User:2603:3008:207:2C00:21ED:5B99:DCB3:CC74/Prasaṅgika

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 is a subschool of Madhyamaka, which asserts that all concrete and mental phenomena, although existing conventionally, are empty of any type of inherent identity or self-characterizing essence. The name is derived from prasaṅga, a method of logical inquiry of reductio ad absurdum; they point out implicit errors by taking reasonings to logical extremes. Nagarjuna and later commentators such as Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and Je Tsongkhapa use this method to refute essentialist views.

History
The Madhyamaka views generally were expounded as commentaries upon the work of Nagarjuna, who wrote about the Prajnaparamita sutras. Buddhapalita was an early adopter of syllogistic methods in his teachings, although of a particularly limited form. He commented upon Nagarjuna's discourses by basing himself on their logical consequences. Bhavaviveka later commented upon and critiqued Buddhapālita's interpretation of Nagarjuna. Candrakirti later responded to Bhāvaviveka's criticisms. His response became regarded as exemplary of the Prasangika approach and view.

When Buddhism was established in Tibet, however, the primary philosophic viewpoint established there was that of Shāntarakshita – a synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka – in the 9th century. Much later Je Tsongkhapa established Candrakirti's work as primary, and it continues as the main approach to Madhyamaka taught in the Gelug school. Other masters of the various lineages of Tibetan Buddhism also contemplate views but hold different opinions with regard to the best way to describe the experience of emptiness (i.e. Prāsaṅgika, Svātantrika, Chittamātra, and their sub-schools).

Three Types of Dependent Origination
Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika asserts that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, self-characterization, self-identity, or essence because they are dependently co-arisen. All phenomenon in all possible worlds lack inherent existence and come into existence only relative to a designating consciousness. At the time of Candrakīrti, the Prāsaṅgika included three dependencies:

Je Lama Tsongkhapa of the Tibetan Gelugpa denomination took this analysis to its logical conclusion by stating that the most important and primary relationship of co-dependent arising is the third relationship: dependent designation. Why is this the most important and primary relationship? In order for something to exist, from the Prāsaṅgika perspective, it must be designated validly by a designating consciousness. If something has a cause-effect relationship or a relationship of parts-whole, then those objects are already existing. In order to be already existing, they must have been designated by mind.
 * 1) (Pratītyasamutpāda or 'dependent arising') All phenomena come to be in dependence on causes and conditions, and cease when those causes and conditions are no longer present. "All things arise in dependence on causes and conditions, and this is the meaning of dependent origination".
 * 2) All wholes are dependent upon their parts, and the parts of wholes are dependent for their existence on the wholes of which they are parts. "Although both from the standpoint of reality and from that of everyday life, The sevenfold reasoning shows that a chariot cannot be established, in everyday life, without analysis it is designated in dependence on its parts. 
 * 3) (Prajñaptir upādāya or 'dependent designation') Entities are also dependent for their existence as entities on conceptual imputation "Although dependent origination is generally maintained to be dependence upon conditions, from our perspective, this is not inconsistent with [them existing in] dependence upon mundane nominal conventions."

Further, "cause and effect" are merely designated by mind and "parts and whole" are merely designated by mind. Relationships between objects cannot exist without being validly designated into existence. It is mind that determines that a cause has ceased and its effect is now in existence. It also mind which determines that some collection of parts is now considered to be a whole. Therefore, the relationship of dependent designation is primary among the three types of dependencies. It is the most fundamental type of relationship in terms of conventional objects: the relationship between a designating mind and the conventional object which has been designated - and therefore brought into existence - by that mind.

IMPORTANT: The Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika are not saying that nothing exists. This philosophical position is that nothing inherently exists, and things only come into existence relative to conscious observers who are applying conceptual and nominal conventions to mere experiences. Things and phenomenon  do exist dependently  based upon a relationship with a knowing and designating mind, but nothing exists in an independent, self-arising, or self-sustaining manner. This position negates the extremes of Essentialism in various forms: a Wholeness, Materialism, Dualism, Non-Dualism, Mind-Only, Oneness, Souls, Universal Consciousness, Creator Gods, Universal Tao, Monotheism, Panpsychism, and so on. It also negates the extremes of Nihilism: Absolute Nothingness, Lack of Meaning, Lack of Purpose, Lack of Functionality, and so on. Things are neither non-existent nor are they self-existent. This is what makes this position the "Middle Way" between the extremes. It is a middle position which does not fall into the philosophical traps of Essentialism or Nihilism. Phenomena are dependently co-arisen with designating minds, while at the same time being empty of self-characterization, self-identity, or inherent identity. In this way, the viewpoints of Emptiness and Dependent Origination are completely harmonious.

Logical Consequence & Non-Affirming Negation
A prominent and important feature of the approach is their use of the non-affirming negation. Rather than assert their own position in a debate against another position, they find it more useful to simply point out the flaw in the opposing position. The best type of negation or argument structure for this approach is non-affirming negation. A non-affirming negation is a negation which does not leave something in the place of what has been negated. For instance, when one says that a Buddhist should not drink alcohol, they are not affirming that a Buddhist should - in fact - drink something else. One is merely negating the consumption of alcohol under a particular circumstance. The argue that the philosophical position of Emptiness is itself a non-affirming negation: a lack of inherent existence. So, the argumentation style of the Prāsaṅgika school matches the nature of the position they hold. Prāsaṅgika translates to "Consequetialist." They use the consequences of essentailism to negate essentialsim. For example, if chocolate causes pleasure from its own side, then - therefore - it must cause pleasure in all recipients, under all conditions. If "causing pleasure" is coming from the chocolate (and by implication, not from mere nominal designation), then the chocolate MUST cause pleasure. Since we know this is not the case, it leaves us with the sense that there must be something wrong with our naive viewpoint that chocolate is - in fact - the cause of our pleasure when consuming chocolate.

For the Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika,  Emptiness is a mere absence of impossible modes of existence . So, if one were to describe Emptiness as the presence of some quality - an essencelessness, selflessness, impermanence, a tao, the ultimate nature which exists 'out there somewhere,' etc - it would linguistically and philosophically contradict the nature of the object which it is attempting to characterize. The object itself is a non-affirming negation, but the term being applied to the object implies that the object itself has an essence or an independent existence. Emptiness is the simple absence of inherent existence, true existence, occult entities, inherent identities, etc., having any role in the arising, existence, or ceasing of any object or phenomenon, in all possible worlds. Emptiness is explicitly not the presence of some other quality (for example, an essencelessness) which is being affirmed in the place of the absence of an impossible mode of existence.

Emptiness is also empty of inherent existence according to Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika: emptiness only exists nominally and conventionally, dependent upon the existence of other conventional phenomenon which are themselves empty. To clarify, there is no Emptiness just "floating around out there" or a "great Emptiness from which everything arises." To illustrate this, a table is empty of inherently being a table from it's own side. This is referred to as "the emptiness of the table." The emptiness of the table exists conventionally as a property of that particular table. It is the same with all types of emptiness. There is no "independent emptiness" or "ultimate emptiness." Therefore, Emptiness is an Ultimate Truth - a truth which applies to all phenomena - but it is not an Ultimate Phenomenon - something which has always existed, is self-created, and is self-sustaining - which is impossible from the perspective of Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika.

The criticism of this approach by other schools of thought within Buddhism, and much later by Western scholars, is that it slides into Nihilism. Since we have negated the inherent identity of object, but we have not affirmed anything else, haven't we negated the object's existence completely? Je Lama Tsongkhapa argues that we have not negated the object completely, but rather have merely eliminated an impossible mode of existence misattributed to the object (see Ignorance.) By negating inherent existence and inherent non-existence, we have negated modes of existence which would have made the valid conventional arising and existence of the object impossible. Therefore, we have provided argumentation in favor of the conventional arising and existence of the object. This is a critical point.

The Debate Briefly
The Svātantrika are primarily using syllogistic reasoning to arrive at emptiness. While this approach is also effective, it leaves room to affirm that there is a real, true, and inherent essenceless or emptiness "out there" which has major philosophical problems from the point of view. Related to this problem, Svātantrika assert a type of "other-emptiness" from the point of view of Prāsaṅgika. An other emptiness is the idea that an object is empty of true existence, but not empty of itself. The inherence being negated is "other-than" the conventional appearance of the object. For the Svātantrika, a table is not empty of being a table, it is empty of being inherently existent. From the Svātantrika viewpoint, there is a conventionally arising self apart from the observer or mental imputation - the constituents of a table, for example - which are thought to be a natural basis for the term "table." The Svātantrika assert the table is empty of a true self or a truly existent table, while simultaneously asserting that the undesignated object - through the causal nexus that brought it about - is a natural basis for the term. Not only is it a natural basis for the term, but they insist that we are negating only "inherence" and we are not negating "identity of the table." In other words, for the Svātantrika, the table still has a self, which is not negated and appears conventionally, but that self is not "true" in the sense that it is not findable at the material level and that it is nominally designated. This view - in effect and practice - means that the table is already a table before it is mentally designated, from the Prāsaṅgika position.

The Prāsaṅgika view this kind of thinking as a subtle form of grasping at inherent existence. The mind is still searching for some way to hold on to a self or identity for the table. For the Prāsaṅgika, when you do the analysis of a table, the object you are negating is not some abstract intellectual concept apart from the table called "inherence." For the Prāsaṅgika, you negate the conventionally appearing table, which appears to your naive perception as being inherent. So, the table's self-identity is negated. The table is empty of being a table. It is not just empty of inherent existence in some abstract way. You are negating the identity of the table as it appears to your normal, everyday perception. That normal everyday perception is mistaken. For the Svātantrika, you are negating some "inherent identity which is other than that conventional appearance" because the conventional appearance is valid from their viewpoint. This is a subtle difference to be sure, but an important one in terms of practice. For the Prāsaṅgika, the table - even when validly designated and validly in existing as a table - is empty of being a table and is not in any way a natural basis for any particular term. This is a very important distinction.

Nāgārjuna's Merely Designated Causality
In Nāgārjuna's own words, causality itself is not findable as existing inherently. Not only is causality not finable inherently, but movement, change, the senses and their objects, relationships, impermanence, emptiness, the path to enlightenment, and the results of the path to enlightenment are not findable as existing inherently. That being said, let's start with causality. Four Diamond Slivers:

"Neither from itself, nor from other, Nor from both, Nor without a cause Does anything anywhere, ever arise." The implied modifying phrase in this passage according to Lama Tsongkhapa is "inherent." So, the negations in this passage would read: Not from inherent self, not from inherent other, not from inherent both, not from inherent nothingness/causelessness.

Notice that each one of these statements is a non-affirming negation which merely negates the subject (some type of inherent cause for the arising of any given conventional phenomenon) and does not affirm some other mode of arising in its place. These four possibilities include all possible ways that a conventional phenomenon could arise if - in fact - phenomena arose through some type of inherent arising process. Each one of these modes is negated in sequence (from self, from other, from both, and from no cause) leaving you with a mere absence: the absence of all inherent modes of causality. That mere absence is the called "the absence of inherent causality." All these arguments are fleshed out individually in Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary to Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, "Ocean of Reasoning."

Rather than leaving this thought hanging in mere absence, one can complete the circle with dependent origination. The causality of the is one of dependent designation. By way of example, if one created a flow chart of the process of a seed turning into a sprout by taking 5000 photographs of all the intermittent stages from seed to sprout, and then asked fifty people, "Where does the seed become the sprout?" What do you imagine the answers would be? Would all fifty answers be: ""Yes, on slide 2,199 the sprout arose. That is clearly and definitely the case." If not, why not?

Nāgārjuna's argument according to Lama Tsongkhapa is that if the sprout arose (came into existence) inherently in any of the four ways listed above, then all fifty people would independently have no choice but to say, "Yes, on slide 2,199 the sprout arose. That is clearly and definitely the case." If the sprout was caused by the seed independent of a designating consciouness, then the seed would

In reality - since the arising of a sprout is something which is merely nominally designated by the conceptual mind - when we independently question fifty people, we get 50 different answers. This is a strong indication that the sprout (and by implication all other phenomenon) are not something which arise and exist objectively or inherently. It indicates that human beings do not passively experience phenomena, but that the content of our experiences is something which is validly conceptually designated by mind. This ties back into Candrakīrti's dependencies, again placing dependent designation in the primary position in terms of co-dependent arising.

The Mind aspect of reality provides the name, identity, function, structure, relationship, distinctness, sameness, and conventional discreteness to phenomena, according to the Prāsaṅgkia. In the flowchart example, the moment mind validly decides that the object "seed" is no longer a valid basis for the term and concept "seed," it then labels the term-concept "sprout" and that object becomes a sprout. When mind validly applies the term and concept "sprout" to its mere experience, that experience becomes a sprout. The sprout co-dependently arises with a mind that designates it with the term. The mind designating the term "spout" experiences it's experience as a sprout. By implication, the arising of the sprout is linked to the valid designation of the term-concept "sprout," and not some causal force that existed previously in the seed, nor some identity of universal 'sproutness' that existed somewhere prior to the arising of the sprout.

Designation is - in the basic Buddhist sense - the application of a conceptual (or in some cases a non-conceptual) image and term to an object of experience. Once the object is validly designated as a sprout, then that object of experience exists as a sprout (for more information see also 7-point analysis of a chariot). The problem that immediately comes to mind is, "Well, if that's the case, can't anything be anything?" It is important to note that there are also invalid ways to designate objects, which will be covered in the next section. The rules for valid versus invalid nominal designation are clearly laid out in Prāsaṅgika. Before we cover this, let us look at what makes an object "existent" according to Prāsaṅgika.

A Prāsaṅgika asserts that something 'exists conventionally' (synonym: validly designated) if it meets all of the following three conditions: Whatever fails to meet those criteria does not exist. To take these in reverse order, the Prāsaṅgika cannot accept that an intrinsic or inherent nature exists, even conventionally. If you do an analysis searching for the nature of the object and find that it has inherent existence, then you have found something which doesn't exist. This addresses the third point. Second, a "conventional cognition" is a mind which designates an object. A conventional cognition occurs within a socio-linguistic context (a norm, a convention, a language game), and it cannot contradict that context. In other words, if you see an elephant as bunny rabbit, then you are conventionally delusional, insane, or impaired in some way. Therefore, that designation is considered to be invalid. Further, if you have a cognition of an object which is (or will be) later contradicted by a second cognition of the same object, then the initial cognition was invalid. The below example of the Indo-Tibetan Rope Snake addresses this point. Finally, number one, all existing things must appear to a designating consciousness. If it is not cognized by a conscious being in the most basic sense of being experienced and known, then it is non-existent. If something is undesignated, then it is "merely existent" but has no characteristics and cannot be said to exist conventionally.
 * 1) If it is known to a conventional consciousness.
 * 2) If no other conventional cognition (within that convention) contradicts it from being thus known.
 * 3) If reason that accurately analyses reality (that is, analyses whether something intrinsically exists) does not contradict it.

This can get very interesting. If something is possible to be known from another reference frame, then it is not ruled out completely from being existent. However, it is not currently existing from within the reference frame in question. However, if it is impossible to be known from that reference frame, it is non-existent in that reference frame. For example, seeds and sprouts have no relationship in the mind or socio-linguistic context of a dog. So, there is no causal relationship between seeds and sprouts in the reality of a dog. Simply put, there is no such thing as a seed which becomes a spout, which in turn becomes a plant for a dog. Since it is impossible for a dog to designate such a relationship, this type of causality - therefore - does not occur for a dog. Even while, from a different reference frame (namely for human beings), this type of causality is occurring all the time.

Our viewpoint is - however - more correct, because it provides better explanation, prediction, and control over one's own reality. But, both types of designation are valid from within their reference frame. In other words, it is valid for seeds, sprouts, and plants to have no relationship for a dog, while simultaneously having a relationship of causality for human beings. Similarly, it is valid for the Arya Prāsaṅgika (one who has seen emptiness directly in meditative analysis) to see the relationship of causality as being unfindable between the seed and sprout, and for them to see the mental designation as being the cause of the sprout. Arguably, this viewpoint provides even better explanation, prediction, and control over one's reality, and therefore it is even more correct than either the normal socio-linguistic context of humans and that of the world of canines.

Indo-Tibetan Rope Snake: Valid & Invalid Designation
When most people hear that all phenomena only arise because they are designated by a mind, they skeptically ask, "Well, if that is the case, then can't anything be anything? Can't a table be a wall and a rabbit be an elephant?" According to Lama Tsongkhapa, the answer to all of those questions is no. There is an example which makes valid and invalid conceptual designation easy to understand. This is the Rope-Snake example:

A coiled rope's speckled color and coiling are similar to those of a snake, and when the rope is perceived in a dim area, the thought arises, “This is a snake.” As for the rope, at that time when it is seen to be a snake, the collection and parts of the rope are not even in the slightest way a snake. Therefore, that snake is merely produced by conceptuality. This example is more often used when trying to help Buddhist philosophers and practitioners find the absence of inherent "I, me," but it is also helpful in the discussion of valid and invalid designation. If we refer back to Lama Tsongkhapa's guidelines, this rope cannot be validly designated a snake for several reasons. First off, at a later period of time and under different conditions, you will not designate that object as a snake, you will validly designate it as a rope based upon the socially agreed upon use of the term-concept rope. Therefore, a subsequent conventional consciousness in the same continuum of mind contradicts the object being currently known as a snake. Also, the object cannot fulfill the conventionally agreed upon function of a snake, so it violates the rule that the term-concept designated must stay within the agreed upon use of the term-concept. Since this is the case, according to the social arena in which the term "rope" means one thing and "snake" means something else, the use of the term-concept to designate and describe that experience is - therefore - invalid.

As a side note, in the same way that there is nothing inherent to that object that is providing a "snake identity," there is also nothing inherent to that object which is providing a "rope identity." The rope identity is something which is validly imputed by a designating consciousness. Even after the rope is conceptually designated as a rope, there is still no rope identity happening among the material parts of that object. From the side of the object, it is absent of any inherent quality or conventional quality which forces us to label and experience that mere phenomena as a rope.

This is consequently why it is possible to misattribute the identity of a snake to a rope in the first place. This is also the reason the term-concept rope can be validly applied to a unique object of experience (a collection of rope fibers) and cause that object (when there are no qualities which would socially or ultimately disqualify that object from being a rope) to exist and function as a rope conventionally. This discussion may also provide evidence for the case that Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika have huge differences. There is a difference between the mere absence of inherence and valid conventional existence according to the Prāsaṅgika, and the absence of true existence and existence according to characteristics of the Svātantrika.

Svātantrika Debate Greater Detail
Bhāvaviveka was later categorized - most prominently by Lama Tsongkhapa - as presenting a Svātantrika view, in opposition to Candrakīrti's. While this was a later distinction, it was useful for students to study the viewpoints as a set of tenets and subsequent metaphysical consequences that could be debated and discussed. This usage is sometimes referred to as the " school" and the "Svātantrika school", even though no schools with those names existed. Some masters of the Gelug argue that Je Tsongkhapa's description of the views various schools of emptiness are meant to be a psychologically reflexive tool for identifying when we are falling into those schools of thought during our ordinary activities, and that they are not meant to be a historical doxography. Ordinary activity here refers to the ethical choices we make under the influence of the understanding of emptiness, during our path practice as a Bodhisattva. (See Paths and Grounds of a Bodhisattva)

The distinction included both a technical component and a set of metaphysical implications. On one level, the disagreement centered around the role of 'prasaṅga' (consequence) in formal debate. While the Prāsaṅgika view holds it to be the only valid method of demonstrating emptiness of inherent existence, the Svātantrika felt that assertions about the nature of the ultimate were also necessary. The counter that when attempting to find the correct object of understanding - which is a mere absence or mere negation of impossible modes of existence - one should not use positivist statements about the nature of reality. Positing an essencelessness rather than merely negating inherent identity creates a subtle linguistic and analytic barrier to finding the correct understanding.

In the Lam Rim Chen Mo, Je Tsongkhapa writes extensively on the Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction, and addresses several modern viewpoints which are shown by Elizabeth Napper to be pertinent to recent scholarship.

Tsongkhapa's thesis is that "The opponents of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (a seminal text regarding the Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction) are both (a) the essentialists, who accept that things ultimately have intrinsic nature, and (b) the Svātantrikas, who refute that, but accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature."

- Lam Rim Chen Mo

However, from Ju Mipham's view, Tsongkhapa himself is considered to be a Svātantrika. Blankleder/Fletcher write: "The Gelugpa interpretation of Prāsangika has often been described by its critics as a form of Svātantrika in disguise, since its presentation of 'conventional,' as distinct from 'true,' existence seems very close to the 'existence according to characteristics' that Bhavya had ascribed to phenomena on the relative level."

This position is, however, also refuted conclusively in Lama Tsongkhapa's "Ocean of Reasoning." The Svātantrika posit that a unique, conventionally existing identity arises on the part of each individual phenomenon which makes that phenomenon a natural basis for the designation of a particular term or identity. The reject this idea given that, even if such a natural identity were findable with analysis (which it is not) such an identity cannot account for the various properties of identity and fails in a very similar way to inherent identity to provide an explanatory picture for our normal everyday experience.

For example, since a specific table has a unique conventionally arising characteristic of 'being that unique and specific object,' that unique characteristic does not provide the object with the natural identity of being the very general object "Table." That unique characteristic does not have an element to its natural identity which allows it to belong to the general class of objects. Since this is the case, it does not provide that object with a table identity or make it a natural base to be a table, in any way, shape, or form. This and many other arguments by the show that there are legitimate ontological differences between the two schools of thought. While they do have similarities, it is very clear that they are not a rose by any other name. The differences are as subtle as they are cogent, and extremely important in terms of Buddhist thought and practice.

Commentaries

 * The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment, Vol. 3 by Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
 * Lopez, Donald. A Study of Svatantrika.  Snow Lion Publications.  Ithaca, New York.  (1987)
 * della Santina, Peter. Madhyamaka Schools in India.  Motilal Banarsidass.  Delhi.  (1986)
 * Shantarakshita and Ju Mipham (2005) The Adornment of the Middle Way Padmakara Translation ISBN 1-59030-241-9