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October 29

Far from bringing the general consolidation expected, the decision taken by the HWP Central Committee on October 28 caused an avalanche. One reason was that the two sides put different interpretations on the situation and on the change in the HWP’s behaviour and policy. Imre Nagy wanted to strike a compromise with the rebels against the extremists. He would accept and fulfil the maximum demands that the Soviets could be brought to accept, in return for cooperation from the rebels against what seemed to be a real threat of counter-revolution. The rebels saw the change of stance by the party leadership as a partial victory that justified them in battling on to fulfil their complete programme.

The most urgent task in Imre Nagy’s eyes was to restore order as soon as possible. He knew that was the only way he and his policies could win Kremlin support, or at least tolerance. The proclaimed ceasefire had to be enforced. The revolutionaries had to be persuaded to lay down their arms and the workers to return to work, because these events would be seen as offsetting the concessions the party leadership was making. So the prime minister, as he moved into the government offices in Parliament on October 29, having given his name to the party leadership’s actions since October 23, tried to persuade his rebellious country to lay aside the two instruments with which it had succeeded: its arms and the strike.

The rebels remained wary of the prime minister and still more of the government. Their suspicions had been enhanced by several events since October 23 (the call for Soviet troops, the introduction of summary justice, the volleys fired on the rebels in several towns, etc.) The events happening at the time also gave them cause to be cautious.

Heavy battles were fought in Budapest on October 29 against the Soviet troops. This gave the revolutionaries the impression that the ceasefire proclaimed by Nagy did not apply to the Soviets, or that the prime minister could not guarantee the ceasefire, so that there was no sense in it. (Even on October 31, some important objects in Budapest such as the Interior and Defence ministries and the Soviet Embassy were still being guarded by Soviet armoured troops.) Fighting also continued in Kecskemét.

Bodies are collected during a lull in the fighting on October 28, 1956, on the corner of József körút and Pál utca (8th District) The uncertainty was exemplified by events in Ózd on October 29. The commanding officer of the town’s national guard had a nervous breakdown and started shooting wildly in his office. No one was injured, but a rumour spread through the town that the police and the already disbanded ÁVH were shooting on the rebels. A crowd rushing to defend those it thought were under attack lynched an investigator from the prosecutor’s office, a policeman and an ÁVH officer.

The uncertainty was coupled with incomprehension. Rebels all over the country could not see why they should back down at a time of victory, why they should lay down their arms and return to work. Arms and the strike had brought them their gains and seemed to be their chief hope of gaining more concessions.

The government statement of October 28 conceded several of the revolution’s demands, but not two of the main points formulated at the Budapest Technical University: free, multi-party elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. The rebels could not consider they had won a full victory unless these essential demands were granted as well. Their continued insistence on them after the 28th was not just a dogged pursuit of their full programme. Without a multi-party system and full Soviet withdrawal, there was no guarantee that the communist regime would not be restored. The government would have to accept these demands before the rebels laid down their arms or the workers called off their strike.

The government concentrated its efforts on October 29 on persuading the revolutionaries to lay down their arms in the light of the ceasefire. The negotiations were impeded by mutual suspicions and lack of a clear structure of command among the rebels. The leaders of the rebel groups could not always guarantee that terms they agreed to would be accepted by their members. Their relations with other groups were confined to occasional cooperation on a specific action. There was no rebel commander-in-chief, with whom the prime minister or his representative could treat. There were successive negotiations, at Parliament, the Defence Ministry and the Budapest police headquarters, where the rebels advanced successive demands. (Arms would only be handed over to Hungarian units after the Soviet army had left the country, provided the government guaranteed that units volunteering to join would be incorporated into the new security force, etc.) The rebel negotiating position was strengthened by support from the Kilián Barracks and their commander, Colonel Pál Maléter, who drew up six ceasefire conditions in conjunction with the rebels. The most insistent rebel demand was for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which Mikoyan and Suslov, representing the CPSU  Presidium in Hungary, warned against strongly. Having conceded this demand, it became impossible for Imre Nagy to justify his decision of October 28 to the Soviet leadership, which increased Moscow’s suspicions of the prime minister further.

Another serious challenge to the government was the October 29 programme of the Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Intelligentsia, founded the day before as an umbrella for several revolutionary organizations. While the turn of events on October 28 was welcomed, the committee’s proclamation said the policy outlined by the government did not go far enough. National reconciliation (order and consolidation) could only be reached by meeting the rebels’ main demands in full. In other words, there had to be a radical transformation that went beyond a reform of the existing system, while maintaining the system of socialist ownership. The question was not whether the party, having lost absolute power, should continue to hold power at all, but whether it should remain in sole office or be obliged to share power with the newly forming democratic parties.

Imre Nagy and János Kádár were aware by October 29 that the party they wished to keep in power had largely collapsed and disintegrated. Some of the central and local leaders and cadres were in hiding. Others, notably Ernõ Gerõ, had fled to the Soviet Union or placed themselves under the protection of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. Lower and middle-level party leaders found they could only remain political factors by creating a new leadership and programme, allying with and protected by the new revolutionary authorities  and legitimized by contributions to the revolution.

When Imre Nagy moved on October 29 from the Akadémia utca party centre to the Parliament building, central power effectively passed from the party leadership to the government. The HWP no longer had any real means of influencing events.

Notes and References
