Talk:Western Front (World War II)/Archive 1

Page one
I was under the impression that the Western Front generally only referred to events in Europe from Overlord onwards. Oberiko
 * I've never heard anyone make such a claim, and I have in fact seen it used many times to refer to the early events in the war. &rarr;Raul654 18:10, Sep 3, 2004 (UTC)
 * Alright, then is it the North-West European Campaign that would refer to events Overlord and beyond?
 * I sincerely doubt there's a specific term for the post D-day Western front. I consider myself well versed in this area, and I can't think of one. &rarr;Raul654 18:40, Sep 3, 2004 (UTC)
 * I think there has to be a way to differentiate it. A few sites that do refer to that matter in question with the name NWEC Canadian department of defense website, British army website, Royal Canadian Armoured Core website, Book from the Imperial War Museum.  This was, admittedly, a quick and dirty Google search, but I think it does show that there is a specific name for the events by reputable sources.
 * Also, if all these events (essentially everything west of Germany) encompass the Western Front, would that make Poland part of the Eastern Front? Oberiko 12:38, 4 Sep 2004 (UTC)

The British (and Canadians) Army fought the 1944-1945 North-West European Campaign culminating in the German surrender on Lüneburg Heath in 1945. The campaign battle honour was "North-West Europe 1944-1945". After the breakout from Normandy most of the rest of the Western Front 1944-1945 was manned by the US Army and commanded by US Generals under Eisenhower's "broad-front" strategy. Most of the troops who landed in Operation Dragoon in the South of France on the Mediterranean coast (17 km from St Tropez) never saw cold wet NW Europe.

BTW During the battle of France in 1940 the campaign battle honour awarded to the British regiments was "North-West Europe 1940"

To answer your question is Poland (1939) part of the Eastern Front. As you know from other pages where we have been debating this over the last couple of days, I would say yes. But I can also appreciate the argument that as there were no combatants on the Eastern front between the fall of Poland and the start of operation Barbarossa that to lump them together could be confusing. However on the Western Front as the UK was still in the fight and the Germans had to keep divisions on the western coast, to defend against raids like Dieppe and later the D-Day invasion, so the Western Front was in existence from 1939-1945. Philip Baird Shearer 09:17, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)


 * Running out of names here then. I'll probably call it Western Front (campaign) and move this page to Western Front (theatre). Oberiko 15:03, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I don't think that is a good idea. The name of this article is fine as it is unless it is moved to "Western Front of World War II". The name "Western Front (theatre)" could be used for the Western Front (WWI) as well, so it is ambiguous.

If you want a specific page for the British campaign then call it "North-West European Campaign (1940)" and "North-West European Campaign (1944-1945)". Not that I think that this is necessary at the moment as the "Military history of Britain during World War II" covers it in as much detail as most would need. Fleshing out the very sketchy "Battle of France" would seem to me to be a better way to spend time.

As a general rule I would argue that one can not have theatres in the theatres. Because it is confusing to read. Look at the example in WWII when the mischievous US General Vinegar Joe Stilwell made what was an administrative grouping the "CBI theater" in to an line organisation with a command staff. It caused confusion at the time in the "South-East Asian Theatre" chain of command and still causes confusion for anyone trying to understand what was happening in the China/India/Burma triangle during WWII! The immediate assumption that the reader makes is that the Americans were running their own theatre independent of the "South-East Asian Theatre" and therefore separate campaigns which were not related. This of course was not true.

I do not understand why you do not feel comfortable with there being more than one campaign on a Front. After all this is quite normal just look at the Napoleonic wars where there was a new campaign every year often over the same ground. On the Eastern front winter tended to stop major initiative until the next year and it is quite possible to call the next summers attack a campaign Eg the the Caucus campaign. Also one can argue that when new allies join an existing front and take up most of the fighting like the Germans did in Africa or the Americans in Britain, that a new campaign starts on an existing Front.Philip Baird Shearer 18:02, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)


 * I have no problem with multiple campaigns within a theatre or a front, but I would consider the Anglo-American campaign as one joint venture (just as the American and British assaults into Tunisia during the finishing days of the North African Campaign is generally catagorized as one Allied campaign).


 * I also have no problem with campaigns within campaigns, as that's quite common.


 * As I've said earlier, I prefer to catagorize by campaign more so then theatre or the ever ambigious front. The Italian Campaign was seperate from the Balkans, even though one might consider them both the Southern Front.  Poland was a seperate campaign from the Soviet-German war, even though they could, (as our debates have shown) potentially, both be considered the Eastern Front by some.


 * What I'm looking for is a way to distinguish the joint Anglo-American attack (which is, I believe, one large joint campaign made up of multiple smaller campaigns) from 1944-1945 in Western Europe as seperate from, say, the Battle of France. I'd rather not resort to something unwieldly Western Allied Campaign to liberate Europe when I'm sure there's a more common, and therefore better, name for the venture. Oberiko 20:02, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I think that the year titles in the article Western Front (WWII) are sufficient: 1939 – 1941, 1942 – 1943, 1944 – 1945. I think you are flogging a dead horse and should lighten up on the campaign bit in this case, because the Americans tend not to use the term they have wars, theater commands, operations and battles rather than campaigns, (it very positive thinking because it does not allow for defeats), while armies modelled on the British system have wars, campaigns, operations and battles (probably because the first campaign in a major war is often a defeat for the British). You can see this in the "campaign" medals awarded to Americans at the end of WWII, which are so broad as to be theatre medals,American Campaign Medal, Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal,. If the names of articles in Wikipedia are to be close to those used in other references, the best that can be done is to try to muddle the two together. A Western Front article is a good name for an overview which allows those two different views to be encompassed in one document with links into more detailed articles. But I would not exclude 1939-1943 from the Western Front because they are just as much part of the front as 1944-1945.Philip Baird Shearer 23:56, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)


 * Alright, I found it. European Theater of Operations was an American term used to refer to the European Campaign (for all Western Allies) from (essentially) Overlord onwards.  While there is some ambiguity to the Mediterrean, it is common  to see it as strictly Western Europe.  I'll do the writing there. Oberiko 14:48, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

If you do make sure that you do not mix up American adminstrative commands like ETOUSA and allied joint operational commands like SHAEF. Philip Baird Shearer 19:22, 7 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Roer or Rur?
I have changed the river's name to the German Rur from the Flemish/Dutch Roer mainly because this is the accepted spelling on that topic's main page (Roer gets a redirect). Also, though, the vast majority of the river flows through Germany, not the Netherlands, and in this context the crossing took place entirely on German soil. As far as I know, the convention adopted in the field and subsequently in the literature of using the Dutch was solely to avoid ambiguities with the 'Ruhr' of 'Ruhrgebiet' fame. But on Wiki the disambiguity is made explicit on both rivers' pages (I mean Rur and Ruhr). On the Rur page I've added a little bit more detail about its history as a front from Dec. to Feb. 44-45 Ribbit 13:33, 3 March 2006 (UTC)Ribbit

Casualties
Quick Question Did more US troops die on the Western Front against Germans or did more died fighting against the Japanese?--Secret Agent Man 20:37, 5 Mar 2005 (UTC)


 * There were about 407,000 US deaths in World War II of which about 292,000 were killed in action or missing and about 115,000 died due to other causes (accidents, disease, mistreatment as POWs etc). According to the figures for killed in action break down very roughly into 4,000 in Africa, 30,000 in Italy, 109,000–135,000 on the Western Front, 92,000 in the Pacific, 4,000 in Southeast Asia, and 27,000–53,000 elsewhere. So more died on the Western Front. Gdr 19:20, 2005 Mar 19 (UTC)


 * The list of casualties is a bit incomplete. The number of casualties 1939-1940 has simply been drawn from the Battle of France only, but as the Western Front, as defined in the article, covers also the invasion of Denmark and Norway, casualties from this part of the front should also be added. Besides. What is the explanation for the exlusion of the Battle of Britain? EriFr (talk) 23:17, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

Discussion on the 44-45 campaign
This text was added to the article (Revision as of 04:44, 22 January 2007) by W. B. Wilson:  >==1944 – 1945: The Campaign in Hindsight==

While the unconditional surrender of Germany represented a resounding Allied success, the path to this outcome was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides. In retrospect, it is clear that particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the campaign.


 * The Allied deception as to where the D-Day landings would take place was very successful, with the majority of the German command convinced the landings would take place at Calais. For their part, the Germans underestimated Allied willingness to risk an amphibious assault over a route longer than the shortest path across the English Channel.  While the Allies meticulously planned the landings, they failed to assess the countryside immediately beyond the beaches, which resulted in the Germans very successfully using the hedgerow country (Bocage) as a system of natural defensive works that took the Allies two months to clear at a staggering cost in infantry casualties.  Historians have also asserted the U.S. Army should have landed on the eastern end of the Normandy beaches and formed the northern wing of Allied forces in Northwest Europe.  The primary argument in support of this is that the mobility of American forces could have been better used in the more open terrain and most direct route to Berlin that the northern approach offered.  As it was, the pre-invasion basing of troops in England determined the arrangement of the landing forces.


 * While the Germans had reason to occasionally doubt Allied military proficiency, it is clear the Germans consistently underestimated Allied competency. In its most damaging expression, this habit of underestimation led to the rejection of any notion that the Allies might have broken German military ciphers, most famously the Enigma code.  The ability to monitor German military communications was an Allied strategic asset of the highest order.  Less dramatically, the Germans also too often underestimated Allied troop proficiency, a habit that resulted in occasional sharp defeats for overconfident German units.


 * Manpower strongly affected the course of the campaign. The German ability to form a cohesive defensive line (the so-called "Miracle in the West") after the disaster their forces endured in Normandy was due almost entirely to the ability of the German Ersatzheer (Replacement Army) to quickly deploy large numbers of new troops.  These inexperienced troops were paired with seasoned cadres who swiftly transformed the replacements into competent combat units. Thus, while the Allies took large numbers of German prisoners during their advance from Normandy to the German border, they underestimated the ability of the Germans to reconstitute their forces under very disadvantageous circumstances.  The Allies also gravely underestimated the infantry casualties their forces would suffer in Northwestern Europe and the number of divisions that would be required to win the campaign.  British manpower shortages became so grave that two infantry divisions had to be disbanded, while the Americans were forced to shake excess personnel out of their logistical and Army Air Force units in order to bring rifle units up to strength.  Shortages of American manpower were strongly aggravated by a tendency to attack head-on regardless of circumstances, a habit that was particularly in evidence during the months of fighting in the Hurtgen Forest.  The Allied logistical crisis that dominated their operations from September through December had the further pernicious effect of limiting the number of divisions in England that could be moved onto the continent to reinforce the front, since the Allies were only able to supply a limited number of divisions east of the Seine River.  After the Allies mastered the logistical crisis, the Americans diverted divisions bound for the Pacific Theater to Europe in a belated realization that more divisions were needed for operations in Europe.


 * While the Germans achieved strategic surprise with their offensive in the Ardennes, the Panzer divisions that had been so painstakingly rebuilt could have been more profitably used to defend the Westwall and the Rhineland, or perhaps, in the defense of Berlin against the Red Army. The German thrust failed to shatter their enemies' alliance and cost Germany high casualities and equipment losses it could ill-afford.  This folly was repeated in Alsace in January, but with the added disadvantage this time that the Allies were expecting the attack.


 * The Allies made serious errors and questionable uses of their forces several times during the course of operations in 1944-45.


 * Upon breaking out of Normandy in August, the Americans committed two armored divisions to operations in Brittany when armored units were direly needed for the pursuit of the German army across France. While the port of Brest, France was ultimately captured by the Americans, it consumed the operations of an American corps for an entire month and ultimately did little for the Allied effort because the Germans so thoroughly destroyed the port before it was captured.


 * Out of fear that two wings of their forces might collide, the Allies failed to definitively close the Falaise Gap in August, allowing trapped German forces an escape route to the east. Although the operations around Falaise trapped a considerable number of German prisoners, experienced German leadership cadres evaded Allied forces and were available to reconstitute a cohesive front line along the Westwall.


 * Although British forces conducted a brilliant pursuit across northern France that resulted in the liberation of the critically important port of Antwerp in early September, they failed to realize the port would remain unuseable while the Scheldt Estuary remained uncleared of Germans. The Germans immediately grasped the signficance of the Scheldt Estuary and moved in troops to conduct a lengthy defense.  The Allied failure to swiftly clear the Scheldt Estuary meant the port of Antwerp could not be used until November 28, and strongly contributed to the lengthy logistical crisis that hamstrung Allied operations for four months.  Operation Market-Garden was a double failure in the sense that the resources used for it would have been more profitably committed to clearing the Scheldt Estuary instead of carving out an extended salient that did nothing but extend an already over-extended Allied front line.


 * Despite grave shortages of riflemen, American operations in front of the Westwall, particulary in U.S. First Army's area, were characterized by bloody frontal assaults. Stubbornness and misplaced notions that the U.S. Army could not allow itself to abandon unprofitable operations saw five infantry divisions shredded in the Hurtgen Forest fighting, with the attack being abandoned only in December after the Germans attacked into the Ardennes.  The concentration of divisions in the Hurtgen Forest-Aachen area also forced a corresponding lack of concentration along the Ardennes front, with the result that only four U.S. divisions were initially available in the Ardennes to parry a German offensive that was 26 divisions strong.


 * When, in November, the Allies enjoyed significant success in 6th Army Group's area, General Eisenhower refused to reinforce the success and even forbade his commanders in the south to attempt to assault across the Rhine in the area of Strasbourg while the German defenses were in shambles. This lack of bold enterprise was a by-product of General Eisenhower's decision to conduct limited-objective attacks on a broad front even though the Allies lacked a sufficient number of divisions to both man a broad front and concentrate enough combat power in chosen areas to achieve breakthroughs.


 * After crossing the Rhine, Allied force deployments were tainted by misplaced priorities, lack of firm direction from supreme political echelons, and to some extent, by exaggerated fears of German capabilities. When American troops reached the Elbe River in mid-April, General Eisenhower unilaterally decided that Berlin was no longer a significant military or political objective and ordered U.S. forces to halt along the Elbe and Mulde Rivers.  Thus, these spearheads were practically immobilized while the war raged on for three more weeks.  Simultaneously, General Bradley considered the Germans trapped in the Ruhr Pocket to be the most significant threat and committed suprisingly large numbers of U.S. troops to contain the pocket instead of reinforcing his troops at the Elbe River.  As a consequence of Eisenhower's decision, British 21st Army Group was ordered to drive northeast in the direction of Hamburg instead of proceeding due east in the direction of Berlin.  Finally, the Allies proved curiously gullible about German propaganda claiming the existence of a "National Redoubt" in the Alpine hinterlands of Bavaria and Austria.  Fearing a large-scale last stand by the Nazis in this so-called redoubt, General Eisenhower directed no less than three field armies to clear southern Germany at a time when the largest groups of German forces stood to the east, not the south, of General Eisenhower's troops.  Fortunately for the Allies, the German Army of April,1945, was in no position to exploit such misguided troop movements.

Thus, while the Allies enjoyed a great victory, it is equally obvious that their prosecution of the campaign was far from flawless, and that on occasion it afforded their German adversaries opportunities that prolonged the fighting unnecessarily. I have placed it here because it contains a lot of assertions which are not attributed to any source and as such can be seen as either original research or a none neutral point of view. If such assertions are going to be made then I think the section needs to follow the example in Rhineland_Campaign:
 * Some scholars, including Stephen Ambrose, have suggested that the siege of Aachen was a mistake. ...

But even that example uses weasel words and does not cite its source which it ought to do:
 * Stephen Ambrose asserts that the siege of Aachen was a mistake (book xyz page 99). ...

would be better --Philip Baird Shearer 08:19, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

References provided - The text in the "1944 - 1945: The Campaign in Hindsight" section in question is neither original research nor an attempt to assert a non-neutral POV (indeed, the standard histories of the 1944-45 campaign for many years were non-neutral POVs that failed to adequately identify Allied failures - Author Norman Davies in his work Europe has described a superset of this phenomenon as the "Allied Scheme of History".) If the text seems to focus on the Allies much more than the Germans, that is because the Allies held the initiative that drove the campaign's course for the bulk of its duration. Hopefully, the references provided will indicate where the comments in the text issue from. W. B. Wilson 18:00, 4 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Just in passing: British historians have always commented on this campaign (either to praise Monty or to bury him). They either emphasise that if only Monty's ideas had been followed the Western Allies would have been in Berlin months earlier than the Soviets, or to bash Monty (thank goodness Ike did not listen to Monty, look what a mess Monty made of advancing on a narrow front with Market Garden). --Philip Baird Shearer 19:33, 10 May 2007 (UTC)

Suggesting split
This article is really about two different campaigns, fought in some of the same locations, but a few years apart and by slightly different countries:
 * 1) the "Blitzkreigs" of 1939-40
 * 2) the "Second Front" of 1944-45.

The "Interlude" section is somewhat relevant to both &mdash; as an afterword to the first part and a preamble to the second.

I suggest splitting it into:


 * Western front (1939-40)
 * Western front (1944-45)

Apart from anything else, it seem odd to me that we don't have overview articles about either of the above subjects. What do others think? Regards, Grant  |  Talk  07:17, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Agreed. Also I believe it should link to an article on the greater European-Mediterianian-African theatre. I imagine many people (myself included) may search for a Western Front in the terms of the war including the Western allies against Germany, including the Italian, Mediteranian, and African, as well as the Atlantic. Homersmyid 07:02, 30 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Perhaps we should go the other direction, and merge it into the air war and the war at sea, and the Mediteranian conflict. Something should cover the entire span of the UK-Nazi 39-45 conflict in which the two phases of the western front are only shorter chapters.  Perhaps the western front should span everything from Norway to Syria (and west), and then split out detailed sections on the fall of france, the second front, etc.  Gomm 18:36, 31 August 2007 (UTC)  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Gomm (talk • contribs)

I'm not so sure about splitting them. I can see how they're substantially different but I think they're closely related enough that it's not really a problem as such. Certainly, if the article gets too big and two articles are called for, that would definitely be the way to do it. As for now, I think it's small enough that it's all very much accessible so it's good having it together.Gregory j 22:56, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Gregory j. Also what about 1940 to 44? --Philip Baird Shearer 19:50, 20 September 2007 (UTC)


 * We can definitely create a Western European Campaign (1944-1945) article (a title that's used in several sources) to contain the events including and beyond Overlord. For the 1939-1940 Western Europe actions (Phony War, Norwegian Campaign, Battle of France and Battle of Britain), I'm in agreement with Grant that Western Front (1939-1940) would be acceptable.  If we did that we could also then have Western Front (1941-1944) (if needed) to cover events such as the Dieppe Raid, the actions by British Commandos and the bombing attacks over Germany.  We could then keep Western Front as the parent article to the three.


 * To address Homersmyid's point, there's no common name (so far as I'm aware) which refers to the entirety of European Axis' war with the Western Allies as opposed to their war against the Soviets. My personal suggestion would to use The Western Allies war against the European Axis; a bit long, but quite clear. Oberiko 23:42, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

Redirects now work to sections. So I have altered Western European Campaign (1944-1945) to redirect to the specific section. So unless this article becomes so large that it needs a main article under the section "1944-45: the Second Front" I do not see the advantage of splitting the article. --Philip Baird Shearer 09:17, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

List of commanders
The list of commanders in the infobox is a mess. Many are missing and the command levels shown are including at least one division commander. It would be more tidy if it listed only theater and perhaps army group (and air / naval equivalent) commanders for 1939-1940 and 1944-45. Comments? W. B. Wilson 03:39, 10 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Agreed. I've made some revisions but still fear it is too unruly. It would seem the only way to truncate would to only include the head of state and most important field commander for each Allied army (for example only Roosevelt and Eisenhower to represent the US).
 * As for the changes I made 1) Clark fought in the Mediterianian, he doesn't belong on this list 2) Milburn was a corps commander, not as notable as Army commanders like Patton that aren't even on this list. 3) Removed Béthouart and Goislard also beacuse they were Corps commanders 4) Added Gamelin since he commanded the entire French Army during the fall of France 5)Added George Marshall as the chief of staff of the US Army (this might be contreversail since he wasn't a field commander, I'll leave it to the people's discretion).
 * Also I'd like to sugest possibly one representative of the Norwegian, Dutch, and/or Belgian armies be added to recognise their involvement in the campaign. Homersmyid 22:21, 12 October 2007 (UTC)

Casualties II: Return of the Question
Hello. How many German casualties may one find in the Western Front? The Eastern Front Article has them. ShaneMarsh (talk) 13:49, 23 August 2008 (UTC) As regards to 4.3 million at Eastern Front as compared with 5 million total, I see no contradiction there, taking into account a relative duration and scale of battles in E.F and elsewhere. --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:44, 16 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Western Front until May 30, 1944: 66,266 dead and 3,218 missing (Müller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, volume III, p. 265)
 * same, from D-Day until November 30, 1944: 54,754 dead and 338,933 missing (same source)
 * It gets fuzzy here because the sources I have don't break down late war German losses by front.
 * Ardennes Offensive, mid December 1944 to mid January 1945: estimated between 80,000 to 100,000 total casualties.
 * All fronts, 1 January 1945 until April 30, 1945: 265,000 dead and 1,012,000 missing or taken POW. As a start, one could assume something like 30% of these losses occurred on the Western Front.  Source again is Müller-Hillebrand.
 * Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:30, 23 August 2008 (UTC)
 * One other note - the 4.3 million mentioned as German dead in the eastern front article is at odds with other sources, as is the World War II Casualties article that claims over 5 million German military dead for all fronts. For all fronts of World War II, other sources give figures closer to 4 million, such as the Oxford Companion to the Second World War (as quoted in Norman Davies' No Simple Victory), which shows 4.212 million German military deaths.  The eastern front article's figures are based on Rüdiger Overmans' Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg; how he figures an additional million dead on the eastern front I'm not sure. Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 07:13, 24 August 2008 (UTC)
 * I am not 100% sure, I have no sources before me right now, but the difference between Müller-Hillebrand and Rüdiger Overmans is as follows. The former shows only, or primarily, losses documented during the war, so majority of MIA's etc were not included. His number are in contradiction with present day's Germany's catalogues of burial places in Eastern Europe, for instance: number of buried Germans there exceeds the number of losses presented by Müller-Hillebrand (although there were almost no German civilians there). In contrast, Overmans takes into account not only older Müller-Hillebrand's data, but additional sources also. In addition, Dr Overmans works in Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (German Armed Forces Military History Research Office), a specialized high reputable institution, and, in contrast to Müller-Hillebrand (who was an archive worker) Dr. Overmans is a historian. Therefore I see no reason not to trust Overmans's numbers.
 * Found this as well on p. 64 of Slaughterhouse (ed. Keith Bonn). So, - very - roughly, 400,000 losses from D-Day to the Ardennes, 120,000 during the winter battles and something like 400,000 to 600,000, depending on source, for 1 January to 30 April.  These figures include POWs for at least portions of the period June 1944 - April 1945 and thus includes different categories of data mixed into the totals in uneven fashion. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:43, 16 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Most English language German casualty statistics are derived from 1950s studies and deal only with German nationals who were from German (1939 borders) owing to the great uncertainty of displaced persons that persisted through the early years after the end of the war.
 * German authors, Overmans included, however count all serving combatants regardless of their place of birth, and this is your difference, the SS volunteers, those conscripted from new territories, Russian and Ukranian volunteers, etc.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 11:19, 24 August 2008 (UTC)
 * For comparison, Müller-Hillebrand quotes a range of 3.3 to 4.5 million military dead and states "around 4 million" as a probable total. However, he only mentions Alsace, Lorraine, and Austria as sources of other-than-German troops, not sure if he counted all the others. Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:05, 25 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Yes, but he is only writing about Das Heer...Germans are very particular, so Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine are excluded...along with Waffen SS--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 04:38, 25 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Actually, despite the book's title, his numbers include columns for the air force and navy, as well as including the W-SS in his army figures. His work is dated 1969, so I suppose some new information could have come to light after German reunification. Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 15:03, 25 August 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok, well I should not have made the assumption then because I don't have the book. Wonder how he gets the lower-range figure though--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 23:56, 25 August 2008 (UTC)


 * He mentions statistical work done by the Land of Hesse postwar. He may have projected the entire nation's military losses from this, at least for the 1945 period when military records were haphazard.  Not sure, though. Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:56, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

The 1944-45 campaign in hindsight?
I think, this section do not consider two important, maybe crucial factors, namely, (i) the fact that 2/3 to 3/4 Axis troops were fighting in the East, and (ii) the German Army had already been dramatically exhausted during three years of continuous balltes in the East. Therefore, the phrase: "The path to the unconditional surrender of German armed forces was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides. Particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the campaign." This phrase implies it was the Western Front that was the path to unconditional surrender of German armed forces, although simple comparison of the scale and strategic implication of battles in the east and in the west demonstrates that the Western Front was a little bit more than a sideshow. I am intended to rewrite this sentence. --Paul Siebert (talk) 12:07, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * The western front was much more than a side show. Axis losses to the Western Allies were very significant. If one looks at the distance that the Soviets and the Western Allies had to travel to Berlin from their positions in June 1944 they were almost identical. Also you do not mention the Western Allied strategic bombing campaigns which by 1945 were indirectly and directly aiding the armies on both fronts . The measure of men on the two fronts " 2/3 to 3/4 Axis troops were fighting in the East", does it include the German forces in Italy and the very large garrison in Norway? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 17:47, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Of course it would be an exaggeration to tell the Western Front was a sideshow. But it is much greater exaggeration, or even arrogance, to discuss factors leading to Axis defeat without any serious consideration of paramount significance of the Eastern Front.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:57, 12 September 2008 (UTC)
 * 60% of Axis troops were in the East during the last year of the war. For instance, have a look at the ref 1 in the paper, where you can find Glantz's data. The Norvegian garrison was withdrawn to Germany and redistributed between both major fronts. Some Axis member and co-belligerents (Hungary, Romania, Finland, Slovakia, etc) fought against the Soviets exclusively. Effectiveness of bombing campaign is disputable. In addition, number of all European Axis troop in the East was: 80% in 1942, 63% in 1943, 62% in 1944 and 60% in 1945. The whole Axis (including Japan) sustained more losses in the Eastern Front that at all other theatres taken together.


 * "The Norvegian garrison was withdrawn to Germany and redistributed between both major fronts." What is your source for this because many sources state that there were over 300,000 German soldiers in Norway on 8 May. See for example "The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament, 1942-1947" by Chris Madsen, "p. 65 as does this URL. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 22:19, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I am not sure if all German troops were withdrawn from Norway. What I am certain about is the amount of German troops opposing the Soviets. Therefore, additional 300,000 thousand do not change the picture much. --Paul Siebert (talk) 22:41, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * They were not. Only a couple of divisions were withdrawn before the war ended.


 * I think Paul Siebert is missing an essential point about this article. It is not about the eastern front; Wiki has an article whose topic addresses that.  The focus of this article is to document what occurred on the western front.  It is fine to mention in passing the dominant role of the eastern front (in land combat), but if the topic of the eastern front eventually distracts from the article's topic as a whole (i.e. the western front), then that is faulty editing. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 07:15, 13 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I think what Paul is saying is that the strategic considerations that led to the end of the war in Europe were far more influenced by the events on the Eastern Front than on the Western Front
 * Statistics are not very helpful, but the number of Wehrmacht ground troops in the West was 25% of the total. There was a very large contingent of Luftwaffe ground troops also, and this gets lumped into the total
 * We know now that Allied strategic bombing did very little actual damage to the German war economy
 * Diplomatic efforts were ongoing in the West even by Himmler while no such negotiations could be conceivable with the Soviet Union
 * The speed of advance by the Allies between Normandy landings and 8 May can not be really compared to advances in the East. For one, the Allies had to learn the art of strategic and operational movements by large forces from scratch, with only the North African experience to fall back on. For another the vast majority of troops, including senior commanders, were inexperienced, if only due to change in the terrain.
 * One can't say that the Italian Front was significant because the tempo of advance was really low despite a shattered Italian Army and only minimal German force opposing. Considering the advances made in the similar mountainous regions of Carpathians and through Hungary by the Red Army, one can see the weight of experience and operating methodology
 * The Eastern Front had a significant influence on the Western Front if only because of the timing of strategic offensives in the East that took pressure off the Allied troops in the west, starting with the Normandy breakout which took a month
 * Converse is not true. While a second front may have been influential in 1942 and even until the summer of 1943, after the failure of Citadel, Germany lost strategic initiative in the east and never regained it. Opening of the Italian Front did not draw off significant forces from the East, and if the Allies only threatened an invasion in the West, the war would still have finished in 1945 or early 1946 anyway. For the Western Allies, the Western Front was a political expediency of denying all of Europe to Soviet Union, and not a strategic military necessity to end the war faster, particularly from electorate sensitivity to casualties. If anything, letting Red Army fight the Wehrmacht unassisted into 1946 would have allowed it to become even weaker so if the Cold War turned hot in 1946-47 over democratic elections in Europe, they would have been better positioned, though vastly inferiority in combat experience, to restart the war, particularly with the significant Soviet forces redeployed to the Far East
 * The bottom line is that the Western Front can not be claimed to have strategically influenced the end of the war in Europe--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 11:33, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Let me remind you the previous version of that phrase: ''While the unconditional surrender of German armed forces represented a resounding Allied success, the path to this outcome was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides. In retrospect, it is clear that particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the campaign. And after that the detailled analysis of the Western campaign solely'' starts. I would say that in the absence of references to other theatres, especially to the eastern front, this sentence, as well as the whole article, creates a (wrong) impression that the begining of the path to unconditional surrender was Normandy and the end was Reims. Therefore I tried to make the article a little bit balanced. If someone is intended to write an article as a Western Front as a separate theatre of war, I have absolutelu no objections provided that necessary explanations have been done. Regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:38, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * This is an example of Mr Siebert's editing that I consider misplaced:
 * The 1944-45 campaign in hindsight First of all, it is necessary to take into account that unconditional surrender of German armed forces was primarily a result of their devastating defeats in the Eastern Front battles during 1941-1945.[5][6][7] As regards to the the 1944-45 campaign, it was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides.
 * The comment about the eastern front is misplaced in this context because this section refers only to aspects of the 1944-45 campaign on the western front. Such a comment could be profitably placed at the very start of this article and then that topic should be dropped in favor of concentrating on this article's topic.  As it is, the comment creates a confusing context in this section because it focuses the reader on the eastern front battles and then continues with "As regards to the 1944-45 campaign" -- well, which campaign(s) -- those on the eastern front or those on the western front?  Frankly, the comment does not belong where it is inserted and should be moved elsewhere in the article.
 * Regarding comments on the relative importance of the war's theaters, overall they are better placed in articles about the war itself because they are relevant to those articles' scope and topic. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 18:13, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I fully agree that the fragment I inserted is not the best piece of text and the place it has been inserted is not the most appropriate. Unfortunately, the problem of that concrete article is that it is written in such a manner that it creates an impression about the Western Front as a sole, or, at least, a decisive theatre of WWII. I think, you agree neither the former nor the latter are correct.
 * And I see absolutely no problem if someone rewrited, reworded or even removed this sentence, provided that some changes in the article have been done that took into account my and MRG's comments above and below. Cheers, --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:48, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 06:50, 14 September 2008 (UTC) P.S. I didn't perceived any intent. I just told about impression this article creates. The balanced POV is especially needed now, taking into account that article like that http://online.wsj.com/article/SB111560605185327917.html?mod=todays_us_opinion started to appear in high reputable journals.
 * Mr Siebert, two comments. This article, to my knowledge, was never intended to present itself as the sole theater of the war.  I have the impression that you may have perceived intent that is not there.  In any event, the cleanest way to address this concern is to have a brief statement at the beginning of the article to the effect that the western front was one of a number of fronts in Europe during World War II with links to the articles on the other fronts.  As it is, the scope of the article is about the conflict of the western allies and Germany in western Europe.  I see no problem with the article having this as its defined scope, much as the eastern front article focuses on the conflict between Germany and the USSR.  Second, since you are aware of and acknowledge that at least one of your edits is awkwardly presented, I suggest that that you be the one to clean it up -- after all, you introduced the change in question.  I can clean it up if you wish, but you know where I stand regarding the scope and topic of this article.
 * Also -- I see your point regarding the sentence about the end of the war representing a resounding Allied success. The problem here is that Allied operations in NW Europe and Germany did represent an outstanding success for the war effort of the western allies even if it is very true that the bulk of the combat that defeated the German army/SS was done by the Red Army -- my point being that no matter who did what, the western allies achieved their goals and I think that can reasonably be described as a success.  Perhaps a footnote or text in parenthesis after the clause could be inserted to make note of the Soviet contribution to that outcome. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 06:09, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Absolutely agree. I think, doing what you propose would make the article more balanced and correct. I would appreciate if you clean up my editing you mention according to your vision and taking into account the discussion above. Do you have any comments regarding to other edits I did (the End of Third Reich section and a footnote in the beginning)?

Cheers, --Paul Siebert (talk) 13:49, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Just for the record, I have no "vision" on this, I'll leave that to guys like Eisenhower ;-). Before I wade in, I'd like to see if Philip or any other interested editors have further comments.  Regarding the article you referenced, I note Wiki states "The Hoover Institution . . . is a conservative public policy think tank" which may explain the author's stance.  It is also worth noting that the article is an opinion piece in a business journal . . . not really the venue of serious historians. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 07:22, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * User:W. B. Wilson I defer to your judgement on this. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:41, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Under vision I meant your vision of the article's style and shape. As regard to Hoover Institute... To my opinion (probably, wrong), the Wikipedia's audience are mostly people who watch Discovery channel and read popular magazines. Those familiar with Overy's or Glantz's works can read them directly (for instance, I never use Wikipedia to obtain information needed for my own work, because I have much better sources of information). That is why we have to balance a recent drift in mass media articles covering the history of WWII.

The "End of the Third Reich" section
The final instrument of surrender was signed in Kralshorst, according to the Victory in Europe Day article and to the paper "Keitel is defiant at Berlin ritual." that appeared in The New York Times on May 10, 1945. I brought the section in accordance with that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:42, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * "and signed the instrument of surrender that was essentially identical to that signed in Reims with certain additions requested by the Soviets." What do you think were the additions requested by the Soviets? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 17:32, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I just almost literally reproduced a fragment of the NYT article I cited. If you look through those time newspapers, you find that both Reims and Karlhorst were considered equally important events, so both of them should be mentioned. It is worth mentioning also that gen. Susloparov was not authorized to sign order of surrender on behalf of the Soviet side, so formally the Soviets didn't accept German surrender in Reims, and de facto hostilities lasted until May 11.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:36, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * there are editors on Wkipedia that consider that hostilities did not end until the until the unilateral declarations that they were over by the Allied powers, but as this is not mentioned in this article, any more than attacks after 8 May are there is no need to discuss it, but you have added a sentence that implies that additions were made by the Soviets do you think were the additions requested by the Soviets? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 21:44, 12 September 2008 (UTC)


 * According to Zhikov's memoirs, the main Soviets' concern was not the text of the instrument of surrender, but the place and circumstances of its signing. The Stalin's request was the instrument to be signed in Berlin by Soviet high military command. As regards to the text, there were several differences. First, Soviet High Command was mentioned first and Allied Command after that (that seems reasonable taking into account their relative contributions into the victory). Second, the instrument was written in English, German and Russian languages and it was explicitly stated there that only Russian and English versions are authentic. And, third, the instrument was signed by British, American, Soviet and French representatives as opposed to the Reims' document signed by American, French and Soviet official only, the French representative signed as a witness, and, as I already said, the the Soviet representative was not authorized to do that. British representative was absent at all in Reims. --Paul Siebert (talk) 22:37, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

In addition, most Wikipedia articles, e.g. End of World War II in Europe, as well as old newspapers and majority textbook mention both these events, so I don't understand why in this concrete article only the first one should be mentioned.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:47, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * As you point out the differences were minor (the ordering of the commands and the names of the people who signed). AFAICT the signing in Berlin was symbolic, it had no bearing on the mass surrender of all German armies on all fronts as agreed by the Rheims surrender document. If the Berlin signing had not happened, German forces would still have surrendered on all fronts at the same time. It is something that needs mentioning in more specific articles on the end of the war, but I do not see the significance of including it here. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:10, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Generally speaking, all those documents are symbolic, e.g. Japanese surrender on board of Missouri, therefore formal details do matter. To have a legal effect, the instrument had to be signed by proper persons and to be recognized by all sides. The Soviet side didn't authorize Susloparov to sign Reims paper, and considered that document a "preliminary". That very fact alone is sufficient to mention Karlshorst surrender explicitly.


 * There was nothing symbolic about it. Berlin was still the official seat of German Government. The differences are far from minor as at Rheims Germany only technically surrendered to the United States. Because the general population may realise that celebrating VE Day on the 8 May was technically speaking premature, and applied only to the United States.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 14:17, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

As regard to the Russian copy. Can you imagine a situation when the US, for instance, sign an international treaty written in Chinese only (without authentic version in English)?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:15, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * If there had not been a signing in Berlin the war would still have ended when it did. The German surrender in Rheims, unlike that to Monty a few days earlier, was not a theatre or front surrender, it was a general capitulation of all German Armed Forces. What is your evidence that it was "only a surrender to the United states" and not a general capitulation to the United Nations? AFAICT the only difference in English between the two documents is clause 6 tacked on the end. "This Act is drawn up in the English, Russian and German languages. The English and Russian are the only authentic texts." --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 18:43, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * The absence of a signature of a person authorized by the Soviet Supreme command is quite sufficient to consider the Reims document not a general capitulation. The Soviets didn't authorize neither Eisenhower (he was a commander of Western forces only) nor Susloparov to sign the Reims' document, therefore they were not obliged to observe them, ergo this document was not effectual for them ergo it was not a final instrument of surrender. For surrender, like for tango, two sides are needed. One side surrenders and another side accept a surrender. The Soviet side recognized the Reims surrender as "preliminary" only. Taking into account that the number of German troops in the East was as twice as lagre, and that in Germany the Soviets ultimately took 1.5 million POW as compared with 1 millon taken by the rest Allies, the Soviet's opinion played a decisive role, and no document could be considered an instrument of surrender without proper approval by the Soviet side. How can the war end if the major belligerent didn't sign appropriate document?
 * The Soviet side recognized the Rheims surrender as "preliminary" only for political reasons, but they did recognise it, and the rest is just political window dressing which is not relevant to this article. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 22:30, 13 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Not quite. The resolution at Yalta confirmed that the Allies would not accept the surrender of the Axis powers, either individually or together, as independent entities, but together as Allies (see Clause on no separate peace). This meant that authorised individuals representing each of the Allied governments had to be present at the acceptance of capitulation of each and every Axis power to countersign the document of capitulation as was the case with the agreement at Yalta. The names of these individuals were agreed upon by all sides, and in case of front-line commanders, their deputies were also authorised given the possibility of last minute assassination attempts, accidents, or indeed enemy action. The acceptance of the Rheims document as "preliminary" was actually face-saving for Americans who should not have staged the surrender in the first place, but Stalin felt it was not worth starting a diplomatic conflict over. I seem to remember something similar covered in one of Montgomery's biographies where acceptance of surrender was termed "provisional" by the British Government. It was "INSTRUMENT of SURRENDER of all German armed forces in Holland, in northwest Germany including all islands, and in Denmark to Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, General Commanding in Chief, 21st Army Group" only. A formal surrender meant not just the surrender of field combat forces, but the hand-over of power over public administration of the state to military occupying authorities, and the sectoring of Germany into Allied zones, including the partition of Berlin. These were also confirmed in Yalta. The "political window dressing" was in fact all American for wanting to be the first to accept German surrender, which I put down to the American cultural traits of one-upmanship (formally known as the "competitive spirit") and ignoring all rules (formally known as "entrepreneurship")...where had I seen that before? :)--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 03:50, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

P.S. In fact I will go so far as to say that Eisenhower lied in his order of the day on 8 May when he said that "Even before the final week of the conflict you had put 5,000,000 of the enemy permanently out of the war.", but referred only to "The blood of many nations-American, British, Canadian, French, Polish and others-has helped to gain the victory." because "the cause of human freedom as have made this Expeditionary Force such a mighty engine of righteous destruction.". At no time did the Western Allies face 5 million Axis troops, and the "others" was the Red Army that did face the vast majority of these troops but were not deemed to be agents of "the cause of human freedom" as defined by Eisenhower--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 04:01, 14 September 2008 (UTC)


 * mrg3105, I am hardly a fan of Eisenhower, but you seem to have forgotten that hindsight is 20/20. I am quite certain that on 8 May 1945 the Allies had no firm numbers as to the numbers of Germans they had faced during 1944-45.  They had estimates only, and the 5,000,000 figure quoted is most certainly an estimate, probably based on intelligence about German force structure, manning levels, and which units they had faced in the field.  One example of this uncertainty will suffice.  The Allies estimated at the end of the war that the Germans had 150,000 troops remaining in the Netherlands, but the true figure was 117,629 (from The Victory Campaign, p. 614.)  If anyone is to blame on that score, Eisenhower's intelligence staff are probably the ones. Moreover, Eisenhower's order of the day was addressed to his command -- under which no Soviet forces fell, so why should he have mentioned them?  After all, it wasn't like the Soviets were falling all over themselves to acknowledge any western allied achievements in their statements to the Red Army ;-)  There is an odd aspect to Eisenhower's statement, the "engine of righteous destruction" part - evidence that Eisenhower already viewed the western campaigns as a "crusade".  Many do not realize how profoundly religious Eisenhower was and how much of that part of himself manifested in his work both as a general and a president. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 07:03, 14 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, no again. Eisenhower actually lied several times that day. Here is

Proclamation by GENERAL EISENHOWER on the unconditional surrender of Germany. Paris. May 8, 1945. In 1943 the late President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill met in Casablanca. There they pronounced the formula of unconditional surrender for the Axis Powers. In Europe that formula has now been fulfilled. The Allied force which invaded Europe on June 6, 1944, has, with its great Russian ally and the forces advancing from the south, utterly defeated the Germans on land, sea and air. This unconditional surrender has been achieved by team-work, team-work not only among all the Allies participating but among all the services, land, sea and air. To every subordinate that has been in this command of almost 5,000,000 Allies I owe a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid. The only repayment that can be made to them is the deep appreciation and lasting gratitude of all the free citizens of all the United Nations. New York Times, May 9, 1945.
 * You will note the Yalta Conference is not mentioned, and it seems Roosevelt and Churchill determined the "formula of unconditional surrender for the Axis Powers". That formula was fulfilled only after June 6, 1944, D-Day, and the "great Russian ally" is mentioned in the same breath as "the forces advancing from the south" in Italy. The "unconditional surrender has been achieved by team-work" which excluded the Red Army, but grossly inflated the Western Allied force to "almost 5,000,000", i.e. numerical parity, nay inferiority to the Germans who were really defeated in the East. Why, well because the "Russians" were not among the "free citizens of all the United Nations" which is the thinking of 1930s America. Although the American concept of freedom may be a good concept, it was applied very subjectively, and with extreme bias. Eisenhower never had to retreat with his piddly US Army of 180,000 across the continental United States in 1941, and his family never had to live in the Rockies on 200 grams of bread a day and last year's frozen potatoes while manufacturing weapons of war. America never lost millions of prisoners and never had to find out how much its leaders and commanders had a capacity for making mistakes, and if its soldiers would complain of the cold if they had to fight through a second European winter. The great achievement of Western Allies for a month looked like a great reversal while they tried to break out of the beachheads, and later found out that not all terrain in the World is like that of the Salisbury plain or Louisiana. For the most part they fought dispirited, second-rate Wehrmacht troops, who were denied almost everything due to the needs of the Eastern Front. And yet Eisenhower chose to lie, which is I suppose where his presidential election begun.
 * You can not be serious when you suggest that Western Allies faced 5,000,000 German troops on the Western Front
 * Eisenhower included those in the "crusade" and excluded those he thought unworthy, but had to thank everyone as not doing so would have been a rather obvious insult to the Soviets. Religion is not to make one a lier, quite the reverse I thought --mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 09:25, 14 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I think you need to review your sources. Eisenhower's quote on the strength of western allied forces is accurate enough.  " ... Eisenhower commanded by the beginning of May 1945 over four and a half million troops . . . . From D-Day to V-E Day 5,412,219 Allied troops entered western Europe." (Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 727).  Why shouldn't he have mentioned the Allied troops in Italy?  To insist that Eisenhower should have prostrated himself with gratitude over Soviet contributions is to completely ignore the realities of his position and echelon of command -- NO ONE, of any country, would have done that.  You are establishing an arbitrary standard for Eisenhower to meet and then calling him a liar for not meeting that standard.  You are also misrepresenting my statements on the number of Germans faced by Eisenhower's command.  The point is that on May 8, those numbers were still estimates as no one on the Allied side had firm counts.  Eisenhower used an estimate prepared by his staff -- big deal.  To blame Eisenhower for not having had his family starve in the Rockies is frankly irrational, but have at it if you wish.  Nor did I imply that Eisenhower's religion made him a liar, mrg3105, you seem to be the one who has linked those two concepts.  Re-read the comment. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 09:52, 14 September 2008 (UTC)


 * My assertion is simple enough. As a very senior military officer, Eisenhower of all people should have appreciated the effort made for four years on the Eastern Front. If he did, he didn't say so in the pronouncements that counted on the day. His politics got in the way of his morality.


 * His politics got in the way of his morality? Like practically every other high ranker in that war and all the other wars besides? I will concede a point to you if you can convince me why Eisenhower should be judged to a different standard than anyone else of comparable rank and position in practically any conflict. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 14:56, 14 September 2008 (UTC)


 * The reality as you put it is quite different as you well know statistics is a "bitch".
 * 740,000 troops of the 3,000,000 under command were in combat divisions intended for Europe in June. So little opposition was there that by the end of the month 630,000 was in fact landed from the 1,040,000 available, counting divisions and their supporting higher formation troops. These were brought over on 2700 merchant ships using 2500 landing craft, protected by 1100 warships. In the air they were supported by 3500 heavy and 1700 other bombers, 5500 fighters and 2400 transport aircraft. Regardless of the crew, it took at least four Allied ground personnel per aircraft to keep them flying, so there were over 52,000 ground air force personnel directly involved in aircraft support alone. Technology is also a "bitch". In the Red Air Force there were only two ground support personnel per aircraft, and they had very few heavy bombers by comparison. There were other numbers. The US Sherman tanks had five crew, and one non-crew support personnel per tank, so a total of 6. In the Red Army the driver of the 4-man T-34 was also a mechanic. Of the 630,000 landed by 30 June, 177,000 were drivers, or 28% of all troops! The troops were supplied with 950kg per soldier in cargo! It actually took a significant manpower just to keep the logistics going. The troops that will land in the South of France will be given 1.15ton per soldier, and allocated 41,000 drivers in a force of 190,000; one for every 4 non-drivers! One has to understand why Americans often refer to troop movements during the Second World War by saying "they drove". The French troops that landed in the south on the 2 September were advised that the Americans had advanced as far as Lyon already, making the entire exercise strategically academic given Americans were closer to Swiss border than French were! Still, by 25 September there are 324,000 Allied troops landed in the south of France, of them 68,000 drivers, still enough for a vehicle for every five service personnel. They need these because they had 1.51 tons of supplies per soldier to cart around.
 * Of the 5.4 million Allied troops on the Western Front only 3.7 million Allied soldiers had come ashore in western Europe by January 1, 1945. The rest were indeed commanded, but were "in the theatre". They included very large numbers of airforce personnel and not insubstantial naval personnel. Only about 2.5 million actually served in the ground troops. However, due to force structures, close to 50% of these were not in combat or even combat support units, but in logistics and lines of communication or service support units. Compare this to 35% in the Heer, and about 20% in the Red Army. The reason only 1.4 million allied combat and combat support troops were required is because the German forces were on the retreat, at least those that were not surrendering. Owing to complete air superiority, Germans could not put together an offensive until winter, and could not assume a defensive because that just presented a good target for Allied tactical air forces. In fact so leisurely was the Allied advance that unit rotation was performed generally on schedule as prescribed in peacetime lest a private write to his congressman that he had been kept in the front line a week longer. Allied casualties were somewhat less than 15% though, primarily due to inexperience, frontal attacks, and with a significant proportion of these, 64,000, incurred during the Normandy landing and the breakouts to 30 June.
 * Italy can be discounted because it failed to draw off significant numbers from other fronts, and because due to changes on the other fronts became irrelevant a couple of months after Dragoon. With the Soviet offensive into Hungary, the race was on mostly for the British to get to the Yugoslavian border before the Yugoslav Army, which they did virtually unopposed--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 14:24, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

As regards to Eisenhower's claim about a number of German troops the Allies faced, formally he was right: the real number of total German troops during the war was close to that. And he didn't tell directly what part of these troops were destroyed by Americans or Western allies, therefore he cannot be blamed in a direct and deliberate lie. He simply forgot to mention some details...--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:02, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Does Eisenhower's troops number really matter? Not a number matters, but effectiveness. I would remind you some figures. Total Axis military losses (KIA/MIA) on the Eastern Front were 5,178,000 (According to Rűdiger Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Oldenbourg 2000. ISBN 3-486-56531-1, Richard Overy The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia (2004), ISBN 0-7139-9309-X). I don't have exact numbers on Western Front right now, but, based on the table from World War II casualties the number of total Axis losses (including Japan) is about 8,300,000, so the Soviet Union is responsible for more than a half of them. Therefore, from the point of view of unbiased observer (for instance, of Martian historian who came to the Earth to study history of human civilization) WWII was primarily a Soviet-German war. Note, I deliberately left beyond the scope number of Soviet troops or casualties, because that (as well as the number of Eisenhower troops) have no direct relation to the subject of the discussion.


 * While your analysis of the numbers and force structure may carry some validity, it has little do with the context in which Eisenhower issued his statement referring to 5,000,000 allied troops. His number is essentially correct and his comment was directed to all those under his command, whether they were riflemen or bomber mechanics.  I would, therefore, hardly categorize that as a "lie". From where are you drawing your information about the frequency of unit rotation? --W. B. Wilson (talk) 14:56, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Best regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:26, 15 September 2008 (UTC)
 * The figures in World War II casualties include "Military casualties include battle deaths and personnel missing in action, as well as fatalities due to accidents, disease and deaths of prisoners of war in captivity." are meaningless. It is not the number killed and missing in action that is important within a campaign, what is important is the removal of fighting men. To make the point it was the number of Italians that surrendered to the British when they won the campaign in East Africa, not the number who were killed, just as it was the number of British who surrendered at Singapore, not the number killed, that was significant in tipping the balance of power towards the Japanese. Once captured from the point of view of a campaign they were as good as dead, (apart from the cost to the detaining power and if maltreated the effect on their countrymen still fighting). This is a point made by Niall Ferguson in "The Pity of War" despite the best efforts of the Allies (as a strategy) to bleed Germany dry in the first world war, the Allies were unable to removed German soldiers faster than replacements could be found until the last few months of the war when it was the number surrendering that tipped the balance of casualties in that particular piece of calculated strategic butchery. This article is about the Western Front and the sections "End of the Third Reich" and "The 1944-45 campaign in hindsight" should be read in that context and the should not be generalised but remain specific to the conflict on the Western Front. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 19:12, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Good point. However, taking into account number of POWs hardly changes a picture much. The Soviets took 5,450,000 POWs, 3,300,000 of them from Greater Germany (despite of well known fact that Germans tried to use every opportunity to surrender to Western Allies, not the Soviets). Unfortunately, the Western Front article provides not much data to compare with, however, according to Glantz's data I introduced into ref 1, number of POWs taken in West Europe was 1 million.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:25, 14 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I also agree with your notion about the context the sections "End of the Third Reich" and "The 1944-45 campaign in hindsight" should be read in. However, that doesn't mean the ordinary reader will necessarily do that. Unfortunately, majority people will understand them literally, i.e. as the claim that the political end of the Third Reich was the Reims capitulation and the WWII in Europe was primarily the war in the West (thanks to "Saving private Ryan" and similar questionable pseudo-historic operae). That is why explicit statements are needed about the extent of generalization of the article's statements.

Sketches of the 11 Nazi Leaders Who Paid With Their Lives at Nuremberg For War Crimes, The New York Times Oct 16, 1946.

...

Wlilelm Keitel

Signing of two documents of world historic importance, one spelling victory, the other defeat—were the outstanding events in Field Marshal Gen. Keitel career. He signed French armistice in Compiegne Forest in June 1940, and formally ratified Germany's unconditional surrender at Marshal Grerogy K. Zhukoff's Berlin headquarter on May 9, 1945. ... Alfred Jodl

Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl, chief of the staff of German High Command, signed the surrender document in the little red schoolhouse in Reims on May 7, 1945, and thereby sealed the Wehrmaht's fate. Therefore, according to NYT the instrument of surrender was ratified in Karlshorst, so both these events should be mentioned. The instrument of surrender is a political document, therefore political considerations do matter there. By the way, other articles, like Victory Day (Eastern Front) and Victory in Europe Day mention both. Situation is similar with Surrender of Japan: On Aug 15 they issued Imperial Accept of Surrender and signed appropriate document on September 2. Both events are considered important and both are mentioned in textbooks. Note, it is the latter that considered to be an end of WWII. And, once again, would the section's name be, for instance, End of hostilities in West I had absolutely no objection omitting the Berlin surrender (although the article seems to be incomplete without that). However, the current section name implies the political end of the Third Reich, so mentioning of the final political document is absolutely neseccary. Regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 05:39, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

Proposed edits to article
The following proposed edits to the article are submitted in an attempt to address concerns identified on this talk page. Initial pointer to other fronts of the Second World War in Europe (at top of article):

First sentence of "The 1944-45 campaign in hindsight": "While the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces represented a resounding Allied success, the path to this outcome was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides. In retrospect, it is clear that particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the campaign." I am frankly not familiar enough with the details of the surrender to comment authoritatively on that subject. Other editors are invited to comment on or redact these suggestions as appropriate. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:10, 15 September 2008 (UTC)


 * At the start of the article instead of listing the fronts:


 * as that article is designed to do the job. In the second section footnote I suggest we use "Soviet-German War"" (although personally I prefer the Great Patriotic War). --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 05:54, 15 September 2008 (UTC)

''While the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces represented a resounding Allied success, the path to this outcome was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides. In retrospect, it is clear that particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the Second Front campaign.'' ? I think, direct mentioning of the Second Front campaign is desirable because this section is, in actuality, the analysis of the Second Front campaign, 1944-45, whereas "the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces" was a result of joint efforts of Western Allies and the Soviet Union (plus Yugoslavian and Polish partisans etc.) during at least four years. An alternative version of the first sentence would be: While the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces represented a resounding success of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.... Best regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:08, 16 September 2008 (UTC)
 * The quotation to the European theatre of WWII seems to be a good idea. Probably it makes sense to introduce similar quotation in the Eastern Front article to make these pages more uniform. It seems to me that in present version the reference [5] is redundant. As regards to "The 1944-45 campaign in hindsight" section, what do you think about the following version of its first paragraph:

Best regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 13:07, 18 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I don't think the "and the Soviet Union" was a necessary addition to the sentence -- that is why I directed to the reader to a footnote explaining the Soviet role in victory over the Germans. As it is, the additional phrase requires further clarification at the end of the sentence to disambiguate which front the subsequent text addresses.  This is why I was staying away from trying to be too inclusive in the first sentence, because it requires additional explanation -- and is unnecessary given the scope and topic of the article. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 03:50, 18 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Disambiguation is required anyway. Frankly, I don't think the explanation of the Soviet role is needed in that paper. To my opinion, the section should start with explanation of the role of Western Front, and, more concretely of the Second Front campaign (because the subsequent analysis is devoted to this campaign only). Another possibility is to make the first sentence less global. During our previous discussion you pointed out that "Allied operations in NW Europe and Germany did represent an outstanding success for the war effort of the western allies". And I absolutely agree with that statement. So if the section started with something like that, the logical continuation would be: "therefore, the Second Front campaign contributed considerably into the global outcome of the WWII in Europe" (or something less awkward). And then "In retrospect, it is clear that particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the campaign on the western front." will go.

Western Front?
Who officially called it the "Western Front" during the Second World War?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 05:01, 18 September 2008 (UTC)


 * No idea, and I am not sure what you mean by officially as for example the Americans and British did not even fight the same campaigns if one is looking for official names. But a Google search of books turns references of its contemporary use (it was common coin):
 * Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Alex Danchev War Diaries 1939-1945 Page 242 "We were discussing ways and means of establishing new Western Front. I had propounded theory that a Western Front, to be of use, ..."
 * Malcolm Thomson. The Life and Times of Winston Churchill, p. 313 Shows a contemporary news paper clipping.
 * Earl Browder, Workers (Communist) Party of America, Communist Party of the United States of America, Workers Library Publishers, Page 580 "NO DELAY IN OPENING THE WESTERN FRONT! AN EDITORIAL - The Second Front ... delay in the fun and immediate implementation of the agreement for launching the ..."
 * William C. Bullitt, Francis P. Sempa. The Great Globe Itself p. 260 (Feb 16) NY times article


 * However it is not really relevant what the front was called during WWII, what matters is is it commonly used today. A Google books shows that it is:
 * 720 on "Western Front" "D-Day".
 * 722 on "Western Front" "Battle of the Bulge"
 * 598 on "Western Front" "arnhem"
 * Those are all books which mention the "Western Front" and the other key phrase on the same page. To put that in perspective there are 212 books returned by Google for the phrase "North-West Europe Campaign" which was the official British name for both the battle of France and the 44-45 campaign.--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:15, 18 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, I know how to use GoogleBooks, and read printed volumes also, but my question is - did anyone officially cal combat in France either in 1940 or in 1944 "Western Front"? It was so called by all sides during the First World War, and I suspect that given the number of officers who served there, and had no wish to revisit that memory lane (never mind politicians), it seems to me that all governments were at paint to not call it the "Western Front". I had only just realised this interestingly enough--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 12:37, 18 September 2008 (UTC)


 * What do you mean by officially for example if a minister mentioned it in Parliament is that official? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 13:26, 18 September 2008 (UTC)


 * No, government ministers rarely know what they are talking about. A bureaucratic document, administrative record, planning or operational report, etc.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 13:40, 18 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Here is a search of Hansard 1944 on western front http://www.google.co.uk/search?sourceid=navclient&hl=en-GB&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4ADBF_en-GBGB232GB232&q=hansard+western+front+1944 - so it seem it was in general usage in 1944 Jim Sweeney (talk) 13:26, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

topnote
From my talk page: Best regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 21:36, 18 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Dear Philip. I don't think the link you introduced into the European Theatre of World War II article is better, because, as we already discussed, the outcome of the war was a result of collestive efforts of the Western Allies and the USSR, whereas the link directs to the Western Front only. I would like to know your rationale of doing that, otherwise I am intended to revert your edit.

I removed the topnote because the link that it highlighted is included in the first sentence of the article (starting at the sixth word). As I said in the edit history "The European Theatre of World War II is mentioned in the first sentence of the lead, the quote box at the top is overemphasis". --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 07:20, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * In actuality, my question was about the European Theatre of World War II, not this one, so am I still waiting for your explanations. As regards to the topnote in the present article, I would like to point out that I am in a ridiculous situation now. I accepted your proposal about the topnote, and introduced the same topnote into the Eastern front article (explaining that this has veen done to pring both articles in accordance to each other). Immediatelly after that your reverted your own edit, so it looks like I am doing a stupid editing with no ground. --Paul Siebert (talk) 13:13, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Norway ?
By what stretch of imagination is Norway linked to the Western Front?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 10:15, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

reached levels as high as approximately 40%
"German deployments to the Western Front (including North Africa and Italy) reached levels as high as approximately 40% of their ground forces, and 75% of the Luftwaffe." This seems incorrect to me. What proportion of the German Army and Airforce were committed to the Battle of France. I would have thought it was higher than 40%. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 13:10, 19 September 2008 (UTC) In addition to raw numbers, I also found that: "In May 1942 the Germans had adopted a policy that gave the Russian Front first priority for troops and garrisoned the west with those who, because of wounds or other disabilities, were unable to endure the rigors imposed by that theater. Over the year that followed, twenty-two infantry and six armored divisions left France for the Eastern Front, along with the best equipment and men from the divisions that stayed behind. They were replaced by soldiers who were over-age or convalescing from wounds and by units composed of Russian, Italian, and Polish defectors. A few first-line units were present on the Western Front, but most of the rest had been shattered in the east and required replacements and refitting. The weapons they used were often leftovers. The artillery, for example, consisted of more than twenty types of guns, many of Czech or French rather than German manufacture. Training lagged because the men were frequently employed in crash efforts to build fortifications rather than in exercises to sharpen their combat skills." The original can be found there. --Paul Siebert (talk) 14:38, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * For me these numbers seem incorrect too. On average, the amount war even lower. They reached 40% by the very end of the war only (, page 9. Other sources give similar numbers). Note, according to Glantz, 62% German troops were in the East in 1944, it doesn't automatically mean that the rest 38% were in the West. Up to 800,000 troops were tied down by Yugoslav partisans, for instance.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:25, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * It appeared not too easy to find a source that provides a number of German troops in the West. However, a number of losses may tell something, because the losses generally reflect a relative combat scale and intensities. According to : "Through five years of war, the German armed forces had lost over 3 million men killed, 263,000 of them in the west, since D-Day." Note, the site I took this citation from belongs to .mil domain, so it would hardly exaggerate a contribution of non-Americans and theatres Americans weren't involved in.

As regards to Lend Lease, the US payed about $1000 per every killed Soviet soldier, not too much? --Paul Siebert (talk) 13:57, 20 September 2008 (UTC)
 * The same source (AMH-V2) also goes on state: Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:24, 20 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Of course, I am aware of this type arguments. First, the statement you cite treats some facts arbitrarily. Taking into account only a situation in 1944-45 is not completely honest. I would compare, for instance, army sizes of all three allies in Europe in 1944 and conclude that the contribution of the US/USSR was much greater than that of the UK. And this would be ablosutely incorrect because I forget the fact that after France surrendered, for more than a year the UK was fighting alone against the United Europe. I think, you agree that success of Sea lion would mean almost automatical victory of Nazis. Therefore, the failure of Sealion made a British contrubution into combined war efforts enormous, even if we forget about anything else. Similarly, from July to December 1941, the USSR was fighting alone against Hitler, with minimal help from its new western Allies ( the UK was simply unable to provide appreciable help, and there were almost no Lend Lease by that moment. By the way, the US didn't decided yet if they really need to help the USSR at all: I think you remember a famous Truman note about helping the Soviets if Hitler wins and helping Hitler if the Soviets are winning). Similarly to Sealion, a success of Barbarossa would be a disaster for the western allies, because it made Hitler and Japan invincivle. Nevertheless, Barbarossa failed, almost exclusivelly due to the Soviets, and the war passed to the war of attrition stage, with almost no chances for Hitler to win. So I would say, the outcome of the war was pre-determined when the Moscow counteroffensive started, on that same day when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. Without taking that and other similar facts into consideration, it is impossible to discuss seriously.

If I take wartime NYT articles, or works of historians like Glantz or Overy, or old Soviet sources, the picture favours the Soviets even more. However, even that, somewhat biased source supports the idea that contribution of the Soviets was enormous, although the other allies' participation was also vital to win Nazis (note, I never argued about the last part of this statement). --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:58, 20 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Actually, my point was about sources and quoting. I found your selection of a quotation from that source interesting because the book is not really a formidable work of history; rather, it is a military textbook used to instruct officer cadets in the USA.  Thus, it is not surprising that it makes the statements that it does regarding lend lease, relative levels of national contribution to victory, etc., as such a textbook is unlikely to be too unkind to the nation that printed it. If you care to, check out the entire work -- it even includes chapters on the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a topic that I find to be rather too fresh to be easily categorized as "history". I would hazard the guess that most of the content of the book about the Second World War is attitude-oriented more along the lines of the section I quoted. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 14:15, 20 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I understand your point. I took this concrete source for two reasons. First, I needed some piece of text that is available online, so everybody could go there and check a validity of my words (if I take an article, for instance, from jstor, not everyone can do that). Second, the source must be neutral or having a tendency to exaggerate American (not Soviet) contribution.


 * One thing that should be noted is that the German manpower situation overall took a steep dive after the summer of 1944. The losses in Normandy and those caused by the Soviet offensives that year meant the Germans were scraping the bottom of the barrel everywhere.  It may be tempting to assume that after D-Day, somehow only misfits in the German forces were sent west (as in the years when there were no Allied forces in France and the Germans rebuilt some of their units there), but that would be a poor assumption. For example, from June 1944 through mid-January 1945, the western front "enjoyed" the attention of five SS Panzer divisions and one SS Panzergrenadier division, all of which lived up to their reputation as formidable foes.  As well, the northern sector of the western front hosted several Fallschirmjäger divisions who also proved to be bitter opponents.  There were a few German formations on the western front whose competence was frail, but overall the average German unit performance was hardly bad.  I point this out only because some hold the odd belief that the only "manly" Germans to be found were on the eastern front, when in fact, where an active front existed, German troop quality varied but was normally quite competent.  I could write quite a bit about some of the facile comparisons I've seen regarding the fronts, the relative qualities of various national armies, etc. -- some of the ideas "out there" are fairly odd. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 15:56, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I didn't mean that all division in the west were a garbage. I meant only that initially, during the time preceeding D-day there were not the best German troops in the west. Of course, many well equipped divisions had been drawn from the East to the West after D-day. For instance, formidable Fredinand tank destroyers, that were developed specially for the battle of Kursk, were deployed to West later (they became famous under the name Elefant). However, one has to remember what was the major reason for the steep dive of the German manpower situation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:30, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

138+23+24/2+5/2=175.5 (East) 61.5 (West) 21 (Italy) Southeast - Yugoslavia (?) - beyond the scope. Norway, actually included hostilities near Murmansk and Kole peninsular, so it can be attributed more to East than to West. However, if we live it beyond the scope, we obtain: 175.5+61.5+21=258 175.5/258=68% 61.5/258=24% 21/258=8% 8+24=32% Cheers, --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:07, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Paul, no argument from me that the Soviets chewed up many good German formations and were overall the dominant factor in the destruction of the German ground forces. I only point out that sweeping generalizations are often incorrect in substance.  Take some of the "stomach" and "ear" battalions the Germans fielded in the west.  When deployed around Terneuzen and Walcheren, these "physically substandard" soldiers defended like tigers and took many good Allied troops to root them out.  Hell, when properly motivated, even the Volkssturm posed a problem, as the Soviets found at Breslau. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 18:40, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Agree.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:48, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * The German official history of the war, Volume 5-2 (published 1999) shows the following distribution of major units on 4.4.1944:
 * In the east - 138 divisions and 24 brigades, plus 23 divisions and five brigades of other nations
 * In the north - 19 divisions and two brigades, plus 15 divisions and eight brigades from Finland
 * In the west - 62 divisions and 1 brigade (does not include forces in Norway or Denmark)
 * In the southeast - 19 divisions and one brigade, plus 11 divisions and 14 brigades of other nations
 * In the southwest (Italy) - 20 divisions, plus 1 Italian fascist division
 * If one counts two brigades as a division, then the east can be counted as having 150 German divisions. With 62 divisions in the west, this comes out to 41% of the total assigned to the east.  Of course, this ignores Heerestruppen, who made up a fair chunk of the German forces, but I would expect their distribution to roughly reflect that of the major units.  Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 16:33, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Sorry, I didn't understand how did you do your calculations.


 * Paul - the units in Norway were not in contact with Soviet forces in April 1944. Even so, the great bulk of units in Norway were there to protect from an invasion threat and can be therefore be counted as a force that could not participate in eastern front operations because of the western Allied threat.  I counted the divisions of Germany only as we are considering the German war effort.  To include the Hungarians and Romanians includes large numbers of troops who were only marginally effective against the Red Army and who had to be backed up German forces to prevent repeated Stalingrad-type disasters.  Doing the count a different way (Norway + Italy + West) yields 98 division equivalents versus 198 in the east including the German allies, or 49%.  The 'east' in this case does not include the southeast which is Yugoslavia and Greece. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:27, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Agree. So 32% to 49% set a minimal and maximal margine for contribution of the West. Regarding Norway, it was not in contact with western allies either. Although the hypothetic threat is a serious factor, it doesn't work here. For instance, I can remind you that no one takes in consideration that from 1941 too 1945 the USSR kept about 1 million army in Far East tying down the best Japanese Kwantung Army. Without that, this army could appear in Burma, for instance, and consequences could be fatal. Therefore, what the Soviet Union did for western allies in Far East they did for the Soviet Union in west during 1941-44.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:42, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Situation was similar with Norway/France. Hitler kept his troops there because he had to protect himself from invasion, Britain kept her land forces in metropolia for defencive purpose also. However both Hitler's army posed a threat for the UK and vise versa. Of cource, the situation in the west was beneficial for the Soviets, however, the situation in the Far East was equally beneficial for the UK/US. These two benefits almost completely compensate each other, however, only the first one is usually taken into consideration.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:18, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I think you are trying to have it both ways. Let us consider the Soviet troops in the east all came west.  Where is the most -likely- area for the Kwantung Army to go?  Siberia, of course.  The Soviet troops were there to keep the peace until Stalin was ready to break it.  The area they were defending was at peace, even if it was a tense peace, while the German situation in Norway was very much that of being at war. The Germans heavily garrisoned Norway because Hitler believed it to be a critical region of Europe and feared the Allies would try to seize ports and airfields there. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:54, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Not absolutely correct. Japanese kept their army there mostly to protect Manchuria, the most industrially developed region that gave them majority of their resources to continue the war.


 * Paul, I see we have rather different perceptions of the war. Britain kept some land forces on the home isles for several reasons, the least of which was fear of a German invasion -- that matter was resolved when "Sealion" collapsed in 1940.  The German forces in Norway had precious little naval transport with which to mount any kind of invasion; they were hard pressed to get even a couple of divisions to Germany in 1945 for a really serious threat to the Reich.  Your comparison of the Siberian theater does not figure here because (at least I thought) the discussion is about the relative importance, in terms of German unit deployments, of the western and eastern fronts.  If you wish to discuss the war in global terms, then perhaps we should do that on our personal talk pages or on a more appropriate article talk page.  Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 18:28, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Found this in Volume 7 of the German official history, p. 434:


 * I think you are both focusing on post May 1944, the Western Front also existed before that date. In 1940 it is likely that more than 40% of the German Army was on the Western Front. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 16:51, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Philip, that is certainly the case. The reason I am concentrating on post-1940 is to try to establish a factual basis with which to compare the eastern and western fronts. If a person were inclined to reckon division equivalents from a non-traditional perspective then one could conceivably count the Soviet units in eastern Poland in May 1940 as a species of Axis force since they were helping to keep Poland occupied ;)


 * Philip, I think you are absolutely right. In 1940 much more than 40% German troops were in the west. It was a major, actually, the sole theatre of WWII. However, you also have to agree that soon after that it ceased to exist, and, even after it reappeared, it never was a major theatre any more. --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:17, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Paul, you are confusing the meaning of 'dominant' with 'major'. The western front was a major theater, it just wasn't the dominant theater.  I have to admit I am confused why you seem so eager to condemn the western front as something minor.  It had different roles during the war, but after June 1944, it was anything but 'minor' in German calculations. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:34, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Second, soviet invasion of Eastern Poland was annexation rather than occupation, taking into account that citizenship was granted to the Eastern Poland peoples, majority of whom, by the way, were ethnical Ukrainians, Belarus and Jews (for the latters German occupatio would be fatal). So there is more analogy with Sudetes than with what Germans did in Westernn Poland.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:28, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I wouldn't agree with the notion about Soviet divisions for two reason. First, the USSR had never been an axis member. Remember, even Finland was just a German co-belligenet, not the Axis country, although she was involved in much longer and intence battles on German side.


 * Sorry, I don't agree. Whether the USSR declared themselves to be in the Axis or not, the very real effect of their actions in September 1939 was that of a major German ally -- a stance which was still in evidence in June 1940 when Molotov fell all over himself congratulating the Germans for the damage they had caused to British forces during the campaign in the west.  As for annexation versus occupation, choose whichever term best describes deportations and deliberate elimination of the intelligentsia and Polish officers who had the misfortune to fall into Soviet captivity.  What occurred in eastern Poland was very much the actions of an occupation, and a brutal one at that. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:42, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Polish intellegentsia just shared a fate of its Soviet colleagues. There were no difference in treatment of Polish nationals and other Sovies citizens. Statistics of GULAG's camp population show no appreciable change in national composition after 1940. And that was a dramatic (maybe, the sole) difference between pre-war Stalin's regime and Nazis. In addition, Soviet annexation saved many Jews (I personally knew some of them) who got an opportunity to flee East. --Paul Siebert (talk) 21:33, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I opt to cease discussing this topic as I am in complete disagreement with your assessment. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:16, 20 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Whether the WFWWII was or was not a major theatre after 1940 is not what we should be discusing here but the statement "German deployments to the Western Front (including North Africa and Italy) reached levels as high as approximately 40% of their ground forces, and 75% of the Luftwaffe." Which I think is false because it implies that German commitment was never ever higher than 40% of their ground forces even in 1940. The footnote either needs deleting or moving down to the appropriate section. Of those two options which do you prefer? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 17:40, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I think if it is edited to read "German deployments to the Western Front after May 1940 ..." that should eliminate any potential confusion. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:47, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I prefer a detailed description of the contribution of the west, because "reached levels as high as approximately 40%" is a weasel words. This statement should be similar to what I wrote above, namely, that in 1940 it was the sole theatre of WWII, then it ceased to exist, then reappeared again, although had never been a major theatre anymore.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:50, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Cheers, --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:05, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * For my part, I cannot agree with your proposal because the theater never disappeared (as if there were a period of peace) and because your use of the word "major" is incorrect. If you use the term "dominant" then I have no issue with the statement that "after June 22, 1941, the western front was no longer the dominant theatre of war." Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:58, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I see no appreciable difference between "major" and "dominant", so, if you think the latter is better, I have no objections. As regards to "cessation" I meant it ceased to exist as a land theatre of war. Taking into account that the war in Europe was primarily a land war, it is almost the same.


 * For the difference in meaning, I can only (and without rancor) suggest you consult a dictionary. I have to disagree that it is "almost the same" because, again, the Germans felt compelled to garrison their western conquests with substantial forces, therefore the theater still existed even if there were no ground combat operations in France or the BeNeLux from June 1940 until June 1944. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 18:10, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Moreover, I think your dismissal of the German air assets posted to the west is quite wanting. You may be able to better appreciate their effect if you imagine the Germans being able to freely deploy these assets on the eastern front for use against the Soviet air and ground forces.  It is wrong to simply ignore the air and naval war that was waged with Germany -- two aspects of the war that were primarily waged by the western Allies against Germany. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 18:21, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Concerning German garrisons in western Europe, I have to go back to Manchuria. According to Western and Eastern historiography, the USSR didn't participate in the was against Japan until Aug 1945. However, about a million Soviet troops were constantly located there, the amount comparable with German garrison in France/Belgium. Could you please explain me a difference between these two cases?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:47, 19 September 2008 (UTC)Cheers, --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:47, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I consulted a dictionary. It told me primarily and solely are quite different things :-). Let me remind you I used primarily, so I didn't try to completely neglect aeral and naval aspects of the War. However, I think you agree that this war was primarily a land war.

(back to left) My suggestion to consult the dictionary referred to "major" and "dominant", which you stated you saw "no appreciable difference" in the meaning thereof. I think the assertion that it was primarily a land war is something that would be seen from widely differing viewpoints depending on the nation involved. For an island nation like Great Britain, the sea war was quite vital. I still fail to understand what Manchuria has to do with German force deployment in Europe. As I stated above, if you wish to have a discussion about global aspects of the war, we should conduct that elsewhere. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 19:01, 19 September 2008 (UTC) I understood your suggestion about a dictionary, however, I still don't understand what do you mean. There is nothing about global aspects of WWII, I use Manchuria as an example. After devastating defeat at Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, till 1945, about a million Kwantung Army stayed on the southern bank of Amur river, and comparable amount of Soviet troops opposed it. Nevertheless, Japan and USSR weren't at war with each other and no Manchurian theatre of land war existed until August 1945. The situation in France/Belgium was similar. Idle German garrison stayed in Normandy, and British troops opposed it in the UK. You conclude Western front still existed in 1941-44, however, I see no substantial difference between Western Europe and Far East, other than Amur is 2-3 kilometer wide, whereas English Channel is 18 to 30. Could you please explain me what else was different?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:43, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
 * I don't think the viewpoint of nation involved can affect the conclusion about the nature of the war. The war against Germany was won primarily on land, although it doesn't mean that the naval contribution of the UK wasn't more than considerable.


 * I am confused about the example of the Kwantung Army because it plays no role in German force distribution in the Europe. You originally questioned that 40% of German land force strength was arrayed against the western Allies, whether in actual combat or guarding against the potential of an invasion.  I pointed out that German forces in Norway were there to prevent the Allies from landing in the region a second time.  You then wished to compare this with the Kwantung Army.  I find this a non sequitur because the Kwantung Army has nothing to do with the western front or German force deployment between the various fronts of the European war.  As I said, if one wishes to discuss the war as a global action, then comparisons between what was happening in Asia and Europe would be valid, but this discussion was about German force deployment in Europe. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:16, 20 September 2008 (UTC)


 * And, once again, I think nobody will argue about importance of western Allies' war efforts during the battle of Athlantic or strategic bombing campaign, so my above statements have a relation to the land theater only. --Paul Siebert (talk) 21:18, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

After some meditation I agree that "not a major" would be not fully appropriate term. Starting from 1939 till 1945 the Western front was a major factor, although in actuality during 1940-44 it didn't exist as a battlefield. Both the UK and the US posed a formidable threat for Germany, although during a half of the war this threat was mostly potential. Therefore, I would modify my previous statement as follows: starting from the Phony war, Western front was a dominant theatre of WWII, although after conquest of France it ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the very fact of existence of the UK (and, later the US) remained to be one of major factors that determined a cource of the war. Starting from July 22, 1941, Eastern Front emerged as a predominant war theatre, followed by reappearence of the Western Front (Second Front) in 1944 as a second major war theatre that contributed considerably into a final outcome of WWII. I think that would resolve most contradictions. It is also worths mentioning that Western Front hadn't been a predominant theatre even before June 1941, because hostilities moved to Yugoslavia, Grece, Africa, etc.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:06, 19 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Although I am not in complete agreement with this thought, it is not that far off from my own view regarding the role of the western front in the war. Cheers, --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:17, 20 September 2008 (UTC)