Talk:Winograd Commission

"Reactions" or "Consequences"
Since the report, things are in flux in Israeli politics, so I was thinking that "reactions" and consequences to the report should have their own title, just after "preliminary report". What do you think? Cramer 14:02, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Sounds like a good idea. ابو علي (Abu Ali) 14:19, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

We cannot say "response to rocket attacks" because the initial cassus belli involved the capture of soldiers, BEFORE the rockets were fired and killed Israeli civilians, and Israel's spokesmen began to change the chronology of war.70.190.102.49 (talk) 19:08, 28 February 2017 (UTC)

By initial cassus belli, I mean what Israel claimed to be going to war over. It was NOT due to rockets killing Israeli civilians-that happened afterwards. Olmert declared war over the soldiers being captured without any mention of rockets. 70.190.102.49 (talk) 05:50, 1 March 2017 (UTC)

NPOV violations
The history section seems to be blatently POV. It asserts what appears to be the statements of the commission as absolute fact. I don't know enough about the subject to rewrite it, but it is clearly a violation of WP:NPOV. --Samael775 02:49, 6 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Those are the widely-held facts and are sourced as such; they were written months before the committee issued any statements. If you do not know enough about the subject and you cannot realistically claim a violation, without citing anything specific, I suggest you study it. El_C 17:24, 6 May 2007 (UTC)
 * The manner in which we explain reasons for tagging a page with npov is never limited to saying "clearly a violation," you always have to explain why you pose such a claim. Merely saying that you think something is clearly this or that, per se., never counts as an explanation. El_C 17:38, 6 May 2007 (UTC)
 * "During the war, the Israeli State failed to provide sufficient material support, including necessities, to the Home Front population of about one million people in northern Israel who were instructed to remain in shelters for much of the war's duration. Government support networks were not activated or were inadequately run and much of the burden to care for vulnerable populations was left to individual volunteers and charities. The conditions of and access to shelters were often substandard, and government assistance to provide northern Israelis with transport and accommodations in central and southern Israel, were highly lacking. As a result of this government inaction, the weakest segments of Israeli society in affected areas suffered the worst day-to-day privations." Seems quite blatant to me. --Samael775 22:43, 6 May 2007 (UTC)
 * You're just quoting the entire paragraph and then placing a "seems quite blatant to me." Confusing. El_C 02:26, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Indeed, the article cited at the end of this passage says nothing about the content of the paragraph. --Samael775 22:49, 6 May 2007 (UTC)
 * It speaks about it plenty, but there are others I can add or refractor. El_C 02:26, 7 May 2007 (UTC) &mdash; Actually, that ref was misplaced; I couldn't find the one I had set out earlier, but I added some other ones instead. El_C 03:10, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
 * "During the war, the Israeli State failed to provide sufficient material support, including necessities, to the Home Front population". Stating that the government failed to provide sufficient support is POV. So is saying that government support networks were inadequately run. Whose opinion is this? Who disagrees? What sources are there for each side of the argument? --Samael775 00:55, 8 May 2007 (UTC)
 * If you find someone that disagrees (that is, if there is disagreement), feel free to present their views. The sources are cited and they are authoritative. El_C 22:36, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

Democracy and fortitutde
The whole democracy and fortitutde bit editorializes the intro and is, essentially, a cliché. The expansion of the external links section with many links from one site, is also problematic. El_C 22:36, 12 May 2007 (UTC)


 * The links from one site is nothing new and was modeled after other pages. Anyhow, I have already shortened it. The democracy bit has continuously shown up in media, you can see more with the external links. The Nasrallah part is also notable. Bottom line, if a pattern begins to show then it is notable. Just like the idea that Brokeback Mountain would win the Academy Award for Best Picture, or the speculation that Al Gore will run for president in 2008. --Shamir1 19:50, 13 May 2007 (UTC)


 * That does not respond to my objection. That whole ability to self-criticize, democracy & fortitude and so on, are pretty tangential, especially for the into. Please try to gain consensus for the contested addition before inserting it again. Thank you. El_C 03:18, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
 * First of all, the argument you posted on the edit summary was incorrect and had nothing to do with this. The sources that prove a point on the pages mentioned above are similar to those that I have used, and some of these sources come from organizations or institutes. It is sourced, relevant, and in no way tangential. It will be reverted. --Shamir1 03:48, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Sorry, but that attitude demonstrate little willingness for dialogue. That passage is tangential and it is your original synthesis. El_C 03:57, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Anyway, when you are willing, or able, to address my points above, perhaps this dispute can advance toward resolution, but simply saying something like 'it's relevant, it's sourced' looks diversionary and rings hollow. El_C 04:00, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
 * It was notable enough for the Time (magazine) article and several other publications. The reason I noted that above is to show that there is no problem with the inclusion of the material. --Shamir1 23:59, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

Final report
It's missing from the article, besides a short notice on it's publication date at the beginning.--84.108.69.102 (talk) 08:21, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

Interim/Preliminary and Final Report
The Interim Report was submitted on 30 April, 2007. It is important to note that both reports are classified, and only an unclassified version of each is released into the public domain. This first report contains a detailed analysis of the decisions made that lead to the war starting with the abduction on July 12, 2006. The second report was published on January 30th, 2008 and examines the conduct of the thirty-four days of the war itself.

I agree with the comment above, the article needs to include the Final Report. Unlike the Interim Report, the Final Report does not appear to be available on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Dean Armond 04:31, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Criticism section wording
I'd like to discuss some of the changes I made to the criticism section which Jiujitsuguy reverted. Look forward to hearing what others object to in my rewording. Cheers. ← George talk 02:12, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
 * I added that Martin van Creveld was an Israeli military historian. I think the nationality of any Israeli or Lebanese expert/politician/news source is relevant in the given context.
 * I removed several non-neutral terms, such as sharply in "sharply critical" and many in "many successes". The author does not use these terms, and describing his opinion using our own evaluation of it violates NPOV.
 * Van Creveld's opinion piece is about the Winograd Commission, yet the original wording focuses 90% of its text on his opinion of the outcome of the war itself. This isn't a good summary of Van Creveld's op-ed. Our wording should reflect what he wrote, which discusses both the successes and failures of the commission, and only mentions his views on the war's outcome in passing, in the context of the commission's conclusions.
 * Hey George, you've made some valid points and I've made changes that address them. Let me know if you're cool with it.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:01, 25 December 2009 (UTC)
 * Looks good to me. A couple minor things I'm going to change:
 * You're correct that he appears to also be Dutch, as he was born Dutch and moved to Israel as a baby. I've seen him described as a Dutch-Israeli historian, so that seems good to me.
 * We can't write that Van Creveld "cited the fact that Hezbollah 'had the fight knocked out of it'", because to call it a fact would be labeling his opinion as fact. I've changed it to say that he argued that Hezbollah had the fight knocked out of it. I'd also be okay with other neutral wordings like he stated or he said that Hezbollah had the fight knocked out of it - anything that doesn't confuse his opinions with universally agreed upon facts.
 * Hope that makes sense. Cheers. ← George talk 06:43, 26 December 2009 (UTC)
 * The quote “a fairy robust United Nations peacekeeping force” does not appear in the article. However, I'm wondering if the use of the word "fairy" here was a Freudian slip. It's probably more appropriate in this context than the word which was presumably meant to be here, so I won't change it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Craven Maven (talk • contribs) 21:13, 3 June 2010 (UTC)

Final report needs to be re-inserted
This is a proposed synopsis of a section on the Final Report. The primary source (if honestly portrayed as I think I've done) has preference over secondary sources, since the latter are bound to either over-state the degree to which Isael is said to have been defeated, or introduce arguments on how and why Winograd got it wrong.
 * The Final Report of the Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 (the Winograd Committee) was submitted on 30 Jan 2008 to the then Prime minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak. A press release covered some of the major conclusions. The committee stood behind everything they'd said in the Interim Report.
 * The report categorised the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. The war had ended without clear military victory, and a semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population continued throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response. The fabric of Israeli life in the affected regions was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. When Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive the offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed.
 * Some of the troubling findings revealed were as follows:
 * • Serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes at both political and military.
 * • Serious failings and flaws in preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF, especially the Army.
 * • Serious failings and flaws in strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.
 * • Severe failings and flaws in the defence of the civilian population and in coping with rockets.
 * The decision to react immediately to the kidnapping limited Israel's range of options to only two, a stand-off war or an invasion. Israel went to war before it had decided which option to use and military and political echelons failed to have a serious discussion of the options or decide between them. Even so, until the first week of August, Israel did not prepare the military capacity to start a massive ground operation.
 * As a result, Israel was 'dragged' into a ground operation too late. Despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself, Israel did not use its military force well and effectively. Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes.
 * All in all, the IDF failed to provide an effective military response to the challenges posed. This conclusion must not take away the great willingness of the soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and fight in the war. There were many instances of heroism, courage, self-sacrifice and devotion of many commanders and soldiers.
 * The air force should be congratulated on their achievements, however their capabilities could not prove decisive and in fact, the achievements of the air force were necessarily limited, eroded by weaknesses in the overall performance of the IDF.
 * It should be noted that the war had significant diplomatic achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel, despite an absence of preparatory staff work and discussions. The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution in the Security Council was, in the main, quick, systematic and efficient.
 * The 2nd Lebanon War again shows that Israel cannot survive in this region, unless all the people of the region believe that Israel has the leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness to allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her. Israel must - politically and morally - seek peace with its neighbors and make necessary compromises but must do so from a position of social, political and military strength.

More on this subject may be needed (eg Hezbollah was exultant and perhaps IDF or US objections need adding) but the article is obviously incomplete and drive-by reversions by Powder Hound 3000 having this contribution record are to be deplored. Templar98 (talk) 11:57, 16 January 2011 (UTC)