The Keys to the White House

The Keys to the White House is a prediction system for determining the outcome of presidential elections in the United States. It was developed by American historian Allan Lichtman and Russian geophysicist Vladimir Keilis-Borok in 1981, adapting prediction methods that Keilis-Borok designed for earthquake prediction.

The system is a thirteen-point checklist that assesses the situation of the country and political system ahead of a presidential election: when five or fewer items on the checklist are false, the incumbent party nominee is predicted to win the election, but when six or more items on the checklist are false, the challenging party nominee is predicted to win.

Some of the items on the checklist involve qualitative judgment, and therefore the system relies heavily on the knowledge and analytical skill of whoever attempts to apply it. Using the system, Lichtman has correctly predicted the popular vote outcomes of each presidential election from 1984 to 2012. Though Lichtman claims he called the 2016 election correctly based on the 13 keys, his 2016 book and paper stated that the keys only referred to the popular vote, which Donald Trump lost. He switched to just predicting the winner after the 2016 election, stating recent demographics changes give Democrats an advantage in the popular vote in close elections, and correctly called the outcome of the 2020 election.

Lichtman argues that the checklist's content and its track record of reliability prove that the voters select the next president according to how well the country was governed in the preceding four years and that election campaigns have little, if any, meaningful effect on the voters. If the voters are satisfied with the governance of the country, they will re-elect the president or elect their party's nominee, but if they are dissatisfied, they will transfer the presidency to the challenging party.

Development
While attending a dinner party at Caltech in 1981, Allan Lichtman met Vladimir Keilis-Borok, a leading Russian geophysicist. Both men were Fairchild Scholars at Caltech. Keilis-Borok was interested in applying his prediction techniques to democratic political systems. This was not possible for him to do within the Soviet Union, which was a single-party autocracy, and a guest at the party referred him to Lichtman. Lichtman attracted Keilis-Borok's interest because he was a quantitative historian who mathematically analyzed trends in American history. Lichtman agreed to help Keilis-Borok apply his prediction techniques to American presidential elections.

Lichtman and Keilis-Borok examined data collated from every presidential election from 1860 to 1980 to identify factors that seemed predictive of election outcomes. From his own studies of American presidential elections, Lichtman had come to the conclusion that voters are in fact not swayed by election campaigns and instead vote according to how well the president has performed in office. Lichtman also noticed that even if the president did not seek re-election, his successes and failures would help or hinder the prospects of the nominee of his party: these insights shaped how he and Keilis-Borok conducted their research.

Lichtman and Keilis-Borok published their prediction model in a 1981 paper: at this stage, their system had 12 keys, including keys that considered the number of terms the incumbent party had held the presidency, and if the incumbent party had won a popular vote majority in the previous election. Another four keys were ultimately cut that considered political ideology, the dominant party of the era, if there was a serious contest for the challenging party nomination, and if the country was in wartime or peacetime.

The system was later modified to 13 keys, with the tenure key and the popular vote majority key both replaced by the party mandate key and the foreign/military failure and success keys being added.

Some of the keys are objective, such as economic growth, while some are subjective, such as candidate charisma.

The thirteen keys
The Keys to the White House is a checklist of 13 true/false statements that pertain to the circumstances surrounding a presidential election. If five or fewer of the following statements are false, the incumbent party is predicted to win the election. If six or more are false, the incumbent party is predicted to lose.


 * 1) Party mandate: After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives than after the previous midterm elections.
 * 2) No primary contest: There is no serious contest for the incumbent party nomination.
 * 3) Incumbent seeking re-election: The incumbent party candidate is the sitting president.
 * 4) No third party: There is no significant third party or independent campaign.
 * 5) Strong short-term economy: The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.
 * 6) Strong long-term economy: Real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth during the previous two terms.
 * 7) Major policy change: The incumbent administration effects major changes in national policy.
 * 8) No social unrest: There is no sustained social unrest during the term.
 * 9) No scandal: The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.
 * 10) No foreign or military failure: The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.
 * 11) Major foreign or military success: The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs.
 * 12) Charismatic incumbent: The incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.
 * 13) Uncharismatic challenger: The challenging party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.

Key 1: Party mandate
Key 1 (party mandate) is turned true if the incumbent party has achieved a net gain of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives after the term's midterm elections compared to the previous midterm elections. For example, Lichtman refers to the 1982 U.S. House elections in the middle of Ronald Reagan's first term when the Republicans lost 27 seats: as the Republicans had gained 35 seats in 1980, this left them with a net gain of eight seats, turning the key true.

Lichtman says that midterm elections reflect the performance of the incumbent party and are an indicator of nationwide electoral trends. Additionally, if the incumbent party performs poorly, a large loss of House seats can also affect the president's ability to enact policy, which can result in other keys turning false.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 11 of the 14 occasions when it achieved a net gain of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives compared to the previous midterm elections (the exceptions were in 1860, 1952 and 2000).

Key 2: No primary contest
Key 2 (no primary contest) is turned true if the incumbent party nominee wins at least two-thirds of the total delegate vote on the first ballot at the nominating convention with no deep and vocal party divisions. Lichtman says the incumbent party's ability to unite behind a consensus nominee is reflective of successful governance, whereas a contested nomination is indicative of internal party strife caused by weak governance.

Notable primary contests that turned the key false include the 1860 Democrat split over slavery (two conventions and 59 ballots were required to nominate Stephen A. Douglas), the 1896 dispute between the Bourbon and populist wings of the Democrats (the convention required five ballots to nominate William Jennings Bryan), the 1912 Republican split between the conservatives of President William Howard Taft and the progressives of former President Theodore Roosevelt (Taft was nominated for re-election on the first ballot, but with only 52% of the delegate vote after progressives walked out of the convention), and the 1968 deep and vocal divisions within the Democrats over the Vietnam War (including strong opposition by the anti-Vietnam War wing of the Democrats to the nomination of Vice President Hubert Humphrey).

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party was re-elected on 21 of the 28 occasions when the key was true (the exceptions were in 1888, 1932, 1960, 1992, 2000, 2008 and 2020), while 11  of the 13 occasions when the key was false (the exceptions were in 1876 and 1880) saw the incumbent party defeated. Of the 13 keys, Lichtman has said that this key is the single best predictor of an election outcome.

Conversely, a serious contest for the challenging party's nomination does not harm its nominee's election prospects, as a weak incumbent party often results in a crowded challenging party primary in anticipation of a winnable general election.

For example, in 1920, the challenging Republicans required ten ballots to nominate Warren G. Harding. In the general election, Harding defeated the nominee of the incumbent Democrats, James M. Cox, by 26.17 points, the largest popular vote margin in history.

Another example was in 1932, when the challenging Democrats required four ballots to nominate Franklin D. Roosevelt: this contest ultimately helped the Democrats' election prospects, as the nomination of Roosevelt turned key 13 false for the incumbent Republicans. In the general election, Roosevelt defeated President Herbert Hoover by 17.76 points in a landslide.

Key 3: Incumbent seeking re-election
Lichtman says an incumbent president seeking re-election has several advantages, such as the ability to set the national agenda, and often attracts far more media attention than a non-incumbent. The president can also benefit from the rally 'round the flag effect in times of crisis.

Lichtman also says that presidents running for re-election rarely face the strongest candidates from the challenging party, who typically refrain from running unless the president is seen as very vulnerable.

As of the 2020 election, when there was an incumbent president running for re-election and key 3 was true, the president was re-elected on 17 of 25 occasions. Of the 16 open seat elections (when key 3 was false), the incumbent party was defeated on ten occasions (the exceptions were in 1868, 1876, 1880, 1908, 1928 and 1988).

The incumbency key also correlates with key 2 (no primary contest), as it usually guarantees there will be no serious contest for the incumbent party's nomination. As of the 2020 election, when the president was running for re-election and faced no serious contest for their party's nomination, thus turning key 2 true, the president won re-election on 17 of 21 occasions (the exceptions were in 1888, 1932, 1992 and 2020).

If there is a serious primary contest to the president, it signifies major discontent within their own party and thus the broader electorate: on all four occasions when the president was running for re-election and key 2 was turned false (in 1892, 1912, 1976 and 1980), the president was defeated.

Key 4: No third party
Key 4 (no third party) is turned false when there is a major candidate other than the nominees of the Democrats and the Republicans.

Most American presidential elections since 1860 have been de facto binary contests between Democrats and Republicans, as no third party candidate has come close to winning. Lichtman says if a third party candidate is unusually popular, it signals major discontent with the performance of the incumbent party and counts against them. Lichtman defines third parties as either "perennial", having small and loyal constituencies, or "insurgent", rising in response to particular circumstances.

Retrospectively, the key was turned false when a single third party candidate won 5% or more of the national popular vote or there was a significant split in the incumbent party. For example, in 1948, Henry A. Wallace and Strom Thurmond both split from the Democratic Party and ran notable insurgent campaigns, with Thurmond carrying four states: this turned the key false for President Harry S. Truman, despite no third party candidate winning 5% of the popular vote.

For upcoming elections, key 4 is turned false when a single third party candidate consistently polls at 10% or more, indicating they are likely to receive 5% or more of the national popular vote: third party candidates typically underperform their polling by around half, with Lichtman saying they tend to fade in the voting booth as voters focus on the major party candidates. Key 4 is the only key that concerns any polling of candidates.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has been defeated on six of the nine occasions when there has been a significant third party candidate (the exceptions were in 1924, 1948 and 1996).

Keys 5 and 6: Strong long-term and short-term economy
Key 5 (strong short-term economy) is turned false when the economy is, or is widely perceived to be, in recession during the election campaign.

Lichtman cites the early 1990s recession as an example: the recession had ended in March 1991, but a Gallup poll in September 1992 found that 79% of respondents believed the economy was still in recession, turning the key false for George H. W. Bush.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 22 of the 31 occasions when key 5 was true (the exceptions were in 1860, 1888, 1892, 1912, 1952, 1968, 1976, 2000 and 2016), while the incumbent party has been defeated on nine of the ten occasions when key 5 was false (the only exception being in 1876).

Key 6 (strong long-term economy) is turned true when the real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds the mean growth during the previous two terms: Lichtman states that slow economic growth is indicative of an administration's lack of strength.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 14 of the 22 occasions when key 6 was true (the exceptions were in 1860, 1888, 1892, 1912, 1968, 1980, 2000 and 2016).

The incumbent party has won re-election on 14 of the 21 occasions when both economic keys were true (the exceptions being in 1860, 1888, 1892, 1912, 1968, 2000 and 2016); on eight of the nine occasions when both keys were false, the incumbent party was defeated (the exception being in 1876).

Key 7: Major policy change
Key 7 (major policy change) is turned true if the incumbent administration redirects the course of government or enacts a major policy change that has broad effects on the country's commerce, welfare or outlook: it does not matter whether the change is popular with the public, nor does it matter what ideological mold it was cast from. Abraham Lincoln abolishing slavery, Franklin D. Roosevelt enacting the New Deal, and Barack Obama enacting the Affordable Care Act were policy changes that turned the key true.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 15 of the 19 occasions that key 7 was true (the exceptions were in 1892, 1920, 1968 and 2020), while the incumbent party has been defeated on 14 of the 22 occasions that key 7 was false (the exceptions were in 1872, 1876, 1928, 1956, 1972, 1988, 1996 and 2004).

This key often correlates with other keys. A president who fails to take vigorous action during a time of national crisis might prolong an economic recession, which in turn could lead to widespread social unrest, his party having a large loss of House seats in the midterm elections, and the nomination of a charismatic challenger: one case in point is Herbert Hoover and his handling of the Great Depression.

Key 8: No social unrest
Key 8 (no social unrest) is turned false when there is widespread violent unrest that is sustained or leaves critical issues unresolved by the time of the election campaign, which makes the voters call into serious question the stability of the country.

The American Civil War, the racial and anti-Vietnam War riots of 1968, and the protests of 2020 triggered by the murder of George Floyd were incidents of unrest that were sufficiently serious and widespread to turn the key false. By contrast, the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the 1980 Miami race riots and the 1992 Los Angeles riots were too localized to turn the key false.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has been defeated on eight of the 11 occasions that there was sustained social unrest during the term (the exceptions were in 1864, 1868 and 1872).

Key 9: No scandal
Key 9 (no scandal) is turned false when there is bipartisan recognition of serious impropriety that is directly linked to the president, such as widespread corruption in the Cabinet and/or officials of an incumbent administration or presidential misconduct resulting in a bipartisan impeachment. By contrast, the voting public ignores allegations of wrongdoing that appear to be the product of partisan politicking or are not directly linked to the president: for example, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson in 1868 and the Iran-Contra affair during Ronald Reagan's second term did not turn the key false.

While the Watergate scandal began during Republican President Richard Nixon's first term, it did not affect his re-election bid in 1972: at the time, the voting public believed this was political point-scoring by the Democrats. After Nixon's re-election, new information about his involvement in the scandal emerged that also raised concerns among Republicans, turning the key false: the resulting full-blown scandal ultimately caused Nixon's resignation and contributed to the Republicans' defeat in 1976.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has been defeated on four of the six occasions that the incumbent administration was tainted by major scandal (the exceptions being in 1876 and 1924).

Keys 10 and 11: Foreign or military failure and success
Key 10 (no foreign or military failure) is turned false when a failure occurs that is perceived to undermine the standing of the United States and/or erode trust in the president's leadership. Lichtman cites the attack on Pearl Harbor, the botched Bay of Pigs invasion, North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War, and the Iranian hostage crisis as failures that turned the key false. By contrast, failed diplomatic initiatives, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower's failure to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, will not turn the key false.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has been defeated on seven of the 11 occasions that the incumbent administration suffered a major failure in foreign or military affairs (the exceptions were in 1944, 1948, 1964 and 2004).

Key 11 (major foreign or military success) is turned true when an achievement is seen as improving the prestige and interests of the United States. Lichtman cites the formation of NATO under Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower negotiating an armistice to the Korean War, John F. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the killing of Osama bin Laden under Barack Obama as successes that turned the key true.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 17 of the 21 occasions when it achieved a foreign or military success (the exceptions were in 1920, 1952, 1980 and 1992), while the incumbent party has been defeated on 14 of the 20 occasions when the key was false (the exceptions were in 1876, 1880, 1936, 1940, 1984 and 1996).

The incumbent party has won re-election on 13 of the 14 occasions when keys 10 and 11 were both true (the exception was in 1992); on all four occasions when both keys were false (in 1960, 1968, 1976 and 2008), the incumbent party was defeated.

Keys 12 and 13: Candidate charisma
Key 12 (charismatic incumbent) is turned true if the incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero, while key 13 (uncharismatic challenger) is turned false if the challenging party candidate is charismatic or a national hero. Key 13 is the only key that pertains to the challenging party.

Lichtman defines a charismatic candidate as one with an extraordinarily persuasive or dynamic personality that gives him or her broad appeal that extends to voters outside their party's base: having studied the political careers of all historical presidential candidates, he found that James G. Blaine, William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama had charisma that was exceptional enough to make a measurable difference in their political fortunes. By contrast, Lichtman found that while Donald Trump had an intense appeal, it was with only a narrow slice of the electorate, as opposed to the broad appeal that Ronald Reagan had with traditionally Democratic voters.

Lichtman has said that it is possible for candidates to lose their charismatic status: William Jennings Bryan was seen as charismatic and inspirational in 1896 and 1900, but his voter appeal had faded and he had become the subject of frequent press ridicule in 1908, while Barack Obama exuded charisma in 2008 but failed to have the same success in connecting with the public in 2012.

Lichtman defines a candidate as a national hero if they are seen by the public as having played a critical role in the success of a national endeavor: he found that Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower were seen as national heroes, as both were wartime leaders instrumental to major American victories. By contrast, he said that while many Americans admired John McCain for his military service, he was not seen as a national hero because he had not led the country in wartime.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on eight of the ten occasions that key 12 was true (the exceptions being in 1884 and 1896), while the incumbent party has been defeated on five of the six occasions that key 13 was false (the exception being in 1900).

Retrospective application to elections (1860–1980)
While developing the keys, Lichtman retrospectively applied them to every American presidential election from 1860 to 1980.

Republican President Theodore Roosevelt's election in 1904 is the only instance where all 13 keys were true for the incumbent party, while the elections of 1876 and 1960 had an equal-record nine false keys against the incumbent party (the Republicans in both years: there were also nine false keys against the incumbent Republicans in 2008, an election the keys predicted prospectively).

In all but two elections, the keys corresponded with the elected president:
 * In 1876, there were nine false keys against the incumbent Republicans, indicating the defeat of Republican nominee Rutherford B. Hayes: Democratic nominee Samuel J. Tilden won a majority of the popular vote, but an Electoral Commission declared Hayes the winner of the Electoral College by a single vote in a disputed election.
 * In 1888, there were five false keys against the incumbent Democrats, indicating the re-election of Democratic President Grover Cleveland: Cleveland won the popular vote, but Republican nominee Benjamin Harrison won the Electoral College and was therefore elected president.

Lichtman's prediction record (1984–present)
Using the 13 keys, Lichtman has correctly predicted the popular vote outcomes of eight of the nine presidential elections from 1984 to 2016, and also correctly predicted the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

Though Lichtman claims he called the 2016 election correctly when he predicted it for Donald Trump, he released a book and paper ahead of the election in 2016 which explicitly stated that the keys only referred to the popular vote;   Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton won the popular vote, but Trump won the Electoral College and was elected president. Lichtman switched to predicting the election winner after 2016.

In November 1999, he predicted that Vice President Al Gore, the Democratic frontrunner, would be elected president in 2000. Gore won the national popular vote but Republican nominee George W. Bush won the Electoral College and was elected president. Lichtman argued that in 2000 he specifically predicted the winner of the popular vote, which Gore won. In his 1988 book The Thirteen Keys to the Presidency, Lichtman had defined his model as predicting the outcome of the popular vote, but he did not remind readers of this nuance in his journal articles wherein he made his prediction for 2000; he simply predicted that Gore would win. Lichtman further argues that Gore was the rightful winner of the 2000 election, and lost because of improper ballot counting in Florida: had Gore won Florida, he would have received the additional electoral votes he needed to win the election.

Lichtman said that after the 2000 election, he stopped predicting the outcome of the popular vote and simply predicted who would be elected president, explaining that discrepancies between the Electoral College and the popular vote had dramatically increased, with Democrats holding a significant advantage in winning the popular vote but having no such advantage in the Electoral College. However, this is not supported by his books and papers on the subject, which continued (until after the 2016 election) to state that the keys only predicted the popular vote.

Media coverage
Lichtman's model received significant media coverage in July 2010 after he released his forecast for the 2012 election, predicting that Barack Obama would win re-election.

Lichtman again received considerable media attention for being one of the few forecasters to correctly predict Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 election, despite his model only predicting the popular vote. This has been the subject of criticism, both at Lichtman's and the media's expense. Following the election, Trump sent Lichtman a framed copy of his prediction in The Washington Post signed with the message, "Professor - congrats, good call."

Silver statistical analysis
Statistician Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight criticized the subjectivity of several keys, particularly candidate charisma, and said several more keys chosen for the system, such as long term economic growth, could be seen as data dredging and overfitting. Silver said that "It’s less that he has discovered the right set of keys than that he’s a locksmith and can keep minting new keys until he happens to open all 38 doors." Silver also criticized only two of the keys being based on economic factors, despite the economy being a main concern of a majority of voters.

Silver also stated that while the system has accurately predicted the winner, the margin of victory or defeat for parties that had the same number of false keys has varied widely: for example, the elections of 1880, 1924, 1972 and 2004 all had four false keys against the incumbent party, giving a predicted winning margin of 6.43 points, whereas these elections were won by respective margins of 0.09 points (1880), 25.22 points (1924), 23.15 points (1972), and 2.46 points (2004).

Conversely, the 1960 election had an equal-record nine false keys against the incumbent Republicans, giving a predicted losing margin of 11.02 points - a landslide loss - whereas Vice President Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee, lost by 0.17 points to Democratic nominee John F. Kennedy. Also cited by Silver was the 1932 election, which had eight false keys against Republican President Herbert Hoover, giving a predicted losing margin of 7.53 points, whereas Hoover lost by 17.76 points in a landslide to Democratic nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt.

As of 2020, using the popular vote margin gives a mean error for the system of ±5.94 points, with the 95% confidence interval for the popular vote margin for the system being ±15.45 points, which was exceeded in 1912, 1920, 1924 and 1972 (with errors of 18.12 points, 18.64 points, 18.79 points and 16.72 points respectively), and the R-squared value being 56.67%. For Lichtman's predictions from 1984 to 2020, the mean error for the popular vote margin is ±3.68 points, with the 95% confidence interval for the popular vote margin for the system being ±8.61 points (which has not been exceeded for any election Lichtman has predicted) and the R-squared value being 70.56%.

Lichtman responded to Silver, saying the system is based on a theoretical model and avoids random data-mining. He also stated that the system is not designed to predict the margin of victory, and flattens for landslide victories such as those in 1924, 1932 and 1972, also stating that Silver's criticism was "akin to critiquing a pregnancy test, not for its failure to detect pregnancies, but for its failure to determine the day of conception."

Lichtman also defended only two keys being directly based on the economy, pointing out that economic factors can trigger other keys: for instance, the Great Depression turned additional keys false for President Hoover since it caused widespread social unrest, heavy losses in the 1930 midterms, and the nomination of a charismatic challenger in Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Lichtman stated that, purely as a by-product of the system, it was possible to use it to predict the two-party vote for the incumbent party. As of the 2020 election, using the two-party vote gives a mean error for the system of ±3.29 points, with the 95% confidence interval for the two-party vote being ±9 points, which was exceeded in 1912, 1920 and 1924 (with errors of 13.88 points, 9.69 points and 12.02 points respectively), and the R-squared value being 51.71%. For Lichtman's predictions from 1984 to 2020, the mean error for the two-party vote is ±1.95 points, with the 95% confidence interval for the two-party vote being ±4.56 points (which has not been exceeded for any election Lichtman has predicted) and the R-squared value being 68.72%.

Retrospective perception
In 2011, following Lichtman's call that President Barack Obama would win re-election in 2012, Megan McArdle of The Atlantic criticized Lichtman's subjectivity in applying the keys and their reliance on retrospective perception, applying them to Herbert Hoover in 1932, writing, "Unlike the economic models that rely on external metrics, perception is doing a lot of the work here. Do we count Obama's stimulus but not Hoover's?"

Despite her criticism, McArdle had Hoover, based on her analysis, finishing with six to eight false keys, sufficient to predict his defeat in any case: in the event, Lichtman had Hoover finish with eight false keys, and Hoover was defeated in a landslide by Democratic nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Theoretical conclusions
Lichtman says that the lesson of the 13 keys is that it is governance, not campaigning, that determines who will win a presidential election. If voters feel that the country has been governed well for the preceding four years, then they will re-elect the president or elect the nominee from the incumbent party; otherwise, they will elect the nominee from the challenging party.

Given this insight, Lichtman says that candidates should invest less time, money and resources in their election campaigns, since these have little, if any, effect on the outcome of the election. Lichtman also says that observers should ignore polls, pundits, political analysts, media strategists, and any others whose careers revolve around the campaign and its marketing, referring to such people as "hucksters".

As demonstrated by key 7, sitting presidents should not be afraid to propose and implement new policy ideas: the keys show that voters do not care about specific policies, only the broad results of policies.

As demonstrated by key 2, the incumbent party should unite early and clearly behind a consensus nominee; conversely, it is not necessary for the challenging party to do this.