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Distribution of Social Services and Political Agenda
Hezbollah provides social services to a diversity of Lebanese citizens. Hezbollah’s social services focus primarily on Shiite Lebanese. However, Hezbollah also offers social services to Lebanese citizens outside of the Lebanese Shia community. Still, Hezbollah prioritizes servicing its committed party members. Hezbollah’s supporters can be divided into committed members and sympathizers. Hezbollah’s distribution of social services is aligned with the party’s political agenda. The change in Hezbollah’s distribution of social services policy from exclusively focusing on Shiite Lebanese to the inclusion of other sectarian portions of Lebanese society occurred after the end of the Lebanese civil war, specifically in the early 2000s.

Committed Party Members
Hezbollah offers expensive and long term social welfare to a small portion of their adherents who execute the parties’ venturesome quasi-state tasks, such as military action. Hezbollah’s social services original raison d’etre was catering to the needs of its most committed members, namely, its fighters. Hezbollah has been providing unconditional and unpublicized social and financial aid to the families of fighters since the early days of the party in 1982.

In comparison with the Amal movement, Hezbollah’s less dominant Shiite rival party, Hezbollah is more oriented towards serving its committed members. Nevertheless, both Hezbollah and the Amal Movement invest in social provision for other sectarian groups alongside Shiite Lebanese. While Hezbollah has more recently employed a strategy that links its distribution of welfare to election calculations, areas that are predominantly Shia and are potential recruiting grounds for militia men and activists, such as the southern suburbs of Beirut, gain extensive social welfare support. This is done despite their electoral insignificance.

Located in predominantly Shia areas, namely the southern suburbs of Beirut, South Lebanon, and the Bekaa, the Martyrs’ Institution and the Institution of the Wounded are quintessential examples of social service institutions dedicated to servicing committed party members, specifically the families of Hezbollah's fighters that are injured or killed in action. The Martyrs’ Institution aids families of killed fighters by supplying them with occupational opportunities, education, and health care. The Institution of the Wounded offers reparations and healthcare to fighters and civilians injured due to the military activities of Hezbollah.

Shiite Non-member Sympathizers

During the civil war period, the rivalry between the two parties compelled Hezbollah to emphatically direct its distribution of social services towards Lebanese Shiites in order to secure their loyalty. Hezbollah’s support from the Lebanese Shiite community has grown exponentially, in 2012, a poll by the Pew Research Center indicated that 94% of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah. (Haddad 22)

Hezbollah has managed to utilize the distribution of social services as an incentive to encourage Lebanese Shiite to express their support for the party through political activism. Lebanese Shiites take part in political demonstrations, among other activities, so that they can receive welfare benefits such as food and healthcare. The reception of social services is conditioned by their supportive initiative and enthusiasm, not by their socio-economic status or dedication to religious beliefs. In this way, Hezbollah has developed a Lebanese Shiite “resistance society,” in which members have the incentive to proactively support the party. Accordingly, Hezbollah carry out screenings of recipients of social services, in order to determine their eligibility depending on their political stances and actions vis a vis the party.

Provisions for Non-Shiite Lebanese (The Alliance with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement)
Hezbollah’s intention to participate in Lebanese governmental politics incentivized the expansion of its social services. Hezbollah underwent a process of “Lebanonization”, which entailed refraining from employing violent means domestically, and the dilution of their dogmatic beliefs and goals which go against accepting the sectarian pluralism of the Lebanese political institutional landscape. Specifically, Hezbollah reneged on its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. This process began in the late 1980s, and reached its zenith in the early 2000s. Correspondingly, the inclusion of non-Shiite Lebanese in Hezbollah’s social services facilitated the integration of Hezbollah into the Lebanese political system and augmented its legitimacy. According to a report from the Pew Research Center, Hezbollah has significant support from Lebanese Christians (31%), and modest support from Lebanese Sunnis (9%).

As part of its political integration process, in 2006, Hezbollah established an alliance with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement in Lebanon, named the Mar Mikhael Agreement. This was an effort to gain more votes. As a result, Hezbollah began accommodating Christians who support the Free Patriotic Movement through their social provisions. The distribution of social services for the Christian supporters of the Free Patriotic Movement exhibits the inextricable link between Hezbollah’s election strategy and social services. Particularly, Hezbollah began expanding its social provisions to non-Shiites in districts which were critical to the elections. Amsheet is a Christian village with a relatively weighty Shiite population, in which Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Organization operates. Hezbollah’s efforts, during the period of between 2005 and 2009, to expand their social services in Jbeil yielded positive results in the district for the party in the 2009 elections.

While there is a policy of Lebanese Shiite prioritization in Hezbollah’s social services institutions, most of the time non-Shiite Lebanese are accommodated. Third party NGOs confirm that Hezbollah’s healthcare institutions cater regularly to local Christians and Sunnis. Still, it is unequivocally apparent that Hezbollah's social services institutions are located in predominantly Shiite areas. Moreover, there have been instances where such institutions have rejected the requests of non-Shiites that are not local to the area and travel to areas with Hezbollah’s institutions to seek aid.