Talk:War of 1812/Archive 21

British Victory
Surely this should be noted as a British victory? They maintained their belligerent maritime rights, controlled the oceans, repulsed every invasion and burned down the public buildings of Washington. Whereas America was bankrupt, lost the majority of their capitol ships and didn't gain anything from the war while the British were rebuilding Europe.

Anyone not feel this should be reflected in the article? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Americatcp (talk • contribs) 23:20, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Americatcp TFD Personally, I agree, I think it is a British victory, and you can see in the last post, quite a few people do. Yes, the British victory viewpoint could be better represented. It is seen as a British victory from the British Historians viewpoint, but US historians tend to see it as a stalemate. Canada generally sees it as a British Victory, historically, the US has seen it as a stalemate. So wikipedia articles should reflect prevailing viewpoints, as per WP:NPOV and not give too much weight to one side where it is not warranted. I'm happy to insert this into the infobox, if the editors on here agree. The article shouldn't push one point of view, as per WP:NPOV... currently it is leaning to the US centric point of view, which I think is a WP:BIAS issue. Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:26, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * The various views are discussed in the article including the main view of historians that it was a draw. While the British could claim victory for the reasons you mention, the Americans achieved their goals in the war.  Neither side gained territory which is the usual measure of victory although in this case neither side desired territorial gains.  TFD (talk) 05:10, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * The problem here is not that the majority of historians see the outcome as one way - it's that the historians from one country view it differently to historians from another country, as do the people from one country. There is national bias with historian's viewpoints. But the article hides this, the bias is *undeclared*. So with the results box indicating a stalemate - that's the view of US historians, and the view of the US people. That is NOT the view of British Historians, or Canadian historians. That's why it needs to be changed for WP:Bias reasons. So for instance, at the battle of La Drang, like the War of 1812, both sides saw they came out on top. So the infobox says "Both sides claimed victory" [] The results box here, to make the article accurate and not so misleading and reflect the different viewpoints of the different historians, need to be: "British/Canadian claimed victory, US claimed stalemate".Deathlibrarian (talk) 06:10, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * But America did not achieve its war aims, one of its aims was to expand into Canada because its southern most population wanted more land and area to grow cotton. To say that America achieved its war aims is wrong, and if you don’t think America wanted more land then why did they start with the invasion of Florida that belonged to the Spanish and why did they invade Mexico after the war of 1812?
 * America ‘’’lost’’’ the war of 1812 to about 6% of Britain’s total armed forces, had zero money, one single capitol ship and a capitol that was burnt. The British however simply wanted the war to go away while maintaining their maritime rights which is exactly what they achieved. This article should reflect history, not the “stalemate” that never was. Especially when you consider the Royal Navy blockade and the fact that due to the war of 1812 the Americans built forts in all its harbours on the east coast. Which is what the British would remind them of whenever someone asked who won the war of 1812. It’s a British victory, anything other than that is wrong.Americatcp (talk) 07:48, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Americatcp - look personally, I tend to agree with you... I could write pages why I agree with you! But as wikipedians, we can't just put our own opinions as the prevailing viewpoint, we have to reflect the established viewpoints, or opposing viewpoints if there is no agreeance. However, we can include *both* viewpoints in the results box, as this reflects the differing national bias. Would that be acceptable to you?Deathlibrarian (talk) 09:32, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * There is a difference between opinion and established facts though, this article has a clear American bias as it is an american dominated website(through no fault of its own I might add) but it is established by British historians that the war of 1812 was an overwhelming British victory and a side show to the important issues at the time. The map of the things that Britain felt important during the era was solely of Europe, America was a side show of nothing importance, this was why they thought they would be liberating the Canadians and thought they would be welcome with open arms. Anyway, it is established by one of the greatest naval historians of all time; Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies, Kings college London Andrew Lambert that the British won thanks to the Royal Navy breaking America’s economy. These again are facts of what happened, that is why America was bankrupt and that is why the British won while they failed in their aim of expansion. I feel while Americans like to think it was a stalemate due to the proganada over history (see how the flag ship became the constitution as opposed to the taken Chesapeake and President) but in reality the Victory was for the British. History should not be amended to not hurt feelings, it is important for the facts to be presented or Wikipedia will continue to be an unreliable source.Americatcp (talk) 10:11, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * You don't have to convince me, I agree with you!But really, considering there is a US Historians viewpoint that they believe that the war was a stalemate, that does need to be reflected in the article as well as the British/Canadian Historian's view. How do you feel if the results were changed to "British/Canadian claimed victory, US claimed stalemate" to reflect the opposing viewpoints? At least that's better than the infobox just staying as stalemate? Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:19, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * There is a false assumption here that such a thing as a single national bias exists. That is certainly false for the Canadian case – there are multiple positions, including the academic scholars ( who avoid announcing winners and losers),  Popular historians from English-Canada (especially Ontario), Historians from French Canada (who ignore the entire war and do not teach it), and the first Nation, which is the article showed played a major role in the war, but is downgraded as not true Canadians by the English Canadian writers. These four groups all strenuously disagree with each other.  For example it was a major claim for over a century by the popular English Canadian writers that the English-speaking Canadians basically defeated the United States, with minimal help from the British of the Indians.  Led by academic scholars especially C.P. Stacey this false myth was finally discredited in the 1940s, Although you still hear from time to time.  Rjensen (talk) 13:41, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I think that would be far more acceptable than what the current article states. I also think it needs to be amended to show that the US war aims were not all met, and the significance of Charles Napier but that is for another time.Americatcp (talk) 10:35, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Ok, well we will leave it a bit, see if anyone else has opinions on the US historian bias, to establish consensus. If all good, I will update the infobox.Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:50, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Is this Charles Napier? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_James_Napier How does he fit into the war of 1812?Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:50, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * No you are mistaken, I am speaking of Captain Charles Napier of HMS Euryalus, the greatest mind since Nelson. Under the admiralty commanded by Vice Admiral Cockburn, Napier and his men after fighting Napoleon changed the tide of the war of 1812 by sailing to America with better trained men and better frigates such as the Shannon who famously took the Chesapeake in 11 minutes. He took part in the Chesapeake bay campaign, and captured fort Washington with a small band of Royal Marines without taking a single casualty and only one battery ever being fired. He was responsible for numerous feats and naval victories all throughout the war and challenged the constellation to a 1-1 duel in his boredom while in the Royal Navy blockade(the same blockade that the President tried to pass through and failed). Napier was one of if not the greatest naval mind during the war and his contributions as well as the New frigates from Europe in 1814 are what caused such a devisive victory for the British.Americatcp (talk) 11:53, 16 January 2018 (UTC)

While not denying Charles Napier's abilities and later renown, I think you overemphasise his activities during the War of 1812. The blockade was well established and effective long before he arrived on the scene in 1814. HMS Shannon had been on the North American station since 1811, long before Napier got there and the action with Chesapeake was June 1st 1813 while Napier was still in European waters. He was a post captain with no real fleet command responsibilities. Dabbler (talk) 15:30, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Concur with Dabbler, Shannon won because of her Captian who until he won was considered a bit of an oddball.Tirronan (talk) 15:59, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Absolutely Shannon won due to her captain, the experience of the British was what set them apart even when the Americans had larger and more gunned frigates. Napier was hailed as the greatest mind since Nelson, not to mention the taking of the Fort, and the subsequent achievements. I highly recommend watching Professor Lambert’s lecture on the war of 1812 at the bicentenary at the George Washington Memorial in VA. He is extremely consistent.Americatcp (talk) 16:41, 16 January 2018 (UTC)

Apropos of the above discussion, the Naval Chronicle at the time (which I happen to have read) certainly did not regard it as a victory. Especially given the status quo outcome I think it would be a mistake to represent it as other than a stalemate. ... I do wonder what the outcome would have been if Cochrane had been allowed to turn up. Pinkbeast (talk) 21:09, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * I don't think that's a fair description of the Chronicle, it did indeed regard it as a victory, especially when it was described when the war broke out as " Some of ihe recent proceedings of the American Senate breathe a more than ordinarily violent and war-disposed spirit against England." And especially when examining letters to the Admiralty office in 1814 .Americatcp (talk) 21:44, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I do think it's a fair description and also obviously the description at the outbreak of war does not inform the outcome. Pinkbeast (talk) 22:48, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * How can it be a fair description when it is not what the Chronicle conveys? the letters to the Admiralty clearly show the British dominance towards the end of the war and the fact they saw the American frigates as little other than target practice. This is also backed up with how Napier challenged one of the US Capitol frigates to a 1-1 in his absolute boredom due to the US being utterly unable to mount any attack against the Royal Navy blockade.Americatcp (talk) 22:53, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * It is what the Chronicle conveys; I've read it. Naval supremacy does not assure victory; if it did, Napoleon would have had much greater difficulties. Pinkbeast (talk) 23:24, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I have also read it. How can you possibly reach that conclusion? The United States was bankrupt due to the Royal Navy blockade. Their economy wrecked. They were trading with France and Britain prior to the war and in doing so left them no other options when the war broke out. The Royal Navy was directly responsible for the economic collapse of the US in the war of 1812. These are established facts. This is how Britain fought and won wars, via the navy.Americatcp (talk) 23:56, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * You are certainly fortunate to have had that opportunity. Even the various printings of selected items from the Naval Chronicle are, alas, in short supply. You are quite right, of course, that the war had a considerable effect on the US; but as of course you know the UK did not demand significant concessions beyond the status quo in the peace treaty. Pinkbeast (talk) 02:14, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * that is because Britain already had everything it wanted, maintain belligerent maritime rights as they had before the war, and stopped the annexation of Canada Americatcp (talk) 07:14, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * That's as may be, but what they got is status quo. If they wanted status quo, lucky them. That's much of why this discussion is pointless; any assertion about victory will inevitably be problematic, producing these exercises in nose-counting of historians, whereas what we have now - invasion attempts failed, reversion to status quo - is undeniably the complete truth. Leave it be! Pinkbeast (talk) 13:18, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * "What they got is status quo" What they got was belligerent maritime rights that helped begin Pax Britannica, invasion attempts *by the US* failed. The whole argument is that the war is viewed differently by different nations, mainly because frankly to the British and the Canadians it was a victory (And to any one with any sense of logic). Therefore the box needs to reflect that. It is a disservice to state it was a stalemate as it currently does, because it simply was not.Americatcp (talk) 21:44, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I think the British got nothing of the kind _from_ the War of 1812. The complete dominance of the Royal Navy would have ensured Britain could do whatever she liked at sea in any event. Invasion attempts on both sides failed; the British did not take New Orleans. Presently the infobox reflects what actually happened, a vast improvement on reflecting each side's post-war assertions. Pinkbeast (talk) 12:23, 18 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Donald Graves is a top Canadian expert. he does NOT say US lost the entire war--the cite in note 6 refers ONLY about the Battle of Châteauguay.  What Graves actually writes is: "the outcome of the conflict may have been ambiguous but the results for the [US] Army were much more positive."  Graves Journal of military history January 2015 page 185.  Rjensen (talk) 10:15, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Rjensen“The Americans have been getting away with this nonsense for two centuries,” grouses Canadian historian Donald Graves, one of Canada’s most prolific writers on the War of 1812. “In their version of the war, the fact that they got defeated doesn’t even rate a mention.” -seems pretty clear what he thinks about who one the war.Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:29, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Well spotted Death, seems pretty clear to other historians either. More evidence of RJensen cherry picking to fit his agenda.Americatcp (talk) 10:41, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * No Gates is talking about one battle that he just wrote a book about. He wrrote an entire article Donald Graves, “Who Won the War of 1812?,” Canada's History (December 2012-January 2013): 23. 18. It states: "Two centuries after it was fought, there are still doubts and competing claims as to Who Won the War of 1812....This uncertainty about the victor is a modern phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, there was little doubt in the minds of American, British, or Canadian historians as to who was the victor....By now it must be evident that there can be no satisfactory answer to the question, who won the War of 1812? That being the case, perhaps the question might better be, who lost the War of 1812? On this point there is fairly unanimous agreement on the part of American, British, and Canadian historians that it was the Aboriginal peoples east of the Mississippi who lost the war." Rjensen (talk) 10:53, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Rjensen Ok, I see what you are saying, but I think it's actually ambiguous. I have read that sentence about three times now, and yes I think it could be talking about the battle, and he could be talking about the war. However, I think he is talking about the war... because this article also states that he agrees with Lambert, and Hickey, that the British won []. Please have a read, it's pretty clear. Deathlibrarian (talk) 07:09, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * if you want to know what Graves thinks about “Who Won the War of 1812?,” Canada's History (December 2012-January 2013) let me know and I will send a copy. His essay is 2400 words long and I excerpted it here (He says: there can be no satisfactory answer to the question, who won the War of 1812?). or you can take a snippet of two partial sentences strung together in (I suggest) an out of context fashion by a politicized editor at a magazine. Rjensen (talk) 07:15, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Rjensen I have two articles that both say he believes Britain won the war The above article - and please read this one: "Despite their disagreements about the start of the war, they agree about the end. The British won, despite what Americans may think. The British kept Canada, as well as the maritime policies that Americans say were the reason for the war"Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:18, 24 January 2018 (UTC)
 * who are you quoting there? what does he say about british-controlled Indian state? about the abolition of 1807 Orders in Council?  About british policy of never again impressing an American? Rjensen (talk) 18:18, 24 January 2018 (UTC)


 * There is a claim (above) that They [UK] maintained their belligerent maritime rights, controlled the oceans, repulsed every invasion and burned down the public buildings of Washington. Whereas America was bankrupt, lost the majority of their capitol ships and didn't gain anything from the war while the British were rebuilding Europe well no. UK voluntarily gave up its belligerent maritime "rights" That Americans denounced. It stopped impressing American sailors. In 1812 it responded to the American threat of war by repealing the hated Orders in Council (1807)-- but the Americans declared war thinking they were still in effect, because of slow travel times. The Royal Navy did indeed control the oceans And it did burn a few buildings in Washington. It was promptly defeated in a major battle at Baltimore, and its top general left it dead.  Its invasion of New York was a fiasco that can only be compared to the American fiasco at Detroit in 1812.  America was not bankrupt, and gained a great deal from the war say the economic historians (none of whom are cited for the economic history-- The standard scholarship on this is Curtis Nettels, The emergence of a national economy: 1775-1815 (1962) pp 335-40.) The United States made a major mistake in 1811 during peacetime in abolishing the National Bank. The wartime solution was to borrow the money for the war, and hundreds of brand-new banks emerged that issued paper money that provided the necessary financing (it also caused inflation, which happens in every US war).  There was no risk of "bankruptcy"--It seems we have a British naval historian who invented that economic theory.  Furthermore the national government controlled vast acreages of valuable farm land in the West, which gave it a very healthy long-term balance sheet.  Yes, imports and exports dramatically declined,  and the shipping industry & sailors on the East Coast were indeed badly hurt.  However American money turned to manufacturing, since there no longer was competition from British or European factories.  This was the explosive birth of the American Industrial Revolution.  On the whole the United States, apart from those port cities, was wealthier in 1815 than had been in 1812.   Meanwhile the British economy was stretched to the breaking point, and the British leaders gave that as a major reason for coming to peace terms at Ghent. Businessmen were demanding resumption of trade, and manufacturers were  increasingly losing the entire American market to those new factories being built in the US.  The Luddite riots were affecting most of the industrial centers in England, and there was widespread fear among the elites of a revolution.  The fear continued after Napoleon surrendered, and reached a peak at the Peterloo Massacre in 1819. Malcolm Thomis and Peter Holt, Threats of revolution in Britain 1789 to 1848'' (1977) state that, "More alarming to the authorities ... and more suggestive Of revolutionary intent was the wave of machine-breaking, known as Luddism." [p 32] "what Luddism did illustrate, and this was in itself alarming enough for the authorities, was a remarkable capacity for organization within the working class ranks and a remarkable solidarity in the protection of the law breakers and their secrets." [ p 33] "it was also frightening because of the methods that if employed, for Luddism involved the systematic use of organized and controlled violence the achievement of its aims."  The government called out 12,000 regular troops to suppress Luddism. [p 35] There was no such fear of revolution in the United States, and political internal pressures affected the British negotiations, but not Americans. Rjensen (talk) 16:34, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

How can you possibly claim "There was no risk of "bankruptcy"--It seems we have a British naval historian who invented that economic theory." ?? This was the reason the US could not continue the war. the US government was unable to meet even the national debt interest payments, this was discussed when letters were sent from Dallas to the Boston Commissioner for loans on 9 November 1814.

By 27 November even Dallas appeared dejected, he wrote that his "means consisted first of a fragment of an authority to borrow money, when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue Treasury notes, which none but necessitous creditors or contractors in distress ... seemed willing to accept" This was confirmed on the 29th of November when $132,000 was due in Holland as interest on the Louisiana loan stock, which was in fact paid to the Willinks by the British banker Alexander Baring, although according to Gallatin, other Dutch bankers were still owed money for diplomatic expenses. By 2nd of December Dallas admitted that $200,000 in dividends in America were unpaid. On 16 and 31 December "two temporary loan repayments of $250,000 each, which became payable to the State Bank in Boston were not paid, it having been impractable in consequence of the general suspenion of payment in specie' precipitated by the British occupation of Washington. Dallas confirmed this to Congress on 6th February 1815 that "they remain uunpaid". "From the same causes", Dallas said Treasury notes also due for redemption worth $2,799,200 went unpaid, like the loans still unpaid in February 1815, since "The Treasury was unable to make any other provision than that of Treasury notes. The worsening shortage of specie made the redemption and interest of Treasury notes an increasingly serious problem. - JCBL 'an account of the receipts and expenditures for the year of 1814', IBID p 668 Secretary of the Navy Jones to Navy Agent John Bullus, NYHS Gallatin papers II. Letterbook II, pp 215-219.

Continuing, respect for Treasury notes, that was still unacceptable to several Boston banks a year before continued to fall. By 14th December a 25% discount and according to Greene "the expectation of a new emission renders their further depreciation very probable." Prior to this when Campbell submitted his "Financial Statement" to the Senate on 26th of September he shortly after resigned admitting he had been "humbled" by the task, his replacement of course Alexander Dallas. Who confrimed on 17th October an estimated shortfall in revenue for the remainer of 1814 of $13.8m and argued for further loans and Treasury note issues. Bear in mind the $8m of Treasury notes already issued circulated only at an increasing discount representing a potential loss for holders. - JCBL Box 161, f.3 Greene to Ives dated Boston, 29th October 1814. In October Jones had written to Madison "Seamen unpaid and not a dollar to move them" - Brandt, James Madison, vol 6 p345. When Congress refused compensation to the already unpaid men of Barney's Chesapeake gunboat flotillas for clothing lost in action, but nonetheless ordered them to recover merchant's property from Baltimore harbour, their commanding officer offered his resignation. Secretary of the Navy Jones instructed one Navy agent that debts should be paid only in Treasury notes "or in money 60 or 90 days after purchase". But the Naval contractors A. & N. Brown, employing "one thousand Carpenters' bulding warships on lake Ontario, protested that "it will ruin us if money is not sent from the Navy department that will pass in this state". "One hundred thousand dollars was Due on 22nd December 1814, and the Like Sum on the first of February 1815 ... if we are to be paid in money Seven Per Cent under par we never will be able to fulfil our contract" - pp 686-7 Adam and Noah Brown to Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Crowningshield, dated New York, 15 January 1815. Requisitions of Navy agents, going back over three months, totalling $800,000, had had to be "laid over again". James Madison, vol 6 p 345. The American governments poor payment record can have done little to motivate its contractors.

In Maryland, a bill of exchange for the Mint's purchase of copper for striking cents was "protested and returned unpaid". The Mint's last supplies of copper were exhausted in 18134, and no cents were struck in 1815. - Seybert, statistical annals p549 and also P Smith ' Americas copper coinage 1783-1857 p 149-74'. The repercussions of British commercial blockade were reaching even the everyday transactions of ordinary people.

I wonder how you can mock a "naval historian" while calling yourself a historian on 1812 when you are unaware of very basic facts. Facts that even the US War Department in 1942 maintained.Americatcp (talk) 17:20, 20 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Boston bankers did refuse to help finance the war, as a political tactic of the Federalists. so there were long delays in the northeast. But there was no "bankruptcy"--actually the government got all the money it needed by borrowing from the new banks as Nettels points out. That did cause 30% inflation (all US wars had lots of inflation) but it did not dry up the $$$$ needed for munitions, supplies, etc.  and there were no major shortages.  Historians have not reported a major issue of missing ships or supplies because of any bankruptcy.  Heavy purchases of war supplies helped the US factories grow fast--that's one reason GDP grew fast in 1812-1815 (by 3% a year) (a bit faster than today!) --compared with negative 1% a year decline in UK (1811-21).  As for Dallas, the snippets you quote are from his lobbying Congress for a new national bank--which he got and which cleared up the wartime problems caused by Boston bankers. See Raymond Walters Jr, "The origins of the Second Bank of the United States." Journal of Political Economy 53.2 (1945): 115-13 for actual scholarship by experts. As for historical credentials you might look at Richard J, Jensen for some details. Now please tell us about your credentials as a historian=-- i note that you have added only 13 words in all to actual articles in Wikipedia (the 13 words were about submarines) despite all the talk page bravado.  Rjensen (talk) 18:11, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

Interesting revisionist history there, the US was indeed bankrupt as previously explained, contributed massively by specie and the burning of Washington. Remarkable how now you resort to personal attacks, what relevance is my contributions? The "Bravado" is on your part who calls yourself a historian yet is unaware of so many facts. Everyone acknowledges the Royal Navy blockades consequence on the US economy and trade, again, even in 1942 the US War department acknowledged it. Perhaps you should speak to them yourself if you feel they are wrong also? Very interesting. In fact the war of 1812 benefited the US in a sense of making new means of GDP growth due to the economic blockade. However this wasn't truly utilised till at least 1825 with the opening of the Erie canal, The rise of wage labour at the heart of the Industrial Revolution also exploited working people in new ways. The first strike among textile workers protesting wage and factory conditions occurred in 1824 and even the model mills of Lowell faced large strikes in the 1830s. When the national bank closed, state governments responded by creating over 200 state-chartered banks within five years. Indeed, this rapid expansion of credit and the banks' often unregulated activities helped to exacerbate an economic collapse in 1819 that resulted in a six-year DEPRESSION.

I find it also odd that the US economy grew by the Treasury issuing it's own notes, the US itself was very much broke, had no means of paying labourers or seamen (as previously referenced with the Chesapeake debacle) and had no way of borrowing from other nations who saw them unable to protect their own trade, due to the British.

Do you think these things did not happen? do you think that the US was not in huge debt and unable to pay them off? if so then you are remarkably wrong. Americatcp (talk) 18:31, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * there was never a bankruptcy. The US had modest war debts (national debt $127 million in 1815, compared to $925 million in GDP) up from --it was rich and growing fast (3% a year)  and as soon as it set up the 2nd Bank (1816) it caught up with the old bills. Boston Federalist bankers indeed before the peace treaty they worked hard to sabotage Madison's war.  But they were disgraced by Hartford Convention and Federalist Party quickly collapsed.  England was shrinking (-1% a year) and had a much harder time paying its much higher debt of £860 million--its annual GDP was about £540 in 1815 see https://www.measuringworth.com/ukgdpir/result.php).  As for the British blockade, it hurt Boston and other northeast ports but it helped the new factories who no longer had British products to compete with and the 150+ new state banks that sprang up during the war did not have to compete with British gold. Rjensen (talk) 19:01, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

You make these claims about GDP as if they had any relevance during the war, again GDP is measured by the Treasury using its own bills, not specie which was the forefront at the time. Throughout 1813 the level of American exports had continued to decrease, total exports had falled from $38.5m in 1812 to $27.9m in 1813, a fall of almost 28%. Desertion was rife in the US Army, particularly when the bankrupt US government could no longer afford to pay or feed its soldiers in the last year of the war. Often backed by their governors, state militia regularly refused to cross borders, particularly when it meant fighting the enemy on the other side. A furious Madison tried but failed to place them under federal authority. - Troy Bickam Professor of History TAMU.

By February 1814 Joseph Pearson of NC told the house that "the expenditures of the Government from January 1812, to January 1815 will have exceeded ninety millions of dollars, exclusive of many millions of outstanding claims" -D Dewey 'financial history of the United States 1903; 12th edition' Pearson's estimate that "the public debt will, at the close of the present year, exceed one hundred and five millions of dollars" was particularly different to that of Gallatin's estimates. Representative Pearsoon worried that "the proportion which my constituents will have to pay ... unless you restore peace and commerce" would be "more than they are able to pay" - Ibid p 125 and AC 13-2, 1453.

Pearson went on to put his finger on the vulnerable inter-relatioship between the banks and the Government: "Suppose some of the principal banks were to contract for the greater part of the proposed loan, and issue their own paper on the credit of the stock to be created; these bills not finding heneral circulation, or a shock given to the institutions, either by accident or mismanagement, what would be the situation of the Government? Their finances would be deranged, their credit impaired - enriched with debt, but their coffers empty" -Suppose some of the principal banks were to contract for the greater part of the proposed loan, and issue their own paper on the credit of the stock to be created; these bills not finding heneral circulation, or a shock given to the institutions, either by accident or mismanagement, what would be the situation of the Government? Their finances would be deranged, their credit impaired - enriched with debt, but their coffers empty" - AC:13-2 1452.

Nevertheless 24th March 1814, Congress authorised another loan of $25m and a further issue of $10m Treasury notes. The Chairman of the House Foregin Relations Committee, argued that, "The sum proposed" was, "indispensably necessary to meet the expenses of the ensuing year." Even now some denied the need for further credit. Such opponents, Calhoun insisted, appeared "bold in facing bankruptcy." - AC:13-2 p1689, Loan Bill 25 February 1814. Without these steps the 'National Intelligencer' predicted "the bankruptcy of the Treasury; confusion and anarchy at home; and...an ignominious submission to whatever terms the arrogance of the enemy might dictate" - D Hickey p166 quoting "The National Intelligencer", Washington March 12th 1814. This was remarkably similar to what was going to happen within a year, when the loan failed.

It was not a matter a matter of the United States long-term potential which remained under-developed and enormous, but present ability to pay those with an immediate and unassailable right to be paid. For most contemporary Americans, this meant payment in specie, a universally acceptable currency, unlike the discounted State or private bank notes, or more Treasury notes. As already noted the first formal notification of the governments inability to meet even interest payments on the National Debt was sent by Dallas to the Boston commissioner of Loans 9th November 1814.

Continued through from 22 August 1814 when the government offered another $6m in bonds, but even at a 20% discount, subscribers offered only $3.5m, of which the government only received $2.5m "in money." - JCBL B&I corr.. Box 160 letter 6, Ives to Greene. Again, subscribers defaulted on $410,000. When state banknotes worth only 65% in specie were accepted for some stock, early subscribers demanded supplementary stock to make up the difference. - D Dewey op.cit p134. The government returned to the original subscribers at 12%, and improved their terms, but for bonds worth $4m, received only $2.5m in cash. The high pointwas reached in late July when, of the $25m sought, $10.4m in cash had been received. The 4th of March issue of $10m of Treasury notes only ever brought in $7.2m. Of the final $9m instalment authorised, nothing was ever raised. - JCBL: 'Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the year 1814'. Washington, A&G Way, 1815. It now remained only for the government irself to default.

Jacob Barker tasked with finding money for the Treasury indentified the cause of the lack of funds and impending insolvency when he wrote to John Armstrong, the secretary of war, that "The success of the allies and the general blockade, operatee very much against the loan; so difficult is it to raise money that Mr Parish told me it was impossible to raise a single $100,000 in Philadelphia on a deposit of United States stock" - R Guernsey New York City & Vicinity during the war of 1812-15, being a Military, civic and financial local history of that period, New York, Charles Woodward, 1889-95 2 vols, Vol II p270.

This level of financial embarrassment was becoming increasingly evident, Madison put "motion 2" before his cabinet meeting on the 23rd June 1814, which dealth the matter which Madison and Monroe had made the crucial point of the cause of the war of 1812 in October 1812. It asked, "Shall a treaty of peace silent on the object of impressment be authorised?" When asked for their opinion the following day, all voted "no" except WilliamJones, until so recently Secretary of the Treasury, and John Armstrong Secretary of War, "who were aye" -James Madison Papers online 'James Madison to Cabinet June 23 1814'. These were precisey the two who knew just how weak the United States had become, both financially and therefore militarily. On 27 June, exactly the day on which the French Minister wrote of their "fright", Madison again consulted his Cabinet. According to Madison, "in consequence" of Baynard and Gallatin's letters, and "other accounts from Europe as to the ascendary & views of Great Britain & the disposition of the great Continental powers, the preceding question No 2" was again put to the Cabinet - Madison Papers online includes note from June 27 1814. This time it was unanimously "agreed to by Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong and Jones, Rush being absent". Secretary of state Monroe was instructed to inform the American Peace Commissioners that an American insistence on a British end to impressments, as a prerequisite of peace, had been abandoned. - JHL Jonathan Russell, Corr; secretary of state Monroe to Peace commissioner Russell, Washington 27 June 1814. Nor would government revenues meet the cost of an American occupation of Canada. British commercial blockade without American prior fiscal reform, and now no longer accompanied by any American legislative trade restrictions, had eviscerated American war aims.

So when earlier when it was claimed that the Americans got what they wanted and impressment ended, it not only was nothing to do with America and the war, but didn't formally end for 30 years after. America didn't achieve any of its aims and once again, was bankrupt.Americatcp (talk) 20:42, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

Results in infobox - change to reflect National bias of Historians
As per previous discussion, I would like to change the results of the infobox to reflect the national bias of the historians, and the various sides about the results of the War. I am proposing to use "US claimed stalemate, British/Canadian claimed victory, ". There is national bias with historian's viewpoints, but the article hides this, the bias is *undeclared*. So with the results box indicating a stalemate - that's the view of US historians, and the view of the US people. On the whole, that is NOT the view of British Historians, or Canadian historians. That's why it needs to be changed for WP:Bias reasons. So for instance, at the battle of La Drang, (like the War of 1812), both sides saw they came out on top. So the infobox says "Both sides claimed victory" [] The results box here, to make the article accurate and not so misleading and reflect the different viewpoints of the different historians, need to be: "British/Canadian claimed victory, US claimed stalemate".Americatcp and I both think this is a more accurate reflection of the results, please speak up if you have any objections.Deathlibrarian
 * Agree Americatcp (talk) 21:45, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Disagree The article says "By 1814, both sides had either achieved their main war goals or were weary of a costly war that offered little but stalemate." The article also says that Wellington considered it a draw. The British did not get their desired Natve American buffer state in he Northwest, nor did they get the desired access to the Mississippi. A couple of Wikipedia editors cannot turn a draw into a British victory. Edison (talk)
 * Edison This is not about a couple of Wikipedia editors, this is about what the historians say about who won the war - the article should reflect the difference between what British and Canadian historians say, and what US historians say. Do you want an infobox that reflect a US centric viewpoint??? Shouldn't we remove the bias from the infobox? Deathlibrarian (talk) 22:20, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Nonsense the Americans 'did not achieve their main war goals and were entirely bankrupt The British were not, they simply wanted the sideshow in America to go away. This is especially apparent with the amount of frigates in the area and the fact that Napoleon was about to invade Russia which the British were also on the forefront of. America wanted expansion, and was more concerned with slaves and cotton than it was with being recognised by the British. This is also apparent when after the Battle of New Orleans instead of chasing the British back to their ships instead Jackson rounded up all the escaped slaves, why do you think the statue in the square of him is there? To re-enforce this view that the British had it is noted in the Chronicle and other texts at the time that once Napoleon abdicated the British sent only 6,000 more men to America to help finish off the skirmish. They did not send a force that was deserving of a full scale war because to them it simply wasn't important. Again, the British achieved their aims of maintaining their belligerent maritime rights, the US however lost it's capitol ships, was bankrupt, failed in expansion and had it's capitol burnt. Thus this needs to be reflected in the article, as at present it is very much a revisionist piece of history by an American dominated website.Americatcp (talk) 22:24, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Perhaps a list of the British and Canadian historians who believe that it was a British victory should be suggested so that we can see who is saying this. So far I have only seen Lambert's name mentioned. Dabbler (talk) 23:19, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Thanks Dabbler, good idea. I have a spreadsheet at home, I can put the names on here in some form. Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:54, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * No, and hell no, go take it up with the higher authorities.Tirronan (talk) 23:53, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Disagree And there is no difference between how mainstream historians interpret the outcome in the various countries. TFD (talk) 00:03, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * TFD Could you tell me your source for that statement? Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:54, 17 January 2018 (UTC)

AGREE There is absolutely difference between how mainstream historians interpret the outcome in various countries how can you possibly say that in good faith? The list should also reflect the relevance of that historian and the expertise they have. Lambert is the Laughton professor of naval history at Kings college London, he is the ONLY lecturer invited to speak at the bicentennial at the George Washington Masonic memorial in VA (his lecture can be easily found on YouTube) he is world renowned as arguably the greatest naval historian, his work on Jutland is described as exemplary and the Crimean war. He is the trusted opinion and writer of many books such as “The Challenge” in which he goes into great detail on the war of 1812 and how the British won it convincingly. Don Graves a Canadian historian agrees and also notes that the Americans contest that they wished to wrest Canada from the British (which the Us clearly did). Don Hinckley at Nebraska argues that the aim of the US was fighting the british due to their maritime rights and Canada was simply a way to get the British’s attention, however at the end of the war the British maintained their maritime rights as well as stopping the annexation of Canada. Even American historians agree: Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot Cohen, a senior adviser to former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, writes in his just-published book Conquered Into Liberty that, “ultimately, Canada and Canadians won the War of 1812.” And Cohen acknowledges that, “Americans at the time, and, by and large, since, did not see matters that way. So ask yourself who’s opinion do you value more? The Laughton professor that was the only one asked to speak at bicentennial in VA, the Canadian historian(not likely) or even the American historian? The answer is obvious, anything other than the admission of this is wrong.Americatcp (talk) 00:13, 17 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Personally, I've always considered 1812 to have been more of a British victory than a stalemate. But what I, or anyone else here, personally thinks is irrelevant. If you want to change the article from it's current stance, you need to look at how many sources are currently attached to this article that supports this stance, then go out and find more reliable sources (significantly more) that support the changes you want to make. Without that, this is just an exercise in talk page futility. - the WOLF  child  01:24, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * All may notice those people that edit the article have said noting to this point.....why?? You may be asking yourselves? This comes up every 6 months or so.....they won't chime in till there are sources presented that are of value. No Change will come without sources that say the opposite of the 50 here.--Moxy (talk) 01:34, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Moxy - User: Thewolfchild In regards to national bias of historiasn, thanks for your comments - but, actually this is a new issue not addressed in the article - nothing here mentions anything about National bias of historians and the war of 1812 (and please feel free to point where it does, but I can't see it). So there are no articles here that say there is no national bias amongst historians - nothing needs to be refuted. I'm bringing this up because I think it *does need* to be mentioned, and the bias of historians needs to be addressed, and the infobox needs to address it. Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:48, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * OK well, the heading of this sub-section was about the infobox, so I stand by my comments; if you want to change the content of the infobox, you will need sources. That said, if you want to address a new and separate issue, namely the bias of historians on the view of the outcome of this war, then that's not something that would be addressed in the infobox. Consider creating a new section to address the issue, post the proposed content of that new section here on the talk page first (with your supporting refs), for discussion. Something like that will likely require consensus before being added. It certainly seems like a worthwhile issue to address, so I hope you're able to see it through. Cheers - the WOLF  child  02:05, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Ok, fair enough - Thanks User: Thewolfchild - I've done that now. Cheers Deathlibrarian (talk) 11:01, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Ohhhh the wall of text is not about the box.....got it now. Here's a overview of the problem by Amanda. Let's ping User:Rjensen our resident historian on this topic. User:Rjensen can you do a fast read over of the article....see were we can slip this back in....I see the article has had lots of non expert edits in the past year.--Moxy (talk) 02:13, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * And while he's here, perhaps can post his thoughts on the bias issue. Cheers. - the WOLF  child  03:11, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * 31:10 -- Richard Jensen: "Refighting the War of 1812 on Wikipedia"--Moxy (talk) 03:37, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * National bias of historians?? I have seen very little of that among historians in US & Canada in last 25+ years. The "bias" may still exist among non-historians who have not read read scholarship but even then not so much any more.  The "bias" is not evident in university level textbooks published since 1990 or so.  I note that nobody here is citing any recent scholarship apart from Lambert.  He is a naval historian who has pretty wobbly legs when he gets on dry land--he has less than one paragraph on New Orleans and then states the "real losers that day were the Indians" (who were not there). But even so we have one British historian compared to hundreds who focus victory over over Napoleon as the maion event for britain. Rjensen (talk) 04:22, 17 January 2018 (UTC).
 * Lambert also maintains that Napoleon was the main victory of the time, hence why 1812 was a mere sideshow for Britain. Have you read “The Challenge”? Or even seen his lectures on the subject? He takes every major frigate battle as well as others. As I have said already, it’s not just Lambert(who may well be the most trusted on the subject) but also Canadian and American historians that I have already named. At present there is plenty of reason to change the outcome of the war to that that accurately reflects what happened and how trusted historians see it. It is wrong to leave it as a stalemate because it simply wasntAmericatcp (talk) 07:20, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * People who say there is no national bias amongst the nationality of historians, and their viewpoint of the war of 1812... I'm sorry you are wrong. Dabbler asked for a synopsis, so here it is. I have a spreadsheet of all the references, dates and most of the pertinent quotes. This is a couple of days research (I have good resources at work).. Please don't republish this without checking with me first on my talk page, as I'm half way through writing it up properly. If you have any other historians who have made a statement on who they think won the war, would be great if you could let me know and I will add them! :-)
 * British Victory (11 out of 14 Brit/Can - clear correlation)
 * Jon Latimer(UK), Elliot Cohen(US), Don Hickey(US), Donald Graves (Can), Carl Benn (Can), Gilbert Auchinleck (Can), William James (UK), Brian Arthur (UK), Andrew lambert (UK), JCA Stagg (US), Stephen Marche (Can), Claire Sjolander (Can), Patrick Richard Carstens (Can), Jim Guy (Can) []
 * Stalemate (7 out of 10 US)
 * Wesley Turner (Can), John Steven Watson (UK), Robert Cotterill (US), Harry Allen (UK), John Hicks (US), Sarah Purcell (US), Spencer Tucker (US) Jeremey Black (UK), Gregory A. Waselkov (US) [], Elizabeth Cobbs (US), Alan Taylor (US)
 * Let's get real here. "Nardo is a historian who specializes in ancient Greek and Roman civilizations. He taught high school for eight years, while writing part-time." His book is for children, the publisher says. Rjensen (talk) 02:51, 18 January 2018 (UTC)
 * It is indeed! Apologies Rjensen- I've removed Nardo Deathlibrarian (talk) 04:49, 18 January 2018 (UTC)
 * US Victory (3 out of 3 US - 100% correlation)
 * Stephen Budiansky (US), Alan Taylor (US), Troy Bickham (US) - Deathlibrarian (talk) 08:16, 17 January 2018 (UTC)


 * British victory also; Jim Guy professor emeritus Cape Breton University (Can), Jeremy Black professor at the Univeristy of Exeter (UK)- although some day Black claims a stalemate, Brian Merett CEO Niagara 1812 Bicentennary Legacy Council (Cad), David Bereuson Military historian University of Calgary (Can), Donald Hickey professor Wayne state college Nebraska (US), John Grodzinski professor Royal Military college of Canada (Can) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Americatcp (talk • contribs) 11:02, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Need page numbers ...links...ect.--Moxy (talk) 13:34, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Ok, Moxy - I can include page numbers and books titles, will do tonight. Americatcp thanks for these extras - are the people you talking about all historians, with a published reference where they state their opinions? Deathlibrarian (talk) 21:54, 17 January 2018 (UTC)

Edit Break 1
As per Moxy's request, I have included here a breakdown of historians, their viewpoints on who won the war, their nationalities, and the reference to the published work where their viewpoint on "who one the war" was cited. To sum up, most of the historians claiming the Britain won the war are either Canadian or British. The historians who believe there was a stalemate leans towards US historians. Only US historians believe that the US won the war. This has taken me a *long time* to research this, there's no doubt a few more out there.


 * British Victory (13 out of 16 Brit/Can - strong correlation)
 * Jon Latimer "War of 1812" p??(UK-2007), Elliot Cohen "Conquered into Liberty" p300(US-2012), Don Hickey[](US - 2012), Donald Graves [](Can-2011), Carl Benn "The War of 1812" p83 (Can-2002), Gilbert Auchinleck "The War of 1812: A History of the War Between Great Britain and the United" p400(Can-1860), William James "Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812" p528(UK-1817), Brian Arthur "How Britain Won the War of 1812" p Xviii(UK-2011), Andrew Lambert "The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812"(UK-2012), JCA Stagg "War of 1812 Conflict for the continent" (US-2012), Stephen Marche "That Time We Beat the Americans" p24(Can-2012), Claire Sjolander ""Through the looking glass: Canadian identity and the War of 1812" p166 (Can-2014), Patrick Richard Carstens (Can), Jim Guy (Can) [], Pierre Berton (Can)"war of 1812" [], Tory Bickham "The weight of vengeance" p272, 266 (UK-2012),


 * Stalemate (12 out of 19 US - clear correlation)
 * Wesley Turner "The war that both sides won"(Can), John Steven Watson "The Reign of George III, 1760-1815" p??? (UK), Robert Cotterill "A Short History of the Americas" p207(US), Harry Allen "Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)"p336 (UK-1955), John Hicks "The Federal Union: A History of the United States to 1865"p207 (US-1952), Sarah Purcell "The early National Period" p211(US-2004), Spencer Tucker "????" p?? (US) Jeremey Black "???" p??(UK), Gregory A. Waselkov "A conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick war of 1813-1814"p177 (US-2012) [], Elizabeth Cobbs "Major Problems In American History Vol 1"p196(US-2012), Alan Taylor "The Civil War of 1812" p12(US-2011), John B. Hattendorf "The Naval War of 1812 in International Perspective" p5, p20 (US-2013) Patrick Richard Carstens "The Republic of Canada - Almost"p17 (Can), Matthew Dennis "Reflection on a Bicentenial:The War of 1812 in American Public memory p275 (US-2014), William Weber "Victory or Defeat, and for whom-Alternative Outcomes for the war of 1812" p144,145 (US-2013), Thomas.K.McRaw "Winning the peace" Ch in "The Founders in Finance" p311 (US-2012), Richard Archer "Dissent and Peace Negotitations at Ghent" p14 (US-1977), Renee Lafferty (can-2012) [], Henry.J.Sage (US) []


 * US Victory (2 out of 2 US - 100% correlation)
 * Stephen Budiansky "Perilous Fight: America’s Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812-1815" [](US-2011), Troy Bickham "The Weight of Vengeance" p??(US-2012) - Deathlibrarian (talk) 08:16, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
 * It is amazing how Deathlibrarian and Americatcp speak. Almost as one. I've rarely agreed so much with another editor as these two different persons with one another. It is admirable. Edison (talk) 05:33, 19 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Please do refrain from making dangerous assumptions there Pink, people are allowed to agree with each other. Naval and military history are a great interest of mine and I think you’ll find many historians also agree with each other as strongly as I do with Deathlibrsrisn here.Americatcp (talk) 07:28, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Edison&Pinkbeast guys, I've been on here 12 years, believe it or not, its not the first time someone has decided I'm a sockpuppet. If you want to start a Sockpuppet investigation, go ahead, here's the link []. You'll be wasting your time, I'm not Americatcp.Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:18, 19 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Academic historians versus popular English-speaking historians is a major theme in Canada. French Canada ignores the war of 1812. First Nations in Canada were losers (everyone agrees) but the English-speaking popular historians do not consider them to be real Canadians and do not count their defeat as a defeat for Canada. Tiro (2012) states: "Thus, the nationalist narrative of the War of 1812 has long been a potent force in Canadian culture. Canadian academic historians remain keenly aware of its radioactive nature, even if its half-life had passed by the 1960s. Unwilling to reify the mythic narrative, they have accordingly kept a safe distance from the bicentennial. The prevailing scholarly view is that reading the Canadian nation back into the war is anachronistic, and they point out that colonists and Indians could not really have been ‘‘fighting for Canada’’ when Canada did not exist yet. Although the Canadian historical profession is not always so scrupulous the upshot is that Canadian university presses have offered few publications on the war, leaving most of that market to a small private imprint, Robin Brass Studio." [K M Tiro, "Now You See It, Now You Don't: The War Of 1812 In Canada And The United States In 2012." Public Historian 35, no. 1 (February 2013): 89-97. ] Rjensen (talk) 10:43, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * My point only is that historian's viewpoints on "who won the war" of 1812 breaks down on national lines. There is pretty blatent national bias - and this is not mentioned anywhere at all in the article.Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:53, 19 January 2018 (UTC)


 * @Rjensen You are correct, many agree that it was not the Canadians that won but the British. As Lambert coins; - In June 1812 the United States, not yet fifty years old, challenged the greatest naval and economic power of the time, invading Canada and attacking British ships. It would be a curious war, fought in the shadow of a far greater conflict. At first the British simply did not believe that the Americans meant to fight about issues of principle, issues which they had no hope of upholding. Eventually they accepted the need to respond, but only after Napoleon began his terrible retreat from Moscow. Eighty years later a great American historian gently reminded his fellow citizens that the War of 1812 had been a disaster; after a litany of defeats all along the Canadian border, the capture and destruction of Washington, bankruptcy and the loss of several ships, including the national flagship; the settlement had been a fortunate escape. This begs the question how could a defeated nation, one that suffered such devastating losses, declare a victory and remain in occupation of the literary battlefield for two centuries?

- The answer lies in the smokescreen of words that obscured American aims and objectives throughout the conflict. President Madison went to war demanding that Britain end the practice of stopping and searching American merchant ships and impressing seamen on the high seas. Yet these aims were not even mentioned in the treaty that ended the war; the peace process was dominated by questions of land and the rights of Indians. While this mismatch between rhetoric and reality was hardly unusual, examining British war aims and strategy reveals a very different war. Both sides considered the war in the context of the European conflict. In the summer of 1812 Napoleon was about to invade Russia with over half a million men. The American administration expected that Napoleon would win. They planned to seize British North America - modern Canada - and hold it while Napoleon defeated the British. Former President Thomas Jefferson expected that the Canadians, anglophobe and francophobe alike, would be happy to join the American Republic, indeed Jefferson opined that conquest would be "a mere matter of marching". Instead, invading American armies were repulsed by a handful of British regulars, Canadian militia and their Indian allies. - In fact the only battles the Americans won in 1812 were at sea, despite the Republican administration effectively ignoring the navy. In three frigate actions that year substantially larger American ships captured smaller, less powerful British opponents. Desperate for good news to bolster their flagging grip on political power, the Republican Party latched on to the sea of glory, claiming these victories had been won in fair and equal combat, and linked the claim to the idea that war had been declared as response to British treatment of American ships and sailors. In reality the seafaring communities of New England and New York, who suffered most from pre-war British actions, consistently voted against war, a fact which reinforces the charge of partisan opportunism. War was popular with Republican voters in the agrarian Central Atlantic states, and especially in the West, because it offered a golden opportunity to seize land from the British and the Indians. - Although the war would drag on until the end of 1812, its outcome was decided by the failure of the American army to conquer Canada, the defeat of American attacks on British merchant shipping and a devastating British economic blockade that left America bankrupt and insolvent. In case anyone in America had missed the utter helplessness of their government, 4,000 British troops captured and burned Washington DC. The Presidential mansion, where the decision for war had been taken, was one of the public buildings to be torched. In the rebuild it acquired a coat of whitewash. The idea that the British 'lost' the war - in which they secured their war aims by compelling the Americans to stop invading Canada, destroyed their capital city, and reduced them to insolvency in the process - is one that requires explanation.


 * He continues; The American attack on commercial shipping failed and instead most American warships were blockaded in port, leaving the entire coast open to economic and amphibious attack. As Napoleon wryly observed, the Americans had "not yet succeeded in seriously disturbing the English". He expected they would do better in the future.


 * Pages1-3 "The Challenge". His view is also in corroboration with records by William James in "Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812"
 * Madison went to war demanding that Britain end the practice of stopping and searching American merchant ships and impressing seamen on the high seas. Yet these aims were not even mentioned in the treaty strange logic-- the US sought actual change in behavior & US got exactly what it wanted --UK actually permanently stopped impressment and harassment  of American ships.  US ALSO got the end of Indian threat AND it got honorable treatment by UK after 1815.  Does it have to be written in treaty to be  real?  Britain did not get its protectorate in Midwest -- a failure that was not mentioned in treaty either.  Rjensen (talk) 12:34, 19 January 2018 (UTC)

It’s odd that you seem to believe that was their only aim, when they also wanted land and expected to be welcomed with open arms and thought it be “a mere matter of marching”, so they achieved a single aim of stopping impressment... something never mentioned in any treaty. Whereas the British simply wanted to war to go away, but they didn’t achieve this through a treaty.they achieved it by an economic blockade that drove the US to insolvency, the British *forced* the US to bend to their will, stop indavidng Canada, and maintained their belligerant maritime rights. It’s a British victory, simple as that.Americatcp (talk) 12:52, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * well not quite--the land business came after the war started. The british did NOT " simply wanted to war to go away" for decades they planned to set up an Indian state in the American Midwest and they demanded it at Ghent -- and lost it because their Indians had been largely defeated already. Rjensen (talk) 12:57, 19 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Yes the British absolutely did want the war to go away, they had more pressing matters in Europe; news of Madison’s declaration coincided with Napoleon’s Grande Armee of half a million men which was the largest force ever assembled in Europe, invading Russia. The British decided its only option was to concentrate on Europe and regard the American conflict as a side issue. This is why just two battalions and nine frigates were sent across the Atlantic. Command of the North American station was given to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, whose orders famously were “to explore all reasonable avenues for negotiation”. The British didn’t want a war when they had the French on their doorstep, the historical documents show the British simply wanted it to end as soon as possible. Americatcp (talk) 13:09, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Well no. Napoleon surrendered in April 1814, & was exiled to Elba -- he returned after the war with the United States ended.  While he was gone British authorities decided to escalate the war against the United States, sending highly experienced veteran armies, and large elements of its fleet.  They staged a massive invasion of Louisiana--planning to keep the territory it conquered & link to Midwest puppet state, and also invaded upstate New York and captured part of Maine--& raided Washington DC.  They wanted Wellingtons to lead the expanded war, but he refused, saying it was a stalemate.  Meanwhile, the British economy was very badly hurt by the war, large-scale unrest was breaking out, and the merchants were demanding a return to profitable trade with the United States.  That was the condition of Britain in 1814, when The government was not eager to and the war.  Rjensen (talk) 13:47, 19 January 2018 (UTC)

Um no. "While he was gone British authorities decided to escalate the war against the United States, sending highly experienced veteran armies, and large elements of its fleet" No, the British sent a mere 6,000 men. In fact during the entire conflict America was fighting as little as 7% of the total force of the British. The Tonnant, intended as Cochrane's flagship was delayed, The Superb, Bulwarl, and Saturn were the only major frigates to leave Portsmouth for Bermuda. (The Saturn was a cut down 74). In fact even prior to this throughout April Cochrane was quoted as saying "the Crews of His Majesty's ships in this Port have not had a Day's fresh Provisions since my arrival here" implying criticisim of his predecessor's arrangements. The British weren't reenforced a great deal, mainly because they were rebuilding Europe and re-establishing trade to try and get out of the debt they had incurred prior to Napoleon's Abdication. In fact the British were considerably successful without the need for reenforcements as Rear-Admiral Cockburn was retained as second in command and conducting operations in Chesapeake bay, where the blockades had remained uniterrupted even during the winter months. Captain Robert Barrie's letters home from the Dragon in Chesapeake Bay testify to this, and "the professional aggression of its onshore raids". There was "a squadron of Frigates & another squadron cruising within the Capes so that the Chesapeak is completely blockaded". American Commodore Barry to secretary of the Navy Jones said "any attempt" by the American ship sloop Erie trapped at Annopolis "to get out would be imprudent". The Royal Navy didn't need a great deal of men, not that they could afford to spare them anyway as they were occupying France, Wellington authorised the removal of six battalions and 2000 men from each of the two foot guard battalions. The 3rd/1st to England, and the 21st, 27th, 40th, 81st, and 88th Regiments of Foot to Ireland. The North American conflict again, received 6000 men and a mere supply of extra frigates.


 * "captured part of Maine--& raided Washington DC" It was a deliberately short occupation, the containment or elimination of American fighting vessels in Chesapeake Bay (especially after the destruction at Pig Point of Commodore Barney's flotilla of gun boats and a sloop) gave the British land forces unhindered access to the Pateux River. After a short battle at Bladensburg this allowed a British attack on Washington on the 24th/25th of August and during the deliberately brief occupation the Americans burnt Washington Navy yard, leading 'Columbia' and 'Argus' to be destroyed, the British themselves burnt the public buildings causing the 13th congress to meet in the Post and Patent office. The reasons for this anmd much important financial results were as follows; a major run on Washington, Baltimre, and Philidephia banks where many deposits were withdrawn, Especially following the earlier export of $3.8m of specie to Canada, largely used to buy British Government securities, this caused great contribution to the American administrations' critical shortage of coin leading to far greater reaching fiscal, financial, and political consequences.


 * "Wellingtons to lead the expanded war, but he refused, saying it was a stalemate" He did NOT say that, what he said was; "depends upon the navigation of the lakes … Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by the establishment of naval superiority on the lakes." In fact to Wellington the American war served the interests of France by forcing Britain to split her resources between two continents and this diversion could ultimately create a division between Britain and her allies. - Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley, 23 May 1813, WD X, p. 395. And Of the 44 cavalry, artillery and infantry units sent to America, only 21 - less than half of them - came from the Peninsular Army. Meaning the claim of American literature that Britain sent it's most veteran men is again... wrong. By December 1814, the arrival of all these units in North America, brought the overall total of troops there to just over 37,000 British regulars in the northern theatre, an extremely small chunk of the total force that was in Europe. Wellington also said "military operations by large bodies are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely have" - Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 22 Feb 1814, WD XI, p. 525-526. Referencing his problems in Portugal in Spain.
 * The lack of serious men and frigates and the fact that the Royal Navy blockade was already incredibly successful was to show that Britain again, wanted the war over as quick as possible while they were focussing on the occupation of France and rebuiling Europe.Americatcp (talk) 14:38, 19 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Well no --you have the years wrong --we want 1814-15, not 1813. " In November 1814, the Duke of Wellington was invited to take over Britain's armies in North America. Disapproving strongly of the war, he refused" [Robert Cowley - 2001 ] -- Napoleon was gone at this point, and the invasion forces of regulars outnumbered the American amateur defenders in the two key invasions of Louisiana and New York.  They were both defeated and ended in failure, with the top British generals dead or in disgrace. "fearing that the American war could wear on endlessly, in November 1814 the British government accepted Wellington's recommendation to agree to terms of status quo ante bellum." [Howard Jones 1988].  the British in late 1814 had 48,163 officers and men plus thousands more Marines and Canadians, with a fleet that gave mobility. As for finance, Britain was financially stressed and the Luddite riots were underway. "The distress was widespread" (Norman Gash 1979 p 77). Wellington warned, "the continuance of the American War will entail upon us a prodigious expense, much more than we have had any idea of, along with the other burdens it would bring." So time to call a draw and give up dreams of controlling the Midwest. The British war goal was to control the "whole frontier" but that was impossible Wellington said on 9 Nov 1814: "naval superiority on the Lakes. Till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier."  The Prime Minister agreed and told Foreign Secretary Castlereagh on 18 Nov, that Britain should “not continue the war for obtaining, or securing any acquisition of territory”   He mentioned problems in France and said "We have also been obliged to pay serious attention to the state of our finances." [Hitsman, Incredible War p 271]  So it was a military stalemate and a financial crisis for UK. Rjensen (talk) 15:22, 19 January 2018 (UTC)


 * So the consensus of reliable sources is that it was a draw and not a British victory, without the nationalistic divide of scholars claimed by Deathlibrarian and Americatcp. This supports the status quo. Edison (talk) 02:59, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * And even supposing that were not so, we would be much better off with what we have now in the infobox - definitely true statements about the actual outcome - than trying to count the noses of historians to establish "who won" when historians didn't agree. Pinkbeast (talk) 03:23, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * The predominant viewpoint of the sources says it was a draw. However, it would appear that Canadian and British Historians think it was a British victory, and its more American historians that think it was a stalemate. *This* is the problem - the fact that a large amount of historians think it was a stalemate, doesn't preclude the national bias. Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:18, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I have 3 separate issues here. 1. The idea that a modern historian would risk his professional reputation to wave the flag in the name of national bias is somewhat ludicrous to me. 2. Deathlibarian has brought this up before over and over and over for a decade. It has been refuted each time but once again we find ourselves going to the same muddy trenches again. Exactly how long are we expected to do this? 3. We have a major issue in the assumption that the British Empire wanted to continue the war when it did not. That is not my opinion, that is historical fact. The conclusion that the PM made in consultation with the Duke of Wellington was that no real progress had been made in the war. Further, it was estimated that to conclude the war by military means would take at least an additional year. The Duke of Wellington's estimation was that a war could not be won at all.


 * Which leads me to the reluctant conclusion that if the British leadership regarded the war as a stalemate it is hard to argue that point at all. Again, that is not my opinion, it is noted by every historian worthy of the term.


 * Finally, this article was subject to a formal complaint by Deathlibarian about the summation and no action was taken. Impuning the reputation of historians to get your own way in twisting the truth of the articles does not speak well. Are we to subscribe to the "fake news" issues in our politics today?Tirronan (talk) 12:37, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * TirronanI'd ask you to please remain civil to me in this discussion, please consider attacking the argument, not the man. CheersWP:CIV Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:18, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Well no... this is still not the case. It was not a military stalemate, on land yes, on sea no not even close. Of the four frontiers the British dominated 2 and the Americans none. The British financial situation was also considerably better than that of the US, considering they were now driven to insolvency. "The British commercial blockade and its consequences contributed hugely to the American government's insolvency and, by making the original American war aims clearly unattainable, hastened a negotiated peace. Falling import levels and therefore customs revenue forced upon Madison fiscal, financial, economic and political realities which induced him to end the war from a weakened position." - Brian Arthur 2011. The difference was Britain was in debt, the US was literally bankrupt. You speak of Howard Jones' opinion of events in his book coined so particularly as "The completion of American independence" where he fails to mention how the US government was unable to meet even the national debt interest payments, this was discussed when letters were sent from Dallas to the Boston Commissioner for loans on 9 November 1814, and published in the usually pro-government Niles' Weekly Register.

Even when the British agreed to negotiate with the U.S., the discussions at Ghent remained entirely subordinate to the main diplomatic gathering at Vienna. Eventually the British offered a status quo ante bellum peace, without concession by either side: the Treaty of Ghent ignored the Orders in Council, the belligerent rights and impressment. By accepting these terms the Americans acknowledged the complete failure of the war to achieve any of their strategic or political aims. Once the treaty had been signed, on Christmas Eve 1814, the British returned the focus to Europe.

Anglo-American relations remained difficult for the next fifty years, but when crises erupted over frontiers and maritime rights, British statesmen subtly reminded the Americans who had won the War of 1812, and how they had won it. In case any doubt remains the results were written in stone all along the American coast. Between 1815 and 1890, American defence expenditure was dominated by the construction of coastal fortifications on the Atlantic seaboard.

Significantly, the man who was the head of the British negotiating team at Ghent had been Dr William Adams, an Admiliralty lawyer rather than a diplomat or career politician. He was accompanied by retired Admiral Lord Gambier. No part of the Ghent treaty had narrowed contraband to solely "munitions of war", nor phobitied mid-ocean "paper blockades" imposed far from named coasts or harbours. None of its clauses had removed or limited a belligerent's right to stop and search neutral merchant vessels in wartime, a right which Britian would have to depend on in later wars. This feature of the peace agreement reflected the Royal Navu's successful implementation of maritime economic warfare in North America, and the American's inability to withstand its fiscal and financial consequences. The treaty had not even required Britain to concede its assumed right of compulsorily impressing apperently British seamen found in neutral merchant bessels, formerly so often American. This was despite its having been the point on which Madison and Monroe had concentrated after Britain had revoked its 1806 Orders in Council restraining neutral trade as far as the United states was concerned, an earlier bone of contention. In fact Secretary of state Monroe's answer to Warren's peace-feeler in November 1812 when the British simply wanted the war to go away had required Britain's abandonment of impressment as a prerequisite of peace negotiations, something that never occured, ensuring that war continued.

Remember the letter in late August Gallatin wrote to Monroe "I have the most prefect convition that, under the exisiting unpropitious circumstances of the world, America cannot by a continuance of the war compel Great Britain to yeild any of the maritime points in dispute, & particularly to agree to any satisfactory agreements on the subject of impressment; & that the most favourable terms of peace that can be expected are the status quo ante bellum". This letter reached the Commissioners in Ghent on 10 August. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Furthermore the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United states of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue to create major budget deficits and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit. This is epitomised here by John Eppes, Committee of ways and Means, to Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Dallas - "it will be agreed on all sides the most operative [of causes] have been the inadequacy of our system of taxation to form a foundation for public credit.. but the public credit at this juncture is so depressed that no hope of adequate succour on moderate terms can safely rest upon it". The British also had complete military dominance on the oceans as that the United States could not prevent British amphibious landings and major incursions which the British did at will. The unopposed landing which led to the British capture of Washington had far reaching financial consequences that contributed to the favourable outcome of the war to Britain.

Ratification's exchanged on the evening of 17 February 1815, no territory had been due to change hands. Despite the British occupation of parts of northern Maine since September 1814, news of American successes reaching London in October had caused the British peace Commissioners to relinquish earlier territorial claims. The status quo ante bellum was to be resumed. This wasn't due to the defeat of the British, this was due to politics. Also note that the main British concern was the Allies meeting in Vienna, and the real possibility of renewed fighting in Europe (something they were wise on) implying the need for continued heavy taxation and borrowing in Britain, had moderated attitudes on anything less vital than the retention of British maritime rights. The British didn't need or want to keep the territory in Northern America, even though they could have. In fact comparison of the British government's unimpaired ability to borrow with their own inability to raise any appreciable loans at home or in Europe had renewed the American Peace Commissioner's search for a negotiated settlement.

This view of the British winning the war of 1812 was still alive to this day, during a tour of America in 1942, just after the United States' entry into the second world war, the BBCs correspondent Alistair Cooke, met an insurance broker in Hartford, Connecticut, who told him "of course, somethings we won't insure. Nobody in this country will insure any cargo that the British might consider contraband. The British Navy virtually controls the seas, and we can't insure against British capture." Hard feelings even continued to such a great degree that in the United States War Department's "instruction sof American servicemen in Britain" issued in 1942, "there is no time today to fight old wars over again, or bring up old grievances. But there may be time enough to acknowledge that, for too long, the significance of the Royal Navy's blockades of the United States during the War of 1812 has been seriously under-estimated."

So you see it is not just historians who feel the war of 1812 was won by the British, the very War Department felt this way too. The country at large felt that way, American servicemen felt that way, British historians felt that way. And in the evidence just provided... it is not hard to see why.Americatcp (talk) 13:36, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Americatcp seems to make up his argument from unknown sources. He seems unaware of the scholarship.  And he makes strange claims: Eventually the British offered a status quo ante bellum peace, without concession by either side: the Treaty of Ghent ignored the Orders in Council, the belligerent rights and impressment.   In fact every diplomat at Ghent knew that the British had stopped all the hostile practice that so troubled the Americans.  The Americans wanted them to stop. They stopped and were never resumed. That is what success looks like for US diplomacy--is it a failure for Americatcp. Take a 2018 hypothetical example: if North Korea suddenly permanently stops its missile program that would be a big win for the USA--even if North Korea does not officially sign a treaty that it is doing so.  Demanding that your success be admitted in writing by the other side --or else it is deemed a failure--is very poor diplomacy indeed. Rjensen (talk) 14:48, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

Unknown sources? I literally listed the letters dates and publication names as well as known names of the men there as well as the actual US War documentation in 1942. If you do not wish to accept them because they do not fit your agenda that is your own problem. That doesn’t change what the US documents said in regards to the war of 1812 in 1942 and it doesn’t change the fact the Us was insolvent and none of its demands were met.

If the singular goal of the US was to stop impressment then it wasn’t formally ended for over 30 years after 1815. If the singular goal of the British was to stop the war by forcing the US to not be able to continue and keep control of Canada, as well as maintains their belligerent rights, then the British again.. won entirely.

I am confused as to the fact you think that simply getting the British to stop impressment is a win... when the British stopped after 1815 anyway due to Napoleonic wars and Orders of Council, not to mention that searching merchant ships was still done.. over and over again. The British rights were not infringed upon in a single way. And yet.. you seem to think this means that the British decided it was a stalemate? The US deemed it impossible to continue the war as they had no money and in letters already mentioned had no way of compelling the British to do anything. Which is also reflected in the treaty at Ghent where the Americans achieved nothing. Americatcp (talk) 15:20, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Americatcp's personal views are based on primary sources that he garbles. His talk page claims fail the wp:OR rule and they are unacceptable on the article page. The good news is that he never tries to add to the actual article pages (with the exception of one sentence about submarines once.) Dewey Financial History of the US has full coverage of the economics of the war--and makes no mention whatever of any bankruptcy.  never happened. see Dewey online at https://ia801607.us.archive.org/17/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.224004/2015.224004.Financial-History_text.pdf Rjensen (talk) 09:25, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Ian W. Toll goes to mention that the Royal Navy was at great pains to neither stop American ships or to impress sailors during the War of the Six Coalition. So I find that claim false. They didn't give up the right to impress but they damn sure stopped exercising it, at least in regard to American ships. As for Lambert I read his history and he knows what he speaks of when he talks about the Royal Navy, however his expertise failed from that point on.Tirronan (talk) 09:20, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Interesting how you ignored my other edit that I shall repeat here, also I find hilariously pathetic that a “professional historian” claims that my “primary sources that I garble” are those that are letters from Madison himself, letters to congress, and all sourced information.

You seem to not even realise that GDP is irrelevant when the currency at the time is specie. That’s like arguing that a country can never go bankrupt they just print more money! Laughably false. Do read carefully now, everything is we’ll sourced from your own government texts at the time. Perhaps you should stop emotion and personal bias getting in your way? Instead of attacking me about “submarines” which is of zero relevance and goes to show you’re attempting to distract from the information you know nothing about.

-You make these claims about GDP as if they had any relevance during the war, again GDP is measured by the Treasury using its own bills, not specie which was the forefront at the time. Throughout 1813 the level of American exports had continued to decrease, total exports had falled from $38.5m in 1812 to $27.9m in 1813, a fall of almost 28%. Desertion was rife in the US Army, particularly when the bankrupt US government could no longer afford to pay or feed its soldiers in the last year of the war. Often backed by their governors, state militia regularly refused to cross borders, particularly when it meant fighting the enemy on the other side. A furious Madison tried but failed to place them under federal authority. - Troy Bickam Professor of History TAMU. By February 1814 Joseph Pearson of NC told the house that "the expenditures of the Government from January 1812, to January 1815 will have exceeded ninety millions of dollars, exclusive of many millions of outstanding claims" -D Dewey 'financial history of the United States 1903; 12th edition' Pearson's estimate that "the public debt will, at the close of the present year, exceed one hundred and five millions of dollars" was particularly different to that of Gallatin's estimates. Representative Pearsoon worried that "the proportion which my constituents will have to pay ... unless you restore peace and commerce" would be "more than they are able to pay" - Ibid p 125 and AC 13-2, 1453.

Pearson went on to put his finger on the vulnerable inter-relatioship between the banks and the Government: "Suppose some of the principal banks were to contract for the greater part of the proposed loan, and issue their own paper on the credit of the stock to be created; these bills not finding heneral circulation, or a shock given to the institutions, either by accident or mismanagement, what would be the situation of the Government? Their finances would be deranged, their credit impaired - enriched with debt, but their coffers empty" -Suppose some of the principal banks were to contract for the greater part of the proposed loan, and issue their own paper on the credit of the stock to be created; these bills not finding heneral circulation, or a shock given to the institutions, either by accident or mismanagement, what would be the situation of the Government? Their finances would be deranged, their credit impaired - enriched with debt, but their coffers empty" - AC:13-2 1452.

Nevertheless 24th March 1814, Congress authorised another loan of $25m and a further issue of $10m Treasury notes. The Chairman of the House Foregin Relations Committee, argued that, "The sum proposed" was, "indispensably necessary to meet the expenses of the ensuing year." Even now some denied the need for further credit. Such opponents, Calhoun insisted, appeared "bold in facing bankruptcy." - AC:13-2 p1689, Loan Bill 25 February 1814. Without these steps the 'National Intelligencer' predicted "the bankruptcy of the Treasury; confusion and anarchy at home; and...an ignominious submission to whatever terms the arrogance of the enemy might dictate" - D Hickey p166 quoting "The National Intelligencer", Washington March 12th 1814. This was remarkably similar to what was going to happen within a year, when the loan failed.

It was not a matter a matter of the United States long-term potential which remained under-developed and enormous, but present ability to pay those with an immediate and unassailable right to be paid. For most contemporary Americans, this meant payment in specie, a universally acceptable currency, unlike the discounted State or private bank notes, or more Treasury notes. As already noted the first formal notification of the governments inability to meet even interest payments on the National Debt was sent by Dallas to the Boston commissioner of Loans 9th November 1814. Continued through from 22 August 1814 when the government offered another $6m in bonds, but even at a 20% discount, subscribers offered only $3.5m, of which the government only received $2.5m "in money." - JCBL B&I corr.. Box 160 letter 6, Ives to Greene. Again, subscribers defaulted on $410,000. When state banknotes worth only 65% in specie were accepted for some stock, early subscribers demanded supplementary stock to make up the difference. - D Dewey op.cit p134. The government returned to the original subscribers at 12%, and improved their terms, but for bonds worth $4m, received only $2.5m in cash. The high pointwas reached in late July when, of the $25m sought, $10.4m in cash had been received. The 4th of March issue of $10m of Treasury notes only ever brought in $7.2m. Of the final $9m instalment authorised, nothing was ever raised. - JCBL: 'Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the year 1814'. Washington, A&G Way, 1815. It now remained only for the government irself to default.

Jacob Barker tasked with finding money for the Treasury indentified the cause of the lack of funds and impending insolvency when he wrote to John Armstrong, the secretary of war, that "The success of the allies and the general blockade, operatee very much against the loan; so difficult is it to raise money that Mr Parish told me it was impossible to raise a single $100,000 in Philadelphia on a deposit of United States stock" - R Guernsey New York City & Vicinity during the war of 1812-15, being a Military, civic and financial local history of that period, New York, Charles Woodward, 1889-95 2 vols, Vol II p270.

This level of financial embarrassment was becoming increasingly evident, Madison put "motion 2" before his cabinet meeting on the 23rd June 1814, which dealth the matter which Madison and Monroe had made the crucial point of the cause of the war of 1812 in October 1812. It asked, "Shall a treaty of peace silent on the object of impressment be authorised?" When asked for their opinion the following day, all voted "no" except WilliamJones, until so recently Secretary of the Treasury, and John Armstrong Secretary of War, "who were aye" -James Madison Papers online 'James Madison to Cabinet June 23 1814'. These were precisey the two who knew just how weak the United States had become, both financially and therefore militarily. On 27 June, exactly the day on which the French Minister wrote of their "fright", Madison again consulted his Cabinet. According to Madison, "in consequence" of Baynard and Gallatin's letters, and "other accounts from Europe as to the ascendary & views of Great Britain & the disposition of the great Continental powers, the preceding question No 2" was again put to the Cabinet - Madison Papers online includes note from June 27 1814. This time it was unanimously "agreed to by Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong and Jones, Rush being absent". Secretary of state Monroe was instructed to inform the American Peace Commissioners that an American insistence on a British end to impressments, as a prerequisite of peace, had been abandoned. - JHL Jonathan Russell, Corr; secretary of state Monroe to Peace commissioner Russell, Washington 27 June 1814. Nor would government revenues meet the cost of an American occupation of Canada. British commercial blockade without American prior fiscal reform, and now no longer accompanied by any American legislative trade restrictions, had eviscerated American war aims. So when earlier when it was claimed that the Americans got what they wanted and impressment ended, it not only was nothing to do with America and the war, but didn't formally end for 30 years after. America didn't achieve any of its aims and once again, was bankrupt.Americatcp (talk) 10:05, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Edit break 2

 * Question......as I am reading some of the more obscure books.....is there a second book by Andrew lambert as the book I am reading over seems to skip the great Lakes theater?--Moxy (talk) 15:43, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

I assume you mean “The Challenge” Lambert covers them minorly in fairness, Brian Arthur covers them more in his own publication, or there is a joint effort by William James & Lambert in “Naval occurrences of the war of 1812: A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War Between Great Britain and the United States of America,1812-1815” which is far more neutral and still correct. All good reads.Americatcp (talk) 15:48, 20 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Sounds good.....lots to read over ..... Bibliography of the War of 1812   --Moxy (talk) 15:58, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

Plenty of other options, plenty of sources. Do watch the lecture at the George Washington Masonic Memorial too if you get time, considering Lambert was the only historian asked to speak at the Bicentennial.Americatcp (talk) 16:02, 20 January 2018 (UTC)


 * William James was thoroughly taken to task for the fallacies in his book by Theodore Rosevelt's book on the subject. Overly so in my opinion but the refutation was overwhelming and complete. Please don't do me the incredible disservice of quoting the gent.09:13, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Again, plenty of options to choose from that support the view I maintain. Americatcp (talk) 11:08, 21 January 2018 (UTC)


 * And wrongly so I maintain.Opinions are one thing and a dime a dozen but history quite another.Tirronan (talk) 14:35, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Which is why it is important to examine the sources I provide in my edits which RJensen has yet to address. GDP is irrelevant when the currency at the time was specie.Americatcp (talk) 14:45, 21 January 2018 (UTC)


 * It doesn't hold water, all loans were paid off very quickly and the country itself was not bankrupt. The year after the war was over America built 200,000 of commercial shipping, more than rebuilding all losses of the war, tons of shipping and began projects of all kinds. I've seen and commented on the actual data, unfortunately, it is OR.Tirronan (talk) 17:17, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Of course it holds water, specie was the currency of the time and the country could not obtain credit and had to default on many loans. The United States could neither pay it's soldiers or it's sailors, it had been crippled economically by the blockade which led to mass desertions in the US army during 1814. How can you see and comment on the actual data when clearly you have not? These things actually happened, the chesapeake flotilla a very good example that US sources corroborate. If the country was not bankrupt how did so many go without pay? how did the country not obtain credit from Holland? how did Sailors not get paid? how did the coinage run dry never to be used again? Ridiculous claims.Americatcp (talk) 17:32, 21 January 2018 (UTC)


 * This is getting old, you get told how the Office of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and his principal military advisor thought that the war was a stalemate, but you know better. You get told that America wasn't broke and I offer a proof but you know better. Look my Ernest friend either you are going to offer an honest conversation with some ability to give and take, or this is a complete waste of my and everyone else's time.Tirronan (talk) 13:31, 22 January 2018 (UTC)

Your proof elects to ignore the lack of specie and inability to pay the military, your proof elects to ignore the default on loans, your proof elects to ignore how many US army deserters there were (something you’ll find corroborated by the National archives and records administration, record group 94, records for the Adjutant Generals office, 1780s to 1917) which are part of “Post Revolutionary war papers, 1784-1815” which includes records of various monetary accounts relating to the payment of Regular and volunteer soldiers and construction of military installations as well as returns for clothing provisions, and forage; enlistment papers; and pay and muster rolls. Which show that thousands of men were not getting paid due to the Treasury (remember Gallatins letters?) and the country itself being so short of funds. Your “proof” is remarkable since these things actually happened, men went without pay, desertions were high, sailors went without pay, and even the Secretary of War acknowledged the impending insolvency in 1814.

It’s remarkable that you are either voluntarily unaware of these established facts, or your research simply isn’t good enough.Americatcp (talk) 13:42, 22 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Please bear in mind that all these first-hand sources, if parked in the article, would probably constitute original research. Are there any reliable second-hand sources which covers them? HLGallon (talk) 14:10, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * turning to economic history we have a lot of misunderstanding here, so I recommend reading a text like Nettels or Dewey before making huge mistakes. We have people making claims here who do not even know what GDP is. Specie is gold & silver. Contractors and soldiers in USA were paid in paper money--believe it or not paper money is "real" --but it did cause inflation. ($100 in gold = $130 in paper, which is 30% inflation). The paper notes did cause delays in the Northeast when Federalist banks in that region refused to accept it.  They were secretly shipping gold to Canada and were trying to sabotage the war effort. All claims got paid (and when the war ended gold and silver were back in use.) Every bit of the national debt was paid.  There was no default and no bankruptcy (note that people who use the terms are unable to specify the dates when these "events" supposedly happened.) No military defeats were caused by the money delays.  The US economy was growing steadily and (apart from northeast ports) was doing very well. The national debt was far less of a burden than in England, where the Luddite riots threatened a working class revolution.  Exports to Europe were shut down but they were a very small part of the US economy (and a very large part of the UK economy.) and the $$$ freed up was used to rapidly build factories and speed up industrialization.  Rjensen (talk) 14:17, 22 January 2018 (UTC)

RJensen is obsessed with talking about England in regards to the US. The economic situation in England was irrelevant to the US economic situation, literally irrelevant. It would be like saying that the US has a high murder rate, and then arguing "well at least it's not as bad as Somalia!" as if that has any relevance to the US.

The treasury consistently fell short in meeting federal financial obligations, and the government finally defaulted on the treasury notes due in 1814 and its debt payments (debt servicing had to be paid in hard money, which the government did not have; thus, the government defaulted on the payment). The United States government was essentially bankrupt by November of 1814. The difficulty in finding loan subscribers and buyers of treasury notes was only part of the problem. Revenue continued to fall, so the government no longer covered its regular expenditures either. Other symptoms of the financial crisis were soldiers’ pay being six to twelve months in arrears, the closing of the Springfield Armory that supplied weapons to the army, and the inability to recruit new soldiers because there was no money for bonuses. To compensate for the last shortcoming, Congress increased the land bounty to 320 acres for men serving the duration of the conflict.- D Hickey "The War of 1812: A forgotten Conflict" JCA Stagg "The War of 1812: Conflict for a continent".

These are events that actually happened, I am keen to know what reasoning RJensen believes was behind this? For a country that "wasn't broke", how were they unable to pay their military? How were they unable to sufficiently pay it's debt?

"Fortunately, the war was close to being over when the government defaulted on its obligations. By the end of December, peace delegates had reached an agreement and signed the Treaty of Ghent. Had the United States needed to continue the war in 1815, it is likely the costs of war would have become unbearable. Secretary George Campbell, who took over from Jones, continued the trend of horrific financial estimates, projecting expenses for 1815 would reach $56 million; of that, more than $15 million would be needed just to service the debt. Congress had no choice but to implement new taxes in 1815, which it did. Unlike the taxes imposed for 1814, the tax program approved for 1815 would remain in effect until the public credit was restored. In all, nearly $14 million flowed into federal treasuries in 1815, but this was a far cry from what was needed to service the national debt and meet regular expenses. When the War of 1812 ended, the treaty followed a status quo antebellum. Yet, not everything returned to the way it was before 1812. Financially, the War of 1812 cost the United States tremendously, though there were many lessons learned about national weaknesses. In sum, the United States spent $158 million on the war with more than $90 million of that total going just to the army and navy. The U.S. needed $16 million just for interest on money borrowed and almost $50 million to cover promises made to war veterans. The national debt likely would have been paid off by 1815 had the United States not gone to war with Britain. Instead the debt ballooned to $127 million. The War of 1812 saw no territories change hands, but the war provided an expensive lesson to Americans about its financial system and the costs of war, a fact that Congress was reminded of every year after 1815 until the national debt was paid off in 1837.”- Eugene Van Sickle Assistant Professor of American History University of North Georgia.

We again, see RJensen making false claims such as "no default" or "believe it or not paper money is real money" and yet it wasn't was it? Men could not use it, and that's why so many went unpaid. How a "historian" can ignore this is remarkable. If paper money was acceptable then again, care to explain how so many went unpaid? explain why there were so many deserters? Bias claims by bias "historians" such as RJensen are clear.

For further reading, see Stephen Budiansky, "Perilous Fight: America's Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas 1812-1815" and Alan Taylor "The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies"

And of course the National Archives I have already linked that show indisputable evidence of men going unpaid consistently, something a "non broke" nation shoudln't be doing.. but alas, revisionist history.Americatcp (talk) 14:38, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * "had to be paid in hard money" or it's "default" is not true. "Default" is a legal term decided by judges when people sue for what is owed them--and that did not happen. Congress is not limited to what it can make legal money, says the Supreme Court. As for full payment, the difference between gold and paper prices is called inflation.  In all it was about 30% during the war of 1812. US governments use inflation to pay for major wars (especially Revolution, Civil War, WWI). And please learn the rules here: your scattered quotes from primary sources are are not allowed as WP:RS reliable sources in Wikipedia.   Rjensen (talk) 20:35, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

Holy, wow, you're now changing the definition of default? https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/default "to fail to do something, such as pay a debt, that you legally have to do:" The loans had to be paid in hard money, which they were not. "The British then hoped to obtain major territorial concessions in a peace treaty. The situation was particularly serious for the United States because the country was insolvent by the fall of 1814, and in New England opponents of the war were discussing separation from the Union. The HARTFORD CONVENTION that met in Connecticut in December 1814 and January 1815 stopped short of such an extreme step but suggested a number of constitutional amendments to restrict federal power." - Berton, Pierre, Flames across the Border (1981; repr. 1988) and The Invasion of Canada (1980; repr. 1988); Caffrey, Kate, The Twilight's Last Gleaming: The British against America 1812-1815 (1977); Coles, Harry L., The War of 1812 (1965); Horsman, Reginald, The War of 1812 (1969); Mahon, John K., The War of 1812 (1972); Tucker, Glenn, Poltroons and Patriots: A Popular Account of the War of 1812, 2 vols. (1954). (Plenty of RS here for your "rules" ;D)


 * paper money not real money? The entire country used it and grew at 3% a year doing so.  We use it in 2018.  defaults? I don't think so--what was the exact date?. "impending insolvency"? did that happen? on what date was that? Men went without pay--well no--there were late payments but everyone got paid.  Desertions--yes: rather common in 19th century wars.   National Archives--I spent many weeks working in them (working on the 1890s), how about you? the series you cite runs hundreds of thousands of handwritten pages.  How many pages did you read? Wikipedia relies 99% on reliable secondary sources, so give them a try some day. Rjensen (talk) 16:30, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * "the closing of the Springfield Armory" ?????  just when did that happen exactly--the Armory's monthly reports to the War Dept are on line and look ok to me, with 9588 new weapons in 1814 and 5190 old ones repaired in 1814 (says Feb 3 1815 report p 71--he also complains re late payments from the War Dept) [see https://books.google.com/books?id=5NLIDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA70  pp 70-71 Rjensen (talk) 17:39, 22 January 2018 (UTC)

Are you sure you spent "weeks" working in National Archives? Because if so how can you claim "there were late payments but everyone got paid"? It would appear I have read more than you quite blatantly.

If we examine the records, such as the claims presented to the State of New York for payment of expenses for military clothing and equipment provided by volunteers during the war. These claims were for clothing and equipment "which were depreciated, worn out, lost and destroyed in said service for which he had not received payment." Only the claims of those who performed duty "in the service of the State" were paid. Some additional claims were paid in good faith by the state, but as late as 1885, 17,228 claims were unpaid. Records indicate that these claims were never paid. These are free of course for you to read should you give them a try some day, they are compiled on file in the Bureau of War records maintained by the Division of Military and Naval Affairs, Public Security Building, Albany, New York, 12206, just in case you weren't sure of the address.

Let us continue to deconstruct your lie of "there were late payments but everyone got paid"; If we look at "The War of 1812 U.S. War Department Correspondence, 1812-15" By John C. Frederiksen(a reliable secondary source mind you so let's get that in there), we will see many notes contradicting your statement.

Page 319, 8167. Mar 9th 1815, Charleston SC. Pinckney alerts Secretary Dallas as to the discomfiture of numerous mechanics who have not been paid by the Commissary General of Purchases due to his lack of funds. "I have taken the liberty of representing their hardship to you, being people whose substinence and that of their families, depends on the produce of their industry, whih has been applied to the service of the United Sates".

Page 431, 11019. Aug 3rd 1815 Schuylkill, PA. Wilson complains to the War Department that he has provided Mr. Calhoun in Baltimore with $1,400 worth of goods but was never paid. "I assure you, Sir, it is a serious inconvenience to a manufacturer in woollen goods, where every article of the raw materiel is cash to want so long for paument & especially as there is not more than a bare commission of 5 cent profit attached to their sale."

11021. Aug 4th 1815, Charleston SC. Wilson contacts Superintendent of Military Stores Richard Cutts to enclose his returns for the second quarter of 1815. "I believe you will find them correct, if otherwise, I will be obliged to you to note any errors that you find." He further notes that his employees have not been paid in months and are "in great distress."

Page 43, 1181. May 1814, Natchitoches, LA. Consists of a signed statement by David Brown a former employee of Dr. John Siblet who never paid him the $700 he earned. "The account which I have furnished for Dr. Sibley was a just one & the charges in said account are such as are always passed in this country for the work of the kind mentioned."

Page 97, 2421. Feb 25th 1815, New London CT. Cushing contacts John R. Shearman, cashier of the Bank of Newport, regarding his $15,000 Treasury Notes, which he hopes will be cashed soon. "There must be an actual protest if the draft is not paid by your bank."

Cushing continues in 2422. Mar 18th 1815, he informs Secretary Monroe that $15,000 in Treasury Notes placed in the Newport bank has not been cashed.

Page 389, 9986. Jun 29th 1813, Burlington VT. Major, Deputy Quartermaster General Thomas James updates his affairs for Secretary Armstron by mentioning that the 4th US infantry has arrived. Moreover, the enemy is seeking control of Lake Champlain and is constructing several gunboats and small vessels. He also criticizes General Woolsey, the late assistant deputy quartermaster as, "He is bankrupt for a very considerable sum (tis said $12,000) and says he is in advance for the govt. $9,000."

7698. Jul 5th 1815 Pittsburgh, PA. The owners inform Secretary Dallas that they are drawing on him for $20,000 in favor of Alexander Johnson, cashier of the Bank of Pittsburgh, to supply troops in Pennsylvania and the Michigan Territory. "Moreover, they need funding in addition to the above and our situation is such that if this advance be not granted we shall become insolvent." The grant of course never came.

Page 24, 520. Apr 18th 1815, New York NY. "I received no money; made no disbursements. Nor have I ever received money or made disbursements." Barron contacting George Graham at the War Department.

Page 297, 7684. Feb 3rd 1815. West Point, NY. Partridge encloses for the War Department his list of cadets under fourteen years old and recommendation that they be furloughed until reaching that age. He also mentions the dismissal of Cadet James H Rodgers, who lives twelve miles distant, and could not return to the campus in winter because, "He had no money to hire a sleigh and horses to bring him to the Point."

Now let's examine the default claims that you so deny.

"In June 1812, war broke out between the United States and Great Britain, which lasted until February 1815. The federal government, aside from military challenges including the burning of the Capitol and White House, suffered from severe institutional deficiencies that hindered its ability to meet its financial obligations. One pair of historians concluded that while the War of 1812 “was ill-managed militarily, [it] was even more bungled financially.” Those financial difficulties included unambiguous examples of default. - Historians 24 Paul Studenski and Hermann Krooss, Financial History of the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 75.

Madison was keenly aware of the financial woes of the country. The expenses during the first nine months of the year were $2 million greater than the revenue received, and $11 million of that received came from loans. Congress had to find some way to appropriate more money. Madison urged Congress to take up with out delay, means to appropriate funds to continue the war. Times were tough, but there was no backing down, "our country calls for its greatest efforts".

Associated Press points out that the U.S. defaulted in 1814: The young nation had a dramatic excuse: The Treasury was empty, the White House and Capitol were charred ruins, even the troops fighting the War of 1812 weren’t getting paid. Historian Don Hickey isn’t surprised that the default in November 1814 gets overlooked. After all, he titled his book, “The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict.” “He doesn’t know his history,” Hickey said of the president. “It’s that simple.” To be fair, not many people do. When it comes to the War of 1812, naval heroics and the rockets’ red glare get the ink. The failure to pay some bondholders on time doesn’t make it into many history texts, said Hickey, a professor at Wayne State College in Nebraska. http://apnews.excite.com/article/20131014/DA9E0BU00.html

And finally let's address the comment about the "Springfield armoury" perhaps you read half the sentence and not the entirety of it? What I said was "the closing of the Springfield Armory that supplied weapons to the army" Which is correct, the armoury closed production of new muskets; ". The expanded demands of the War of 1812 found too few muskets available at the national armories. Half of those in storage needed rebuilding before they could be issued to soldiers. As a result, Springfield Armory ceased production of new muskets so that they could focus on rebuilding. " http://www.forgeofinnovation.org/Springfield_Armory_1812-1865/Themes/Technological_Development/Production_Problems/index.html

So not only have you lied... again, but to have the gall to ask me "how many pages did you read?" when you clearly have not read hardly any yourself, goes to show the bias "historian" you claim to be. This article has been written in an American-centric view for so long, and I can see why when all evidence prevented is simply ignored. Laughable.Americatcp (talk) 19:38, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * talk about lies! take a look at this statement above: One pair of historians concluded that while the War of 1812 “was ill-managed militarily, [it] was even more bungled financially.” Those financial difficulties included unambiguous examples of default. - Historians 24 Paul Studenski and Hermann Krooss, Financial History of the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 75. the text is at https://books.google.com/books?id=_0UqxH-5fdkC&pg=PA75 the words Those financial difficulties included unambiguous examples of default. are fake--they are not in the book. Studenski and Krooss never use the word "default" re war of 1812. So that's a deliberate falsification of your source.--just like your using New York state date when the issue is federal behavior. Rjensen (talk) 20:51, 23 January 2018 (UTC)


 * "Talk about lies!" Sheesh, I know you're an old man, but your reading comprehension is lacking, do you see the quote marks? They end right after ''One pair of historians concluded that while the War of 1812 “was ill-managed militarily, [it] was even more bungled financially.” THEN I said - Those financial difficulties included unambiguous examples of default. I never quoted the texts as saying the exact words "those financial difficulties included unambiguous examples of default". Some of the examples are as follows; "Since government spending was very heavy and taxes were not imposed to mop up the excessive volume of currency, pricce inflation resulted. In a short time, the public lost its confidence in bank notes and began to present them for redemption. In addition, bankers themselves lost their faith in bank paper and refused to accept notes drawn in other states. As a consequence, what little specie was left went into hoards, and in the summer of 1814 the banks had to suspend specie payments. Thereafter, there was no circulating medium which could be used universally, and the entire banking and currency system broke down. " Page 80. "For practical purposes, much of the Treasury's revenue was useless, for it was collected in state-bank notes, which were not acceptable to citizens in other states. Therefore, the Treasury could operate only if its revenue collections in each state equaled what it owed in that state. This being obviously impossible, the Treasury by 1814 could not meet its obligations in some sections of the country. " Page 80. There's those examples of being unable to pay, and of defaults.


 * Let's see what you said - "So that's a deliberate falsification of your source.--just like your using New York state date when the issue is federal behavior." No, that's the exact summary of my source, which is exactly what I said. What happened is your reading comprehension failed you, and you leapt into a quick fire rage without actually reading what I said properly.Americatcp (talk) 22:00, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * You did or did not know the statement about two economists had been falsified?? You did or did not know that New York State is not the federal government?  Did you actually just now write "There's those examples of being unable to pay, and of defaults."  as I tried to explain, "default" is a legal term. it's used in contract law. judges make the decision and they leave a paper trail. the paper trail does not exist . The fed government had all the money it needed in 1814 as Studenski and Krooss demonstrate in their tables 5 and 6: they show 1814 cash out = = $34.7 million, cash in = $47.3 (receipts = $11.2 + loans = $36.1 (=$12.0+$1.5+$10.0+$8.3+$4.3). the difficulties came when $$$ bills were due weeks or months before the $$$$ money was in hand & that caused delays. For 1812-15 as a whole, cash out = $119.5, cash in  $154,0  (=$51.0 in receipts plus $103.0 loans).  source = https://books.google.com/books?id=_0UqxH-5fdkC&pg=PA77 and https://books.google.com/books?id=_0UqxH-5fdkC&pg=PA79  Rjensen (talk) 22:23, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Do you not know what default means? The definition is broader than your "legal term" I am going to link it here in the Oxford Dictionary; https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/default "Failure to fulfil an obligation, especially to repay a loan or appear in a law court." Example;‘the company will have to restructure its debts to avoid default’. You can try and change the definition all you like, but as explained many historians (that I have provided with RS as requested) also agree the US defaulted, and by definition (see above... the dictionary) They are correct. Again, "For practical purposes, much of the Treasury's revenue was useless, for it was collected in state-bank notes, which were not acceptable to citizens in other states. Therefore, the Treasury could operate only if its revenue collections in each state equalled what it owed in that state. This being obviously impossible, the Treasury by 1814 could not meet its obligations in some sections of the country. page 80. Being unable to meet your obligations WHEN YOU ARE THE TREASURY is defaulting! That's the very definition! That's why men went without pay, and that's why the country couldn't afford to continue the war, directly due to Royal Navy's economic blockade. STOP trying to cherry pick the definition just because you do not like it, Donald Hickey agrees with me; The treasury consistently fell short in meeting federal financial obligations, and the government finally defaulted on the treasury notes due in 1814 and its debt payments (debt servicing had to be paid in hard money, which the government did not have; thus, the government defaulted on the payment). The United States government was essentially bankrupt by November of 1814. The difficulty in finding loan subscribers and buyers of treasury notes was only part of the problem. Revenue continued to fall, so the government no longer covered its regular expenditures either. Other symptoms of the financial crisis were soldiers’ pay being six to twelve months in arrears, the closing of the Springfield Armory that supplied weapons to the army, and the inability to recruit new soldiers because there was no money for bonuses. To compensate for the last shortcoming, Congress increased the land bounty to 320 acres for men serving the duration of the conflict.- D Hickey "The War of 1812: A forgotten Conflict" JCA Stagg "The War of 1812: Conflict for a continent". Seriously this is getting silly now.Americatcp (talk) 22:35, 23 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Well no.  the issue is the federal govt and you switch to state govt [eg 17,228 claims against the New York STATE government.]] How many FEDERAL claims were unpaid so long, if any You don't seem to know.  You quote a book I provided here about monthly reports to the War Department. Yes it was often a month or even 6 months late in making payments.  The issue however is never-payment--how many examples have you found, if any?  As for "default" -- the Congress during the war made all its paper notes legal tender  for all debts.  Professor Kagin states "The success of the Treasury notes was demonstrated by the fact that they were fully subscribed and accepted by the banks and merchants." [in Journal of Economic History (March 1984) page 69].  What's misleading you is that Federalist Congressmen said debts MUST be paid in specie and therefore govt was defaulting. They made a constitutional argument that has been repeatedly tried and rejected by the Supreme Court: Congress has "plenary" (complete) power over money; since 1789 Congress has the power to make paper notes legal tender. See Knox v. Lee for constitutional details. Rjensen (talk) 18:05, 23 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Well no. 'Continued through from 22 August 1814 when the government offered another $6m in bonds, but even at a 20% discount, subscribers offered only $3.5m, of which the government only received $2.5m "in money." - JCBL B&I corr.. Box 160 letter 6, Ives to Greene. Again, subscribers defaulted on $410,000. When state banknotes worth only 65% in specie were accepted for some stock, early subscribers demanded supplementary stock to make up the difference. - D Dewey op.cit p134. The government returned to the original subscribers at 12%, and improved their terms, but for bonds worth $4m, received only $2.5m in cash. The high pointwas reached in late July when, of the $25m sought, $10.4m in cash had been received. The 4th of March issue of $10m of Treasury notes only ever brought in $7.2m. Of the final $9m instalment authorised, nothing was ever raised. - JCBL: 'Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the year 1814'. Washington, A&G Way, 1815. It now remained only for the government irself to default. Hickey and JCA Stagg state; "The treasury consistently fell short in meeting federal financial obligations, and the government finally defaulted on the treasury notes due in 1814 and its debt payments (debt servicing had to be paid in hard money, which the government did not have; thus, the government defaulted on the payment). The United States government was essentially bankrupt by November of 1814. The difficulty in finding loan subscribers and buyers of treasury notes was only part of the problem. Revenue continued to fall, so the government no longer covered its regular expenditures either. Other symptoms of the financial crisis were soldiers’ pay being six to twelve months in arrears, the closing of the Springfield Armory that supplied weapons to the army, and the inability to recruit new soldiers because there was no money for bonuses. To compensate for the last shortcoming, Congress increased the land bounty to 320 acres for men serving the duration of the conflict."- D Hickey "The War of 1812: A forgotten Conflict" JCA Stagg "The War of 1812: Conflict for a continent".


 * The U.S. economy was dealt a severe setback. Exports and imports plunged. The collapse of trade emptied what was left of the government's meager coffers. As revenue from duties shrank and expenses mounted, the public debt soared and soon became unsustainable. Forced to suspend interest payments on its bonds, the U.S. Treasury technically defaulted on November 9, 1814. So controversial became the war for a time that in some parts of the country local militias refused to cooperate and some states flirted with secession. In others, murderous mobs raged against suspected enemy sympathizers. The title of historian Alan Taylor's magisterial book, The Civil War of 1812, captures the mayhem that had been unleashed. The union's future hung in the balance. By the autumn of 1814 -- with key New England states wanting out, the army gravely shorthanded, the navy's largest ships disabled, Congress incapable of securing essential financial instruments (and the government hence basically bankrupt), and, for good measure, the heart of the nation's capital a smoldering wreck -- the only rational course was to try to call a halt and to do so without great delay. - PIETRO S. NIVOLA Co-editor of What We So Proudly Hailed: Essays on the Contemporary Meaning of the War of 1812. You cannot say that "oh well they were paid back later with money that wasn't actually acceptable at the time", That would be similar to paying a Frenchman in 1980 in Euros in 1999 as you have no Francs at the time, you STILL default on the current borrowing.Americatcp (talk) 20:22, 23 January 2018 (UTC)


 * As I was reminded not long ago on this page, keep it civil. I think I would ask RJensen for a overview of mainstream historians views and we can progress to a final AFD and move on. Like I have said this is getting old and I don't intend to blogging endlessly.Tirronan (talk) 20:22, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I've already provided an overview of all the historian's views for who they think won the war - and as you can see, it breaks down on national bias lines. If Rjensen wants to do the same, I would welcome that (and would be good to have more added to the list), but I have provided the references which anyone is free to check, so I don't see how his list is magically going to show there is *no* national bias, when it is so prevalent in the works I've provided here. Deathlibrarian (talk) 03:03, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I'd like more context than that, and seven articles are hardly conclusive. Some of the worst contrived BS I've ever read was from US "Historians" back in the 1950's. You would have thought the USS Constitution won the war single-handedly. I give that as an example. So time frame of the work and the results of peer review would be vital. Anyone quoting James Williams would be laughed out of a room of modern historical scholars.Tirronan (talk) 06:03, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Just clarifyingTirronan, are you saying you want me to add the dates to the survey of historian's opinions on who won the war?Deathlibrarian (talk) 12:14, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I'm looking for more than 7 articles for one thing. I am looking for dates that they were published for another. I am looking for peer reviews for a third. Look I'll call it on my own countryman again, some of the worst histories every written were from American's in the 1st half of the 20th century. I'm sure crap was being produced elsewhere but that is what I am aware of. I'm looking for actual history books that historians have to live with after the fact, not articles.Tirronan (talk) 14:50, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Not sure if we are talking about the survey of Historians and their views on who won the war? Or something else?IN any case, I've added the dates for you. Deathlibrarian (talk) 23:01, 24 January 2018 (UTC)

I can remain civil while pointing out the blatant lies that the “resident historian” spews. It beggars belief how his opinion is regarded as fact by those equally unaware of what actually happened. Again, my response has gone ignored, perhaps his standing as neutral is damaged.Americatcp (talk) 07:43, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * OK, first RJensen is an accredited scholar on the subject. As best that I can tell you simply have an opinion and anyone that has proof to the contrary is either ignored or you attempt to shout them down. That doesn't raise my confidence in you. But nothing drops my consideration faster than calling people liars here. We all make mistakes hell I've made a few and had to retract publicly, fun that, NOT! Now just present your FACTS backed up by RS and that suffices here. Anything else and you are wasting both my time and your breath. Are we clear? The personal comments are irritating and again a waste of time.Tirronan (talk) 14:50, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * AmericatcpI largely agree with you on your opinions about the bias on this page, and there are editors on here who are clearly not neutral and shouldn't be consulted under that assumption (not that you can blame people for having their own opinion) it can be frustrating at times, but I agree with Tirronan, lets keep it civil, eh?

If editors come across as a bit uncivil, people won't see you seriously, and that won't help your arguement.Deathlibrarian (talk) 22:31, 23 January 2018 (UTC) As I have said previously myself, scholars on the subject are still subject to bias and ignorance (something that has been already acknowledged). You'll find though, that RJensen tried to shout ME down by saying "all men were paid" and asking me "have you read them?" in regards to archives which he clearly hasn't himself. I already have presented RS such as "The War of 1812 U.S. War Department Correspondence, 1812-15" By John C. Frederiksen, Records from the State of New York, Historians Paul Studenski and Hermann Krooss, Financial History of the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 75, “The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict.” D Hickey, showing how not only the US defaulted many times during the war; "In June 1812, war broke out between the United States and Great Britain, which lasted until February 1815. The federal government, aside from military challenges including the burning of the Capitol and White House, suffered from severe institutional deficiencies that hindered its ability to meet its financial obligations. One pair of historians concluded that while the War of 1812 “was ill-managed militarily, [it] was even more bungled financially.” Those financial difficulties included unambiguous examples of default. I don't appreciate a "historian" telling me to read up on information that I already know and he clearly does not. So here, FACTS backed up by RS. State of New York for payment of expenses for military clothing and equipment provided by volunteers during the war. These claims were for clothing and equipment "which were depreciated, worn out, lost and destroyed in said service for which he had not received payment." Only the claims of those who performed duty "in the service of the State" were paid. Some additional claims were paid in good faith by the state, but as late as 1885, 17,228 claims were unpaid. Records indicate that these claims were never paid. Either a retraction of the statement "Men went without pay--well no--there were late payments but everyone got paid." Would suffice, and acknowledgment that the US defaulted during the war of 1812. I don't need to waste my breath, this article is already regarded as "unreliable" by a wide amount of forums. Lambert discussed with myself at RMAS the war of 1812, indeed a retraction of the beforementioned statement would suffice.Americatcp (talk) 15:30, 23 January 2018 (UTC)


 * If you are waiting for me to say that the War of 1812 was either well run or well-financed on the American side you are in for a very long wait. I know that and so does RJensen. I have often thought that President Jefferson could not have set America up for more of a disaster if he tried. Let me count the ways... We start with the removal of all taxes except for import taxes when you know the trade is threatened. Then instead of building a strong Navy to defend America's mercantile interests, he built gunboats that were only slightly useful. Instead of a real army, we had a militia. All this is in the article every stumble and disaster well recorded. Nothing hidden. So no, I don't think that the article is biased. You made a statement that Canada could always defend itself, strange that the Admiralty made the statement, "if we go to war with America again we must lose Canada." not my quote, theirs. Everyone on both sides of the Atlantic knew damn well what the United States would become. If you have doubts read a history of the Mexican American War. Then follow that up with a research of the American Civil War. Then compare it to the Crimean war. As early as the 1850's America proved it could project a 50,000 man force and sustain it with logistics. By the 1860's it could treble that number repeatedly. I'd say that the Admiralty's assessment was correct. Yes, the War of 1812 was ill fianced, but America has a lot of resources that had never been properly tapped. I country that is really bankrupt could not finance 209,000 of merchant hulls the following year. That is fact, not an assumption. I don't mind at all talking about America's follies in 1812, what I do resent is that you don't do the same on the British side.


 * As for Lambert, well I'll tell you what my professor at UTD told me. "I eagerly await his next book, how the RN won the Pacific War with some small help from the uncouth, uncultured, and much inferior US Navy." I don't care if the man was knighted by the Queen his accuracy or lack thereof, and his gratuitous slaps at America and American's, in general, have both been noted. While he writes to a fanboy base in the Commonwealth he is not well regarded here and with good reason. He acts like a fanboy and it shows. And yes I read this book completely. His opinion means zero to me though I do hold him in less contempt that James Williams. Don't bother defending him you are wasting your time where I am concerned. I admire historians that slap either side with great gusto such as Riehn's book on the Invasion of Russian.Tirronan (talk) 16:43, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

The nation that financed numerous merchant hulls the following year but left "17,228 claims unpaid" that were never paid, speaks more volumes. I never made the statement that Canada could have always defended itself, it didn't even exist as a country during the period and was British North America. The article is bias, the American problems are diminished, the lack of pay for men, the amount of desertion, Napier in the Euryalus in the Potomac, just some examples. Whether you regard Lambert as writing to his "fanboy base" or not is irrelevant, it was the US who regarded him as the expert at the bicentennial, and at the symposium, I am sure they forgot to ask WP what their opinion was which would have been so highly regarded. I don't need to defend him, your own country did that itself by making him the main speaker. As I said, what I said was correct; men were not paid, and were never paid. Whether this is admitted is now neither here nor there considering it is established fact. The article is already regarded as unreliable as I have said.Americatcp (talk) 17:01, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

National Bias of Historians as to who won the war of 1812
I think it essential to include a note about the national bias of historians, as (seemingly?) purposefully ommitting this information would I think make the article a bit misrepresentative. This information is going to be helpful for the reader. Any Canadian Schoolkid for instance, coming to this page, is going to want to know that Canadian and British Historians favour a British victory as an outcome, and American historians more favour a stalemate - its going to put things in perspective for the user and give context. As such, I'd like to propose we include some information about national bias in the article, at least. So please consider this as a new section, or addition (may be to the historians views section).
 * Historians have different views on who won the War of 1812, and there is an element of national bias to this. Mainly British and Canadian historians follow the view that the war was a British victory, though some US historians, also support this view . US Historians tend to favour a stalemate outcome, though some Canadians and British do as well. Only US historians follow the minority view that the US was the victorious party in the war. -  . Similiarly, surveys of school text books have found historians from Canada, Britain and the United States will emphasize different aspects of the war according to their national narrative, and some British texts will scarcely mention the war.

Thanks Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:07, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * pls review WP:SOURCETYPES.....that seen I do think something like this  would solve POV concerns...just need to find academic and peer-reviewed publications.--Moxy (talk) 15:39, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Thanks Moxy - I've checked, not really any peer reviewed Academic journals for this, however these sources should qualify as "Reliable non-academic sources" as per WP:SOURCETYPESDeathlibrarian (talk) 07:35, 22 January 2018 (UTC)


 * I don't think the source says that historians are biased based on their nationality but that their perspectives differ. So Canadian historians might write about how the war played out in Upper Canada, while Americans would be more likely to write about how it played out in Baltimore and New Orleans.  The other point is that the effect on national consciousness differed in the two countries, with Canadians seeing it as a victory by Canadians.  I note too an error in the source:  "Canadian nationalist narratives...appeared only after 1867."  In fact the narrative appeared following the war that the loyalists had defeated the invasion, although it might better be described as an imperialist narrative.  (See David Mills, |The Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada, 1784-1850.)  Furthermore, the source is a summary of recently released books about the war, one would expect a source that reviewed the full range of literature.  TFD (talk) 11:41, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes, they certainly focus on different aspects of the war (as you would expect them to) but also talk about the results, for instance - "Americans believe they gave their former mother country a good drumming, Canadians pride themselves in turning back ‘the massed might of the United States’, and ‘the English are happiest of all, because they don’t even know it happened’.(1) These competing perspectives are the result of the different functions the Anglo-American conflict served in their respective nations’ historical master narratives." I agree, Canadians to an extent see it as a victory of their own militia, but that is still an overall British victory, as they were on the same side (and Canada wasn't a separate country, but a colony of Britain). In terms of a wider range of the literature, I've done one above, and its very clear there is bias amongst Historians, with probably about 80% of the historians seeing a British victory as being British or Canadian, and the majority of the "stalematers" being US.Deathlibrarian (talk) 20:15, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * When Dr Jasper Trautsch says that Americans believe the U.S. beat the UK, Canadians believe the Upper Canadian colonists beat the Americans, etc., he is talking about national attitudes, not what historians say. Clearly when he says that the English "don't even know it happened," he is not saying that English historians of the war did not know there was a war.  Your straw poll of books is not helpful because we cannot determine that historians are biased based on a few books.  You need a source that actually makes the claim you want to put into the article.  If you cannot find one, then it lacks significance for inclusion.  TFD (talk) 23:50, 22 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Dr Jasper Trautsch follows that with "these competing perspectives are the result of the different functions the Anglo-American conflict served in their respective nations’ historical master narratives." *Historical narratives* are written by Historians - not by the people, so it is referring to Historians. Also "To date, the various collective memories of the conflict are still largely premised on national *historical* narratives and the bicentennial of the war sparked yet more books on the conflict which reaffirm the national trajectories." The whole article is discussing the various historian's books and their viewpoints, - it's not an article on popular opinion. Additionally, there are also two other articles that back the national bias. My list of authors, is not a straw poll, its a survey of all the major historians who write on the war of 1812 I could locate, and its blatently obvious the national bias with historians in this matter - feel free to check it, or provide others if you know of any. Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:28, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * All the historians you could find is the definition of a straw poll. How do you know you have selected the most significant ones?  You would require expert opinion and for that you need secondary sources that say what you have concluded.  Also, "competing perspectives" is not the same thing as who won the war.  Obviously, Prevost, Brock, Tecumseh and Strachan will get more attention from Canadian historians as opposed to Madison and Jackson.  The book I mentioned, The Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada, which explains the myths of 1812, is more likely to be written by a Canadian and published in Canada than by an American in the U.S.  It does not mean that it English or American historians would consider its conclusions wrong, it's just that they would find the subject less interesting.  TFD (talk) 02:21, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * IN this article, Trautsch is using competing perspectives to refer to the who won the war debate. "Americans believe they gave their former mother country a good drumming, Canadians pride themselves in turning back ‘the massed might of the United States’, and ‘the English are happiest of all, because they don’t even know it happened’.(1) These competing perspectives are the result of the different functions the Anglo-American conflict served in their respective nations’ historical master narratives." - The phrase here competing perspectives is referring directly to the competing perspectives mentioned before it - that is, the perspectives of who won the war, America giving UK a "good drumming", Canada turning back the massed tide of the US, etc. As for the list of historians opinions, I didn't select anyone - I included *all historians* who had an opinion on who won the war, online, or in any books I had access to. If you look at the list it in fact does have most of the famous War of 1812 historians on there. Graves, Hickey, Lambert, Taylor, Stagg, Pierre Berton and many others. I obviously don't have every historian. However, the point it, you can see there is an obvious pattern, particularly with Historians who say Canadian/British victory. Deathlibrarian (talk) 10:25, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * If English historians don't even know the war happened, how could they write books about it? Isn't it more likely that Trautsch is referring to the English public rather than English historians?  TFD (talk) 11:15, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * it refers to historians. Trautsch is paraphrasing Charles Perry Stacey, a Canadian historian who wrote it in 1950s --a time when near-zero historians in UK wrote more than an incidental comment on the war of 1812.   today there are a handful -- less than ten I would guess. Stacey was a u of Toronto scholar who demolished the popular "militia myth" to the effect that Canadian locals saved Canada from an American takeover.  See https://books.google.com/books?id=WajWxsRB1_AC&pg=PA107  Rjensen (talk) 12:01, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Thanks Rjensen,cheers.Deathlibrarian (talk) 12:05, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

"How do you know you have selcted the most significant ones?" I would argue one of the most significant would be Lambert, considering he was the only historian asked to speak at the Bicentinnial at the George Washington Masonic Memorial in VA, and who conclusively argues that it was an overwhelming British victory as opposed to any vistory by the United states or even a stalemate. The same historian not only taught myself at RMAS, but also teaches at Kings as the Laughton professor of Naval History. Remember this is a BRITISH historian that was asked to speak, not an American, they obviously respected his clear expertise and opinion backed up by fact. Unlike RJensen who continues to make false claims that I refute with evidence such as "all men were paid" when they clearly were not, yet he is a "trusted historian". Lambert holds much more weight than RJensen and the majority of historians, otherwise why were they not asked to speak at the Bicentinnial? The answer is clear. Lambert also spoke in DC in 2014, at the symposium commemorating the 200th anniversary of the British invasion and burning of Washington DC. I stress again, one of if not the most significant men who are considered an expert in the subject not only by the British but clearly also Americans as he was asked to not only speak at the Bicentinnial but also at the capital itself. "America under Fire: Mr. Madison's war and the Burning of Washington City" took place september 3-4 if you wish to look it up, I suggest doing so. Brian Arthur wrote a book that was named one of the 20 notable Naval books of 2011 in the US Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine May 2012, again.. acknowledged by the Americans and the British with his book "How Britain Won the War of 1812 The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815." Sir David Cannadine described Lambert as "the outstanding British naval historian of his generation". American historian John B Hattendorf, formerly of the University of Oxford writes for the WSJ here and acknowledges Death's opinion that there are differences in national viewpoints; "For even after 200 years it is not agreed who won-or rather, there are still significant differences in national viewpoints." https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204409004577156861451737498 If we are going to decide how much credit we give historians in our sources then firstly, we must rank Lambert at the very top and RJensen at the very bottom, considering I have disproved his claims time and time again on this very talk page.Americatcp (talk) 12:11, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I've basically got any historian I can find who has made a statement about their opinion, including Lambert. I'm not entirely sure who is regarded as the top most experts on the war, but I would think Graves, Hickey, Lambert, Taylor, Stagg, Pierre Berton would be and they are all there.Americatcp (you should probably avoid the attacks on Rjensen, its against WP policy).Deathlibrarian (talk) 12:27, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the Hattendorf articleAmericatcp, I will add that, brilliantDeathlibrarian (talk) 12:27, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

No worries, I do believe that British historians such as Lambert should be added to the “historians views” section of the article in essence of fairness as an american naval historian is there with opposing views. It should also be noted that Lambert spoke at the bicentennial and the symposium. Quotes should be included that he believes the British won the war of 1812, with his cited work to reflect this.Americatcp (talk) 13:38, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Lambert was one of a series of guest speakers at a program on the bicentennial of the burning of Washington sponsored by the visitor's bureau of the city of Alexandria, Virginia across from Washington DC.  It was entirely a small local event--it indicates Lambert's reputation all right-- a small local one for people interested in a famous local event. The historic district of Alexandria is preserved as it was in 1814 (when Alexandria was part of DC and was threatened but not attacked by the Brits)   His presentation was "John Bull Came to Town: Alexandria in the War of 1812" but he had a prepared text based on summariZing his book and focused on Washington not Alexandria---and then answered questions from the audience of 30 or so local people about how the Brits behaved toward non-government property in downtown Washington. He discussed how the Brits burned the local newspaper office and ruined its type. I think that puts his expertise in excellent perspective.  for details see https://networks.h-net.org/node/28441/discussions/39251/alexandrias-war-1812-bicentennial. Rjensen (talk) 17:40, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

On Lambert at that very event “Since 2001 Andrew Lambert has been the Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies, Kings College London. He is author of the highly acclaimed Nelson; Britannia’s God of War (2004) and The Challenge—Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812 (2012), and he wrote and presented for the BBC television series War at Sea. Professor Lambert is now writing a biography of Charles Napier, Captain of the 36-gun frigate Euryalus, who joined Captain James Alexandria Gordon, Captain of the 38-gun frigate Seahorse and other supporting naval ships in the brilliantly executed August 1814 ascension of the Potomac River and capture of Alexandria.

Captain Napier, who would rise to be one of the most popular and visionary British Admirals in the Victorian era, carefully noted the appearance of the town, the design of its buildings, its commerce, and its culture during his 1814 “visit.” In addition to sharing these observations, Professor Lambert, who has previously visited and conducted research in Alexandria and Washington, will describe the Battle of the Potomac, a battle in which Captain Napier was wounded by friendly fire.”

Sounds like he’s quite respected to me, he also spoke at the Symposium in 2014 in DC, did you receive an invite?

Hattendorf references Lamberts expertise in his lecture here http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00253359.2013.766989 his expertise are well recognised, especially considering his current position at Kings. Teaching at Sandhurst, we’re you ever asked to teach at West Point? He is absolutely regarded an expert in history. Interesting how you play down his credentials when they far outweigh your own.Americatcp (talk) 18:00, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Lambert gets an invitation from the visitor's bureau at a small event in Virginia and one of our editors lauds over and over a half dozen times his towering reputation. Not a balanced view but our newbie editor was a student of his it appears. Lambert is one of about 400 to 500 scholars working in the last decade on the war of 1812, and one of a handful in Britain. [My estimate comes from the main abstract guide America History and Life which lists 961 published scholarly articles & books on the war since 2007.]  Lambert's work on the salt-water naval war of 1812 is generally good but in my opinion he is much weaker on land (and on the Great Lakes) and takes an extreme position on the won-loss question. Not many historians buy his argument that the blockade ruined the US economy--I think he is badly informed and did not do the needed research in economic (and legal) history. 90% of the goods blockaded were flour, cotton and tobacco that were not lost--they were sold at home or were stored and sold in 1815. Lambert never sees that the US prospered during the 1812-1815 at an annual growth rate of about 3% in GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund. That is much better than his winner the UK which shrank in size 1812-15 and faced massive Luddite riots by the impoverished.  [see ]  The great majority of professional historians (especially in Canada) avoid the -"who won" question, as Graves explained in 2012.  It's a game for local patriots to play, not one for scholars or encyclopedia editors. Rjensen (talk) 18:42, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I think there probably is a reluctance by some to be drawn on who won the war, but there are plenty who make their opinions known, including probably all the top experts on the war of 1812, and even Graves himself.Deathlibrarian (talk) 20:40, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

It is not hidden that Lambert is a "Naval" Historian, I never claimed otherwise. "Not many historians buy his argument that the blockade ruined the US economy" - This is by and large false from our "resident historian". The British blockade was by far the most important naval activity. The fleet of Royal Navy warships guarding American ports grew from twenty in October 1812 to 135 in early 1815. The blockade was gradually extended and tightened. New England was initially exempted, notes Carl Benn, “because the British hoped to increase dissension between north-eastern states that opposed hostilities and the rest of America, and because the British army fighting Napoleon in Spain needed American grain to survive, which New Englanders happily supplied in American ships licensed and protected by the British.” In May 1814, following Napoleon’s defeat, the British added New England ports. The blockade was effective in preventing most U.S. naval ships, privateers, and merchant vessels from leaving port. “By 1814,” writes Benn, “only one out of every 12 merchant ships in the United States even dared to leave port, dramatically exemplifying the economic impact of the war on the republic’s economy.” U.S. exports went into steep decline between 1812 and 1814, their value decreasing from $39 million to $7 million. The value of imports similarly plummeted, from $79 million to $13 million. This steep drop resulted in unemployment and hardship in the maritime industry. - Carl Benn, The War of 1812, pp. 55, 57. Brian Arthur, How Britain Won the War of 1812, p241.

The British effectively frozen the commerce of the young United States up and down the eastern seaboard. The Columbian Centinel reported in the fall of 1813, that "Our coasts unnavigable to ourselves, though free to the enemy and the money making neutral; our harbors blockaded; our shipping destroyed or rotting at the docks; silence and stillness in our cities; the grass growing upon the public wharves."

...The British blockade was taking a toll on the whole American economy, shutting down not only oceanic trade but also coastal trade. The federal government’s finances were also in jeopardy. Having failed to plan for a long war, let alone an invasion of the United States, the government was running out of sources of loans to meet payroll and keep the war going, and the idea of raising taxes met with stiff resistance in the depressed economy. Secretary of the Treasury George W. Campbell was so frustrated that he quit after only eight months in office (February to October 1814). President Madison tried to put the best face on the situation. In his Sixth Annual Message to Congress on September 20, 1814, he encouraged Americans to “cheerfully and proudly bear every burden of every kind which the safety and honor of the nation demand.” Perhaps thinking of the historical record, he also assured Americans that the British were responsible for the war, having abused “the tranquility of the civilized and commercial world.” - President James Madison, “Sixth Annual Message (September 20, 1814),”

Although the British blockade lacks the glamour and excitement of the naval duels on the high seas, it was the preeminent use of naval power in the war, and it had a huge impact. Americans were then a maritime people, with the livelihood of most people tied, directly or indirectly, to the sea. The British blockade cut sharply into U.S. foreign and coastal trade and undermined government revenue, which was heavily dependent on trade. This left the government scrambling for money at a time when expenses were soaring from the cost of the war. Naval historians have traditionally paid little attention to the blockade. For those who served on blockading ships, there was much boredom, and their memoirs are more likely to be filled with stories of the predatory raids they took part in or the prize ships and goods they captured. The impact of the British blockade can only be understood by studying U.S. economic and financial history, and that holds little appeal for most naval historians. - Donald Hickey, War of 1812, Issue 19 "British Blockade"

Hickey continues.. Henry Adams was no military historian, and his treatment of the battles and campaigns is probably the weakest part of his study. Much stronger is his examination of U.S. domestic history, and Adams understood the crushing impact of the British blockade. “No ordinary operations of war,” he said, “could affect the United States so severely as this inexorable blockade.” (Adams, History of the United States (Harbert ed.), 2:803.) Dudley almost surely underrates the British blockade’s effectiveness against armed American ships, and he dismisses its impact on U.S. commerce, claiming that the republic voluntarily withdrew from international trade during the conflict. But this withdrawal, which had a devastating effect on both the U.S. economy and government revenue, was far from voluntary.

Other historians that agree with Hickey's conclusions; Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (Boston, 1905) Herbert Heaton, “Non-Importation, 1806-1812,” Journal of Economic History 1 (November, 1941), 171-98.

Jeremy Black writes; Thus, blockade was seen as more important than raiding the Chesapeake Bay, an instructive indication of the importance of economic warfare and one that is important to bear in mind when considering British operations. In fact, the blockade greatly harmed the U.S. economy, with exports dropping from $45 million in 1811 to $7 million in 1814, and it became more effective from 1813, restricting American raids as well as trade. Sourcing from Joseph A. Goldenberg, "The Royal Navy's Blockade in New England Waters, 1812-1815," International History Review, 6 (1984), pp. 424-39.

Again with the whataboutism about the British economy, completely irrelevant to that of the US during the war of 1812. Please do stay on topic.Americatcp (talk) 20:06, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I would tend to agree with Americatcp Lambert seems quite formidable. From his wikipedia page he has held top positions at Sandhurst, and Kings College London, both very prestigous, amongst other places... he's written 18 books on Naval history and numerious articles. He has also lectured on Naval history in 5 different countries.[]Deathlibrarian (talk) 20:35, 23 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Indeed so, he’s one of the most decorated and respected of the era.Americatcp (talk) 10:04, 24 January 2018 (UTC)

Views of some additional historians I am listing here a small number of historians who have written about the War of 1812 to add to the small number that is already listed. My experience from reading these and other historians is that not all of them declare a definitive winner nor do they even say it’s a stalemate.

Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and The Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship by Duncan Andrew Campbell. Born in Africa, moved to Canada and went to Queen’s University and the University of Toronto then to the University of Cambridge. In referring to the comment from John Quincy Adams that “I hope this will be the last treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States,” Campbell stated: “It was – the numerous war scares during the rest of the century notwithstanding. This was why both sides won. They had fought each other to a standstill and whatever each had gained, they had, at least, not taken it from each other. Each had given as good as they got, and if Britain had been distracted, America had been divided.” (pgs. 35-36)

The United States, Great Britain and British North America: From the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812 by Canadian A. L. Burt. “As neither side had won the war or wished to continue it, neither side could enforce its will upon the other.” (pg. 371)

The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812 by Robin Reilly (British) Reilly did not declare either side to have won. In response to the quote of an outburst of anger by Henry Clay on December 22, 1814 to the terms of the treaty that they were to agree to, Reilly wrote: “And yet, he [Clay] was unable to comprehend it at the time, the cause which he had personally made his own had been preserved and vindicated. In spite of the military incompetence, internal dissension, and financial ruin, his country’s honor was held in greater respect in Europe than at any time since the Revolution.” (pg. 257)

The Treaty of Gent: The British Perspective by Michael Dunne (British) Dunne states: “Innumerable pages have been written on the military and naval campaigns of the War of 1812. From them we can see that the war ended not so much in a draw as in stalemate; for the forces on either side were not equally matched but rather incomparable.”

The Passionate Canadians: The Historical Debate about the Eastern Canadian-American Boundary by Francis M. Carroll (Canadian) On page 86 Carroll states: “The War of 1812 also had an impact on the border. A decisive military victory by either the United States or His Majesty’s forces, might well have settled the boundary controversy once and for all, but by and large the war was fought to a stalemate.”

For Honour’s Sake: The War of 1812 and The Brokering of an Uneasy Peace by Mark Zuehlke (Canadian). He does not declare an absolute winner, but sees both sides as obtaining an honorable peace. He describes the Treaty of Ghent as resulting in “a satisfactory peace where the honour of both sides was preserved.” (pg. 390)

United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 by Reginald C. Stuart (Canadian). Another historian who does not see one side as winning. He does not explicitly state that it was a stalemate but the implication is clear.

Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812 by Faye M. Kert (Can) She stated: “Out of the War of 1812 came heroes and villains, millionaires and paupers, politicians, preachers, and several American presidents. There were, however, no clear victors.” (pg. 147)

Perilous Fight: America’s Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 18112-1815 by Stephen Budiansky (US) It is claimed, based on a magazine article, that Budiansky states the United States won. The writer states: “The U.S. navy was the ‘unambiguous victor of the war’” according to Budiansky. This is taken completely out of the context that Budiansky used it in. What Budiansky stated was: “If there was one unambiguous victor of the war, it was the United States navy. American hostility to a standing navy vanished with scarcely a trace, and never again would there be any doubt that a permanent navy was the backbone of American security.” (pg. 362) Budiansky is stating that the war resulted in an internal US decision for the need for a blue water navy, and is not referring to the US navy having defeated the Royal Navy. Budiansky includes a number of comments, his own and quotes from others, that are obviously inconsistent with claiming the US won the war. He quotes Federalist senator Christopher Gore as saying: “The treaty must be deemed disgraceful to the Government who made the war and the peace, and will be so judged by all, after the first effusions of joy at relief have subsided.” (pg. 356) Budiansky then states: “But the amnesia that sets in after all wars took hold with lightning swiftness. Simply, no one wanted to hear that a war in which men fought and died had been in vain; no one wanted to be reminded of all the blunders and incompetence and miscalculations of the generals, or all the inconsistencies and opportunism of the politicians. Almost immediately the Republicans were declaring the war not merely an American triumph but a ‘second war of independence.’” (pg. 356) Budiansky also referred to “Madison’s ignominious abandonment of America’s positions on impressment and free trade in the negotiations at Ghent…” (pg.359) In the end, Budiansky seems to see the war as ending ambiguously.

The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812 by Troy Bickham (British-US?) I was told that Bickham was born in Britain and raised in the US. I’ve no way of knowing if that is true, but given the emphasis on the nationality of the historians it may be relevant for some here. After getting his bachelor’s degree in the US Bickham went to Britain for several years where he got his master’s and Ph.D. from Oxford. He does see Britain as the loser. He states: “…the true primary issue of the War of 1812−whether or not the United States would be respected as a sovereign nation rather than humbled as a quasi-part of the British Empire−was resolved, and Britain had lost.” (pg. 263) Dwalrus (talk) 18:14, 24 January 2018 (UTC)
 * DwalrusGood to see more of these, the more the better!, but a question, what was you criteria for selecting which historians you put here in your list? I just noticed they are all Canadian and British, and you've only got historians who believe the war ended in a draw. No US historians (except for Budiansky).Deathlibrarian (talk) 01:52, 25 January 2018 (UTC)


 * I've read some of the British newspapers that were very bitter that the US hadn't been utterly ruined, its shipyards burned, and its future expansion halted. Thus they thought that the war was a defeat. But... it always seemed a reach for me and the issue is muddy enough as is.Tirronan (talk) 14:56, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I would suggest that is an indication not that they saw it is a defeat, but that they believed it was not as strong a victory as it could have been if the politicians hadn't wimped out. You don't complain that you weren't harsh enough towards your enemy if you think you lost, you are just grateful that things weren't worse for your side. Dabbler (talk) 15:33, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Yeah, the complaints were more along the line of, gah, you think they are bad now just wait a few decades and see the monster they become type. Take a gander at them and you'll see what I mean.Tirronan (talk) 19:04, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I would agree with Dabbler, most would suggest their conviction should have been stronger, and the victory even more so defined than it was.Americatcp (talk) 19:32, 25 January 2018 (UTC)

I only included these historians to show that the list you provided was inadequate. Understand that I agree that the predominant view in the US is that the war was a stalemate. As for Canada and Britain I don’t know the answer, but the small numbers listed by you and myself don’t seem large enough to form a definitive conclusion. However, the New Zealand born, raised, and educated historian J.C.A. Stagg stated in his book that you list under British victories that: “Many historians, including some Americans as well as most Britons and Canadians, have asserted that, as the United States accomplished none of its declared war aims, the result was an American defeat.” (pg. 154) I don’t know if Stagg is correct, but his personal view of who won is interesting. He states that with respect to Canada “the war can be regarded as a victory inasmuch as they survived a serious threat to their existence as members of the empire….” (pg. 155) But as for Britain, Stagg states: “To put it another way, even if the British had won the war….” (pg. 155) So now he has Canada winning but not Britain. By the way, I believe the United States lost. Dwalrus (talk) 20:17, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Well Dwalrus, yes, but at the same time I think your results are skewed because you are being selective in what you are showing. But IMHO if you theoretically had done a survey of *all* historians, and their opinions, rather than just selecting Canadian/British historians that saw the war as a stalemate (and yes, I understand you were doing that to prove your personal viewpoint that you see the war as a stalemate), you would have come up with a more balanced conclusion that was probably closer to mine. Logically, (1) there is a larger body of US historians, and (2) we would all agree more US historians believe the war was a stalemate, than a British victory. I surveyed all historians I could find, I obviously can't cover all historians, but even in so doing, IMHO it shows a pattern that would be largely reflected in the larger body of historians. So in short......you can get as many historians views as you want, but you will still find British or Canadian historians favour British victory and US historians favour a stalemate.
 * I rather doubt that all US historians would agree to a stalemate either. Most military historians find it a stalemate given that neither side operated a single successful offensive. But that is a more limited view. The wider political outcome is another matter altogether.Tirronan (talk) 21:54, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes, I agree, not all US historians would agree it was a stalemate, (for instance Donald Hickey doesn't) but most would. Just as a side note, some British historians argue that militarily on land it was more even, but at sea, it was a British victory - US historians seem to not look at the British naval victory in regards to the "who won the war?" question. Once again, it's a national historical narrative, and that's how national bias works. Deathlibrarian (talk) 23:10, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
 * More likely a better understanding of the US economy of the time. The US Government was getting its money from import taxes. Economic data says there was one hell of a lot of money available they hadn't tapped, yet. I had a lovely book on sailing men of war from a British Author on the subject. He noted that the US lost its merchantile prowess due to the war. I took it as gospel till six months ago, it was ruined in the depression of 1818 and US financers had given up on it as too risky a venture to throw money at. Shows more lack of understanding of the other side's economic nuances I guess. It isn't something I'm pushing I just find it interesting. It takes a lot of digging.Tirronan (talk) 00:26, 26 January 2018 (UTC)

Edit Break 1
Considering this has been discussed for some time, and gone nowhere, I'd like to propose a vote for the inclusion of this reference to the national bias of Historians for the war of 1812. I think it essential to include a note about the national bias of historians, as (seemingly?) purposefully ommitting this information would I think make the article a bit misrepresentative. This information is going to be helpful for the reader. Any Canadian Schoolkid for instance, coming to this page, is going to want to know that Canadian and British Historians favour a British victory as an outcome, and American historians more favour a stalemate - its going to put things in perspective for the user and give context. As such, I'd like to propose we include some information about national bias in the article, at least. So please consider this as a new section, or addition (may be to the historians views section).
 * Historians have different views on who won the War of 1812, and there is an element of national bias to this. Mainly British and Canadian historians follow the view that the war was a British victory, though some US historians, also support this view . US Historians tend to favour a stalemate outcome, though some Canadians and British do as well. Only US historians follow the minority view that the US was the victorious party in the war. -  . Similiarly, surveys of school text books have found historians from Canada, Britain and the United States will emphasize different aspects of the war according to their national narrative, and some British texts will scarcely mention the war.

Would be good to have your vote on this issue, Americatcp, Rjensen, Moxy, HLGallon, 'the WOLF  child ,talk * SupportAmericatcp (talk) 10:44, 24 January 2018 (UTC)
 * SupportDeathlibrarian (talk) 10:10, 24 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Support Rjensen (talk) 10:17, 24 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Support Dabbler (talk) 11:39, 24 January 2018 (UTC)
 * SupportTirronan (talk) 17:27, 24 January 2018 (UTC)

Thanks everyone for your votes, and the time and effort in the debate, some enlightening debates were had. As the suggested inclusion has got all supports and no opposes, I'll put this in to the article, in the historian's section. Cheers Deathlibrarian (talk) 21:49, 25 January 2018 (UTC) Well, well, well, AmericanCP was a sockpuppet after all.Tirronan (talk) 23:58, 18 February 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 2 March 2018
Sarabtad000 (talk) 16:54, 2 March 2018 (UTC) the 1st french empire in some ways were involved on the american side


 * Incomplete request. "This template must be followed by a complete and specific description of the request, that is, specify what text should be removed and a verbatim copy of the text that should replace it." Laszlo Panaflex (talk) 17:07, 2 March 2018 (UTC)

British Memory/Commemoration of the War
I have noticed that there is no section under the 'Memory and Historiography' sub-heading for the British perspective. I would be interested in adding a few sentences about why the war isn't really remembered or commemorated in Britain, especially in comparison to Canadian and American bicentennial celebrations.

Unfortunately, the absence of the conflict in British public memory has transferred over to the sources that discuss this particular field. Here is a provisional list of sources I am considering, but I would be very welcome to further suggestions and/or additions:

Amanda Foreman, 'The British View the War of 1812 Quite Differently Than Americans Do', Smithsonian, (2014). https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/british-view-war-1812-quite-differently-americans-do-180951852/

Slate article James M. Lundberg, 'Happy 200th Birthday, War of 1812!', Slate, (2012). http://www.slate.com/articles/life/history/2012/05/war_of_1812_bicentennial_why_does_no_one_remember_the_war_that_made_andrew_jackson_famous_.html

USA Today article http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-14/war-of-1812-bicentennial/55603666/1

Rick Hampson, 'War of 1812 bicentennial: The USA shrugs as Canada goes all out', The Washington Post, (2012). https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/want-to-learn-more-about-the-war-of-1812-go-to-canada/2013/09/23/394b9922-2457-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html?utm_term=.2ce5d3e9961c

Richard Simon, 'Who really won the War of 1812?', LA Times, (2012). http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/26/nation/la-na-war-of-1812-20120226

Whose war of 1812? Competing Memories of the Anglo-American Conflict http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1387

The challenge: Britain against America in the naval war of 1812 Martin Salmon, 'The challenge: Britain against America in the naval war of 1812', Journal for Maritime Research, (2015). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21533369.2015.1024532

Matthew Dennis, 'Reflections on a Bicentennial: The War of 1812 in American Public Memory', Early American Studies, 12, (2014). http://www.jstor.org/stable/24474882?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=Whose&searchText=War&searchText=of&searchText=1812&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DWhose%2BWar%2Bof%2B1812&refreqid=search%3Aa6d5a60c7447d8489c17cb66281c6588&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Lawrence Hatter, 'Party Like it's 1812: The War at 200' Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 71, (2012). http://www.jstor.org/stable/42628248?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=Whose&searchText=War&searchText=of&searchText=1812&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DWhose%2BWar%2Bof%2B1812&refreqid=search%3Aa6d5a60c7447d8489c17cb66281c6588&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

1812: A British Perspective https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q_4b7mjSJFU

Jeremy Black, 'A British View of the Naval War of 1812', Naval History Magazine, 22, (2008). https://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2008-08/british-view-naval-war-1812

Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (USA, 2012). https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ik6Vi82gLagC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=the+war+of+1812+british+perspective&ots=j3nrzz4UWy&sig=0MhFJctrE66Uc4g9_9GzQ41ewFk#v=onepage&q=the%20war%20of%201812%20british%20perspective&f=false

Wilbur Devereux Jones, 'A British View of the War of 1812 and the Peace Negotiations', The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 45, (1958). http://www.jstor.org/stable/1889322?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
 * it's going to be difficult. I have serious troubles with Amanda Foreman's essay: she has two howlers in one sentence: [If the U.S. has its Paul Revere, Canada has Shawnee chief Tecumseh Paul Revere was a different war--It's the first nations who celebrate Tecumseh, not the Canadian historians.] But mostly she uses "memory" To discuss not the British writers after 1815, but the British policymakers during the war. I think we all use "memory" in the sense that memory comes after the event. British historians until last decade gave very brief coverage of the war, very little analysis or explanation, and did almost no research whatever in American sources. I think that's what scholars mean when they often say of the pre-2000 British historians, "because they don’t even know it happened.”  Rjensen (talk) 07:27, 3 March 2018 (UTC)

Request for comments regarding my potential edits
Hi all, I am planning to add to this article as part of a course I am taking at The George Washington University. Please feel free to share suggestions/additions/questions/comments/concerns with me regarding my topic and bibliography!

I plan to add to the War of 1812 Wikipedia entry information about the war's impact on Québécois nationalism and Quebec's (rather, Lower Canada's) relations with the rest of Canada. Several sources of tension between the Québécois and their Anglo-counterparts also contributed to the sour relations between American and Great Britain. For example, just as Britain suspected that the United States was colluding with Napoleonic France, British Canadians likewise suspected that the Québécois would aid Napoleon, should he attempt to retake Canada. I further hope to add information on the Voltigeurs and their role in both the war and the intra-Canadian frictions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Emilioluna (talk • contribs) 02:00, 7 March 2018 (UTC)