Talk:Woodhead Commission

Map
The Cohen book has a map of Plan C on pp. 212, but as it's copyright I can't include it in the article. If someone wants to use it to draw a map to include in this article, let me know and I'll scan it in. Noel (talk) 18:22, 30 September 2005 (UTC)

unclear
The last sentence ("The recommendations were eventually rejected by both Zionists and Palestinian Arabs.")..is a bit unclear to me: is it this report (i.e. the Woodhead Commission) ..or was it the 1939 "Round Table" (=White Paper of 1939) that was "eventually rejected by both Zionists and Palestinian  Arabs"? Huldra 03:08, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

majority opinion?
I think that the following summary from the UNSCOP report is better, in particular it exposes the differences between the commissioners more clearly:
 * The Partition (Woodhead) Commission, 1938, rejected the partition plan of the Royal Commission upon finding that the Jewish State contemplated by that plan, after certain modifications of the proposed frontier which its security would necessitate, would contain an Arab minority amounting to 49 per cent of the total population. The four commissioners could not, however, agree on any other partition scheme. One concluded that no form of partition was practicable. The chairman and another member recommended a plan according to which the Jewish State would have consisted of a strip of territory in the northern part of the Maritime Plain, approximately 75 kilometres in length, but restricted by an Arab enclave at Jaffa and a corridor connecting with the Mediterranean a Jerusalem enclave under Mandate. The Arab State would consist of the remainder of Palestine except Galilee and the sub-district of Beersheba, which would be administered by the mandatory until the Arab and Jewish populations could agree on their final destination. An essential feature of the plan was a customs union of the Arab State, the Jewish State and the territories under Mandate. The fourth member of the commission recommended the addition to the Jewish State proposed by the chairman and another member of the valleys of Esdraelon and Jezreel with lakes Huleh and Tiberias. --Zero 02:15, 14 March 2006 (UTC)

Maps
I removed these maps: A B C, because they are completely different from the original maps as reproduced in. I'll attempt to bring a scan of Map C. Zerotalk 13:08, 18 August 2011 (UTC)

incorrect and biased claims
I removed: "The Commission rejected Arab claims that the Jews had acquired the "best land" in Palestine: "That much of the land now in possession of Jews has become the best land is a truer statement...It was impossible not to be impressed when inspecting some of the bare rocky places where Jewish settlements have been or are in the course of being made. Such remarkable efforts may well disturb statistics. [The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Its History in Maps, Martin Gilbert, p. 29]" This appears in the "Note of reservations by Sir Alison Russell", not in the canonical report of the commission. Zerotalk 07:41, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * It wasn't a "minority report" either, since Russell signed the main report. Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Your personal research counts for nothing. The source quotes it as a "Minority Report."--Geewhiz (talk) 13:07, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * A better source (the original) calls it a Note of Reservation and records that Russell signed the report. Zerotalk 22:55, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

The date was Nov 9, not Nov 8, for both publication of the report and presentation to parliament. Proof in Hansard. Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Ditto. News reports and academic books give the date as Nov 8. And there is no mention whatsoever of this commission's report in the long-winded piece of nothing you linked to. -Geewhiz (talk) 13:42, 22 January 2012 (UTC) Geewhiz (talk) 13:08, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Seems to be variance between the sources, but after seeing Nov. 9 in a reliable source, I have changed it, as requested.--Geewhiz (talk) 14:54, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

"Russell argued that the plan was not in accord with the obligations to the Jews." - refers only to Plan C and is just one sentence from Russell's 14-page statement. Russell supported Plan B, like it said before and will again. Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * The source does not refer just to Plan C. That is your interpretation, which again, counts for nothing.--Geewhiz (talk) 13:09, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * First sentence of Russell's reservations: "For the following reasons it seems to me that plan B is to be preferred to plan C." The only words in Russell's reservations similar to the claim: "In my opinion, an offer to the Jews of a state of the size proposed in plan C does not comply with the obligations to them." Zerotalk 22:55, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

"it is only the Jewish contributions to tax revenue that have enabled Palestine to balance its budgets." - there is no such statement in the report. The source refers to the future economic feasibility of an Arab state: "This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget." (page 196). Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * This is in quotes, in the cited source, and so it will remain.--Geewhiz (talk) 13:11, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * The original shows your source to be unreliable on this issue. Zerotalk 22:55, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

"tiny Jewish state surrounded by a much larger Arab state and a British zone" - one historian's pov can't be presented as a plain fact, especially when it is contrary to the Commission's pov. Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * This is a conclusion that is valid, sourced, factual, and provides a succinct summary for the reader.--Geewhiz (talk) 13:14, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * The word "tiny" is an opinion since it ignores the land quality. There are plenty of other opinions including those of the report itself that should be represented. Zerotalk 22:55, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

"Plan A was the Peel plan" - needs qualification given that the maps are significantly different. Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * This is what the sources say. Your belief that the plans are different requires qualification.--Geewhiz (talk) 13:15, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

"According to the report: 'The customs revenue would ..." - this section is presented as if it is quotation from the report, but it is not. Actually it is composed of sentences paraphrased from different parts of the report, including parts of two different economic plans (called "Formula A and Formula B") that are presented as alternatives. It would be better to just quote the report's conclusions, which I will do. Zerotalk 12:28, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * All the information added to the article is based on reliable sources. Wikipedia articles are not based on quotes from plans, they are based on sources such as the books and articles I have cited. Are you planning to edit war over this article? Just wondering.--Geewhiz (talk) 12:59, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * As I've said before to someone else, the sourcing rules are designed to prevent OR, not to allow someone to wikilawyer in material known to be false. Zerotalk 22:55, 22 January 2012 (UTC)


 * zero - what gives? i turn my head for a minute and you are taking geewhiz to task based on OR? i don't get it. not to mention gee's use of RS. some enlightenment might help us... Soosim (talk) 13:50, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

It's doesn't seem clear what Zero is objecting to. --MichaelNetzer (talk) 20:16, 22 January 2012 (UTC)

The report of the Woodhead Commission is a better source for what the report contains than random newspaper articles or other secondary sources. While we can rely on secondary sources for the background, overall impact, related issues, etc, when it comes to quoting from the report there is no excuse for quoting things that are not there. I'm not accusing Gilabrand of OR, only of using sub-optimal sources and in a few cases of removing more accurate cited material that was there before. She even deleted the bibliographic details of the report, so some of the citations now mean nothing. Overall her edits made the article considerably less accurate. I'm not embarrassed to be devoted to getting the facts right. Zerotalk 22:41, 22 January 2012 (UTC)
 * This page has been improved immeasurably since I worked on it. It is now a full-fledged article that conveys to the reader what this commission was, why it was appointed, some of the behind-the-scenes intrigues and what it led to. I have cited academic books & contemporary coverage of the commission's work by a respected news agency. Wikipedia is not based on primary sources, and Zero has been around long enough to know that. There is nothing suboptimal here, except Zero's attempts to scare me away.--Geewhiz (talk) 05:03, 23 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Mistakingly including false content is always suboptimal, even if content is compliant with policy. If the article says that "Commission rejected Arab claims that the Jews had acquired the best land" while the actual report by the commission does not, then the claim has to go, regardless whether a historian (Gilbert) supports it or not. We are here to present accurate information to the reader, not disinformation. --Frederico1234 (talk) 05:48, 23 January 2012 (UTC)
 * You obviously have not read the article and are taken in by the misleading arguments of O. This is quoted from a Minority Report submitted by the Commission, and it is as worthy of inclusion as any other part of the commission's findings. Another point worth mentioning is that the commission was made up of a total of 4 members, so that even a "minority" opinion is far from trivial. In fact, before I touched the page, it stated that a "majority" of the members supported Plan C, whereas the truth (covered up by Zero's wording) is that two members out of four supported it with reservations.--Geewhiz (talk) 05:55, 23 January 2012 (UTC)
 * In fact all four members signed the report, but it was me who correctly added the reservations of Russell and Reid (which you removed in the case of Russell, replacing it with a distortion of his position). Zerotalk 11:51, 23 January 2012 (UTC)

Out of JTA's summary of the plan of "economic federalism", only the last sentence is a quotation from the commission report. It is part of the last sentence of the Introduction (page 14). None of the rest appears, though fragments of it appear scattered around in different places. Looking again at JTA, they don't even claim to be quoting the report but only some unidentified summary of it. We shouldn't pretend to quote the report when we aren't, and we don't need to quote some unidentified intermediate source when the original is readily available. Zerotalk 10:56, 25 February 2012 (UTC)

Economical aspect
I have been reading the Peel and Woodhead reports, and I am trying to better understand the economic difficulties mentioned here. Going by the Peel report, it seem like its a reference to Jewish and British Subvention. It appears that Jewish per capita revenue contributions were higher, which allowed better public services for the Arabs, so partition would mean that Arabs would no longer profit from the taxable capacity of the Jewish, and thus the Jewish state would have to pay the Arabs state?! Take half of the debt total debt, while the Arabs will get additional grants from British(source. This seems weird. Does anyone have any WP:RS that covers this topic.--PLNR (talk) 01:03, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

Original research
The Plan A/B/C and some other parts seem to be sourced to a Primary resource. Does anyone have a secondary source which covers those plans in details to make sure that all important segments are duly represented and that those section are not the result of original research.--PLNR (talk) 12:38, 7 February 2014 (UTC)


 * Concerning this revert .  My text has nothing todo with my interporation and is based on reliable WP:RS.


 * According to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry the the Woodhead report revealed that:
 * "no plan of partition could be evolved within the terms of reference which would, in the view of the members of the Commission, offer much hope of success. The Peel plan was rejected and two possible alternatives were considered. ... Two members of the Commission favored Plan C, one favored Plan B. and one declared that no practicable scheme of partition could be devised."
 * according to the JTA Archive:
 * "The 310-page report presented three alternative forms of partition, but the four members could not agree unanimously on any of the alternatives, and reported that they were unable to recommend boundaries within the terms of reference which would give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states."
 * according to the UN special Committee report:
 * " The four commissioners could not, however, agree on any other partition scheme. One concluded that no form of partition was practicable. The chairman and another member recommended a [plan C] ... The fourth member of the commission recommended the addition to the Jewish State proposed by the chairman and another member of the valleys of Esdraelon and Jezreel with lakes Huleh and Tiberias."
 * So my variant is supported by WP:RS and provide a far better summary of the conclusion. While your variant states that: "It concluded that Plan C was the best of the three plans but listed considerable difficulties for it." Which I couldn't find anywhere, but according to the JTA Archive:
 * "Plan C, A further Modification, was considered by two members, including Chairman Woodhead, as the best that could be devised under the terms of reference. The fourth member, while agreeing that Plan C was the best that could be devised under the terms of reference, regarded both plans as impracticable."


 * Which suggest that your variant is a violation of WP:SYN or WP:OR, the majority might have seen this plan as best of what they could come up, but the final conclusion\recommendation was that no plan is was workable. So I am undoing your edit, if you can find a source supporting the "best variant" you can append it to the summary. Although I wouldn't bother with the "reservations" part unless you wish to merge with the last paragraph which deals with it. --PLNR (talk) 06:06, 10 February 2014 (UTC)


 * Reporting what is in a source is not original research. Read the report; it says in plain words exactly what my text says.  There is a main section, signed by all four people, and two notes of reservation.  The main section, in the chapter "Summary and Conclusion", states the conclusions of the committee as a whole.  Amongst other things,
 * 484. In chapters XI, XIII and XIV, we have described, under the title of plan C, the best plan of partition which we have been able to devise . We will now summarize, under different heads, the chief points which in our opinion His Majesty's Government will have to take into account in deciding whether this plan can be regarded as equitable and practicable or not, and will indicate our views on each.
 * It then devotes several pages to explaining the problems with plan C. The problems are severe but the report never says they are fatal.  What it says in regard to the various difficulties is things like "we should not be justified in rejecting plan C solely on the ground that...",  "the boundary under plan C can be regarded as providing adequate security", "These difficulties are not, however, insuperable...", then it lists various financial/economic requirements plan C would have, burdens the UK government would bear, etc..  This is all close to my wording, which is neither OR nor SYNTH but mere reporting.  Then it says that it doubts the immediate economic viability of two "self-supporting states" and proposes that the two states enter for some time into a customs agreement that is administered by the UK. On that condition it says
 * 507. Subject to these reservations, however, we think that the financial and economic needs of the Arab and Jewish States may now be said to have been provided for satisfactorily ; and we should be prepared with the aforesaid reservations to report that the boundaries which we have recommended under plan C will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual  establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. It would then remain for His Majesty's Government to consider whether, if the plan of partition which we have put forward should in other respects appear to them equitable and practicable, it is better to accept the financial liability involved than to reject partition entirely in favour of some other alternative.
 * That's there in black and white in the report. An article of Woodhead about it repeats more or less the same thing ("The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 18, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1939), pp. 171-193):  "Having come to the conclusion that neither Plan A nor Plan B was acceptable, we, the majority of the members of the Commission, put forward an alternative which we called Plan C." — followed by a pessimistic description of how difficult it would be implement.  Again, just like I wrote.  It is of course perfectly fine for other people to read the report and draw different conclusions from what the committee drew, but we are not obliged to follow them.  The UK government had already decided that partition was out, so it was to be expected that they would emphasise the negative aspects of it.  The JTA report is a Zionist perspective that is wrong. (Note how their wording about "self-supporting state" is very similar to what I quoted from para 507 but states the opposite.)  The other two you quote note that two people thought C was plausible, one preferred B, and one thought they all sucked. That is true but is already stated with more detail in my version. Zerotalk 09:29, 10 February 2014 (UTC)


 * I just want to emphasise this:
 * JTA report: "they were unable to recommend boundaries within the terms of reference which would give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states"
 * Woodhead Report: "the boundaries which we have recommended under plan C will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States."
 * The wording is so close that it can't be a coincidence. But the meaning is opposite.  JTA would probably answer that they are covered by the words "within the terms of reference"; anyway it is either a mistake or a stunt. Zerotalk 09:35, 10 February 2014 (UTC)


 * Primary sources has their uses, as you can seen I haven't touched all instances where you used the report. However, you are not a WP:RS and when you try to build a summary of several hundred page report, want to ignore WP:RS based on your analysis and speak about about UK government bias, I have to insist that you find a WP:RS source that support your interpretation of the report, otherwise it is violation of WP:OR.


 * For example see the section you wanted to emphasize. The JTA summary that covers the report as whole, while you compared it to a direct quote that speaks about Plan C. (1) The JTA quote is almost word for word the UNSCOP and Anglo-American committees wording, it just unpacked the vague "within the terms of reference" as stated in the report(first two iirc) - which is the difference you noted. (2) You neglect to provide context for the direct quote e.g. an essential feature of plan C, was an economic union between the three, which was reject( thus the proposal for economic federalism). Which is why ~'no plan of partition was found withing the terms of references' is bottom line of every WP:RS I provide and what I put in the text.
 * No, the report does not reject "economic federalism". It defends it (para. 508). I stand by my summary above.  (But I don't at all mind adjusting the wording of what is in the article provided it doesn't say that the report concludes something that it does not conclude.) Zerotalk 12:57, 10 February 2014 (UTC)


 * with that being said, we have paragraph on why Plan A and B were rejected, jumping to the economical aspect. I think you can pinch there that tid bit about Plan C, being considered best by the majority.--PLNR (talk) 11:40, 10 February 2014 (UTC)


 * I'm out of time for about 20 hours....but your comment about me not being a RS suggests you don't understand the rules about primary sources. There is no rule against reporting them, but only against interpreting them.  That's why I did not attempt to interpret the overall impact of the report but went straight to the conclusions section and reported what it said.  Even sources that miserably fail WP:RS can be used as sources for their own content.  If source X says "the butler did it", then no matter how many derivative sources say "X claims the janitor did it", we should still report what X actually says.  (And I'll remind you that I also have a journal article which agrees.) Zerotalk 12:57, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
 * Let me try to clarify (1) in general terms if you wish to contest what is said in the WP:RS that I provided, then you need to provide a WP:RS that support your interpretation of the report, because what you think that some direct quote means and what the report actually says about that topic may not be the same. (2) Lets focus, what is the goal of our discussion i.e. what exactly you want to add or change? maybe we are wasting time arguing about nothing... --PLNR (talk) 14:17, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

woodhead conclusion

 * 1) This is the full text of Woodhead Commission conclusion: We can now sum up the position. The question whether partition is practicable involves considerations of two kinds : practical and political. The former concern chiefly finance and economics ; the administrative difficulties are great, but they  cannot be called insuperable, if the will to find a solution is present.  But the financial and economic difficulties, as described in this  chapter, are of such a nature that we can find no possible way to  overcome them within our terms of reference. Rather than report that we have failed to devise any practicable plan, we have proposed, in paragraph 506, a modification of partition which, while it with-  holds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish States, seems to  us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of  settlement, if His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the  very considerable financial liability involved.  There remain the political difficulties. We cannot ignore the  possibility that one or both of the parties may refuse to operate  partition under any conditions. It is not our duty, as a fact-finding  Commission, to advise what should be done in that event. But  there is still the possibility that both sides may be willing to accept  a reasonable compromise. We cannot feel confident that this will  happen, but we put forward the proposals in this chapter in the  hope that they may form the basis of a settlement by negotiation.  "''
 * 2) user:Zero0000 edit (Diff page) is misleading, vague and even erroneous.
 * A Zero: "was noted to be unsatisfactory for financial and political reasons".The word "political" use here is a mistake.
 * B Zero: "was noted to be unsatisfactory". The word unsatisfactory is a mistake, as it clearly seen in the conclusion full text, quoted here.
 * C Zero:" concluded that no plan of partition could be evolved within the terms of reference which would, in the view of the members of the Commission, offer much hope of success". Misleading. The conclusion does not say "offer much hope of success". The next sentence of the report is omitted here, although it clearly indicate a practical solution, provided the U.K would finance the proposed Arab state. Keeping in mind the precedent of the U.K treasury  supporting Transjordan, it could be repeated for the proposed Arab state.
 * D Zero: "but listed considerable difficulties for it.". Vague. What difficulties? if it is the Arab state lack of income, then it should be noted here, rather then a vague sentence. more later. Ykantor (talk) 13:07, 25 October 2014 (UTC)
 * That's a good point to refer to the full conclusions to argue a point.
 * Could you show when Zero0000 stated the points that you refer to. The context is needed.
 * My point is that it is a primary source. Given this, it seems that the commission had a secret agenda : to bury the Peel conclusions. So how can you give weight to the arguments that they put forward to conclude the Peel analysis was not practicable and that instead, Jews and Arabs should "accept a reasonable compromise"... So, what do 2nd sources say about this ?
 * Anyway, regarding this article (not the 16 other ones), which talk about the Commission itself, it is reasonnable to provide a fair summary of its conclusions.
 * A simple compromise between Zero0000 and you could be just to copy/paste them. There is not copyrights on this and if the full conclusion is that small, that is not an issue.
 * Pluto2012 (talk) 19:14, 25 October 2014 (UTC)

There are multiple issues involved here. I'll leave the "real agenda" issue to below and address the summary here. The problem with the text Ykantor added, and also with the claim that the text quoted above sums up the commission's conclusions is that both of them refer only to the commission's conclusions about Plan C. To see this you have to at least skim the report and not just look at a page or two. Plans A and B were rejected primarily on demographic grounds; this is stated on many pages. Because of these demographic reasons, the Galilee and the Jerusalem corridor were excluded from both the Jewish and Arab states. The effect was that the Arab State would exclude more than half the Arab population of Palestine and almost all of the high quality land owned by Arabs. It's hardly surprising that this left the Arab State with poor financial prospects. It is essential to note that these financial prospects were for the Arab State that the Woodhead Commission designed, after rejecting other plans (including Peel's) on other grounds. Ykantor wrote in 17 articles (a highly antisocial action), that the partition plan was rejected because there could not be a financially viable Arab State; that is simply a false summary. The text quoted above is not a summary of the whole document but a summary of the chapter, which is about Plan C as it says in Para 484. Woodhead himself emphasised that in his public summary (published as "The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 18, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1939), pp. 171-193): "the greater part of the Arab wealth of Palestine lies outside the Arab State, and that must be so under any plan of partitition which is based upon the inclusion in the Arab State of the fewest possible Jews and Jewish enterprises and on the creation of a mandated enclave for the Holy Places at Jerusalem and Bethlehem". Zerotalk 04:44, 26 October 2014 (UTC)

Regarding the "secret agenda" of the Woodhead commission: the opinion of Morris is not universally held and should not be stated as a fact. Alas Morris does not give a reference, but one reason it is a common belief is that a seminal paper on the subject by Galnoor (Territorial partition of Palestine —The 1937 decision, Political Geography Quarterly. Vol 10. 1991, 382–404.) cited an archival source for "However, the new Commission also received secret instructions according to which they were to conclude that partition was not possible." I added that to this article long ago. The problem is that Galnoor changed his mind later on. In a book he published on the same subject 6 years later (cited in the article) he gave the same archival source for a much weaker statement: "The commission was secretly told that, in accordance with the cabinet's decision, it was within the commission's authority to recommend that "no workable scheme could be produced."". That could have come with an unwritten "wink, wink" as an instruction to kill the plan, but it makes perfect innocent sense as well since the formal Terms of Reference were to recommend how to implement partition and don't explicitly give the option of recommending against. Galnoor is a specialist on this subject and cited sources, unlike Morris who isn't and didn't, so I don't think Morris should appear as the bringer of unattributed facts that others more qualified don't consider facts. Zerotalk 05:14, 26 October 2014 (UTC)


 * - to Zero: You have not replied yet to my notes concerning mistakes, misleading sentence and a vague sentence
 * - At the moment, the report text is not accessible. As soon as possible I'll check your claim that the conclusion passage (quoted above) is "''refer only to the commission's conclusions about Plan C"'.
 * - Zero: "these financial prospects were for the Arab State that the Woodhead Commission designed, after rejecting other plans (including Peel's) on other grounds". It is a pity that you do not refer to the report p. 236 sentence  "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting", which proves that the financial deficit was not inherent to one partition alternative, as you stated.
 * - I repeat my question concerning fixing multiple artivles. what is wrong eith that? As said, previously some of the articles were contradicting each other or had mistakes. In my opinion, I have upgraded them all. However, If I am proven wrong, it is my responsibility to fix allegedly mistaken edits of mine.
 * - Concerning Morris and Galnoor, I quoted Morris who is a respected source. It seems that you researched the issue further, and I have no objection if you modify the text accordingly. Ykantor (talk) 05:51, 26 October 2014 (UTC)


 * - Out of curiosity, I have looked for the reason of an insufficient tax payments of the Arabs. I stumbled in an interesting article by Kenneth W. Stein that explains the reason for the impoverishment of the fellahin(Arab farmer). Among the reasons are: - exorbitant interest rates PAYED TO MONEY LENDERS,- lot of plots were owned by a group of farmers, so every year the farmer got another plot and had no incentive to invest in manure and other means. :- Payments to local notables etc. - The poor farmer wheat seasonal product  was around 1 quarter of the Egyptian farmer. There was a  major period of decline in the rural economy commenced in the late 1920s and lasted until 1939 because of drought,locust, field mice etc. The local Arab newspapers  of the period wrote about these problems.  No wonder they could not pay taxes.  It seems that the mandate government did not care about the poor fellahin. Ykantor (talk) 19:13, 26 October 2014 (UTC)

-Concerning the secret agenda, it seems that Galnur supports Morris view. I added to the article a quote of Galnur. - Zero: "The text quoted above is not a summary of the whole document but a summary of the chapter, which is about Plan C". Not true. the text of the Conclusion passage (p. 246) is a summary of the last chapter of the report's body, which is called "CHAPTER XXII.—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION"(p. 232). It is clear that this chapter, and especially its' last passage - conclusions, should be the source for the Wikipedia article. However, if you wish to elaborate on plans A,B, based on the report's previous chapters, I have no objections. - Zero: "the partition plan was rejected because there could not be a financially viable Arab State; that is simply a false summary.". Not true. This text is a quote of the report, so it cannot be false. You might have said that you wish to add a background, though. -E Zero: "It is essential to note that these financial prospects were for the Arab State that the Woodhead Commission designed, after rejecting other plans (including Peel's) on other grounds.". Not true. the statement is clear: "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting". - Why such a low income of the proposed Arab state? If the article will explain it, it should include Zero's explanation together with the report's body reasons. i.e.
 * 1) The major contributor to the state income is custom duties. (table, p. 183)
 * 2)  The reduction in customs duties is attributed to the falling of in immigration (probable Jewish immigration). see p. 187  "and to a lesser extent to the decline in customs revenue consequent on the falling-off in immigration ,accompanied by a decline in the importation of immigrants' capital, and the trade depression". more latter. Ykantor (talk) 07:16, 28 October 2014 (UTC)

What is Chapter XXII about?
Ykantor, I suggested before that you read para 484; here it is for your convenience (my emphasis):
 * In chapters XI, XIII and XIV, we have described, under the title of plan C, the best plan of partition which we have been able to devise. We will now summarize, under different heads, the chief points which in our opinion His Majesty's Government will have to take into account in deciding whether this plan can be regarded as equitable and practicable or not, and will indicate our views on each.

So the Chapter itself says it is about Plan C. Then the chapter has 7 sections, each considering one aspect of Plan C, saying so explicitly multiple times and referring for its data back to the earlier chapters about Plan C.  The words you quote "we found that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend" are prefixed by "In chapter XVIII", which is a detailed economic analysis of Plan C.  The figures like 610,000 quoted just below come from the tables in chapter XVIII about Plan C. Compare the text in this paragraph with that in Para 383 of Chapter XVIII:
 * The situation under plan C is, therefore, that as a result of partition, and leaving out of account the cost of defence, while the Jewish State will enjoy a surplus of nearly £P.600,000 per annum, the Arab State will be faced with a deficit of about £P.550,000, or £P.610,000 if Trans-Jordan is united...

It is almost verbatim, the same numbers, proving beyond doubt that this paragraph is about Plan C. Zerotalk 09:57, 28 October 2014 (UTC)

About Galnoor and Morris
Ykantor, You claim to have found proof that Galnoor agrees with Morris, but the source you brought shows that Galnoor does not agree with Morris. First, Galnoor does not say that the Cabinet voted to reject partition; he says they voted to "delay all immediate action for more than a year and meanwhile to appoint another commission to examine the plan and submit its opinion". It's completely different. Only "in retrospect" does Galnoor consider that this decision was the turning point against partition. Then regarding the secret advice to Woodhead, Galnoor does not say that Woodhead was instructed to kill partition. He was told that the committee was permitted to recommend against partition. Again, it is completely different. Galnoor summarises "That is to say, the government told the commission that it was prepared to accept a recommendation to retract the partition recommendations of the Peel commission". Again, "prepared to accept" is utterly different from instructing the commission to find against partition, and even weaker than saying that the government would prefer or like such a decision. Galnoor simply does not agree with Morris' black and white sentence. Zerotalk 10:18, 28 October 2014 (UTC)

Having now spent more than an hour reading the minutes of the Cabinet meeting (available from the National Archives), I think that even Galnoor's description is slightly overstated. The background is a document (CAB 24/273/14 also called CP 289 (37)) from one week earlier which gives a draft "Despatch to Acting High Commissioner for Palestine" from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. That Despatch states that the policy of the British Government is to accept the Peel Commission's recommendations that "scheme of tripartite division is the best and most hopeful solution of the problem". It then states terms for a new commission to advise on the best way to implement that policy (i.e. not to investigate whether partition should or should not be carried out). In the meeting of Dec 8 referred to by Galnoor (CAB 46 (37) also called CAB 23/90A/8), various people argued for and against the wording of the Despatch. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs noted that "The Terms of Reference would not enable the Commission to hear opinions to the effect that partition was unworkable, or to say so themselves." Finally they passed a resolution to ask for a revised Despatch, details to be decided on consultation with named people. Paragraph (g) says:
 * That if it was deemed necessary to inform the Commission that it was open to them to represent that no scheme of partition that they could devise was likely to prove workable, this should be done by means of a personal communication to the Chairman.

There was absolutely no decision to reject partition at this meeting. Regarding the delay mentioned by Galnoor, there was no decision to create a delay but only a realisation that the process would take a long time. It says that the new commission would take "many months" since hydrographic and other surveys had to be completed first, and even after a plan had been recommended it would have to be brought to the Parliament and the League of Nations. Thus the resolution at (f) says
 * That a public statement should be made on an appropriate occasion pointing out the time that must elapse before partition could be enforced.

In other words, it is quite wrong to state that the Cabinet rejected partition at this meeting. They did not. Nor did they decide to ask Woodhead to bury the partition plan. Zerotalk 11:54, 28 October 2014 (UTC)


 * - The hidden Agenda (or Galnoor and Morris). Since you researched this issue further, please go ahead and modify the article accordingly.
 * - The report last chapter: The commission itself called it "CHAPTER XXII.—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION "(p. 232). Hence no one may claim that this is not the "SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION" of the whole report, even if the chapter does not mention other partition alternatives at all.
 * Sorry but you can't argue on the basis of the title in contradiction to the content. The report is badly edited, that's all.  You have to study it, not just look at titles. Since the chapter itself explicitly states it is about Plan C, it is about Plan C.  Zerotalk 01:03, 29 October 2014 (UTC)


 * I also see it as that the part speaks about Plan C. The argument that the chapter is called "CHAPTER XXII. — SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION" and therefore speaks about the whole report does not hold either. We can also look at another chapter which mentions the economic difficulty in the same way (page 210):


 * 431. These objections cannot be answered without reference to the financial situation as we have described it in chapter XVIII. In that chapter we saw that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting. In round figures, and without making any provision, for the cost of defence, the Arab State would be faced with a deficit of about £P.610,000 per annum, which would have to be made good by the United Kingdom, while the Jewish State would be in receipt of a surplus of about £P.600,000. In addition, the United Kingdom Government would be obliged, in accordance with recognized practice, to vote grants of £P.460,000 in order to enable the Government of the Mandated Territories to balance its budget.


 * That part is from "CHAPTER XIX. — CUSTOMS" on page 210. We can also look at the summary for that chapter in "CHAPTER I. — INTRODUCTORY" (page 13):


 * 15. Chapter XVIII deals with finance, and, after examining the budgetary prospects of the several areas under plan C, so far as it is possible to forecast them at present, concludes that it is not possible to recommend boundaries which will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State.


 * Zero0000 said that it is true that the report "in a few places Woodhead hints that the economic difficulties of the Arab State in Plan C would also hold for other plans". We can take a look at for example page 179 under "CHAPTER XVIII. — FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS (PART I)":


 * 376. The figures given in this chapter will show that under plan C, and indeed under any other conceivable plan of partition, the Arab State will be far from self-supporting in the strict sense, and further that the Government of the territories to be retained under Mandate will be unable to balance its budget without a very large amount of assistance from the Mandatory Power. In judging whether these deficiencies in plan C are such as to render the plan wholly impracticable, we consider ourselves entitled, for the reason given above, to some latitude in the interpretation of our terms of reference: in particular we shall think it relevant to consider to what extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and how far that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result of partition.


 * A part from page 198 to 199, which is also under "CHAPTER XVIII. — FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS (PART I)":


 * 399. If this argument is sound, and if we were right in holding, as we have done in paragraph 388, that the Jews cannot fairly be asked to come to the relief of the Arab State simply as the price of receiving sovereignty in their own state, then only one conclusion is possible. In the long run it is necessary to face boldly the question whether it is worth while for His Majesty's Government to bear the full cost, whatever it may be, of making good the deficits of both the Mandated Territories and the Arab State after partition, rather than to abandon the idea of partition as impracticable on this ground. In considering how this question should be answered, it is relevant, we think, to take into account the argument in the preceding paragraph as indicating that a part at least of the aggregate deficit represents a charge for which His Majesty's Government cannot easily escape a certain responsibility. But we do not put the case higher than this and the real issue is clearly whether an annual charge on United Kingdom funds, which may at the outset be put in the neighbourhood of £1,250,000* (apart from the cost of defence), is in itself sufficient to render plan C (and, indeed, any other conceivable plan of partition) impracticable. The answer to this question can only be given after taking into account not only the present cost of Palestine to the British taxpayer, which we have indicated above, but also the consequences, political as well as financial, of the rejection of partition. The former it is neither within our terms of reference nor within our power to estimate, and we do not feel, therefore, that we can usefully express an opinion on the question of the practicability of plan C from this aspect. But as regards the latter, we offer the following observations.


 * So I think this show they generally talk about Plan C and sometimes add that it would be the same with other plans. --IRISZOOM (talk) 18:53, 10 April 2015 (UTC)


 * - The Arab state deficit. "We are forced, therefore, to the conclusion that it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. 393. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget" (p. 196). Hence the envisaged Arab state deficit is not inherent to plan A, B, C or any other plan that separates the Arabs and the Jews.
 * - My edit was: "On November 9, 1938, it reported that "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting". It proposed "a modification of partition which, ...seems, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of settlement", if the U.K was prepared to provide a "sufficient assistance to enable the Arab State to balance its budget". This edit can't be false, since it is a direct extract of the report.
 * - The previous text was: It published its conclusions on November 9, 1938, ultimately rejecting partition as unfeasible on administrative and financial grounds., which is clearly a mistake.
 * - In my opinion, by now you should agree that my edit is correct and improves the article.
 * - Your have undone my edit, and instead provided your version, which is flawed, as seen in my notes at the beginning of this section. (Designated A,B,C, D). Ykantor (talk) 17:17, 28 October 2014 (UTC)
 * (I have very little time to reply just now.) It is true that in a few places Woodhead hints that the economic difficulties of the Arab State in Plan C would also hold for other plans, but that was not the reason given for rejecting the other plans. You can read the chapters on Plan A and Plan B to see why they were rejected. Your text tries to blame the whole failure on the Arab economy, it is highly misleading and not a correct summary of Woodhead's case. Zerotalk 01:17, 29 October 2014 (UTC)

Woodhead commission 2
These is the differences between Zero and myself:

If you do not agree with the table presentation of your views, I'll appreciate if you modify it accordingly.

Will you cooperate if I'll refer the discussion to wp:drn? Ykantor (talk) 20:26, 30 October 2014 (UTC)


 * I am on the road from tomorrow for a week and won't have time to do more than look in occasionally. I don't necessarily support the previous text and indeed it has problems.  But your "summary" was worse.  For one thing, it is essential to mention that the WC rejected the Peel plan outright and why; it wasn't economics!  The rest was hardly even within the terms of reference, as the WC report openly admits.  DRN is too drastic at the moment. Zerotalk 07:13, 1 November 2014 (UTC)


 * My edit ( The Diff page ) -replaced a mistaken text 1: "It published its conclusions on November 9, 1938, ultimately rejecting partition as unfeasible on administrative and financial grounds."- and mistaken text 2: "concluded that no plan of partition could be evolved within the terms of reference which would, in the view of the members of the Commission, offer much hope of success, for eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states"- with the correct text: "and found that "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting". It proposed "a modification of partition which, ...seems, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of settlement", if the U.K is prepared to provide a "sufficient assistance to enable the Arab State to balance its budget".- Hence my edit clearly improved the article. - As to your comment: "to mention that the WC rejected the Peel plan outright and why", please go ahead. As said previously, if in your opinion a text from the report body is sufficiently important than it could be added to the conclusions. Ykantor (talk) 17:11, 1 November 2014 (UTC)

The Arab state deficit
-An earlier quote in the same section says: "It is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget".

-At a first glance, those 2 quotes seem to contradict each other. Will it be possible for you to elaborate on this point? Ykantor (talk) 19:11, 12 April 2015 (UTC)


 * There is no contradiction. One statement says that the Arab State would not be self-supporting, and the other gives reasons why it would not be self-supporting. The same explanation is in the report itself in the Conclusions chapter (p239):
 * "One of the main arguments against partition is, we think, the fact that, under any plan of partition which is based on the inclusion in the Arab State of the fewest possible Jews and Jewish enterprises and on the creation of a Jerusalem Enclave and Corridor, the greater part of the Arab wealth of Palestine is necessarily left outside the Arab State (whether in the Jewish State or the Mandated Territories) ; that state is therefore found to be singularly lacking both in natural resources, in created assets, and in inherited wealth, and is likely to remain a very poor country." Zerotalk 01:58, 13 April 2015 (UTC)


 * - Those 2 quotes of yours, concerning the Arab wealth which is left outside the Arab state, are vague in my opinion because it leaves opened the question if this Arab  wealth would be sufficient for a balanced budget of the proposed Arab state, or it will decrease the deficit but won't balance it.
 * -The other quote "inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget", is clear. the only mean for balancing the Arab state budget is adding Jews (via inclusion of an area) and not wealthier Arabs.
 * -Generally the report is well written, so it is strange to find such an unclear sentences. Ykantor (talk) 18:05, 14 April 2015 (UTC)
 * I think it is the worst written of the major reports written during the mandate. But that's not important. You are right that the report does not try to quantify the total Arab economy but only that which would be directly relevant to an Arab state in a partition.  Any more would have been outside the terms of reference.  But we can't ignore a qualitative assessment that is reported as "one of the main arguments against partition". Zerotalk 13:27, 17 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Ykantor, I think you are misunderstanding what "would alone enable" means. It does not mean that only by adding Jews could the budget for the Arab state be balanced but that an area with "a large number of Jews" would itself be enough. As the part about "the greater part of the Arab wealth of Palestine is necessarily left outside the Arab State (whether in the Jewish State or the Mandated Territories)" tells and Zero0000's addition based on how John Woodhead summarised it, in addition to the Jews paying "much higher per capita" in taxes, "the greater part of the Arab wealth lay in the places that would become part of the Jewish state due to their large Jewish populations".


 * So the Arab state may have been self-supporting with most of the wealth included instead of excluded but that state would also have a large number of Jews (any partition plan was to have so few Jews as possible in an Arab state and vice versa). As those part had a large number of Jews, it was suggested that they would became part of the Jewish state, and as the quote above shows that would include "the greater part of the Arab wealth". --IRISZOOM (talk) 17:02, 17 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Ykantor, it's time to give up trying to push a viewpoint that is not supported by the sources. "The distribution of the citrus land under Plan C illustrates this point. The Arabs and the Jews possess almost an equal area of land under citrus. The Arabs own 143,000 dunums, but of those only 41,000 dunums are in the Arab State; the position is practically the same under Plans A, B, and C." Woodhead also emphases the lack of "natural resources" in any Arab State, which is nothing directly to do with Jews. Reid summarized it like this: "Under the scheme a small part of Palestine would be set aside for the Jewish State ; but it is the richest Arab and Jewish part, the area most favoured by nature, by reason of its fertile soil, good rainfall and abundant underground water resources. Land planted with citrus in bearing is most valuable being worth several hundred pounds per acre."  The report in several places stresses the economic value of the Galilee, but none of the plans put it in the Arab state. Concerning Plan A: "The lands which they would be called upon to leave-the Maritime Plain, the plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan, the Huleh Basin and the hill country of Galilee-constitute the most fertile and best watered parts of Palestine."  The economic value of Haifa to Arabs is also mentioned, but it wasn't in the Arab state in any of the plans. Statements like this are throughout the report; you should read it again with an open mind. This aspect of the situation has only two sentences in our article (so far) and it is not fine for you to try to minimize it even further. Zerotalk 09:09, 18 April 2015 (UTC)


 * I don't know why Ykantor again inserted the part "that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting". It as you say already in the previous paragraph and is explained better there. This part that was added back in October is still at nine other articles that gives a misleading view of the conclusions, like it was before too in other articles before it was removed or changed. So a better summary is needed there. A suggestion on how to phrase it could be discussed here. --IRISZOOM (talk) 16:09, 18 April 2015 (UTC)


 * The third paragraph at Woodhead Commission also needs to be expanded to match the Conclusions section. --IRISZOOM (talk) 16:07, 18 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Perhaps Zero0000's wording at Timeline of intercommunal violence in Mandatory Palestine could be used. --IRISZOOM (talk) 22:47, 30 April 2015 (UTC)


 * - As suggested, I " read it again with an open mind" and found that it is a pity that user:IRISZOOM has not apparently read the Woodhead report before falsely describing my edit as misleading. My edit (""that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting"") is nearly word to word as the source says, so it can't be misleading. Moreover, this text is somehow a mild version of the reports text, that even for unpartitioned Palestine:
 * -"the future for the Arab population is already menacing—unless Jewish immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue. "
 * -" It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this result, which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue contributed by the Jews".
 * - "The Arabs would be no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital."
 * - "there would be much to be said for a pause or standstill of several years during which no further acquisition by the Jews of agricultural land whatever …would be permitted outside the Jewish State. This standstill would give time for the present bitterness of feeling between the two races to die down…But if there is to be no assurance of further Jewish agricultural settlement beyond what can be done on the land which the Jews already possess, it cannot be expected that His Majesty's Government will be willing to spend the United Kingdom taxpayer's money on the development of the land for the sole benefit of the Arabs ; the Jews obviously will not do s o ; and it is quite certain that the revenues of the Mandated Territory alone will not be adequate for the purpose."


 * - Zero proves that the wealthier part of the Arab states lied within the Jewish state in any partition plan that stuck to the term of reference. But the question is whether this Arab wealth was a rich source of taxes.
 * -The commission reports that "Of the total Arab cultivable land about 2*4 per cent, consists of citrus and banana plantations". which is a surprisingly low percentage(?), and may indicate that it is not a sufficiently rich source of taxes.
 * -Please note that major contributor to taxes money was surprisingly a customs tax. A major contribution to this tax were the import of the new immigrants and equipments for investments. (BTW the government income was reduced significantly during the rebellion period 1936-1939 because of the reduction of immigration, caused by the government.)
 * - Before reading this article and report, my knowledge of the partition's financial aspects was rather limited. I was surprised to find out how important were the financial aspects. It seems that the expected deficit of the proposed Arab state was sufficiently important for the U.K to retreat from the partition proposal. (Although according to the sources they had other reasons). Ykantor (talk) 08:42, 1 May 2015 (UTC)


 * It is out of my mind how you can keep say I have "falsely accused" you of adding something misleading (which Zero0000 also said about your addition). Just because the quote you took is copied from the article, it does not mean it can't be misleading because the misleading part was that the quote did not match the claim you added, not that the quote itself was tangled. I actually thought about it during the night when I read much of a very long report on the Syrian refugees impact on the Jordanian labour market. They told how many were unemployment for example. If I had added it on an article here and not told that the data given is just for refugees from a certain area and in a certain area (mostly rural Syrians in northern Jordan), that would be misleading even if the quote or data itself matches what the source says.


 * You have been told what the "terms of reference" referred to and what John Woodhead himself thought was the reason a partition would not work. You have not addressed that but as usual you focus on addding certain quotes. --IRISZOOM (talk) 11:45, 1 May 2015 (UTC)


 * - It is out of my mind how you can keep claiming "misleading" without apparently reading the Woodhead report. Will you please read it, and especially the pages around my fresh quotes: 27 29 30 127 246 . You will see for yourself that even for the unpartitioned Palestine, the Arabs tax contribution was very low relatively to the services they received (e.g. education, health etc.). for instance:


 * -(p. 27) "''As the result of the abnormally high birth-rate and the relatively low death-rate, the natural increase of the Arab population is abnormally high… We thus have the Arab population reflecting simultaneously two widely different tendencies—a birth-rate characteristic of a peasant community in which the unrestricted family is normal, and a death-rate which could only be brought about under an enlightened modern administration, with both the will and the necessary funds at its disposal to enable it to serve a population unable to help itself. It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this result, which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue contributed by the Jews….
 * -(p. 28) If a population, which did not control births, had increased to the point where there was only just enough food to keep the members alive, it would show high birth- and death rates running parallel. For, even if death from disease was controlled* deaths would take place from lack of foo d/'f On the other hand, it seems certain that the amount of land now under cultivation, by present methods and on present standards, is insufficient to support the same percentage of the total Arab population to-day as in 1922… If a population, which did not control births, had increased to the point where there was only just enough food to keep the members alive, it would show high birth- and death rates running parallel. For, even if death from disease was controlled* deaths would take place from lack of foo d/'f On the other hand, it seems certain that the amount of land now under cultivation, by present methods and on present standards, is insufficient to support the same percentage of the total Arab population to-day as in 1922….
 * -(p. 29) If this argument is sound, then, subject to two qualifications, to be mentioned below, three conclusions follow, (i) First, that if the sources of present supplementary employment are cut off, even partially, the consequences for the Arabs affected will be serious, (ii) Secondly, that if the Arab rural population continues to increase at its present rate, the demand for such supplementary employment, and even tbe pressure to leave the land and seek for whole-time…
 * -(p. 30) employment in the towns, will be intensified—quite apart from any further acquisition of land by the Jews, (iii) And thirdly, that since such employment can only be provided by capital, and, with few exceptions, capital is only likely to be invested in Palestine by Jews, the future for the Arab population is already menacing—unless Jewish immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue….Professor Carr-Saunders, speaking of the same problem in India, says: “ Family limitation is the only way of escape."… The Arabs would be no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital….
 * -(p. 31) that, if Jewish immigration were to be completely closed down in Palestine, His Majesty's Government would be willing to provide funds from the British taxpayer's pocket for the sake of enabling a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine. So far as concerns non-agricultural settlement, it would seem that economic conditions in Palestine are by now so closely bound up with Jewish immigration, both actual and prospective, that the Arabs in Palestine would be faced with the prospect of greater economic hardship if Jewish immigration should be completely closed down, than they would be even if it should be allowed to continue…."'' (to be continued) Ykantor (talk) 15:01, 1 May 2015 (UTC)


 * - Let us have a look at the table in page 188. The table compares revenue and expenditure among the 3 proposed territories: Arab, Jewish and Mandated. Let us use numbers in order to check Zero's claim that the Arabs in the Jewish state are a rich source of taxes, that otherwise they could balance the Arab states budget. So hypothetically, let us redraw the borders between the Arab and Jewish states in such a way that all the Arabs in the Jewish state may belong to the Arab state. The revenues of these  55400 Arabs is paid to the Arab state. Assuming optimistically that their revenue per head are in the higher figure of the Jewish state of 5.27 £ per head, it means that the Arab state revenue may be increased by 55400 X 5.27£=~ 292000£ . the Arab state revenue may be increased  510000£ + 292000£ = 802000£, which is still below the 1064000£ expenditure. Moreover, this expanded Arab state expenditure  should be increased as well with those extra  54400 Arab people. So the deficit grows somehow again. In my opinion, this calculation, together with the fresh quotes of today, proves that the Arab state could not balance its budget, even if it include all the Arab people from the Jewish state. Ykantor (talk) 15:35, 1 May 2015 (UTC)


 * I repeat what has already been said several times: the commission did bring up that the financial difficulties would be there in other plans than Plan C too but that was not the reason they were rejected. What you did was to add a part about Plan C and make it look like being the truth for all of the plans.


 * The part about Jews paying much higher tax per capita than Arabs have been mentioned as one of the two reasons John Woodhead thought an Arab state would not be financially feasible. So when you say "Zero proves that the wealthier part of the Arab states lied within the Jewish state in any partition plan that stuck to the term of reference. But the question is whether this Arab wealth was a rich source of taxes" and "Let us use numbers in order to check Zero's claim that the Arabs in the Jewish state are a rich source of taxes, that otherwise they could balance the Arab states budget", it is not a correct description of what has been said. --IRISZOOM (talk) 00:20, 2 May 2015 (UTC)
 * The Woodhead report does not provide enough information to assess the Arab economy in the imaginary event that all the Jews disappeared. And even if it did, since Woodhead never considers the question it would be original research on our part to try to compile the information ourselves. It isn't even clear what it would mean (how would you treat a Jewish-owned business whose employees were mostly Arabs? This was a very common situation.) What is clear is that even Woodhead's most general statements about the economic viability of an Arab state refer only to plausible states that didn't cross his red lines, one of which is that it would not include any places with substantial Jewish population. Zerotalk 04:40, 2 May 2015 (UTC)
 * As you say, the massive quotation spam carried out by Ykantor in multiple articles remains mostly uncorrected. The implication that Woodhead rejected the Peel plan on economic grounds is a serious distortion, and the quotation that is actually about Plan C must not be presented as if it refers to all plans. Zerotalk 05:09, 2 May 2015 (UTC)
 * - Thank you for your fine compliment: "the massive quotation spam carried out by Ykantor" . Doesn't suit you as civilized person.
 * - The situation here is clear. I will appreciate it if you agree for a wp:drn about adding this text to the article: "On November 9, 1938, it reported that "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting"
 * - this text is based on the report quote: "It is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget". (p. 246)
 * - Your's supposedly contradicting quote is:""One of the main arguments against partition is, we think, the fact that, under any plan of partition which is based on the inclusion in the Arab State of the fewest possible Jews and Jewish enterprises and on the creation of a Jerusalem Enclave and Corridor, the greater part of the Arab wealth of Palestine is necessarily left outside the Arab State (whether in the Jewish State or the Mandated Territories) ; that state is therefore found to be singularly lacking both in natural resources, in created assets, and in inherited wealth, and is likely to remain a very poor country."(p. 239) The meaning is that together with this Arab wealth the Arab state will be in a better shape (e.g. a smaller deficit), but not necessarily a self supporting state. Hence it is not contradicting, and the "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting" should not be deleted from the article. Ykantor (talk) 09:22, 2 May 2015 (UTC)


 * I'm not interested in discussing this further. You failed to establish your case and I don't share your obsession with it. Read what I have written on this page already, it answers you completely. Zerotalk 10:01, 2 May 2015 (UTC)


 * -It is a pity that you are not prepared to cooperate in wp:drn, and this is not the first time. Let me remind you that you objected fiercely to the sentence "The Arabs rejected any kind of partition" (1947) and eventually, in a wp:drn (not with you) the result was very close to this sentence. So, you are not immune and you are making mistakes. In my opinion, opposing this text: "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting" is another mistake of yours.
 * - Your question mark: "how would you treat a Jewish-owned business whose employees were mostly Arabs?", is simply not relevant. As said, the major government was custom duties (see table at page 183), and probably they did not have an income tax. What matters is how much import one consumed/ invested and not the salary or the ethnic identity of the employer or employees. The Jews bought/ consumed more imports than the Arabs, so they produced much more government revenue. But without Jewish immigration , the tax paid by the Jews would have been reduced a lot. Ykantor (talk) 18:53, 3 May 2015 (UTC)


 * I totally agree. It is disturbing to see how much Ykantor keeps pushing for this, including now saying the quote should be restored.


 * I saw you removed the quotes from some articles but the misleading summaries are still there so this has to be corrected to, either by adding the summary you added to Timeline of intercommunal violence in Mandatory Palestine or the one you added to Peel Commission. Both are fine so I can add one of them soon. --IRISZOOM (talk) 15:23, 2 May 2015 (UTC)
 * Not only has Ykantor put the sentence: "it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting" into *this* article, the exact same sentence also occur in: Yishuv, White Paper of 1939, 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine, London Conference (1939), Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine, History of Israel ...aaaaaaand History of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Ykantor: you are way, way over the line here. Huldra (talk) 21:45, 2 May 2015 (UTC)


 * Yess. It was in many more articles before and now are still uncorrected on those articles you link. --IRISZOOM (talk) 21:58, 2 May 2015 (UTC)


 * I have removed them now and replaced it with the summary Zero0000 wrote at Peel Commission. The former was a real mess that had been there for more than a half year, giving a misleading view for a long time. --IRISZOOM (talk) 22:30, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

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 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20131103061306/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4941922311B4E3C585256D17004BD2E2 to https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4941922311B4E3C585256D17004BD2E2

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Cheers.— InternetArchiveBot  (Report bug) 02:38, 27 December 2017 (UTC)