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All data for 2 Nov. goes here These are Research Notes!

November 2–3

On November 2, the government nominated delegations to negotiate on the various issues at stake. The delegation appointed to implement the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was led by Géza Losonczy. Politicians and army representatives were to be accompanied to Warsaw by a workers’-council member, as a personal guarantee that the decision really came from the Hungarian people, with the support of the working class. The delegation to have accompanied Imre Nagy to the UN General Assembly consisted of Zoltán Tildy, Anna Kéthly and Béla Kovács. The delegation to discuss the troop withdrawals with the Soviets was to be headed by Ferenc Erdei and Pál Maléter.

Meanwhile Marshal Ivan Konev, commander-in-chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact arrived in Szolnok, which had been designated as the Hungarian headquarters of the Soviet army. He gave an immediate briefing and issued the order for an attack on November 4.

The country was not left to enjoy its temporary victory in peace. Amidst all the news of normalization, there were tense expectations and measures to avert a renewed attack. A succession of workers’ councils voted for a return to work on Monday, November 5. Indeed work was resumed on Saturday the 3rd in several places, so that production could resume on Monday at full capacity. Local branches of political parties sprang up all over the country. The revived parties of the 1945–7 coalition were the quickest to organize, but more than 20 other parties came into being, of which the Christian Democrats were the only one with realistic political prospects.

The revolutionary councils, in cooperation with the national-guard units and the army, began to organize and install defences against the threatened Soviet attack. Partial mobilization was ordered in several places. Soviet troops and roads into towns were kept under observation. Dressing stations were set up. The mood of the country was marked by relief at the victory and faith in a better future won at the price of bloodshed, but at the same time by anxiety over the Soviet menace.

The apparent ambiguity of the Soviet moves increased on November 3. On the one hand, Soviet troops, having surrounded the airfields, blocked off the larger cities and closed main roads and the Western frontier. On the other, negotiations began in Parliament on troop withdrawals. Based on the reports received from the army, the Hungarian leaders believed that the Soviet forces stationed and still arriving in Hungary were of unwarranted size compared with any expected Hungarian resistance. It could therefore be assumed that their real purpose was to offset the contingency of an attack by the West. This interpretation lent importance to an announcement by the Austrian ambassador that his government had formed a demilitarized zone along the Hungarian border, to prevent any movement of regular or irregular troops towards Hungary. At the negotiations in Parliament, both sides stated their points of view. Pál Maléter put the Hungarian government’s position according to instructions received from Imre Nagy. The Soviet units that had arrived since October 23 were to withdraw from the country by December 31. Negotiations would resume later on the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary earlier under the terms of the Warsaw Pact. It was agreed to continue the talks later the same day. The second round would be held at the Soviet base at Tököl.

November 3 also brought a cabinet reshuffle, to meet the demands of the revived political parties, which wanted to delegate representatives to replace the coalition politicians that Imre Nagy had invited. This brought into the government István B. Szabó of the Smallholders, István Bibó and Ferenc Farkas of the Peasants’ (Petõfi) Party, and József Fischer and Gyula Kelemen of the Social Democrats. The new defence minister was to be Pál Maléter, who was promoted to the rank of major general. Except for Ferenc Erdei, the other members of the government (János Kádár, Anna Kéthly, Béla Kovács, Géza Losonczy and Zoltán Tildy) remained in office.

Having strengthened order at home, Imre Nagy concentrated his energies on averting the threat from abroad. Apart from the government reshuffle, only one important measure was taken to consolidate the domestic situation, and even that had a foreign dimension. The prime minister turned to the Polish ambassador, requesting him to try to influence Cardinal Mindszenty, through the Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyñski. Nagy was concerned that Mindszenty should not to disturb the new social peace or raise new tensions with a radio broadcast that the cardinal planned to make in the evening.

The government had twin objectives at this time. One aim, through the international press, was to reassure the world, especially the Soviet Union, that there was no counter-revolution of any kind taking place in Hungary. The government was united behind the fundamental social changes that had occurred after 1945, such as land reform and nationalization, in other words behind a new order that was acceptable to Moscow. The other approach was to appeal to the Polish and Romanian diplomats to mediate, to try to prevent the Soviet Union from using armed force against Hungary.

It was fruitless. After the CPSU  Presidium had taken its decision on October 31, Khrushchev first obtained approval from Gomulka. Then he expressed his views of the Hungarian question to the party leaders of the less important satellite countries, in a short address delivered in Bucharest. Overnight on November 2–3, he had a secret meeting on the Adriatic island of Brioni with Tito, leader of the League of Yugoslav Communists. Tito placed no obstacles in the way of the planned Soviet intervention, as Khrushchev had feared he might do beforehand. He promised to neutralize Imre Nagy and his group when the moment came, by offering them refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest and persuading Nagy to resign. Finally, it was agreed at the talks with Tito that János Kádár would head the counter-government, not Ferenc Münnich, whom the Soviets would have preferred.

Kádár and his group arrived in Moscow on November 2, where they immediately took part in a meeting of the CPSU  Presidium. Kádár argued cautiously for a peaceful solution, favouring the retention of the present government and institutions. There are several possible explanations for this fact, which is curious indeed in the light of subsequent events. For one thing, Khrushchev was still absent, so that Kádár may not have realized how united the Presidium was in its decision. For another, Kádár had emphasized several times, even before the turn of events on October 28, what dangers would lie in defeating the revolution by force of arms, unless it were coupled with the most necessary political reforms. He saw clearly that simply to crush the revolutionaries with Soviet might would block subsequent political development: the military victory would rule out a real settlement that removed the causes of the crisis. The government that took over would simply be a Soviet puppet, which was a role that had few attractions for Kádár. Until Khrushchev returned, Kádár did not know what positions the heads of the other people’s democracies were taking, or whether others, besides the Soviets, would be taking part in the occupation. (Participation by Romania, which Bucharest offered, would have made the position of the new Hungarian government even more difficult for historical reasons: the intermittent conflicts and antagonism between the two countries, ever since the revolution of 1848.) He had no way of telling what stance the Yugoslavs and the Poles were taking, either. Finally, he was unclear about how far the Soviets wanted to go in restoring the old regime. He saw no guarantee that Rákosi and his supporters would not return to power, which would mean he had to wage a struggle on two fronts, against the reformers in the party and against the hard-liners. Since he would be facing the opposition of the whole country, his failure under those conditions would be certain.

Khrushchev, on his return to Moscow on November 3, hastened to reassure Kádár, who may also have been persuaded by further news he received from Hungary, such as the formation of a real coalition government. He received an undertaking from Khrushchev that Rákosi would not be allowed to return to Hungary, let alone re-enter the political scene. Khrushchev also gave an account of his talks with Gomulka and Tito. As a result, Kádár would have the support of the other reforming countries in the bloc. Kádár’s discussions with Khrushchev also made it clear that the Soviet decision was irrevocable. Kádár faced only two courses: to cooperate and remain in power, or to stick by the government, Imre Nagy and the Hungarian people and face the consequences. He chose the first alternative, although he made a faint gesture by stipulating, ‘This government should not be a puppet government.’ In fact there was no chance of it being anything else. The Soviets drew up the list of ministers. The government programme was composed in Russian, and Kádár, who did not speak the language, could not even help with the translation. To avoid any complications, the Soviets sent in politicians as well as soldiers. Kádár was accompanied back to Hungary by three members of the CPSU Presidium: Georgy Malenkov, Anastas Mikoyan and Leonid Brezhnev.

While Kádár and his Soviet staff were in Moscow, preparing to travel to Hungary after the decision had been reached, Cardinal Mindszenty was delivering a speech on Free Kossuth Radio. The head of the Catholic Church in Hungary did not come out against the Nagy government, but he described its members as ‘successors of the fallen regime’. He called for the return of the Catholic Church’s ‘institutions and societies’, but not of the landholdings confiscated in 1945. The speech was calmer than many people had expected. However, the emphases in it and the fact of a political declaration by the cardinal meant that the possibility of a new centre of power, opposed to the government, had emerged.

The whole country sensed the looming danger on November 3, but everyone was still hopeful. They trusted that the Soviets would refrain from opposing a Hungarian will that was so united. They trusted that the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops would not bring the predictable reaction from Moscow. After all, the Soviets had withdrawn from Finland and Austria, when they were offered requisite guarantees, and there had a reassuring start to the negotiations in Hungary. They trusted that any further Soviet aggression would be prevented and the country’s sovereignty and neutrality defended by the United Nations, of which Hungary had become a member less than a year before.

Hungary is admitted to the UN on December 14, 1955 Hopes were increased by a further improvement in domestic law and order on November 3. After the initiatives of November 2, most workers’ councils agreed to end the strike, in decisions that were often endorsed by representatives of the armed groups and the political parties. The end of the fighting and the nationwide resumption of work showed plainly that the government was in control again. Hungary was not in crisis and outside intervention was not required. In many places, a start was made to re-examining the cases of people arrested or placed in protective detention during the revolution. In some, the process was completed: those found innocent being released and the rest transferred to cells at police stations.

The country retired to bed on Saturday, November 3, hopeful of a peaceful Sunday after a tense week and a half. Meanwhile, during the evening and overnight, the final steps were being taken in Budapest and in the provinces to prepare and secure the Soviet attack on the next day. When a Romanian delegation arrived in Budapest, Imre Nagy and members of the HSWP Executive Committee tried to probe them about Soviet intentions and persuade them to mediate on behalf of maintaining peace. The Romanians, however, tried to draw out the negotiations, to keep Nagy occupied and reduce the government’s chances of acting and informing itself.

The Hungarian government delegation led by Ferenc Erdei and Pál Maléter arrived at the Soviet command in Tököl in the late evening. They had hardly begun their negotiations when Soviet security men armed with machine guns burst in, headed by General Ivan Serov, head of the KGB. They flouted international law and basic diplomatic norms by arresting the delegation and thereby (figuratively for the time being) disarming the Hungarian army on the eve of the attack.

Notes and References
