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pp 96-105 Krum, one of Bulgaria's greatest warrior rulers, came to the Bulgarian throne in about 803. He was originally a Bulgarian chieftain from Pannonia. Nothing is known about his activities there nor about his acquisition of the Bulgarian throne.

It is tempting to associate him with the old royal house, and make him a descendant of Kovrat's son who migrated to Pannonia in the 660s. If that son were Kuver, possibly he left sons behind him when he migrated south to Macedonia; then Krum might have been a descendant of Kuver. This is idle speculation. But it is likely that the warfare in Pannonia between the Avars and Franks caused various defeated Avars :md their clients (who could well have included some Bulgars) to become dislocated and move east as a compact unit. We have discussed the instability existing in the Bulgarian state, where a struggle for the throne had been going on for decades. Possibly these immigrants appeared at a moment of crisis and took over.

Wars with the Avars

Shortly thereafter, in 805, Krum was at war with the Avars who had already lost their western territories to the Franks and their Croatian allies. Krum was successful. After a brief encounter he defeated the Avars and united the Bulgarians of the west (Pannonia) to those of the east and thereby created a far more powerful state. The Bulgarian state then may have extended to the Tisza River, which was the eastern border of the expanding Frank state. However, Cankova-Petkova believes Krum's western borders did not even reach the Timok River. In the territory to the west of the original Bulgar state around the Timok and beyond were small tribal groups. She argues that these peoples were only subjected by Krum's son, Omurtag, in 827. 1 At whatever moment-be it under Krum or Omurtag-the Bulgars acquired this territory, the Bulgars and Franks came to have a common border for the first time. In addition, with the fall of the Avar khaganate the Bulgars replaced the Avars as overlords over the Slavs and proto-Rumanians living in the territory north of the Danube up to the Carpathians and as far east as the Dnepr.

Wars with Byzantium

Very little is known about Krum's state until warfare broke out with Byzantium. It seems the event that set things off was a Byzantine raid launched against Bulgaria in 807. It is not known whether this was an aggressive act or retaliation for some earlier Bulgar action. In any case the raid had hardly begun when a plot against the emperor Nicephorus was uncovered, leading to the immediate recall of the imperial army. Krum, however, did not take this lightly. In 808 Bulgarian troops raided into imperial territory along the Struma River and in 809 Krum's armies took Sardika (Sofija). According to Byzantine sources, having massacred the garrison (supposedly six thousand men), he razed the walls and returned to Bulgaria. 2 In retaliation, it seems, later in 809, the emperor Nicephorus marched against the Bulgarian capital of Pliska and ravaged its environs. However, time was short, forcing him to withdraw.

At this juncture (810-11) Theophanes notes the "wickednesses" of Nicephorus and mentions the relocation of Greeks from elsewhere in the empire (presumably chiefly from Anatolia) to the Sclavinias. Most studies associate these shifts of population with the wars against Krum and conclude that these people were settled in Thrace along the Bulgarian border. This is perfectly plausible, but the Chronicle of Monemvasia mentions population transfers to the Patras region in 806. Further relocations of people to recovered Greece cannot be ruled out. Thus the new settlers could have been settled in Thrace near the Bulgarian border and/or the regions of Greece which were being recovered in the first decade of the ninth century. If they were sent to Thrace, they would have strengthened defenses against the Bulgarian raiders and have diluted the Slavs in Thrace, some of whom may well have had ties with Krum or with other Slavs living within his state. Nicephorus was angry over the sack of Sardika and also believed that various Byzantine commanders and officials had not done all that they might have to defend the town. Word reached these people of the emperor's displeasure and they learned that they would not be pardoned. These people, including some engineers, fled to Krum. The Byzantine authors report that these refugees, especially the engineers, proved useful to Krum; in particular they helped improve his siege machinery. While this may have been true, it might also be taken as a typically arrogant Byzantine interpretation to believe that no barbarians could develop technical improvements on their own and to thus assign credit to the imperial brains which deserted. Such a view may not be warranted. After all, Krum's predecessors, and presumably former masters in Pannonia, the Avars, were masters at siege warfare and Krum himself took Sardika seemingly with little difficulty prior to these desertions.

In any case Nicephorus, unhappy with developments in Bulgaria, in 811 led a massive campaign to destroy the upstart Krum. A brief account of the campaign is given by Theophanes but a much fuller account is preserved in a manuscript recently found by I. Dujcev in a Vatican collection of saints' lives. According to this source, Krum was not prepared for a major invasion and he held out offers of peace to Nicephorus, who refused them. Seeing no chance to defend Pliska against this massive army, Krum abandoned his capital and fled to the mountains, leaving a small garrison behind at Pliska. The newly found manuscript states that this garrison was composed of twelve thousand men, but possibly this figure is exaggerated. Nicephorus took Pliska without difficulty, penetrated the khan's residence, and massacred the garrison. He then succeeded in wiping out a late-arriving small Bulgarian force sent to aid the defenders. Having occupied Pliska, Nicephorus plundered the city. The anonymous manuscript reports that he divided the wealth, gold, and wine with his soldiers. According to the strongly biased monk Theophanes, who detested Nicephorus for the emperor's church policy at home, Nicephorus put his personal seal on all the goods and refused to allow his soldiers to receive any booty; those soldiers who touched things had their ears and other members cut off. The anonymous manuscript gives a brief description of the khan's palace at Pliska. It was enormous, and had a series of terraces with alleys running through it. Nicephorus decided he wanted to erect a new Byzantine town here to be named for himself. To prepare the way for this he burned down the entire town, much of which-including a major portion of Krum's palace-was built of wood.

Then, leaving Pliska in ruins, he ordered a march in the direction of Sardika, hoping for an engagement with Krum in order to destroy him. Krum again sent envoys requesting peace, and once again Nicephorus refused the offer. The anonymous author presents us with an account of the disastrous end of the campaign. Previously, only the results were known but not how they had come about. Probably the story should be accepted as accurate, though it must be noted that the tale of Nicephorus was told to illustrate his hubris and how the sin of pride (illustrated by his ambitions to build a city named for himself on the ruins of the Bulgarian capital) preceded a fall. According to the story, his sin was punished almost immediately.

After a few days' march southwest from Pliska, Nicephorus began to neglect affairs. His spirit was no longer the same; he was like a man outside of himself; he lost his mind and suffered mental confusion and a paralyzed will. He retired to his tent. The army camped around him with its tents spread at some distance from one another as a precaution against a surprise attack. Nicephorus remained in his tent constantly, refused to see anyone, and issued no orders. His generals and officials did not dare to force their way into his presence. Finally they persuaded his son Staurakios to go and reason with him in an effort to convince him to leave this place located dangerously beneath a mountain range. Nicephorus lost his temper with his son and wanted to hit him; the army remained camped where it was. Some soldiers, seeing what was happening, broke discipline and began pillaging the area, burning fields, stealing animals, feasting and carousing, while other soldiers simply deserted and went home.

The Bulgarians, camped in the mountains above the Byzantines, watched the disintegration of the Byzantine army. Krum had already sent embassies to neighboring Avars and Slavs for aid. This shows that Krum had good relations with some Slavic tribes who lived outside of his state. Most probably they were Slavs from Thrace or Macedonia. Krum then armed his women as well as his men and ordered a dawn surprise strike upon the Byzantine camp. As noted, the Byzantine tents were spread widely apart; when the attackers struck word of the attack was slow to circulate. The Bulgars immediately directed their attack toward the imperial tent; Nicephorus was killed and his son and heir Staurakios was mortally wounded. A massacre followed and the Bulgars enjoyed a complete victory. Krum then in triumph had the emperor's head carried back on a pole to Pliska where it was cleaned out, lined with silver and made into a goblet which he allowed his Slavic princes (archons) to drink from with him.

With the emperor dead, and his only son and heir lingering on his deathbed for several months, the empire was in considerable chaos. No army stood between Krum and Constantinople. However, he did not immediately take advantage of the situation; almost a year passed before he attacked. Then in 812 he launched his invasion against the important fortress of Develtus near the Black Sea. After taking the city, he destroyed it, leveling all the fortifications so that they could not be used against him. Its inhabitants were forcibly transferred to Bulgaria. He then sent an ultimatum for a truce to the empire.

By this time the empire had found a new ruler, Michael I Rangabe, the husband of Nicephorus's daughter. Michael was incompetent in all respects as a statesman, but since he favored the party of the Extremist monks and listened to their advice, he receives praise from the chronicler Theophanes. The Byzantines were slow to respond to Krum's ultimatum, so Krum captured the important Black Sea port of Mesembria from which he took great booty.

Meanwhile, in Constantinople the Byzantines were debating over the treaty; in particular they were arguing over whether to accept a clause calling for the handing over of all Bulgarian deserters who had sought refuge in imperial territory. The Byzantine officials wanted to agree to this clause and completely accept the proposed treaty but Theodore of Studios and the Extremist monks convinced the emperor Michael that he must reject this point for it would be a sin to return the deserters. They persuaded the emperor to reject the clause by citing John 6:37, "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." So the clause was rejected and Krum resumed his attack.

Zlatarski speculates that there may have been more to the clause's rejection than Christian ethics; those who deserted to Byzantium frequently included high officials and members of various political factions which had been struggling for the throne. Byzantium liked to have such people around to use whenever an opportunity presented itself to meddle in Bulgarian affairs. As noted, Byzantium installed its puppets on the Bulgarian throne on occasions during the eighth century. Thus Zlatarski may be right in thinking that there were also political reasons to reject this clause.

In 813 Krum raided imperial territory again and an imperial army was sent out against him. Poor Byzantine leadership and dissensions within the army resulted in a major victory for Krum. As a result of this defeat the emperor Michael was deposed and a general, Leo, took the throne as Leo V. A later source accuses Leo of deliberately losing the battle against Krum to discredit Michael and obtain the throne for himself. After his victory, with no further imperial troops around to oppose him, and with a change of rulers being effected in the capital, Krum advanced on the major city of Adrianople which he besieged. Leaving his brother to capture it, he then marched on Constantinople; arriving with his armies, he was given an invitation and a promise of safe conduct to meet with the new emperor. Accepting this at face value, Krum set out unarmed for the capital with only a small escort. Suddenly he found himself in an ambush; he wheeled around and managed to escape. Needless to say, this treachery infuriated him and he ravaged the countryside beyond the walls of the capital and destroyed the suburbs. One source reports that he even carted off large pillars to redecorate Pliska, which he was rebuilding after its destruction by Nicephorus.

Unable to take Constantinople, he returned to Adrianople, which had fallen to his brother. There he captured a large number of inhabitants, including the archbishop of Adrianople, Manuel. These people were carried off beyond the Danube. As noted above, the Bulgarian state by then occupied both sides of the Danube and extended north up to the Carpathians. In these years many captives were taken to Bulgaria from the empire. Probably they included Slavs as well as Greeks; but clearly many of them were Christians (and the archbishop has been noted). As a result, many Christians came to be found inside of Bulgaria who soon began to sow the seeds of their religion there.

In 814 Krum assembled a huge army, which, the sources say, included Slavs and Avars, and launched a new campaign that was aimed at Constantinople. However, on the way he suffered a stroke and died. Thus the empire was spared further pillaging at the hands of this able warrior prince. Though Krum is usually depicted as a major enemy of Byzantium, it should be noted that Byzantium seems to have initiated the wars. In the early stages Krum sought peace but was rebuffed by the Byzantines. He turned to a major assault against the empire only after his great victory over Nicephorus in a war Nicephorus forced upon him. Even after this triumph, he waited to strike the empire and only pressed war upon it when his peace offers were rejected.

Krum's Achievements

Krum is credited by scholars with many achievements: he united the western Bulgars to his state and extended Bulgaria's borders to the west where they may have reached as far as the Tisza River. He also expanded Bulgaria's territory to the north and east. He did a great deal to strengthen Bulgaria's armies; he won victories over the Byzantines, though his greatest successes began when the emperor Nicephorus had what could be called a nervous breakdown and then continued through a disastrous two-year reign of an incompetent emperor followed by a palace revolution. Thus the empire was not able to offer Krum the opposition it could have at other times. But he showed himself able in besieging and capturing cities (and he was able to take a series of well-fortified towns). He did not try to hold all of them; at times he just razed the walls so that they could not be used against him. He did not permanently expand Bulgarian boundaries to the south against Byzantium; he occupied some territory there briefly but after his death the boundary again was to be the Balkan mountains.

Krum also issued a law code; unfortunately its text has not been preserved and only a couple of items from it were preserved by a tenth-century compiler who wrote under the name of Suidas. The code prescribed the death penalty for false oaths and false accusations and ordered the uprooting of vines; the last is usually interpreted as a measure against drunkenness. As far as is known this was the first law code issued for the Bulgarian state. Zlatarski believes it was valid for everyone. If so, the code would have put an end to specific laws and privileges for different elements in the society and would have placed everyone under a single set of laws. Though Zlatarski's is a reasonable hypothesis, it is not certain that the code was intended to put an end to all local self-rule privileges, and even if this was Krum's intent, he may not have been successful.

Sources exist to support the preceding statements about Krum's achievements. However, Krum is also credited, with little basis, with having achieved a variety of other things. First., historians claim that he centralized the state and built up more of a state apparatus to put down the individual boyars who had been governing independently in the provinces. Such could have been the case but no sources exist to prove it. All that can be said is that his military success suggests he was able to obtain obedience from the boyars. However, he may have achieved this by being a successful military leader who brought much booty to those following his standard. Through such rewards he could have built up a large following, by means of which he could have forced others to obey or be subject to punitive raids. It is also possible that he won the support of the boyars by allowing them great independence in their provinces, and that he avoided revolts against his rule by recognizing boyar privilege. If this second hypothesis is correct, there would have been no reason for the boyars to oppose him, and he could have been successful in battle without increasing the central government's authority at all. In fact, he would have had foreign successes as a result of not trying to centralize.

The law code might suggest an attempt at centralization; however, since its text has not survived, its thrust and aims remain unknown. Furthermore, even if the code gave great authority to the khan and his servants it would not demonstrate centralization unless it could be shown that the khan was able to enforce its articles. The fact that no revolts against him are known might suggest that he crushed the oligarchy. However, if he was popular with its members, there would have been no reason for them to revolt. Reigns of eleven years without revolt occurred earlier without scholars suggesting centralization.

Krum's Relations with the Slavs

Krum is also credited with showing no favoritism to the Bulgar boyars over the Slavs, and it has been said that he built his state into an autocracy as opposed to an oligarchy by relying on the Slavic element. This may be true but it cannot be proven. First, no evidence exists to show that he did replace an oligarchy by an autocracy; and, secondly, the sources report so little about his relations with the Slavs that it is impossible to say what role they played in government. If the initial agreements with the defeated Slavs back in the seventh century, despite making them pay tribute, allowed them much local autonomy, possibly they would not have been interested in strengthening the central government at all. In addition, the limited sources provide no information to show that Krum played the Slavs off against the old Bulgar boyars or that he included many Slavs in his government. Except for the references to Slavs in his armies or Slavs coming to aid him on his summonses-which were occasions which had nothing to do with internal affairs but instead involved fighting a foreign enemy there are only two sources that suggest any particular friendship toward Slavic elements.

The first of these is a Byzantine chronicle which reports that having made Nicephorus's skull into a goblet, Krum gave it to Slav princes (archons) to drink from. Since the passage does not refer to Bulgars or boyars, some scholars have suggested this shows some favored position to the Slavs. Others have even interpreted it to mean that Slavs had been brought into dominant positions at court and in the retinue, forcing out the old Bulgar aristocracy (possibly even sending them off to their own estates in the provinces) and thereby paving the way for the khan to deprive the boyars of their hereditary role and raise himself up as an autocrat. This all could be true, but it is reading a great deal into this one simple story.

An alternative explanation could be the following: the anonymous manuscript reports that when Nicephorus was experiencing his victories, taking Pliska and then heading south in pursuit of Krum, Krum had sent for aid to the neighboring Slavs and Avars. If the neighboring Slavs (who evidently lived as independent tribes and were not members of the Bulgar state, since the source calls them neighboring) had sent aid, then very likely Krum would have invited their leaders to a victory banquet after his triumph. If so, then the archons referred to could well have been these foreign Slav leaders. In fact, Byzantine sources usually used the term archon to designate a prince; it would seem to be a very high title for this source to use if the Slavs were simply high officials at his court.

Finally, common sense suggests that if Krum needed a force to use against the old Bulgars (the boyars living in the northeast, in the central part of the old state) and if he was really from Pannonia, then he would have relied upon his own tribesmen and cohorts from the west who had presumably come east with him as his retinue when he obtained the throne and who very likely provided the muscle which allowed him to obtain the throne in the first place. That this was perhaps his policy is seen in the fact that his second in command-who took Adrianople and who probably governed it after its conquest-was his own brother. If Krum relied heavily on these Pannonians, this policy could have somewhat limited the privileges and positions of the old court boyars from the eastern part of the state.

The second source suggesting Krum's friendship toward the Slavs simply reports that Krum sent a man named Dragomir as an ambassador to Constantinople in 812. This is clearly a Slavic name. However, names may not have been given strictly according to nationality at this time; after over a century of probable intermarrying much mixing could be expected to have taken place in the society. Thus names could have crossed ethnic lines. In fact, Krum's own grandson was to have the Slavic name of Malamir. However, if Dragomir was really a Slav, which is perfectly likely, it merely shows that one Slav attained a trusted position. Though it is probable that others were in high positions as well, this one remark is by no means proof that Krum used Slavs exclusively or even that he used more than one. In fact, the one source that lists high officials-an inscription we shall turn to shortly-gives the names of the three highest men in the state; and not surprisingly all three are Bulgars. Thus it is wrong to state-as some scholars have-that the old boyars were exiled from court to provincial posts to be replaced by Slavs. No source exists to suggest such an expulsion occurred and there is continued evidence of Bulgar boyars at the top of the administration.

However, as a ruler in a multi ethnic state in the nonnationalist Middle Ages, who would have wanted to have his whole country behind him to fight a dangerous foreign enemy, Krum surely would have tolerated all ethnic elements in his state. There is no known reason for him to have persecuted Slavs-and ethnic persecution was a very rare phenomenon in the medieval Balkans. Thus it would be plausible to assume that he maintained good relations with both ethnic groups and utilized members of each in civil and military posts. And if he did this, it, along with the regular contacts between the two peoples living in one society in close proximity to one another, would have contributed to mixing the two elements. This in itself would have played a role in limiting the old Bulgar privileges. Presumably through intermarriages, the Bulgar minority was gradually being linguistically (and possibly culturally) assimilated by the larger number of Slavs. This assimilation was probably occurring under Krum, but there is no reason to think it was happening more rapidly under him than under his predecessors.

In short, there is nothing in the sources to show that Krum relied exclusively on the Slavs or gave them any particular or new privileges or that he persecuted in any way or exiled from court the old boyar aristocracy. In fact, common sense suggests he would not have persecuted the boyars as a group. Such a policy would probably have led to civil war and Krum would not have wanted to provoke internal friction when he was involved in a major foreign war for seven of the eleven years he reigned.

Krum's Relations with the Greeks

It is also worth noting that Krum was not always harsh to Greeks. Theophanes mentions various Byzantine notables and malcontents deserting to Krum and offering him their services. There were those who feared Nicephorus's wrath after the fall of Sardika. In 811 a high official-a domesticus-close to Nicephorus deserted to Krum, as did a certain Constantine Pabikos who was later to marry Krum's sister. The sources also mention an Arab who instructed the Bulgars in the construction of siege machinery. The presence of these Greeks and the Arab serving Krum supports our contention that he was working to strengthen his state and would not have played on animosities between groups.

This policy of good relations with Greeks is also reflected in an inscription from Hambarli in Thrace. As noted above, Krum took various Byzantine cities in Thrace and along the Black Sea coast which, though they soon reverted to Byzantium, seem to have remained Bulgarian throughout the remainder of Krum's lifetime. The inscription, which cannot be read in its entirety, states after an initial lacuna that the strategos Leo is subordinate to Krum 's brother, that from Berrhoia ... the Interior Boyar Tuk is chief of the right side of the kingdom and beneath him are the Strategoi Bardas and Jannis. For the left side of my [Krum's] empire, Anchialos, Develtus, Sozopolis, Ranuli, are under the boyar Kavkhan Iratais, and the Strategoi Kordylas and Gregoras are his subordinates.

This extremely important inscription describes the division of the newly added Greek regions. No old Bulgar places are mentioned, thus this is simply a public notice of the administration of the regions Krum had conquered. Since the inscription was placed in Thrace and written in Greek, it can be taken as a notice about the occupation government to the local Greek-speaking inhabitants. What region was to be administered by Krum's brother is lost in a lacuna, but presumably it would be the region around Adrianople because the brother conquered that. 1 The extent of Tuk's territory is lost since all that survives of the text is the city of Berrhoia on one end. The three major figures mentioned were all Bulgars: Krum's brother, Tuk, and Iratais. The title kavkhan is usually taken for the second position in Bulgaria, regent in the absence of the khan, like the count palatine in later Hungary. This office was held by a Bulgar, so there was clearly no replacement of Bulgars by Slavs in the very top positions. By establishing this new administration, it is apparent that Krum intended to retain this territory for Bulgaria; of course, this was not to be realized since shortly after his death it reverted to Byzantium.

Subordinate to these three leading Bulgars were Byzantines (shown by their Christian-Greek or Armenian-names) in official positions, called strategoi. Strategos is a Greek term for general; by this time it usually was used for the commander of a theme. Whether some or all of them had been strategoi earlier under Byzantium is not known. Possibly Krum, since they were Greeks being given important administrative roles in a Greek-speaking area, simply gave them this Greek title. It is quite possible that the so-called strategoi were earlier deserters to Krum, whom he trusted and decided to put over these captured areas. In any case, Krum used Greek strategoi in each of the three occupied regions as his seconds in command. They were under the close control of Bulgarian superiors, but it seems that he was making a serious effort to make Bulgarian rule more acceptable to the Greek population by using Greek administrators. Two of the five strategoi (Leo and Jannis) were eventually to be executed as Christian martyrs under Krum's son and successor Omurtag. Two others are also mentioned later. Evidently, under Krum these five strategoi, left in the newly occupied territory, were believed to be trustworthy or sufficiently under Bulgar control to assure their loyalty. However, it is evident that his successors felt it unsafe to have Greeks in high positions on the border with Byzantium, for in 836 sources mention some Greek peasants called Macedonians (i.e., their place of origin earlier, a geographic rather than an ethnic term) who sent a secret embassy to Constantinople to ask for boats to take them to Byzantine territory. They were living on Bulgaria's northeast frontier beyond the Danube where the Bulgars used them to defend it. This military role was the same as that which they had earlier had in Byzantium. They had served under the strategos Kordylas and his son Bardas (who surely is the same man as the inscription's Bardas). The Byzantines sent aid and as a result ten thousand peasants were able to flee to Byzantine territory.

This shows that the Bulgars utilized not only Greek leaders but whole Greek thematic units. Presumably Krum's successor immediately on Krum's death, before the Byzantines recovered the Thracian Macedonian territory, uprooted whole villages of thematic troops (soldier-peasants) to utilize in their regular defensive role for Bulgaria's benefit. Since Krum's inscription shows their leaders were still in the south, presumably Krum felt it safe to use them-and possibly these Greek troops under them as well-there. But then his successor, not wantin& to return the troops to Byzantium when the territory was given back and not wanting to leave them inside Bulgaria on a border with the empire, removed them and sent them to the northern border with the Steppes where they would oppose non-Greeks. This was in keeping with Omurtag's policy which showed great distrust of the Byzantines (in fact, he would execute two of the original five strategoi). In the north these Greeks could not have aided the empire but could have been useful as defenders of the dangerous northeastern border, from which it would have been hard for them to escape and return to Byzantium because of the distance. Furthermore, Krum and his successors left the troops under Greek commanders, probably expecting them to fight more loyally under their own leaders. Thus Krum also used Byzantines in running his state. He seems to have favored no nationality but to have aimed at administering a multinational state. This was an accepted concept of his time; the multinational Byzantine Empire also did not favor one ethnic element over another.