Talk:World War I/Archive 16

war crimes should at least be mentioned in the lead
War crimes have an entire section in this article. As such, the lead should at least mention that war crimes were committed by a number of nations. The WW II article, for example, mentions the Holocaust in the lead.OnBeyondZebrax (talk) 00:21, 15 October 2014 (UTC)
 * World War II does not mention war crimes in the lead; it singles them out by individual events, but it doesn't specifically mention it directly as a whole by all sides. In the case of World War II, that includes war crimes commited by Italians, Soviets, and Allies, as well as the Japanese. Supersaiyen312 (talk) 01:11, 15 October 2014 (UTC)
 * The manual for leads, MOS:LEAD, says the lead should summarize the article and cover "prominent controversies." The war crimes in WW I involved some very prominent controversies, such as the genocide of Armenians. The WW I article is not compelled to follow the other WW article. I have pointed out that the Algerian War article mentions war crimes in the lead. I don't see why such a short sentence ("War crimes were committed by a number of participating nations.") cannot be placed in the lead.OnBeyondZebrax (talk) 17:48, 15 October 2014 (UTC)


 * If important enough to mention war crimes, then they ought to be summarized to at least give context so that the reader knows if we are talking about attacks on civilians by soldiers or crimes committed on soldiers by other soldiers. "War crimes were committed by a number of participating nations" will leave a reader either saying "so?", or "so what?"GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:29, 15 October 2014 (UTC)
 * yes indeed, so what? I suggest only the Belgium and Armenian cases are important enough for the lede. Rjensen (talk) 19:47, 15 October 2014 (UTC)
 * I will add the Belgium and Armenian cases to the ledeOnBeyondZebrax (talk) 20:38, 15 October 2014 (UTC)

There is an RfC underway at Vietnam War: Should the lead state "War crimes were committed by both sides"? Please comment there. Alsee (talk) 18:08, 23 October 2014 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 29 November 2014
Please remove the word that appears after 1907

24.14.13.13 (talk) 04:04, 29 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format. — &#123;&#123;U&#124;Technical 13&#125;&#125; (e • t • c) 04:11, 29 November 2014 (UTC)

War Crimes
The section on war crimes needs expansion. As it reads now, only the atrocities of the Central Powers and post-revolutionary Russia are considered such. NPOV, people. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 4.35.14.90 (talk) 19:14, 1 December 2014 (UTC)

Last-minute countermand failed?
I heard Lloyd Jeff Dumas mention on the radio that an order countermanding the German invasion of Luxembourg arrived half an hour too late. I assume he documents this in his book. If this were corroborated, it might be interesting to add to the article or to Western Front (World War I). -- Beland (talk) 03:03, 20 January 2015 (UTC)

grammar editations
I would like to change some mistakes or badly written sentences, not to do anything with the informational content.

❌ This is not the right page to request additional user rights. If you want to suggest a change, please request this in the form "Please replace XXX with YYY" or "Please add ZZZ between PPP and QQQ". Please also cite reliable sources to back up your request. - Arjayay (talk) 17:18, 16 February 2015 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 23 April 2015
centerd in euorope

70.15.190.160 (talk) 21:11, 23 April 2015 (UTC)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format. --I am  k6ka  Talk to me!   See what I have done  21:19, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

Fall of the Romanovs?
Maybe it's in there and I'm just not seeing it, but it looks like the fall of the Romanovs/collapse of the Russian Empire actually gets more words devoted to it in the lead than it does in the body. It seems fairly important. Russia gets out and the US doesn't come in and you can call it a day. Everybody go home; Germany wins. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:34, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Never mind. The section is obvious. I just started reading in a previous section and got to 1918 and didn't realize the article was divided up by front and didn't run chronologically. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:47, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

No other war had changed the map of Europe so dramatically.
Is this not a complete statement of opinion? Napoleon?Timothyjosephwood (talk) 15:05, 25 April 2015 (UTC) (apparently I didn't sign)
 * It is a common observation by historians. Note that many Napoleons changes were undone in 1814-15. World War I radically changed the map of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa and made some difference in the Pacific as well. Rjensen (talk) 07:08, 25 April 2015 (UTC)
 * It's a cliche so it should go. The war changed a lot of people into dead people, which is more significant than piffling details germane to ponces in parliaments and chancelleries.Keith-264 (talk) 09:59, 25 April 2015 (UTC)
 * I agree on that it should go - it sounds a bit un-encyclopedic. - Anonimski (talk) 15:08, 25 April 2015 (UTC)
 * I concur. It is subjective, and factually unsubstantiated. Mediatech492 (talk) 20:18, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

How about "The First World War dramatically changed the map of Europe and much of the world." Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:12, 25 April 2015 (UTC)
 * Sounds okay. - Anonimski (talk) 08:04, 26 April 2015 (UTC)
 * The sentence no longer says anything -- So let's leave it out. Rjensen (talk) 08:15, 26 April 2015 (UTC)
 * It is just padding. A sentence which actually says nothing. A tired cliche. Support complete removal. Irondome (talk) 12:22, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Weapons of mass destruction
Hello group, instead of edit warring lets discuss WMD in the FWW here on the talk page. I submit that the use of chemical weapons and the use of large tunnel-mines were the first use of WMD in warfare. I am open to further discussion and improvement. Thank you IQ125 (talk) 11:16, 24 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Tunnel mines were the largest human-made explosions until the invention of the nuclear weapon, which caused indiscriminate large-scale death and destruction. One example is the Mines in the Battle of Messines (1917). The explosion is considered a WMD, see Freemantle, Michael. Chemists' War: 1914-1918 Ref 2. Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014..  I submit that the machine gun a relatively new and powerful weapon was a WMD Ref#1, Ref 2.
 * 1) I dont think the term should be used since it is an anachronism for the period.
 * 2) Pretty much the definition of the term is "A chemical, biological or radioactive weapon capable of causing widespread death and destruction." - OED.
 * 3) I would like to see some peer reviewed professional RS that state the machine gun was a WMD, rather than two unsourced internet articles. Likewise, for the submarine. The links used to support tunnel mines do not use the phrase, and the links are of dubious quality. Should it also be highlighted that aerial bombardment is a method, not a weapon.
 * At the moment, i would be in support of deleting the entire section.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:37, 24 April 2015 (UTC)
 * Hello EnigmaMcmxc, thanks for using the talk page to discuss. Different dictionaries have different definitions for WMD.  The American Heritage Dictionary states: A weapon that can cause widespread destruction or kill large numbers of people, especially a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.  In other words, it does not have to be nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC).  For example, the terrorist for the Boston Marathon bombings was charged under United States law 18 U.S.C. 2332A for using a weapon of mass destruction and that was a pressure cooker bomb.  The weapon caused large-scale death and destruction, without being an NBC weapon.  IQ125 (talk) 16:35, 24 April 2015 (UTC)
 * Scrolling through GoogleBooks and JSTOR, the definition of the term is clearly set within the boundaries of NBCs and branches off to cover modern terrorism. Your retort is to further define the term in a modern setting, which does not address my first point. Furthermore, any thoughts on my third point?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:12, 24 April 2015 (UTC)


 * The article should be restored...horrible sources for the claims. That said sources can be found I will let others think of the wording here. Its a hard one as UN convention did not have this term till 1948. That said no need for its own section ..perhaps a passing mention in the section on technologies. We have a problem.. we have a clear definition ....but also have prospective look back on the origins of WMD's. Again will let others work this out but do believe the current sourcing is not antiquate. -- Moxy (talk) 19:44, 24 April 2015 (UTC)


 * The machine gun is not a WMD. There is a difference between a weapon of mass destruction and a weapon of destruction used on a massive scale. A single chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapon causes mass casualties. It took (tens of?) thousands of Maxims and Vickers to achieve similar results. A submarine isn't even a weapon; it's a weapons delivery system.


 * Having said that, the use of chemical weapons in WW1 was an important first and deserves extensive coverage. (edit) Also the machine gun was revolutionary as was advancement in artillery. This deserves to be mentioned, but without muddling the discussion of CBRN vs conventional weapons. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:02, 24 April 2015 (UTC)
 * 1) the WMD Term originates in 1937 regarding the aerial bombardment of civilians in the Spanish Civil War, and is rarely applied to World War I. So that's a stretch that requires extensive coverage in the reliable sources. 2) the main cite is to a short book review of a Higher Form Of Killing: Six Weeks in World War I that Forever Changed the Nature of Warfare by Diana Preston, a popular historian whose last book was on the Taj Mahal. Her book was published two months ago and has not been evaluated by scholars. It deals with poison gas, submarines and aerial bombardment. Her key point is their usage against civilians. 3) As for machine guns and mines, they had been in use for many decades. The Gatling gun was  patented in 1861 and machine guns had seen extensive use in many armies before 1914. No one calls them WMD. On mines, see Battle of the Crater for the use of mines on a large scale by Ulysses Grant against Lee in 1864. No one calls them WMD. 4) In WWI most of the casualties were caused by artillery, not these other weapons, and that key factor gets left out.  No one calls them WMD. 5) Stretching WMD to include all sorts of other weapons goes far beyond the reliable sources and is unacceptable in this article.  Rjensen (talk) 20:05, 24 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Mines were huge. Especially at third Ypres as mentioned above. But I agree, they are not consistent with the post-WW2 usage of a WMD. Third Ypres is only mentionable in the instance of it's mines because it was the largest conventional weapons explosion in history. And again, Messines wasn't a single giant mine; it was lots and lots of mines detonated in a short period. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:22, 24 April 2015 (UTC)
 * Largest? I think that goes to the Halifax explosion, doesn't it?LeadSongDog come howl!  05:02, 26 April 2015 (UTC)
 * Actually, you seem to have stumbled into an important contradiction between articles. Halifax explosion does claim to be the largest. However, Largest artificial non-nuclear explosions actually lists it third. Mines in the Battle of Messines (1917) lists mines whose combined weight in explosives seems to put it at the top of the list, depending on how it stacks up to tnt. Largest artificial non-nuclear explosions gives it a hat tip, but has no cumulative measure of tnt equivalent and does not include it at all in it's list of largest explosions by yield. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 14:44, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
 * There is no contradiction, the Halifax explosion articles says it was "the largest man-made explosion prior to the development of nuclear weapons"; which is quite accurate. There have been larger explosions since then, both nuclear and conventional; but up until that point it was the big one. Note also the tonnage number for the Messines mines is a combined total, and this total was divided into twenty-odd separate charges. Separately none of the mines comes into the top ten of conventional explosions. Mediatech492 (talk) 15:54, 28 April 2015 (UTC)
 * The wording on Halifax is misleading though. It led both of us to think that it was the largest convention explosion. If you are not comparing it to nuclear weapons then the development of nuclear weapons is completely arbitrary. I have addressed this in the Halifax talk page. We'll see what they say.Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:16, 28 April 2015 (UTC)
 * ♠The term is anachronistic & a bad choice. Citing modern law for what is, or is not, a "WMD" is nonsense; the DoJ considers a brick of C4 a WMD in law. Or a hand grenade. (So far, an M16 or AK-47 hasn't been rerated, but given the desires of the gun-ban crowd, I expect that any day now.)
 * ♠That said, mines (or saps; I've never heard them called "tunnel mines") don't qualify, since AFAIK they were incapable of genuinely mass or indiscriminate killing. Neither, AFAIK, were WW1 CW agents used in such a way as to meet a modern (hence anachronistic by default) definition of WMD.
 * ♠In short, cut it all.
 * ♠And if you are seriously contemplating listing a submarine as a WMD, you're going to need to list every battleship & artillery piece, too. Let's not be ridiculous, shall we?  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  20:50, 24 April 2015 (UTC)


 * I don't have a source at hand, but the Germans released literally hundreds of tons of gas during the First World War. It is small scale in comparison with the current ability of the US to kill every person on earth a dozen times over, but that's kindof an unrealistic standard to hold the armies of 100 years ago to. I believe Ypres (first or second) was the largest use, but I may be wrong on that. A section on WMDs that only includes gas (nothing else had been invented) would be correct, but why not just call it a section on gas, because that's all you'll have in there. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:39, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I agree with the previously mentioned concerns about a too wide definition of WMD. Mentioning so many different things as such would be WP:SYNTH, since they're not commonly included in that context. And as Trekphiler mentioned, laws aren't of much use here - they are country-specific and can be changed from year to year. - Anonimski (talk) 22:06, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

One caveat about the "anachronism" argument. The concept is being misapplied. Some things exist for decades or even centuries before a retronym is coined for them. Racism existed long before the word "racism" was coined. That doesn't mean you can't accurately talk about racism that existed 7 centuries ago. You can. For example, Europeans hating Moors or Roma or believing that people from the East Indies or sub-Saharan Africa were subhuman undoubtedly existed at that time. Similarly, you can be assured that many people in AD 1000 were sexist (believed that men were inherently smarter and better than women), even though that word and even a frame of reference for coining it didn't exist yet. — ¾-10 22:29, 24 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Yes, but there are many reliable sources that discuss racism and sexism in history. Are there reliable sources that classify a random assortment of devices used in WW I as WMDs?  I suspect there aren't, and that's a WP:SYNTH violation.  The concept of anachronism isn't being misapplied here. Wikipedia does not get to define the terminology it uses to discuss historical events about which there is extensive research and writing, much of it done in recent years.  Individual editors are not permitted to pick and choose among varying dictionary definitions to decide what terminology they want to use.  Just follow the sources.   Quale (talk) 22:58, 24 April 2015 (UTC)
 * to follow up on Quale's good point. The WMD concept is over 75 years old, & has been very widely discussed since Hiroshima. Scholars and experts have had two generations to apply it to WWI and they have not done so --until Wikipedia did it a day ago on the basis of a brand-new book by a popular writer (Preston) that no one here has actually read. The WWI article already covers poison gas, submarines, and aerial bombardment. The WMD section is poorly handled, poorly sourced, synthetic and superfluous. Rjensen (talk) 23:48, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

On the bright side, the Higher Form of Killing book sounds like a great read. I mean, thanks for the recommendation I guess. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:02, 25 April 2015 (UTC)
 * I entirely agree, discussing the past in modern terms is acceptable. The problem is when we try applying modern definitions to things that don't fit the modern conception. I would, thus, object to any WW1 CW being classed a WMD. (A modern lethal gas, less so--& even then, I think "WMD" gets thrown around for political reasons having damn all to do with the actual "mass destruction".) Is the Tallboy a WMD? Is the Lanc? Is the Gatling gun? Let's be very, very careful about that slippery slope, shall we? Or we are a step from calling Remington 700s or Mossberg 500s "assault weapons". That's not something WP should be stooping to.  TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  21:05, 26 April 2015 (UTC)


 * If I make a blatant appeal to authority, I've served in a CBRN unit (chemical biological radiological nuclear, pronounced see-burn). WMD is not a military term; CBRN is. The classification is based, from a tactical perspective, on the response measures, not necessarily on the number of casualties. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:21, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Prisoners of war
The first paragraph in this section is...bad. It's just a jumbled mess of statistics smashed into your face. It's so bad that I hesitate to unilaterally try to solve the problem. Anyone have any ideas. There's so many stats that it's hardly prose. Could we do this better as a table or a bulleted list? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 23:22, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

Lack of Maps
Unlike the articles about the Western Front, the Eastern Front, Serbian Campaign, Italian Front, and Ottoman Front has a distinct lack of maps. It shows the territorial advances and losses of the West, but in the Eastern campaign, there are no maps showing the Russian advances to Konigsberg and the successful battle of Pzemisil, which resulted in Galicia being lost to Russia until 1915-1916. I, myself, do not know how far the Germans advanced in the East. When I read other sources, I read that they made it as far as Kiev and others say that the Brest-Litovsk line was the farthest advance. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Crazy soviet (talk • contribs) 21:15, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

"mostly centred"
Look at it this way. If you're saying something is mostly centred in Europe, that's the same as saying it was centred in Europe. What extra information are you actually adding? Where else was WW2 "centred"? Yes, I know conflict took place elsewhere, but were those the conflict's centres?

"Predominantly" is no better - the problem is the verb "centre".

I suspect the information you really want here is that it mostly took place in Europe, or something like that. Popcornduff (talk) 19:56, 18 May 2015 (UTC)


 * Moved here from my Talk page.

I really haven't got time for this. Suggest you improve the article. Edith Waring (talk) 21:53, 18 May 2015 (UTC)
 * You're not living up to your name. Popcornduff (talk) 22:26, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

War Crimes: Chemical Weapons
Do we have a source that states the use of such weapons, at the time, constituted a war crime?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:54, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
 * I suppose it depends on how literally you want to read the Hague Convention. It outlawed the use of projectiles to deliver gas. Germany got around the loophole by simply opening the lids on thousands of containers when their enemy was down wind. "Sorry ref. Bad call. The Hague didn't say anything about just letting it float over. It's really the wind's fault when you look at it." Timothyjosephwood (talk) 02:19, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * With the widespread use of such weapons, by both sides, surely there is a source that discusses the legality and if their use constituted a war crime, otherwise the article just points out that it breached the treaty leaving the section open to attack on a OR front (as have you pointed out both sides appear to have utilized in loopholes in the treaties).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:42, 20 May 2015 (UTC)
 * The article on the Hague Convention uses this citation:
 * From page 4: "However, the use of poison gas was much less defensible [as a war crime compared with submarine warfare and aerial bombardment], as the Hague Convention on land warfare explicitly forbade the use of 'poison or poisoned arms.' But even here, questions might be raised under the Hague Convention on "asphyxiating or deleterious gases,' which was limited to their diffusion by the 'use of projectiles.'"
 * So it looks like Germany skates around "deleterious gasses", but failed to account for the prohibition against "poisoned arms". Timothyjosephwood (talk) 22:20, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

Too long?
Tpbradbury added a too long template to the page stating "too long, 20,000 words readable prose". Opinions? WWII is over 26k words. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 11:51, 29 May 2015 (UTC)


 * This has been brought up before. Considering the massive scale of the subject being covered in this article the length is not unreasonable. Mediatech492 (talk) 13:53, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * The article is not too long. WWI was one of the two or three largest and most complex events in world history. And is perhaps the single most studied, with tens of thousands of scholarly books and articles and hundreds of thousands of popular publications. It's amazing it got condensed to such brief format. Rjensen (talk) 17:01, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * agree with Rjensen
 * Gravuritas (talk) 16:26, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Looks like there is general agreement then. I'm going to remove the tag and if Tpbradbury wants to come to the talk and discuss specifics we can give it a go. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:35, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * The article could use a trim...410th biggest article here...but this trim would just be of fluff...that has creped in and is a bit misleading. For example in the "Conscription section" it mentions Canada's problem alot..then goes on to list numbers that are not related to conscription. The fact is Canadian Conscription did not impact the war to a great extent....thus only need a passing mention in one sentence in my opinion (As a Canadian) . There are other examples that I am sure  Rjensen could point out. -- Moxy (talk) 17:08, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Moxy has a very good suggestion. I revised the section on conscription, put it in the context of the Anglo-Saxon world, and added fresh citations. Rjensen (talk) 17:29, 1 June 2015 (UTC)
 * I'm not against a bit of a rework. As can be seen above, I myself was quite confused when I first came here and didn't realize the article didn't follow a chronological order. WWII seems much more intuitive. Also some of the content here could possibly be spun off into other articles. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:44, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

Conflicting info
This article says, " More than 9 million combatants and 7 million civilians died as a result of the war..." but another wiki article for WWI says "over 17 million deaths and 20 million wounded, ranking it among the deadliest conflicts in human history." Could someone reconcile the numbers please? e.g. 9 million combatants; over 17 million deaths and 20 million wounded...doesn't add up. If it does add up, it's confusing the way it's written (since it specifies one as "civilians", then combatants should be soldiers). Combatants plus civilians is 16 mil (9+7) in one article, but the other article says over 17 million.

Lifesnadir (talk) 04:59, 26 June 2015 (UTC)LifesnadirLifesnadir (talk) 04:59, 26 June 2015 (UTC)


 * The numbers are perfectly compatible with one another. "More than 9" could be 9.6, and 'more than 7' could be 7.6.  9.6+7.6= 17.2, which is 'over 17'.  There's no problem, and I don't see how this is confusing.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 06:48, 26 June 2015 (UTC)

Map inconsistency
In the map Military alliances leading to World War I, Italy is shown as one of the Central Powers, but in the list of Belligerents it is shown as an ally of Britain, France, etc.TCLongChplHl (talk) 20:19, 25 July 2015 (UTC)

edit needed: 1899 boys
In the Italian participation section is the following text: "the Italian Government called to arms the so-called '99 Boys (Ragazzi del '99): that is, all males born on 1899 and after, and so were 18 years old or older." This doesn't make sense; it should probably read 'in 1899 or before'. 69.166.47.99 (talk) 18:51, 7 October 2015 (UTC)

Cartoon "The Deserter" by Boardman Robinson
The cartoon The Deserter by Boardman Robinson is immediately reminiscent of The Third of May 1808 by Francisco Goya. Should this be mentioned in the caption or image description (obtained by clicking on the image)? I thought it would be best to ask here rather than one of the other pages that uses the image. Readers familiar with Goya's painting will almost certainly notice the resemblance, while the similarity might be interesting to other readers. The perspective, the angle of the wall, the position of the guns, and the general positioning and stance of the soldiers is almost exactly the same. The soldier in the foreground has a saber in both paintings as well, and a church is visible in the background. The only difference is that "The Deserter" shows Jesus (whose hands are not raised) as the target, while in Goya's painting the target is a group of civilians with one man in particular standing out, with his hands raised. It may also be notable that some observers note Christian symbolism in Goya's work; the central figure even appears to have a stigma in his hand. Roches (talk) 12:49, 10 October 2015 (UTC)
 * It seems a bit off-topic for the article. If there was an article about the cartoon itself, and the observation of a connection with "The Third of May 1808" was put there, with a source, then yes. ( Hohum @ ) 13:43, 10 October 2015 (UTC)

Amiens 1918 not the turning point.
The offensive of August 8th is widely described as the turning point, "black day," defeat from which the Germans never recovered, etc., but a considerable (and verifiable) body of opinion holds that Soissons, July 18th - 26th deserves those titles. It was planned while the last German offensive was still under way, and was launched when that ran out of steam. It is sometimes seen, therefore, as a counter-attack, but it was, in chronological terms, the first of the successful Allied attacks of 1918 that culminated in Germany's defeat. It's often said that there were no German offensives after Amiens, but that applies to Soissons. Amongst those who described it, either at the time or subsequently, as the "turning point" were Haig, Foch, Pershing, and von Hertling, the German Chancellor. Soissons was a mostly French operation (with American participation), and is a little-reported event, even in French histories, but it is significant for the use by the French of about 478 tanks, including 255 Renault FTs, so it was not a side show. It certainly deserves some mention here. Unfortunately, the Wikipedia article claiming to be about this battle is utter nonsense, and therefore no use as a link. Hengistmate (talk) 13:48, 16 October 2015 (UTC)

Map showing Italy as part of the Central Powers is wrong
Italy was on the side of France and England (WWI) not so during (WWII) - the map showing Italy with the central powers is wrong. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 23.117.215.67 (talk) 17:27, 23 October 2015 (UTC)
 * You will notice it indicates national alignments prior to 1914. In 1914 Italy was still formally part of the Triple Alliance. As you obviously are aware, Italy switched allegiance only in 1915, and had expressed the view in 1914 that the terms of the Triple Alliance had not been invoked because it was itself acting as the aggressor. The map is therefore technically correct. Irondome (talk) 17:36, 23 October 2015 (UTC)

Library guides section
There is a library guides section at the very end of this article. How do people feel about replacing it with the Library Resources template, which is more complete and point readers to local resources first? TeriEmbrey (talk) 15:41, 4 December 2015 (UTC)

Contradictions in Gas Casualties
Hi there,

In the section "Ground Warfare" under "Technology," the article states that  Few war casualties were caused by gas,[242] as effective countermeasures to gas attacks were quickly created, such as gas masks. However, the "Chemical weapons in warfare" under "War crimes" states that chemical weapons caused 1.3 million casualties, which I wouldn't call "few," and if accurate constitutes almost 10% of deaths in the war.

Just thought I'd point this out as it paints two completely different pictures.

AnyyVen (talk) 14:21, 17 December 2015 (UTC)

Amend armistice section on the Italian front
The article reads "On 29 October, the imperial authorities asked Italy for an armistice. But the Italians continued advancing, reaching Trento, Udine, and Trieste. On 3 November, Austria-Hungary sent a flag of truce to ask for an armistice. The terms, arranged by telegraph with the Allied Authorities in Paris, were communicated to the Austrian commander and accepted. The Armistice with Austria was signed in the Villa Giusti, near Padua, on 3 November. Austria and Hungary signed separate armistices following the overthrow of the Habsburg Monarchy." the following needs to be corrected: 1) Asking for an armistice cannot happen twice in two separate days, 29 October and 3 November: infact the negotiating began on 29 October and the armistice was signed on 3 November. 2) the armistice was signed in the Villa Giusti with Austria-Hungary, not just Austria, the terms accepted by the imperial commander, not just Austrian 3) Austria and Hungary signed separate peace treaties one year later, so one only armistice between Italy and Imperial forces and two separate treaties later — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.173.169.105 (talk) 21:17, 17 December 2015 (UTC)

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Historyofwar.org reliability
I'm disinclined to trust a source which titled a page Erich von Ludendorff. I think we can probably do better. Mackensen (talk) 02:31, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

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edit needed: 1899 boys
In the Italian participation section is the following text: "the Italian Government called to arms the so-called '99 Boys (Ragazzi del '99): that is, all males born on 1899 and after, and so were 18 years old or older." This doesn't make sense; it should probably read 'in 1899 or before' (were it 1899 and after, that would be 18 years old and younger).

(Note: I raised this here 6 months ago and it timed out and disappeared into the archive without being addressed) 69.166.47.99 (talk) 23:45, 20 April 2016 (UTC)
 * ✅ Timothy Joseph Wood  23:49, 20 April 2016 (UTC)

Russia's date of surrender?
Why does the page have Russia surrendering in 1917? There was action on the Eastern Front until March 1918. It's seriously misleading, at least put on the infobox that the Russian SSR was in the war in 1918. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:582:C502:B0C9:534:C905:F7C7:A578 (talk) 22:36, 21 May 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 27 May 2016
Under the Russian revolution section, there appears this line, "but when German troops began marching across the Ukraine unopposed..." This should be changed to "...marching across Ukraine..." It's not THE Ukraine.
 * ✅ Timothy Joseph Wood  15:37, 27 May 2016 (UTC)

140.32.6.1 (talk) 15:29, 27 May 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 30 May 2016
151.229.188.149 (talk) 19:09, 30 May 2016 (UTC)The First World War was truly ‘the Great War’. Its origins were complex. Its scale was vast. Its conduct was intense. Its impact on military operations was revolutionary. Its human and material costs were enormous. And its results were profound.

The war was a global conflict. Thirty-two nations were eventually involved. Twenty-eight of these constituted the Allied and Associated Powers, whose principal belligerents were the British Empire, France, Italy, Russia, Serbia, and the United States of America. They were opposed by the Central Powers: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire.

The war began in the Balkan cockpit of competing nationalisms and ancient ethnic rivalries. Hopes that it could be contained there proved vain. Expansion of the war was swift. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914; Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August. Germany declared war on France on 3 August and invaded Belgium. France was invaded on 4 August. German violation of Belgian neutrality provided the British with a convenient excuse to enter the war on the side of France and Russia the same evening. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia on 6 August. France and Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary six days later.

The underlying causes of these events have been intensively researched and debated. Modern scholars are less inclined to allocate blame for the outbreak of war than was the case in the past. They have sought instead to understand the fears and ambitions of the governing élites of Europe who took the fateful decisions for war, particularly that of imperial Germany.

Fears were more important than ambitions. Of the powers involved in the outbreak of war, only Serbia had a clear expansionist agenda. The French hoped to recover the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine lost to Germany as a result of their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, but this was regarded as an attempt at restitution rather than acquisition. Otherwise, defensive considerations were paramount. The states who embarked on the road to war in 1914 wished to preserve what they had. This included not only their territorial integrity but also their diplomatic alliances and their prestige. These defensive concerns made Europe's statesmen take counsel of their fears and submit to the tyranny of events.

The Austrians feared for the survival of their multi-racial Empire if they did not confront the threat of Serb nationalism and Panslavism. The Germans feared the consequences to themselves of allowing Austria, their closest and only reliable ally, to be weakened and humiliated. The Russians feared the threat to their prestige and authority as protector of the Slavs if they allowed Austria to defeat and humiliate Serbia. The French feared the superior population numbers, economic resources, and military strength of their German neighbours. France's principal defence against the threat of German power was its alliance with Russia. This it was imperative to defend. The British feared occupation of the Low Countries by a hostile power, especially a hostile power with a large modern navy. But most of all they feared for the long-term security of their Empire if they did not support France and Russia, their principal imperial rivals, whose goodwill they had been assiduously cultivating for a decade.

All governments feared their peoples. Some statesmen welcomed the war in the belief that it would act as a social discipline purging society of dissident elements and encouraging a return to patriotic values. Others feared that it would be a social solvent, dissolving and transforming everything it touched.

The process of expansion did not end in August 1914. Other major belligerents took their time and waited upon events. Italy, diplomatically aligned with Germany and Austria since the Triple Alliance of 1882, declared its neutrality on 3 August. In the following months it was ardently courted by France and Britain. On 23 May 1915 the Italian government succumbed to Allied temptations and declared war on Austria-Hungary in pursuit of territorial aggrandizement in the Trentino. Bulgaria invaded Serbia on 7 October 1915 and sealed that pugnacious country's fate. Serbia was overrun. The road to Constantinople was opened to the Central Powers. Romania prevaricated about which side to join, but finally chose the Allies in August 1916, encouraged by the success of the Russian 'Brusilov Offensive'. It was a fatal miscalculation. The German response was swift and decisive. Romania was rapidly overwhelmed by two invading German armies and its rich supplies of wheat and oil did much to keep Germany in the war for another two years. Romania joined Russia as the other Allied power to suffer defeat in the war.

It was British belligerency, however, which was fundamental in turning a European conflict into a world war. Britain was the world's greatest imperial power. The British had world-wide interests and world-wide dilemmas. They also had world-wide friends. Germany found itself at war not only with Great Britain but also with the dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa and with the greatest British imperial possession, India. Concern for the defence of India helped bring the British into conflict with the Ottoman Empire in November 1914 and resulted in a major war in the Middle East. Most important of all, perhaps, Britain's close political, economic, and cultural ties with the United States of America, if they did not ensure that nation's eventual entry into the war, certainly made it possible. The American declaration of war on Germany on 6 April 1917 was a landmark not only in the history of the United States but also in that of Europe and the world, bringing to an end half a millennium of European domination and ushering in 'the American century'.

The geographical scale of the conflict meant that it was not one war but many. On the Western Front in France and Belgium the French and their British allies, reinforced from 1917 onwards by the Americans, were locked in a savage battle of attrition against the German army. Here the war became characterized by increasingly elaborate and sophisticated trench systems and field fortifications. Dense belts of barbed wire, concrete pillboxes, intersecting arcs of machine-gun fire, and accumulating masses of quick-firing field and heavy artillery rendered manœuvre virtually impossible. Casualties were enormous.

The first phase of the war in the west lasted until November 1914. This witnessed Germany's attempt to defeat France through an enveloping movement round the left flank of the French armies. The plan met with initial success. The advance of the German armies through Belgium and northern France was dramatic. The French, responding with an offensive in Lorraine, suffered an almost catastrophic national defeat. France was saved by the iron nerve of its commander-in-chief, General J. J. C. Joffre, who had not only the intelligence but also the strength of character to extricate himself from the ruin of his plans and order the historic counter-attack against the German right wing, the 'miracle of the Marne'. The German armies were forced to retreat and to entrench. Their last attempt at a breakthrough was stopped by French and British forces near the small Flemish market town of Ypres in November. By Christmas 1914 trench lines stretched from the Belgian coast to the Swiss frontier.

Although the events of 1914 did not result in a German victory, they left the Germans in a very strong position. The German army held the strategic initiative. It was free to retreat to positions of tactical advantage and to reinforce them with all the skill and ingenuity of German military engineering. Enormous losses had been inflicted on France. Two-fifths of France's military casualties were incurred in 1914. These included a tenth of the officer corps. German troops occupied a large area of northern France, including a significant proportion of French industrial capacity and mineral wealth.

These realities dominated the second phase of the war in the west. This lasted from November 1914 until March 1918. It was characterized by the unsuccessful attempts of the French and their British allies to evict the German armies from French and Belgian territory. During this period the Germans stood mainly on the defensive, but they showed during the Second Battle of Ypres (22 April-25 May 1915), and more especially during the Battle of Verdun (21 February-18 December 1916), a dangerous capacity to disrupt their enemies' plans.

The French made three major assaults on the German line: in the spring of 1915 in Artois; in the autumn of 1915 in Champagne; and in the spring of 1917 on the Aisne (the 'Nivelle Offensive'). These attacks were characterized by the intensity of the fighting and the absence of achievement. Little ground was gained. No positions of strategic significance were captured. Casualties were severe. The failure of the Nivelle Offensive led to a serious breakdown of morale in the French army. For much of the rest of 1917 it was incapable of major offensive action.

The British fared little better. Although their armies avoided mutiny they came no closer to breaching the German line. During the battles of the Somme (1 July19 November 1916) and the Third Battle of Ypres (31 July-12 November 1917) they inflicted great losses on the German army at great cost to themselves, but the German line held and no end to the war appeared in sight.

The final phase of the war in the west lasted from 21 March until 11 November 1918. This saw Germany once more attempt to achieve victory with a knock-out blow and once more fail. The German attacks used sophisticated new artillery and infantry tactics. They enjoyed spectacular success. The British 5th Army on the Somme suffered a major defeat. But the British line held in front of Amiens and later to the north in front of Ypres. No real strategic damage was done. By midsummer the German attacks had petered out. The German offensive broke the trench deadlock and returned movement and manœuvre to the strategic agenda. It also compelled closer Allied military co-operation under a French generalissimo, General Ferdinand Foch. The Allied counter-offensive began in July. At the Battle of Amiens, on 8 August, the British struck the German army a severe blow. For the rest of the war in the west the Germans were in retreat.

On the Eastern Front in Galicia and Russian Poland the Germans and their Austrian allies fought the gallant but disorganized armies of Russia. Here the distances involved were very great. Artillery densities were correspondingly less. Manœuvre was always possible and cavalry could operate effectively. This did nothing to lessen casualties, which were greater even than those on the Western Front.

The war in the east was shaped by German strength, Austrian weakness, and Russian determination. German military superiority was apparent from the start of the war. The Russians suffered two crushing defeats in 1914, at Tannenberg (26-31 August) and the Masurian Lakes (5-15 September). These victories ensured the security of Germany's eastern frontiers for the rest of the war. They also established the military legend of Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, who emerged as principal directors of the German war effort in the autumn of 1916. By September 1915 the Russians had been driven out of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. Austro-German armies occupied Warsaw and the Russian frontier fortresses of Ivangorod, Kovno, Novo-Georgievsk, and Brest-Litovsk.

These defeats proved costly to Russia. They also proved costly to Austria. Austria had a disastrous war. Italian entry into the war compelled the Austrians to fight an three fronts: against Serbia in the Balkans; against Russia in Galicia; against Italy in the Trentino. This proved too much for Austrian strength. Their war effort was characterized by dependency on Germany. Germans complained that they were shackled to the 'Austrian corpse'. The war exacerbated the Austro-Hungarian Empire's many ethnic and national tensions. By 1918 Austria was weary of the war and desperate for peace. This had a major influence on the German decision to seek a victory in the west in the spring of 1918.

Perceptions of the Russian war effort have been overshadowed by the October Revolution of 1917 and by Bolshevik 'revolutionary defeatism' which acquiesced in the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (14 March 1918) and took Russia out of the war. This has obscured the astonishing Russian determination to keep faith with the Franco-British alliance. Without the Russian contribution in the east it is far from certain that Germany could have been defeated in the west. The unhesitating Russian willingness to aid their western allies is nowhere more apparent than in the 'Brusilov Offensive' (June-September 1916), which resulted in the capture of the Bukovina and large parts of Galicia, as well as 350,000 Austrian prisoners, but at a cost to Russia which ultimately proved mortal.

In southern Europe the Italian army fought eleven indecisive battles in an attempt to dislodge the Austrians from their mountain strongholds beyond the Isonzo river. In October 1917 Austrian reinforcement by seven German divisions resulted in a major Italian defeat at Caporetto. The Italians were pushed back beyond the Piave. This defeat produced changes in the Italian high command. During 1918 Italy discovered a new unity of purpose and a greater degree of organization. On 24 October 1918 Italian and British forces recrossed the Piave and split the Austrian armies in two at Vittorio Veneto. Austrian retreat turned into rout and then into surrender.

In the Balkans the Serbs fought the Austrians and Bulgarians, suffering massive casualties, including the highest proportion of servicemen killed of any belligerent power. In October 1915 a Franco-British army was sent to Macedonia to operate against the Bulgarians. It struggled to have any influence on the war. The Germans mocked it and declared Salonika to be the biggest internment camp in Europe, but the French and British eventually broke out of the malarial plains into the mountainous valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers before inflicting defeat on Bulgaria in the autumn of 1918.

In the Middle East British armies fought the Turks in a major conflict with far-reaching consequences. Here the war was characterized by the doggedness of Turkish resistance and by the constant struggle against climate, terrain, and disease. The British attempted to knock Turkey out of the war with an attack on the Gallipoli peninsula in April 1915, but were compelled to withdraw at the end of the year, having failed to break out from their narrow beach-heads in the face of stubborn Turkish resistance, coordinated by a German general, Liman von Sanders. The British also suffered another humiliating reverse in Mesopotamia when a small army commanded by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend advanced to Ctesiphon but outran its supplies and was compelled to surrender at Kut-al-Amara in April 1916. Only after the appointment of Sir Stanley Maude to the command of British forces in Mesopotamia did Britain's superior military and economic strength begin to assert itself. Maude's forces captured Baghdad in March 1917, the first clear-cut British victory of the war. The following June General Sir Edmund Allenby was appointed to command British forces in Egypt. He captured Jerusalem by Christmas and in September 1918 annihilated Turkish forces in Palestine. Turkey surrendered on 31 October 1918.

The war also found its way to tropical Africa. Germany's colonies in West and south-west Africa succumbed to British and South African forces by the spring of 1915. In East Africa, however, a German army of locally raised black African soldiers commanded by Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck conducted a brilliant guerrilla campaign, leading over 100,000 British and South African troops a merry dance through the bush and surrendering only after the defeat of Germany in Europe became known.

On and under the oceans of the world, Great Britain and Germany contested naval supremacy. Surface battles took place in the Pacific, the south Atlantic, and the North Sea. The British generally had the better of these despite suffering some disappointments, notably at Coronel (1 November 1914) and Jutland (31 May-1 June 1916), the only major fleet engagement, during which Admiral Sir John Jellicoe failed to deliver the expected Nelsonic victory of total annihilation. Submarine warfare took place in the North Sea, the Black Sea, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic. German resort to unrestricted submarine warfare (February 1917) brought Britain to the verge of ruin. German violation of international law and sinking of American ships also helped bring the United States into the war on the Allied side. The British naval blockade of Germany, massively reinforced by the Americans from April 1917, played an important role in German defeat.

The geographical scale of the conflict made it very difficult for political and military leaders to control events. The obligations of coalition inhibited strategic independence. Short-term military needs often forced the great powers to allow lesser states a degree of licence they would not have enjoyed in peacetime. Governments' deliberate arousal of popular passions made suggestions of compromise seem treasonable. The ever-rising cost of the military means inflated the political ends. Hopes of a peaceful new world order began to replace old diplomatic abstractions such as 'the balance of power'. Rationality went out of season. War aims were obscured. Strategies were distorted. Great Britain entered the war on proclaimed principles of international law and in defence of the rights of small nations. By 1918 the British government was pursuing a Middle Eastern policy of naked imperialism (in collaboration with the French), while simultaneously encouraging the aspirations of Arab nationalism and promising support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. It was truly a war of illusions.

Europe's political and military leaders have been subjected to much retrospective criticism for their belief that the ‘war would be over by Christmas'. This belief was not based on complacency. Even those who predicted with chilling accuracy the murderous nature of First World War battlefields, such as the Polish banker Jan Bloch, expected the war to be short. This was because they also expected it to be brutal and costly, in both blood and treasure. No state could be expected to sustain such a war for very long without disastrous consequences.

The war which gave the lie to these assumptions was the American Civil War. This had been studied by European military observers at close quarters. Most, however, dismissed it. This was particularly true of the Prussians. Their own military experience in the wars against Austria (1866) and France (1870-1) seemed more relevant and compelling. These wars were both short. They were also instrumental. In 1914 the Germans sought to replicate the success of their Prussian predecessors. They aimed to fight a 'cabinet war' on the Bismarckian model. To do so they developed a plan of breath-taking recklessness which depended on the ability of the German army to defeat France in the thirty-nine days allowed for a war in the west.

Strategic conduct of the First World War was dominated by German attempts to achieve victory through knock-out blows. Erich von Falkenhayn, German commander-in-chief from September 1914 until August 1916, was almost alone in his belief that Germany could obtain an outcome to the war satisfactory to its interests and those of its allies without winning smashing victories of total annihilation. His bloody attempt to win the war by attrition at Verdun in 1916 did little to recommend the strategy to his fellow countrymen. The preference for knock-out blows remained. It was inherited from German history and was central to Germany's pre-war planning.

Pre-war German strategy was haunted by the fear of a war on two fronts, against France in the west and Russia in the east. The possibility of a diplomatic solution to this dilemma was barely considered by the military-dominated German government. A military solution was sought instead. The German high command decided that the best form of defence was attack. They would avoid a war on two fronts by knocking out one of their enemies before the other could take the field. The enemy with the slowest military mobilization was Russia. The French army would be in the field first. France was therefore chosen to receive the first blow. Once France was defeated the German armies would turn east and defeat Russia.

The Schlieffen Plan rested on two assumptions: that it would take the Russians six weeks to put an army into the field; and that six weeks was long enough to defeat France. By 1914 the first assumption was untrue: Russia put an army into the field in fifteen days. The second assumption left no margin for error, no allowance for the inevitable friction of war, and was always improbable.

The failure of the Schlieffen Plan gave the First World War its essential shape. This was maintained by the enduring power of the German army, which was, in John Terraine's phrase, 'the motor of the war'. The German army was a potent instrument. It had played a historic role in the emergence of the German state. It enjoyed enormous prestige. It was able to recruit men of talent and dedication as officers and NCOs. As a result it was well trained and well led. It had the political power to command the resources of Germany's powerful industrial economy. Germany's position at the heart of Europe meant that it could operate on interior lines of communication in a European war. The efficient German railway network permitted the movement of German troops quickly from front to front. The superior speed of the locomotive over the ship frustrated Allied attempts to use their command of the sea to operate effectively against the periphery of the Central Powers. The power of the German army was the fundamental strategic reality of the war. 'We cannot hope to win this war until we have defeated the German army,' wrote the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. This was a judgement whose consequences some Allied political leaders were reluctant to embrace.

The German army suffered from two important strategic difficulties. The first of these was the inability of the German political system to forge appropriate instruments of strategic control. The second was Great Britain. German government rested on the tortured personality of the Kaiser. It was riven by intrigue and indecision. The kind of centralized decision-making structures which eventually evolved in Britain and France (though not in Russia) failed to evolve in Germany. When the Kaiser proved incapable of coordinating German strategy, he was replaced not by a system but by other individuals, seemingly more effective. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg radiated calm and inspired confidence. This gave him the appearance of a great man but without the substance. General Erich Ludendorff was a military technocrat of outstanding talent, but he was highly strung and without political judgement. In 1918 his offensive strategy brought Germany to ruin.

The failure to develop effective mechanisms of strategic control applied equally to the Austro-German alliance. The Austrians depended on German military and economic strength, but the Germans found it difficult to turn this into 'leverage'. Austria was willing to take German help but not German advice. Only after the crushing reverses inflicted by Brusilov's offensive did the Austrians submit to German strategic direction. By then it was almost certainly too late.

Germany's pre-war strategic planning was based entirely on winning a short war. British belligerency made this unlikely. The British were a naval rather than a military power. They could not be defeated by the German army, at least not quickly. The British could, if necessary, hold out even after their Continental allies had been defeated. They might even have chosen to do this. They had in the past and they would again in the not-too-distant future. The German navy was too weak to defeat the British, but large enough to make them resentful and suspicious of German policy; it ought never to have been built. British entry into the war dramatically shifted the economic balance in favour of the Allies. Britain was one of the world's great industrial powers. Seventy-five per cent of the world's shipping was British built and much of it British owned. London was the world's greatest money and commodities market. British access to world supplies of food and credit and to imperial resources of manpower made them a formidable enemy, despite the 'contemptible little army' which was all they could put into the field on the outbreak of war. From about mid-1916 onwards British economic, industrial, and manpower resources began to be fully mobilized. Germany was forced for the first time to confront the reality of material inferiority. Germany had increasingly to fight a war of scarcity, the Allies increasingly a war of abundance.

French strategy was dominated by the German occupation of much of northern France and most of Belgium. At its closest point the German line was less than 40 miles from Paris. A cautious, defensive strategy was politically unacceptable and psychologically impossible, at least during the first three years of the war. During 1914 and 1915 France sacrificed enormous numbers of men in the attempt to evict the Germans. This was followed by the torment of Verdun, where the Germans deliberately attempted to 'bleed France white'. French fears of military inferiority were confirmed. If France was to prevail its allies would have to contribute in kind. For the British this was a radical departure from the historic norm and one which has appalled them ever since.

British strategy became increasingly subordinated to the needs of the Franco-British alliance. The British fought the war as they had to, not as they wanted to. The British way in warfare envisaged a largely naval war. A naval blockade would weaken Germany economically. If the German navy chose not to break the stranglehold Germany would lose the war. If it did choose to fight it would be annihilated. British maritime superiority would be confirmed. Neutral opinion would be cowed. Fresh allies would be encouraged into the fight. The blockade would be waged with greater ruthlessness. Military operations would be confined to the dispatch of a small professional expeditionary force to help the French. Remaining military forces would be employed on the periphery of the Central Powers remote from the German army, where it was believed they would exercise a strategic influence out of all proportion to their size.

The British never really fought the war they envisaged. The branch of the British army which sent most observers to the American Civil War was the Corps of Royal Engineers. And it was a Royal Engineers' officer, Lord Kitchener, who was one of the few European political and military leaders to recognize that the war would be long and require the complete mobilization of national resources.

Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War on 5 August 1914. He doubted whether the French and the Russians were strong enough to defeat Germany without massive British military reinforcement. He immediately sought to raise a mass citizen army. There was an overwhelming popular response to his call to arms. Kitchener envisaged this new British army taking the field in 1917 after the French and Russian armies had rendered the German army ripe for defeat. They would be 'the last million men'. They would win the war and decide the peace. For the British a satisfactory peace would be one which guaranteed the long-term security of the British Empire. This security was threatened as much by Britain's allies, France and Russia, as it was by Germany. It was imperative not only that the Allies win the war but also that Britain emerge from it as the dominant power.

Kitchener's expectations were disappointed. By 1916 it was the French army which was ripe for defeat, not the German. But the obligations of the French alliance were inescapable. The British could not afford to acquiesce in a French defeat. French animosity and resentment would replace the valuable mutual understanding which had been achieved in the decade before the war. The French had a great capacity for making imperial mischief. And so did the Russians. If they were abandoned they would have every reason for doing so. There seemed no choice. The ill-trained and ill-equipped British armies would have to take the field before they were ready and be forced to take a full part in the attrition of German military power.

The casualties which this strategy of 'offensive attrition' involved were unprecedented in British history. They were also unacceptable to some British political leaders. Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from December 1916), in particular, were opposed to the British army 'chewing barbed wire' on the Western Front. They looked to use it elsewhere, against Germany's allies in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Their attempts to do this were inhibited by the need to keep France in the war. This could only be done in France and by fighting the German army. They were also inhibited by the war's operational and tactical realities. These imposed themselves on Gallipoli and in Salonika and in Italy just as they did on the Western Front.

Attempts to implement an Allied grand strategy enjoyed some success. Allied political and military leaders met regularly. At Chantilly in December 1915 and December 1916 they determined to stretch the German army to its limits by simultaneous offensive action on the western, eastern, and Italian fronts. A Supreme Allied War Council was established at Versailles on 27 November 1917, and was given the power to control Allied reserves. Franco-British co-operation was especially close. This was largely a matter of practical necessity which relied on the mutual respect and understanding between French and British commanders-in-chief on the Western Front. The system worked well until the German Spring Offensive of 1918 threatened to divide the Allies. Only then was it replaced by a more formal structure. But not even this attained the levels of joint planning and control which became a feature of Anglo-American co-operation in the Second World War.

Allied grand strategy was conceptually sound. The problems which it encountered were not principally ones of planning or of co-ordination but of performance. Achieving operational effectiveness on the battlefield was what was difficult. This has given the war, especially the war in the west, its enduring image of boneheaded commanders wantonly sacrificing the lives of their men in fruitless pursuit of impossibly grandiose strategic designs.

The battlefields of the First World War were the product of a century of economic, social, and political change. Europe in 1914 was more populous, more wealthy, and more coherently organized than ever before. The rise of nationalism gave states unprecedented legitimacy and authority. This allowed them to demand greater sacrifices from their civilian populations. Improvements in agriculture reduced the numbers needed to work on the land and provided a surplus of males of military age. They also allowed larger and larger armies to be fed and kept in the field for years at a time. Changes in administrative practice brought about by the electric telegraph, the telephone, the typewriter, and the growth of railways allowed these armies to be assembled and deployed quickly. Industrial technology provided new weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. Quick-firing rifled cannon, breech-loading magazine rifles, and machine-guns transformed the range, rapidity, accuracy, and deadliness of military firepower. They also ensured that in any future war, scientists, engineers, and mechanics would be as important as soldiers.

These changes did much to make the First World War the first 'modern war'. But it did not begin as one. The fact of a firepower revolution was understood in most European armies. The consequences of it were not. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) appeared to offer a human solution to the problems of the technological battlefield. Victory would go to the side with the best-trained, most disciplined army, commanded by generals of iron resolution, prepared to maintain the offensive in the face of huge losses. As a result the opening battles of the war were closer in conception and execution to those of the Napoleonic era than to the battles of 1916 onwards.

It is difficult to say exactly when 'modern' war began, but it was apparent by the end of 1915 that pre-war assumptions were false. Well-trained, highly disciplined French, German, and Russian soldiers of high morale were repeatedly flung into battle by commanders of iron resolve. The results were barren of strategic achievement. The human costs were immense. The 'human solution' was not enough. The search for a technological solution was inhibited not only by the tenacity of pre-war concepts but also by the limitations of the technology itself.

The principal instrument of education was artillery. And the mode of instruction was experience. Shell-fire was merciless to troops in the open. The response was to get out of the open and into the ground. Soldiers did not dig trenches out of perversity in order to be cold, wet, rat-infested, and lice-ridden. They dug them in order to survive. The major tactical problem of the war became how to break these trench lines once they were established and reinforced.

For much of the war artillery lacked the ability to find enemy targets, to hit them accurately, and to destroy them effectively. Contemporary technology failed to provide a man-portable wireless. Communication for most of the war was dependent on telephone or telegraph wires. These were always broken by shell-fire and difficult to protect. Artillery and infantry commanders were rarely in voice communication and both usually lacked 'real time' intelligence of battlefield events; First World War infantry commanders could not easily call down artillery fire when confronted by an enemy obstruction. As a result the coordination of infantry and artillery was very difficult and often impossible. Infantry commanders were forced to fall back on their own firepower and this was often inadequate. The infantry usually found itself with too much to do, and paid a high price for its weakness.

Artillery was not only a major part of the problem, however. It was also a major part of the solution. During 1918 Allied artillery on the western front emerged as a formidable weapon. Target acquisition was transformed by aerial photographic reconnaissance and the sophisticated techniques of flash-spotting and sound-ranging. These allowed mathematically predicted fire, or map-shooting. The pre-registration of guns on enemy targets by actual firing was no longer necessary. The possibility of surprise returned to the battlefield. Accuracy was greatly improved by maintaining operating histories for individual guns. Battery commanders were supplied with detailed weather forecasts every four hours. Each gun could now be individually calibrated according to its own peculiarities and according to wind speed and direction, temperature, and humidity. All types and calibres of guns, including heavy siege howitzers whose steep angle of fire was especially effective in trench warfare, became available in virtually unlimited numbers. Munitions were also improved. Poison gas shells became available for the first time in large numbers. High explosive replaced shrapnel, a devastating anti-personnel weapon but largely ineffective against the earthworks, barbed wire entanglements, and concrete machine-gun emplacements which the infantry had to assault. Instantaneous percussion fuses concentrated the explosive effect of shells more effectively against barbed wire and reduced the cratering of the battlefield which had often rendered the forward movement of supplies and reinforcements difficult if not impossible. Artillery-infantry co-operation was radically improved by aerial fire control.

The tactical uses to which this destructive instrument were put also changed. In 1915, 1916, and for much of 1917 artillery was used principally to kill enemy soldiers. It always did so, sometimes in large numbers. But it always spared some, even in front-line trenches. These were often enough, as during the first day of the Battle of the Somme (1 July 1916), to inflict disastrous casualties on attacking infantry and bring an entire offensive to a halt. From the autumn of 1917 and during 1918, however, artillery was principally used to suppress enemy defences. Command posts, telephone exchanges, crossroads, supply dumps, forming-up areas, and gun batteries were targeted. Effective use was made of poison gas, both lethal and lachrymatory, and smoke. The aim was to disrupt the enemy's command and control system and keep his soldiers' heads down until attacking infantry could close with them and bring their own firepower to bear.

The attacking infantry were also transformed. In 1914 the British soldier went to war dressed like a gamekeeper in a soft cap, armed only with rifle and bayonet. In 1918 he went into battle dressed like an industrial worker in a steel helmet, protected by a respirator against poison gas, armed with automatic weapons and mortars, supported by tanks and ground-attack aircraft, and preceded by a creeping artillery barrage of crushing intensity. Firepower replaced manpower as the instrument of victory. This represented a revolution in the conduct of war.

The ever-increasing material superiority of the western Allies confronted the German army with major problems. Its response was organizational. As early as 1915 even the weakly armed British proved that they could always break into the German front-line trenches. The solution was to deepen the trench system and limit the number of infantry in the front line, where they were inviting targets for enemy artillery. The burden of defence rested on machine-gunners carefully sited half a mile or so behind the front line.

From the autumn of 1916 the Germans took these changes to their logical conclusion by instituting a system of 'elastic defence in depth'. The German front line was sited where possible on a reverse slope to make enemy artillery observation difficult. A formal front-line trench system was abandoned. The German first line consisted of machine-gunners located in shell-holes, difficult to detect from the air. Their job was to disrupt an enemy infantry assault. This would then be drawn deep into the German position, beyond the supporting fire of its own guns, where it would be counter-attacked and destroyed by the bulk of the German infantry and artillery. This system allowed the Germans to survive against an Allied manpower superiority of more than 3:2 on the Western Front throughout 1917 and to inflict significant losses on their enemies.

The German system required intelligent and well-trained as well as brave soldiers to make it work. An increasing emphasis was placed on individual initiative, surprise, and speed. In 1918 specially trained ‘stormtroops', supported by a hurricane bombardment designed to disrupt their enemies' lines of communication and their command and control systems, were ordered to bypass points of resistance and advance deep into the enemy's rear. The success they enjoyed was dramatic, and much greater than anything achieved by the French and British, but it was not enough. Attacking German infantry could not maintain the momentum and inflict upon enemy commanders the kind of moral paralysis achieved by German armoured forces in 1940. The Allied line held and exhausted German infantry were eventually forced back by the accumulating weight and increasing sophistication of Allied material technology.

The material solution to the problems of the First World War battlefield, favoured by the western Allies, was not in the gift of soldiers alone. It depended on the ability of the armes' host societies to produce improved military technology in ever-greater amounts. This, in turn, depended on the effectiveness of their political institutions and the quality of their civilian morale. It was a contest at which the liberal democracies of France and Great Britain (and eventually the United States of America) proved more adept than the authoritarian regimes of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia.

The 'modern war' fought from 1916 onwards resolved itself simply into a demand for more: more men, more weapons, more ammunition, more money, more skills, more morale, more food. Some of the demands were contradictory. More men meant more men for the armies and more men for the factories. Balancing the competing demands was never easy. 'Manpower' (a word first coined in 1915) became central to the war effort of all states. The Allies were in a much stronger position than Germany. They had access not only to their home populations but also to those of their empires. 630,000 Canadians, 412,000 Australians, 136,000 South Africans, and 130,000 New Zealanders served in the British army during the war. Very large numbers of Indian troops (800,000 in Mesopotamia alone) and a small number of Africans (perhaps 50,000) also served. (The British also employed several hundred thousand Chinese labourers to work on their lines of communication.) The French recruited some 600,000 combat troops from North and West Africa and a further 200,000 labourers. And of course there were the Americans. American troops arrived in France at the rate of 150,000 a month in 1918. Truly the new world had come in to redress the balance of the old.

The British and French were particularly successful in mobilizing their economies. In Britain this had much to do with the work of David Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions (May 1915-July 1916). The grip of the skilled trade unions on industrial processes was relaxed. Ancient lines of demarcation were blurred. Women replaced men in the factories. Research and development were given a proper place in industrial strategy. Prodigies of production were achieved. On 10 March 1915, at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the British Expeditionary Force struggled to accumulate enough shells for half an hour's bombardment. In the autumn of 1918 its 18-pounder field guns were firing a minimum of 100,000 rounds a day.

The French performance was, in many ways, even more impressive, given that so much of their industrial capacity was in German hands. Not only did the French economy supply the French army with increasing amounts of old and new weaponry, but it also supplied most of the American Expeditionary Force's artillery and aeroplanes. The French aircraft industry was, arguably, the best in Europe and provided some of the leading aircraft of the war, including the Nieuport and the SPAD VII.

Morale was also a key factor. All sides tried to explain and justify the war and used increasingly refined techniques of propaganda to maintain commitment to the cause. Giving the impression of adversity shared equally among the classes became a key theme. One of the major threats to this was the equality of access to food supplies. In Germany this proved increasingly difficult to maintain. Morale deteriorated and industrial efficiency suffered as a result. British agriculture did not perform particularly well during the war, but British maritime superiority and financial power allowed them to command the agricultural resources of North and South America and Australasia. Food was one of the Allies’ principal war-winning weapons. The degree of active resistance to the war was low in most countries. But war-weariness set in everywhere by 1917. There were many strikes and much industrial unrest. In Russia this was severe enough to produce a revolution and then a Bolshevik coup d’état which took Russia out of the war in 1918.

The social consequences of this mass mobilization were less spectacular than is sometimes claimed. There were advances for the organized working class, especially its trade unions, especially in Britain, and arguably for women, but the working class of Europe paid a high price on the battlefield for social advances at home. And in the defeated states there was very little social advance anyway.

The First World War redrew the map of Europe and the Middle East. Four great empires, the Romanov, the Hohenzollern, the Habsburg, and the Ottoman, were defeated and collapsed. They were replaced by a number of weak and sometimes avaricious successor states. Russia underwent a bloody civil war before the establishment of a Communist Soviet Union which put it beyond the pale of European diplomacy for a generation. Germany became a republic branded at its birth with the stigma of defeat, increasingly weakened by the burden of Allied reparations and by inflation. France recovered the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, but continued to be haunted by fear and loathing of Germany. Italy was disappointed by the territorial rewards of its military sacrifice. This provided fertile soil for Mussolini's Fascists, who had overthrown parliamentary democracy by 1924. The British maintained the integrity and independence of Belgium. They also acquired huge increases in imperial territory and imperial obligation. But they did not achieve the security for the Empire which they sought. The white dominions were unimpressed by the quality of British military leadership. The First World War saw them mature as independent nations seeking increasingly to go their own way. The stirrings of revolt in India were apparent as soon as the war ended. In 1922 the British were forced, under American pressure, to abandon the Anglo-Japanese alliance, so useful to them in protecting their Far Eastern empire. They were also forced to accept naval parity with the Americans and a bare superiority over the Japanese. 'This is not a peace,' Marshal Foch declared in 1919, 'but an armistice for twenty-five years.'

The cost of all this in human terms was 8.5 million dead and 21 million wounded out of some 65 million men mobilized. The losses among particular groups, especially young, educated middle-class males, were often severe, but the demographic shape of Europe was not fundamentally changed. The real impact was moral. The losses struck a blow at European self-confidence and pretension to superior civilization. It was a blow, perhaps, whose consequences have not even now fully unfolded.


 * Are you proposing that the above replaces the current article? Irondome (talk) 19:19, 30 May 2016 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: This is a long, unverified essay and is unsuitable for inclusion on an encyclopedia (see: WP:NOTESSAY. Patar knight - chat/contributions 19:22, 30 May 2016 (UTC)
 * I feel like someone may have just finished Blueprint for Armageddon. Timothy Joseph Wood  00:11, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

Map is wrong
File:Map_Europe_1923-en.svg is wrong by 1923 the Irish Free State was established Gnevin (talk) 10:02, 3 June 2016 (UTC)
 * Well, your're right. And it's arguably a direct consequence of the war to boot. Unfortunately I'm not a map guy. Pinging here since they seem to be the original creator. If they or someone else doesn't get to it in a few days, you can try posting at Graphics Lab/Map workshop.  Timothy Joseph Wood  12:23, 3 June 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 20 Jun 2016
Fourth paragraph, first sentence. "On 28 July, the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia" needs link fixing. --[[User:Graham Phillips 110|Graham Phillips 110 (talk) 09:45, 20 June 2016 (UTC)
 * ✅ Timothy Joseph Wood  12:13, 20 June 2016 (UTC)

Recent r/v
I have reverted this edit. It's a bit of an over simplification to say that WWII was caused by the invasion of Poland. WWII was caused by a lot of things. Maybe some modification of this statement might be appropriate, but as it was, it wasn't quite accurate. Timothy Joseph Wood 13:55, 25 June 2016 (UTC)

Error in the Section: Ottoman Empire conflict, 1917–1918
About this time, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein was relieved of his duties as the Eighth Army's commander, replaced by Djevad Pasha, and a few months later the commander of the Ottoman Army in Palestine, Erich von Falkenhayn, was replaced by Otto Liman von Sanders.[142][143]

This section has a reference error. Ottoman and German army commanders do not replace each other.....amd Erich van Falkenhayn was not commander of the Ottoman Army.... Regards from Switzerland 188.63.153.245 (talk) 16:20, 3 July 2016 (UTC)

Opening hostilities/German forces in Belgium and France
"In the east, Russia invaded with two armies. In response, Germany rapidly moved the 8th Field Army from its previous role as reserve for the invasion of France to East Prussia by rail across the German Empire." No. The German 8th Field Army was formed in Posen to defend East Prussia. It was never "rushed by rail across the German Empire". Some reinforcements were diverted from the Western Front, albeit too late to participate in the battle of Tannenberg. Could the Authors of the article please counter-check and clarify this? 213.61.58.164 (talk) 11:44, 12 July 2016 (UTC)kookee

Western Front/Trench warfare begins
"Commanders on both sides failed to develop tactics for breaching entrenched positions without heavy casualties. In time, however, technology began to produce new offensive weapons, such as gas warfare and the tank.[57]" This is at least inaccurate, if not entirely wrong. In fact, several commanders developed new tactics to overcome the challenges of trench warfare (see the article on "stormtroopers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stormtrooper) without resorting to new weapons. Could the authors of the article please rephrase/clarify this. 213.61.58.164 (talk) 11:47, 12 July 2016 (UTC)kookee

'Great War'
Where it says 'also known as the First World War and the Great War' should it be put in parentheses Great War (prior to WWII)? Because no one and I mean no one calls WWI the Great War anymore. Just my thoughts and I can't edit it since I'm an IP and it's semi-protected. 75.151.5.228 (talk) 14:26, 27 July 2016 (UTC)
 * Have you so much as tried googling "Great War"? --jpgordon&#x1d122;&#x1d106; &#x1D110;&#x1d107; 14:50, 27 July 2016 (UTC)
 * Great War is an out-dated way to reference WWI. It is only used for historical reference and feel. It is entirely archaic. No historian uses it except in reference to what it was formerly called. Trust me.75.151.5.228 (talk) 15:29, 27 July 2016 (UTC)
 * Certainly it is not today's primary way of referring to the subject, but it was widely used at the time, and still often appears in the retrospectroscope. See, for example National Geographic PBSCanadian EncyclopediaUK National ArchivesThe Atlantic LeadSongDog come howl!  18:50, 27 July 2016 (UTC)
 * Certainly in the UK you can see and hear the term Great War used without anybody thinking it was odd or outdated. MilborneOne (talk) 19:54, 27 July 2016 (UTC)

Ottoman entry
At the moment the section on the Ottoman Empire begins:

"The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in the war with the secret Ottoman–German Alliance signed in August 1914.[93] The Ottomans threatened Russia's Caucasian territories and Britain's communications with India via the Suez Canal."

This isn't accurate as the Ottoman entry into the war began on 29 October 1914 when its navy attacked the Russian Black Sea coast. This prompted Russia and its allies, Britain and France, to declare war on the Ottomans. Instead of clarity the current entry is vague and doesn't give any indication of dates and cause & effect. Instead I'd like it changed to:

"The Ottoman Empire joined the war on the side of the Central Powers when it attacked the Russian Black Sea coast on 29 October 1914. This prompted Russia and its allies, Britain and France, to declare war on the Ottomans in November 1914."

Can I get permission to change it or can someone make the edit for me?

thanks

Wikipedia Tarzan (talk) 10:06, 19 June 2016 (UTC)
 * Well this is a bit odd. Currently there seems to be three different dates in the article for this event: Nov 14 in the lead, August 14 in the body (signing of the agreement), and October 14 in the footnotes. Seems like some of the disagreement is in the signing of an agreement vs. shots fired. But I'm still not sure how we wound up with three dates. Timothy Joseph Wood  12:18, 20 June 2016 (UTC)


 * Thanks for your response. At the moment the entry is erroneous in saying:

"The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in the war with the secret Ottoman–German Alliance signed in August 1914."

Since the Ottoman Empire did not join the Central Powers in war in August 1914. My proposed edit would undo this factual error and clearly state what happened in October and November 1914: "The Ottoman Empire joined the war on the side of the Central Powers when it attacked the Russian Black Sea coast on 29 October 1914. This prompted Russia and its allies, Britain and France, to declare war on the Ottomans in November 1914."

Can someone insert this text on the page and get rid of the erroneous information?

Thanks,

Wikipedia Tarzan (talk) 08:17, 22 June 2016 (UTC)

Sorry, I've been elsewhere and haven't found the time to pin down a source for this. If you can provide a source and page number it can be easily verified and quickly incorporated. Timothy Joseph Wood 12:42, 23 June 2016 (UTC)

Great & thanks. Here's a source with page number:

The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies, edited by Herausgegeben von Holger Afflerbach, De Gruyter, 2015 p163

Hope this is ok

Wikipedia Tarzan (talk) 22:39, 28 June 2016 (UTC)


 * Ok, so the difference seems to be between when they joined the war and when the joined battle. Your source does indicate that they joined battle on that date. But, compare this source, which covers the actual treaty between them and Germany. So, to avoid making a decision on which event counts as "joining the war", I have changed the passage to indicate what occurred on both dates. Hopefully this will suffice. Timothy Joseph Wood  12:47, 29 June 2016 (UTC)

The current edit as of August 10, 2016 reads as follows: "They then joined battle on when they attacked the Russian Black Sea coast". This includes a grammatical issue and should read instead "They then joined battle when they attacked the Russian Black Sea coast" (Remove the "on") Nerdcorenet —Preceding undated comment added 02:58, 11 August 2016 (UTC)

Semi protected edit request on 14 Aug 2016
This article needs to be edited to correct grammar errors and poorly crafted prose, generally speaking. Also, the introductory section fails to mention America's involvement in the war. That is quite an ommision. With regards to the US, they are already mentioned three times in the lead section, - Arjayay (talk) 14:43, 14 August 2016 (UTC)
 * ❌ as you have not requested specific changes in the form "Please replace XX with YY" or "Please add ZZ between PP and QQ".

Brest Litovsk victory?
I don't understand how the treaty itself was a victory, let alone 'in fact a victory'- please justify. Gravuritas (talk) 19:08, 30 August 2016 (UTC)
 * The treaty was forced on Russia, whose government had just collapsed. It was a formal declaration that the Central Powers had defeated them on the eastern front. It was (would have been if they had won the war) also very favorable to Germany in land and reparations. Timothy Joseph Wood  19:12, 30 August 2016 (UTC)


 * I believe the confusion is about a treaty being described as a victory, rather than the terms of that treaty being a victory. I agree the wording is a little odd.  I'll see what I can do.  --A D Monroe III (talk) 20:13, 30 August 2016 (UTC)


 * Completely accept the description of the situation as described by TJW- in fact that's possibly an understatement- but my feeling is that the treaty was the recognition of a military victory, not a victory in itself.  If the treaty had got better terms than one would have expected from the military situation, that would have been a treaty victory.  As ADM suggests, in those circs the wording is a bit odd.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 20:52, 30 August 2016 (UTC)
 * Well, to put it a different way, the real victory for Germany was shutting down half the war. Had there been no treaty, the threat was that Germans would continue marching through a broken Russia. Russia didn't want that really, but Germany really didn't want that, because they wanted all those troops in the west. Timothy Joseph Wood  21:00, 30 August 2016 (UTC)


 * I've reworded it slightly in this edit. I think it's still slightly awkward, but I didn't want to refactor most of the paragraph just to make it flow a fit better.  Others are welcome to improve.  --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:37, 2 September 2016 (UTC)

Allied war crimes
The Royal Navy's starvation blockade of Germany was illegal under international law. Churchill is widely suspected of deliberately allowing civilians to be killed on RMS Lusitania in order to bring the United States into the war. It was not legal for passenger liners to carry war munitions and explosives. (HiremanFam (talk) 19:39, 20 September 2016 (UTC))
 * that's how Berlin talked in 1914 but no scholar agrees. The issue was whether German subs allowed passengers & crew to board lifeboats as required by intl law.  Rjensen (talk) 06:52, 4 October 2016 (UTC)

Did Britain have a choice?
A TV documentary series said Britain had to enter the war in order to preserve its empire in Africa and Asia. (165.120.240.108 (talk) 06:39, 4 October 2016 (UTC))
 * that seems unlikely. Germany did not have a strong navy & could hardly threaten much.  Rjensen (talk) 06:50, 4 October 2016 (UTC)
 * The narrator said the survival of Britain's vast empire required remaining on good terms with France (in Africa) and Russia (in Asia). Failing to support Russia and France against Germany would have caused much ill feeling. Germany's navy was second only to the Royal Navy. (165.120.240.108 (talk) 07:11, 4 October 2016 (UTC))


 * Britain's self-interest was in surviving as an independent state, never mind the Empire. It could not  do that as an island offshore from a continent dominated by one country- in this case Germany, previously the same applied to Napoleon's France.  Luckily for Europe, the interests of freedom and Britain's self-interest coincided.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 07:24, 4 October 2016 (UTC)
 * The war had nothing to do with "freedom" as Britain, France, Russia and Germany were all imperial powers with empires. (165.120.240.108 (talk) 07:34, 4 October 2016 (UTC))
 * If I remember correctly, the study was about the Second World War, but it's position works here as an off hand comment: the Western European states existed within an ideological duality of being Democratic nation states that advocated for such political movements, yet ran colonial empires in a very different manner. Now, while am not saying the First World War was or was not about "freedom" (that essentially was the casus belli behind the UK entering the war in support of Belgium), having an empire and being an imperial power is in itself not a retort.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 08:29, 4 October 2016 (UTC)


 * Of course the war had a great deal to do with freedom, within Europe at the least. Examine the status of the various ethnic groups within the European part of the German empire, and try applying that situation to the wholecontinent under, say, the terms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.  All imperial powers were not the same.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 09:55, 4 October 2016 (UTC)

Mislabelled Photo?
As i was browsing the page i read the caption of this photograph, which is "French soldiers under General Gouraud, with machine guns amongst the ruins of a cathedral near the Marne, 1918." as i looked at the photo i thought 'that cannot be a cathedral' firstly it is made of two different types of material on the left there is brick, and on the right it is made of what i am assuming is some kind of quarried stone. secondly as far as i am aware there is no cathedral near the river Marne. Thirdly the actual picture's caption says it is the ruin of a church. Fourth because it is made of at least two different types of masonry i thought that it wouldn't be a church because they tend to be old buildings made exclusively of quarried stone, so to find one with a brick part would be extremely strange. Based on these facts i believe it is more likely to be the ruins of a old house which has had an extension built onto it, rather than a church. i haven't done anything yet, because i wanted a second opinion on it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by JJIHARKER (talk • contribs) 16:52, 6 December 2016 (UTC)


 * The description appears to be from the US Department of Defense (archive source). So unless you have a source that says differently, I'm afraid we have to go with the DoD over any original research, no matter how convincing it may be. Timothy Joseph Wood  16:57, 6 December 2016 (UTC)

Fair enough, but it does still look a bit fishy but you got to do what you got to do — Preceding unsigned comment added by JJIHARKER (talk • contribs) 16:59, 6 December 2016 (UTC)


 * The commons image information does say "church near the Marne" not cathederal. MilborneOne (talk) 19:39, 6 December 2016 (UTC)
 * Sorry ignore that the DoD says Cathederal. MilborneOne (talk) 19:42, 6 December 2016 (UTC)


 * There are cathedrals in the Marne Valley area, including Langres (Saint Mammes), and Meaux (Saint Stephen). But I see no way of telling from the picture which, if any it might be. Mediatech492 (talk) 20:43, 6 December 2016 (UTC)


 * It seems like it would make everyone's lives easier to simply say "amongst ruins near the Marne," and make everyone happy in one fell swoop? After all, it's not entirely clear how the DoD identifies this particular pile of rubble as being anything in particular at all. It is clearly a ruin, so why don't we just go with the simpler is better option? Timothy Joseph Wood  20:48, 6 December 2016 (UTC)

ottoman leaders
you should also add Three Pashas to the leader side of the empire, they have suspended the emperors powers (except for ceremonial ones) after the coup which led turkey to war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.140.225.144 (talk) 22:57, 13 December 2016 (UTC)

Soldiers who didn't fire at the enemy
I once read in a paper (around 1990) that in World War I, 90% of soldiers didn't fire their ammunition at the enemy, but in the air. Can this be true???Marcin862 (talk) 19:11, 15 January 2017 (UTC)
 * Much as I would love to have this discussion this is for discussing improvements to the article, not general discussion about the Great War.Slatersteven (talk) 19:16, 15 January 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 12 February 2017
WORLD WAR 1 was a problem that faced america in the first decade of the 19OO's — Preceding unsigned comment added by Brian20021 (talk • contribs) 22:49, 12 February 2017 (UTC)
 * Firstly World War 1 took part in the 2nd decade of the 20th Century, not the first, secondly, you havn't said what change you want to make.Nigel Ish (talk) 22:55, 12 February 2017 (UTC)

misspelling ?
in the lead, should the word "gruelling" be replaced with "grueling"? L.S. inc. (talk) 23:49, 16 February 2017 (UTC)


 * The article uses British English spelling, "gruelling" is correct". Mediatech492 (talk) 00:37, 17 February 2017 (UTC)

okay. L.S. inc. (talk) 00:40, 17 February 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 21 February 2017
66.161.137.115 (talk) 14:34, 21 February 2017 (UTC) dear sir mixalot, please let me edit If you want to suggest a change, please request this in the form "Please replace XXX with YYY" or "Please add ZZZ between PPP and QQQ". Please also cite reliable sources to back up your request, without which no information should be added to, or changed in, any article. - Arjayay (talk) 15:25, 21 February 2017 (UTC)
 * You need to say what your edit is going to be.Slatersteven (talk) 14:39, 21 February 2017 (UTC)
 * ❌ This is not the right page to request additional user rights.

alliances - inaccurate and misleading
In order to understand the causes of the WW1 it is essential to counteract popular misconceptions of how the war started. One of the most enduring misconceptions is that the "alliance system" started the war - and -linked to this- is the idea that the central powers are deliberately provoking war with Russia.

It becomes essential to explain that Serbia is not allied to Russia. That is Russia is not obliged by treaty to come to her defence. Unless you explain this you cannot understand how Austria can declare war on Serbia without expecting the Russians to come to Serbia's aid. Rather Russia makes a decision to come to Serbia's aid wholly independently of any treaty obligations.

Equally, Great Britain is not allied to France or Russia. Again, Great Britain makes a decision to enter the war wholly independently of any treaty obligations to France or Russia. We must make this clear and avoid using the word alliance in both these context-, because it is both inaccurate and misleading.Keith Johnston (talk) 08:51, 11 March 2017 (UTC)


 * this graphic is better Keith Johnston (talk) 09:31, 11 March 2017 (UTC)




 * But it throws away the geography. Why not just edit the legend/colours of the previous map? GraemeLeggett (talk) 17:09, 11 March 2017 (UTC)
 * that would be ideal, but I have no access to the map to do that. Since the map is inaccurate in important ways it should be amended, but in the absence of that, it should ultimately be removed if no-one can edit it.Keith Johnston (talk) 18:56, 11 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Is this OR or do RS make counter the claim made in many RS that the alliance system was partially responsible for the war?.Slatersteven (talk) 19:05, 11 March 2017 (UTC)
 * The key point is that the map is inaccurate - there is no alliance between Serbia and Russia (if there is give me the date, name and terms?) or Great Britain and France. The Entente is not an alliance - As British Foreign Office Official Eyre Crowe minuted: "The fundamental fact of course is that the Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to have no substance at all. For the Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content." Also Ponting, Clive (2002). Thirteen Days: The Road to the First World War. Chatto & Windus. ISBN 978-0-7011-7293-0."Russia had no treaty of alliance with Serbia and was under no obligation to support it diplomatically, let alone go to its defence"  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Keith Johnston (talk • contribs) 19:16, 11 March 2017 (UTC)
 * And it was not the invasion of France that brought Britain into the war, it was the invasion of Belgium. As a result of negotiations, the representatives of the Russian and French general staffs signed a military convention on Aug. 5, 1892, which provided for mutual military aid in the event of a German attack. By an exchange of letters between Dec. 15, 1893, and Dec. 23, 1893 (Jan. 4, 1894), both governments announced their ratification of the military convention. It was not Russians alliance with Serbia, but Frances alliance with Russia that was the issue.Slatersteven (talk) 21:09, 11 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I have added the erroneous map here as this is what is being discussed. That map contains a number of important errors most importantly -  there is no alliance between Serbia and Russia.  The Entente is not an alliance.    Map Europe alliances 1914-en.svg in green; Triple Alliance in brown]] Keith Johnston (talk) 08:58, 12 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I expanded the caption to explain the "alliance" issue. The map does NOT assert an "alliance between Russia and Serbia." RS often use "ally" eg Lyon 2015: "For Serbia, the most pressing question centered on Russia: would the Tsar honor Russia's commitment to Serbia?51 A Russian refusal of support to its Balkan ally would mean Serbia must stand alone against Austria" [here are examples used in 2017 by multiple online dictionaries: a formal treaty is NOT necessary to be an ally: 1) Canada and the United States were allies in World War II.; 2) There may be occasions when America can ally with some of those states, as we did during the Gulf War.  3) An example of an ally is Britain to the US in World War II. 4) One in helpful association with another: legislators who are allies on most issues. 5) a nation, group, or person associated with another or others for some common cause or purpose. 6) a country that agrees to help or support another country in a war Rjensen (talk) 09:51, 12 March 2017 (UTC)
 * The expanded caption describes the relationships as "coalitions". A coalition is a temporary alliance for combined action. This is 1) not the relationship between Serbia and Russia immediately prior to the war. 2) Neither is it the relationship between Britain on the one hand and Russia and France on the other. Therefore I cannot agree with coalition. Moreover the problems with the map goes beyond the visible caption as the text in the map says "Military Alliances in 1914". The map certainly asserts an alliance between Russia and Serbia - describing Serbia and Montenegro as "Slavic Allies of Russia" ( an-a historical term it itself, what does "Slavic Allies mean?). As for historians using the term, "ally" imprecisely, let us not compound that error by repeating it.  I repeat Ponting, Clive (2002). Thirteen Days: The Road to the First World War. Chatto & Windus. ISBN 978-0-7011-7293-0."Russia had no treaty of alliance with Serbia and was under no obligation to support it diplomatically, let alone go to its defence". See OS Eyre Crowe on the Entente (above) - The Entente is not a military alliance, this map says it is.  This map is wrong and misleading.  In the absence of an alterative suggestion I would remove the map and, ideally replace it with a map of Europe in 1914 and the graphic previously suggested.  This map creates confusion.  Can I suggest we focus on the content of the map (which cannot easily be changed) rather than the caption, which can be changed but does not matter in the sense that the text in the map will remain even if we change the caption?  Please also address both the errors - 1) The Entente and 2) Serbia  Keith Johnston (talk) 10:25, 12 March 2017 (UTC)


 * It would be nice to fix the wording on the map....who knows how to do that? The caption now explains away the term "alliance". The map does NOT say there was an alliance between Russia and Serbia.  it uses "ally" (RS use "ally" when there is no treaty--as in Israel is an important American ally.) Note: historians agree that Serbia was a client state of Russia which protected it against Austria.    Clark says Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov warned Austria in 1914 that Russia "Would respond militarily to any action against the client state." Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2012) p 481. As  for the map, there is no available alternative and a map of July 1914 is essential to understand that critical month.  I changed the caption to this: Only the Triple Alliance was a formal "alliance"; the others listed were informal patterns of support. Serbia was a client state of Russia which told Austria it would protect its client. that takes care of Entente & Serbia, I think.  As for the graphic proposed: it has many major mistakes. it falsely states there was an "alliance" between Germany and Ottomans in 1914. Not true. It also gets Bulgaria all wrong. Its spatial relations are badly garbled.  Rjensen (talk) 11:11, 12 March 2017 (UTC)
 * agreed that the graphic has its own problems. Rjensen is quite correct in that there is no alliance between Ottomans and Germany.  In the absence of a better map, which would be the best solution, I agree that the best solution is to change the caption.  If we agree that the map should convey the alliances and alignments of pre war Europe then I suggest a slight alteration of Rjensen text to state:  "Note: The map in incorrect - only the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance were formal defensive "alliances"; the others listed represent informal patterns of support rather than formal alliances."  "Client-state" is a controversial and non-neutral statement.  The Russians may have seen the Serbs as a Client-state, but did the Serbs?  Did The British?  Did the Germans?  Did the Austrians? We can quickly see the term is too subjective to be used as a factual statement without substantial caveat.  Such caveats are better inserted in to the text of the body of the article (probably on the Causes of the War), not a caption which should be brief.Keith Johnston (talk) 17:07, 12 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Re "client state" -- the issue is do the 21st century RS see Serbia as a client state of Russia and the cites prove yes they do. 1) "Serbia was essentially a client state of Russia," [ Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I (2009) p 20. 2) "Serbia itself became a Russian client state " [Reneo Lukic, ‎Allen Lynch - 1996 p 331] 3) "Austria-Hungary's leaders hesitated only because Serbia was a client-state of Russia, and Russia had an ally in France" [Bowman - 1998 p 372]; 4)--here's a 1922 usage: " Serbia, which had become almost a. client state of ... Russia" [Ency Britannica 1922]; 5) "great tension between Austria and Serbia, a Russian client state. " [Haffner 1989 p 78]; 6) in July 1914 "Russia promptly mobilized to protect its little client state," [Merry 2005]; 7) " St. Petersburg had many motives for acting as the patron of a greater-Serbian client state." [Hermann, 1997 p 115] 8) "Russia's status as a Great Power required that it not allow its client state, Serbia, to be humiliated, much less obliterated. " [Noble et al 2007 textbook]. 9) "Montenegro was effectively a Russian client state" [Ponting 2002 p 60] 10) "Britain regarded Serbia as a client state of Russia" [Cowper 1990 p 209]  11) " Serbia's overt hostility to Austria was made possible by Russian patronage of its most reliable client state" [Lowe 2013]. Rjensen (talk) 02:47, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * The caption is still incorrect, you need to add the caveat on the Franco-Russian alliance. Should state "Only the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance were formal defensive "alliances"; the others listed represent informal patterns of support rather than formal alliances."  Informal pattern of support is an improvement on "client-state", which is too subjective to be defensible and we have a good alternative.  Clarke uses "client state" (p481) in the context of referring to the Sazanov's view of Serbia, not as an objective statement of fact.  In any case Russian influence and support varied significantly between Serbia and Bulgaria almost on a monthly basis.  There is no need to give undue prominence to Sazanoz's warning  as it is not dated so we don't know where that fits into the chronology of the July crisis.  The warning is better placed in the text (most usefully in the Causes of WW1 article, where it can be placed into context) and where it can be sourced and caveated.Keith Johnston (talk) 12:56, 13 March 2017 (UTC)


 * On use of "client state" - Christoper Clark is explicit on use of the term client state, on exactly this issue: Russia's view of Serbia and Sazanov's view in particular: "It was a risk enhancing initiative to see Serbia as a kind of client...Serbia to my knowledge, has never been a client of anyone.  This is a mistake, when Great Powers think they can secure the services of "client states". That "clients" are never, in fact, "clients".  But this is a mistake that is presumably going to be keep being made by our political leaderships, though one hopes one day it will stop." CIRSD Conference on WWI: Panel "What Kind of Failure?" - Prof. Christopher Clark, 21:48.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sV2147p9xho Published on 30 May 2014.  Hence client state is too subjective a term to be allowed, or at the very least too subjective to be used without caveat in the body of the text.Keith Johnston (talk) 14:10, 13 March 2017 (UTC)

Chronology of the start of the war
The article states:

On 28 July, the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia.[13][14] As Russia mobilised in support of Serbia, Germany invaded neutral Belgium and Luxembourg before moving towards France, leading the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany.

This is misleading as it gives the strong impression that as the Russian are merely mobilising, the Germans are invading Belgium. In fact the Russians begin mobilisation on 25 July and in response to this the Germans mobilise. A more neutral and informative explanation would be:

On 25 July Russia began mobilisation and on 28 July, the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia.[13][14] Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia to demobilise, and when this was refused, declared war on Russia on 1 August. Germany then invaded neutral Belgium and Luxembourg before moving towards France, leading the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany.

I realise the need for brevity in this section, and this adds a lot of meaning in a few words.Keith Johnston (talk) 09:18, 11 March 2017 (UTC)


 * The meaning that it adds is misleading. The mobilisation period for Russia was much longer than that for Germany, so Germany's invasions & declaration of war on Russia were not the consequences of the Russian mobilisation.  Your statement of the chronology implies causation, but Germany's actions were simply in accordance with their long-planned war plan.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 15:49, 11 March 2017 (UTC)
 * 1) I can reference historians who would disagree on the causation, latterly Clark: "The Russian general mobilisation was one of the most momentous decisions of the July crisis. This was the first of the general mobilisations. It came at the moment when the German government had not yet even declared the State of Impending War". Clark, Christopher (2013). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.  And: "German efforts at mediation – which suggested that Austria should “Halt in Belgrade” and use the occupation of the Serbian capital to ensure its terms were met – were rendered futile by the speed of Russian preparations, which threatened to force the Germans to take counter–measures before mediation could begin to take effect" ibid.


 * Thus, in response to Russian mobilisation, Germany ordered the state of Imminent Danger of War (SIDW) on 31 July, and when the Russian government refused to rescind its mobilisation order, Germany mobilised and declared war on Russia on 1 August. Given the Franco-Russian alliance, countermeasures by France were, correctly, assumed to be inevitable and Germany therefore declared war on France on 3 August 1914.


 * 2) The idea of a ″long-planned war" (Fischer et al) is rejected by almost all modern historians (Clark, Macmillan, Strachan) and is to say the least highly controversial. among the few still peddling that are the journalist Max Hastings. Hence the absolute need to amend the text to something more neutral.  Even if we disagree the rules of Wikipedia would make that conclusion too controversial to stand alone as it does at present. Keith Johnston (talk) 19:09, 11 March 2017 (UTC)


 * In addition to comments on 1) I would add Clark

"Yes, the Germans declared war on Russia before the Russians declared war on Germany. But by the time that happened, the Russian government had been moving troops and equipment to the German front for a week. The Russians were the first great power to issue an order of general mobilisation and the first Russo-German clash took place on German, not on Russian soil, following the Russian invasion of East Prussia. That doesn’t mean that the Russians should be ‘blamed’ for the outbreak of war. Rather it alerts us to the complexity of the events that brought war about and the limitations of any thesis that focuses on the culpability of one actor." Keith Johnston (talk) 08:40, 13 March 2017 (UTC)


 * Im planning to make the change proposed above tomorrow. Any further comments let me know. Keith Johnston (talk) 21:14, 14 March 2017 (UTC)


 * The above is not remotely NPOV. Why is the geography of the first Russo-German clash of any significance, given that the German strategy was to knock out France first, and until that had been done, be defensive in the East?  If you or Clark want to refer to who mobilised first, why are you studiously avoiding the considerable difference in mobilisation leadtimes btw Russia and Germany?  The initial para to which you are objecting is a more neutral staement than the line you are peddling of Germany purely reacting to Russian orders to mobilise.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 02:14, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I take Clark's point to mean that even if a country believes its acting on the defensive, its military can invade other countries. Equally, the fact that a country declares war first, as Germany did join this case with Russia, does not on its own mean that country was the agressor (e.g. Germany/UK WWII).  Clark believes it is vitally important to be aware that the Russian's mobilised on 25 July, prior to the Austrian declaration of war and prior to any military actions by Germany.  Hence my proposal to add that to the timeline.  The initial para makes no mention of Russian partial mobilisation on 25 July, nor the German ultimatum to Russia.  Not only is it factually incorrect (Russia starts to mobilise before Austria declares war) it also gives the strong impression that as the Russian are merely mobilising, the Germans are invading Belgium.  There is an intermediate stage -namely the German ultimatum and declaration of war, which can (and surely must, the German declaration of war is important in an article about WW1, right?) be included and what more we can still maintain the structure of the paragraph.  Its unclear to me why you object to this.  Perhaps you are concerned that this points the finger at Russia?  As Clark states:"That doesn’t mean that the Russians should be ‘blamed’ for the outbreak of war. Rather it alerts us to the complexity of the events that brought war about and the limitations of any thesis that focuses on the culpability of one actor." Clark is a distinguished RS, do you have any RS in support of your assertions? However, all that is sort of besides the point, I am making changes to account for important facts.  To my mind to object to these changes you would need to find sources to demonstrate that Russia did not begin to mobilise 1.1. million men on 25 July, that Germany did not declare war on Russia on 1 August or that for some reason these are not important. Keith Johnston (talk) 13:27, 16 March 2017 (UTC)


 * "The book challenges the imputation, hitherto widely accepted by mainstream scholars since 1919, of a peculiar "war guilt" attaching to the German Empire, instead mapping carefully the complex mechanism of events and misjudgements that led to war". That's WP's entry on Clark's book.  So, on the basis that it challenges something accepted by mainstream scholars, you'd better get a bit more firepower to support it before you start changing the article.  Try "In fact, the Germans issued the Austrians a blank cheque which they expected and wanted their allies to use." (The Cambridge History of Warfare, Parker, p271).  Try "All the evidence, and there is much, points to Imperial Germany preparing for a European war of aggression against France and Russia"  (Mud, Blood, and Poppycock, Gordon Corrigan, p29).  And "...the German declaration of war is important in an article about WW1, right?"  er, no.  In 1913 Moltke & Ludendorff decided that military operations would begin immediately upon notification of mobilization, with movement into neutral Luxemburg and Belgium- to spell it out, prior to declaration of war.  So your edit which inevitably only includes a few facts, selects those facts to imply that Germany was no more at fault than Russia.  So your edit cannot stand without much more support.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 22:25, 26 March 2017 (UTC)

Thanks. I think you are confusing a few things. My changes are to change this:

Old:

On 28 July, the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia.[13][14] As Russia mobilised in support of Serbia, Germany invaded neutral Belgium and Luxembourg before moving towards France, leading the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany.

to new:

On 25 July Russia began mobilisation and on 28 July, the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia.[13][14] Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia to demobilise, and when this was refused, declared war on Russia on 1 August. Germany then invaded neutral Belgium and Luxembourg before moving towards France, leading the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany.


 * This does not state, as you claim, that Germany was at no more fault than Russia. It corrects a factual error in the old version, namely that Russia does not begin to mobilise after the Austrian declaration of war, she begins to mobilise before the Austrian declaration of war.  I also add the fact that Germany declares war on 1 August, which is an essential piece of information because it effectively marks the formal start of WW1.  Germany both mobilised and declared war on the same day so your final point is otiose.  Who is "guilty" - if you want to use that terminology -  is a much more complex issue which, because of the brevity required on this page, is surely best discussed in detail on the Causes of WW1 page.  For the avoidance of doubt the changes - and Clark -  do not say Russia is guilty.  Keith Johnston (talk) 08:41, 1 April 2017 (UTC)


 * The implication of the timeline that you are so keen to insert is that Germany's mobilization was in reaction to Russia's mobilization. That's not supported by most source, and your enthusiasm for amending the article to reflect Clark's position cannot stand, in a well-established, sourced article, without more support.  The relative speeds of mobilization are of major significance in understanding who did what to whom, when, and what choices they had.  I suggest you try a few more sources and get some balance.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 06:36, 9 April 2017 (UTC)


 * Firstly I am careful to avoid stating in the para that  Germany's mobilization was in reaction to Russia's mobilization. Causation is best left to the Causes of WW1 article, where is can be explored in more detail.   Nevertheless, you are correct to state that is one of Clark's fundamental points, alongside noting that the Serbian response to the ultimatum was rejection on most points (another matter where it seems you disagree with Clark) .  Clark is a leading source, arguably the world's leading historian on this subject.  Feel free to source other historians, but none will disagree that Russia began its mobilisation first because its simply a fact - Strachan would suit your wider argument. Keith Johnston (talk) 20:39, 17 April 2017 (UTC)

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Suggestion for additional wikilink
In the introduction, the words "Belgian neutrality" (paragraph 4) should link to the Wikipedia article for the Treaty of London (1839). 67.149.110.240 (talk) 08:04, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 15 July 2017
5.36.199.28 (talk) 20:18, 15 July 2017 (UTC)

the first world could have been avoided if pricip the guy who assented
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Additionally, personal opinions should not be taken into an edit request. jd22292 (Jalen D. Folf) (talk) 20:51, 15 July 2017 (UTC)

It's not sebria
It is siberia Viral gohil (talk) 16:22, 31 July 2017 (UTC)


 * You are probably right but what has it to do with this article? MilborneOne (talk) 18:44, 31 July 2017 (UTC)


 * The word "sebria" does not appear anywhere in the article. My guess is that is a confusion of "Serbia" and/or "Siberia", which (of course) are two different places. Mediatech492 (talk) 21:27, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 13 August 2017
Waopledo (talk) 11:17, 13 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format. Favonian (talk) 11:22, 13 August 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 19 June 2017
{{subst:trim| 109.68.194.155 (talk) 10:37, 19 June 2017 (UTC)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format. Izno (talk) 12:34, 19 June 2017 (UTC)

If someone could please add that it was also called The War for Civilisation please. I'll send imagines of a medal from the war, once I unpack. The medal calls it The War for Civilisation. Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by ClieQueen1971 (talk • contribs) 14:45, 13 August 2017 (UTC)

Error in Prelude Section
Ferdinand and entourage were not returning from the hospital. They were returning from a reception at City Hall. They decided to skip the rest of the day's program and were heading TO the hospital to visit those injured by the bomb.

In the preceding paragraph, instead of saying that the thrown bomb missed and the convoy continued on, it is more accurate to say that the thrown bomb barely missed Franz Ferdinand and blew up under the next car injuring a number of military and dignitaries and roughly a dozen bystanders. Then it would make sense why the Archduke's party was going to the hospital -- since some of their party were wounded in the initial procession.

114.88.221.215 (talk) 05:05, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

Error in starting date
The right-side info panel lists the starting year as 1941 instead of 1914 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.50.95.162 (talk) 13:36, 25 August 2017 (UTC)
 * Fixed, I wonder how long it has been like that?Slatersteven (talk) 13:37, 25 August 2017 (UTC)

this map is wrong for yugoslavia part
a-h empire borders were close to montenegro and serbian borders. a-h empire included at that time croatia, slovenia, bosnia herzegovina. bosnia and herzegovina is left out on that a-h part. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A00:1028:9198:E50E:AD1C:F48B:7C3E:37FF (talk) 07:48, 8 September 2017 (UTC)

SEPTEMBER 17th 2017, Wrong Hyper Linking to another article
In the top of this page it states a brief summary of the war and goes into detail of how Germany invaded Belgium and Luxembourg. The hyperlink for the invasion of Luxembourg FALSELY leads to the WW2 invasion by Nazi Germany, instead of the correct WW1 occupation/invasion page. Thank you!

This is the line in which the issue will be found.

"The border between France and Germany was heavily fortified on both sides so, according to the Schlieffen Plan, Germany then invaded neutral Belgium and Luxembourg before moving towards France from the north, leading the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany on 4 August due to their violation of Belgian neutrality." 180.3.173.224 (talk) 08:54, 17 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Done.Slatersteven (talk) 09:16, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

While you removed the hyperlink, there is a possible page you can redirect to instead which is the WW1 occupation of Luxembourg by germany. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 180.3.173.224 (talk) 09:17, 18 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Done. --A D Monroe III (talk) 17:39, 18 September 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 23 September 2017
ADD a reference to the German historian Fritz Fischer who proved that the Kayser and the German Army actually provoked the first world war. Nataf (talk) 21:15, 23 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Sparkling Pessimist   Scream at me!  22:11, 23 September 2017 (UTC)

Who caused WW1
Shouldn't responsibility be discussed somewhere in the article? I bet some people come here to find out.Ernio48 (talk) 19:36, 27 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Why? Blaming someone for a past war isn't useful.  And how?  --A D Monroe III (talk) 19:48, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I don't know how. But someone might be looking for such info. And reading a very long article on July Crisis isn't comfortable.Ernio48 (talk) 20:00, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I think the question of responsibility (by all sides) is best covered in the Causes of World War I article. It is an unnecessary redundancy to repeat it here. Mediatech492 (talk) 03:10, 28 September 2017 (UTC)
 * That's helpful, thanks. I have read July Crisis but didn't find much apart from how it unfolded, who said what, etc.Ernio48 (talk) 05:56, 28 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Responsibility, accountability, cause, and blame are related but quite distinct concepts. Making sense of what went wrong is the whole point of history, lest we be "doomed to repeat it". Assigning blame (and damage reparations) was a grand folly of 1922, however understandable.  Yes, the main treatment of causes (i.e. "what set the stage", not "who did it") belongs in the  article, but there should also be a capsule version of its lede section shown here.LeadSongDog  come howl!  19:33, 28 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Oy. Covering various causes is great -- in fact, likely necessary to give needed context. Historical assignments of reparations is part of the war's documented effects; that goes in.  No one has expressed any opposition to anything like that.
 * But the question was who caused WW1. That's the question I responded to.  Affixing blame is something officially appointed courts are for, which don't exist for the "crime" of WW1.  It's beyond WP's "jurisdiction" to attempt to answer "who".   --A D Monroe III (talk) 20:41, 28 September 2017 (UTC)
 * To chime in, the whole issue has been subject of which debate for the past 100-years. For example, in the aftermath of the war, German historians attempted to prove that Germany was not responsible for starting the war and thus release Germany from her obligations from reparations. Fritz Fischer, for another example, argued that Germany did in fact start it, and was the consensus opinion for a while IIRC. Whereas more recent studies have suggested it is a whole lot more complicated than that.
 * In short, I agree with A D Monroe III.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:09, 28 September 2017 (UTC)

The finale of the war
The section on the article about the end of the war is lacking in detail about developments on the Macedonian Front that led to Bulgarian and Ottoman capitulation. At the moment their capitulations are mentioned without any detail whatsoever under World War I. In the Vardar Offensive we see the collapse of the Bulgarian army that leads to them seeking an armistice, and the threat that the British Army advancing eastwards towards Constantinople posed led to Ottoman capitulation as well. Further to this the contribution of the Entente advance into Serbia to Austrian capitulation deserves a mention. I would add these to the article myself, but this is somewhat tricky given the overlap with World War I, so I'd like to hear what other editors think. Alcherin (talk) 19:52, 23 October 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 26 October 2017
the line " If Germany believed it would be many more months before American soldiers would arrive and that their arrival could be stopped by U-boats, it had miscalculated." has IMO an overly dramatic tone and does not suite the style of Wikipedia.

A reference how Germany did not not anticipated this responds and therefor miscalculated would be better suited.

(personal note) Not trying to be a ped-ant but I was enjoying reading this section and this last line was jarring. Thijs87126 (talk) 05:14, 26 October 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes check.svg Done Agreed. There is no reason to cite this odd 1930's speculation when more recent scholarship is available. Eggishorn (talk) (contrib) 05:31, 26 October 2017 (UTC)

phrasing on the section on "new nations"
The article explains: "The Russian Empire, which had withdrawn from the war in 1917 after the October Revolution, lost much of its western frontier as the newly independent nations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were carved from it. Romania took control of Bessarabia in April 1918.[204]"

It is misleading to claim both that Poland was a "new nation" and that it was "carved out" of Russia. The Wikipedia Article The Territorial Evolution of Poland clearly shows that large parts of Poland were annexed by the German Empire and the Austo-Hungarian Empire in the period before WW1.

This paragraph should be re-written to be more accurate.

ZeroXero (talk) 14:44, 11 November 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 20 November 2017
Under the section "Peace treaties and national boundaries", please provide some context or introductory information about Hagen Schulze as follows:

From: Schulze said the Treaty placed Germany "under legal sanctions, deprived of military power, economically ruined, and politically humiliated."

To: German historian Hagen Schulze said the Treaty placed Germany "under legal sanctions, deprived of military power, economically ruined, and politically humiliated."

Stokerm (talk) 06:02, 20 November 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes check.svg Done, although you could have made the edit yourself because you are autoconfirmed. Gulumeemee (talk) 07:38, 20 November 2017 (UTC)

Result: Allied Victory?
The panel on the right hand side states:

Result: Allied Victory

However, this is inaccurate and misleading. I have changed this twice to:

Result: Allied Victory (exception: Russian defeat)

This is to highlight the fact that a key members of the Allies, Tsarist Russia, was defeated by the Central Powers in 1917-18 before the war was concluded by the rump of the allies in 1918-19. This is highly significant. A Victory for Russia would have called into question the emergence of a free Poland and the Baltic states and Tsarist Russia may even have annexed Constantinople. The Russians did not participate in the treaty of Versailles, arguably one of the greatest weaknesses of the treaty. Therefore this is an important exception which needs to be highlighted prominently. I further argue that this change can be done unobtrusively by the addition of the parenthesis. Not all the Allies of 1914 emerged victorious in this war. Views please? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Keith Johnston (talk • contribs) 13:16, 27 November 2017 (UTC)


 * If as stated above, "The Russian Empire, which had withdrawn from the war in 1917 after the October Revolution, ... " is accurate it was by then no longer a belligerent, and so there is no need to qualify the result. By November 1918 Russia was no longer a combatant.

Misleading date?
In this sentence: "When Bulgaria signed a separate armistice on 29 September, Ludendorff, having been under great stress for months, suffered something similar to a breakdown. It was evident that Germany could no longer mount a successful defence." it seems to imply that Ludendorff had the breakdown on 29 september. However, according to David Stevenson 1914 - 1918, The History of the First World War (2012), page 468, it says that the news of Bulgarian negotiations was received by the Germans and that Ludendorff had his breakdown and demanded armistice on 28 september. Ulflarsen (talk) 13:07, 8 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Well picked up. Yes, it does imply that. Wrongly according to a random source I have just checked. I suggest, "When news of Bulgarian negotiations for a separate armistice reached Germany, Ludendorff, having been under great stress for months, suffered something similar to a breakdown on 28 September." The Bulgarians asked for an armistice on 25 September; did it really take 3 days for news to reach Ludendorff and then cause his breakdown? It seems rather a delayed effect. Gog the Mild (talk) 15:01, 8 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Asking for an armistice, and signing it are two different things. The way I read it, the negotiations were still ongoing when Ludendorf was informed of it; it was not yet a done deal. Mediatech492 (talk) 15:27, 8 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Stevenson writes as follows about Ludendorff on page 468: "On the evening of the 28th he collapsed, and decided Germany must at once seek a ceasefire." Ulflarsen (talk) 21:26, 8 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Deciding and demanding are not the same thing.Slatersteven (talk) 10:21, 9 January 2018 (UTC)
 * My point, as I start this thread with, is that Ludendorff's breakdown happened on the 28, not the 29th. Ulflarsen (talk) 11:36, 9 January 2018 (UTC)
 * And collapsed and breakdown do not mean the same thing, one can proceed the other.Slatersteven (talk) 11:46, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

Keegan: ''28 September... he lost it [his nerve] altogether, giving way to a paranoid rage 'against the Kaiser, the Reichstag, the navy and the home front '. His staff shut the door of his office to stifle the noise of his rantings until he gradually regained an exhausted composure.'' Doesn't sound like a breakdown or a collapse. More a fit of pique or a temper tantrum. Do we have a source which gives a more detailed description and/or uses the word "collapse" or "breakdown"? Hull would be a good source; does anyone have access to a copy? Gog the Mild (talk) 22:44, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

British Commonwealths in World War 1
I would like to see the individual commonwealths mentioned instead of the British Empire. We deserve as much credit as the empire we came to the aid of. I believe it is disrespectful to my great great grandfather who died from mustard gas syndrome. ArizonaRanger21 (talk) 17:14, 30 November 2017 (UTC)
 * Each of the British Dominions has a complete and detailed article that describes their respective commitments, and sacrifices in the war. I do not object to expanding this article wherever relevant; but considering the massive amount of subject matter that it encompasses it is an ongoing struggle to decide what to include here and what can be better served by putting it in the various branching articles. Mediatech492 (talk) 02:31, 1 December 2017 (UTC)

I should have specified more, what I mean is I would like the commonwealths mentioned in the belligerents under allied powers. ArizonaRanger21 (talk) 15:04, 1 December 2017 (UTC)
 * I'm sorry, but listing all the consituent parts of the British Empire would be an exceptionally long list, and would only raise the question of why we should include these, and not the territories of France, Russia, the US, or any other country on the list. I'm sorry, but all that information is currently in the main articles, for example, British Empire or Russian Empire, and I'm afraid interested readers will probably have to go to the main articles for that level of detail.  G M G  talk   15:18, 1 December 2017 (UTC)


 * Some specific mentions are made in the body of the article about particular units and campaigns. Which unit, which campaign is your focus?  The British Commonwealth didn’t exist until 1949, btw, so I think the British Empire in those days would naturally include such independent countries as e.g. Canada.
 * Gravuritas (talk) 16:02, 1 December 2017 (UTC)


 * None of the Empire's constituent countries awarded their own citizenship until after WW II. Before then the people from all parts of the Empire were British subjects, so 'British' refers to them too. It was their empire as much as anyone's. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.52 (talk) 09:03, 9 December 2017 (UTC)

Do you people realize that you are insisting on changing and omitting history for the only end of keeping an article, that encompasses the entire war, just a wee bit shorter? The word, "Australians" is only 4 letters longer than the word "British". I'm sure Arizonaranger knows when the Commonwealth came into existence, 1931 not 1949. I think he meant what "are now called" commonwealth countries be named. Regardless, at the time they weren't known as British when they were involved in battles but as the country from which they came. Their identity wasn't buried in "British Empire" by either Germany or France and certainly not Britain. When they awarded their own citizenship has nothing to do with the fact that when Germany was attacked they knew if it was by the Australians or Canadians or British or the French. Having the independent countries named under British Empire is far different than naming irrelevant territories of France or the US...even if the US Virgin Islands do have their own president. Independent countries that were heavily involved in the war militarily, politically and economically is far different than territories that only sent men to fill out French battalions.Brocky44 (talk) 09:47, 13 January 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 15 January 2018
{ — Preceding unsigned comment added by Salty4565 (talk • contribs) 14:37, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
 * It might be helpful to know what you want.Slatersteven (talk) 08:40, 16 January 2018 (UTC)

Missing missing?
I am currently working on the equivalent article on Wikipedia in Norwegian Bokmål, and I have added sources for killed and wounded soldiers and civilians (civilians are lacking in the infobox in this article). There is however listed missing, for both belligerents. From what I can see the source for that is the article World War I casualties. But when I look it up it seems that dead and missing are one and the same.

I wonder if someone have mixed this up, as if we add these numbers up we get a total of over 9 million dead on allied side and over 8 million dead for the central powers. This is far from what Stevenson states in 1914-1918, page 544. Or is this something else, like deserters? Ulflarsen (talk) 21:23, 8 January 2018 (UTC)

If one add (deaths and missing) it comes up at 17,6 millions (missing assumed dead). Now, Hew Strachan writes as follows in his The First World War (2013): "We know that the war was responsible for the death of over 9 million military personnel." (page xv in introduction). I assume someone has just mixed this up, basically counted the same number twice, so the part of missing should either be corrected with good sources, or removed. Ulflarsen (talk) 23:05, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

As no one address this question I add a reminder: ZeroXero, Stokerm, Mediatech492, Gravuritas, Brocky44, TrueRavin, Gog the Mild, MilborneOne, MilborneOne, Rjensen. The question is as follows:

1. Are missing equal with deads? 2. If missing are equal with deads, why are then our numbers about the double of what dependable sources gives?

Using the numbers in the infoboks I find that it adds up to 17,661 (dead + missing). It is about twice as what reliable sources states for deaths in world war one for soldiers. So either I have mixed something up, or the numbers are counted twice. Ulflarsen (talk) 23:28, 14 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Hi Ulfersen. Greetings all. Yes, looking at the two Wikipedia articles and what references I have, it seems that someone has got confused when composing the info box on this page. (Over 8mn military missing in total doesn't pass the "really?" test without very solid sourcing.) I would suggest deleting the "Military missing"; they are, as you say, already included in the KIA figure. And then adjusting the "Total" figure appropriately. For both belligerents. As you spotted it, would you care to do the honours? And well spotted – a gross mistake like that on a major page is worrying.


 * On a related note, do we want to put total civilian deaths in? It would seem appropriate to me, and if we are removing "Missing" it would leave the infobox no more crowded. Gog the Mild (talk) 10:08, 15 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Hi Gog the Mild and thanks for kind words. I hope someone quickly remove the "Military missing", I don't want to do it myself, both because I like to have others to look it over and besides that this is not my main Wikipedia. Regarding civilian deaths, I have started on that in our article in Wikipedia in Norwegian Bokmål. But the numbers are very vague and should be supplied with much caution. Hew Strachan writes in his overview of the war that "More specifically, we have no idea how many civilians died as a consequence of the First World War.", introduction, page XV. So if any numbers at all is given, due warning about they being very vague, should be given. Best regards, Ulflarsen (talk) 14:04, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
 * OK. I will wait 24 hours to give others a chance to input, and them boldly edit myself. Gog the Mild (talk) 14:17, 15 January 2018 (UTC)


 * I like both ideas: removing the "missing" which seems to be included in "killed" and causing the overall numbers to be way off, and also adding in the number of civilian dead. ZeroXero (talk) 16:16, 16 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Thank you for your support. Boldly edited. Gog the Mild (talk) 16:36, 16 January 2018 (UTC)

End date
I am not quite sure why the armistice date is used to indicate the end of the war?12:39, 13 January 2018 (UTC)

Brocky44 (talk) 05:03, 13 January 2018 (UTC)
 * That is when we generally celebrate the end of the war.Slatersteven (talk) 12:31, 13 January 2018 (UTC)

Sorry, who is "we"? Check World_War_I, and Termination of the Present War (Definition) Act 1918. I think you will find that it is the armistice which you celebrate.Leutha (talk) 12:39, 13 January 2018 (UTC)
 * .Slatersteven (talk) 12:42, 13 January 2018 (UTC)


 * As far as the general public are concerned the war and the fighting finished with the armistice, the legal ending of the war made no difference to the man on the street so they/us always celebrate the 11 November as the end of the war. MilborneOne (talk) 12:47, 13 January 2018 (UTC)

I am sorry, I disagree, that is a particular view point which holds sway amongst certain people. The link to 2014-2018 WW1 Centenary Events only lists events in a handful of countries. I feel that an article concerning the First World War as a Global War certainly needs to admit this amibuity rather than reflecting the popular opinion in one or two countries. Leutha (talk) 12:56, 13 January 2018 (UTC)
 * So c an you link to any countries that will be celebrating the end of the war in 2019?Slatersteven (talk) 12:59, 13 January 2018 (UTC)
 * the rule here is to rely on the reliable secondary sources. Relying on primary sources is strongly not recommended especially if you are not a trained lawyer. Rjensen (talk) 01:06, 14 January 2018 (UTC)
 * I was addressing the point made about how this is a view enjoyed by only a few countries. I think a demonstration when a given place is celebrating the end of WW1 is valid for purposes of demonstrating that.Slatersteven (talk) 11:11, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
 * The problem here is that the matter is not clear cut. It is not a matter of reinforcing the views of a handful of countries to the detriment of others. As regards, Afghanistan, for example, bearing in mind the use of the Termination of the Present War (Definition) Act 1918 as regards the Third Anglo-Afghan War, I am not sure how relevant it is to ask for evidence of them "celebrating" the end of the First World War in 2019. Please also check this. I am also not quite sure the relevance of the issue of the use of primary sources is? Leutha (talk) 09:34, 16 January 2018 (UTC)

Strange!? I didn't post anything about END DATE or ask the question "I am not quite sure why the armistice date is used to indicate the end of the war" My post is the one above, Incomplete Editing. Brocky44 (talk) 05:47, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

Incomplete editing
Under "The Hundred Days offensive" erasing of information has been done leaving the next sentence to state "Faced with these advances..." Anyone reading the article wouldn't know what advances the article is talking about because of the erasing editing. There was a reason that OHL issued orders for 6 armies to withdraw into the Hindenburg Line, it was a specific battle that broke through the Wotan position resulting in the rest of the Hindenburg Line being outflanked. That defeat left Ludendorff with no option but to withdraw his armies.

The article now reads: "Faced with these advances, on 2 September the German Supreme Army Command issued orders to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line in the south. This ceded without a fight the salient seized the previous April.[176] According to Ludendorff "We had to admit the necessity ... to withdraw the entire front from the Scarpe to the Vesle"

Without the erased part being reinserted in the article the above 3 lines might as well be erased also... since the advances and resulting danger facing OHL is not stated in the article. 6 German armies didn't withdraw into the Hindenburg Line just because of the British advances west of that defensive Line, it was because one section of the Hindenburg line was breached.

Also, the above current 3 lines of the article say: "...withdraw to the Hindenburg Line in the south. This ceded without a fight the salient seized the previous April." This would make one think that the salient seized the previous April was in the south, it wasn't, it was in the north near Ypres. Very poor editing by whoever did this, erasing out the middle part of the statement leaves the remaining words not make any sense. The middle part being ",behind the Canal Du Nord at the Canadian-First Army front and back to a line east of the Lys in the north giving up..." All together it reads "...withdrawal back into the Hindenburg line in the south, behind the Canal Du Nord at the Canadian-First Army front and back to a line east of the Lys in the north giving up without a fight the salient seized in the previous April." Now it makes sense.

This part was erased: "On September 2nd the Canadian Corps’ outflanking of the Hindenburg line, with the breaching of the Wotan Position, made it possible for the Third Army to advance and sent repercussions all along the Western Front. That same day OHL had no choice but to issue orders to six armies for withdrawal back into the Hindenburg line in the south, behind the Canal Du Nord at the Canadian-First Army front and back to a line east of the Lys in the north giving up without a fight the salient seized in the previous April. According to Ludendorff “We had to admit the necessity…to withdraw the entire front from the Scarpe to the Vesle.”

I understand completely the mindset of some Wiki editors and their preference for changing and omitting history in favour of saving space in an article. You can read the words of individual French military and politicians of WW1 as well as the same of the Germans and also the same of the British. They all recognized who the Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders were and what they had done when they did it. They weren't all simply lumped in as British, even though they were British subjects, they were from individual countries that had names and those names were spoken by ally and enemy alike whenever actions on the battlefield by those countries were played out. History is different at Wiki than what actually took place.

Any objections to editing the partial statement back to the complete original statement?Brocky44 (talk) 06:02, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

Consription
This article is bloated. It is also over focused on the Western Front and goes into arguably too much detail on the English speaking experience with little or no corresponding information regarding other nations' experiences. I consider the section on conscription to be a prime example. As much room as is given to Aviation and more than is given to the U-boat war. All of it relating to the Commonwealth; bar one sentence on the US, incongruously under 'Conscription in Britain'. I am going to drastically trim it, and point readers to the various perfectly good articles on conscription in the English speaking world.

If this is not considered appropriate, perhaps we could discuss it here? Gog the Mild (talk) 15:36, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Conscription was major issue in the UK, arguably the single most important thing. Yes it was not a British war, that does not mean that these things should be ignored as "not being universal enough". There is an argument for an article on the subject, but that is not an argument for trimming.Slatersteven (talk) 16:03, 21 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Conscription in the UK is now linked to the specific section on WWI, all seven lines of it. I would agree that this is worthy of more detail - but in a separate article. Currently Wikipedia seems to cover the whole question of Irish (non-)conscription in 1 line! That is worth an article in itself.


 * I could argue that conscription in the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire was a bigger issue than in Britain. But if I wanted to elaborate on this, which I readily could with plentiful references, I would put it in a separate article with a link to here. Similarly with the role of conscription in the Russian Revolution. We could easily generate 5,000 or more words on conscription in the various belligerents, all relevant to WWI, but this isn't the place for that. Let us clearly flag readers to this level of detail in specific articles. (Which sadly seem to be lacking.) Gog the Mild (talk) 19:52, 21 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Then go ahead and write those articles. But a this time this is the only place we have this material.Slatersteven (talk) 20:02, 21 January 2018 (UTC)


 * Fair point, well put. I will agree to use this page for information on conscription then. Let us see if we can provide sections on each of the belligerents. Gog the Mild (talk) 20:46, 21 January 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 1 February 2018
197.211.240.14 (talk) 15:49, 1 February 2018 (UTC)


 * Not done - user failed to make a request. MilborneOne (talk) 15:51, 1 February 2018 (UTC)

Missing: Featured article
I contribute almost only to Wikipedia in Norwegian Bokmål, and for over a year I have mainly worked on our article about World War I. This article is now featured in Norwegian Bokmål and I can not understand why this article is not improved so its featured also in Wikipedia in English. A few reason for doing this:


 * 1) This is not about just any war, its the war that George F. Kennan labeled as the original catastrophe.
 * 2) In various ways this war led to World War II, which makes it a must to know about if one wants to study that war, and the aftermath.
 * 3) The ways the war started is closer to today's situation than is comfortable, another good reason to study it. While its true that history never repeat itself its a lot of lessons to be learned from both how it began and how it was fought.
 * 4) Number of views are high, a daily average of close to 25 thousand. The many readers deserve a better article than the current one.

For anyone interested in taking on this task I can see at least two topics that needs to be covered in separate sections: Women and the politics of the home fronts. Females took a huge load of work in all countries involved in the war, and one can not understand how the war developed without knowing about the politics of the home fronts. If you will excuse my poor English, I do hope someone will find the time to improve this article so it can become featured. Ulflarsen (talk) 19:37, 6 February 2018 (UTC)

World War 1 or The First World War
Let me start by apologising if this has been discussed before - I had a quick scan through the archives and didn't see anything recent. The phrase 'World War 1' really jars with me - it sounds like the sort of shorthand name that people might use quickly in conversation, but I would have thought that the 'proper name' we give this ought to be The First World War.


 * Quick Google scholar check gives about 940,000 hits for "The First World War", and about 39,000 hits for "World War 1"
 * I also checked on Amazon - lots of respectable-looking academic books called "The First World War"; the ones called "World War 1" are less numerous, and they tend to be of the colourful, 'words and pictures' type aimed at school kids.

Should we consider renaming the page "The First World War", and mentioning that it is also called "World War 1"? I think that this would be a better reflection of how historians refer to it in their writing.Girth Summit (talk) 10:58, 9 March 2018 (UTC)

"outnumbered"?
"Being outnumbered on the Eastern Front, Russia urged its Triple Entente ally France to open up a second front in the west." Should this actually say "overpowered/-whelmed", not "outnumbered"? I thought the Russian Army was typically gigantic and swollen with barely trained recruits, and had more men than all of the other armies combined, or something like that. If this was a temporary situation, perhaps because Germany was able to mobilize their whole army faster and achieve a local numerical superiority before Russia could complete her mobilization, then maybe it should be made clearer. i

64.223.165.28 (talk) 02:37, 26 March 2018 (UTC)
 * The passage is talking about mobilized numbers as of August 1, 1914; while France and Britain were still neutral. The Russian army at mobilization numbered about 1.4 million and Serbian initial mobilization was about 200,000. These faced the combined armies of Germany which mobilized 1.9 million, and Austria-Hungary which mobilized over 400,000. Mediatech492 (talk) 03:24, 26 March 2018 (UTC)

Quoting the current page''Over forty years earlier in 1870, the Franco-Prussian War had ended the Second French Empire and France had ceded the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to a unified Germany. Bitterness over that defeat and the determination to retake Alsace-Lorraine made the acceptance of Russia's plea for help an easy choice''

Not sure why we are painting the French to be passive victims. Poincaré was Alsacian and Revanchard and took the initiative to meet with Nicholas 2 in St Petersburg after the assassination of the heirs to encourage him to go to war by extolling the two front eventuality. There is a quote somewhere about the guilt he should have for starting the war. Also, only the German/Alsacian language parts were reunified with Germany, not the entire provinces.

whitewashing
Quoting the current page''Over forty years earlier in 1870, the Franco-Prussian War had ended the Second French Empire and France had ceded the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to a unified Germany. Bitterness over that defeat and the determination to retake Alsace-Lorraine made the acceptance of Russia's plea for help an easy choice''

Not sure why we are painting the French to be passive victims. Poincaré was Alsacian and Revanchard and took the initiative to meet with Nicholas 2 in St Petersburg after the assassination of the heirs to encourage him to go to war by extolling the two front eventuality. There is a quote somewhere about the guilt he should have for starting the war. Also, only the German/Alsacian language parts were reunified with Germany, not the entire provinces. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.200.10.146 (talk) 20:38, 6 April 2018 (UTC)


 * This is hardly "painting the French as passive victims". There is almost always something more that could be said on any historical question, but in what must remain a fairly succinct  encyclopedia article we have to keep a sense of proportion. WWIReferences (talk) 20:04, 11 April 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 15 April 2018
Change "After a the stunning German Spring Offensive along the Western Front in the spring of 1918" to "After the stunning German Spring Offensive along the Western Front in the spring of 1918" or whatever, as the "a" is clearly a mistake. Vekz (talk) 20:31, 15 April 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes check.svg Done with thanks, Nici  Vampire  Heart  00:42, 16 April 2018 (UTC)

Need section on final casualty counts
An important question the casual reader would have - and currently no answer to it that is easily apparent. -Wwallacee (talk) 09:03, 22 April 2018 (UTC) Wwallacee (talk) 09:03, 22 April 2018 (UTC)
 * There is an entire article on World War I casualties. Mediatech492 (talk) 09:51, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

Daggers by Franz Joseph and Mehmed V
In the infobox under commanders and leaders it shows daggers by the names Franz Joseph I and Mehmed V. Although they both died during the coarse war, neither was killed in action which is usually what a dagger next to a person’s name indicates, especially in the context of a war. Vanagoy (talk) 12:15, 30 April 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 11 May 2018
216.200.63.108 (talk) 13:22, 11 May 2018 (UTC)
 * Red question icon with gradient background.svg Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. L293D (☎ • ✎) 13:30, 11 May 2018 (UTC)

Alsace-Lorraine
The opening section has the line: Over forty years earlier in 1870, the Franco-Prussian War had ended the Second French Empire and France had ceded the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to a unified Germany. To be correct the latter half should read ceded parts of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine Alsace-Lorraine was the name ascribed to the annexed areas of the 2 provinces when they became part of the German Empire, before that such a name didn't exist and even if it had done then as said Germany only aquired parts of each province not the whole of them. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:C7D:86B:4A00:A4D5:23B5:DE79:2A8 (talk) 18:59, 24 May 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 2 June 2018
Also known as the European war LivePrimer (talk) 13:42, 2 June 2018 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Eggishorn (talk) (contrib) 17:40, 2 June 2018 (UTC)

Changing infobox collage to a more extensive one
I also did this for the article on World War II. This doesn’t necessarily conflict with anything, so I’m not sure if consensus has to be found beforehand, unless somebody flat out disagrees. While it may seem unnecessary, I would say a wider visual depiction of the war is appropriate for the Infobox. Roddy the roadkill (talk) 20:16, 19 June 2018 (UTC)
 * The caption now completely overloads the infobox.Nigel Ish (talk) 12:06, 20 June 2018 (UTC)


 * Do we really need all these images in the infobox ? MilborneOne (talk) 12:14, 20 June 2018 (UTC)
 * That's really overkill for the infobox, and net effect of combining so many pictures into one is that none of them is large enough to have a visual impact. Better place individual images from the collage in the relevant sections of the article. — JFG talk 15:36, 20 June 2018 (UTC)
 * ❌ due to unanimous opposition so far, here and at Talk:World War II. Feel free to restore if you later obtain consensus. — JFG talk 15:42, 20 June 2018 (UTC)
 * File:WW1montageredux2.jpeg and File:WW1preview.png Roddy the roadkill (talk) 19:51, 20 June 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 8 July 2018
In the lead section, change "entangled-international-alliances" to "entangled international alliances". The hyphens are odd and unnecessary. 109.145.5.46 (talk) 17:40, 8 July 2018 (UTC)
 * Seems valid, done.Slatersteven (talk) 17:59, 8 July 2018 (UTC)

Anti-Semitic trope stuck in the article - needs to be removed
In section 4.5.2, under the heading "Russian Revolution," third, > paragraph, this content appears: Following the Tsar's abdication, >  Vladimir Lenin was > ushered by train from Switzerland into Russia 16 April 1917. He was > financed by  Jacob Schiff. > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I#cite_note-150> [142] > > The "citation" is to Cholly Knickerbocker. New York Journal American. > 3 February 1949. > > This is an old anti-Semitic trope, pushed down the years, under the > general heading that "the Jews" were behind the Russian Revolution, communism, etc. > Jacob Schiff, who vehemently opposed Bolshevism, did not finance Lenin > or any part of the revolution, but this one gossip column has been > used by white supremacist groups for decades as "proof" of the global > Jewish conspiracy.

71.198.75.98 (talk) 18:23, 1 August 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 2 August 2018
Change the links allied/central powers >leaders< from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Powers and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allies_of_World_War_I too instead https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_leaders_of_World_War_I and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leaders_of_the_Central_Powers_of_World_War_I 213.89.118.82 (talk) 09:39, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
 * Yes check.svg Done Danski454 (talk) 21:03, 3 August 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 30 July 2018
In section 4.5.2, under the heading “Russian Revolution,” third paragraph, this content appears: Following the Tsar's abdication, Vladimir Lenin was ushered by train from Switzerland into Russia 16 April 1917. He was financed by Jacob Schiff.[142]

The “citation” is to Cholly Knickerbocker. New York Journal American. 3 February 1949.

This is an old anti-Semitic trope, pushed down the years, under the general heading that “the Jews” were behind the Russian Revolution, communism, etc. Jacob Schiff, who vehemently opposed Bolshevism, did not finance Lenin or any part of the revolution, but this one note by a gossip column writer using the pseudonym "Cholly Knickerbocker" has been used by white supremacist groups for decades as “proof” of the global Jewish conspiracy. That citation itself has no basis in fact.

I am asking that you remove the reference to Jacob Schiff immediately. It is not supported by scholarship and is simply the spreading of an old anti-Semitic lie. Let’s stop spreading the hate. Thank you.

Cliff Baker cliffb714@comcast.net Cliffb714 (talk) 04:21, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
 * I agree. Lenin in fact was heavily subsidized by the German government. see   Rjensen (talk) 04:34, 30 July 2018 (UTC)


 * Yes check.svg Done —  Newslinger  talk   04:22, 4 August 2018 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 24 August 2018
Typo: Second paragraph, remove the "n" at the end of "Russian": "The conflict initially involved two opposing coalitions: France, Russian and Britain, in the Triple Entente, against the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary." Marttimo (talk) 22:25, 24 August 2018 (UTC)


 * Well picked! Now corrected! WWIReferences (talk) 22:57, 24 August 2018 (UTC)