question is: which facts do we include the infobox? -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 22:12, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * I guess an option is just to put Moscow Armistice as the result. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 22:32, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Works for me. -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 23:59, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * I'm not so sure about that. Moscow armstice was the result of the war, not offensive. The offensive was the final major military undertaking in the war, and it's result affected to the result of the war. The same end result (Moscow armstice) would have been reached even without the offensive. It was a needless offensive which only clarified to the both sides what can be demanded and what has to be accepted. There were proponents on the both sides, Finland and Soviet alike, that imagined that their countries could achieve more if the war continues. All the offensive did was prove that it was not worth the effort. I still strongly oppose the result "Soviet strategic victory". It was militarily Soviet victory in the beginning of the offensive, but in a same way in bogged down to the stalemate at the end. "Ceasefire" is problematical in the same way as "Moscow armstice" is. There is still 1-2 month (depending on fronts) interlude between the offensive and the ceasefire. That is the reason I proposed what I wrote above: It simply takes only the offensive, it's goals and hopes, and how it came out when it ended, not going further than that. Soviets did achieve tactical victories early in the offensive, that should be shown somehow in the result, but in the end failed to fulfill goals set by STAVKA. --Whiskey (talk) 17:01, 8 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Interesting. So you're proposing we only write the territorial changes in the result section? That's okay with me. But what are sources saying about this? Do sources say that the offensive lead to the armistice? -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 00:24, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Here are the quotes from the sources again: -YMB29 (talk) 05:18, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Thanks. "This offensive, known as the Svir-Petrozavodsk Operation, continued until 9 August and was strategically significant in that it led to the reopening of bilateral negotiations between Finland and the U.S.S.R. on 25 August. On 4 September, the two sides signed an armistice that required Finland to expel or disarm all German troops still on its soil by 15 September." So maybe we can write in result section along with territorial changes, "Reopening of peace negotiations"? -- FutureTrillionaire (talk) 13:41, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Come on, no other part of the war forced Finland to accept the peace conditions. Remember what was the Finnish position in June 1944, prior to the offensive. Finland was convinced that Germany would lose the war already after Stalingrad, and seeked for peace negotiations in December 1943. Stalin presented Finland with the conditions already in March 1944 but Finland turned these down as too harsh in April 1944. Hence it is utterly fair to say the offensive forced Finland not only to negotiate but to accept the peace terms. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:40, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Except that the conditions presented at March 1944 included two "treaty killers", namely reparations of $600 millions and German withdrawal in two weeks, both which were impossible for Finns to fulfill. Even Swedes, who were mediating the negotiations at that time considered those conditions impossible and even voiced out that Soviets have something else planned for Finland than an honest peace. Paasikivi asked changes for these but he was turned down. At September, reparations were halved and time limit for German withdrawal was rephrased so, that if Germans refused to do so, it wouldn't result treaty breach for Finns. And there has been some findings from Soviet archives, that even the March 1944 conditions which were presented were not the final version from Soviet side, but there would have come more conditions if Finns have accepted those presented. --Whiskey (talk) 18:02, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Point taken but it still remains that the armistice was the result of the offensive. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:26, 9 December 2012 (UTC)

How about: "Initial Soviet tactical victories, ended to stalemate. Soviet liberation of East Karelia and southern Karelian Isthmus. Eventually lead to Moscow armistice."

That contains the armistice issue in a way which follows timeline more closely, contains land exchange what happened in the offensive and also short statement about the fighting. --Whiskey (talk) 14:08, 12 December 2012 (UTC)
 * What sources say it ended in stalemate and how do they weigh out the sources that say it was a Soviet (strategic) victory? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 15:30, 12 December 2012 (UTC)